

#### GLOBUS TOOLKIT SECURITY

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#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Introduction (3-5)
- Grid Security Infrastructure (6-15)
  - Transport & Message-level security
  - Authentication
  - Authorization
  - Single sign-on and Delegation
- Configuration with Security Descriptors (16-21)
- Demo: Simple Client/Service Security (22-22)
- Security services (23-26)
  - Community Authorization Service
  - Passport Online CA & MyProxy
  - Delegation Service





#### WHAT IS A SECURE COMMUNICATION?

#### • Privacy:

• only the sender and the receiver should be able to understand the conversation.

#### • Integrity:

- the receiving end must be able to know *for sure* that the message he is receiving is exactly the one that the transmitting end sent him.
- Authentication (and Non-repudiation):
  - ensure that the parties involved in the communication are who they claim to be.
  - protected from malicious users who try to *impersonate* one of the parties in the secure conversation.
- Authorization vs. Authentication (Access control):
  - Accounting/auditing for policy compliance.
- Managing user credentials
- Administering access rights





#### GRID SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

- Authentication for User/Processes/Resources
- Appliance of local access control mechanisms
- Constraints:
  - Single sign-on & Delegation
  - Protection of credentials
  - Interoperability with local security solutions
  - Exportability (standard X.509v3)
  - Support for secure group communication
  - Support for multiple implementations





#### JAVA WS AUTH & AUTHZ

- Web Services use SOAP over HTTP for communicating messages.
- Implements the WS-Security standard and the WS-SecureConversation specification.
- Provided features are:
  - authentication of the sender.
  - encryption of the message.
  - integrity protection of the message.
  - replay attack protection.





#### GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

- Provides:
  - Transport-level and message-level security.
  - Authentication through X.509 digital certificates.
  - Several authorization schemes.
  - Credential delegation and single sign-on.
  - Different levels of security:
    - o container, service, resource and client.



# GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: TRANSPORT & MESSAGE-LEVEL SECURITY

- Transport-level security
  - Encrypts the **complete** communication.
- Message-level security
  - Encrypts only the **content** of the SOAP message.
- Both are based on public-key cryptography.
- o Can guarantee privacy, integrity, authentication.
- Security schemes (not mutually exclusive):
  - GSI Secure Message: message-level, WS-Security.
  - GSI Secure Conversation: message-level, WS-SecureConversation, secure context, credential delegation.
  - GSI Transport: transport-level, TLS(SSL).



GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE:  TRANSPORT & MESSAGE-LEVEL SECURITY					
	GSI Secure	GSI Secure			

	GSI Secure Message	GSI Secure Conversation	GSI Transport
Technology	WS-Security	WS- SecureConvers ation	TLS (SSL)
Privacy (Encrypted)	YES	YES	YES
Integrity (Signed)	YES	YES	YES
$Anonymous \\ authentication$	NO	YES	YES
Delegation	NO	YES	NO
Performance	Good if sending few messages	Good if sending many messages	Best





### GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: AUTHENTICATION

- GSI supports three authentication methods:
  - X.509 Certificates:
    - o provides strong authentication.
    - all three protection schemes support X.509 certificates.
  - Username and password:
    - o more limited form of authentication.
    - privacy, integrity and delegation features are not supported.
  - Anonymous authentication:
    - o unauthenticated communication.
    - when using more than one security scheme.
    - ex.: GSI Secure Conversation (with X.509 certificates) and anonymous GSI Transport escape redundant authentication.





# GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: BASIC AUTHENTICATION (HOW TO)

- Obtaining host certificates
  - Request a certificate from well-known CA.
  - Use SimpleCA:
    - \$GLOBUS\_LOCATION/setup/globus/setup-simple-ca.
    - \$GLOBUS\_LOCATION/setup/globus\_simple\_ca\_CA\_Hash\_setup/setup-gsi-defaul.
    - o grid-cert-request -host 'hostname'.
    - grid-ca-sign -in hostcert\_request.pem -out hostsigned.pem.
  - Use Globus's low-trust cert.: <a href="http://gcs.globus.org:8080/gcs">http://gcs.globus.org:8080/gcs</a>.
- Install host credentials in container
  - Should be located in /etc/grid-security/.
  - Container key should be only readable by 'globus' user.
- Verify basic security (creating local proxy certificate)
  - grid-proxy-init -verify –debug.





### GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: AUTHORIZATION


- Based on XACML authorization model
  - Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
    - intercepts the access requests from users and sends the requests to the PDP.
  - Policy Decision Point (PDP)
    - makes **access decisions** according to the security policy or policy set written by PAP.
    - **queries** the PIP for attributes of the subjects, the resource, and the environment.
    - the access decision is sent to the PEP.
  - Policy Information Point (PIP)
  - Policy Administration Point (PAP)
- A policy language
  - Policies organized hierarchically into PolicySets, Policies and Rules.
  - A rule is composed of a target, an effect and a condition.
  - A Policy consists of a target, one or more rules, and an optional set of obligations.







# GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: GT4 AUTHORIZATION FRAMEWORK







### GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: BUILT-IN AUTHORIZATION OPTIONS


- Server-side authorization PDPs at Container, Service or Resource level
  - None: no authorization is performed.
  - *Self*: client's identity should match server's identity.
  - *Gridmap*: a list of 'authorized' users (ACL).
  - *Identity authz*.: one user gridmap conf. programmatically.
  - *Host authz*.: client should provide a host credential.
  - SAML callout authz.: OGSA Authorization Service.
- Client-side authorization options
  - None: no authorization is performed.
  - Self: server's identity should mach client's identity.
  - *Identity authz*.: service should have specified identity.
  - *Host*: service should have a host credential and client should resolve address of the host.
- Custom authorization





### GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: SINGLE SIGN-ON AND DELEGATION

- A user should be able to initiate computations by authenticating only once.
- A computation may acquire resources, use resources, release resources, and communicate internally without further authentication of the user.
- Users should be able to delegate (restricted) rights to computational units (credential delegation).



• Public key based authentication – do not expose your private key.





# GRID SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE: X.509 PROXY CERTIFICATES

- A "proxy certificate" is a special type of X.509 certificate that is signed by the normal end entity cert (or by another proxy).
- Gives the owner of the proxy the right of *temporarily* acting on the original entity's behalf.
- The private key of a proxy may not be secured by a password (exposure is limited).
- Contains embedded restriction policies
  - Policy is evaluated by resource (upon proxy use).
  - Reduces rights available to the proxy to a subset of those held by the original entity.
- May be used in local environment or created remotely and signed by the original entity to support delegation.





# CONFIGURATION WITH SECURITY DESCRIPTORS: SETUP

- Configuring Container Security Descriptor
  - \$GLOBUS\_LOCATION/etc/globus\_wsrf\_core/server-config.wsdd.

- Configuring Service Security Descriptor
  - o in the service's deployment descriptor section as a parameter.

```
<service name="MyDummyService" provider="Handler" style="document">
    ...
    <parameter name="securityDescriptor" value="org/globus/wsrf/impl/security/descriptor/security-config.xml"/>
    ...
</service>
```





# CONFIGURATION WITH SECURITY DESCRIPTORS: SETUP

- Configuring Resource Security Descriptor
  - the object should be returned by getSecurityDescriptor method.

```
public MyDummyResource implements SecureResource {
    private ResourceSecurityDescriptor desc = null;

    public MyDummyResource() {
        this.desc = new ResourceSecurityDescriptor("/path/to/security/file");
        this.desc.initialize();
}

public ResourceSecurityDescriptor getSecurityDescriptor() {
        return this.desc;
    }
}
```

- Configuring Client Security Descriptor
  - o directly on the stub.

```
// Client security descriptor file
String CLIENT_DESC = "org/globus/wsrf/samples/counter/client/client-security-config.xml";
//Set descriptor on Stub
((Stub)port)._setProperty(Constants.CLIENT_DESCRIPTOR_FILE, CLIENT_DESC);
```





# CONFIGURATION WITH SECURITY DESCRIPTORS: COMMUNICATION

- Valid only for Service and Client Security Descriptors.
- <auth-method>
  - o <none/>: (server only) No authentication is performed.
  - <GSISecureMessage>
    - o ction-level>
      - <integrity/>: the message must be integrity-protected (signed).
      - <privacy/>: the message must be privacy-protected (encrypted and signed).
  - o <GSISecureConversation>
    - o ction-level>
      - <integrity/>: the message must be integrity-protected (signed).

