原文信息：
- 标题：2021 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：2022-02-26
- 链接：2021
- 中文翻译参考：上角里
- 整理：XiaoTao、Ponge
- 校译：
**BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦股东：
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing a portion of your savings. We are honored by your trust.
我的长期搭档查理·芒格和我的工作是管理你们的留在伯克希尔的部分收益，因为你们的信任，我们两个倍感自豪。
Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager. We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well.
我们基于，如果我们是不了解具体经营情况的股东而你们是伯克希尔经理人，我们希望从你们的报告中获得什么内容的立场来写年报。我们喜欢以年报和年度股东大会的方式和大家直接交流。
Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.
我们的原则是平等对待所有股东，我们不会单独和证券分析师或大型投资机构讨论伯克希尔的情况。同样，在可能的情况下，我们会在星期六的早上公布重要的公司信息，以便各位股东和各个媒体在周一市场开盘前有充足的时间消化这些信息。
A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 – K-119. Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire.
伯克希尔的资产情况和经营数据列示在SEC要求的常规年度10-K文件中，这些数据也在K-1到K-119页列示，有些股东会对这些具体数据感兴趣，有些股东可能对过去一年中查理和我认为在伯克希尔发生的新鲜有趣的事情更感兴趣。
Alas, there was little action of that sort in 2021. We did, though, make reasonable progress in increasing the intrinsic value of your shares. That task has been my primary duty for 57 years. And it will continue to be.
可惜啊，2021这样新鲜有趣的事很少！但在伯克希尔内在价值提升方面，我们确实取得了实实在在的进步，提升伯克希尔的内在价值是我57年来的重要职责，未来我还会继续这么做。
Berkshire owns a wide variety of businesses, some in their entirety, some only in part. The second group largely consists of marketable common stocks of major American companies. Additionally, we own a few non-U.S. equities and participate in several joint ventures or other collaborative activities.
伯克希尔旗下有各种各样多元化的生意，有些生意我们100%控股，有些生意我们持有部分股权。伯克希尔旗下第二大资产主要是我们持有的美国上市公司的普通股。此外，通过参与一些合资企业或其他形式的合作，我们还拥有一些美国以外的企业权益。
Whatever our form of ownership, our goal is to have meaningful investments in businesses with both durable economic advantages and a first-class CEO. Please note particularly that we own stocks based upon our expectations about their long-term business performance and not because we view them as vehicles for timely market moves. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
无论我们的所有权形式是什么，我们的目标是投资那些拥有长期经济优势和一流CEO的生意。请大家注意，我们持有股票是基于我们对公司长期业绩良好表现的预期，而不是将股票当作准备时刻交易的工具，查理和我不是股票买手，而是生意买手，这一点至关重要。
I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. One advantage of our common-stock segment is that – on occasion – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena.
我犯了很多错误，因此，我们广泛的生意组合中包括了一些拥有卓越竞争优势的企业，也有许多具有良好竞争优势的企业，同样也有一些盈利能力不佳的企业。普通股投资的一大优势，是偶尔我们能很轻松地以非常有吸引力的价格买到优秀公司的部分股权，这种「瓮中捉鳖」式的机会，在通过谈判收购生意的过程中很少见，更不会同时批量出现。在股票市场中，我们也能更容易通过卖出股票来纠正自己所犯的错误。
Here are a few items about your company that often surprise even seasoned investors:
伯克希尔的以下几点，经常会让经验丰富的投资者也感到惊讶：
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Many people perceive Berkshire as a large and somewhat strange collection of financial assets. In truth, Berkshire owns and operates more U.S.-based “infrastructure” assets – classified on our balance sheet as property, plant and equipment – than are owned and operated by any other American corporation. That supremacy has never been our goal. It has, however, become a fact.
很多人把伯克希尔看作一个大型的、有些奇怪的金融资产集团，事实上，伯克希尔拥有并运营着比其他美国企业更多的美国「基础设施」资产，在资产负债表中的财产、工厂和设备这个科目中列示，这种优势从来都不是我们刻意追求的目标，是自然而然发展到今天的一种结果。
At yearend, those domestic infrastructure assets were carried on Berkshire’s balance sheet at $158 billion. That number increased last year and will continue to increase. Berkshire always will be building.
截至年底，伯克希尔的资产负债表上所记录的国内基础设施资产价值为1580亿美元。这个数字去年有所增加，并将继续增加。伯克希尔公司将会持续建设它。
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Every year, your company makes substantial federal income tax payments. In 2021, for example, we paid $3.3 billion while the U.S. Treasury reported total corporate income-tax receipts of $402 billion. Additionally, Berkshire pays substantial state and foreign taxes. “I gave at the office” is an unassailable assertion when made by Berkshire shareholders.
每年伯克希尔都要缴纳大量的联邦所得税。例如，2021年我们缴纳了33亿美元，而美国财政部报告的企业所得税收入总额为4020亿美元。此外，伯克希尔公司还支付大量的州税和外国税。"我已经捐过钱了"对伯克希尔的股东来说，并不是个借口。
Berkshire’s history vividly illustrates the invisible and often unrecognized financial partnership between government and American businesses. Our tale begins early in 1955, when Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing agreed to merge their businesses. In their requests for shareholder approval, these venerable New England textile companies expressed high hopes for the combination.
伯克希尔的历史生动地描绘了存在于美国政府和企业之间那种无形的、不被注意到的财务伙伴关系。我们的故事起源于1955年初伯克希尔精纺公司和哈撒韦制造公司合并的时候，在给双方股东的合并请求中，这两家历史悠久的新英格兰纺织公司都对合并寄予厚望。
The Hathaway solicitation, for example, assured its shareholders that “The combination of the resources and managements will result in one of the strongest and most efficient organizations in the textile industry.” That upbeat view was endorsed by the company’s advisor, Lehman Brothers (yes, that Lehman Brothers).
比如，哈撒韦公司在请求中明确向其股东保证：两家公司资源和管理能力的合并会使其成为纺织业最强大、最有效率的企业之一。这一乐观的观点得到了该公司顾问——雷曼兄弟的支持（是的，就是我们熟知的那个雷曼兄弟）。
I’m sure it was a joyous day in both Fall River (Berkshire) and New Bedford (Hathaway) when the union was consummated. After the bands stopped playing and the bankers went home, however, the shareholders reaped a disaster.
