原文信息：
- 标题：1974 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1975-03-31
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Terrellchen
- 校译：Terrellchen
To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Operating results for 1974 overall were unsatisfactory due to the poor performance of our insurance business. In last year’s annual report some decline in profitability was predicted but the extent of this decline, which accelerated during the year, was a surprise. Operating earnings for 1974 were $8,383,576, or $8.56 per share, for a return on beginning shareholders’ equity of 10.3%. This is the lowest return on equity realized since 1970. Our textile division and our bank both performed very well, turning in improved results against the already good figures of 1973. However, insurance underwriting, which has been mentioned in the last several annual reports as running at levels of unsustainable profitability, turned dramatically worse as the year progressed.
由于我们的保险业务表现不佳，1974 年公司整体经营业绩并不令人满意。在去年年报中已预测盈利会有所下降，但是下降的程度却是意料之外的。 1974 年的经营收益为 8,383,576 美元，即每股 8.56 美元，初始股本回报率为 10.3%。这是自 1970 年以来实现的最差股本收益率。我们的纺织业务和银行业务都表现的非常好，与 1973 年早前良好的数字相比，业绩有所改善。然而，在过去几年的年报中提到的，以不可持续的利润率运营的保险承保业务，随着时间的推移，行业状况急剧恶化。
The outlook for 1975 is not encouraging. We undoubtedly will have sharply negative comparisons in our textile operation and probably a moderate decline in banking earnings. Insurance underwriting is a large question mark at this time—it certainly won’t be a satisfactory year in this area, and could be an extremely poor one. Prospects are reasonably good for an improvement in both insurance investment income and our equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps. During this period we plan to continue to build financial strength and liquidity, preparing for the time when insurance rates become adequate and we can once again aggressively pursue opportunities for growth in this area.
1975 年的前景也并不乐观。毫无疑问，我们纺织业务将出现严重的下滑，银行业务的收入也可能会温和的下降。保险承保业务在这时是一个很大的问题，在这个领域今年显然不是令人满意的年份，还可能是十分糟糕的一年。对于保险的投资收入以及我们在蓝筹印花公司股权收益增长的前景是十分看好的。在此期间，我们计划继续增强财务实力和流动性，为保险费率变得合适的时机做好准备，并再次积极寻求这一领域的扩张机会。
During the first nine months of 1974 textile demand was exceptionally strong, resulting in very firm prices. However, in the fourth quarter significant weaknesses began to appear, which have continued into 1975.
在 1974 年前的九个月，纺织业务的需求猛增，导致价格非常坚挺。然而，第四季度纺织业务的疲软开始出现了，这会持续到 1975 年。
We currently are operating at about one‐third of capacity. Obviously, at such levels operating losses must result. As shipments have fallen, we continuously have adjusted our level of operations downward so as to avoid building inventory.
我们目前在这项业务里的产能只运行约三分之一。显然闲置三分之二必然会带来经营损失。随着出货量的下降，我们继续向下调整我们运营水平，以避免增加存货。
Our products are largely in the curtain goods area. During a period of consumer uncertainty, curtains may well be high on the list of deferrable purchases. Very low levels of housing starts also serve to dampen demand. In addition, retailers have been pressing to cut inventories generally, and we probably are feeling some effect from these efforts. These negative trends should reverse in due course, and we are attempting to minimize losses until that time comes.
我们的产品大多集中在窗帘领域。在经济不稳定的时期里，非必需品窗帘可能会是可延迟购买商品列表的前几名。极低的房屋开工水平也会抑制需求。同时，零售商大都开始敦促消减库存，我们可能从这些努力中受到一些影响。这些负面的趋势将在适当的时候扭转，我们试图在这个时期到来之前最小化我们的损失。
In the last few years we consistently have commented on the unusual profitability in insurance underwriting. This seemed certain eventually to attract unintelligent competition with consequent inadequate rates. It also has been apparent that many insurance organizations, major as well as minor, have been guilty of significant underreserving of losses, which inevitably produces faulty information as to the true cost of the product being sold. In 1974, these factors, along with a high rate of inflation, combined to produce a rapid erosion in underwriting results.
在过去的几年里，我们一直在评论保险承保中的异常盈利能力。这可能最终会引起愚蠢的行业竞争，使得费率不足。很显然，很多保险机构，不论大小，都存在严重的损失准备金计提不足的问题，这不可避免地会导致关于销售产品真实成本的错误信息。在 1974 年，这些因素及高通货膨胀率，使得保险承保的业绩大幅下降。
The costs of the product we deliver (auto repair, medical payments, compensation benefits, etc.) are increasing at a rate we estimate to be in the area of 1% per month. Of course, this increase doesn’t proceed in an even flow but, inexorably, inflation grinds very heavily at the repair services -- to humans and to property -- that we provide. However, rates virtually have been unchanged in the property and casualty field for the last few years. With costs moving forward rapidly and prices remaining unchanged, it was not hard to predict what would happen to profit margins.
