原文信息：
- 标题：1965 Letter to Limited Partners
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1966-01-20
- 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
January 20, 1966
Our War on Poverty was successful in 1965.
1965年我们的脱贫战非常成功。
Specially, we were $12,304,060 less poor at the end of the year.
我们在年底的贫穷程度减少了12,304,060美元。
Last year under a section in the annual letter entitled “Our Goal” (please particularly note it was not headed "Our Promise"), I stated we were trying to achieve “... An average advantage (relative to the Dow) of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks.”
在去年信中的“我们的目标”部分（需要特别注意这个标题不是“我们的承诺”），我写道我们试图达到：“……合伙基金的年化收益率，在扣除给普通合伙人的分成之前，大概会多出10个百分点，同样有很大波动，或许某些年份低于道指10个百分点，或许有些年份高于道指25个百分点。“
My fallibility as a forecaster was quickly demonstrated when the first year fell outside my parameters. We achieved our widest margin over the Dow in the history of BPL with an overall gain of 47.2% compared to an overall gain (including dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Dow) of 14.2% for the Dow. Naturally, no writer likes to be publicly humiliated by such a mistake. It is unlikely to be repeated.
作为一个蹩脚的预测者，我的预测很快就被证实是错的了，因为今年我们的结果偏离了我们的标准。我们获得了巴菲特合伙公司成立以来相对于道指最大的优势，我们的收益率是47.2%，而道指加上分红后的增长率是14.2%。虽然没有作者会因为这种错误而被公开羞辱。但是这种状况很可能不会再次发生。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
下述表格反映了多年来道指、分成（超出6%的部分收取25%）给普通合伙人之前的合伙基金、有限合伙人的收益情况：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
下表列出了以复利计算的累积收益：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 94.9% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 - 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 11.4% | 29.8% | 23.9% |
After last year the question naturally arises, "What do we do for an encore?” A disadvantage of this business is that it does not possess momentum to any significant degree. If General Motors accounts for 54% of domestic new car registrations in 1965, it is a pretty safe bet that they are going to come fairly close to that figure in 1966 due to owner loyalties, dealer capabilities, productive capacity, consumer image, etc. Not so for BPL. We start from scratch each year with everything valued at market when the gun goes off. Partners in 1966, new or old, benefit to only a very limited extent from the efforts of 1964 and 1965. The success of past methods and ideas does not transfer forward to future ones.
取得去年这样的成绩以后，一个问题很容易会被问到：“我们能够做什么来重复这样的成绩？”投资这门生意的缺点就是对于收益率不存在任何惯性。如果通用汽车1965年国内的汽车销售量增加了54%，或许预测1966年仍然可以达到这个增长率是非常可信的，因为这里有顾客忠诚度、经销商的能力、产品的产能、消费者的期望等等作为后盾。但是巴菲特合伙公司就不行。当猎枪收起时，我们只好重新又开始在市场中捡那些小鱼小虾1。1966年的合伙人，不管是新的还是老的，只能从1964和1965年的投资经历中获取非常少的益处。过去成功的方法和观念也许在未来是没有用的。
I continue to hope, on a longer-range basis, for the sort of achievement outlined in the "Our Goal" section of last year's letter (copies still available). However, those who believe 1965 results can be achieved with any frequency are probably attending weekly meetings of the Halley’s Comet Observers Club. We are going to have loss years and are going to have years inferior to the Dow - no doubt about it. But I continue to believe we can achieve average performance superior to the Dow in the future. If my expectation regarding this should change, you will hear immediately.
我仍旧希望基于长期的标准，我们的投资收益仍然是去年信中我们的目标部分（复印件仍可以提供）所描述的那样。然而，那些希望能够以任何频率获取1965年收益的人，很可能是像参加哈雷慧星研究俱乐部每周的会议一样2。我们有可能某些年会有损失，有可能有些年份会比道指表现更差，这点毫无疑议。但是我仍旧相信未来我们能够获取超越道指的收益。如果我的期望有任何改变，会立刻通知你们。
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95% - 100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp. manage over $5 billion, are owned by about 600,000 shareholders, and are probably typical of most of the $35 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们经常将我们的投资结果和两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式基金做对比。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。这四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund 、Tri-Continental Corporation、Lehman Corporation的资产大概共有50亿美元，有约600,000个投资者。他们是拥有总额达350亿美元资产的投资基金公司中的典型代表。我认为他们的投资收益跟那些管理着更多资产的大多数投资咨询公司的收益差不多。
The purpose of this tabulation is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of about $10 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.
我列出相关数据是想说明道指作为投资评判标准并不低。上述基金的天才管理者们每年收取的年费约为1000万美元，这只是整个基金行业的很小一部分。这些拥有高收入、高智商的管理者的基金公司所获得的平均收益率却比道指稍低。
YEARLY RESULTS 年度收益
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont. (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1965 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-64. Estimated for 1965.