我相信交易完成的那天对伯克希尔所在地福尔里弗和哈撒韦所在地新贝德福德来说都是愉快的一天。然而，随着乐队表演的结束和银行家们的离去，股东们收获的却是一个灾难。
In the nine years following the merger, Berkshire’s owners watched the company’s net worth crater from $51.4 million to $22.1 million. In part, this decline was caused by stock repurchases, ill-advised dividends and plant shutdowns. But nine years of effort by many thousands of employees delivered an operating loss as well. Berkshire’s struggles were not unusual: The New England textile industry had silently entered an extended and non-reversible death march.
合并后的9年里，伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东们眼睁睁看着公司的净资产从5,140万美元跌落到2,210万美元。造成净资产下降的部分原因，是股票回购、不明智的分红和部分工厂的关闭。但9年时间里，几千名员工的努力只换来运营的亏损，也是不争的事实。在新英格兰地区纺织业已经悄悄步入漫长而不可逆转的衰退背景下，伯克希尔的困境也就不难理解了。
During the nine post-merger years, the U.S. Treasury suffered as well from Berkshire’s troubles. All told, the company paid the government only $337,359 in income tax during that period – a pathetic $100 per day.
在合并后的9年里，美国财政部也因伯克希尔的困境蒙受了损失。在这一时期，伯克希尔总计支付了337,359美元的所得税，相当于每天只给财政部缴纳可怜的100美元所得税。
Early in 1965, things changed. Berkshire installed new management that redeployed available cash and steered essentially all earnings into a variety of good businesses, most of which remained good through the years. Coupling reinvestment of earnings with the power of compounding worked its magic, and shareholders prospered.
1965年初，情况发生了变化。伯克希尔迎来了新的管理层，重新部署了可用现金的使用方向，基本上把所有的收益都投入到了各种各样的好生意中，时光荏苒，大部分好生意依然优秀。收益再投资在强大的复利作用加持下产生了奇妙的效果，股东们变得富有。
Berkshire’s owners, it should be noted, were not the only beneficiary of that course correction. Their “silent partner,” the U.S. Treasury, proceeded to collect many tens of billions of dollars from the company in income tax payments. Remember the $100 daily? Now, Berkshire pays roughly $9 million daily to the Treasury.
值得注意的是，伯克希尔的股东并不是这一变化的唯一受益者，伯克希尔低调的合伙人——美国财政部——从公司获得了几百亿美元的所得税。还记得每天只有100美元所得税的日子吗？现在，伯克希尔每天向财政部缴纳大约900万美元的所得税。
In fairness to our governmental partner, our shareholders should acknowledge – indeed trumpet – the fact that Berkshire’s prosperity has been fostered mightily because the company has operated in America. Our country would have done splendidly in the years since 1965 without Berkshire. Absent our American home, however, Berkshire would never have come close to becoming what it is today. When you see the flag, say thanks.
在很大程度上，因为我们在美国这片土地上经营着生意，才孕育出了伯克希尔的繁荣，为了公平对待我们的政府合伙人，伯克希尔的股东应该认识到这一点，也确实应该大声地告诉所有人这一点。自1965年以来，即便没有伯克希尔这个公司，我们的国家依然会蓬勃发展，然而，如果离开美国这个国度，伯克希尔不可能发展到今天的模样。所以，当你看到美国国旗时，请道一声谢谢。
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From an $8.6 million purchase of National Indemnity in 1967, Berkshire has become the world leader in insurance “float” – money we hold and can invest but that does not belong to us. Including a relatively small sum derived from life insurance, Berkshire’s total float has grown from $19 million when we entered the insurance business to $147 billion.
自1967年用860万美金买下国民赔偿保险公司以来，伯克希尔在保险行业持有的浮存金（浮存金：我们可以用于投资但不属于我们的钱）规模已经是世界第一。算上来自人寿保险的少量浮存金，伯克希尔的浮存金从我们入行以来的1,900万美元增长到了现在的1,470亿美元。
So far, this float has cost us less than nothing. Though we have experienced a number of years when insurance losses combined with operating expenses exceeded premiums, overall we have earned a modest 55-year profit from the underwriting activities that generated our float.
到目前为止，我们使用浮存金的成本是负的。虽然我们经历了一些保险赔付加运营费用超过保险收入的年份，总体来看，在从事给我们带来浮存金的保险业务的55年中，我们获得了一些微弱的承保利润。
Of equal importance, float is very sticky. Funds attributable to our insurance operations come and go daily, but their aggregate total is immune from precipitous decline. When it comes to investing float, we can therefore think long-term.
同样重要的是，保险浮存金是极具稳定性的。每天保险业务的资金进进出出，但沉淀下来的总量不会急剧下降。当使用浮存金投资时，我们可以进行长期投资。
If you are not already familiar with the concept of float, I refer you to a long explanation on page A-5. To my surprise, our float increased $9 billion last year, a buildup of value that is important to Berkshire owners though is not reflected in our GAAP (“generally-accepted accounting principles”) presentation of earnings and net worth.
如果你对浮存金的概念还不是很熟悉，我推荐你看A-5页的解释。让我意外的是，去年我们的浮存金增加了90亿美元，虽然这90亿美元没有体现在我们的收益和净资产中（按GAAP准则），但这对伯克希尔股东来说是重要的价值增加来源。
Much of our huge value creation in insurance is attributable to Berkshire’s good luck in my 1986 hiring of Ajit Jain. We first met on a Saturday morning, and I quickly asked Ajit what his insurance experience had been. He replied, “None.”
我们保险业务所创造的巨大价值归功于阿吉特·贾恩，伯克希尔很幸运在1986年雇到了他。在一个星期六的早上，我们第一次见面，我急着问他在保险行业有什么经验，他回答道：“没有”。
I said, “Nobody’s perfect,” and hired him. That was my lucky day: Ajit actually was as perfect a choice as could have been made. Better yet, he continues to be – 35 years later.
我说：“没有人是完美的”。然后聘用了他。那天真是我的幸运日，阿吉特实际上是最完美的选择。更棒的是，35年后，他依然是。
One final thought about insurance: I believe that it is likely – but far from assured – that Berkshire’s float can be maintained without our incurring a long-term underwriting loss. I am certain, however, that there will be some years when we experience such losses, perhaps involving very large sums.
关于保险的最后一个想法：我认为，伯克希尔很可能（但远非肯定）会在不产生长期承保亏损的情况下，维持浮存金增长和使用的良好状态。当然，我可以确定未来有些年份我们一定会遭受承保损失，而且可能是很大金额的损失。
Berkshire is constructed to handle catastrophic events as no other insurer – and that priority will remain long after Charlie and I are gone.