我们经营的产品的成本(汽车修理，医疗赔付，补偿金等)我们估计每月以1%的增速增长。当然，这种增长并不是平稳的进行，但是通货膨胀无情地使我们提供的人身和财产保险的维修服务损失很大。然而，财险和意外伤害险费率事实上在最近几年几乎没有变化。由于成本快速上升，而价格保持不变，不难预测会有怎样的边际利润。
Best’s, the authoritative voice of the insurance industry, estimates that in 1974 all auto insurance premiums in the United States increased only about 2%. Such a growth in the pool of dollars available to pay insured losses and expenses was woefully inadequate. Obviously, medical costs applicable to people injured during the year, jury awards for pain and suffering, and body shop charges for repairing damaged cars increased at a dramatically greater rate during the year. Since premiums represent the sales dollar and the latter items represent the cost of goods sold, profit margins turned sharply negative.
保险行业最权威的机构 Best's 估计，1974 年美国全部汽车保险的保费只增加了 2%。这些可获得的资金的增长不足以支付保险损失和其他费用。很显然，今年用于人身伤害的医疗费用、陪审团对肉体和精神上的创伤的裁决费用以及对于汽车维修的费用在今年都大幅上涨。由于保费代表了销售收入，而后者代表了销售商品的成本，边际利润迅速变为亏损的了。
As this report is being written, such deterioration continues. Loss reserves for many giant companies still appear to be understated by significant amounts, which means that these competitors continue to underestimate their true costs. Not only must rates be increased sufficiently to match the month‐by‐month increase in cost levels, but the existed expense‐ revenue gap must be overcome. At this time it appears that insurers must experience even more devastating underwriting results before they take appropriate pricing action.
在我写这封报告时，这样的恶化仍在继续。很多大公司提取的损失准备金仍在很大程度上低估，这意味着这些公司仍然低估了他们的真实损失。保险费率不仅应该大幅提高，以匹配每月增加的成本水平，还应该弥补目前出现的费用同收入的缺口。就目前来看，保险公司在采取合适的定价行动之前，他们会遭受更为严重的承保业绩损失。
All major areas of insurance operations, except for the “home state” companies, experienced significantly poorer results for the year.
除了 Home-State 保险业务以外，所有保险业务中主要领域的业绩在今年都很糟糕。
The direct business of National Indemnity Company, our largest area of insurance activity, produced an underwriting loss of approximately 4% after several years of high profitability. Volume increased somewhat, but we are not encouraging such increases until rates are more adequate. At some point in the cycle, after major insurance companies have had their fill of red ink, history indicates that we will experience an inflow of business at compensatory rates. This operation, headed by Phil Liesche, a most able underwriter, is staffed by highly profit‐oriented people and we believe it will provide excellent earnings in most future years, as it has in the past.
国民保险的传统业务是我们最大的保险业务板块，在经历了连续几年的高盈利之后，今年产生了近 4% 的承保损失。保单量一定程度上增加了，但是在费率更加合适之前，我们并不期待这样的业务增加。历史表明，在这一周期的一些时间点上，也就是主要的保险公司发生亏损之后，我们会在补偿性的费率提高下获得业绩的回暖。这项业务是由最能干的承保人菲尔·列舍 (Phil Liesche) 主导的，由高度以盈利为导向的员工组成，我们相信在未来的几年内它会带来极好地收入，正如它过去一样。
Intense competition in the reinsurance business has produced major losses for practically every company operating in the area. We have been no exception. Our underwriting loss was something over 12% -- a horrendous figure, but probably little different from the average of the industry. What is even more frightening is that, while about the usual number of insurance catastrophes occurred during 1974, there really was no “super disaster” which might have accounted for the poor figures of the industry. Rather, a condition of inadequate rates prevails, particularly in the casualty area where we have significant exposure. Our reinsurance department is run by George Young, an exceptionally competent and hardworking manager. He has cancelled a great many contracts where prices are totally inadequate, and is making no attempt to increase volume except in areas where premiums are commensurate with risk. Based upon present rate levels, it seems highly unlikely that the reinsurance industry generally, or we, specifically, will have a profitable year in 1975.
