原文信息：
- 标题：1998 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1999-03-01
- 链接：HTML
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：XiaoTao
- 校译：XiaoTao
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.1
Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings -- but not this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better than it sounds? Well, Berkshire's progress in 1998 -- though more than satisfactory -- was not as good as it looks. That's because most of that 48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.
通常当公司的账面价值一年能够成长48.3%时，大家应该要高兴的手舞足蹈，但今年不行，还记得德国音乐天才瓦格纳吗？他的音乐曾被认为盛名难副。我想伯克希尔在1998年的进展，虽然表面上看起来进步巨大，但实际并没那么好，主要的原因在于在增加的48.3%账面价值当中，绝大部分来自于因并购交易所发行的新股。
To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value, which means that any issuing of shares we do -- whether for cash or as consideration in a merger -- instantly increases our per-share book-value figure, even though we've earned not a dime. What happens is that we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up. These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I can't tell you too often (though you may feel that we try), it's the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire's intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms, and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our Owner's Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and 62.)
再进一步说明，由于我们公司目前的股价远高于帐面价值，这意思代表每当我们溢价发行新股，不管是现金增资还是换股合并，都会立即大幅拉高我们每股的帐面价值，但实际上我们没有因此多赚进半毛钱，而真实的情况是，这类交易并不会立即提升我们每股的内在价值，我们所得到的跟我们所付出的只能算是大致相等。而就像我与合伙人查理·芒格不厌其烦，但却一再强调的真正重要的是内在价值的增加而非帐面账面价值的增加。虽然伯克希尔1998年的内在价值也大幅成长，但绝不到帐面账面价值增加48.3%的那种幅度，不过尽管如此，我还是必须强调，目前的内在价值仍远高于帐面账面价值。(有关"内在价值"等名词的解释，请大家参阅股东手册，手册中揭示了本公司经营的宗旨，也包含了许多对伯克希尔股东相当重要的信息。)
We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses and managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998, General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way -- more about both later -- and the performance of our operating businesses last year exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.
展望1999年，我们拥有有史以来最佳企业与经理人的黄金组合，我们在1998年买下的两家公司，分别是通用再保险(GeneralRe)与公务机航空(ExecutiveJet)，它们在各方面皆是一流的(后面还会详加说明)。而原来拥有的企业表现更是超乎我个人的预期，GEICO保险再一次获得傲人业绩，当然也有不好的消息，几家我们拥有大笔投资的大型上市公司经营下滑，这是当初我们没有预期到的，因此我们股票投资组合的绩效表现不如同期标普500指数，还好这些公司所发生的问题都只是暂时的，查理跟我都相信他们长期发展的远景还是相当的乐观。
In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a table that we regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.
在最近三年的年报中，我们提供了我们认为最能够估计伯克希尔内在价值的一张表，在今年更新的版本中，我们以拟制的方式将通用再保险的数字加入其中，也就是假设该公司自年度一开始就为我们所拥有，第一栏的数字代表我们持有的平均每股投资金额(包括现金与类现金，但扣除金融子公司通过金融产品持有的证券)，第二栏则是每股在扣除利息与经营费用之后，伯克希尔来自本业的经营收益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏投资所贡献的股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，从这张表可以看出，若是把伯克希尔分拆成两家公司的话会变成怎样，一家是持有我们投资组合的投资公司，另一家是经营旗下所有业务并负担全部成本的经营性公司。
| Year 年份 |
Investments Per Share 每股投资收益 |
Pre-tax Earnings Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded 税前每股经营收益 |
|---|---|---|
| 1968 | $ 53 | $ 2.87 |
| 1978 | 465 | 12.85 |
| 1988 | 4,876 | 145.77 |
| 1998 | 47,647 | 474.45 |
Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:
下表是这两个部分每十年的成长率
| Decade Ending 十年期 |
每股投资 投资规模 |
排除所有投资收入的税前每股收益 税前流程图经营收益 |
|---|---|---|
| 1978 | 24.2% | 16.2% |
| 1988 | 26.5% | 27.5% |
| 1998 | 25.6% | 12.5% |
| Annual Growth Rate, 1968-1998 年化增长率 |
25.4% | 18.6% |
During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, or 25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re (included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest gain.
回顾1998年，我们每股的投资规模增加了9604美元或25.2%，不过每股经营收益却减少33.9%，主要原因是通用再保险(如先前所说，在今年以拟制的方式并入伯克希尔)，这家公司拥有相当大的投资部位，这使得我们每股的投资金额大幅增加，不过另一方面，该公司在1998年也产生了承保损失，这又拖累了我们的每股经营收益表现，事实上，要是我们没有买下通用再保险，我们当年的每股经营收益可能还能维持小幅增加。
Though certain of our acquisitions and operating strategies may from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire's capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can't).
虽然某些特定的并购案与经营策略会影响到其中某一栏数字，但我们还是尽量让两栏数字能够均衡发展，不过有一点可以确定的是，我们未来的成长率将远不及过去所创造的水准，伯克希尔现在的规模实在是大到我们很难再做出任何重大的突破，若是你不这样认为，你应该去从事销售工作，而不是去教数学(请永远记住，世界上只有两种人，一种会算术，另一种不会)。
Currently we are working to compound a net worth of $57.4 billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course, our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three times Berkshire's. Net worth, though, measures the capital that managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become huge.
现在我们可以掌控的账面价值高达574亿美元，这数字居所有美国公司之冠，(如果埃克森和美孚石油合并成功，我们将会让出宝座)，当然这并不代表伯克希尔实际的价值，对于股东来说，公司总市值才是最重要的，就这点而言，通用电气与微软的市值就是伯克希尔的三倍以上。总而言之，账面价值代表着一家公司经理人可以运用的资金，就这方面而言，伯克希尔的规模无疑是相当可观的，
Nonetheless, Charlie and I will do our best to increase intrinsic value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far short of that -- including years showing negative returns -- and those will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands just won't do. Today's markets are not friendly to our search for "elephants," but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.
不过，说归说，查理跟我还是希望能够尽力让公司的价值在未来以每年15%的平均速度成长，这是我们认为可能达到的极限，在往后的日子，有时我们可能可以超过15%，但也很有可能远不如这个标准，甚至可能会变成负的，而使得我们平均成长率往下拉，另外大家要知道，所谓每年平均15%的成长率代表在往后的五年之内，我们的账面价值必须要成长580亿美元，如果没有几个轰轰烈烈的大案子的话，是绝对不可能办的到的，像卖卖爆米花这种小生意可不行，而现在的市场环境也不利于我们寻找合适的大象猎物，不过我们可以向大家保证一定会全神贯注。
Whatever the future holds, I make you one promise: I'll keep at least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party. To that end, I've already selected a "power spot" at the office for my urn.
不管未来会如何，有一点我可以向各位保证的是，只要我还在，我都会将我个人99%以上的身家放在伯克希尔，至于能够维持多久？我则是希望能够效法忠诚的民主党员FortWayne，临终时还表示希望死后能够葬在芝加哥，好就近参加党的活动，所以我也在办公室事先选好了一个好位置，以后可以用来摆我的祭坛。
Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth: We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998 bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another 2,500. To balance this gain of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8 doesn't refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting, working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5 million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the assets we manage.
随着经济实力的增长，我们雇用员工的人数也同步增加，我们现在拥有47566位员工，其中包含1998年并购通用再保险后并进来的7074人，以及内部增聘的2500人，而为了服务新增加的9500个人手，我们的总部人员也从原来的12人扩编为12.8人(0.8指的不是查理或是我本人，而是我们新请的一位会计人员，一个礼拜工作四天)，尽管这是组织浮滥的警讯，但是我们去年税后总部开支却只有区区350万美元，大概占我们管理总资产的一个基点(万分之一)还不到。
One beneficiary of our increased size has been the U.S. Treasury. The federal income taxes that Berkshire and General Re have paid, or will soon pay, in respect to 1998 earnings total $2.7 billion. That means we shouldered all of the U.S. Government's expenses for more than a half-day.
我们规模扩大最直接的受惠者就是美国国税，今年光是伯克希尔与通用再保险已经支付或即将支付的联邦所得税就有27亿美元之多，这笔钱足够供美国政府支应半天以上的开销。
Follow that thought a little further: If only 625 other U.S. taxpayers had paid the Treasury as much as we and General Re did last year, no one else -- neither corporations nor 270 million citizens -- would have had to pay federal income taxes or any other kind of federal tax (for example, social security or estate taxes). Our shareholders can truly say that they "gave at the office."
也就是说，全美国只要有625个像伯克希尔及通用再保险这样的纳税人的话，其它所有的美国公司或2.7亿美国公民都可以不必再支付任何的联邦所得税或其它任何形式的联邦税(包含社保或房产税)，所以伯克希尔的股东可以说是竭尽所能。
Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does not bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals, have prospered in America as we would have in no other country. Indeed, if we lived in some other part of the world and completely escaped taxes, I'm sure we would be worse off financially (and in many other ways as well). Overall, we feel extraordinarily lucky to have been dealt a hand in life that enables us to write large checks to the government rather than one requiring the government to regularly write checks to us -- say, because we are disabled or unemployed.
对于查理跟我来说，向国税局签发后面有一长串零的大额支票一点都不会感到困扰，伯克希尔身为一家美国企业，以及我们身为美国公民，得以在美国这个伟大的国家繁荣发展，这是在其它国家所不可能达到的，我想，如果我们生在世界上别的角落，那么就算是我们再怎么努力的逃避税负，我们也不可能像现在这么富有(也包含生活上的其它层面)，从另一个角度来说，我们感到很幸运能够支付一大笔钱给政府，而非因为我们残障或失业，要靠政府三不五时来救济我们。
Berkshire's tax situation is sometimes misunderstood. First, capital gains have no special attraction for us: A corporation pays a 35% rate on taxable income, whether it comes from capital gains or from ordinary operations. This means that Berkshire's tax on a long-term capital gain is fully 75% higher than what an individual would pay on an identical gain.
伯克希尔的纳税情况常常引起外界的误解，首先资本利得税对我们并不太有利，企业不论是资本利得或是其它正常的营利都必须支付35%的所得税，这也就是说同样情况下，伯克希尔的长期资本利得税负担要比一般个人要高出75%以上。
Some people harbor another misconception, believing that we can exclude 70% of all dividends we receive from our taxable income. Indeed, the 70% rate applies to most corporations and also applies to Berkshire in cases where we hold stocks in non-insurance subsidiaries. However, almost all of our equity investments are owned by our insurance companies, and in that case the exclusion is 59.5%. That still means a dollar of dividends is considerably more valuable to us than a dollar of ordinary income, but not to the degree often assumed.
另外还有一种误解，认为我们可以将70%以上的股利收入列为免税收入，事实上这种适用于大部分美国企业的优惠，仅适用于伯克希尔旗下非保险公司所持有的股票，可惜我们大部分的股票都是由保险公司所持有，这部分的免税比例就只有59.5%，当然这仍然代表每一块钱的股利收入比起其它一般的应税收入来得有价值。
Berkshire truly went all out for the Treasury last year. In connection with the General Re merger, we wrote a $30 million check to the government to pay an SEC fee tied to the new shares created by the deal. We understand that this payment set an SEC record. Charlie and I are enormous admirers of what the Commission has accomplished for American investors. We would rather, however, have found another way to show our admiration.
伯克希尔去年真的是卯起来为国税作贡献，像是去年的通用再保险合并案，我们就付了3000万美元给美国证监会作为发行新股的手续费，这金额创下了证监会有史以来的新纪录，查理跟我对于证监会为所有投资人所做的努力感到崇敬，只是如果能用其它方法来表示敬意就更好了。
Combine a great idea with a great manager and you're certain to obtain a great result. That mix is alive and well at GEICO. The idea is low-cost auto insurance, made possible by direct-to-customer marketing, and the manager is Tony Nicely. Quite simply, there is no one in the business world who could run GEICO better than Tony does. His instincts are unerring, his energy is boundless, and his execution is flawless. While maintaining underwriting discipline, Tony is building an organization that is gaining market share at an accelerating rate.
