System calls and Page faults

ECE 469, Feb 10

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Recap: Interrupts

Hardware Interrupts

• Software Interrupts



Recap: Hardware Interrupts



- A way of hardware interacting with CPU
- Example: a network device
 - NIC: "Hey, CPU, I have a packet received for the OS, so please wake up the OS to handle the data"
 - CPU: call the interrupt handler for network device in ring 0 (set by the OS)
- Asynchronous (can happen at any time of execution)
 - It's a request from a hardware, so it comes at any time of CPU's execution
- Read
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_8259
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller

Recap: Software Interrupts / exceptions



- A software mean to run code in ring 0 (e.g., int \$0x30)
 - Telling CPU that "Please run the interrupt handler at 0x30"
- Synchronous (caused by running an instruction, e.g., int \$0x30)
- System call
 - o int \$0x30 □ system call in JOS


Recap: Types of exceptions



- Classification based on how they are handled:
 - Fault
 - Exception occurred but can be fixed
 - IP points to the current instruction
 - Trap
 - Exception occurred but the program could continue execution
 - IP points to next instruction
 - Abort
 - Unhandlable exception
 - Hardware failures in processor

Recap: Interrupts classification





Recap: Handling Interrupts

Setting an Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)

Interrupt Number	Code address
0 (Divide error)	0xf0130304
1 (Debug)	0xf0153333
2 (NMI, Non-maskable Interrupt)	0xf0183273
3 (Breakpoint)	0xf0223933
4 (Overflow)	0xf0333333
8 (Double Fault)	0xf0222293
14 (Page Fault)	0xf0133390
0x30 (syscall in JOS)	0xf0222222

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Load the base address into IDTR




Figure 6-1. Relationship of the IDTR and IDT

Recap: Handling Interrupts



Setting an Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)

Interrupt Number	Code address
0 (Divide error)	t_divide
1 (Debug)	t_debug
2 (NMI, Non-maskable Interrupt)	t_nmi
3 (Breakpoint)	t_brkpt
4 (Overflow)	t_oflow
8 (Double Fault)	t_dblflt
14 (Page Fault)	t_pgflt
0x30 (syscall in JOS)	t_syscall

```
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t divide, T DIVIDE);
                                         // 0
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t debug, T DEBUG);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t nmi, T NMI);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t brkpt, T BRKPT);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t oflow, T OFLOW);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t bound, T BOUND);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t illop, T ILLOP);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t device, T DEVICE);
TRAPHANDLER(t dblflt, T DBLFLT);
TRAPHANDLER(t tss, T TSS);
TRAPHANDLER(t segnp, T SEGNP);
TRAPHANDLER(t stack, T STACK);
TRAPHANDLER(t gpflt, T_GPFLT);
                                    // 13
TRAPHANDLER(t_pgflt, T_PGFLT);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t fperr, T FPERR);
TRAPHANDLER(t align, T ALIGN);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t mchk, T MCHK);
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t simderr, T SIMDERR); // 19
TRAPHANDLER NOEC(t syscall, T SYSCALL); // 48, 0x30
```

```
void
trap_init(void)
{
    extern struct Segdesc gdt[];

    // LAB 3: Your code here.
    SETGATE(idt[T_DIVIDE], 0, GD_KT, t_divide, 0);
    SETGATE(idt[T_DEBUG], 0, GD_KT, t_debug, 0);
```

- Interrupt arrives to CPU!
- Call interrupt hander in IDT
- Call _alltraps (in kern/trapentry.S)

```
trap init(void)
   extern struct Segdesc gdt[];
   // LAB 3: Your code here.
   SETGATE(idt[T DIVIDE], 0, GD KT, t divide, 0);
   SETGATE(idt[T DEBUG], 0, GD KT, t debug, 0);
#define TRAPHANDLER NOEC(name, num)
     .globl name;
     .type name, @function;
     .align 2;
     name:
     pushl $0;
     pushl $(num);
```