再保险业务激烈的竞争中，行业里几乎每一家公司都造成了很大的损失。我们也不例外。我们承保业务的损失大约超过了12%，这是一个可怕的数字，但可能与行业平均水平相差不大。更令人担忧的是，1974 年发生的保险业务重大事故的数量同往常差不多，实际上并没有发生可能导致现在这么可怜的盈利数据的超级灾难。相反，较普遍的情况是保险费率严重不足，尤其是在我们有重大风险敞口的意外伤害领域。我们的再保险业务是由 George Young 管理的，他是一个非常有能力而且很勤奋的管理人。他取消了很多价格明显不合理的合同，除了在那些保费收入与风险相当的领域，并没有采取措施来增加销售额。依照目前的费率水平，整个再保险行业很难在 1975 年获得盈利，特别是我们。
Our “home state” companies, under the leadership of John Ringwalt, made good progress in 1974. We appear to be developing a sound agency group, capable of producing business with acceptable loss ratios. Our expense ratios still are much too high, but will come down as the operation develops into units of economic size. The Texas problem which was commented upon in last year’s report seems to be improving. We consider the “home state” operation one of our most promising areas for the future.
在 John Ringwalt 的领导下，我们的住宅保险业务 (Home-State) 在 1974 年业绩不错。看来我们正在发展一个健全的代理机构，有能力在可接受的赔付率下开展业务。我们的费用率仍然很高，但随着业务发展到适度的经济规模下，费用率就会降低。去年的报告中提到的德克萨斯州的问题正在改善。我们认为 Home-State 保险业务是我们未来最有前景的领域之一。
Our efforts to expand Home and Automobile Insurance Company into Florida proved disastrous. The underwriting loss from operations in that market will come to over $2 million, a very large portion of which was realized in 1974. We made the decision to drop out of the Florida market in the middle of 1974, but losses in substantial amounts have continued since that time because of the term nature of insurance contracts, as well as adverse development of outstanding claims. We can’t blame external insurance industry conditions for this mistake. In retrospect, it is apparent that our management simply did not have the underwriting information and the pricing knowledge necessary to be operating in the area. In Cook County, where Home and Auto’s volume traditionally has been concentrated, evidence also became quite clear during 1974 that rates were inadequate. Therefore, rates were increased during the middle of the year but competition did not follow; consequently, our volume has dropped significantly in this area as competitors take business from us at prices that we regard as totally unrealistic.
我们将 Home & Auto 业务扩展到弗罗里达州的努力证明结果损失惨重。该州的承保损失达到 200 万美元，这是 1974 年实现的损失中的一大部分。我们在 1974 年中期决定退出弗罗里达州的市场，但是从那以后大量的损失仍然持续发生，这是因为保险合同的长期性以及未决赔款的不利发展。我们不能将这个错误归结为外部保险业的状况不佳。回顾过去，很明显我们的管理层没有掌握这个地区运作所需的承保信息以及定价知识。在 Home & Auto 运营的根据地库克县，也有很明确的证据指出在 1974 年保险费率是不足的。因此，保险费率在今年年中上涨，而竞争对手并没有跟进，因此竞争对手以我们认为不切实际的价格从我们手中抢走了业务，我们在这一领域的销售量大幅下滑。
While the tone of this section is pessimistic as to 1974 and 1975, we consider the insurance business to be inherently attractive. Our overall return on capital employed in this area -- even including the poor results of 1974 -- remains high. We have made every effort to be realistic in the calculation of loss and expense reserves. Many of our competitors are in a substantially weakened financial position, and our strong capital picture leaves us prepared to grow significantly when conditions become right.
尽管在 1974-1975 年保险业务的基调是悲观的，但我们认为保险业务本身还是很吸引人的。即使包括 1974 年的糟糕业绩，我们在这个领域的整体已投资资本回报率仍然很高。在计算损失和管理费用时，我们已尽一切努力做到实事求是。我们的许多竞争对手的财务状况都相当疲弱，而我们雄厚的资本状况使我们准备好在条件成熟时实现大幅增长。
Investment funds generated from the operation of our insurance companies continued to grow during 1974. Investment income grew correspondingly, and produced overall profitability for the insurance group despite the poor underwriting results. As the insurance group balance sheet shows, we have increased liquidity substantially. This trend has continued since yearend. With poor underwriting and with generally weakened capital ratios throughout the insurance industry, such a higher level of liquidity is appropriate and comforting. It eliminates the possible temptation to write business at any price, simply to maintain cash flow, which is a major problem faced by many companies.