好的理念加上好的经理人，最后一定可以获得好的成果。这样的完美组合在GEICO保险身上获得最佳的印证，通过直销大幅降低成本的汽车保险，搭配像托尼·莱斯利(Tony Nicely)这样优秀的经理人，很显然的全世界再没有其它人可以像Tony可以把GEICO保险经营的这样好，他的直觉毫无偏差、他的能量没有上限，而他的执行力完美无暇，在严守承保纪律的同时，Tony所带领的团队正以超高的速度攻占市场占有率。
This pace has been encouraged by our compensation policies. The direct writing of insurance -- that is, without there being an agent or broker between the insurer and its policyholder -- involves a substantial front-end investment. First-year business is therefore unprofitable in a major way. At GEICO, we do not wish this cost to deter our associates from the aggressive pursuit of new business -- which, as it renews, will deliver significant profits -- so we leave it out of our compensation formulas. What's included then? We base 50% of our associates' bonuses and profit sharing on the earnings of our "seasoned" book, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. The other 50% is tied to growth in policyholders -- and here we have stepped on the gas.
这样的速度更因我们的薪酬计划而加快，通常的直销保单是指，不通过代理或中介直接由保险公司与客户接洽的业务，这需要一笔相当大的前置费用，也因此第一年刚接到的保单通常都没有什么利润，不过要是客户在接下来年度能够继续续约的话，公司将享有极高的盈利。在GEICO保险，我们不希望这一成本阻碍本公司的员工积极开拓新业务，所以我们特别将第一年业绩排除在薪酬计算公式之外，我们将50%员工奖金与分红基于续保业务的盈利，也就是投保期超过一年以上的保单，另外的50%则是根据公司保单数量的成长情况，这也是我们正加紧油门全力冲刺的指标。
In 1995, the year prior to its acquisition by Berkshire, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $143 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,162. The effects that these efforts had at the company are shown by the new business and in-force figures below:
1995年当伯克希尔还没有完全买下GEICO保险时，该公司每年的营销预算是3300万美元，并有652位电话销售员，到了去年，公司的营销预算增加为1.43亿美元，电话销售员的人数也增加至2162位，这些努力所得到的成果可以从下表该公司新接保单与有效保单数字中看出端倪。
| Years 年份 |
New Auto Policies* 新加入自愿性保单 |
Auto Policies In-Force* 有效保单数量 |
|---|---|---|
| 1993 | 354,882 | 2,011,055 |
| 1994 | 396,217 | 2,147,549 |
| 1995 | 461,608 | 2,310,037 |
| 1996 | 617,669 | 2,543,699 |
| 1997 | 913,176 | 2,949,439 |
| 1998 | 1,317,761 | 3,562,644 |
* "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
In 1999, we will again increase our marketing budget, spending at least $190 million. In fact, there is no limit to what Berkshire is willing to invest in GEICO's new-business activity, as long as we can concurrently build the infrastructure the company needs to properly serve its policyholders.
展望1999年我们将继续增加营销预算到至少1.9亿美元，事实上伯克希尔对于GEICO保险在新业务取得上的投资是没有上限的，只要我们可以帮公司建立起能够为客户提供更好服务的各种措施。
Because of the first-year costs, companies that are concerned about quarterly or annual earnings would shy from similar investments, no matter how intelligent these might be in terms of building long-term value. Our calculus is different: We simply measure whether we are creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent -- and if that calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.
而也正是因为新客户第一年的高额成本负担，许多关心短期利益的公司都回避此类投资，不管这些投资对公司建立长期价值是如何的有益，但是我们的盘算就不一样了，我们只是很简单的去评量现在所投入的每一块钱在未来是否能产生高于一块钱的效益，如果估算出来确实有利，那么就算是花再多的钱我也开心。
There is far more to GEICO's success, of course, than low prices and a torrent of advertising. The handling of claims must also be fair, fast and friendly -- and ours is. Here's an impartial scorecard on how we shape up: In New York, our largest-volume state, the Insurance Department recently reported that GEICO's complaint ratio in 1997 was not only the lowest of the five largest auto insurers but was also less than half the average of the other four.
当然GEICO保险成功的原因决不仅于低价与强势的营销，索赔的处理也要公正、快速、友好，这里有一个客观的数据可说明这点，在业务量居我们首位的纽约地区，保险主管机关最近公布GEICO保险在1997年前五大汽车保险公司当中，其投诉比率是最低的，其比例甚至远低于其它四家同业平均数的一半。
GEICO's 1998 profit margin of 6.7% was better than we had anticipated -- and, indeed, better than we wished. Our results reflect an industry-wide phenomenon: In recent years, both the frequency of auto accidents and their severity have unexpectedly declined. We responded by reducing rates 3.3% in 1998, and we will reduce them still more in 1999. These moves will soon bring profit margins down -- at the least to 4%, which is our target, and perhaps considerably lower. Whatever the case, we believe that our margins will continue to be much better than those of the industry.
GEICO保险1998年的承保利润率达到6.7%，超过我们当初的预期，事实上是远高于我们所能想象的程度，我们的成绩反映出产业间普遍存在的一种现象，近几年来，汽车意外发生的频率与程度都比以往减轻许多，也因此我们立刻反应调降3.3%的费率，预计在1999年还会降得更多，虽然这个举动马上使得我们的利润率下降，但我们的目标至少是4%或甚至更低，不过不论如何，我们相信GEICO保险的利润率还是远比同业要好的多。
With GEICO's growth and profitability both outstanding in 1998, so also were its profit-sharing and bonus payments. Indeed, the profit-sharing payment of $103 million or 32.3% of salary -- which went to all 9,313 associates who had been with us for more than a year -- may well have been the highest percentage payment at any large company in the country. (In addition, associates benefit from a company-funded pension plan.)
由于GEICO保险1998年优异的绩效与盈利能力，利润分享和奖金数字亦跟着水涨船高，总计1.03亿美元，约占年薪的32.3%，由公司全体年资超过一年以上的9313位员工共同来分享，这个数字在全美所有公司当中比例可以说是最高的，(此外员工还受益于公司支持的退休金计划)。
The 32.3% may turn out to be a high-water mark, given that the profitability component in our profit-sharing calculation is almost certain to come down in the future. The growth component, though, may well increase. Overall, we expect the two benchmarks together to dictate very significant profit-sharing payments for decades to come. For our associates, growth pays off in other ways as well: Last year we promoted 4,612 people.
虽然公司分红计划中的成长能力应该还会继续维持，但考量到盈利能力在未来几乎可以肯定会逐渐下降，所以32.3%的比例可以说是破天荒的新高，当然我们预期这两项因子在未来的十年内仍然会是分红计划中扮演极为重要的角色，不过对于我们的同仁来说，成长还代表着另一个意义，去年总计有4,612位员工获得晋升。
Impressive as the GEICO figures are, we have far more to do. Our market share improved significantly in 1998 -- but only from 3% to 3½%. For every policyholder we now have, there are another ten who should be giving us their business.
虽然GEICO保险的绩效数字是如此的令人印象深刻，但是我们仍然还有相当大的成长空间。GEICO保险1998年的市场占有率确实大幅提升，但也只不过从3%增加为3.5%而已，换句话说相较于我们现在服务的每一个保单客户，等于还有十个在外面等待我们去给他们提供服务。
Some of you who are reading this may be in that category. About 40% of those who check our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgements, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographical areas or work at certain occupations. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount -- usually 8% -- to our shareholders. So give us a call and check us out.
有些正在读我们年报的人很可能就属于这类的人，在每个来征询GEICO保险保单费率的人当中，平均有40%的人会发现，通过我们投保能为他们省下一笔钱，而之所以不是100%的原因在于每家保险业者对于风险的判断估计都有所不同，有些保险公司对于居住于某些特定地区的居民或从事某些特定职业的客户有偏好，不过我仍然坚信我们提供给一般民众的费率通常都低于其它全国性的业者，在随年报附赠的GEICO保险资料中，大家将可以看到我们提供给来自全美40州股东最高8%的折扣费率，所以记得打电话给我们试一试。
You may think that one commercial in this section is enough. But I have another to present, this one directed at managers of publicly-owned companies.
在这段我还有一个广告要打，这广告主要是要写给上市公司的经理人看的。
At Berkshire we feel that telling outstanding CEOs, such as Tony, how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness. Most of our managers wouldn't work for us if they got a lot of backseat driving. (Generally, they don't have to work for anyone, since 75% or so are independently wealthy.) Besides, they are the Mark McGwires of the business world and need no advice from us as to how to hold the bat or when to swing.
在伯克希尔我们一直认为要教像Tony这样杰出的经理人如何经营公司是一件相当愚蠢的事，事实上要是我们一直在背后指指点点的话，大部分的经理人可能早就干不下去了(坦白说他们大多根本就可以不必要再靠工作过活，75%以上的人都已经财务自由了)，他们可以说是商场上的强打者马克·麦奎尔(Mark McGwires,棒球明星)，根本就不需要我们去指导他如何拿棒子或何时挥棒。
Nevertheless, Berkshire's ownership may make even the best of managers more effective. First, we eliminate all of the ritualistic and nonproductive activities that normally go with the job of CEO. Our managers are totally in charge of their personal schedules. Second, we give each a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own 100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family have or will ever have; and 3) you can't sell or merge it for at least a century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be counted.
尽管如此，由伯克希尔掌控企业所有权，甚至可能让这些经理人有更好的发挥。首先，我们去掉所有CEO必须面对的一般繁文缛节和没有生产力的活动，我们的经理人可以全心全意的安排自己个人的行程，第二，我们给予相当明确简单的任务指示，那就是一、像自己拥有公司一样的心态来经营，二、把它当作是你跟你家人在全世界仅有的资产来看待，第三、在有生之年内，你没办法将它卖掉或是让别人给买走。我们告诉他们完全不要被会计帐面方面的考量来影响到其实际经营上的决策，我们希望经理人了解什么才是最关键紧要的事。
Very few CEOs of public companies operate under a similar mandate, mainly because they have owners who focus on short-term prospects and reported earnings. Berkshire, however, has a shareholder base -- which it will have for decades to come -- that has the longest investment horizon to be found in the public-company universe. Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs to manage for maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter's earnings. We certainly don't ignore the current results of our businesses -- in most cases, they are of great importance -- but we never want them to be achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive strengths.
很少有上市公司的经理人可以如此自在的经营公司，这是因为大部分公司背后的股东往往只着重短期的利益。然而，伯克希尔几十年来一直拥有相当稳定的股东基础，他们有其它上市公司少见的长期投资眼光，事实上，这些股东打算一直持有伯克希尔至死方休，也因此旗下的经理人可以用一辈子的时间来经营公司，而不用为了下一季的盈利情况来烦恼，当然这绝不代表我们就不关心公司经营的现况，事实上，这点也相当的重要，只是我们绝不希望为了追求短期的盈利而被迫牺牲掉公司长远发展的竞争优势。
I believe the GEICO story demonstrates the benefits of Berkshire's approach. Charlie and I haven't taught Tony a thing -- and never will -- but we have created an environment that allows him to apply all of his talents to what's important. He does not have to devote his time or energy to board meetings, press interviews, presentations by investment bankers or talks with financial analysts. Furthermore, he need never spend a moment thinking about financing, credit ratings or "Street" expectations for earnings per share. Because of our ownership structure, he also knows that this operational framework will endure for decades to come. In this environment of freedom, both Tony and his company can convert their almost limitless potential into matching achievements.
我想GEICO保险成功的经验再次显示出伯克希尔经营模式的优越性，查理跟我从来就没有指示Tony该怎么做事，我想以后也不会，我们的工作就是提供给他一个绝佳的环境，让他能够彻底发挥才能去做该做的事，他不需要把时间耗费在无意义的董事会、新闻采访或与金融分析师会谈上，此外他也不必担心公司的融资问题、信用评级或坊间对于公司盈利的预期。由于我们特殊的股权结构，他也知道这样的经营模式至少可以继续持续几十年，在这样自由的环境之下，Tony跟他所带领的团队就可以将100%的心思花在应付外在多变的竞争环境上。
If you are running a large, profitable business that will thrive in a GEICO-like environment, check our acquisition criteria on page 21 and give me a call. I promise a fast answer and will mention your inquiry to no one except Charlie.