（2）1957-1965年数据来源于1964年Moody银行和金融手册；1965年数据为估计值。
COMPOUNDED 累积收益
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont. (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957-58 | 26.4% | 29.2% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957-59 | 37.8% | 42.5% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.3% | 74.7% |
| 1957-60 | 36.4% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.9% | 107.2% |
| 1957-61 | 71.3% | 76.9% | 70.8% | 77.4% | 74.9% | 181.6% |
| 1957-62 | 54.5% | 53.2% | 46.2% | 59.7% | 61.6% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 85.4% | 78.5% | 80.8% | 88.9% | 94.9% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 64 | 114.9% | 104.0% | 105.4% | 112.7% | 131.3% | 402.9% |
| 1957 - 65 | 136.8% | 124.0% | 145.3% | 138.4% | 164.1% | 588.5% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 10.1% | 9.4% | 10.5% | 10.1% | 11.4% | 23.9% |
A number of the largest investment advisory operations (managing, in some cases, well into the billions of dollars) also manage investment companies partly as a convenience for smaller clients and partly as a public showcase. The results of these funds roughly parallel those of the four funds on which we report.
很多大型的投资咨询机构（有时候，管理数十亿美元的资金），也运营着投资公司，一方面是为了方便小客户，一方面是为了向公众展示。这些基金的投资结果跟上述的4家基金基本类似。
I strongly believe in measurement. The investment managers mentioned above utilize measurement constantly in their activities. They constantly study changes in market shares, profit margins, return on capital, etc. Their entire decision-making process is geared to measurement - of managements, industries, comparative yields, etc. I am sure they keep score on their new business efforts as well as the profitability of their advisory operation. What then can be more fundamental than the measurement, in turn, of investment ideas and decisions? I certainly do not believe the standards I utilize (and wish my partners to utilize) in measuring my performance are the applicable ones for all money managers. But I certainly do believe anyone engaged in the management of money should have a standard of measurement, and that both he and the party whose money is managed should have a clear understanding why it is the appropriate standard, what time period should be utilized, etc.
我非常相信“衡量标准”。上面提到的投资公司的经理们会用某些标准对他们的投资标的进行衡量。他们不停的研究市场份额、利润率、资产回报率的改变等等。他们的整个决策系统也与这些标准严丝合缝，包括管理水平、行业状况、竞争领域等等。 我确信他们会对自己的新业务工作以及咨询业务的盈利能力进行打分。不过，还有什么比对投资想法和决策的衡量标准更为基础的标准呢？我绝不是说我用于衡量自己投资表现的标准（也希望我们的合伙人使用的衡量标准）适用于所有其他的投资经理。不过，我确实相信任何从事投资的人都要有一个衡量标准，不管是从业者还是投资者都应该清楚地理解为什么这是个合适的标准、这个标准所适用的时间长度等等。
Frank Block put it very well in the November-December 1965 issue of the Financial Analysts Journal. Speaking of measurement of investment performance he said," ...However, the fact is that literature suffers a yawning hiatus in this subject. If investment management organizations sought always the best performance, there would be nothing unique in careful measurement of investment results. It does not matter that the customer has failed to ask for a formal presentation of the results. Pride alone should be sufficient to demand that each or us determine objectively the quality of his recommendations. This can hardly be done without precise knowledge of the outcome. Once this knowledge is in hand, it should be possible to extend the analysis to some point at which patterns of weakness and strength begin to assert themselves. We criticize a corporate management for failure to use the best of tools to keep it aware of the progress of a complicated industrial organization. We can hardly be excused for failure to provide ourselves with equal tools to show the efficiency of our own efforts to handle other people’s money. ...Thus, it is our dreary duty to report that systems of performance measurement are not automatically included in the data processing programs of most investment management organizations. The sad fact is that some seem to prefer not to know how well or poorly they are doing.
Frank Block在1965年11-12月出版的Financial Analysts Journal上的文章对投资表现的衡量标准描述得非常好：“……但是，在这个主题上文字的描述会产生很大的漏洞。如果投资管理机构总是想着要有最好的表现，那么谨慎的投资衡量标准就没有什么独特的了。客户即使不去问关于投资结果的解释也没什么关系。仅仅是自尊就已经足以使每个投资管理者客观评价他投资的质量了。没有关于收益的精确知识很难做到这一点。但一旦掌握了这种知识，就很容易将分析扩展到某个地步，那时强弱表现都可以用于证实他们自己。我们批判公司管理层没有应用最好的工具来警惕复杂工业组织的进程。我们却很难因为没有用类似的工具来评价我们管理他们财富的效果而受到批判……所以，我们不得不沮丧地指出，在大多数投资管理机构中，衡量表现的标准并没有天然地包含在数据分析进程中。令人悲伤的事实是，有些人更乐于无法得知他们的所作所为是好还是坏。”
Frankly, I have several selfish reasons for insisting that we apply a yardstick and that we both utilize the same yardstick. Naturally, I get a kick out of beating par - in the lyrical words of Casey Stengel, "Show me a good loser, and I’ll show you a loser.” More importantly, I insure that I will not get blamed for the wrong reason (having losing years) but only for the right reason (doing poorer than the Dow). Knowing partners will grade me on the right basis helps me do a better job. Finally, setting up the relevant yardsticks ahead of time insures that we will all get out of this business if the results become mediocre (or worse). It means that past successes cannot cloud judgment of current results. It should reduce the chance of ingenious rationalizations of inept performance. (Bad lighting has been bothering me at the bridge table lately.) While this masochistic approach to measurement may not sound like much of an advantage, I can assure you from my observations of business entities that such evaluation would have accomplished a great deal in many investment and industrial organizations.
