

# Abductive Reasoning in Intuitionistic Propositional Logic via Theorem Synthesis

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# Overview

- we synthesize minimal assumptions under which a given formula in Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (**IL**) becomes a theorem
- our tool: a compact Prolog-based **IL** theorem prover
- $\Rightarrow$  an abductive reasoning mechanism for **IL**
- a generalization of abduction: we synthesize sequent premises using a set of canonical formulas covering via a reduction mechanism arbitrary **IL** formulas
- the paper is a self-contained literate Prolog program, with code at: <https://github.com/ptarau/TypesAndProofs/blob/master/isynt.pro>.

# The Truth Tables of Classical Logic (**CL**)

- given a formula  $F$  in **CL**, each row in a formula's truth table describes a conjunction of literals  $C$
- as an example, let us consider the **CL** formula  
$$F = (A \vee B) \ \& \ (B \vee C) \ \& \ (C \vee A).$$

$A \ B \ C : \ F$

$[0, 0, 0] \rightarrow 0$

$[0, 0, 1] \rightarrow 0$

$[0, 1, 0] \rightarrow 0$

$[0, 1, 1] \rightarrow 1$

$[1, 0, 0] \rightarrow 0$

$[1, 0, 1] \rightarrow 1 \quad \leftarrow \text{selected row}$

$[1, 1, 0] \rightarrow 1$

$[1, 1, 1] \rightarrow 1$

$A \ B \ C : \ G \rightarrow F$

$[0, 0, 0] \rightarrow 1$

$[0, 0, 1] \rightarrow 1$

$[0, 1, 0] \rightarrow 1$

$[0, 1, 1] \rightarrow 1$

$[1, 0, 0] \rightarrow 1$

$[1, 0, 1] \rightarrow 1$

$[1, 1, 0] \rightarrow 1$

$[1, 1, 1] \rightarrow 1$

- select a row, say  $[1,0,1] \rightarrow 1$  and interpret it as  $G = A \ \& \ \sim B \ \& \ C$
- reading the truth table as a disjunctive normal form, it immediately follows that  $C \rightarrow F$  is a tautology
- the truth table of the resulting tautology  $G \rightarrow F$  is shown in the right column.

# The Envy for the Classics: Can we replicate this in **IL**?

- contrary to **CL** and intermediate logic, in **IL** we have:
  - *no finite truth-tables*, no inter-definability of logical connectives
  - no rule of excluded middle
  - only a concept of *tautology* and *contradiction*
- $\Rightarrow$  in **IL** we need to find assumptions that would make the formula a theorem
- such assumptions include conjunctions of literals, mimicking the truth tables of **CL**, but it also makes sense to extend them to more expressive subsets of formulas
- given a formula in **IL**, we will need a search process for finding assumptions that would make it a theorem
- however, we would like our assumptions to be minimal with respect to the partial order relation governing the logic: *intuitionistic implication*

# An Inspiration Source: Abductive Logic Programming

- Abductive **LP**: facts designated as *abducibles* are filtered with integrity constraints to provide relevant assumptions needed for the success of a goal  $G$  w.r.t. a given program  $P$
- in the context of **IL**, our abductive reasoning algorithm will rely on finding *minimal assumptions under which a formula becomes a theorem*
- in the absence of a convenient automated semantic method like truth tables or SAT solvers in **CL**, we will need a theorem prover, ideally derived directly from the rules of a *terminating* sequent calculus

# Roy Dyckhoff's **G4ip** sequent calculus

termination ensured with “multiset ordering”, no loop checking is needed!