伯克希尔在处理灾难性事件方面的能力和优势是其他保险公司所不具备的，在我和查理过世以后，这一优势依然会延续很长时间。
Through Berkshire, our shareholders own many dozens of businesses. Some of these, in turn, have a collection of subsidiaries of their own. For example, Marmon has more than 100 individual business operations, ranging from the leasing of railroad cars to the manufacture of medical devices.
我们的股东们通过伯克希尔拥有几十种不同的生意。其中，一些企业又拥有自己的一系列子公司。比如，玛蒙公司旗下有超过100个独立的子公司，经营着从铁路车厢租赁到医疗设备制造的各种生意。
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Nevertheless, operations of our “Big Four” companies account for a very large chunk of Berkshire’s value. Leading this list is our cluster of insurers. Berkshire effectively owns 100% of this group, whose massive float value we earlier described. The invested assets of these insurers are further enlarged by the extraordinary amount of capital we invest to back up their promises.
当然，四巨头公司的运营肩负着伯克希尔很大的一部分价值。四巨头中的领头羊是我们的保险公司集群。伯克希尔100%拥有这些保险公司，巨额浮存金的价值我们之前已经提到过。为保险公司的承保承诺而投入的巨额资金，进一步扩大了这些保险公司的投资资产。
The insurance business is made to order for Berkshire. The product will never be obsolete, and sales volume will generally increase along with both economic growth and inflation. Also, integrity and capital will forever be important. Our company can and will behave well.
保险是为伯克希尔量身定制的业务，保险产品永远不会过时，保费收入一般会伴随经济增长和通货膨胀而增加，此外，诚信和资本实力永远是最重要的，在保险业，我们公司能够而且一定会经营得很好。
There are, of course, other insurers with excellent business models and prospects. Replication of Berkshire’s operation, however, would be almost impossible.
当然，这个行业一定会有其他具有杰出商业模式和优秀前景的保险公司存在，然而，伯克希尔的模式几乎很难复制。
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Apple – our runner-up Giant as measured by its yearend market value – is a different sort of holding. Here, our ownership is a mere 5.55%, up from 5.39% a year earlier. That increase sounds like small potatoes. But consider that each 0.1% of Apple’s 2021 earnings amounted to $100 million. We spent no Berkshire funds to gain our accretion. Apple’s repurchases did the job.
苹果公司是我们持有的不同于保险公司的资产，按照年底的市值排名，是我们第二大的巨头。我们持有苹果的股份从一年前的5.39%上升到现在的5.55%，这个上升看起来微不足道，但是要知道，按照苹果2021年的收益，0.1%的股份对应的是一亿美元净利润。伯克希尔没有花一分钱就获得了在苹果公司利润份额的增加，这是苹果公司回购股票的结果。
It’s important to understand that only dividends from Apple are counted in the GAAP earnings Berkshire reports – and last year, Apple paid us $785 million of those. Yet our “share” of Apple’s earnings amounted to a staggering $5.6 billion. Much of what the company retained was used to repurchase Apple shares, an act we applaud. Tim Cook, Apple’s brilliant CEO, quite properly regards users of Apple products as his first love, but all of his other constituencies benefit from Tim’s managerial touch as well.
重要的是，我们要知道，根据GAAP的规则，伯克希尔的净利润中只包含了苹果公司对伯克希尔的分红，去年（2021年），我们从苹果公司收到了7.85亿美元的分红。但是，按照持股比例，我们可以从苹果获得56亿美元的净利润，其中的绝大部分被苹果留存下来用于回购股票，我们赞成回购。苹果才华横溢的CEO蒂姆·库克很恰当地将苹果产品的用户视如自己的初恋，同时，蒂姆的其他支持者也都受益于他的管理才能。
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BNSF, our third Giant, continues to be the number one artery of American commerce, which makes it an indispensable asset for America as well as for Berkshire. If the many essential products BNSF carries were instead hauled by truck, America’s carbon emissions would soar.
北伯林顿铁路公司（BNSF），是我们的第三巨头，继续扮演着美国商业第一大动脉的角色，是美国必不可少的基础设施，也是伯克希尔必不可少的资产。如果北伯林顿铁路公司现在承运的很多主要产品改成卡车运输，美国的二氧化碳排放量将猛增。
Your railroad had record earnings of $6 billion in 2021. Here, it should be noted, we are talking about the old-fashioned sort of earnings that we favor: a figure calculated after interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and all forms of compensation. (Our definition suggests a warning: Deceptive “adjustments” to earnings – to use a polite description – have become both more frequent and more fanciful as stocks have risen. Speaking less politely, I would say that bull markets breed bloviated bull . . ..)
北伯林顿铁路公司2021年的净利润是60亿美元。特别需要强调的是，我们这里讲的净利润是我们喜欢的、老派的净利润概念，即扣除利息、税收、折旧、摊销和所有其他的报酬后的净利润。（我们此处的定义提出了一个警告：随着股市价格的上涨，对净利润进行欺骗性的「调整」——用礼貌的说法——已经越来越普遍，也越来越具有幻想色彩，恕我直言，牛市孕育了股市的疯狂。）
BNSF trains traveled 143 million miles last year and carried 535 million tons of cargo. Both accomplishments far exceed those of any other American carrier. You can be proud of your railroad.
北伯林顿铁路公司去年的运输里程达1.43亿英里，运输了5.35亿吨货物，两者都远超美国同行，你们可以以北伯林顿铁路公司为傲。
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BHE, our final Giant, earned a record $4 billion in 2021. That’s up more than 30-fold from the $122 million earned in 2000, the year that Berkshire first purchased a BHE stake. Now, Berkshire owns 91.1% of the company.
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE），是我们的第四大巨头，2021年赚了40亿净利润，和第一次投资BHE的2000年的1.22亿净利润相比，增长超过30倍。现在，伯克希尔拥有该公司91.1%的股份。
BHE’s record of societal accomplishment is as remarkable as its financial performance. The company had no wind or solar generation in 2000. It was then regarded simply as a relatively new and minor participant in the huge electric utility industry. Subsequently, under David Sokol’s and Greg Abel’s leadership, BHE has become a utility powerhouse (no groaning, please) and a leading force in wind, solar and transmission throughout much of the United States.
