Uni IT Security Notes

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Basics

Security Mindset

- Focus on weaknesses, not on features
- Don't rely on the "good case"
- Anticipate what an attacker could do to a system
- Weight security against user experience and privacy

Security Objectives

- **Confidentiality**/`conf`
  - Nobody but the legitimate receiver can read a message
  - Third party cannot gain access to communication patterns
- **Integrity**/`int`: The contents of communication can't be changed
- **Authenticity**/`authN`
  - **Entity Authentication**: Communication partners can prove their respective identity to one another
  - **Message Authentication**: It can be verified that a message is authentic (unaltered and sent by the correct entity)
- **Authorization**/`authZ`
  - Service or information is only available to those who have correct access rights
  - Depends on authentication being set up

- **Non-Repudiation**/`nRep`: A sender cannot deny having sent a message or used a service
- **Availability**/`avail`: Service is available with sufficient performance
- **Access Control**/`ac`: Access to services and information is controlled
- **Privacy**/`priv`
  - Restricted access to identity-related data
  - Anonymity
  - Pseudonymity

Attacks, Threats and Vulnerabilities

- **Attacker**: A person who has the skill and motivation to carry out an attack: The steps needed to carry out an attack
- **Vulnerability**: Some characteristics of the target that can result in a security breach
- **Threat**: Combination of an attacker, an attack vector and a vulnerability
- **Attack**: A threat that has been realized and has caused a security breach

Threat Identification

- Define **system boundaries**: What is part of your system, what is not?
- Define **security objectives**: What is important for your system to be secure?
- **List all threats** you can think of: Brainstorming and discussion with experts
- Use **conventions**:
  - Similar threat models
  - Requirement specifications
  - How to break or circumvent the specifications
  - Note security assumptions of the system
  - Be careful with perimeter security: What if perimeter has been breached?
  - Note *possible*, but not yet exploitable vulnerabilities

Security Frameworks

Network Specific Threat Examples

- Remote Attacks
- Eavesdropping: Sniffing of information
- Altering information
- Spoofing
- DoS
- Session hijacking
- Viruses attacking clients
- Spam
- Phishing

- Data trails/privacy leaks

STRIDE: Attacks on a Multi-User System

- **S**poofing of Identity
- **T**ampering with Information
- **R**epudiation
- **I**nformation Disclosure
- **D**oS
- **E**scalation of Privileges

Security policies

- Classification of system states into “allowed” and “forbidden” states
- Secure system: Is only in allowed states
- Breached system: Is in forbidden state

Malware

- Performs unwanted functions
- Often runs without user’s consent
- Telemetry (often hidden in proprietary software behind EULAs)
- Backdoors

Networking

TCP Overview

- Characteristics
  - Reliable
  - Connection-Oriented
  - Full-Duplex
  - Layer atop IP
  - Connection management: Setup, Release and Abort
  - Ordered delivery (package sequence control)
  - Repetition of lost packets
  - End-to-End ACKs
  - Checksum in header
- Identified by a 5-tuple
  - Source IP
  - Destination IP
  - Transport Protocol
  - Source Port
  - Destination Port

TCP Connection Establishment

- Virtual connection between two systems
- 3-Way-Handshake with connection states

An example connection from the client to the server:

```
<Client>                                           <Server>

[Closed]                                           [Closed]
                 SEQ=x     CTL=SYN             =>
[SYN Sent]
             <=  SEQ=y     CTL=SYN+ACK   ACK=x+1
                                                   [SYN Received]
                 SEQ=x+1   CTL=ACK       ACK=y+1 =>
[Established]                                      [Established]
```

IP Security Issues

- IP header doesn't have confidentiality or integrity protection
  - Faking the sender address is easy to do
  - Traffic can be analyzed by sniffing packet headers
- IP payload doesn't have confidentiality or integrity protection
  - Eavesdropping is possible by sniffing packets
- Loose coupling with lower layers:
  - Easy to divert traffic
  - Availability can be easily attacked
  - Confidentiality and integrity can't be guaranteed
- Unprotected error signaling via ICMP: Fake error messages can affect availability
- DNS is insecure; i.e. DNS spoofing