坦白说，对于应用一个标准且我们双方都用同样的标准，我有些私心。一般来说，我希望能够高出平均水平——用Casey Stengel的优美语言描述，就是：“给我看一个好的失败者，我就会给你看一个失败者”。更重要的原因是，这样可以保证我不会因为错误的原因（某年有亏损）被指责，只会因为正确的原因（没有超过道指）被指责。了解到合伙人能够以正确的标尺评价我，会帮助我把工作做的更好。最后，提前设定好标准，可以让我们在投资收益一直不好或很差时，退出合伙公司。这意味着过去的成功不能影响对当前结果的判断。这或许会减少对笨拙表现找聪明借口的机会（最近打桥牌时，暗淡的灯光老是影响我的发挥）。这种自讨苦吃的去设立标准或许看起来并没有什么好处，但是我可以向你保证，以我观察企业的经验来看，这种标准会对很多投资机构或工业企业帮助非常大。
So if you are evaluating others (or yourself!) in the investment field, think out some standards - apply them - interpret them. If you do not feel our standard (a minimum of a three-year test versus the Dow) is an applicable one, you should not be in the Partnership. If you do feel it is applicable, you should be able to take the minus years with equanimity in the visceral regions as well as the cerebral regions -as long as we are surpassing the results of the Dow.
所以，如果想要在投资领域评判其他人（或者你自己）的表现，你们应该想出某些标准，并应用它们、解释它们。如果你认为我们的标准（以不少于3年的时间，用道指作比较）不是一个可执行的标准，你就不应该加入我们的合伙基金。如果你认为它可执行，只要我们超越了道指，即使我们某些年是亏损的，你们的身心都应该镇定自若。
Usually, at this point in my letter, I have paused to modestly attempt to set straight the historical errors of the last four or five hundred years. While it might seem difficult to accomplish this in only a few paragraphs a year, I feel I have done my share to reshape world opinion on Columbus, Isabella, Francis I, Peter Minuit and the Manhattan Indians. A by-product of this endeavor has been to demonstrate the overwhelming power of compound interest. To insure reader attention I have entitled these essays "The Joys of Compounding. " The sharp-eyed may notice a slight change this year.
一般在这一部分，我都会试图去揭示过去四五百年间历史上发生的错误。虽然在每年如此短的段落中要完成这项任务看起来很困难，但是我认为我已经在重塑以下事件的观点中做出了我的贡献——Columbus, Isabella, Francis I, Peter Minuit和Manhattan印第安人。这项工作的副产品就是揭示了复利的巨大力量。为了吸引读者们的注意力，我给这部分命名为“复利的快乐”。眼尖的人或许会发现今年有所变化。
A decent rate (better we have an indecent rate) of compound -plus the addition of substantial new money has brought our beginning capital this year to $43,645,000. Several times in the past I have raised the question whether increasing amounts of capital would harm our investment performance. Each time I have answered negatively and promised you that if my opinion changed, I would promptly report it.
不错的复利率（好在我们的复利率不止不错）加上大量的新钱涌进来，使得我们年初的资金达到43,645,000美元。过去我曾多次提到过资金的增加是否会损害我们的投资表现。每次我都认为不会，并承诺如果我的想法改变了，会立刻通知你们。
I do not feel that increased capital has hurt our operation to date. As a matter of fact, I believe that we have done somewhat better during the past few years with the capital we have had in the Partnership than we would have done if we had been working with a substantially smaller amount. This was due to the partly fortuitous development of several investments that were just the right size for us -big enough to be significant and small enough to handle.
到目前为止，我并不觉得增加资本对我们的运营造成了损害。实际上，我认为我们合伙基金过去多年的表现会比资金大幅缩小情况下的表现要好。这要部分归功于我们幸运的投资了适合我们规模的投资标的——足够大以令其很重要、足够小以便我们能够掌控。
I now feel that we are much closer to the point where increased size may prove disadvantageous. I don't want to ascribe too much precision to that statement since there are many variables involved. What may be the optimum size under some market and business circumstances can be substantially more or less than optimum under other circumstances. There have been a few times in the past when on a very short-term basis I have felt it would have been advantageous to be smaller but substantially more times when the converse was true.
但是我现在感觉到我们已经快到了规模增长会不利于我们的时候了。我不太想过于精确的描述这种状况，因为有很多变量存在。有些市场和商业环境下可能的有利规模，在另外一些状况下可能或多或少显得不利。过去，我曾在一些较短的时间段内认为我们的规模更小会好，但更多的时候我的想法是相反的。
Nevertheless, as circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results.