BHE对社会作出的贡献和它的财务表现一样优秀。2000年的时候，BHE既没有风能发电业务，也没有太阳能发电业务，当时，BHE还被认为是整个巨大的电力行业中的一个新手和小角色。随后，在大卫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔的领导下，BHE成为了公用事业领域的巨擎（请不要尖叫），一家为美国大部分地区提供风能、太阳能和电力输送的领军企业。
Greg’s report on these accomplishments appears on pages A-3 and A-4. The profile you will find there is not in any way one of those currently-fashionable “green-washing” stories. BHE has been faithfully detailing its plans and performance in renewables and transmissions every year since 2007.
格雷格将这些成就列在A-3和A-4这两页中，你会发现这些介绍绝对不是那些时下流行的「洗绿」的故事。2007年以来，BHE每一年都会认真详细地介绍在可再生能源和电力传输方面的计划和表现。
To further review this information, visit BHE’s website at brkenergy.com. There, you will see that the company has long been making climate-conscious moves that soak up all of its earnings. More opportunities lie ahead. BHE has the management, the experience, the capital and the appetite for the huge power projects that our country needs.
如果想进一步了解这方面的信息，请访问BHE的官方网站brkenergy.com。通过网站，你会看到BHE长期以来一直在采取应对气候变化方面的举措，这些举措消耗了公司所有的利润。更多的机会在未来等待着我们。BHE为我们国家需要的大型能源项目做好了管理、经验、资本和意愿方面的全方位准备。
Now let’s talk about companies we don’t control, a list that again references Apple. Below we list our fifteen largest equity holdings, several of which are selections of Berkshire’s two long-time investment managers, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. At yearend, this valued pair had total authority in respect to $34 billion of investments, many of which do not meet the threshold value we use in the table. Also, a significant portion of the dollars that Todd and Ted manage are lodged in various pension plans of Berkshire-owned businesses, with the assets of these plans not included in this table.
现在让我们聊一聊我们投资的非控股公司，这个列表中再次提到了苹果公司。下面列表中列出了我们持有的最大的15家公司，其中几家是由我们的两位长期投资经理——托德·库姆斯和泰德·韦施勒——选择投资的。截止去年底，这两位优秀的经理人管理着价值340美元的投资组合，很多投资的市值都没有达到单独列入下表的金额要求。此外，托德和泰德管理的很大一部分资金存在于伯克希尔旗下企业的各种养老金计划中，这些计划中的资产并不包括在这个列表中。
| Shares 股份数量 |
Company 公司名称 |
Percentage of Company Owned 百分比 |
Cost* 12/31/21 (dollars in millions) 成本 |
Market 12/31/21 (dollars in millions) 市值 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company 美国运通 |
19.9 | $ 1,287 | $ 24,804 |
| 907,559,761 | Apple lnc 苹果 |
5.6 | 31.089 | 161,155 |
| 1,032,852,006 | Bank of America Corp 美国银行 |
12.8 | 14,631 | 45,952 |
| 66,835,615 | The Bank of New York Mellon Corp 纽约梅隆银行 |
8.3 | 2,918 | 3,882 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Co.Ltd** 比亚迪 |
7.7 | 232 | 7,693 |
| 3,828,941 | Charter Communications,Inc 特许通讯 |
2.2 | 643 | 2,496 |
| 38,245,036 | Chevron Corporation 雪佛龙 |
2.0 | 3,420 | 4,488 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company 可口可乐 |
9.2 | 1,299 | 23,684 |
| 52,975,000 | General Motors Company 通用汽车 |
3.6 | 1,616 | 3,106 |
| 89,241,000 | ITOCHU Corporation 伊藤忠商事 |
5.6 | 2.099 | 2728 |
| 81,714,800 | Mitsubishi Corporation 三菱商事 |
5.5 | 2,102 | 2,593 |
| 93,776,200 | Mitsui & Co.,Ltd 三井物产 |
5.7 | 1,621 | 2,219 |
| 24,669,778 | Moodys Corporation 穆迪公司 |
13.3 | 248 | 9.636 |
| 143,456,055 | U.S.Bancorp 美国合众银行 |
9.7 | 5,384 | 8,058 |
| 158,824,575 | Veriz Communications Inc Verizon通讯 |
3.8 | 9,387 | 8,253 |
| Others*** 其他 |
26,629 | 39,972 | ||
| Total Equity Investments Carried Market 投资总额 |
$ 104,605 | $350,719 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
* 成本是我们的实际买入价，也是我们的计税基础；
** Held by BHE; consequently, Berkshire shareholders have only a 91.1% interest in this position.
** BYD由BHE持有，因此伯克希尔股东仅持有其91.1%的权益；
*** Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $10.7 billion.
*** 其他项包括对西方石油公司OXY的100亿美元投资，包括优先股和购买普通股的认股权证，这一组合现在价值107亿美元。
In addition to the footnoted Occidental holding and our various common-stock positions, Berkshire also owns a 26.6% interest in Kraft Heinz (accounted for on the “equity” method, not market value, and carried at $13.1 billion) and 38.6% of Pilot Corp., a leader in travel centers that had revenues last year of $45 billion.
除了附注中提到的对西方石油的头寸和我们其他普通股的持仓，伯克希尔还持有卡夫亨氏公司26.6%的权益（以权益法而不是市值入账，账面价值131亿美元）和Pilot公司38.6%的股份，Pilot公司是旅行中心行业的领导者，2021年营收450亿美元。
Since we purchased our Pilot stake in 2017, this holding has warranted “equity” accounting treatment. Early in 2023, Berkshire will purchase an additional interest in Pilot that will raise our ownership to 80% and lead to our fully consolidating Pilot’s earnings, assets and liabilities in our financial statements.
自2017年我们投资Pilot公司以来，这部分投资是以权益法入账的。2023年初，伯克希尔计划收购更多Pilot公司的股份，以致持股达到80%的份额，届时，我们可以把Pilot公司的权益、资产和负债都合并到我们的财务报表中。
Berkshire’s balance sheet includes $144 billion of cash and cash equivalents (excluding the holdings of BNSF and BHE). Of this sum, $120 billion is held in U.S. Treasury bills, all maturing in less than a year. That stake leaves Berkshire financing about 1⁄2 of 1% of the publicly-held national debt.