$$\Gamma, p \Rightarrow p \quad Ax \quad (p \text{ an atom})$$

$$\Gamma, \perp \Rightarrow \Delta \quad L\perp$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \phi \quad \Gamma \Rightarrow \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \phi \wedge \psi} R\wedge$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, \phi, \psi \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, \phi \wedge \psi \Rightarrow \Delta} L\wedge$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \phi_i}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \phi_0 \vee \phi_1} R\vee \quad (i = 0, 1)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, \phi \Rightarrow \Delta \quad \Gamma, \psi \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, \phi \vee \psi \Rightarrow \Delta} L\vee$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, \phi \Rightarrow \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \phi \rightarrow \psi} R\rightarrow$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, p, \phi \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, p, p \rightarrow \phi \Rightarrow \Delta} Lp\rightarrow \quad (p \text{ an atom})$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, \phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \gamma) \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, \phi \wedge \psi \rightarrow \gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} L\wedge\rightarrow$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, \phi \rightarrow \gamma, \psi \rightarrow \gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, \phi \vee \psi \rightarrow \gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} L\vee\rightarrow$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, \psi \rightarrow \gamma \Rightarrow \phi \rightarrow \psi \quad \gamma, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} L\rightarrow\rightarrow$$

# The Theorem Prover for **IL**

- we derive the prover directly from Roy Dyckhoff's G4ip calculus

```
iprover(true,_) :-!.
iprover(A,Vs):-memberchk(A,Vs),!.
iprover(_,Vs):-memberchk(false,Vs),!.
iprover(~A,Vs):-!,iprover(false,[A/Vs]).
iprover(A<->B,Vs):-!,iprover(B,[A/Vs]),iprover(A,[B/Vs]).
iprover((A->B),Vs):-!,iprover(B,[A/Vs]).
iprover((B<-A),Vs):-!,iprover(B,[A/Vs]).
iprover(A & B,Vs):-!,iprover(A,Vs),iprover(B,Vs).
iprover(G,Vs1):- % atomic or disj or false
    select(Red,Vs1,Vs2),
    iprover_reduce(Red,G,Vs2,Vs3),
    !,
    iprover(G,Vs3).
iprover(A v B, Vs):-(iprover(A,Vs) ; iprover(B,Vs)),!.
```

# The Prover, continued

- we delegate details to helper predicates: `iprover_reduce/4` and `iprover_impl/4`.

```
iprover_reduce(true,_,Vs1,Vs2):-!,iprover_impl(false,false,Vs1,Vs2).
iprover_reduce(~A,_,Vs1,Vs2):-!,iprover_impl(A,false,Vs1,Vs2).
iprover_reduce((A->B),_,Vs1,Vs2):-!,iprover_impl(A,B,Vs1,Vs2).
iprover_reduce((B<-A),_,Vs1,Vs2):-!,iprover_impl(A,B,Vs1,Vs2).
iprover_reduce((A & B),_,Vs,[A,B|Vs]):-!.
iprover_reduce((A<->B),_,Vs,[ (A->B), (B->A) |Vs]):-!.
iprover_reduce((A v B),G,Vs,[B|Vs]):-iprover(G,[A|Vs]).
```

```
iprover_impl(true,B,Vs,[B|Vs]):-!.
iprover_impl(~C,B,Vs,[B|Vs]):-!,iprover((C->false),Vs).
iprover_impl((C->D),B,Vs,[B|Vs]):-!,iprover((C->D),[(D->B)|Vs]).
iprover_impl((D<-C),B,Vs,[B|Vs]):-!,iprover((C->D),[(D->B)|Vs]).
iprover_impl((C & D),B,Vs,[ (C->(D->B)) |Vs]):-!.
iprover_impl((C v D),B,Vs,[ (C->B), (D->B) |Vs]):-!.
iprover_impl((C<->D),B,Vs,[ ( (C->D) -> ( (D->C) ->B ) ) |Vs]):-!.
iprover_impl(A,B,Vs,[B|Vs]):-memberchk(A,Vs).
```

- Classical Logic “for free”, via Glivenko’s theorem:

```
cprover(T):-iprover(~ ~T).
```



# Abductive Reasoning Mechanisms

- defining some of the atoms occurring in a formula  $F$  as the only ones to be used in the search process brings us to declare them as *abducibles*
- Protasis generation*: assume of a subset of abducibles and their negations

```
any_protasis(Prover,AggregatorOp,WithNeg,Abducibles,Formula,Assumption):-  
    abducibles_of(Formula,Abducibles),  
    mark_hypos(WithNeg,Abducibles,Literals),  
    subset_of(Literals,Hypos),  
    join_with(AggregatorOp,Hypos,Assumption),  
     $\vdash$  (call(Prover,Assumption->>false)), % we do not assume contradictions !  
    call(Prover,Assumption->Formula). % we ensure this is a theorem
```