但是，在现在的状况下，我认为更大的规模很可能会损害我们将来的表现而不是有利于它们。或许从我个人利益的角度出发，这种结论不正确；但是对于你们这些有限合伙人，这个结论很可能是对的。
Therefore, unless it appears that circumstances have changed (under some conditions added capital would improve results) or unless new partners can bring some asset to the Partnership other than simply capital, I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.
所以，除非环境有所改变（在某种情况下资金量增大会提升投资收益）或新的合伙人能够带来超出资金以外的资产，我打算不再增加新的合伙人了。
The only way to make this effective is to apply it across-the-board and I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.
唯一使之能够实施的办法是一视同仁。我已经通知了Susie，如果我们还有另外的孩子，她要负责去为他们另找合伙公司。
Because I anticipate that withdrawals (for taxes, among other reasons) may well approach additions by present partners and also because I visualize the curve of expectable performance sloping only very mildly as capital increases, I presently see no reason why we should restrict capital additions by existing partners.
由于我认为撤回资金（因为税收及其他原因）或许会跟现有合伙人的新增投资持平，也由于我认为资金量的缓慢增加只会让我们的收益率有微弱的下滑，所以我认为现在没有理由限制现有合伙人追加资金。
The medically oriented probably will interpret this entire section as conclusive evidence that an effective antithyroid pill has been developed.
以医学为导向的人可能会把这整节内容理解为已经研制出有效抗甲状腺药片的确凿证据。3
Last year I discussed our various categories of investments. Knowing the penalties for cruel and unusual punishments, I will skip a rehash of the characteristics of each category, but merely refer you to last year's letter. However, a few words should be said to bring you up to date on the various segments of the business, and perhaps to give you a better insight into their strengths and weaknesses.
去年我讨论了我们各种类型的投资。知道你们厌烦了这种折磨，我将不再复述这些投资类型的特性，而只是建议你们参考去年的信。不过因为要更新你们对各类投资的认知，所以仍然需要用一些文字来阐述，这或许也能够让你们更好的理解它们的优点和缺点。
The "Workout" business has become very spasmodic. We were able to employ an average of only about $6 million during the year in the Workout section, and this involved only a very limited number of situations. Although we earned about $1,410,000 or about 23 1⁄2% on average capital employed (this is calculated on an all equity basis - borrowed money is appropriate in most Workout situations, and we utilize it, which improves our rate of return above this percentage), over half of this was earned from one situation. I think it unlikely that a really interesting rate of return can be earned consistently on large sums of money in this business under present conditions. Nevertheless, we will continue to try to remain alert for the occasional important opportunity and probably continue to utilize a few of the smaller opportunities where we like the probabilities.
“Workouts”类型的投资变得很稀少了。我们去年在这部分只投资了大概600万美元，而且项目的数量也很少。虽然我们获取了1,410,000美元的收益，也就是23.5%的收益率（这是按照所投资资金的总额计算的，在大多数“Workouts”类的投资中我们都使用了杠杆，这会使我们的收益率高出上述的数字），有超过一半的收益是通过一个项目实现的。我认为在目前的状况下，在更大的投资项目中持续获得这种收益率是不太现实的。我们仍旧继续对可能偶然出现的巨大机会保持警醒，并且目前很有可能会抓到一些较小的机会。
The "Generals-Private Owner Basis" category was very good to us in 1965. Opportunities in this area have become more scarce with a rising Dow, but when they come along, they are often quite significant. I mentioned at the start of last year that we were the largest stockholder of three companies in this category. Our largest yearend 1964 investment in this category was disposed of in 1965 pursuant to a tender offer resulting in a realized gain for BPL of $3,188,000. At yearend 1964 we had unrealized appreciation in this investment of $451,000. Therefore, the economic gain attributable to 1965 for this transaction was only $2,737,000 even though the entire tax effect fell in that year. I mention these figures to illustrate how our realized gain for tax purposes in any year bears no necessary relationship to our economic gain.
“Generals-可私有化”在1965年的表现很好。虽然这类投资的机会在道指上涨时变得更少，但是一旦有机会就会非常大。我提到过去年年初我们就是这类投资中三个公司的最大股东。其中，1964年底最大的投资项目在1965年已经通过要约收购完成了，这个项目给合伙基金带来了的收益为3,188,000美元。1964年底我们在这个项目上有451,000美元的账面收益，所以我们在1965年的收益只有2,737,000美元，尽管所有的税收影响都会在这一年产生。我提到这些数字是想描述我们在某一年与税收相关的利润跟我们的经济利润没有什么必然联系。
The fundamental concept underlying the Generals-Private Owner category is demonstrated by the above case. A private owner was quite willing (and in our opinion quite wise) to pay a price for control of the business which isolated stock buyers were not willing to pay for very small fractions of the business. This has been a quite common condition in the securities markets over many years, and although purchases in this category work out satisfactorily in terms of just general stock market behavior, there is the occasional dramatic profit due to corporate action such as the one above.