2021年底伯克希尔资产负债表中的现金和现金等价物是1440亿美元，其中，1200亿美元是持有的美国国债，这些国债的到期日都在一年以内。伯克希尔持有的1200亿国债，相当于为美国财政部发行的1%的国债提供了大约一半的融资额。
Charlie and I have pledged that Berkshire (along with our subsidiaries other than BNSF and BHE) will always hold more than $30 billion of cash and equivalents. We want your company to be financially impregnable and never dependent on the kindness of strangers (or even that of friends). Both of us like to sleep soundly, and we want our creditors, insurance claimants and you to do so as well.
查理和我保证伯克希尔（除了BNSF和BHE之外的所有子公司）会永远持有不低于300亿美元的现金和现金等价物。我们希望伯克希尔在财务上固若金汤，永远不要依赖陌生人（甚至是朋友）的仁慈救助。查理和我都喜欢安枕入眠，我们希望我们的债权人、保险理赔客户和你们也都可以安枕入眠。
But $144 billion?
但是，要留1440亿美元这么多现金和现金等价物吗？
That imposing sum, I assure you, is not some deranged expression of patriotism. Nor have Charlie and I lost our overwhelming preference for business ownership. Indeed, I first manifested my enthusiasm for that 80 years ago, on March 11, 1942, when I purchased three shares of Cities Services preferred stock. Their cost was $114.75 and required all of my savings. (The Dow Jones Industrial Average that day closed at 99, a fact that should scream to you: Never bet against America.)
这个壮观的数字，我可以向你保证，并不是某种精神错乱的爱国主义情怀，也不意味着查理和我丧失了对企业所有权追求的热情。实际上，在80年前的1942年3月11日，当我购买资本成公司的3股优先股时，我就初次展现了对企业的热情，购买成本是114.74美元，这耗尽了我所有的积蓄。（道琼斯工业指数那天的收盘价是99点，一个足以让你惊叫的事实是：永远不要做空美国。）
After my initial plunge, I always kept at least 80% of my net worth in equities. My favored status throughout that period was 100% – and still is. Berkshire’s current 80%-or-so position in businesses is a consequence of my failure to find entire companies or small portions thereof (that is, marketable stocks) which meet our criteria for long- term holding.
自我第一次一头扎进股权市场后，我总是至少将我净资产的80%投在股权资产上，那段时间我喜欢将所有现金都投在股权资产中，现在也是这样。伯克希尔目前只有80%的资本配置在股权资产中，是由于我无法找到满足我们长期投资要求的整个公司或者上市公司一部分股权导致的。
Charlie and I have endured similar cash-heavy positions from time to time in the past. These periods are never pleasant; they are also never permanent. And, fortunately, we have had a mildly attractive alternative during 2020 and 2021 for deploying capital. Read on.
过去，查理和我也时不时忍受过大量现金在手的阶段，这些时期从不愉快，但也不会是永久的。幸运的是，2020和2021年，我们找到了一些具有一定吸引力的机会来配置资本。请继续往下看。
There are three ways that we can increase the value of your investment. The first is always front and center in our minds: Increase the long-term earning power of Berkshire’s controlled businesses through internal growth or by making acquisitions. Today, internal opportunities deliver far better returns than acquisitions. The size of those opportunities, however, is small compared to Berkshire’s resources.
我们有三种方式可以增加你投资的伯克希尔股票的价值。第一种是在我们心中永远排第一位的方式，即：通过内生增长或收购企业的方式增加伯克希尔旗下控股企业的长期盈利能力。如今，控股企业的内生增长机会，相比企业收购，为伯克希尔提供了更多的回报，但是，内生增长带来的回报相对伯克希尔的体量而言显得很小。
Our second choice is to buy non-controlling part-interests in the many good or great businesses that are publicly traded. From time to time, such possibilities are both numerous and blatantly attractive. Today, though, we find little that excites us.
我们的第二个选择，是购买那些优秀或伟大的上市企业的部分非控制股权。有时，这样的机会数量众多且价格具有明显吸引力。如今，很难找到让我们感到兴奋的机会。
That’s largely because of a truism: Long-term interest rates that are low push the prices of all productive investments upward, whether these are stocks, apartments, farms, oil wells, whatever. Other factors influence valuations as well, but interest rates will always be important.
这主要是因为一个不争的事实：长期的低利率推升了所有生产性资产的市场价格，无论是股票、公寓、农场，还是油井。虽然，其他因素也影响了估值，但利率一直是最重要的因素。
Our final path to value creation is to repurchase Berkshire shares. Through that simple act, we increase your share of the many controlled and non-controlled businesses Berkshire owns. When the price/value equation is right, this path is the easiest and most certain way for us to increase your wealth. (Alongside the accretion of value to continuing shareholders, a couple of other parties gain: Repurchases are modestly beneficial to the seller of the repurchased shares and to society as well.)
最后一种增加价值的方式是回购伯克希尔的股票。通过这个简单的举动，我们增加了你们所拥有的伯克希尔旗下控股类和非控股类公司的股份比例。当价格最终会反映价值这一规律还有效的时候，回购股票是增加你们财富最容易且最确定的一种方式。（随着对留下来的股东所持股票价值的增加，其他几方也会获益：回购对卖方和社会都有一定的好处）
Periodically, as alternative paths become unattractive, repurchases make good sense for Berkshire’s owners. During the past two years, we therefore repurchased 9% of the shares that were outstanding at yearend 2019 for a total cost of $51.7 billion. That expenditure left our continuing shareholders owning about 10% more of all Berkshire businesses, whether these are wholly-owned (such as BNSF and GEICO) or partly-owned (such as Coca-Cola and Moody’s).
随着第一、第二种选择变得不具吸引力，阶段性的回购股票对伯克希尔的股东来说是有意义的。过去两年中，基于2019年底的流通股份数量，我们总共花了517亿美元回购了9%的股份。这一举措让留下来的股东在伯克希尔的权益增加超过10%，无论是在全资拥有的子公司（比如BNSF和GEICO）还是在拥有部分股权的公司（比如可口可乐和穆迪）中的权益都增加超过10%。
I want to underscore that for Berkshire repurchases to make sense, our shares must offer appropriate value. We don’t want to overpay for the shares of other companies, and it would be value-destroying if we were to overpay when we are buying Berkshire. As of February 23, 2022, since yearend we repurchased additional shares at a cost of $1.2 billion. Our appetite remains large but will always remain price-dependent.