所以如果你同样也在管理一家盈利稳定的大型企业，并且向往在像GEICO保险一样的经营环境下蓬勃发展的话，建议你先看看我们报告后段的并购标准，然后打个电话给我，我保证一定会很快可以回复，而且除了查理之外，我不会把这件事告诉其它任何人。
To understand the huge potential at Executive Jet Aviation (EJA), you need some understanding of its business, which is selling fractional shares of jets and operating the fleet for its many owners. Rich Santulli, CEO of EJA, created the fractional ownership industry in 1986, by visualizing an important new way of using planes. Then he combined guts and talent to turn his idea into a major business.
想要了解EJA的无限潜力，你必须要先了解其业务特性，它专门出售部分企业行政专机所有权给客户，并为众多所有人维护保养机队，EJA的CEO理查德·桑图里(Richard Stantulli)设想了一种飞机使用的革命新方法，于是发挥其个人绝佳的胆识与才能让其创意成真，在1986年开创了公务机共享所有权这个新兴行业。
In a fractional ownership plan, you purchase a portion -- say 1/8th -- of any of a wide variety of jets that EJA offers. That purchase entitles you to 100 hours of flying time annually. ("Dead-head" hours don't count against your allotment, and you are also allowed to average your hours over five years.) In addition, you pay both a monthly management fee and a fee for hours actually flown.
按照公务机部分所有权计划，你购买的是EJA提供各系列飞机中所有权的一部分，比如说一架公务机1/8的所有权，这样你便可获得该飞机每年100个小时的飞行时数，但不包含飞机停机的时间，而且你还有权在五年内自由分配将这些时数，每个月要扣除一些管理费和按小时收取的飞行成本。
Then, on a few hours notice, EJA makes your plane, or another at least as good, available to you at your choice of the 5500 airports in the U.S. In effect, calling up your plane is like phoning for a taxi.
然后，你只要提前几个小时通知我们，EJA就可以在全美指定的5,500座机场为你安排好飞机或者提供另一架同样好的飞机，换言之，这种便利性跟你打电话叫出租车一样的方便。
I first heard about the NetJets® program, as it is called, about four years ago from Frank Rooney, our manager at H.H. Brown. Frank had used and been delighted with the service and suggested that I meet Rich to investigate signing up for my family's use. It took Rich about 15 minutes to sell me a quarter (200 hours annually) of a Hawker 1000. Since then, my family has learned firsthand -- through flying 900 hours on 300 trips -- what a friendly, efficient, and safe operation EJA runs. Quite simply, they love this service. In fact, they quickly grew so enthusiastic that I did a testimonial ad for EJA long before I knew there was any possibility of our purchasing the business. I did, however, ask Rich to give me a call if he ever got interested in selling. Luckily, he phoned me last May, and we quickly made a $725 million deal, paying equal amounts of cash and stock.
我是在四年前头一次听说Netjets(共享飞机所有权业务被称为Netjets®，2002年EJA公司更名为利捷航空Netjets)，是从我们旗下布朗鞋业经理人Frank Roony哪里听说的，Frank常常使用这项服务，并对其相当满意，于是他建议我可以和Rich碰个面，看看是否让我的家人也加入。结果Rich前后只花了15分钟的时间，就说服我买下一架Hawker1000型飞机1/4的所有权(也就是每年200小时)，从此之后，我的家人在经过900个飞行小时，300次旅程之后，亲身体到EJA是一个多么友好、高效与安全的运营方式，并毫无疑问地爱上它，所以在我知道我们有可能收购EJA之前很久，我就为 EJA 做了一次推荐广告。不过我确实跟Rich提到，如果他有意愿卖出的话，记得随时打电话给我，而幸运的是，Rich真的在去年5月份打电话给我，我们很快就达成这笔7.25亿美元的交易，其中现金与股票各半。
EJA, which is by far the largest operator in its industry, has more than 1,000 customers and 163 aircraft (including 23 "core" aircraft that are owned or leased by EJA itself, so that it can make sure that service is first-class even during the times when demand is heaviest). Safety, of course, is the paramount issue in any flight operation, and Rich's pilots -- now numbering about 650 -- receive extensive training at least twice a year from FlightSafety International, another Berkshire subsidiary and the world leader in pilot training. The bottom line on our pilots: I've sold the Berkshire plane and will now do all of my business flying, as well as my personal flying, with NetJets' crews.
EJA目前已是这个行业规模最大的公司，拥有超过1000位的客户以及163架的飞机，(其中包含23架由EJA自有或租来的核心飞机，约14%，用来确保在订位需求最强劲时还能保持最高品质的服务)，安全性当然是任何飞行运营中最重要的考量，而Rich旗下650位的飞行员每年都要到飞安国际公司(伯克希尔旗下全世界最大的飞行员训练公司)接受至少两次广泛的飞行训练。对我来说我能做的都做了：我已经卖掉了伯克希尔的专机，现在将与Netjets的机组同事一起，完成我所有的商务和个人飞行。
Being the leader in this industry is a major advantage for all concerned. Our customers gain because we have an armada of planes positioned throughout the country at all times, a blanketing that allows us to provide unmatched service. Meanwhile, we gain from the blanketing because it reduces dead-head costs. Another compelling attraction for our clients is that we offer products from Boeing, Gulfstream, Falcon, Cessna, and Raytheon, whereas our two competitors are owned by manufacturers that offer only their own planes. In effect, NetJets is like a physician who can recommend whatever medicine best fits the needs of each patient; our competitors, in contrast, are producers of a "house" brand that they must prescribe for one and all.
在这个行业成为领导品牌是我们的一个很大优势，我们的客户因为我们遍布全美各地的机队而受惠，这使得我们可以提供无与伦比的服务，同时，我们受益于高网络覆盖率而大幅降低飞机停在地面的时间。另一个令客户无法抵挡的致命吸引力是我们提供了各式各样的飞机，从波音、湾流、Falcon、Cessna到雷神，相较之下其它两家飞机制造商经营的竞争对手，只能提供自家生产的飞机。事实上，Netjets就好象是一位医生，可以为每个患者提供其所需的所有药物。而我们的竞争对手，为所有客户提供的只有自家品牌。
In many cases our clients, both corporate and individual, own fractions of several different planes and can therefore match specific planes to specific missions. For example, a client might own 1/16th of three different jets (each giving it 50 hours of flying time), which in total give it a virtual fleet, obtained for a small fraction of the cost of a single plane.
实际上我们有许多客户，包含企业与个人，同时拥有不同种类的飞机部分所有权，以应付不同场合所需不同的机型，举列来说，一个客户可以拥有三种飞机各1/16的所有权(也就是每架各50小时的飞行时数)，这等于只要花一架飞机成本的一小部分，就拥有一个虚拟机队。
Significantly, it is not only small businesses that can benefit from fractional ownership. Already, some of America's largest companies use NetJets as a supplement to their own fleet. This saves them big money in both meeting peak requirements and in flying missions that would require their wholly-owned planes to log a disproportionate amount of dead-head hours.
更重要的是，不仅仅是中小企业可以从这种分享服务中受益，目前已经有一些大企业利用Netjets服务来补充自身机队调度的不足，这为他们节省了大量资金，既可以满足高峰时的飞行需求，又可以在飞机闲置时去执行其他飞行任务。
When a plane is slated for personal use, the clinching argument is that either the client signs up now or his children likely will later. That's an equation I explained to my wonderful Aunt Alice 40 years ago when she asked me whether she could afford a fur coat. My reply settled the issue: "Alice, you aren't buying it; your heirs are."
当一架飞机被用来仅供个人使用，有一个很大的争议那就是，要么是由现在的客户买单，要么是由其后代来买单。这也是我最敬爱的阿姨Alice在40年前，问我是否应该买一件貂皮大衣时，我回答她的话："阿姨，你花的不是自己的钱，而是你的继承人的"。
EJA's growth has been explosive: In 1997, it accounted for 31% of all corporate jets ordered in the world. Nonetheless, Rich and I believe that the potential of fractional ownership has barely been scratched. If many thousands of owners find it sensible to own 100% of a plane -- which must be used 350-400 hours annually if it's to make economic sense -- there must be a large multiple of that number for whom fractional ownership works.
EJA正以爆炸性的速度成长，1997年，占全球公务机飞行订单的31%，不过Rice与我都认为飞机共享所有权的潜力根本还未充分的被挖掘，如果目前有成千上万的人认为拥有一整架飞机100%的所有权是明智的(从经济的角度，一家飞机每年必须使用350-400个小时)，那么一定有更多人需要拥有部分飞机的所有权。
In addition to being a terrific executive, Rich is fun. Like most of our managers, he has no economic need whatsoever to work. Rich spends his time at EJA because it's his baby -- and he wants to see how far he can take it. We both already know the answer, both literally and figuratively: to the ends of the earth.
Rich除了身为一位杰出的经理人之外，本人也非常风趣幽默，就像是我们旗下大多数的经理人一样，Rich根本就不需要靠工作来过活，Rich之所以愿意全心全力地投入在EJA，完全因为这是他的孩子，他想看看自己能够走多远，当然我们都已经知道最后的答案，不论是从文字上还是形象上都是永远。
And now a small hint to Berkshire directors: Last year I spent more than nine times my salary at Borsheim's and EJA. Just think how Berkshire's business would boom if you'd only spring for a raise.
另外给伯克希尔董事会们一个小暗示，去年我光是在波仙珠宝与EJA的花费就是我个人薪水收入的9倍以上，所以大家可以想象到只要给我一点小小的加薪，保证会对伯克希尔集团企业的生意有大大的提升。
On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition of General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124 countries.
12月21号我们完成对通用再保险公司220亿美金的并购案，除了拥有这家全美国最大的财产险再保险公司之外，这家公司还拥有世界上历史最悠久的科隆再保险公司(Cologne Re)82%的股权(包含预计准备要买进的股份。2003年通用再保险支付法国安盛保险公司8.17亿完成了交易，持股比例提高到89%)，两家公司共同为所有险种提供的再保险服务，并在全世界124个国家开展业务。
For many decades, General Re's name has stood for quality, integrity and professionalism in reinsurance -- and under Ron Ferguson's leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more. Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re's and Cologne Re's managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can teach us.
几十年来，通用再保险代表的是再保险行业的品质、诚信与专业，而在罗恩·弗格森(Ron Ferguson)的领导之下，这个招牌更加获得肯定，关于通用再保险的专业，伯克希尔实在没有太多的东西可以给他们，反倒是他们应该有很多的东西可以教我们。
Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire's ownership will benefit General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re's management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow the company to exploit its strengths.
不过我们仍然相信通用再保险加入伯克希尔将在许多方面受益，而在往后的十年内，通用再保险的盈利情况应该可以比合并之前要好的许多，而我们的自信心完全建立在我们能够提供通用再保险一个可以完全自由发挥其经营优势的环境。
Let's look for a moment at the reinsurance business to understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.
让我们花一点时间来了解，为何通用再保险自己运营没有办法像加入伯克希尔后那样发挥其优势，再保险的需求大部分来自于直保保险公司，他们想要规避大型的意外损失导致的盈利大幅波动，事实上，再保险公司就是靠吸收直保保险公司想要规避的波动性而获得利润。
Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by both its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are called "retrocessions") or rejecting good business simply because it threatens to bring on too much volatility.
讽刺的是，一家上市的再保险公司必须要同时接受股东以及外界评估其盈利稳定的检验，因此收益波动过大将会影响其金融市场的债信评级和股票市场的市盈率估值。就算就长期而言，这家公司可以期望获得令人满意的平均回报。市场的短期需求有时却可能导致再保险公司因此犯下重大的错误，包含被迫放弃原先接下的一大部分业务(业界一般称为转分保)，或者仅仅因为可能给盈利带来太大的波动性而放弃上门的好生意。
Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as it carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time. Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile earnings can't impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the perfect structure for writing -- and retaining -- reinsurance in virtually any amount. In fact, we've used this strength over the past decade to build a powerful super-cat business.