TCP Security Issues

- TCP header doesn't have confidentiality or integrity protection
- Session hijacking
  - When sniffing session details, attacker can impersonate a peer in a TCP connection
  - Attackers can guess session details and attack remotely using spoofed IP addresses
- RST attack: Attackers can reset/abort attacks by injecting packets with the RST flag
- Port scanning
  - Find out open ports
  - Determine software running on port
- SYN flooding
  - Overload system resources by initializing many connections and not pursuing them

Port Scanning

- Objective: **Collect information**
  - Installed services
  - Software versions
  - OS
  - Firewall
- Enumeration based on port
  - Well-known ports (i.e. SSH $\rightarrow$ 22)
  - Invalid connection requests: Different way of error handling can be used to fingerprint the OS
- Possible scanning methods
  - TCP connect scan
  - Half-open scan
  - SYN-ACK scan
  - ACK scan

TCP Protection Mechanisms

- SYN flood protection
  - Limit rate of SYN packets
  - SYN cookies (RFC 4987)
    * Limit resources
    * Half-open connections are not stored in the connection table but instead as a hash in the ISN
    * Only if the 3rd ACK handshake packet matches the sequence number, the connection is added to the connection table
    * Server does not need to maintain any state information on half-open connections: Resources can't be exhausted
- Connections are only accepted if the sequence numbers are within a certain range of acceptable values (attackers would have to sniff sequence numbers or guess them)

Session Hijacking

- Attacker takes over existing connection between two peers
- Requirement: Attacker has to sniff or guess sequence numbers of the connection correctly

RST Attacks (In-Connection DoS)

Inject packet with RST flag into ongoing connection: Connection has to be aborted immediately

Blind IP Spoofing

Firewall is configured to only allow one source IP address and destination IP address (A $\rightarrow$ B).

To circumvent this restriction:

1. Attackers starts DoS attack on A to prevent A from sending RST packets to B
2. Attacker sends TCP connection setup packet with A's source IP address to B
3. B sends SYN+ACK packet to A, but can't respond due to DoS
4. Attacker sends TCP connection ACK packet to B with ACK matching the initial sequence number chosen by B (which has to be guessed, as B sent the SYN+ACK packet to A, not the attacker)

Only works if B uses a predicable algorithm for it's ISN and packet filters aren't in place.

Perimeter Defense in Pratice

Architecture Recommendations

- Known from medieval cities, castles etc.
- Definition of system boundary between "inside" and "outside"
- Different threat models for inside and outside
  - **Inside**: Trusted
  - **Outside**: Untrusted
- Objectives
  - Create said boundary
  - Only a defined set of communication relations is allowed
  - Special security checks
  - Limited number of interconnection points
  - Simpler to manage and audit than a completely open architecture
- Problems
  - Requires intelligent selection of system boundaries
  - May require multiple levels of perimeters
  - No system/user in the "trusted inside" can truly be trusted

Application in Networking

- Installing security devices at the network border
- Seperation of network areas into inside/outside
- Prevent sensistive information from being sent to the outside (view the system in the inside as the potential, probably unintentional attacker)
- Multiple levels can increase security
- But: Perimeter security is not sufficient on its own!

    - The will probably be additional non-secured paths into the network (i.e. `ssh -R`)
    - Some malicious traffic might look like "normal" traffic and can pass

Stateless Packet Filter

- Access Control List (ACL): Applies set of rules to each incoming packets
- Discards (denies, blocks) or forwards (allows, permits) packets based on ACL
- Typically configured by IP and TCP/UDP header fields
- Stateless inspection: Established connections can only be detected with the ACK control flag
- Can be easy to misconfigure by forgetting essential protocols
    - DNS
    - ICMP
- Advantages
    - Fast/High throughput
    - Simple to realize
    - Software-based, can be added as a package
    - Simple to configure
- Disadvantages
    - Inflexible
    - Many attacks can only be detected using stateful filtering
    - Rules and their priorities can easily get confusing
- Default discard policy
    - Block everything which is not explicitly allowed (allowlist)
    - Issue: The security policy has to be revised for each new protocol or service
    - This rule must come last/have the lowest priority, behind all "allowing" rules