我必须强调，为了让伯克希尔的回购变得有意义，回购股价必须对应一个合适的价值。我们在购买其他公司股票的时候不希望支付过高的价格，同样，如果我们回购伯克希尔股票时支付了过高的价格，也会造成价值损失。从2021年底到2022年2月23日，我们又花费了12亿美元回购了股票。我们回购的胃口依然很大，但这还是取决于价格。
It should be noted that Berkshire’s buyback opportunities are limited because of its high-class investor base. If our shares were heavily held by short-term speculators, both price volatility and transaction volumes would materially increase. That kind of reshaping would offer us far greater opportunities for creating value by making repurchases. Nevertheless, Charlie and I far prefer the owners we have, even though their admirable buy-and-keep attitudes limit the extent to which long-term shareholders can profit from opportunistic repurchases.
我们应该清楚，由于伯克希尔拥有高质量的股东人群，我们回购股票的机会是相当有限的。如果我们的绝大部分股票被短期投机者持有，那么，我们股票的价格波动和成交量都会大增，在这种情况下，我们可以通过回购股票给留下来的长期股东创造更大的价值。不过，查理和我还是更喜欢现有的股东人群，尽管他们令人钦佩的「买入并长期持有」的态度，限制了长期股东因机会主义式回购带来的获利程度。
Finally, one easily-overlooked value calculation specific to Berkshire: As we’ve discussed, insurance “float” of the right sort is of great value to us. As it happens, repurchases automatically increase the amount of “float” per share. That figure has increased during the past two years by 25% – going from $79,387 per “A” share to $99,497, a meaningful gain that, as noted, owes some thanks to repurchases.
最后，在计算伯克希尔的内在价值时容易被忽视的一点是：正如我们已经讨论过的，低沉本甚至是负成本的保险浮存金对伯克希尔价值巨大。股票回购自动增加了每一股伯克希尔股票对应的浮存金金额。过去两年，每股伯克希尔A股对应的浮存金从79,387美元增加到了99,477美元，增幅25%，如前所述，这其中一部分要归功于股票回购。
Last year, Paul Andrews died. Paul was the founder and CEO of TTI, a Fort Worth-based subsidiary of Berkshire. Throughout his life – in both his business and his personal pursuits – Paul quietly displayed all the qualities that Charlie and I admire. His story should be told.
去年，保罗·安德鲁斯过世了。保罗是总部位于沃斯堡的伯克希尔子公司TTI的创始人兼首席执行官。纵观其一生，无论是工作还是个人追求方面，保罗总是默默展示着查理和我都羡慕不已的品质。他的故事值得铭记。
In 1971, Paul was working as a purchasing agent for General Dynamics when the roof fell in. After losing a huge defense contract, the company fired thousands of employees, including Paul.
1971年，当意外来临时，保罗是通用动力公司的一名采购员，在失去一份重大的国防合同后，通用动力公司解雇了数千名员工，其中也包括保罗。
With his first child due soon, Paul decided to bet on himself, using $500 of his savings to found Tex-Tronics (later renamed TTI). The company set itself up to distribute small electronic components, and first-year sales totaled $112,000. Today, TTI markets more than one million different items with annual volume of $7.7 billion.
当时保罗的第一个孩子即将出生，他决定赌上一把，用自己的500美元储蓄创建了Tex-Tronics公司（后来更名为TTI）。这家公司成立时主要销售小型电子元器件，第一年的销售额是112,000美元，如今，TTI年销售额高达77亿美元，在市场上销售超过100万种产品。
But back to 2006: Paul, at 63, then found himself happy with his family, his job, and his associates. But he had one nagging worry, heightened because he had recently witnessed a friend’s early death and the disastrous results that followed for that man’s family and business. What, Paul asked himself in 2006, would happen to the many people depending on him if he should unexpectedly die?
时光倒回到2006年，63岁的保罗，和家人、同事相处愉快，也热爱自己的工作。但他有一个挥之不去的担忧，因为他最近亲眼目睹了一个朋友的早逝，以及随之而来的对他家庭和生意造成的灾难性后果，这更加剧了他的担忧。2006年，保罗不禁自问：如果自己意外死亡，对许多依靠他的人会造成什么后果？
For a year, Paul wrestled with his options. Sell to a competitor? From a strictly economic viewpoint, that course made the most sense. After all, competitors could envision lucrative “synergies” – savings that would be achieved as the acquiror slashed duplicated functions at TTI.
整整一年，保罗都在为自己的选择而挣扎。把公司卖给一个竞争对手？从严格的经济学观点来看，这个选择最具经济价值。毕竟，竞争对手可以预见到利润丰厚的「协同效应」——通过砍掉从TTI收购来的重复职能部门节约运营成本。
But . . . Such a purchaser would most certainly also retain its CFO, its legal counsel, its HR unit. Their TTI counterparts would therefore be sent packing. And ugh! If a new distribution center were to be needed, the acquirer’s home city would certainly be favored over Fort Worth.
但......这样的买家通常只会保留公司的CFO、法律顾问和HR部门，其他的同事应该会被打包处理。天哪！如果需要一个新的配送中心，收购方的家乡城市一定是首选，而不是沃斯堡。
Whatever the financial benefits, Paul quickly concluded that selling to a competitor was not for him. He next considered seeking a financial buyer, a species once labeled – aptly so – a leveraged buyout firm. Paul knew, however, that such a purchaser would be focused on an “exit strategy.” And who could know what that would be? Brooding over it all, Paul found himself having no interest in handing his 35-year-old creation over to a reseller.
保罗很快意识到，无论财务回报是多少，把公司卖给竞争对手不是他愿意的选择。接着，保罗考虑找一个财务投资者，这样的买方曾被恰当地称为用杠杆收购企业的买方。但是，保罗也知道，这样的买方最关注的是收购后的退出策略。谁知道他们最终会如何退出呢？考虑到这一切，保罗发现他再也没有兴趣将自己创立35年的公司卖给一个中间商。
When Paul met me, he explained why he had eliminated these two alternatives as buyers. He then summed up his dilemma by saying – in far more tactful phrasing than this – “After a year of pondering the alternatives, I want to sell to Berkshire because you are the only guy left.” So, I made an offer and Paul said “Yes.” One meeting; one lunch; one deal.
当我和保罗见面时，他和我解释了他为何排除了上面提到的两类买家。然后，他用更委婉的措辞总结了他面临的困境，他说：“思考了一整年可能的选择之后，我想把我的公司卖给伯克希尔，因为伯克希尔是仅剩的最后买家”。因此，我报了价，保罗说：“好的”。一次见面，一顿午餐，一笔生意。
To say we both lived happily ever after is an understatement. When Berkshire purchased TTI, the company employed 2,387. Now the number is 8,043. A large percentage of that growth took place in Fort Worth and environs. Earnings have increased 673%.