不过伯克希尔却很愿意接受这样的波动性，只要就长期而言，它的预期回报能够有好的表现。更重要的是，伯克希尔可以说是资本的诺克斯堡金库，也就是说任何收益的剧烈变动一点也不会影响到我们的债信评级，也因此我们有能力也有意愿签下并自留没有任何上限的再保保单，事实上，过去十年来，我们早已运用这个优势建立起强大的巨灾再保险业务。
What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force, technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re's outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by the constraints that have limited its growth.
而通用再保险可以提供给我们的是营销渠道、技术背景与管理技能，让我们得以将原本拥有的资本优势更充分运用到保险业的每一个层面，尤其是通用再保险与科隆再保险现在可以加速进军国际市场，这块市场是大家看好将呈现高成长的处女地，而就像合并案的公告说明书中所强调的，伯克希尔将为通用再保险带来税收与投资上的优势，但是更重要的原因还在于，通用再保险的优秀管理层将可以在既有的基础上，摆脱原有的种种束缚，尽情地发挥其成长潜能。
Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re's investment portfolio, though not for Cologne Re's. We will not, however, be involved in General Re's underwriting. We will simply ask the company to exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its geographical coverage -- making these moves in recognition of Berkshire's financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings. As we've long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.
伯克希尔将会承担管理通用再保险投资组合的工作(但科隆再保险不包含在内)，除此之外我们并不会干涉通用再保险的承保业务，我们只是很简单地要求他们继续维持原有的承保原则，同时利用伯克希尔强大的资本实力以及对收益变动的超强忍受力，增加自留业务的比例、扩大现有产品线、增加业务区域。就像是我们一再强调的，我们宁可接受波动剧烈的15%，也不要稳健平顺的12%。
Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re's new potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.
相信只要给他们一点时间，Ron跟他的团队一定能够将通用再保险的潜力发挥到极致，我跟他结识多年，彼此之间也一直维持有再保险业务上的往来。事实上，通用再保险在1976年GEICO保险当初东山再起的过程中，扮演极为重要的角色。
Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.
Ron跟Rich两人都将出席今年的股东会，希望届时大家可以过来跟他们两位打声招呼。
With the acquisition of General Re -- and with GEICO's business mushrooming -- it becomes more important than ever that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most important of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
随着通用再保险的加入以及GEICO保险业务的突飞猛进，大家越来越有必要对如何评估保险业有更多的了解，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这个行业所能产生的浮存金规模(2)以及获得它的成本(3)最重要的是这两个因素的长期展望。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金。在保险公司的营运中，浮存金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以覆盖最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它渠道取得资金的成本时，承保业务就有存在的价值，否则一旦保险业务取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗极酸的柠檬。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.
有一点必须特别注意的是，因为损失成本必须依赖估算，所以保险业者对于承保业绩有相当大调节的空间，连带使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司真正的浮存金成本，估计误差，通常是无心的，但有时却是故意，与真实的结果往往会有很大的差距，而这种结果直接反映在公司的损益表上，有经验的行家通常可以经由公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误，但对于一般投资大众来说，除了被迫接受财务报表的数字之外，别无他法，而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师事务所背书的财务报告所吓到，至于就伯克希尔本身而言，查理跟我在编列财务报表时，都尽量采取最保守的做法，因为我们发现，保险业所发生的意外，通常都不会是什么好消息。
The table that follows shows the float generated by Berkshire's insurance operations since we entered the business 32 years ago. The data are for every fifth year and also the last, which includes General Re's huge float. For the table we have calculated our float -- which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume -- by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下表中所显示的数字是，伯克希尔进入保险业务32年以来所贡献的浮存金，其中1998年包含通用再保险的巨额浮存金在内。在这张计算浮存金的表中，我们将所有的损失准备金、损失费用调整准备金、再保险假设和未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付并购成本、预付税负以及取得再保险业务的相关递延费用，得出浮存金的数额，弄清楚了吗？相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的。
| Year 年份 |
Average Float (in $ millions) 平均浮存金近似成本 |
|---|---|
| 1967 | 17 |
| 1972 | 70 |
| 1977 | 139 |
| 1982 | 221 |
| 1987 | 1,267 |
| 1992 | 2,290 |
| 1997 | 7,093 |
| 1998 | 22,762 (yearend) |
Impressive as the growth in our float has been -- 25.4% compounded annually -- what really counts is the cost of this item. If that becomes too high, growth in float becomes a curse rather than a blessing.
平均浮存金规模年化25.4%的成长确实令人印象深刻，不过真正重要的是取得浮存金的成本，如果成本过高，那么浮存金的成长就可能变成一项诅咒而非幸福。
At Berkshire, the news is all good: Our average cost over the 32 years has been well under zero. In aggregate, we have posted a substantial underwriting profit, which means that we have been paid for holding a large and growing amount of money. This is the best of all worlds. Indeed, though our net float is recorded on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had more economic value to us than an equal amount of net worth would have had. As long as we can continue to achieve an underwriting profit, float will continue to outrank net worth in value.
在伯克希尔我们的记录算是不错的了，32年来我们的平均成本远低于零，总的来说，我们享有相当多的承保收益，也就是说我们在持有一笔大额且不断成长的资金的同时，还能获得额外的收益，这是世界最佳。虽然就会计原则而言，浮存金在会计报表系属于负债，但实际上，这些负债对于伯克希尔而言，其价值远高于帐列的等量的股东权益，而只要我们在承保上能够持续维持盈利的话，这些浮存金的价值就远胜于帐上的账面价值。
During the next few years, Berkshire's growth in float may well be modest. The reinsurance market is soft, and in this business, relationships change slowly. Therefore, General Re's float -- 2/3rds of our total -- is unlikely to increase significantly in the near term. We do expect, however, that our cost of float will remain very attractive compared to that of other insurers.
在往后的几年内，伯克希尔浮存金的成长速度可能会略微减缓，再保险的市场相对低迷，在这行商业竞争关系的变动相当缓慢，也因此占我们总浮存金将近2/3的通用再保险浮存金在可见的未来很难有重大的进展，不过我们仍然预期伯克希尔浮存金的成本相较于其它同业能够维持相当低的水准。
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 62 and 63, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，在这张表中购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各业务的收益状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。
| Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益（伯克希尔应占） |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)税后收益（伯克希尔应占） | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (in millions) 以百万美金计 |
1998 | 1997 | 1998 | 1997 |
| Operating Earnings: | ||||
| Insurance Group: | ||||
| Underwriting -- Super-Cat 保险承保：巨灾再保险 |
$ 154 | $ 283 | $ 100 | $ 183 |
| Underwriting -- Other Reinsurance 保险承保：其他再保险 |
(175) | (155) | (114) | (100) |
| Underwriting -- GEICO 保险承保：GEICO |
269 | 281 | 175 | 181 |
| Underwriting -- Other Primary 保险承保：其他直保 |
17 | 53 | 10 | 34 |
| Net investment income 保险投资：净投资收益 |
974 | 882 | 731 | 704 |
| Buffalo News 布法罗新闻 |
53 | 56 | 32 | 33 |
| Finance and Financial Products Businesses 金融业务 |
205 | 28 | 133 | 18 |
| Flight Services 飞安公司 |
181(1) | 140 | 110(1) | 84 |
| Home Furnishings家具业务 | 72 | 57(2) | 41 | 32(2) |
| International Dairy Queen 冰雪皇后 |
58 | -- | 35 | -- |
| Jewelry 珠宝业务 |
39 | 32 | 23 | 18 |
| Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) Scott Fether+Kirby+图书 |
137 | 119 | 85 | 77 |
| See’s Candies 喜诗糖果 |
62 | 59 | 40 | 35 |
| Shoe Group 鞋业集团 |
33 | 49 | 23 | 32 |
| General Re 通用再保险 |
26(3) | -- | 16(3) | -- |
| Purchase-Accounting Adjustments 购买法会计调整 |
(123) | (101) | (118) | (94) |
| Interest Expense(4) 利息费用 |
(100) | (107) | (63) | (67) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions 股东指定捐赠 |
(17) | (15) | (11) | (10) |
| Other 其他（制服） |
34 | 60 | 29 | 37 |
| Operating Earnings 经营收益 |
1,899 | 1,721 | 1,277 | 1,197 |
| Capital Gains from Investments 出售资产和已实现证劵收益 |
2,415 | 1,106 | 1,553 | 704 |
| Total Earnings - All Entities 所有实体-收益合计 |
$ 4,314 | $ 2,827 | $ 2,830 | $ 1,901 |
(1) Includes Executive Jet from August 7, 1998.
(1)包含公务机航空EJA自1998年8月7号之后的收益；
(2) Includes Star Furniture from July 1, 1997.
(2)包含明星家具自1997年7月1日之后的收益；
(3) From date of acquisition, December 21, 1998.
(3) 通用再保险GeneRe自收购之日1998年12月21日开始；
(4) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
(4)利息费用扣除金融业务利息费用。
You can be proud of our operating managers. They almost invariably deliver earnings that are at the very top of what conditions in their industries allow, meanwhile fortifying their businesses' long-term competitive strengths. In aggregate, they have created many billions of dollars of value for you.
大家绝对可以以我们旗下优秀的经理人为荣，他们几乎都能够在各自产业所能允许的情况下创造出最好的盈利，同时还能继续强化企业长期的竞争优势，总的来说，他们已为所有的股东创造出数十亿美元的价值。
An example: In my 1994 letter, I reported on Ralph Schey's extraordinary performance at Scott Fetzer. Little did I realize that he was just warming up. Last year Scott Fetzer, operating with no leverage (except for a conservative level of debt in its finance subsidiary), earned a record $96.5 million after-tax on its $112 million net worth.
举例来说，在1994年的年报中，我曾经向各位提到Ralph在斯科特费泽的杰出表现，只是我万万没想到的是那时还只能算是他的热身阶段，去年在没有任何借款的情况下(除了其财务子公司的保守借款外)，靠着1.12亿美元的账面价值，竟缔造出创纪录的9,650万美元的惊人税后收益。
Today, Berkshire has an unusually large number of individuals, such as Ralph, who are truly legends in their industries. Many of these joined us when we purchased their companies, but in recent years we have also identified a number of strong managers internally. We further expanded our corps of all-stars in an important way when we acquired General Re and EJA.
时至今日，伯克希尔有一大群杰出的明星经理人，就像Ralph等在各自的业务也都是一方传奇，其中很多人是在我们买下公司时，就已经加入了我们的行列，不过近来年我们也从内部发掘出不少人才，而最近在并购通用再保险与EJA之后，更让我们的梦幻队伍声势大振。
Charlie and I have the easy jobs at Berkshire: We do very little except allocate capital. And, even then, we are not all that energetic. We have one excuse, though: In allocating capital, activity does not correlate with achievement. Indeed, in the fields of investments and acquisitions, frenetic behavior is often counterproductive. Therefore, Charlie and I mainly just wait for the phone to ring.
查理跟我在伯克希尔的工作其实很简单，主要的任务就是资金分配，即便是如此我们的态度也不是那么的积极，其中有一个原因在于，做的多不代表得到的多。事实上，在投资与并购领域，疯狂的行为往往会适得其反，也因此查理跟我通常都只是静静地等待电话铃响。
Our managers, however, work very hard -- and it shows. Naturally, they want to be paid fairly for their efforts, but pay alone can't explain their extraordinary accomplishments. Instead, each is primarily motivated by a vision of just how far his or her business can go -- and by a desire to be the one who gets it there. Charlie and I thank them on your behalf and ours.