- Interrupt arrives to CPU!
- Call interrupt hander in IDT
- Call _alltraps (in kern/trapentry.S)
- Call trap() in kern/trap.c

```
trap init(void)
    extern struct Segdesc gdt[];
    // LAB 3: Your code here.
    SETGATE(idt[T DIVIDE], 0, GD KT, t divide, 0);
    SETGATE(idt[T DEBUG], 0, GD KT, t debug, 0);
#define TRAPHANDLER NOEC(name, num)
     .globl name;
     .type name, @function;
     .align 2;
     name:
     pushl $0;
     pushl $(num);
      imp alltraps
      * Lab 3: Your code here for alltraps
      alltraps:
                   Build a
         pushl %ds
         pushl %es
                   Trapframe!
```

```
struct Trapframe {
    struct PushReas tf_reas;
    uint16_t tf_es;
    uint16_t tf_padding1;
    uint16_t tf_ds;
    uint16_t tf_padding2;
    uint32_t tf_trapno;
    /* below here defined by x86 hardware */
    uint32_t tf_err;
    uintptr_t tf_eip;
    uint16_t tf_cs;
    uint16_t tf_padding3;
    uint32_t tf_eflags;
    /* below here only when crossing rings, such as from user to kernel */
    uintptr_t tf_esp;
    uint16_t tf_ss;
    uint16_t tf_padding4;
   _attribute__((packed));
```

```
trap init(void)
    extern struct Segdesc gdt[];
    // LAB 3: Your code here.
    SETGATE(idt[T DIVIDE], 0, GD KT, t divide, 0);
    SETGATE(idt[T DEBUG], 0, GD KT, t debug, 0);
#define TRAPHANDLER NOEC(name, num)
     .globl name:
     .type name, @function;
     .align 2;
     name:
     pushl $0;
     pushl $(num);
     jmp _alltraps
      * Lab 3: Your code here for alltraps
      alltraps:
                   Build a
         pushl %ds
         pushl %es
                   Trapframe!
         pushal
```

- Interrupt arrives to CPU!
- Call interrupt hander in IDT
- Call _alltraps (in kern/trapentry.S)
- Call trap() in kern/trap.c

```
trap init(void)
    extern struct Segdesc gdt[];
   // LAB 3: Your code here.
   SETGATE(idt[T DIVIDE], 0, GD KT, t divide, 0);
   SETGATE(idt[T DEBUG], 0, GD KT, t debug, 0);
#define TRAPHANDLER NOEC(name, num)
     .globl name;
     .type name, @function;
     .align 2;
     name:
     pushl $0;
     pushl $(num);
      imp alltraps
      * Lab 3: Your code here for alltraps
      alltraps:
                   Build a
         pushl %ds
         pushl %es
                   Trapframe!
    void
    trap(struct Trapframe *tf)
```

- Setup the IDT at trap_init() in kern/trap.c
- Interrupt arrives to CPU!
- Call interrupt hander in IDT
- Call _alltraps (in kern/trapentry.S)
- Call trap() in kern/trap.c
- Call trap_dispatch() in kern/trap.c


```
static void
trap_dispatch(struct Trapframe *tf)
{
    // Handle processor exceptions.
    // LAB 3: Your code here.
```

```
trap init(void)
    extern struct Segdesc gdt[];
    // LAB 3: Your code here.
    SETGATE(idt[T DIVIDE], 0, GD KT, t divide, 0);
    SETGATE(idt[T DEBUG], 0, GD KT, t debug, 0);
#define TRAPHANDLER NOEC(name, num)
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     .type name, @function;
     .align 2;
     name:
     pushl $0;
     pushl $(num);
      imp alltraps
      * Lab 3: Your code here for alltraps
      alltraps:
                   Build a
         pushl %ds
                   Trapframe!
```

```
void
trap(struct Trapframe *tf)
{
```

Today

- Syscalls
- Page fault
























```
int main() {
   printf("ECE469");
}
```