说从此我俩过上了幸福的生活，都有点轻描淡写了。当伯克希尔买下TTI时，公司有2,387名员工。现在公司拥有8,043名员工。绝大部分新增员工都在沃斯堡及其四周。公司的净利润增长了673%。
Annually, I would call Paul and tell him his salary should be substantially increased. Annually, he would tell me, “We can talk about that next year, Warren; I’m too busy now.”
每一年，我都会打电话给保罗，告诉他，他的工资应该大幅上涨。每一次，他都会说：“沃伦，这事明年再说，我现在很忙。”
When Greg Abel and I attended Paul’s memorial service, we met children, grandchildren, long-time associates (including TTI’s first employee) and John Roach, the former CEO of a Fort Worth company Berkshire had purchased in 2000. John had steered his friend Paul to Omaha, instinctively knowing we would be a match.
我和格雷格·阿贝尔参加保罗的追悼会时，我们见到了保罗的孩子、孙子、公司的长期伙伴（包括TTI的第一名员工），以及伯克希尔于2000年收购的一家位于沃斯堡的公司的前CEO约翰·罗奇。约翰将保罗引荐到了奥马哈，他知道保罗和我会很合拍。
At the service, Greg and I heard about the multitudes of people and organizations that Paul had silently supported. The breadth of his generosity was extraordinary – geared always to improving the lives of others, particularly those in Fort Worth.
在追悼会上，格雷格和我听说了保罗曾经默默帮助和支持过的很多人和组织。他的慷慨是非凡的，他总是积极地改善别人的生活，尤其是在沃斯堡地区。
In all ways, Paul was a class act.
从各方面来看，保罗都是一个出色的人。
Good luck – occasionally extraordinary luck – has played its part at Berkshire. If Paul and I had not enjoyed a mutual friend – John Roach – TTI would not have found its home with us. But that ample serving of luck was only the beginning. TTI was soon to lead Berkshire to its most important acquisition.
幸运，有时是极端的幸运，在伯克希尔扮演着重要角色。如果保罗和我没有这个共同的朋友——约翰·罗奇——TTI也不会找到伯克希尔这个归宿。但这份丰盛的幸运大餐仅仅是个开始。TTI很快就带伯克希尔完成了一个最重要的收购。
Every fall, Berkshire directors gather for a presentation by a few of our executives. We sometimes choose the site based upon the location of a recent acquisition, by that means allowing directors to meet the new subsidiary’s CEO and learn more about the acquiree’s activities.
每年秋天，伯克希尔的董事们都会聚集在一起，听取几位经理人的陈述。我们有时会选择近期收购公司的地点作为聚会地点，这样董事们可以与新子公司的CEO见面，并更多地了解被收购方的经营活动。
In the fall of 2009, we consequently selected Fort Worth so that we could visit TTI. At that time, BNSF, which also had Fort Worth as its hometown, was the third-largest holding among our marketable equities. Despite that large stake, I had never visited the railroad’s headquarters.
2009年秋天，我们选择了沃斯堡，这样我们可以参观TTI。那个时候，BNSF也把总部设在沃斯堡，当时，BNSF是我们流通股持仓中的第三大公司。尽管有这么大的持仓，我还从来没有参观过这家铁路公司的总部。
Deb Bosanek, my assistant, scheduled our board’s opening dinner for October 22. Meanwhile, I arranged to arrive earlier that day to meet with Matt Rose, CEO of BNSF, whose accomplishments I had long admired. When I made the date, I had no idea that our get-together would coincide with BNSF’s third-quarter earnings report, which was released late on the 22nd.
我的助理黛布·博萨内克将董事会的开幕晚宴安排在10月22日，当天，我提前来到了沃斯堡，与BNSF的CEO马特·罗斯见面，我对马特的成就仰慕已久。选定10月22日这一天时，我完全不知道我们聚会的这一天是BNSF发布三季报的日期。
The market reacted badly to the railroad’s results. The Great Recession was in full force in the third quarter, and BNSF’s earnings reflected that slump. The economic outlook was also bleak, and Wall Street wasn’t feeling friendly to railroads – or much else.
股票市场对铁路公司的业绩反应强烈。大萧条在第三季度全面爆发，BNSF的盈利也反应了这种萧条。经济前景并不乐观，华尔街对铁路公司或其他公司都不友好。
On the following day, I again got together with Matt and suggested that Berkshire would offer the railroad a better long-term home than it could expect as a public company. I also told him the maximum price that Berkshire would pay.
后面几天，我又和马特见面，希望伯克希尔可以给铁路公司提供一个比公众公司更好的长期归宿，我也告诉了马特伯克希尔愿意支付的最高价格。
Matt relayed the offer to his directors and advisors. Eleven busy days later, Berkshire and BNSF announced a firm deal. And here I’ll venture a rare prediction: BNSF will be a key asset for Berkshire and our country a century from now.
马特将收购协议转给他的董事会成员和顾问看。忙碌了十一天之后，伯克希尔和BNSF一起公布了这项交易。在此我做一个大胆的预测：从现在开始往后100年，BNSF会成为伯克希尔和我们国家的一个核心资产。
The BNSF acquisition would never have happened if Paul Andrews hadn’t sized up Berkshire as the right home for TTI.
如果保罗·安德鲁斯没有把伯克希尔当作TTI的最终归宿，对BNSF的收购也就不会发生。
I taught my first investing class 70 years ago. Since then, I have enjoyed working almost every year with students of all ages, finally “retiring” from that pursuit in 2018.
70年前，我教了我的第一堂投资课。从那以后，几乎每年我都很享受与各个年龄段的学生一起教学，最终，我在2018年从教师这个业余岗位上「退休」。
Along the way, my toughest audience was my grandson’s fifth-grade class. The 11-year-olds were squirming in their seats and giving me blank stares until I mentioned Coca-Cola and its famous secret formula. Instantly, every hand went up, and I learned that “secrets” are catnip to kids.
一路走来，对我来说，最难交流的听众是我孙子五年级班上的同学。这群11岁的孩子在座位上扭来扭去，一脸茫然地看着我，直到我提到可口可乐和它著名的秘密配方，立刻，每只手都举起来了，我也认识到「秘密」对孩子来说是非常诱人的。
Teaching, like writing, has helped me develop and clarify my own thoughts. Charlie calls this phenomenon the orangutan effect: If you sit down with an orangutan and carefully explain to it one of your cherished ideas, you may leave behind a puzzled primate, but will yourself exit thinking more clearly.