关于“Generals-可私有化”的基本概念都在上述的案例中描述出来了。私有者很愿意（在我的理解中这相当聪明）为控股而付出只购买少量股票的购买者不愿意付出的价格。多年来，这种情况在证券市场上十分常见，虽然从一般的股市行为来看，这类购买的效果已经令人满意，但偶尔也会出现因公司行为而大幅获利的情况，就像上述案例所显示的那样。
The "Control" section of our business received a transfer member from our “Private Owner” category. Shares in Berkshire Hathaway had been acquired since November 1962 on much the same line of reasoning as prevailed in the security mentioned above. In the case of Berkshire, however, we ended up purchasing enough stock to assume a controlling position ourselves rather than the more usual case of either selling our stock in the market or to another single buyer.
“Controls”会从“Generals-可私有化”类型投资中转入一些项目。我们在1962年11月就开始购买伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股票，也是按照与上述证券大致相同的思路购买的。不过，在伯克希尔这个案例中，没有像大多数以在市场中卖出股票或卖给单一买家作为结束的案例那样，我们最后购买了足以达到控股的股票。
Our purchases of Berkshire started at a price of $7.60 per share in 1962. This price partially reflected large losses incurred by the prior management in closing some of the mills made obsolete by changing conditions within the textile business (which the old management had been quite slow to recognize). In the postwar period the company had slid downhill a considerable distance, having hit a peak in 1948 when about $29 1/2 million was earned before tax and about 11,000 workers were employed. This reflected output from 11 mills.
我们在1962年开始以每股7.6美元购买伯克希尔的股票。这个价格部分反映了之前的管理层因为纺织行业环境的变化而关闭部分工厂导致的大额亏损（老的管理层拖了很久才承认这一点）。战后，它走了很长的下坡路，他们在1948年的税前利润约为2950万美元，员工约有1.1万人，有11家工厂。
At the time we acquired control in spring of 1965, Berkshire was down to two mills and about 2,300 employees. It was a very pleasant surprise to find that the remaining units had excellent management personnel, and we have not had to bring a single man from the outside into the operation. In relation to our beginning acquisition cost of $7.60 per share (the average cost, however, was $14.86 per share, reflecting very heavy purchases in early 1965), the company on December 31, 1965, had net working capital alone (before placing any value on the plants and equipment) of about $19 per share.
而我们在1965年控股它的时候，伯克希尔只剩下了2家工厂，约2300个员工。不过，最令人高兴的是剩下的工厂有很好的管理层，这样我们就不需要从外面请人来管理了。虽然我们初始购买价是每股7.6美元，但因为在1965年的大笔购买，最后的平均价是每股14.86美元。在1965年12月31日，伯克希尔拥有的运营资产（未计算工厂和设备价值之前）大概每股19美元。
Berkshire is a delight to own. There is no question that the state of the textile industry is the dominant factor in determining the earning power of the business, but we are most fortunate to have Ken Chace running the business in a first-class manner, and we also have several of the best sales people in the business heading up this end of their respective divisions.
我们很高兴拥有了伯克希尔。毫无疑问，纺织行业的整体环境是决定这家公司盈利能力的主要因素。但是我们很幸运拥有Ken Chace这样一流的管理者来运营这家公司，并且各个终端分支机构也由非常好的销售人员在领导。
While a Berkshire is hardly going to be as profitable as a Xerox, Fairchild Camera or National Video in a hypertensed market, it is a very comfort able sort of thing to own. As my West Coast philosopher says, “It is well to have a diet consisting of oatmeal as well as cream puffs.”
虽然伯克希尔很难达到Xerox, Fairchild Camera 或National Video的盈利水平，但仍旧值得拥有。就像我在西海岸的哲学家朋友所说的：“我们既吃冰激淋泡芙也吃燕麦片”。
Because of our controlling interest, our investment in Berkshire is valued for our audit as a business, not as a marketable security. If Berkshire advances $5 per share in the market, it does BPL no good - our holdings are not going to be sold. Similarly, if it goes down $5 per share, it is not meaningful to us. The value of our holding is determined directly by the value of the business. I received no divine inspiration in that valuation of our holdings. (Maybe the owners of the three wonder stocks mentioned above do receive such a message in respect to their holdings -I feel I would need something at least that reliable to sleep well at present prices.) I attempt to apply a conservative valuation based upon my knowledge of assets, earning power, industry conditions, competitive position, etc. We would not be a seller of our holdings at such a figure, but neither would we be a seller of the other items in our portfolio at yearend valuations –otherwise, we would already have sold them.
因为控股地位，我们对在伯克希尔投资的估值是对整个生意进行估值，而不是按照市场价格。即使伯克希尔的股价上升了5美元，也不会对巴菲特合伙公司有什么好处——我们不打算卖出股权。同样，即使它的股价下降了5美元，对我们也没有任何意义。我们的股权价值直接取决于这个公司的价值。我对于我们持股的估值没有获得什么神圣的灵感。（或许上述提到过的三个公司的其他股东获得过，不过我认为或许我需要些什么东西能让我在它们现在的股价水平下睡得安稳4）我试着基于我了解的资产、盈利能力、行业状况、竞争地位等，用较为保守的方式来估值。我们不会按照这个估值来卖出我们的股权，当然也不会按照这个标准来卖出我们其他投资标的的股权，不然我们早就卖出了。
Our final category is "Generals-Relatively Undervalued.” This category has been growing in relative importance as opportunities in the other categories become less frequent.