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}
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
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int main() {
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}
```






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int main() {
   printf("ECE469");
}
```





```
int main() {
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}
```





```
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    printf("ECE469");
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```

We cannot let a process access peripherals.













• We cannot let a process access peripherals.














• We cannot let a process access peripherals.












- We cannot let a process access peripherals.
- Why do we have privilege separation?
 - Security!
- We do not know what application will do
 - Do not allow dangerous operations to system
 - Flash BIOS, format disk, deleting system files, etc.
 - Let only the OS can access hardware
 - Apply access control on accessing hardware resources!
 - E.g., only the administrator can format disk














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OS must mediate hardware access request from userspace, and we handle this via system calls













- Library Calls
 - APIs available in Ring 3
 - DO NOT include operations in Ring 0
 - Cannot access hardware directly
 - Could be a wrapper for some computation or
 - Could be a wrapper for system calls
 - E.g., printf() internally uses write(), which is a system call
- Some system calls are available as library calls
 - As wrappers in Ring 3






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




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


- System Calls
 - APIs available in Ring 0
 - OS's abstraction for hardware interface for userspace
 - Called when Ring 3 application need to perform Ring 0 operations




Ring 3 Unprivileged

Ring 0 Privileged




Ring 3 Unprivileged Ring 0 Privileged



Ring 3 Unprivileged Ring 0 Privileged


- Application should not call arbitrary OS functions
 - If so, app can do all operations that OS can do; privilege separation is meaningless!



Ring 3 Unprivileged

Ring 0 Privileged

- Application should not call arbitrary OS functions
 - If so, app can do all operations that OS can do; privilege separation is meaningless!
- How can we protect this, in other words, how can we let apps invoke system calls but no other OS functions?








Call gate: a secure method to control access to Ring 0!

App printf() scanf() send() fwrite()


```
System call gate
(syscall() in JOS)

sys_write()
Trap/syscall(
) sys_read()


sys_send()
```
































Call gate via Interrupt Handler




- Call gate
 - System call can be invoked only with trap handler
 - int \$0x30 in JOS
 - int \$0x80 in Linux (32-bit)
 - int \$0x2e in Windows (32-bit)
 - sysenter/sysexit (32-bit)
 - syscall/sysret (64-bit)



Hardware

- OS performs checks if userspace is doing a right thing
 - Before performing important ring 0 operations
 - E.g., accessing hardware...


Call gate via Interrupt Handler



- Call gate
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 - syscall/sysret (64-bit)

int \$0x30

CHECK!!



- OS performs checks if userspace is doing a right thing
 - Before performing important ring 0 operations
 - E.g., accessing hardware...

Why should we check arguments?



- How can we protect 'read ()' system call?
 - read(int fd, void *buf, size t count)
 - Read count bytes from a file pointed by fd and store those in buf

Usage

```
// buffer at the stack
char buf[512];
// read 512 bytes from standard input
read(0, buf, 512);
```

Why should we check arguments?





• Problem: what will happen if we call...

```
// kernel address will points to a dirmap of
// the physical address at 0x100000
char kernel_address = KERNBASE + 0x100000;
// read 512 bytes from standard input
read(0, buf, 512);
```


- This will overwrite kernel code with your keystroke typing..
 - Changing kernel code from Ring 3 is possible!



















































Test: using Itrace and strace

```
// buffer at the stack
char buf[512];
// read 512 bytes from stdin to stack.
int ret = read(0, buf, 512);

printf("Read to stack memory returns: %d\n", ret);

// read 512 bytes from stdin to kernel.
ret = read(0, (void*)0xfffffff01000000,512);

printf("Read to kernel memory returns: %d\n", ret);
perror("Reason for the error:");
```

Summary: Syscalls



- Prevent Ring 3 from accessing hardware directly
 - Security reasons!
 - OS mediates hardware access via system calls
- You may regard system calls as APIs of an OS
- How to prevent an application from running arbitrary ring 0 operation?
 - Call gate
- Modern OS use call gate to protect system calls
 - At trap handler, an OS can apply access control to system call request

Faults



- Faults
 - Faulting instruction has not executed (e.g., page fault)
 - Resume the execution after handling the fault
- Resume the execution after handling the fault



Occurs when paging (address translation) fails



- Occurs when paging (address translation) fails
 - Access from user but $! (pte\&PTE_U) : protection violation$



- Occurs when paging (address translation) fails
 - Access from user but ! (pte&PTE U): protection violation