当然我们的经理人也非常的努力，且成效显著，而很自然的，他们也希望自己的努力可以得到公平的对待，只是金钱的回报并不足以解释他们为何能有这样杰出的成就，主要的动力还在于，每个经理人都想要了解自己所带领的企业到底能够发挥到怎样的境界。为此，查理跟我谨代表大家向他们致上十二万分的谢意。
Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 39-53, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 65-71, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的各部门信息，另外你还可以找到经过重编，依照伯克希尔四大部门编列的信息，这是查理跟我认为最能够完整呈现伯克希尔现况的模式。
Normally, we follow this section with one on "Look-Through" Earnings. Because the General Re acquisition occurred near yearend, though, neither a historical nor a pro-forma calculation of a 1998 number seems relevant. We will resume the look-through calculation in next year's report.
通常接下来这一段应该是报告完整透视收益，但是由于通用再保险的并购案发生的时点接近年底，所以不管是历史性或拟制性的1998年的盈利数字都已无关紧要，在明年的报告中，我们会再恢复完整透视收益的计算式。
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $750 million are itemized.
下表是伯克希尔市价超过7.5亿美元以上的股票投资。
| Shares | Company 股份数量 |
Cost* 12/31/98 (dollars in millions) 成本 |
Market 12/31/98 (dollars in millions) 市值 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50,536,900 | American Express Company 美国运通-增持 |
$ 1,470 | $ 5,180 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company 可口可乐 |
1,299 | 13,400 |
| 51,202,242 | The Walt Disney Company 迪士尼-减持 |
281 | 1,536 |
| 60,298,000 | Freddie Mac 房地美 |
308 | 3,885 |
| 96,000,000 | The Gillette Company 吉列-1 拆 2 |
600 | 4,590 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company华盛顿邮报 | 11 | 999 |
| 63,595,180 | Wells Fargo & Company 富国银行-1 拆 10 |
392 | 2,540 |
| Others 其他 |
2,683 | 5,135 | |
| Total Common Stocks 合计 |
$ 7,044 | $ 37,265 |
* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.5 billion less than GAAP cost.
* 成本以税务为基础的，比GAAP的帐面成本少15亿美元
During the year, we slightly increased our holdings in American Express, one of our three largest commitments, and left the other two unchanged. However, we trimmed or substantially cut many of our smaller positions. Here, I need to make a confession (ugh): The portfolio actions I took in 1998 actually decreased our gain for the year. In particular, my decision to sell McDonald's was a very big mistake. Overall, you would have been better off last year if I had regularly snuck off to the movies during market hours.
今年我们稍微提高了在美国运通的持股，至于其余另外两项重大的股票投资则维持不变，不过在此同时我们也大幅出脱其余一些较小的投资部位，在这里我也必须承认，嗯！我在1998年做的一些举动事实上导致我们的利得不增反减，尤其是过早决定卖出麦当劳使得我们损失惨重，也就是说如果去年我在股票交易时间一动也不动的话，大家可能会更好过一点。
At yearend, we held more than $15 billion in cash equivalents (including high-grade securities due in less than one year). Cash never makes us happy. But it's better to have the money burning a hole in Berkshire's pocket than resting comfortably in someone else's. Charlie and I will continue our search for large equity investments or, better yet, a really major business acquisition that would absorb our liquid assets. Currently, however, we see nothing on the horizon.
到年底，我们手上持有超过150亿美元的类现金(包含一年内到期的优质债券)，抱着这么多现金耐心等待机会让我们感到相当不自在，但我们宁愿让这150亿美元烂在我们口袋，也不要让他们轻轻松松落入他人手里。当然查理跟我还是会继续去寻找合适的大型股票投资，当然要是能来一个真正的企业并购案会更好，以消化我们手上过剩的流动资金，不过到目前为止，我们还没有发现任何潜在的目标。
Once we knew that the General Re merger would definitely take place, we asked the company to dispose of the equities that it held. (As mentioned earlier, we do not manage the Cologne Re portfolio, which includes many equities.) General Re subsequently eliminated its positions in about 250 common stocks, incurring $935 million of taxes in the process. This "clean sweep" approach reflects a basic principle that Charlie and I employ in business and investing: We don't back into decisions.
当整个合并案正式完成之后，我们立刻要求该公司卖出手头上所有的股票投资(就像之前提到过的，不包含科隆再保险的投资组合)，通用再保险随即将手上超过250种以上的证券清仓，为此还缴了9.35亿美元的税，这个干净利落的清仓动作充分反应查理跟我在经营与投资上的基本原则，我们不替过去决策背书。
Last year I deviated from my standard practice of not disclosing our investments (other than those we are legally required to report) and told you about three unconventional investments we had made. There were several reasons behind that disclosure. First, questions about our silver position that we had received from regulatory authorities led us to believe that they wished us to publicly acknowledge this investment. Second, our holdings of zero-coupon bonds were so large that we wanted our owners to know of this investment's potential impact on Berkshire's net worth. Third, we simply wanted to alert you to the fact that we sometimes do make unconventional commitments.
去年我打破从来不主动公开投资组合的惯例(除非法令有特别要求)，告诉大家我们最近参与的三项非常规投资，之所以会这样做主要有几个原因，第一，关于白银投资，监管机构提出的一些问题，让我们感觉他们希望我们能够公开承认这项投资的存在；第二，零息债券的投资仓位够大，我们希望股东知晓该投资对公司账面价值的潜在影响；第三，我们只是要让大家知道，三不五时我们还是会做出一些与以往大不相同的投资动作。
Normally, however, as discussed in the Owner's Manual on page 61, we see no advantage in talking about specific investment actions. Therefore -- unless we again take a position that is particularly large -- we will not post you as to what we are doing in respect to any specific holding of an unconventional sort. We can report, however, that we have eliminated certain of the positions discussed last year and added certain others.
不过就像是我们在股东手册一再提到的，我们认为主动披露特定的投资动作不会给公司带来任何的好处，因此，除非我们再度在某些特别的项目有非常大笔投资，我们将不会再向各位报告我们在某些非常规投资的有关事项。当然，我们还是会定期向大家报告去年我们清仓的或是新增的某些投资部位。
Our never-comment-even-if-untrue policy in regard to investments may disappoint "piggybackers" but will benefit owners: Your Berkshire shares would be worth less if we discussed what we are doing. Incidentally, we should warn you that media speculation about our investment moves continues in most cases to be incorrect. People who rely on such commentary do so at their own peril.
我们这种对投资"即使不实也不评论"的做法，既让一些有意搭顺风车的人无法得逞，也能达到保护股东利益的目的，因为如果我们不断地公开讨论所有的投资细节，将会严重损及各位所持有的伯克希尔股份的价值，同时我也要提醒大家通常媒体报导有关我们的投资动向往往都是错误的，相信他们话的人请自担风险。
Our General Re acquisition put a spotlight on an egregious flaw in accounting procedure. Sharp-eyed shareholders reading our proxy statement probably noticed an unusual item on page 60. In the pro-forma statement of income -- which detailed how the combined 1997 earnings of the two entities would have been affected by the merger -- there was an item stating that compensation expense would have been increased by $63 million.
我们与通用再保险之间的并购案反映出会计原则一直以来存在的一个重大瑕疵，眼尖的股东在阅读合并相关的股东文件时，应该都会发现其中有一项不寻常的项目，在制式的损益表中，清楚说明了合并对两者1997年的合并收益的影响，其中有一项薪资费用因为合并而增加了6,300万美元。
This item, we hasten to add, does not signal that either Charlie or I have experienced a major personality change. (He still travels coach and quotes Ben Franklin.) Nor does it indicate any shortcoming in General Re's accounting practices, which have followed GAAP to the letter. Instead, the pro-forma adjustment came about because we are replacing General Re's longstanding stock option plan with a cash plan that ties the incentive compensation of General Re managers to their operating achievements. Formerly what counted for these managers was General Re's stock price; now their payoff will come from the business performance they deliver.
我必须特别强调一下，这个科目并不代表查理跟我的原则发生了任何重大的改变(他还是乘坐经济舱出行，并引用富兰克林的话)，同时也不表示通用再保险本身的会计政策有何疏失之处，该公司业已完全依照一般公认会计原则运作。相反，形式上的调整是因为，我们正用一个现金奖励计划取代通用再保险长期以来的股票期权计划。新奖励计划将通用再保险经理人的激励性薪酬与他们的经营业绩挂钩，而此前与这些经理人利益息息相关的是公司的股价，现在，他们的回报完全要看他们各自负责业务的绩效表现。
The new plan and the terminated option arrangement have matching economics, which means that the rewards they deliver to employees should, for a given level of performance, be the same. But what these people could have formerly anticipated earning from new option grants will now be paid in cash. (Options granted in past years remain outstanding.)
新计划与终止的认股期权计划对公司员工来说具有相同的经济效益，也就是说在相同的表现之下，公司给予员工奖励是同样的，只不过原先大家预期可以获得的股票将以现金取代，至于先前已经发放的期权则予以保留。
Though the two plans are an economic wash, the cash plan we are putting in will produce a vastly different accounting result. This Alice-in-Wonderland outcome occurs because existing accounting principles ignore the cost of stock options when earnings are being calculated, even though options are a huge and increasing expense at a great many corporations. In effect, accounting principles offer management a choice: Pay employees in one form and count the cost, or pay them in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder then that the use of options has mushroomed. This lop-sided choice has a big downside for owners, however: Though options, if properly structured, can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way to compensate and motivate top managers, they are more often wildly capricious in their distribution of rewards, inefficient as motivators, and inordinately expensive for shareholders.
虽然两项计划在经济实质上相当，但我们实施的现金奖励计划在会计帐面上却相当不利，这种爱莉丝梦游仙境的结果主要是因为，现有的会计原则在计算公司盈利时，根本上忽略认股票期权的成本，虽然期权成本早已成为许多大企业庞大且不断增加的负担。事实上，会计原则给予公司经理人一个相当弹性的空间，若你以现金形式支付员工回报，就必须计入成本，但若你以另一种期权形式支付则不必。因此，员工股票期权已经到了过度泛滥的地步就不足为奇了。然而，一面倒地采用期权方式对公司的股东利益却非常不利，虽然我承认，如果期权结构合理，有时候是可以成为一种理想补偿和激励高级经理人的好方法，只是大部分的时候，他们通常过于慷慨，严重损及原有股东利益，并不适合作为一项好的激励工具。
Whatever the merits of options may be, their accounting treatment is outrageous. Think for a moment of that $190 million we are going to spend for advertising at GEICO this year. Suppose that instead of paying cash for our ads, we paid the media in ten-year, at-the-market Berkshire options. Would anyone then care to argue that Berkshire had not borne a cost for advertising, or should not be charged this cost on its books?
不过不管股票期权到底有怎样的优点，有关它们的会计处理原则实在是太离谱，试想今年我们预计投入1.9亿美元在GEICO保险汽车保险的广告之上，假若我们不支付现金而改以同等价值的伯克希尔股票期权作为给予厂商的对价，那么有没有人会跳出来说伯克希尔的广告怎么就可以不花一毛钱，难道它不应该反应在公司的会计帐簿之上吗？
Perhaps Bishop Berkeley -- you may remember him as the philosopher who mused about trees falling in a forest when no one was around -- would believe that an expense unseen by an accountant does not exist. Charlie and I, however, have trouble being philosophical about unrecorded costs. When we consider investing in an option-issuing company, we make an appropriate downward adjustment to reported earnings, simply subtracting an amount equal to what the company could have realized by publicly selling options of like quantity and structure. Similarly, if we contemplate an acquisition, we include in our evaluation the cost of replacing any option plan. Then, if we make a deal, we promptly take that cost out of hiding.
或许Berkeley大主教(大家或许还记得他是一位哲学家，他曾经提到一棵倒在无人迹深山中的大树的笑话)会真的相信会计师没有发现的成本就代表它不存在，不过要查理跟我接受这样的概念实在是有点困难，当我们考虑要投资一家有发行期权的公司，我们会先将这家公司报告的收益适度向下修正，直接扣除若对外公开发行这些期权所能得到的对价。同样的，要是我们准备要并购一家公司时，我们将会再评估中计入替换原有期权计划的成本，然后等到合并案正式完成后，我们会立即将相关成本反应在会计帐面上。
Readers who disagree with me about options will by this time be mentally quarreling with my equating the cost of options issued to employees with those that might theoretically be sold and traded publicly. It is true, to state one of these arguments, that employee options are sometimes forfeited -- that lessens the damage done to shareholders -- whereas publicly-offered options would not be. It is true, also, that companies receive a tax deduction when employee options are exercised; publicly-traded options deliver no such benefit. But there's an offset to these points: Options issued to employees are often repriced, a transformation that makes them much more costly than the public variety.