Stateful Packet Filters

- Store connection states
- Can make decisions based on
    - TCP connections
    - UDP replies to previous outgoing packet with same IP:Port relation ("UDP Connection")
    - Application protocol states
- Similar to application layer gates/proxy firewalls, but less intruding in communication
- Rules can be more specific than in stateless packet filters
- Rules are easier to enforce, i.e. incoming TCP packets don't have to be allowed in because they have ACK set

Stateful Firewalls

- Tries to fix the problems of stateless inspection
  - To many packets have to be allowed by default (ACK → No SYN-scanning protection)
  - Protocols like FTP or SIP, which dynamically allocate port numbers, can't be filtered securely
- Create state per TCP or UDP flow
  - Source and Destination IP:Port
  - Protocol
  - Connection state
- A packet which is not associated with a state is dropped immediately
- Packets which belong to a previously established TCP/UDP "connection" are allowed to pass without further checks
- State tables have to be cleaned up periodically to prevent resource starvation

Application Layer Proxies

- Protected host during connection establishment
- Different kinds
  - Application level
  - Circuit level
  - Forward proxy (client-side)
  - Reverse proxy (server-side)

Application Level Gateways

- Conversion between different application layer protocols
- Evaluation up to OSI layer 7
  - Protocol verification
  - Authentication
  - Malware scanning
  - Spam filtering
  - Attack pattern filtering
- Advantage: Security policies can be enforced at application level
- Disadvantage: Computing and memory performance requirements

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

- **Outside world**: Global Internet
- **Outside router**: Routes packet to and from bastion host
- **Bastian host**: Proxy server and relay host
- **Inside router**: Routes packets only to and from bastion host
- **Inside (protected)**: Intranet

The DMZ creates 2/3 lines of defense by the use of a stub network.

Multi-Level DMZs can create even more secure perimeter defenses:

Global Internet → Access Router and Packet Filter → Public Services Host (offers i.e. public Web services) → Screening Router and Packet filter (prevents IP spoofing) → Mail host (for external mail communication) → Bastion host (i.e. proxy for FTP and Web access) → Intranet

Web Application Firewalls (WAFs)

- Acts on the application layer
- Is a reverse prxoy
- Can protect the web server from "evil" client input
  - Cross-Site scripting
  - SQL injection: Filters out JS or SQL commands in client input by removing special symbols (i.e. `<`, `'` etc)
  - Cookie poisoning: Stores the hash values of sent cookies
  - HTML manipulation: Encypts URL parameters

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

- Security product that is specialized on detecting anomalies during live operation of networks and computers
  - Virus/Botnet activity
  - Suspicious network activity (malware phoning home)
- Basic Approaches
  - **Signature based**: Use attack signatures/known malicious communication activity patterns
  - **Anomaly based**: Significant deviation from previously recorded baseline activity
  - **Rule based**: Define allowed by behaviour by app-specific set of legitimate actions
- Actions
  - Send ut alarm
  - Logging
  - Blocking of known patters
- Realization
  - Appliance
  - Integration in firewall
  - Integration into host

Encryption

Symmetric Encryption

Alice:

1. Creates message
2. Chooses key

3. Computes cyphertext
4. Send cyphertext to Bob

Eve (Attacker):

1. Copies cyphertext
2. Tries to guess the key

Bob:

1. Receives cyphertext
2. Uses key
3. Computes plaintext
4. Reads message

Kerckhoffs' Principle

- From "La Cryptographie Militaire"
- Most important point: **The security of a crypto system must lie in the non-disclosure of the key but not in the non-disclosure of the algorithm**
- Implementation
  - Keep secret which function you used for encryption
  - But a disclosure of the set of functions should not create a problem

Strong Algorithms

- There is no attack that can break it with less effort than a brute force attack ("complete enumeration")
- There are so many keys that a complete search of key space is infeasable

Crypto Attack Classes

- **Active** attacks
  - Most relevant for cryptographic protocols
  - Active interference (modification, insertion or deletion of messages)
  - Man in the middle (MITM) can receive messages and modify them on the way to the receiver
- **Passive** attacks: Pure eavesdropping, without interference with communication

Perfect Security

Cyphertext does not give any information you don't already have about the plaintext

One-Time-Pad

- **Vernam Cypher**: Create ciphertext by XOR addition of secret key and plaintext
- **Mauborgne**: Random key, never re-use key (“one time”)
- **Shannon**: OTP is unbreakable if key is ...
  - Truly random
  - As large
  - Never reused
  - Kept secret

Stream Ciphers

Encryption like one-time-pad, but using pseudo-random bits instead of true random (using a **Crytographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG)**)

Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generators (CSPRNG)

A CSPRNG must ...