```
int main() {
    char *kernel_memory = (char*)0xf0100000;
    // I am a bad guy, and I would like to change
    // some contents in kernel memory
    kernel_memory[100] = '!';
}
```

```
0x00800039 ? movb $0x21,0xf0100064
```

- Occurs when paging (address translatied to the oxion of the oxion oxion of the oxion oxion
 - Access from user but ! (pte&PTE U):

```
int main() {
    char *kernel_memory = (char*)0xf01
    // I am a bad guy, and I would lik
    // some contents in kernel memory
    kernel_memory[100] = '!';
}
```

```
esi
     0x00000000
ebp
     0xeebfdfd0
     0xefffffdc
ebx
     0x00000000
edx
     0x00000000
     0x00000000
ecx
     0xeec00000
eax
es
     0x - - - 0023
ds
     0x - - - 0023
trap 0x0000000e Page Fault
     0xf0100064
cr2
     0x00000007 [user, write, protection]
err
eip
     0x00800039
     0x - - - 001b
flag 0x00000096
     0xeebfdfb8
esp
```

00001000

0x - - - 0023

[00001000] free env

What does CPU do on a page fault?




CPU let OS know why and where such a page fault happened

```
frame at 0xf01c0000
                              0x00000000
                              0x00000000
                              0xeebfdfd0
                         oesp Oxefffffdc
                              0x00000000
                              0 \times 000000000
                              0x00000000
                              0xeec00000
                               0x - - - 0023
                             0x----0023
                         trap 0x0000000e Page Fault
                              0xf0100064
                              0x00000007 [user, write, protection]
                              0x00800039
                               0x----001b
                         flag 0x00000096
                              0xeebfdfb8
kernel_memory[100]
                                            00001000
```

What does CPU do on a page fault?

00001000



CPU let OS know why and where such a page fault happened

 CR2: stores the address of the fault Page fault virtual advess 0xf0100064 CR2 frame at 0xf01c0000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0xeebfdfd0 oesp 0xeffffdc 0×000000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0xeec00000 0x----0023 0x----0023 trap 0x0000000e Page Fault 0xf0100064 0x00000007 [user, write, protection] 0x00800039 0x----001b flag 0x00000096 0xeebfdfb8 kernel_memory[100]

What does CPU do on a page fault?




CPU let OS know why and where such a page fault happened

CR2

- CR2: stores the address of the fault
- Error code: stores the reason of the fault

```
TRAP frame at 0xf01c0000
                              0x00000000
                          edi
                               0x00000000
                               0xeebfdfd0
                          oesp 0xeffffdc
                          ebx
                               0x00000000
                          edx
                               0 \times 000000000
                               0x00000000
                               0xeec00000
                               0x - - - 0023
                               0x - - - 0023
                          trap 0x0000000e Page Fault
                          cr2 0xf0100064
                               0x00000007 [user, write, protection]
                              0x00800039
                               0x----001b
                          flag 0x00000096
                               0xeebfdfb8
kernel memory[100]
                                             00001000
```





• User program accesses 0xf0100064



User program accesses 0xf0100064

- CPU generates page fault (pte&PTE_U == 0)
 - Put the faulting address on CR2
 - Put an error code
 - Calls page fault handler in IDT



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 - Calls page fault handler in IDT
- OS: page_fault_handler
 - Read CR2 (address of the fault, 0xf0100064)



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 - Put the faulting address on CR2
 - Put an error code
 - Calls page fault handler in IDT
- OS: page_fault_handler
 - Read CR2 (address of the fault, 0xf0100064)
 - Read error code (contains the reason of the fault)



- User program accesses 0xf0100064
- CPU generates page fault (pte&PTE_U == 0)
 - Put the faulting address on CR2
 - Put an error code
 - Calls page fault handler in IDT
- OS: page_fault_handler
 - Read CR2 (address of the fault, 0xf0100064)
 - Read error code (contains the reason of the fault)
 - Resolve error (if not, destroy the environment)



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 - Read CR2 (address of the fault, 0xf0100064)
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 - Resolve error (if not, destroy the environment)
 - Continue user execution

How does OS handle page fault?



- User program accesses 0xf0100064
- CPU generates page fault (pte&PTE_U == 0)
 - Put the faulting address on CR2
 - Put an error code
 - Calls page fault handler in IDT
- OS: page_fault_handler
 - Read CR2 (address of the fault, 0xf0100064)
 - Read error code (contains the reason of the fault)
 - Resolve error (if not, destroy the environment)
 - Continue user execution
- User: resume on that instruction (or destroyed by the OS)

Page fault example (2): Handling call stack



- inc/memlayout.h
- We allocate one (1) page for the user stack

Page fault example: Handling call stack



- inc/memlayout.h
- We allocate one (1) page for the user stack