在期权问题上与我意见不一致的读者，此时在心理上可能会抗议我将发给员工期权的成本跟对外公开发行的股票期权划上等号。诚然，在这些争辩中，员工期权有时会被回收，使得股东权益受损的程度有可能会减小，公开发行的期权则不会。同样，员工在行使期权时，公司也会获得税收抵免，公开发行的期权也没有这项好处。但在相反一面，员工期权的转换价格常常会做修正，比起公开发行的期权来说，所付出的代价更为高昂。
It's sometimes argued that a non-transferable option given to an employee is less valuable to him than would be a publicly-traded option that he could freely sell. That fact, however, does not reduce the cost of the non-transferable option Giving an employee a company car that can only be used for certain purposes diminishes its value to the employee, but does not in the least diminish its cost to the employer.
还有人认为，对于员工来说，有限售期的员工期权与公开交易的期权相比，其价值要来得低。然而这一事实并没有降低公司发行不可转让期权的成本，就像是公司配给员工的配车，虽然限制员工只能作为公务使用，但是这并不能降低公司买车的成本。
The earning revisions that Charlie and I have made for options in recent years have frequently cut the reported per-share figures by 5%, with 10% not all that uncommon. On occasion, the downward adjustment has been so great that it has affected our portfolio decisions, causing us either to make a sale or to pass on a stock purchase we might otherwise have made.
近年来，查理跟我会对带有期权的账面收益向下修正，通常将每股收益数字砍去5%，砍10%的情况也不少见。有时向下调整的幅度太大，以致于影响了我们的投资决策，导致我们要么卖出要么放弃买进。
A few years ago we asked three questions in these pages to which we have not yet received an answer: "If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?"
几年前，我们就曾提出至今还没有得到解答的三个问题："如果期权不算是一种补偿的话，那它又算是什么？而如果给予员工的补偿不算是一种成本的话？那它又算是什么？而如果成本不必列入损益表计算收益的话，那么又应该把它们摆到哪里去呢？"
The role that managements have played in stock-option accounting has hardly been benign: A distressing number of both CEOs and auditors have in recent years bitterly fought FASB's attempts to replace option fiction with truth and virtually none have spoken out in support of FASB. Its opponents even enlisted Congress in the fight, pushing the case that inflated figures were in the national interest.
管理层在员工股票期权会计问题上所扮演的角色很难是正面的，近年来，许多CEO与会计师极力反对美国财务会计准则委员会FASB试图将期权计入成本的做法，反对者甚至动员国会议员参与游说，甚至将这种收益虚增提升到国家利益的层次。
Still, I believe that the behavior of managements has been even worse when it comes to restructurings and merger accounting. Here, many managements purposefully work at manipulating numbers and deceiving investors. And, as Michael Kinsley has said about Washington: "The scandal isn't in what's done that's illegal but rather in what's legal."
尽管如此，我认为有些管理层在公司重组与合并的会计处理上的行为更糟，很多管理层故意操纵损益数字欺骗投资人，正如Michael Kinsley曾经批评华府所说的：真正的丑闻不是那些违反法律的，而是那些完全合法的行为。在以前通过财务报表，很容易可以分辨一家公司的好坏。
It was once relatively easy to tell the good guys in accounting from the bad: The late 1960's, for example, brought on an orgy of what one charlatan dubbed "bold, imaginative accounting" (the practice of which, incidentally, made him loved for a time by Wall Street because he never missed expectations). But most investors of that period knew who was playing games. And, to their credit, virtually all of America's most-admired companies then shunned deception.
如1960年代末掀起一波被骗徒称之为"大胆且富想象力的会计"的热潮。这种做法在当时受到华尔街人士的热烈追捧，因为他们从来都不会让人失望。不过在当时大家都知道谁是老千。而且值得称道的是，几乎所有受到崇敬的美国大公司基本上都洁身自好。
In recent years, probity has eroded. Many major corporations still play things straight, but a significant and growing number of otherwise high-grade managers -- CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses for your children or as trustees under your will -- have come to the view that it's okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall Street's desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind of manipulation is not only okay, but actually their duty.
近年来，道德逐渐沦丧，虽然许多大企业还是坚持走正道，但越来越多所谓高格调的经理人，(就是那种你想要把女儿许配给他或请他担任遗嘱执行人的人)，渐渐认为玩弄数字以满足华尔街预期的做法没有什么大不了的。事实上，有许多经理人不但觉得这类操纵收益的行为很正常，甚至是他们的工作责任之一。
These managers start with the assumption, all too common, that their job at all times is to encourage the highest stock price possible (a premise with which we adamantly disagree). To pump the price, they strive, admirably, for operational excellence. But when operations don't produce the result hoped for, these CEOs resort to unadmirable accounting stratagems. These either manufacture the desired "earnings" or set the stage for them in the future.
这些经理人一开始往往就认定他们的主要工作之一是让公司的股价越高越好，(关于这点我们实在不敢苟同)，而为了撑高股价，他们可以说是无所不用其极地在公司的运营上冲刺，但是当运营结果不若预期时，他们就会诉诸难以想象的会计手法，要么"制造"出想要的收益数字，要么为未来的收益数字创造条件。
Rationalizing this behavior, these managers often say that their shareholders will be hurt if their currency for doing deals -- that is, their stock -- is not fully-priced, and they also argue that in using accounting shenanigans to get the figures they want, they are only doing what everybody else does. Once such an everybody's-doing-it attitude takes hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Bad accounting drives out good.
而为了让这样的行为合理化，这些经理人常常表示，如果公司股票的价格不能合理反应其价值，则公司股东的权益将会受损，同时他们还辩称，在运用会计诡计来获得想要的数字的时，他们只是在做其他人都在做的事，而一旦这种"人人都在做"的态度确立后，道德上的顾虑就消失殆尽了，Gresham之子称这样的行为叫做：糟糕的会计会驱逐好的会计。
The distortion du jour is the "restructuring charge," an accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a device for manipulating earnings. In this bit of legerdemain, a large chunk of costs that should properly be attributed to a number of years is dumped into a single quarter, typically one already fated to disappoint investors. In some cases, the purpose of the charge is to clean up earnings misrepresentations of the past, and in others it is to prepare the ground for future misrepresentations. In either case, the size and timing of these charges is dictated by the cynical proposition that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five cents per share.
有一种会计科目叫做"重组损失"，在法律上虽然合法但却通常被用作操纵损益的工具。在这次特别设计的骗局中，通常公司会将多年来累积的成本在单一季度一次性提列损失，而这个季度必定让投资人大失所望。有时候，公司则是为了将过去虚假不实的收益一次性出清，或是为虚增未来年度的收益预先做准备。不管怎样，这些做法的主要前提都是基于这样一种心理：华尔街只关心未来年度的收益高于预期的五分钱，却一点也不在乎公司当季的收益少了五美元。
This dump-everything-into-one-quarter behavior suggests a corresponding "bold, imaginative" approach to -- golf scores. In his first round of the season, a golfer should ignore his actual performance and simply fill his card with atrocious numbers -- double, triple, quadruple bogeys -- and then turn in a score of, say, 140. Having established this "reserve," he should go to the golf shop and tell his pro that he wishes to "restructure" his imperfect swing. Next, as he takes his new swing onto the course, he should count his good holes, but not the bad ones. These remnants from his old swing should be charged instead to the reserve established earlier. At the end of five rounds, then, his record will be 140, 80, 80, 80, 80 rather than 91, 94, 89, 94, 92. On Wall Street, they will ignore the 140 -- which, after all, came from a "discontinued" swing -- and will classify our hero as an 80 shooter (and one who never disappoints).
这种将所有的垃圾在当季一次性出清的做法，跟高尔夫球场上一种大胆投机的得分方法类似，在球季一开始，取巧的高尔夫球员忽略自身的实际实力，先在计分卡上填上最糟糕的成绩(柏忌、双柏忌、三柏忌)，结果一算下来可能有140杆之多。建立这个储备之后，接着他再跑到高尔夫俱乐部给教练表示他想要调整一下不理想的挥杆，然后等到他再度回到球场上时，他就专挑打的好的洞的成绩，而不好的部分则全部归到先前所预留的储备中。结果五回合下来，他的成绩就变成140杆、80杆、80杆、80杆、80杆，而不是本来的91杆、94杆、89杆、94杆、92杆。不过对华尔街的哪些人来说，他们根本就不管最前面的140杆，因为那不是正常情况下的表现，然后直接把这位选手归类为平均80杆的高手(而且成绩还相当稳定)。
For those who prefer to cheat up front, there would be a variant of this strategy. The golfer, playing alone with a cooperative caddy-auditor, should defer the recording of bad holes, take four 80s, accept the plaudits he gets for such athleticism and consistency, and then turn in a fifth card carrying a 140 score. After rectifying his earlier scorekeeping sins with this "big bath," he may mumble a few apologies but will refrain from returning the sums he has previously collected from comparing scorecards in the clubhouse. (The caddy, need we add, will have acquired a loyal patron.)
而对于这种喜欢预先作弊的球员来说，这种策略会有一种变体。这位球员与一位能够配合的球童单独比赛，也就是会计师，好让他可以将不好的洞数往后递延，顺利地先拿下四局80杆，使得这位球员可以得到表现杰出且稳定的运动家称号后，然后再交出第五局的140杆球卡，用一场大洗澡纠正前面的欠账。他随便应付几句抱歉的话，但他不会退还之前在俱乐部比较加分卡时赢得的金额。而这位球童，不用我们说，当然是深得其老板的心，不怕下次得不到主人的惠顾。
Unfortunately, CEOs who use variations of these scoring schemes in real life tend to become addicted to the games they're playing -- after all, it's easier to fiddle with the scorecard than to spend hours on the practice tee -- and never muster the will to give them up. Their behavior brings to mind Voltaire's comment on sexual experimentation: "Once a philosopher, twice a pervert."
不幸的是，现实中使用这些惯用作弊技俩的CEO往往习惯于玩这种把戏，毕竟与其花费时间在辛苦练习上，还不如轻轻松松在计分卡上动动手脚，要说服他们放弃不玩可能比登天还难，他们这种行为不禁让我想到法国文豪伏尔泰对于性实验的评论：一回生，二回熟。(伏尔泰一次到妓院去体验生活，事后有人问他感觉如何，他回答说，第一次去还算是哲学家，但要是再去的话，可能便会成为堕落者)。
In the acquisition arena, restructuring has been raised to an art form: Managements now frequently use mergers to dishonestly rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them to both smooth and swell future earnings. Indeed, at deal time, major auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, first-class people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics. CEOs understandably do not find it easy to reject auditor-blessed strategies that lead to increased future "earnings."
在并购领域，重组已被提升至艺术的层次，经理人现在越来越习惯通过合并来操控公司资产与负债的价值，以使得公司未来的收益能够平稳地虚增。事实上，在交易的时候，大型的会计师事务所偶尔也会建议公司来点小小会计戏法(当然有时也可能会搞的很大)。而在得到领路者的引诱，一流的人格往往会屈服于三流的伎俩，CEO实在是很难拒绝会计师所提出让公司未来收益好看一点的美意。
An example from the property-casualty insurance industry will illuminate the possibilities. When a p-c company is acquired, the buyer sometimes simultaneously increases its loss reserves, often substantially. This boost may merely reflect the previous inadequacy of reserves -- though it is uncanny how often an actuarial "revelation" of this kind coincides with the inking of a deal. In any case, the move sets up the possibility of 'earnings" flowing into income at some later date, as reserves are released.