- Be unpredictable
- Be computationally infeasible to compute the next outputs

... when the initial state of the CSPRNG is not known

Design Principles for Block Ciphers

Two methods for frustrating a statistical analysis:

- **Confusion**: The ciphertext should depend on the plaintext in such a complicated way that an attacker cannot gain any information from the ciphertext (redundancy should not be visible anymore in the ciphertext)
- **Diffusion**: Each plaintext and key bit should influence as many ciphertext bits as possible
  - Changing one bit in plaintext → Many pseudo-random changes in cyphertext
  - Changing one bit in the key → Many pseudo-random changes in cyphertext

Feistel Networks

- Described by Horst Feistel
- Algorithm
  - Plaintext block B is divided in 2 halves
  - Derive r round key keys from key
  - Feed one half through round function F
  - Then XOR the result with the other half

    - Exchange halves
- Repeat r times

DES (Tripple DES)

- Single DES breakable in less than 24h (complete search of key space)
- Tripple DES is still secure
- Three steps of DES on each data block using up to three keys
- Decryption in reverse sequence
- 3 independend keys are the most secure
- Three same keys can be used for (insecure) DES compatibility

AES Key Features

- FIPS standard 197
- Key length: 128/192/256 bit
- Block size: 128 bit
- Iterative rounds of substitutions and permutation, but no Feistel structure
- 10, 12 or 14 rounds
- Blocks of 16 bytes arranged in 4x4 state matrix
- Components of the round function are invertible and independent of key
    - **Substitute Bytes**: Non-linear substitution of bytes in state
    - **Shift Rows**: Cyclic shifting of rows
    - **Min Columns**: Multiplication of state elements with a fixed 4x4 matrix M

Modes of Operation for Block Ciphers

- Objective: Encrypt multiple plaintext blocks with the same block cipher
- Straightforward solution: blockwise encryption ("Electronic Codebook Mode")
- Problem: Patterns in the distribution of plaintext blocks remain visible

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- Avoids telltale patterns in ciphertext
- Decryption fails if a data block is missing or corrupted
- Each data block is encrypted in relation to the previous block

Counter Mode (CTR)

- Simple and efficient
- Random access still possible
- No issues if data block is missing
- Incrementing counter is involved in randomization per data block

Padding

- Plaintext needs to be a full number of blocks
- If plaintext does not fill the last block completely, it must be padded before encryption
  - In order to facilitate safe decryption, the last block is always padded: For example for a block size of n bytes, there are 1...n bytes added to the plaintext before encryption
  - Decryption can check last bytes and strip them off correspondingly
- Always need to pad with at least one byte!
- Common methods
  - Pad with bytes of the same value as the number of padding bytes (PKCS#5; i.e. if there are three bytes to be padded, add `0x03 0x03 0x03`)
  - Pad with `0x80` followed by `0x00` bytes
  - Pad with zeroes except for the last byte that indicates the number of padding bytes
  - Pad with zeroes
  - Pad with space characters (`0x20`)

Key Length Considerations

- Cryptography is always a matter of complexity
  - With enough time and/or space, all schemes can theoretically be broken
  - "brute force" attacks
  - Example: 56bit keys DES can be broken in <24h since 1999
- Meanwhile
  - 128bit keys have to be replaced in the coming years
  - 192bit keys are secure in medium term
  - 256bit keys are hard to crack due to physical boundaries
- Quantum computers might be able to crack keys much more quickly
- Numbers refer to unbroken algorithms in symmetric cryptography
  - Broken algorithm is one where an n bit key can be determined trying out significantly less than 2^n keys