1974 年，我们的保险公司运营产生的投资资金继续增长。投资收入相应增长，尽管承保业绩不佳，但仍为保险集团带来了整体盈利能力。正如保险集团的资产负债表所显示的，我们的流动性大幅增加。这一趋势自去年底以来一直在持续。在整个保险业承保业绩不佳、资本比率普遍下降的情况下，这种更高水平的流动性是合适和令人放心的。它消除了为维持现金流而不惜以任何价格承保业务的可能诱惑，而这正是许多公司面临的主要问题。
Several comments regarding market value of securities may be appropriate. Between the insurance group and the bank, we have approximately $140 million invested in bonds. About $20 million of this investment is in very short-term Treasury securities or commercial paper, neither of which is subject to other than negligible market fluctuation. This leaves about $120 million in bonds of longer maturities, with a very large percentage of this sum in municipal bonds with an average maturity of perhaps twelve to fifteen years. Because of our large liquid position and inherent operating characteristics of our financial businesses, it is quite unlikely that we will be required to sell any quantity of such bonds under disadvantageous conditions. Rather, it is our expectation that these bonds either will be held to maturity or sold at times believed to be advantageous.
关于证券的市值需要作一些评述。在保险集团和银行之间，我们大约有 1.4 亿美元投资于债券。其中约 2,000 万美元投资于短期国库券或商业票据，这两种证券的市场波动都很小。剩下的约 1.2 亿美元是期限较长的债券，其中很大一部分是平均期限为 12 至 15 年的市政债券。由于我们有大量的流动资金和金融业务固有的经营特点，我们是不太可能被迫在不利条件下出售相关债券。相反，我们预计这些债券要么将持有至到期，要么在有利的时机出售。
However, on any given day the market value of our bond portfolio is determined by yields available on comparable securities. Such market values can swing dramatically. For example, during 1974 a leading index of high-grade municipals increased in yield from a level of 5.18% at the beginning of the year to 7.08% at the end of the year. In the bond market, each 1/100 of 1% change in yield is referred to as a “basis point” and thus, a change of 1% in interest levels is referred to as 100 basis points. As measured by the index, bond yields increased 190 basis points during 1974. On a fifteen-year bond, an increase of 10 basis points translates to about a 1% downward change in market value. On $120 million of such bonds, it is therefore clear that a change of 10 basis points in yields (which easily can happen in one day) changes the market value of our bond portfolio by something over $1 million. Thus, in 1974 our bond portfolio, which probably had a market value roughly approximating its carrying value at the start of the year, had a market value substantially below carrying value at the end of the year. The market value of our bond portfolio will continue to move in both directions in response to changes in the general level of yields but we do not consider such movements, and the unrealized gains and losses that they produce, to be of great importance as long as adequate liquidity is maintained.
然而，在任何一天，我们债券投资组合的市场价值是由可比证券的收益率决定的。这样的市场价值可能会大幅波动。例如，1974 年高等级市政债券的领先指数收益率从年初的 5.18% 上升到年底的 7.08%。在债券市场上，收益率每变化 1% 的百分之一被称为一个基点，因此，利率水平每变化 1% 被称为 100 个基点。以该指数衡量， 1974 年债券收益率上升了 190 个基点。对于 15 年期债券来说，10 个基点的上升意味着市场价值下降 1%。因此，对于 1.2 亿美元的此类债券，很明显，收益率变化 10 个基点（这很容易在一天内发生）显然会使我们债券组合的市值变化超过 100 万美元。因此，在 1974 年，我们的债券投资组合在年初的市场价值可能大致接近其账面价值，但在年底的市场价值却大大低于账面价值。我们债券组合的市场价值将继续随着收益率总体水平的变化而双向变动，但我们认为，只要保持足够的流动性，这种变动及其产生的未实现损益并不十分重要。
Our stock portfolio declined again in 1974 -- along with most equity portfolios -- to the point that at yearend it was worth approximately $17 million less than its carrying value. Again, we are under-no pressure to sell such securities except at times that we deem advantageous and it is our belief that, over a period of years, the overall portfolio will prove to be worth more than its cost. A net capital loss was realized in 1974, and very likely again will occur in 1975. However, we consider several of our major holdings to have great potential for significantly increased values in future years, and therefore feel quite comfortable with our stock portfolio. At this writing, market depreciation of the portfolio has been reduced by more than half from yearend figures, reflecting higher general stock market levels.