财产意外险业有一个很好的例子可以作为说明，当一家公司取得另一家财产险公司时，买方通常会顺势大幅补提大量的损失准备金，这项举动只会凸显以前损失准备提拨不足的问题。虽然你会发现这种精算调整的时机与整个交易签字的时点是如此令人惊异的巧合。更重要的是，这样的举动等于是为以后损失准备回冲，以增加公司未来盈利数字所预埋的伏笔。
Berkshire has kept entirely clear of these practices: If we are to disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our accounting. In all of our acquisitions, we have left the loss reserve figures exactly as we found them. After all, we have consistently joined with insurance managers knowledgeable about their business and honest in their financial reporting. When deals occur in which liabilities are increased immediately and substantially, simple logic says that at least one of those virtues must have been lacking -- or, alternatively, that the acquirer is laying the groundwork for future infusions of "earnings."
不过伯克希尔从来都不会干这类的勾当，如果我们真要让你们失望，那么宁愿是真实的盈利情况而不是会计手法。在我们所有的并购案当中，我们皆让损失准备的数字保持在当初我们发觉时的水准，因为一直以来与我们共事的保险业务经理人都很了解自己本业的状况，同时在财务报表的编制上也都坦诚布公。所以，如果是在这些并购案进行的同时，还发生负债大幅增加的状况的话，那么就代表这些美德其中之一出现了问题，或者说并购方为虚增未来收益预留的后路。
Here's a true story that illustrates an all-too-common view in corporate America. The CEOs of two large banks, one of them a man who'd made many acquisitions, were involved not long ago in a friendly merger discussion (which in the end didn't produce a deal). The veteran acquirer was expounding on the merits of the possible combination, only to be skeptically interrupted by the other CEO: "But won't that mean a huge charge," he asked, "perhaps as much as $1 billion?" The "sophisticate" wasted no words: "We'll make it bigger than that -- that's why we're doing the deal."
这里有一件真实的故事充分说明美国企业普遍存在的一种观点。有两家大型银行的CEO，其中有一位主导了很多并购案，在不久前参与了一项友善并购的讨论(虽然后来并没有成功)，正当这位经验丰富的并购老手侃侃而谈合并后可能的种种好处时，突然被另一位CEO的问题给打断：那不是意味着高额的成本吗？我想可能不下十亿美元吧！这位老练的银行家毫不迟疑的回答到：这正是我们要做这笔交易的原因，而且我们想把它搞的更大。
A preliminary tally by R. G. Associates, of Baltimore, of special charges taken or announced during 1998 -- that is, charges for restructuring, in-process R&D, merger-related items, and write-downs -- identified no less than 1,369 of these, totaling $72.1 billion. That is a staggering amount as evidenced by this bit of perspective: The 1997 earnings of the 500 companies in Fortune's famous list totaled $324 billion.
根据巴尔的摩R.G.协会初步的统计，光是1998年宣布或认列的特别费用，包含重组费用、研发费用、并购费用以及减值费用等共计1369项，加总的金额就超过721亿美元。这真是一个惊人的数字。相比之下，1997年财富500大企业的总盈利也不过是3240亿美元而已。
Clearly the attitude of disrespect that many executives have today for accurate reporting is a business disgrace. And auditors, as we have already suggested, have done little on the positive side. Though auditors should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their pay. ("Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.")
显然，现今许多经理人对于编制正确报表的藐视态度可说是商业界的一大耻辱，正如我们先前所提到的，会计师在导正这种偏见方面几乎没有什么作为。尽管理论上会计师应该要把投资大众当作是他们的老板，但他们却选择向那些有权决定会计师人选并发放薪酬的经理人卑躬屈膝(唉！正所谓拿人手短)。
A big piece of news, however, is that the SEC, led by its chairman, Arthur Levitt, seems determined to get corporate America to clean up its act. In a landmark speech last September, Levitt called for an end to "earnings management." He correctly observed, "Too many corporate managers, auditors and analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks." And then he laid on a real indictment: "Managing may be giving way to manipulating; integrity may be losing out to illusion."
不过告诉各位一个大消息，在现任主席Arthur Levitt的带领下，证监会似乎有意要好好地整顿美国企业的种种不当行为，在去年9月的一次历史性演说中，Levitt呼吁大家停止"收益管理"，他一针见血地指出太多的企业经理人、会计师与分析师参与这种大家心知肚明的骗局，接着他又开门见山地提出一项指控，当经理人得到太多的机会来操纵收益的同时，其人格也随着消失殆尽化成幻影。
I urge you to read the Chairman's speech (you can find it on the Internet at www.sec.gov) and to support him in his efforts to get corporate America to deliver a straight story to its owners. Levitt's job will be Herculean, but it is hard to think of another more important for him to take on.
我强烈建议大家读一读Levitt主席的演说内容(你可以在www.sec.gov上找到)，同时共同声援他致力于导正美国企业向股东们提供真实财务报告所作的努力，Levitt这项工作或许相当艰巨，但也很难再找到其它任何比这个更重要的任务了。
Berkshire's Internet site, www.berkshirehathaway.com, has become a prime source for information about the company. While we continue to send an annual report to all shareholders, we now send quarterlies only to those who request them, letting others read these at our site. In this report, we again enclose a card that can be returned by those wanting to get printed quarterlies in 1999.
伯克希尔的官方网站www.berkshirehathaway.com成为取得本公司信息的最重要来源，除非事先要求，否则我们每季的季报都只通过网站对外公布，当然我们还是一如往来将每年的年报邮寄给各位股东，里面也包含了申请寄发1999年季报的申请表格。
Charlie and I have two simple goals in reporting: 1) We want to give you the information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed; and 2) We want to make Berkshire's information accessible to all of you simultaneously. Our ability to reach that second goal is greatly helped by the Internet.
在编写报告时，查理跟我禀持两个简单的原则：1)我们希望能够提供各位你我立场互换，我们希望各位能够提供给我们的所有信息；2)我们希望这些信息能够在同一个时间到达各位手上，而通过网络使得我们第二个目标得以更容易地达成。
In another portion of his September speech, Arthur Levitt deplored what he called "selective disclosure." His remarks were timely: Today, many companies matter-of-factly favor Wall Street analysts and institutional investors in a variety of ways that often skirt or cross the line of unfairness. These practices leave the great bulk of shareholders at a distinct disadvantage to a favored class.
今年我们预计分别在5月14日、8月13日及11月12日将季报公布在公司的网站上，另外也预计在2000年3月11日周六将年报公布在网站上，并在同一时间将年报邮寄出去给所有的股东。同时我们也会立即将相关的信息公布在我们的网站上，也就是说你不需要依赖经过报章媒体消化过的二手消息，而可以轻轻松松在家通过计算机直接读到最原始的内容。
At Berkshire, we regard the holder of one share of B stock as the equal of our large institutional investors. We, of course, warmly welcome institutions as owners and have gained a number of them through the General Re merger. We hope also that these new holders find that our owner's manual and annual reports offer them more insights and information about Berkshire than they garner about other companies from the investor relations departments that these corporations typically maintain. But if it is "earnings guidance" or the like that shareholders or analysts seek, we will simply guide them to our public documents.
在伯克希尔，我们将持有一股B股的持有者视为与我们的大型机构投资者平等。当然，我们热烈欢迎机构作为所有者，并通过通用再保险的合并获得了其中的一些机构。我们还希望这些新股东发现我们的所有者手册和年度报告为他们提供了更多有关伯克希尔的见解和信息，而不是从这些公司通常维护的投资者关系部门获得的有关其他公司的信息和信息。但如果股东或分析师寻求的是“盈利指导”或类似内容，我们将简单地引导他们查看我们的公开文件。
This year we plan to post our quarterly reports on the Internet after the close of the market on May 14, August 13, and November 12. We also expect to put the 1999 annual report on our website on Saturday, March 11, 2000, and to mail the print version at roughly the same time.
今年我们预计分别在5月14日、8月13日及11月12日将季报公布在公司的网站上，另外也预计在2000年3月11日周六将年报公布在网站上，并在同一时间将年报邮寄出去给所有的股东。
We promptly post press releases on our website. This means that you do not need to rely on the versions of these reported by the media but can instead read the full text on your computer.
同时我们也会立即将相关的信息公布在我们的网站上，也就是说你不需要依赖经过报章媒体消化过的二手消息，而可以轻轻松松在家通过计算机直接读到最原始的内容。
Despite the pathetic technical skills of your Chairman, I'm delighted to report that GEICO, Borsheim's, See's, and The Buffalo News are now doing substantial business via the Internet. We've also recently begun to offer annuity products on our website. This business was developed by Ajit Jain, who over the last decade has personally accounted for a significant portion of Berkshire's operating earnings. While Charlie and I sleep, Ajit keeps thinking of new ways to add value to Berkshire.
虽然本人对计算机一窍不通，但是我还是很高兴地向各位报告，我们旗下的事业，包含GEICO保险、波仙珠宝、喜诗糖果以及布法罗新闻在内现在皆已通过网络从事大量的商务活动，同时我们也开始在网站上销售相关的年金产品，这项业务主要是由阿吉特·贾恩所负责开发，他个人在过去十年来为伯克希尔贡献了大量的收益，每当查理跟我休息时，阿吉特还是无时无刻不在为伯克希尔想出增进价值的方法。
About 97.5% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1998 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 54-55.
大约有97.5%的有效股权参与1998年的股东指定捐赠计划，捐出的款项总计约1,690万美元，详细的名单参阅附录。
Cumulatively, over the 18 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $130 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $12.5 million in 1998, including in-kind donations of $2.0 million.
累计过去18年以来，伯克希尔总计已依照股东意愿捐赠出高达1.3亿美元的款项，除了之外，伯克希尔还通过旗下的子公司进行捐赠，而这些慈善活动都是早在他们被我们并购以前就进行多年(先前的老板自行本身负责的个人捐赠计划之外除外)，总的来说，我们旗下的关系企业在1998年总计捐出1,250万美元，其中包含200万美元等值的物品。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1999, will be ineligible for the 1999 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.
想要参加这项计划者，必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自己而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1999年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1999年的捐赠计划，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，以免被丢在一旁给忘记了，逾期恕不受理。
This year's Woodstock for Capitalists will be held May 1-3, and we may face a problem. Last year more than 10,000 people attended our annual meeting, and our shareholders list has since doubled. So we don't quite know what attendance to expect this year. To be safe, we have booked both Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 14,000 and the Holiday Convention Centre, which can seat an additional 5,000. Because we know that our Omaha shareholders will want to be good hosts to the out-of-towners (many of them come from outside the U.S), we plan to give those visitors first crack at the Aksarben tickets and to subsequently allocate these to greater Omaha residents on a first-come, first-served basis. If we exhaust the Aksarben tickets, we will begin distributing Holiday tickets to Omaha shareholders.
今年伯克希尔的Woodstock狂欢节将在5月1日至3日举行，只是我们面临到一个问题，去年总计有超过10000名的股东来参加我们的股东年会，而如今我们股东的人数又增加了一倍，这使得我们很难预估今年到底会有多少股东与会，为了安全起见，我们特别订下可容纳1.4万名观众的Aksarben体育馆，另外外加5千个座位的Holiday会议中心，而奥马哈地区的股东们为了尽地主之谊，也特地将场地的前排座位让给远道而来的股东(很多都来自海外)，至于大奥马哈地区的股东则采取先到先选的方式入座，如果Aksarben体育馆的门票发光了，就会开始发放Holiday会议中心的门票给奥马哈地区的股东。
If we end up using both locations, Charlie and I will split our pre-meeting time between the two. Additionally, we will have exhibits and also the Berkshire movie, large television screens and microphones at both sites. When we break for lunch, many attendees will leave Aksarben, which means that those at Holiday can, if they wish, make the five-minute trip to Aksarben and finish out the day there. Buses will be available to transport people who don't have cars.
而万一要是两个场地还不够，查理跟我就会将正式会议前的时间分成两部分，此外，在两个会场我们都准备了展示品、伯克希尔特别制作的影片、大型的电视屏幕以及麦克风，等到中午休息时间，许多与会者陆续离开Aksarben体育馆后，此时坐在Holiday会议中心的股东就可以利用简短的五分钟时间参观一下会场，然后一直待到会议结束，会后我们也备有巴士接送没有开车的股东。
The doors will open at both locations at 7 a.m. on Monday, and at 8:30 we will premier the 1999 Berkshire movie epic, produced by Marc Hamburg, our CFO. The meeting will last from 9:30 until 3:30, interrupted only by the short lunch break.
