


EECS 575 FA21

Lecture 21

Proofs of knowledge

Announcements

- Hw6 due 11/22
- . Explaining absence

Recap from last time

- HVZK

An interactive proof system P, V
is HVZK for L if Input S
st. $\forall x \in L$

$$\text{View}_{\sqrt{\sum P(x) \leftrightarrow V(x)}} \approx_{\epsilon} S(x)$$

"View" includes prover's msg
Verifier's msg, and random coins
of verifier

"Full" zero-knowledge

An IP for lang L is fZK if \exists nonppt V*

\exists nonppt simulator S.t. $\forall x \in L$,

$$\text{view}_{V^*} [P(x) \leftrightarrow V^*(x)] \approx_{\epsilon} S(x)$$

Exercise: what are the differences b/w
this fZK and the previous HVZK?

Proof of Knowledge

- "Soundness" meaning

\exists witness s.t. statement is true

Identification protocols

Smart cards

Prove your identity to a verifier

Pub key / identity of X

priv key : X

Regular soundness doesn't guarantee
"knowledge" of X

POK of discrete logarithm

Let $G = \langle \bar{g} \rangle$, $\text{ord}(\bar{g}) = q$.

Public group element \bar{X} ,

Prover(\bar{X}, w):

$$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$


$$\bar{z} = \bar{g}^r$$


$$a = r + bw$$

Schnorr protocol

Fiat-Shamir

Sigma protocol





• Complete?

If $\bar{x} = g^{-w}$ then

$$\text{OK } g^a = g^{r+wb} = \bar{z} \cdot \bar{x}^b *$$

• Zero Knowledge?

Idea: come up with simulator $S^{V*}(x)$ that simulates view of or nppp $V*$

- Sample $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$; output \bar{g}^r
- \rightarrow sample random $b \in \{0, 1\}$; return b
- sample random $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, output either a' or r

Check: dist. of S^{V*} 's output is comp. ind. from real exec.

1 choose random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, random $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$

2 send $\bar{z} = g^a / \bar{x}^b$ to V^* , get back bit b^*

3 If $b^* = b$, output (\bar{z}, b, a) . Else "rewind" V^* and try again (got 1)

: PPK for discrete log :)

- Does a prover who convinces a verifier "know" the discrete log w of \bar{x} ?
→ Formulate new "proof of knowledge"

Auxiliary notion: NP relation.

$R \subseteq \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^*$ given by det. alg. $W(\cdot,\cdot)$,
runs in poly-time in first input length
 $R = \{(x,w) : W(x,w) \text{ accepts}\}$

Can get NP lang $L_R = \{x : \exists w \text{ s.t. } W(x,w) \text{ accepts}\}$

E.g. discrete log:

$R = \{\bar{x} \in \mathbb{G}, w \in \mathbb{Z}_q : \bar{g}^w = \bar{x}\}$

PoK for discrete log?

An IP(P, V) is a PoK ^{for R} with "Knowledge error" K if \exists oracle machine K (the "extractor") s.t

$\forall x \in LR_1 \supset \mathbb{R}^*$ s.t. $\Pr[\text{out}_V[K^* \leftrightarrow V(x)] = 1] = \frac{1}{x}$

every x
possibly
unbounded

$$\Pr[K^* \in R(x)] \geq \text{poly}(P_x^* - B)$$

↑
Efficient to
check

IPoK for discrete log

Theorem: The previous dlog protocol is a proof of Knowledge for the discrete log relation, with $H = \mathbb{Z}_2$.

Proof: Construct $K^{P^*}(\bar{x})$:

- Run \bar{P}^* , obtain $\bar{z} (= \bar{g}^r)$
- Send $b=0$ to P^* , get a_0
- Rewind \bar{P}^* , send $b=1$, get a_1
- output $a_1 - a_0$

$$\begin{aligned}a_1 &= r + w \\a_0 &= r + \alpha \cdot w \\a_1 - a_0 &= w\end{aligned}$$

To finish: Show that $P_1[K^{P^*} \in R(\bar{x})] \geq \text{poly}(\alpha)$

$K^{P^*}(\bar{x})$:

- Run P^* , obtain \bar{z} ($= \bar{g}'$)
- Send $b=0$ to P^* , get a_0
- Rewind P^* , send $b=1$, get a_1
- output $a_1 - a_0$

PK for discrete logarithm

Suppose

$$\Pr[\text{out}_V[P^* \leftrightarrow V] = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$$

Claim:

$$\Pr[K^{P^*}(\bar{x}) = w] = \Pr[a_0 \text{ and } a_1 \text{ correct}] \geq \frac{\alpha^3}{2} = \text{poly}(w)$$

Proof:

Define $P_{\bar{z}} = \Pr[R \text{ guesses } V(x) \mid P^*'s \text{ first message is } \bar{z}]$

Must have $\Pr_{\substack{\bar{z} \leftarrow P^*}}[P_{\bar{z}} > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}] \geq \alpha/2$

Define $P_{\bar{z},b} = \Pr_{\substack{\bar{z} \leftarrow P^*}}[P^* \text{ guesses } V(x) \mid P^*'s \text{ first msg is } \bar{z} \text{ and } V(x)'s b-th bit is } b]$

$P_{\bar{z}} = (P_{\bar{z},0} + P_{\bar{z},1})/2$, so $P_{\bar{z},0}$ and $P_{\bar{z},1}$ are $\geq \alpha$. $P_{\bar{z},0}$ and $P_{\bar{z},1}$ indep.

$\Pr[a_0 \text{ and } a_1 \text{ correct}] \geq \frac{\alpha^3}{2}$ \square