```
0xeebfe000
Normal User Stack
                          0xeebfd000
```

- If you use a large local variable on the stack
 - Stack overflow (stack grows down...)

```
int func() {
    char buf[8192];
```

Page fault example: Handling call stack



- inc/memlayout.h
- We allocate one (1) page for the user stack



- If you use a large local variable on the stack
 - Stack overflow (stack grows down...)

```
int func() {
    char buf[8192];
    buf[0] = '1';
}
```

Expand stack automatically




- Can we detect such an access and allocate a new page for the stack automatically?
 - Yes
- We will utilize 'Page Fault'

- Observations
 - Stack overflow would be sequential (access pages adjacent to the stack)
 - We should catch both read/write access (both should fault)


Expand stack automatically

- Stack ends at 0xeebfd000
- Suppose the current value of esp (stack) is
 - 0xeebfd010



Expand stack automatical to the func() {


- Stack ends at 0xeebfd000
- Suppose the current value of esp (stack) is
 - 0xeebfd010
- User program creates a new variable: char buf[32]
 - buf = 0xeebfcff0
 - Buffer range: 0xeebfcff0 ~ 0xeebfd010



0xeebfe000
esp
0xeebfd000
buf
0xeebfc000

Expand stack automatical the func() {

- Stack ends at 0xeebfd000
- Suppose the current value of esp (stack) is
 - 0xeebfd010
- User program creates a new variable: char buf[32]
 - buf = 0xeebfcff0
 - Buffer range: 0xeebfcff0 ~ 0xeebfd010
- On accessing buf[0] = '1';
 - movb \$0x31, (%eax)



0xeebfe000 esp 0xeebfd000

buf 0xeebfc000

Expand stack automatical to the func() {

- Stack ends at 0xeebfd000
- Suppose the current value of esp (stack) is
 - 0xeebfd010
- User program creates a new variable: char buf[32]
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 - Buffer range: 0xeebfcff0 ~ 0xeebfd010
- On accessing buf [0] = 1';
 - movb \$0x31, (%eax)
 - eax = 0xeebfcff0 No translation for 0xeebfc000



Oxeebfe000 esp Oxeebfd090

ouf 0xeebfc000 STACK

No mapping!

Expand stack automatical to the func() {


- Stack ends at 0xeebfd000
- Suppose the current value of esp (stack) is
 - 0xeebfd010
- User program creates a new variable: char buf[32]
 - buf = 0xeebfcff0
 - Buffer range: 0xeebfcff0 ~ 0xeebfd010
- On accessing buf [0] = 1';
 - movb \$0x31, (%eax)
 - eax = 0xeebfcff0 No translation for 0xeebfc000
 - Need to allocate 0xeebfc000 ~ 0xeebfd000




0xeebfe000 esp 0xeebfd000

0xeebfc000


No mapping!




- Lookup page table
 - No translation!





- Lookup page table
 - No translation!





- Lookup page table
 - No translation!
- Store 0xeebfcff0 to CR2






- Lookup page table
 - No translation!
- Store Oxeebfcff0 to CR2
- Set error code
 - "The fault was caused by a non-present page!"






- Lookup page table
 - No translation!
- Store Oxeebfcff0 to CR2
- Set error code
 - "The fault was caused by a non-present page!"
- Raise page fault exception (interrupt #14) -> call page fault handler




Interrupt will make CPU invoke the page_fault_handler()

0xeebfe000




- Interrupt will make CPU invoke the page_fault_handler()
- Read CR2
 - 0xeebfcff0

0xeebfe000



- Interrupt will make CPU invoke the page_fault_handler()
- Read CR2
 - Oxeebfcff0, it seems like the page right next to current stack end