      - <anonymous/>: (client only) Server is accessed as anonymous.
      - <delegation value="full/limited"/>: (client only) Type of delegation to be done.
      - <context-lifetime/>: (client only) the lifetime of the context established.
  - o <GSITransport>
    - o ction-level>
      - <integrity/>: the message must be integrity-protected (signed).

      - <anonymous/>: (client only) Server is accessed as anonymous.





### CONFIGURATION WITH SECURITY DESCRIPTORS: CREDENTIALS

- Valid for Container, Service, Resource and Client Security Descriptors
- The credentials can be set using either:
  - the path to a proxy file.

```
...
cproxy-file value="proxyFile"/>
...
```

• the path to a certificate and key file.





# CONFIGURATION WITH SECURITY DESCRIPTORS: AUTHORIZATION

• Server-side configuration:

- Client-side configuration:
  - Identity authorization is done using the value as the identity.

```
<authz value="self"/>
...
```





# CONFIGURATION WITH SECURITY DESCRIPTORS: OTHER

- Server-side configuration:
  - Reject Limited Proxy if clients that present limited proxies can be allowed to authenticate successfully.
  - Replay attack prevention messages outside of this time window will be rejected automatically, inside checked by UUID.
  - Context lifetime lifetime of security context (GSI Secure Conv.).
  - Default gridmap (resource level).
  - Run-as mode (service level): credentials your service should use for the operation being invoked:
    - <run-as value="caller"/>.
    - o <run-as value="service"/>.
    - o <run-as value="resource"/>.
    - o <run-as value="system"/>.
  - Authentication and run-as per-method (service level).
  - Context Timer Interval (container level) (GSI Secure Conversation).
  - Replay Timer Interval (container level) (GSI Secure Message).
- Client-side configuration:
  - Username/Password <usernameType> element.





#### DEMO: SIMPLE CLIENT/SERVICE SECURITY

- Changes in MathService's source code
  - Only logging security information.
  - Logging the invoked method, identity of the caller, invocation subject, service subject and system subject.
- Using simple service security configuration
  - Requiring private GSI Secure Conversation in service SD.
  - No authorization (with "none" PDP interceptor).
- Shorthand client-side source code configuration (no SD)

```
((Stub)math)._setProperty(Constants.GSI_SEC_CONV,Constants.ENCRYPTION);
((Stub)math)._setProperty(Constants.AUTHORIZATION,NoAuthorization.getInstance());
```

- 1. Using GSI Secure Conversation with Encryption.
- 2. No client side authorization.





#### SECURITY SERVICES: COMMUNITY AUTHORIZATION SERVICE

- Q: How does a large community grant its users access to a large set of resources?
  - Should minimize burden on both the users and resource providers.
- Community Authorization Service (CAS)
  - Community negotiates access to resources.
  - Resource outsources fine-grain authorization to CAS.
  - Resource only knows about "CAS user" credential.
    - CAS handles user registration, group membership...
  - User who wants access to resource asks CAS for a capability credential.
    - Restricted proxy of the "CAS user" cred., checked by resource.






#### International School for Informatics

#### SECURITY SERVICES:

#### COMMUNITY AUTHORIZATION PROTOTYPE





# SECURITY SERVICES: PASSPORT ONLINE CA & MYPROXY

- Requiring users to manage their own certs and keys is annoying and error prone.
- A solution: Leverage Passport global authentication to obtain a proxy credential.
  - Online credential repository.
  - Creates and issues new (restricted) proxy cert. to the user on demand (myproxy-init, myproxy-logon).
  - Store X.509 proxy credentials in the MyProxy repository, protected by a passphrase, for later retrieval over the network.
  - Users can store and retrieve multiple X.509 end-entity credentials (myproxy-store, myproxy-retrieve.
  - Eliminates the need for copying private keys and certificate files.





### SECURITY SERVICES: DELEGATION SERVICE

- Provides an interface for the delegation and renewal of credentials to a hosting environment.
- Allows for a single delegated credential to be reused across multiple service invocations.
- Improved online credential repositories.
- o globus-credential-delegate delegation client.
- <u>globus-credential-refresh</u> delegation refresh client.
- o globus-delegation-client C delegation client.
- wsrf-destroy destroys a resource.
- <u>wsrf-query</u> performs query on a resource property document.