1974 年，我们的股票投资组合随同大多数股票投资组合一起再次下跌，到了年底，它的价值比账面价值少了大约 1700 万美元。同样，我们没有压力出售这些证券，除非在我们认为有利的时候，而且我们相信，经过几年的时间，整个投资组合将证明价值大于成本。 1974 年实现了资本净损失，1975 年很可能再次发生。然而，我们认为我们持有的几只主要股票在未来几年具有显著增值的巨大潜力，因此对我们的股票投资组合感到相当满意。在撰写本文时，该投资组合的市场贬值已较年底数减少了一半以上，反映出股市总体水平的上升。
There is little new to say about Illinois National Bank and Trust. With Eugene Abegg running the operation, the exceptional has become the commonplace. Year after year he continues to run one of the most profitable banks in the United States, while paying maximum interest rates to depositors, operating with unusual levels of liquidity, and maintaining a superior level of loan quality.
对于伊利诺伊国民银行和信托公司，已经没有太多新的话可说了。在尤金·阿贝格的领导下，非凡的业绩已经成为常态。年复一年，他继续经营着美国最赚钱的银行之一，同时向储户支付最高利率，以非同寻常的流动性水平开展业务，并保持着卓越的贷款质量。
Two factors specifically should be noted in looking at the separate income statement of the bank. The effect of filing a consolidated tax return is reflected in their figures, with the tax loss of the insurance operations used to offset the tax liability created by banking operations. Also, a property tax formerly paid by the bank now is assessed to the parent company and is reflected in corporate selling and administrative expense. Because of accruals, this had a double effect at both the bank and corporate level in 1974.
在查看银行的单独损益表时，应特别注意两个因素。提交综合纳税申报表的影响反映在他们的数字中，保险业务的税收损失被用来抵消银行业务产生的税负。另外，以前由银行缴纳的财产税现在由母公司承担，并反映在企业销售和管理费用中。由于权责发生制，这在 1974 年对银行和公司产生了双重影响。
Under present money market conditions, we expect bank earnings to be down somewhat in 1975 although we believe they still are likely to compare favorably with those of practically any banking institution in the country.
在目前货币市场条件下，我们预期 1975 年银行的盈利会下降，尽管我们相信它们同国内那些银行机构相比更有优势。
During 1974 we increased our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps to approximately 25.5% of the outstanding shares of that company. Overall, we are quite happy about the results of Blue Chip and its prospects for the future. Stamp sales continue at a greatly reduced level, but the Blue Chip management has done an excellent job of adjusting operating costs. The See’s Candy Shops, Inc. subsidiary had an outstanding year, and has excellent prospects for the future.
在 1974 年，我们继续增加对蓝筹印花公司的持股，大约占流通股的 25.5%。整体来看，我们很看好蓝筹印花公司的业绩和它未来的前景。印花的销售持续大幅下跌，但是蓝筹印花公司的管理层在调整运营成本方面做得很好。子公司喜诗糖果公司 (See's Candy Shops, Inc.) 今年的业绩很好，而未来也有极好的前景。
Your Chairman is on the Board of Directors of Blue Chip Stamps, as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, a 64% owned subsidiary, and is Chairman of the Board of See’s Candy Shops, Inc. We expect Blue Chip Stamps to be a source of continued substantial earning power for Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
你们的董事长是蓝筹印花公司的董事会成员，同时也是拥有 64% 控股子公司威斯科金融公司 (Wesco Financial) 的董事会成员，还是喜诗糖果公司的董事会主席。我们预计蓝筹印花会成为伯克希尔持续强劲盈利能力的来源。
The annual report of Blue Chip Stamps, which will contain financial statements for the year ended March 1, 1975 audited by Price, Waterhouse and Company, will be available in May. Any shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. who desires an annual report of Blue Chip Stamps may obtain it at any time by writing Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
蓝筹印花公司的年报会在 5 月份发布，这里面包含截止到 1975 年 3 月 1 日年度财务状况，是由普华永道公司审计的。任何伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东想要获得一份蓝筹印花公司的年报，可以随时写信给 Robert H. Bird 先生，地址为加利福尼亚州洛杉矶市东南大街 5801 号，蓝筹印花公司秘书 Robert H.Bird 先生收，邮编 90040。
As you previously have been informed, the proposed merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. was terminated by the respective Boards of Directors on January 28, 1975. We continue to view such a merger as eventually desirable, and hope to reopen the subject at some future time.
如您之前所知，之前提议的对于多元零售公司的收购在 1975 年 1 月 28 日被各自的董事会终止。我们仍旧认为这项合并是值得的，并希望在未来的某个时间重新讨论这项收购。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事长
March 31, 1975
1975 年 3 月 31 日