 - The current stack end is: 0xeebfd000

0xeebfe000



- Interrupt will make CPU invoke the page_fault_handler()
- Read CR2
 0xeebfcff0, it seems like the page right next to current stack end
 - The current stack end is: 0xeebfd000
- Read error code
 - "The fault was caused by a non-present page!"

0xeebfe000



- Interrupt will make CPU invoke the page_fault_handler()
- 0xeebfcff0, it seems like the page right next to current stack end
 - The current stack end is: 0xeebfd000
- Read error code

Read CR2

- "The fault was caused by a non-present page!"
- Let's allocate a new page for the stack!

0xeebfe000

0xeebfd000

No mapping!


Adding new page for stack

- Allocate a new page for the stack
 - Struct PageInfo *pp = page alloc(ALLOC ZERO);
 - Get a new page, and wipe it to have all zero as its contents

0xeebfe000

0xeebfd000

0xeebfc000




Adding new page for stack

- Allocate a new page for the stack
 - Struct PageInfo *pp = page_alloc(ALLOC_ZERO);
 - Get a new page, and wipe it to have all zero as its contents
 - page_insert(env_pgdir, pp, 0xeebfc000, PTE_U|PTE_W0xeebfd000
 - Map a new page to that address!

0xeebfc000


0xeebfe000



STACK

Adding new page for stack

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 - Get a new page, and wipe it to have all zero as its contents
 - page_insert(env_pgdir, pp, 0xeebfc000, PTE_U|PTE_W0xeebfd000
 - Map a new page to that address!
- iret! Oxeebfc000



STACK


0xeebfe000

- On accessing buf[0] = '1';
 - movb \$0x31, (%eax)
 - eax = 0xeebfcff0 No translation for 0xeebfc000

0xeebfe000

0xeebfd000

0xeebfc000



```
On accessing buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0 No translation for 0xeebfc000
Execute the faulting instruction again: buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0
```

```
STACK
STACK
```

```
int func() {
    char buf[32];
    for(int i=0; i<32; ++i) {
        buf[i] = '1' + i;
     }
}</pre>
```

```
On accessing buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0 No translation for 0xeebfc000
Execute the faulting instruction again: buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0 Now translation is valid!
```

```
STACK
STACK
```

```
int func() {
    char buf[32];
    for(int i=0; i<32; ++i) {
        buf[i] = '1' + i;
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```

```
On accessing buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0 No translation for 0xeebfc000
Execute the faulting instruction again: buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0 Now translation is valid!
```

• Continue to execute the loop..

```
int func() {
    char buf[32];
    for(int i=0; i<32; ++i) {
        buf[i] = '1' + i;
     }
}</pre>
```

STACK

```
On accessing buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0 No translation for 0xeebfc000
Execute the faulting instruction again: buf[0] = '1';
movb $0x31, (%eax)
eax = 0xeebfcff0 Now translation is valid!
```

By exploiting page fault and its handler, we can implement automatic allocation of user stack!

Continue to execute the loop...

```
int func() {
    char buf[32];
    for(int i=0; i<32; ++i) {
        buf[i] = '1' + i;
     }
}</pre>
```

STACK