最后一类是“Generals-相对低估”。当其他类投资的机会越来越少时，这类投资所占比重越来越大。
Frankly, operating in this field is somewhat more ethereal than operating in the other three categories, and I'm just not an ethereal sort. Therefore, I feel accomplishments here are less solid and perhaps less meaningful for future projections than in the other categories. Nevertheless, our results in 1965 were quite good in the “Relatively Undervalued” group, partly due to implementation of the technique referred to in last year's letter which serves to reduce risk and potentially augment gains. It should reduce risk in any year, and it definitely augmented the gains in 1965. It is necessary to point out that results in this category were greatly affected for the better by only two investments.
坦白说，相比其他三类投资，这部分投资的收益好的令人觉得不像真的一样，而我不是这类人。所以，我认为这部分的收益不够稳妥，或许对我们未来的收益帮助不大。不过，我们这类投资在1965年收益非常好。部分原因应该是我们执行了去年信中所说的那项技术，能够减小风险并放大收益。每年都可以减少风险，但绝对不是每年都能像1965年这样放大收益。需要指出的是，今年这部分的收益很大部分来源于2个单项投资。
Candor also demands I point out that during 1965 we had our worst single investment experience in the history of BPL on one idea in this group.
另外，我也需要坦白，1965年在这类投资中有我们有史以来最大的单项亏损。
Overall, we had more than our share of good breaks in 1965. We did not have a great quantity of ideas, but the quality, with the one important exception mentioned above, was very good and circumstances developed which accelerated the timetable in several. I do not have a great flood of good ideas as I go into 1966, although again I believe I have at least several potentially good ideas of substantial size. Much depends on whether market conditions are favorable for obtaining a larger position.
总之，相比于机会的数量来说我们在1965年收获良多。我们没有特别多的想法，但是除了上段提到过的那一个想法，其他都是高质量的，而且外部环境加速了这些想法的实施。进入到1966年，我也没有如洪水般的想法涌进来，不过我相信我有几个潜在的大的好点子。这需要取决于股票市场是否给我们买入大量股票的机会。
All in all, however, you should recognize that more came out of the pipeline in 1965 than went in.
不管怎么说，你需要了解的是我们在1965年更多的是收获而不是播种。
Last year in commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of: "(1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.”
去年在评论大部分投资经理都无法取得超越道指的成绩时，我把原因归纳如下：“（1）集体决策——无论规模大小，优秀的投资机构不可能让各方都真正参与决策，这可能是我的一个坏印象；（2）一种倾向——与其他享有盛誉的大型组织的政策和资产组合（某种程度上）趋于一致；（3）机构框架——在那里平均是安全的，而独立行动的回报无法与对应的风险相匹配；（4）某些限制——必须从属于特定且不合理的多元化；（5）惰性——最后也是最重要的因素。”
This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."
在今年11月份的信中，我特别提醒你们注意新的“基本原则”的第7条：“我们的多元化程度比大部分的投资机构都要低。在某些情况下我们或许会将我们净资产的40%投资到某个单一的证券。在这些情况中，我们的事实和归因有非常高的可能是正确的，而只有极低的可能会动摇投资价值的基础。”
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorelated (what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.
很显然，我们的多元化政策跟所有的公开投资机构都不相同。坦白说，我非常赞同能有50个投资机会，每个投资机会的数学期望值（这个值代表了所有的可能性及其概率分布，也包含不利的方面。请不要目瞪口呆！）都能超出道指15个百分点。如果这50个独立的期望都是不相关的（一个事情的发生跟另一件事情无关），我就可以在每个机会上都投入2%的资金，从而会使我们的整体投资结果有非常大的可能可以超越道指15个百分点。
It doesn't work that way.
但这不可能实现。
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is, “How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight. It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.
我们需要极端努力才能发现几个异常有吸引力的机会。这种机会可以定义如下：对投资年化收益的期望（定义见上文）可以超过道指10个百分点。在我们发现的这几个机会中，期望值波动范围非常大。问题永远是：“我应该在第一名和第八名（按照期望值排名）上各投多少钱？”这要取决于第一名和第八名的数学期望值差距有多大，还要取决于第一名有多大的概率会表现很差。两个证券或许会有相同的数学期望，但是一个也许有5%的概率会比道指差15个百分点，另一个只有1%的概率。前一种情况中期望值的波动幅度降低了我们在它身上下重注的意愿。
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations - whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.