教学，和写作一样，帮助我阐述和理清自己的思路。查理把这种现象叫做「红毛猩猩效应」：如果你和一只红毛猩猩坐在一起，仔细地向它解释你的一个珍贵想法，当你离开时，可能会多一个困惑的灵长类动物，但你的思路会更清晰。
Talking to university students is far superior. I have urged that they seek employment in (1) the field and (2) with the kind of people they would select, if they had no need for money. Economic realities, I acknowledge, may interfere with that kind of search. Even so, I urge the students never to give up the quest, for when they find that sort of job, they will no longer be “working.”
和大学生交流要有效得多。我鼓励他们按照以下两个方面找工作，①喜欢的工作领域，②如果不缺钱的话，选择喜欢的人一起工作。我知道，实际的经济情况可能会干扰他们这么做。即使这样，我还是鼓励他们不要放弃这两个要求，因为一旦他们找到这样的工作，「工作」已经不再是一般意义上的工作。
Charlie and I, ourselves, followed that liberating course after a few early stumbles. We both started as part- timers at my grandfather’s grocery store, Charlie in 1940 and I in 1942. We were each assigned boring tasks and paid little, definitely not what we had in mind. Charlie later took up law, and I tried selling securities. Job satisfaction continued to elude us.
查理和我，在早期经历了一些挫折后，也走上了这样的「工作」之路。我俩都是从我爷爷的杂货店零时工开始的，查理是1940年，而我是1942年。我俩都被要求做一些无聊的事情，显然这些并不是我们想要做的事。查理后来开始从事法律工作，而我试着从事证券销售工作。我们对这些工作的满意度仍然不高。
Finally, at Berkshire, we found what we love to do. With very few exceptions, we have now “worked” for many decades with people whom we like and trust. It’s a joy in life to join with managers such as Paul Andrews or the Berkshire families I told you about last year. In our home office, we employ decent and talented people – no jerks. Turnover averages, perhaps, one person per year.
最终，我们在伯克希尔找到了自己喜爱的工作。除了极少数几个例外，我们现在已经与我们喜欢和信任的人「工作」了几十年。能与保罗·安德鲁斯和去年我告诉大家的伯克希尔旗下子公司的经理人们一起共事，是一种生活的乐趣。在我们的总部，我们雇佣正直和有才华的人——没有笨蛋。每年的平均人员流动率大概是一个人。
I would like, however, to emphasize a further item that turns our jobs into fun and satisfaction - - - - working for you. There is nothing more rewarding to Charlie and me than enjoying the trust of individual long-term shareholders who, for many decades, have joined us with the expectation that we would be a reliable custodian of their funds.
然而，我想强调另一个让我们的工作变得有趣和满意的因素——就是为你们工作。能获得每一位长期股东的信任，是对查理和我最大的奖励，几十年来，大家加入我们，期待我们可以成为值得信赖的资本托管人。
Obviously, we can’t select our owners, as we could do if our form of operation were a partnership. Anyone can buy shares of Berkshire today with the intention of soon reselling them. For sure, we get a few of that type of shareholder, just as we get index funds that own huge amounts of Berkshire simply because they are required to do so.
显然，我们无法像运营合伙企业时那样选择我们的股东，今天，任何人都可以怀着短期持有的想法买入伯克希尔的股票，可以确定，我们有一些这种类型的股东，比如，迫于规则而持有大量伯克希尔股票的指数基金。
To a truly unusual degree, however, Berkshire has as owners a very large corps of individuals and families that have elected to join us with an intent approaching “til death do us part.” Often, they have trusted us with a large – some might say excessive – portion of their savings.
然而，伯克希尔拥有一个非常庞大的个人和家庭股东群体，他们以一种「至死不渝」的态度选择加入我们，他们与众不同。通常，他们把大部分积蓄，有时甚至是全部身家，投入到伯克希尔，表达他们对我们的信任。
Berkshire, these shareholders would sometimes acknowledge, might be far from the best selection they could have made. But they would add that Berkshire would rank high among those with which they would be most comfortable. And people who are comfortable with their investments will, on average, achieve better results than those who are motivated by ever-changing headlines, chatter and promises.
股东们知道，有些时候伯克希尔远非他们的最佳选择。但是，他们也知道，伯克希尔是他们所有选择中最安心的一个。一般来讲，对自己的投资感到安心的人，比起那些被不断变化的头条新闻、闲聊和承诺所激励而作出投资决策的人，能获得更好的投资结果。
Long-term individual owners are both the “partners” Charlie and I have always sought and the ones we constantly have in mind as we make decisions at Berkshire. To them we say, “It feels good to ‘work’ for you, and you have our thanks for your trust.”
长期个人股东，是查理和我不断寻找的「合伙人」，也是我们在伯克希尔做决策时头脑中会立刻浮现的人。我们想对大家说：“为大家工作，我们感觉美妙，我们感谢大家的信任”。
Clear your calendar! Berkshire will have its annual gathering of capitalists in Omaha on Friday, April 29th through Sunday, May 1st. The details regarding the weekend are laid out on pages A-1 and A-2. Omaha eagerly awaits you, as do I.
安排好你的日程！伯克希尔将于4月29日（周五）至5月1日（周日）在奥马哈举行年度股东大会。关于会议的细节在A-1和A-2页。奥马哈急切地等待着你，我也一样。
I will end this letter with a sales pitch. “Cousin” Jimmy Buffett has designed a pontoon “party” boat that is now being manufactured by Forest River, a Berkshire subsidiary. The boat will be introduced on April 29 at our Berkshire Bazaar of Bargains. And, for two days only, shareholders will be able to purchase Jimmy’s masterpiece at a 10% discount. Your bargain-hunting chairman will be buying a boat for his family’s use. Join me.
我将以一段推销话语来结束这封股东信。「表弟」吉米·巴菲特设计了一艘漂浮式「派对」船，目前由伯克希尔子公司Forest River生产。这艘船将于4月29日在我们的伯克希尔市集交易会上推出，而且，仅在两天内，股东可以以10%的折扣购买吉米的杰作。你们善于「捡便宜货」的主席会买一艘船供家人使用， 加入我吧。
February 26, 2022
2022年2月26日
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席