大门会在周一早上7点开放，同时照例在8点半会播放由我们财务长Marc Hamburg精心制作具顶级水准的伯克希尔1999年电影短片供大家欣赏，扣除中午短暂的休息时间，整个会议将一直进行到下午3点半。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the badge you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, these will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通(电话800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会安排巴士接送大家往返各大旅馆与会场之间，并在会后接送大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，当然你可能会觉得如何有一辆车就更方便了。
The full line of Berkshire products will be available at Aksarben, and the more popular items will also be at Holiday. Last year we set sales records across-the-board, moving 3,700 pounds of See's candy, 1,635 pairs of Dexter shoes, 1,150 sets of Quikut knives and 3,104 Berkshire shirts and hats. Additionally, $26,944 of World Book products were purchased as well as more than 2,000 golf balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo. Charlie and I are pleased but not satisfied with these numbers and confidently predict new records in all categories this year. Our 1999 apparel line will be unveiled at the meeting, so please defer your designer purchases until you view our collection.
在Aksarben体育馆的会场我们也将备有伯克希尔全系列的产品供大家选购，另外我们也会把其中最热门的商品陈列在Holiday会议中心，去年我们再度打破记录，大家总共买走了3700磅的糖果、1635双的鞋子、1150组Quikut小刀以及3140件伯克希尔的衣服与帽子，另外也卖出26944美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品以及2000颗上面印有伯克希尔Logo的高尔夫球，老实说，查理跟我对于这样的成绩并不太满意，不过我们相当有信心今年一定能够再度刷新所有品项的记录，而我们1999年全新的服装也将在会议期间公布，所以请大家在看过我们的样式之前，暂且将今年的治装费保留住。
Dairy Queen will also be on hand and will again donate all proceeds to the Children's Miracle Network. Last year we sold about 4,000 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a booth that will be manned by a number of our top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In almost all cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder's discount. Check out whether we can save you some money.
冰雪皇后也将再度在现场摆设摊位，同时将所得全数捐给儿童希望联盟，去年我们总共卖出4000根Dilly、雪花棒以及香草/橘子口味的巧克力棒，此外GEICO保险公司会再度派出各地区最优秀的业务员，在会场设立摊位，随时提供股东们汽车保单的报价，在大多数的情况下，GEICO保险都可以提供给你一个相当优惠的股东折扣，各位记得问看看是否能帮自己省下一笔钱。
The piece de resistance of our one-company trade show will be a 79-foot-long, nearly 12-foot-wide, fully-outfitted cabin of a 737 Boeing Business Jet ("BBJ"), which is NetJets' newest product. This plane has a 14-hour range; is designed to carry 19 passengers; and offers a bedroom, an office, and two showers. Deliveries to fractional owners will begin in the first quarter of 2000.
这次的会议还有另一位主秀，那就是79英尺长12英尺宽满配的波音737商务机展示座舱(简称BBJ)，这是Netjet最新推出的产品，这架飞机飞行时长可达14个小时，可搭载19位乘客，并附有一个卧室、一间办公室以及两套淋浴设备，预计在2000年春季加入服务客户的行列。
The BBJ will be available for your inspection on May 1-3 near the entrance to the Aksarben hall. You should be able to minimize your wait by making your visit on Saturday or Sunday. Bring along your checkbook in case you decide to make an impulse purchase.
BBJ在5月1日到3日期间，将会陈列在Aksarben体育馆的大厅入口处，不想排队的人最好提早在周六或周日去参观，记得随身携带你的支票本，以备一时心动的不时之需。
NFM's multi-stored complex, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation did $300 million in business during 1998 and offers an unrivaled breadth of merchandise -- furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and computers -- all at can't-be-beat prices. During the April 30th to May 4th period, shareholders presenting their meeting badge will receive a discount that is customarily given only to its employees.
占地75英亩的内布拉斯加家具店多层复合式建筑距离Aksarben体育馆约1英里远，营业时间平日从早上10点到下午9点，周六及周日则从早上10点到下午6点，内布拉斯加家具店1998年单店的营业额高达三亿美元，提供各式各样的产品，举凡家具、电子产品、小家电、地毯以及计算机，全部都以超低的价格供大家选购，在4月30日到5月4日期间，股东只要持随股东通知附赠的优惠券到内布拉斯加家具店购买各类商品，都可获得员工价的优惠。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 2nd. On annual meeting weekend last year, the store did an incredible amount of business. Sales were double those of the previous year, and the store's volume on Sunday greatly exceeded volume for any day in Borsheim's history. Charlie attributes this record to the fact that he autographed sales tickets that day and, while I have my doubts about this proposition, we are not about to mess with a winning formula. Please give him writer's cramp. On last year's Sunday, Borsheim's wrote 2,501 tickets during the eight hours it was open. For those of you who are mathematically challenged, that is one ticket every 11 seconds.
平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在5月2日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开放，从中午开到下午6点，去年在股东会的那一个周末，我们缔造了历史最佳的记录，业绩比前一个年度增长一倍，周日单日销售额打破历史记录，查理臭屁的认为这完全要归功于当天他在现场接受大家用发票索取签名的缘故，当然我对于这样的推论持保留态度，我不认为这是成功因素中的重要因子，在去年周日短短8个小时的营业时间内，波仙总共开出了2501张的发票，数学好的人可以掐指一算，这约等于每11秒钟开出一张发票，不过请大家千万不要对查理客气，务必让他签名签到手抽筋。
Shareholders who wish to avoid Sunday's crowd can visit Borsheim's on Saturday (10 a.m.-5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.-8 p.m.). Be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that Susan Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, can quote you a "shareholder-weekend" price. Susan joined us in 1983 as a $4-per-hour salesperson and was made CEO in 1994. This move ranks as one of my best managerial decisions.
怕挤的股东可以选择在周六(早上10点到下午5点半)或周一(早上10点到下午8点)光临波仙珠宝，记得向波仙的总裁Susan Jacques表明你伯克希尔股东的身份，如此她才能够给各位股东周末的优惠价，Susan在1983年从每小时时薪4美元的业务员做起，并在1994年成为公司的CEO，这项人事调整事后证明是我一生中最佳的管理决策之一。
Bridge players can look forward to a thrill on Sunday, when Bob Hamman -- the best the game has ever seen -- will turn up to play with our shareholders in the mall outside of Borsheim's. Bob plays without sorting his cards -- hey, maybe that's what's wrong with my game. We will also have a couple of other tables at which another expert or two will be playing.
桥牌爱好者请屏息以待，桥牌界的传奇性人物Bob Hamman将会在周日下午出席在波仙珠宝店外面大厅举办的一场桥牌大赛，Bob打牌从来不用整理排堆，嘿嘿！或许这就是我为什么一直打不好的原因，当然现场还会有其它高手出现与大家一起打牌。
Gorat's -- my favorite steakhouse -- will again be open especially for Berkshire shareholders on the Sunday night before the meeting. Though Gorat's served from 4 p.m. until about 1 a.m. last year, its crew was swamped, and some of our shareholders had an uncomfortable wait. This year fewer reservations will be accepted, and we ask that you don't come on Sunday without a reservation. In other years, many of our shareholders have chosen to visit Gorat's on Friday, Saturday or Monday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1 (but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. The cognoscenti will continue to order rare T-bones with double orders of hash browns.
我个人最爱的Gorat's牛排馆为了伯克希尔股东年会破例在周日开门营业，虽然去年Gorat's牛排馆从下午四点开始营业，一直到半夜一点半，但是餐厅还是被拥挤的人群给挤爆了，以致于让许多股东等候多时，今年我们将减少订位人数，事先没有订位的人请勿前往，当然股东也可选择在周、周六或下周一前往，该餐厅从4月1日后才开始接受预订(电话402-551-3733)，识途的老马都知道要点丁骨牛排加上双份的牛肉丸。
The Omaha Golden Spikes (neé the Omaha Royals) will meet the Iowa Cubs on Saturday evening, May 1st, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Your Chairman, whose breaking ball had the crowd buzzing last year, will again take the mound. This year I plan to introduce my "flutterball." It's a real source of irritation to me that many view our annual meeting as a financial event rather than the sports classic I consider it to be. Once the world sees my flutterball, that misperception will be erased.
奥马哈金钉鞋队(原奥马哈皇家队)将于5月1日周六晚上在Rosenblatt体育馆对上爱荷华州的小熊队，去年本人技惊四座的变化球，将会再度出现在投手丘上，不过今年我还预计祭出新练的上飘球，对于许多人将伯克希尔股东会视为投资金融界而非体育界的盛事，我感到相当的气愤，相信等到世人看过我的上飘球后，应该就能导正大家这种错误的观念。
Our proxy statement includes instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you to enjoy your visit. I particularly urge the 60,000 shareholders that we gained through the Gen Re merger to join us. Come and meet your fellow capitalists.
股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，以及有关本次会议期间大量的旅游信息，在此我也特别呼吁经由并购通用再保险而新加入的6万名股东，一定要来见见其它伙伴。
It wouldn't be right to close without a word about the 11.8 people who work with me in Berkshire's corporate office. In addition to handling the myriad of tax, regulatory and administrative matters that come with owning dozens of businesses, this group efficiently and cheerfully manages various special projects, some of which generate hundreds of inquiries. Here's a sample of what went on in 1998:
在年报结束前，我一定要再感谢一下在伯克希尔企业总部与我一起共事的11.8位工作伙伴，这个团队除了平时要处理旗下数十家经营业务繁杂的租税、法律与行政事务之外，同时还非常有效率且热心地管理许多特别的事务，包含了上千次的不厌其烦的回答，以下就是他们在1998年所做的一些工作。
- 6,106 shareholders designated 3,880 charities to receive contributions.
- Kelly Muchemore processed about 17,500 admission tickets for the annual meeting, along with orders and checks for 3,200 baseball tickets.
- Kelly and Marc Hamburg produced and directed the Aksarben extravaganza, a job that required them to arrange the presentations made by our subsidiaries, prepare our movie, and sometimes lend people a hand with travel and lodging.
- Debbie Bosanek satisfied the varying needs of the 46 media organizations (13 of them non-U.S.) that covered the meeting, and meanwhile, as always, skillfully assisted me in every aspect of my job.
- Debbie and Marc assembled the data for our annual report and oversaw the production and distribution of 165,000 copies. (This year the number will be 325,000.)
- Marc handled 95% of the details -- and much of the substance -- connected with our completing two major mergers.
- Kelly, Debbie and Deb Ray dealt efficiently with tens of thousands of requests for annual reports and financial information that came through the office.
- 6106位股东指定捐赠给3880个慈善机关团体。
- Kelly与Marc Hamburg处理超过1.75万件股东会出席证，外加3200件棒球赛的订单与支票。
- Kelly与Marc Hamburg负责制作、导演整个Aksarben秀，包含安排各个子公司所做的演示文稿、准备短片，有时还要协助来宾解决交通与食宿的问题。
- Debbie Bosanek满足了46家采访媒体机构各种不同的需求(其中还包含13家外国媒体)，同时一如往常地协助我处理所有日常事务。
- Debbie及Marc负责整理股东会报告并负责16.5万份年报的制作与发送(今年份数将增加至32.5万份)。
- Marc负责处理95%以上的细节，同时更重要的是完成两件重大并购案的后续处理工作。
- Kelly、Debbie以及DebRay非常快速地处理成千上万要求寄发年报及相关财务信息的回函。
You and I are paying for only 11.8 people, but we are getting what would at most places be the output of 100. To all of the 11.8, my thanks.
虽然我们只支付11.8人份的薪水，但我们所得到的成果却相当于100位人力的付出，对于这支11.8个人的团队，我衷心地致上个人的感谢之意。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
March 1, 1999
1999年3月01日
Footnotes
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All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A. ↩