上述说法或许会让整个投资决策显得很精确。但绝不是这样的。我们的工作是查明事实，然后用我们的经验和影响这些事实的因素来推导数学期望。我们的推导或许会模糊和情绪化，但这就是投资！投资决策在长期内产生的投资结果会显示你做这种计算的能力——不管你是否意识到你做过这些计算。我认为如果能够了解思考路径，投资者在投资过程中会有很大优势。
There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
有一件事是我可以确定的。如果对一个良好表现的基金有哪怕一点点客观评价，任何一个拥有一百只股票（不管投资经理管理1000美元还是十亿美元）的投资组合都不能很有逻辑的运营。增加这第100只股票以试图减少投资组合的波动性不可能弥补它对降低投资组合数学期望的影响。
Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)
任何在看似学习了多元化优势以后而拥有如此多数量股票的人（我不关心他们是多么赫赫有名），都是在重复我所说的“Noah的投资理念”——什么都要两个。这些投资者或许可以去开诺亚方舟。不过Noah是在遵循已经被时间验证过的生物学原则，而这些投资者却偏离了数学原则。（我只在平面几何中学过一些，不过有个例外，我曾经很仔细的把数学家从我们的合伙人中剔除出去。）
Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in over-diversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.
当然，其他人毫无逻辑的拥有100只证券并不能证明我们是正确的。即使他们的过度多元化是错的，我们为了实现投资目标也必须通过合理的多元化。
The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.
有利的投资组合既要考虑可选机会的期望值，也要考虑他们的方差。选择的标的越多，每年的波动性就越小；当然，考虑到不同的选择有不同的期望值，这也会导致投资收益变低。
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.
我宁愿放弃对年度结果（当我说结果时，我在说相对道指的表现）波动的控制，以求达到更好的长期投资收益。简单来说，这就意味着我愿意在我认为最好的投资机会上集中非常大比例的投资，而这种投资机会或许会使得某年的收益很差，可能会比分散投资差很多。但这也意味着我们的投资结果将来反弹更大，当然也意味着我们长期投资收益会更大。
You have already seen some examples of this. Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965. If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider amplitude. I could have operated in such a manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have reduced our overall performance somewhat although it still would have substantially exceeded that of the investment companies. Looking back, and continuing to think this problem through, I feel that if anything, I should have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past. Hence, the new Ground Rule and this long-winded explanation.
你们已经看过一些案例了。相对道指，我们在1958年高出2.4个百分点，而在1965年是33个百分点。如果你翻阅我们合伙基金的历年表现，你会发现这种波动性增大了。我有办法减小这种波动，但这同时会减少我们的收益，即使这些收益仍旧可以超出那些投资公司很多。我曾回过头深深反思过这个问题，查找过去是否有应当更加集中但没有去做的情况。所以，就有了新的“基本原则”和这一长篇解释。
Again let me state that this is somewhat unconventional reasoning (this doesn't make it right or wrong - it does mean you have to do your own thinking on it), and you may well have a different opinion - if you do, the Partnership is not the place for you. We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare situations - this rarity, of course, is what makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily, when we see such an opportunity. We probably have had only five or six situations in the nine-year history of the Partnership where we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to have to promise very significantly superior performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities available at the time. They are also going to have to possess such superior qualitative and/or quantitative factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is minimal (anything can happen on a short-term quotational basis which partially explains the greater risk of widened year- to-year variation in results). In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment, I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the single investment (or group, if there is intercorrelation) can produce a result for our total portfolio that would be more than ten percentage points poorer than the Dow.
让我再次强调这不是传统思维（无法决定它是否正确——但是这要求你自己要去思考），或许你有不同的意见。如果你有，我们的合伙基金不适合你。很显然，我们只在很少的情况下会投入40%的资金，这种稀有性让我们认为有必要在发现这样的机会时集中投入如此大比例的资金。在我们合伙基金9年的历史中，我们大概只有五六次投资超过25%的情况。在这几次情况中，都有非常大的可能获得大幅超越道指的收益。同时，它们也存在质的因素和量的因素以保障使得发生永久性本金损失的可能性非常低（短期内什么都可能发生，这也解释了年度结果波动幅度的增大）。在选择投资的比例限制时，我会想办法降低单一投资（或有内在关联性的投资组合）导致我们的收益落后道指10个百分点的可能。
We presently have two situations in the over 25% category - one a controlled company, and the other a large company where we will never take an active part. It is worth pointing out that our performance in 1965 was overwhelmingly the product of five investment situations. The 1965 gains (in some cases there were also gains applicable to the same holding in prior years) from these situations ranged from about $800,000 to about $3 1/2 million. If you should take the overall performance of our five smallest general investments in 1965, the results are lackluster (I chose a very charitable adjective).