- an AggregatorOp that mimics Truth Tables, is conjunction “&”

# Finding the Weakest Protasis

- a *partial order* in **IL** is defined by the intuitionistic implication “ $\rightarrow$ ”
- it is a total order in **CL** where  $(p \rightarrow q) \vee (q \rightarrow p)$  is a theorem
- for Peirce’s law  $((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$  (a theorem in **CL**), we obtain a weakest protasis:  $p \vee \sim p$  which would indeed turn **IL** into **CL**
- the *logic of here-and-there* is derived from **IL** by adding the axiom  $f \vee (f \rightarrow g) \vee \sim g$
- the weakest protasis indicates that the excluded middle rule would need to hold for  $f$  or for  $g$ :

```
?- weakest_protasis(iprover, (v), yes,   , (f v (f->g) v ~g), P) .  
P = f v ~f v g v ~g.
```

# An Example of Intuitionistic Abductive Reasoning

- explaining with a Prover, by setting Integrity Constraints:

```
explain_with(Prover,Abducibles,Prog,IC,G,Expl):-  
    any_protasis(Prover,(&),yes,Abducibles,(Prog->G), Expl),  
    call(Prover, Expl & Prog->G),    % ensure it we explain the goal  
    call(Prover,(Expl & Prog->IC)), % ensure the integrity constraints hold  
     $\vdash$  (call(Prover,(Expl & Prog -> false))). % Expl are consistent with Prog
```

- the program:

```
why_wet(Prover):-  
    IC = ~(rained & sunny),  
    P = sunny & (rained v sprinkler -> wet), As=[sprinkler,rained], G = wet,  
    writeln(prog=P), writeln(ic=IC),  
    explain_with(Prover,As,P,IC,G,Explanation),  
    writeln('Explanation: ' --> Explanation).
```

- the query:

```
?- why_wet(iprover).  
prog=sunny&(rained v sprinkler->wet)  
ic= ~(rained&sunny)  
Explanation: --> sprinkler& ~rained
```

# Minimal Canonical Assumptions: the Mints Transformation

- Grigori Mints has proven that any formula  $f$  is equiprovable to a formula of the form  $X_f \rightarrow g$ , where  $X_f$  is a conjunction of formulas of one of the forms:

$$p, \sim p, p \rightarrow q, (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow r, p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r), p \rightarrow (q \vee r), p \rightarrow \sim q, \sim q \rightarrow p.$$

- $\Rightarrow$  we have a set of small canonical assumptions that can turn a given formula into a theorem in **IL**!
- a “weakest Mints premise” is defined along the lines of the weakest protasis
- example:

```
?- weakest_mints_premise(iprover,_, (f v (f->g) v ~g),P).  
P = f ; P = ~g ; P = ( f->g) ; P = ( g-> ~g) .
```

# Discussion

- Abductive LP, ASP, (s)CASP share as a key idea **model synthesis**
- models are sets of **facts** that hold under assumptions described by a program
- ILP aims to synthesize **rules** that describe sets of facts more compactly
- our aim using the Mints canonical form for assumptions is somewhere in-between
- given that an equiprovable sequent to a given formula can be built from a set of Mints formulas, our synthesis algorithm stays as expressive while being restricted to them as if arbitrary formulas would be considered

# Conclusion

- we provide a generalized view of abductive reasoning as an instance of program synthesis controlled by a theorem prover
- this approach can be applied to interesting intermediate logics among which the equilibrium-logic (relevant as a foundation of **ASP** systems) as well as modal logics and their instantiations as alethic, temporal, deontic or epistemic systems
- besides providing (in the form of the concept of weakest protasis) an analogue of the unavailable truth-table models for intuitionistic formulas, we have also generalized our abduced sequent premises to use minimal canonical formulas to which arbitrary **IL** formulas can be broken down, with the potential of synthesizing a richer set of “salient” assumptions that would make a given formula a theorem
- this generalized abduction synthesis could reveal critical missing assumptions, not just as literals but also as a conjunction of *interdependencies* among them