我们现在有两项投资超过了25%，一个是“Controls”型投资；一个是“General-低估价值”投资，在这笔投资中我们不可能取得控股权。我觉得应该指出我们在1965年的表现绝大部分要归功于我们的5笔投资。从这5笔投资中，1965年我们所获得的收益（在某些投资中，前几年的收益也差不多）从80万美元到350万美元不等。不过如果你把1965年我们5个最小的“Generals”类投资的总收益拿出来单独看，这个结果是暗淡无光的（我已经选择了很善意的形容词）。
Interestingly enough, the literature of investment management is virtually devoid of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal diversification. All texts counsel "adequate" diversification, but the ones who quantify "adequate" virtually never explain how they arrive at their conclusion. Hence, for our summation on over-diversification, we turn to that eminent academician Billy Rose, who says, "You've got a harem of seventy girls; you don't get to know any of them very well.”
有意思的是，关于投资管理的著作很少涉及到乐观的多元化对收益的降低效应。所有的文章都说要“适当”的多元化，但是量化“适当”的人从来没有解释过他们是怎么推导出他们的结论的。所以，为了给过度多元化做个总结，我们来看著名学者Billy Rose的说法“你虽然有70个妻妾，但是你一个也不了解”。
Last year we boldly announced an expansion move, encompassing an additional 227 1/4 square feet. Older partners shook their heads. I feel that our gain from operations in 1965 of $12,304,060 indicates that we did not overextend ourselves. Fortunately, we didn't sign a percentage lease. Operationally, things have never been running more smoothly, and I think our present setup unquestionably lets me devote a higher percentage of my time to thinking about the investment process than virtually anyone else in the money management business. This, of course, is the result of really outstanding personnel and cooperative partners.
去年我们大胆地宣布扩张行动，准备增加227.25平方英尺的办公面积。老合伙人会摇头反对。不过我认为我们在1965年获取的12,304,060美元的收益显示我们没有太过放飞自我。幸运的是我们没有签订任何租约。运营上的事情已经好到不能再好了，相比其他投资公司，我认为现在毫无疑问可以让我有更多的时间来考虑我们的投资进程。当然这跟我们特别出色和相当配合的合伙人有非常大的关系。
John Harding has taken complete charge of all administrative operations with splendid results. Bill Scott continues to develop detailed information on investments which substantially enhances our net profit figure. Beth Feehan, Donna Walter and Elizabeth Hanon (who joined us in November) have all handled large work loads (secretary's note -Amen!) accurately and efficiently.
John Harding全面接管了行政管理工作，他做得非常好。Bill Scott继续专注于投资的细节，这给我们的净利润带来非常大的帮助。Beth Feehan, Donna Walter and Elizabeth Hanon（今年11月刚加入我们）让大量的文件工作（秘书注解说“阿门”）精确而有效率。
The above people, their spouses (one apiece) and children have a combined investment in the Partnership of over $600,000. Susie and I have an investment of $6,849,936, which should keep me from slipping away to the movies in the afternoon. This represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card, a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders.
上述的员工以及他们的配偶和孩子在合伙基金中拥有超过60万美元的资金。Susie和我在合伙基金中的资金是6,849,936美元，这将会阻止我在某个下午偷偷溜出去看电影。这几乎是我们所有的净资产，除了我们一直拥有的一个我在1960年买的本地公司，Mid-Continent Tab Card公司的股权，那时候它的股东不超过10个人。
Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, three aunts, two uncles, five cousins, and six nieces and nephews have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $2,708,233. So don't get any ideas about voting a change in the Partnership name.
另外我的三个孩子、母亲、两个姐妹、两个大舅哥、我的岳父、三个阿姨、2个叔叔、5个堂兄弟、6个侄子和侄女在我们的合伙基金中直接或间接持有的资产为2,708,233美元。所以不要想着通过投票来改变我们合伙公司的名字。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. has done the customary excellent job of expediting the audit and tax information. This requires great effort and ability, and they supply both. This year a computer was brought to bear on our problems, and naturally, I was a little worried someone else would come out as the general partner. However, it all worked quite smoothly.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell公司继续在审计和税收方面做出非常出色的工作。这需要努力和能力，而他们两者兼具。今年有一台电脑被带进来帮助处理相关的工作，于是我有些担心某个家伙会跳出来成为普通合伙人。不过，一切都运行的非常好。
Within the coming two weeks you will receive:
接下来几周你们将会收到：
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A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1965 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
一封你们缴纳1965年联邦所得税所需要的所有关于巴菲特合伙公司信息的信。这封信中的信息只用于计税。
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An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1965, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
一封Peat, Marwick, Mitchell公司关于1965年的审计工作的信，包含对巴菲特合伙公司运营情况和财务情况以及你们个人账户的审计。
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A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/66. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
一封关于你们在1966年1月1日在合伙基金中的资金份额的信。这些金额已经通过审计。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. It is difficult to anticipate all of the questions you may have and if there is anything that is confusing, I want to hear about it. For instance, we received an excellent suggestion last year from a partner regarding the presentation of the reconciliation of personal capital accounts.
如果有任何不清楚的地方，请随时联系我。要回答你们所有的问题会很困难，但如果你们有什么疑惑，我都想听到。例如，去年我们收到了一份非常好的关于个人账户整合的建议。
My next letter will be about July 15th, summarizing the first ha1f of this year.
我们下一封信将会在7月15日发出，用于总结上半年的情况。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett