原文信息：
- 标题：1968 Letter to Limited Partners
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1969-01-22
- 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
January 22nd, 1969
Everyone makes mistakes.
每个人都会犯错。
At the beginning of 1968, I felt prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time in our history. However, due in considerable measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come (investment ideas, like women are often more exciting than punctual), we recorded an overall gain of $40,032,691.
在1968年开始的时候，我认为巴菲特合伙有限公司的表现会比历史上任何时候都要差，但是，由于一项简单但是非常棒的投资想法达到了它的收获时间（投资想法就像女人，虽然不按时到，但有时更令人兴奋），我们的总体收益达到40,032,691美元。
Naturally, you all possess sufficient intellectual purity to dismiss the dollar result and demand an accounting of performance relative to the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. We established a new mark at plus 58.8% versus an overall plus 7.7 % for the Dow, including dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average throughout the year. This result should be treated as a freak like picking up thirteen spades in a bridge game. You bid the slam, make it look modest, pocket the money and then get back to work on the part scores. We will also have our share of hands when we go set.
不过你们都已经拥有了足够纯正的投资原则，不会使用总体收益来衡量投资结果，而是会与道琼斯工业指数相比较。我们创记录的获得了58.8%的收益率，而道指包含分红只有7.7%。这个结果非常反常，就像在桥牌游戏中拿到了十三张黑桃一样。你做了大满贯定约，表现的满不在乎，把赢得的钱装进口袋里，然后继续打那些只能叫部分定约的牌局。当我们定约时，我们也有一手这样的好牌。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the General Partner and the results for limited partners:
下述表格反映了多年来道指、合伙基金分成给普通合伙人之前（超出6%收益的25%）、有限合伙人的收益情况。
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 7.7% | 58.8% | 45.6% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
下表列出了累计收益及年化收益：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 94.9% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 - 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 - 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 - 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| 1957 - 68 | 185.7% | 2610.6% | 1403.5% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.1% | 31.6% | 25.3% |
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two largest mutual funds (they stood at the top in size from 1957 through 1966 - they are still number two and three) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
下面我们更新了我们经常与之对比的两家最大的开放式基金（他们从1957年到1966年都是最大的两家，现在仍然是第二和第三）和两家最大的封闭式基金的数据。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont. (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 10.3% | 8.1% | 6.7% | 6.8% | 7.7% | 45.6% |
| Cumulative Results | 189.3% | 167.7% | 225.6% | 200.2% | 185.7% | 1403.5% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.3% | 8.6% | 10.3% | 9.6% | 9.1% | 25.3% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1968 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1967. Estimated for 1968.
（2）1957-1967年数据来源于1968年Moody银行和金融手册；1968年数据为估计值。
It is interesting that after twelve years these four funds (which presently aggregate well over $5 billion and account for over 10% of the investment company industry) have averaged only a fraction of one percentage point annually better than the Dow.
有趣的是，12年后这四只基金（他们共有50亿美元，占投资公司行业资金总额的10%）的平均年化收益率只比道指高不到一个百分点。
Some of the so-called “go-go” funds have recently been re-christened “no-go” funds. For example, Gerald Tsai's Manhattan Fund, perhaps the world's best-known aggressive investment vehicle, came in at minus 6.9% for 1968. Many smaller investment entities continued to substantially outperform the general market in 1968, but in nothing like the quantities of 1966 and 1967.
有些命名为“go-go”的基金1，最近已经被重命名为“no-go”基金。例如Gerald Tsai2的Manhattan Fund，或许是世界上最知名的进取型基金，今年的收益为负6.9%。很多小型的投资公司在1968年继续表现的比道指好很多，但是他们的数量没有1966年和1967年那么多了。
The investment management business, which I used to severely chastise in this section for excessive lethargy, has now swung in many quarters to acute hypertension. One investment manager, representing an organization (with an old established name you would recognize) handling mutual funds aggregating well over $1 billion, said upon launching a new advisory service in 1968:
投资管理行业——我曾经在这部分非常严厉的批评说它们有气无力，但在这几个季度它们变成了血脉偾张。一个管理着超过10亿美元共同基金的机构（有一个你们应该知道的很古老的名字）的投资经理，在1968年启动一项新的投资咨询服务时说：
“The complexities of national and international economics make money management a full-time job. A good money manager cannot maintain a study of securities on a week-by-week or even a day-by-day basis. Securities must be studied in a minute-by-minute program.”
“国内及国际经济的复杂性，让资金管理成为全天候工作。一个好的资金管理者不能仅以周或以天为单位来研究证券，必须以分钟为单位”。
Wow! 哇哦！
This sort of stuff makes me feel guilty when I go out for a Pepsi. When practiced by large and increasing numbers of highly motivated people with huge amounts of money on a limited quantity of suitable securities, the result becomes highly unpredictable. In some ways it is fascinating to watch and in other ways it is appalling.
这类想法，会让我在出去喝杯百事可乐的时候，都感到内疚。当大量且不断增多的高度冲动的人，携带着大量资金买卖数量有限的证券的时候，投资结果将变得高度不可测。或许结果会令人非常兴奋，或许也会令人异常恐惧。
All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1968. Our total overall gain of $40,032,691 was divided as follows:
我们的四类投资在1968年表现的都很好。我们40,032,691美元的总体收益具体来源如下：
| Category | Average Investment | Overall Gain |
|---|---|---|
| Controls | $24,996,998 | $5,886,109 |
| Generals - Private Owner | $16,363,100 | $21,994,736 |
| Generals - Relatively Undervalued | $8,766,878 | $4,271,825 |
| Workouts | $18,980,602 | $7,317,128 |
| Miscellaneous, primarily US Treasury Bills | $12,744,973 | $839,496 |
| Total Income | $40,309,294 | |
| Less – General Expense, including Interest | $276,603 | |
| Overall Gain | $40,032,691 |
A few caveats, as mentioned in my letter two years ago, are again in order (non-doctoral candidates may proceed to next section):
我在两年前的信中提到过需要注意的几点依然如旧（没有博士学位的人需要阅读这部分内容）：
-
An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition. we'll be glad to give you a copy.
关于这几类投资的解释已经在1965年1月18日的信中列明了。如果你们需要重拾记忆或者你们已经找不到那封信了，我们很乐意再提供一份复印件。
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The classifications are not iron-clad. Nothing is changed retroactively but the initial decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary.
这种分类不是不可改变的。虽然回溯的时候不会有所变更，但当初做分类决定的时候有某种随意性。
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Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be understated relative to partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the above figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 150 on December 31 would have an average investment of 125 producing a 40% result contrasted to a 50% result by the customary approach. In other words, the above figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the average investment.
不同于合伙基金按照年初资产价值计算回报率，每类投资的回报率是按照平均资产来计算的。例如，我们在1月1日购买的证券是100美元，在12月31日涨到了150美元，我们会按照125美元为基础计算，得到收益率为40%，而不是50%。也就是说，以上的数据用每月平均资产价值来计算年度平均资产。
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All results are based on a 100% ownership, non-leverage, basis. Interest and other general expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category. When securities are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable average investment category.
所有的结果都按照100%拥有的资金为基础计算的，没有包含杠杆。利息和其他费用从总体收益中扣除，而不会分布到各类投资收益中。直接涉及到各类投资的费用，例如已卖空股票的分红等，直接从各类投资收益中扣除。当直接借入证券并卖空时，净投资额（做多减做空）平均分配至不同的投资类型。
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The above table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non-homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.
上述表格只有有限用途。每类投资的结果主要来自于一或两项投资。它们不表示已经收集了大量数据（例如所有美国男性的道德水平等等），从中可以推导出某些结论。它们只是表示一些不经常、不均匀的现象会根据不同的行为产生很不确定的结果，并且只能被我们使用。
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Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely self-checking.
最后，这种计算并不像我们在数钱时那么用心，也可能因为没有做整体的自我检查而产生某些文字上或数学上的错误。
Overall, the controlled companies turned in a decent performance during 1968. Diversified Retailing Company Inc. (80% owned) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (70% owned) had combined after-tax earnings of over $5 million.
总体来说1968年“Controls”类的投资表现一般。Diversified Retailing Company Inc. （下面简称DRC，我们有80%的股权）和 Berkshire Hathaway Inc.（下面简称B-H，我们有70%的股权）税后利润共有500万美元。
Particularly outstanding performances were turned in by Associated Cotton Shops, a subsidiary of DRC run by Ben Rosner, and National Indemnity Company, a subsidiary of B-H run by Jack Ringwalt. Both of these companies earned about 20% on capital employed in their businesses. Among Fortune's “500” (the largest manufacturing entities in the country, starting with General Motors), only 37 companies achieved this figure in 1967, and our boys outshone such mildly better-known (but not better appreciated) companies as IBM, General Electric, General Motors, Procter & Gamble, DuPont, Control Data, Hewlett-Packard, etc...
不过，由Ben Rosner管理的DRC的子公司Associated Cotton Shops和由Jack Ringwalt管理的B-H的子公司National Indemnity Company都表现的非常好。这两家公司的资产收益率大概为20%，在1967年财富500强中只有37家公司达到了这个水准。我们的这两个小伙子要比那些更知名（但未必更好）的公司更胜一筹，这些公司有IBM, General Electric, General Motors, Procter & Gamble, DuPont, Control Data, Hewlett-Packard等。
I still sometimes get comments from partners like: "Say, Berkshire is up four points - that's great!" or "What's happening to us, Berkshire was down three last week?" Market price is irrelevant to us in the valuation of our controlling interests. We valued B-H at 25 at yearend 1967 when the market was about 20 and 31 at yearend 1968 when the market was about 37. We would have done the same thing if the markets had been 15 and 50 respectively. ("Price is what you pay, value is what you get"). We will prosper or suffer in controlled investments in relation to the operating performances of our businesses - we will not attempt to profit by playing various games in the securities markets.
有时候我会从合伙人那里收到一些这样的评论：“伯克希尔的股价上升了4个百分点，非常棒！”或者“发生了什么事情，伯克希尔的股价上周下跌了3个百分点！”股票价格跟我们控股企业的价值没有什么关系。我们在1967年底对B-H的评估价值是每股25美元，而它的市场价格是20美元；但是在1968年年底我们对它的评估价值是30美元时，它的市场价格却达到了37美元。即使它的市场价格变成15美元或者是50美元，我们所做的事情也不会有什么变化（“你付出的叫做价格，你得到的才叫价值”）。“Controls”类投资的收益跟企业的运营状况息息相关，我们不会试图用买卖普通股的技巧来追逐这部分投资的利润。
Over the years this has been our best category, measured by average return, and has also maintained by far the best percentage of profitable transactions. This approach was the way I was taught the business, and it formerly accounted for a large proportion of all our investment ideas. Our total individual profits in this category during the twelve year BPL history are probably fifty times or more our total losses. The cash register really rang on one simple industry idea (implemented in several ways) in this area in 1968. We even received a substantial fee (included in Other Income in the audit) for some work in this field.
多年来这部分投资的表现，从回报率上来看是我们各个投资类型中最好的，到目前为止也是获利交易中最多的。我学习投资时学到的就是这类方式，一般我们大部分的投资想法都会由此产生。过去12年，我们在这类投资上的总收益是总亏损的50倍。1968年，这部收银机的“叮当声”主要来源于一个简单行业的投资想法（用多种方式执行）。我们甚至因为做了一些工作，而在这个领域收取了一笔可观的费用（已列入审计报告中的其他收入部分）。
Our total investment in this category (which is where I feel by far the greatest certainty regarding consistently decent results) is presently under $2 million and I have nothing at all in the hopper to bolster this. What came through like the Johnstown flood in 1968 looks more like a leaky faucet in Altoona for 1969.
我们现在在这类投资（这部分投资是到现在为止我认为最具确定性的投资，能够持续获取较好的利润）中的资金还不到200万，而且我没有任何办法来增加它。1968年，如Johnstown的洪水般流量的利润，估计到了1969年只能像Altoona的漏水水龙头的流量一样了。
This category produced about two-thirds of the overall gain in 1966 and 1967 combined. I mentioned last year that the great two-year performance here had largely come from one idea. I also said, "We have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.” It gives me great pleasure to announce that this statement was absolutely correct. It gives me somewhat less pleasure to announce that it must be repeated this year.
这部分投资类型的盈利大概是1966年和1967年盈利总和的三分之二。我在去年的信中提到过，那两年非常好的表现主要来源于一个投资想法。我还说：“……我们现在在这种类型的投资上，再也没有能够在规模和潜力上与之相比的投资了”。我要很高兴的宣布，我的预言完全正确。但是我也要不那么高兴的宣布，今年同样会如此。
This category, which was a disaster in 1967, did well during 1968. Our relatively heavy concentration in just a few situations per year (some of the large arbitrage houses may become involved in fifty or more workouts per annum) gives more variation in yearly results than an across-the-board approach. I feel the average profitability will be as good with our policy and 1968 makes me feel better about that conclusion than 1967 did.
这种类型的投资，虽然在1967年是一场灾难，但是在1968年表现的非常好。我们每年只在几个标的上拥有集中且大量的持股（有些大型套利机构每年要投资50个以上的标的），使得我们相比普通的方式，每年的波动幅度更大。但是，我认为用我们的方式所获得的平均收益率也会一样好，而1968年比1967年更让我有自信得出这个结论。
It should again be stated that our results in the Workout area (as well as in other categories) are somewhat understated compared to the more common method of determining results computed on an initial base figure and utilizing borrowed money (which is often a sensible part of the Workout business).
需要强调的是，我们在计算“Workouts”类型的投资（以及其他类型的投资）时，不像大部分投资方法那样以初始资金为基础计算，也没有扣除所借的贷款（它们一般占“Workouts”资金相当大的比例），所以某种程度上这类投资的收益率被低估了。
I can't emphasize too strongly that the quality and quantity of ideas is presently at an all time low - the product of the factors mentioned in my October 9th, 1967 letter, which have largely been intensified since then.
我必须着重强调，我们现在的投资想法的质量和数量是我们有史以来最低的。相关因素已经在1967年10月9日的信中提到了，但是从那以后这些因素更加恶化了。
Sometimes I feel we should have a plaque in our office like the one at the headquarters of Texas Instruments in Dallas which reads: “We don't believe in miracles, we rely on them.” It is possible for an old, overweight ball player, whose legs and batting eye are gone, to tag a fast ball on the nose for a pinch-hit home run, but you don't change your line-up because of it.
有时我感觉我们应该在我们的办公室挂一块匾，就像德州仪器在达拉斯总部所挂的那样——“我们不相信奇迹，我们依靠奇迹”。一个失去双腿和主视眼的、又老又超重的棒球手，精准的击中了一个快球并打出本垒打。这或许是可能发生的，但你不会因为这个原因而更换你的主击球手。
We have a number of important negatives operating on our future and, while they shouldn't add up to futility, they certainly don't add up to more than an average of quite moderate profitability.
未来，我们会有一些重要的、有负面影响的运营项目，虽然不能说它们毫无用处，但是它们也肯定无法对超出平均收益有所帮助。
As one of my older friends says, “Nostalgia just isn't what it used to be.” Let's take a stab at it, anyway.
我的一个老朋友说：“怀旧不再像以前那样了”。但是不管怎样，还是让我们怀旧以下吧。
Buffett Associates, Ltd., the initial predecessor partnership, was formed May 5, 1956 with seven limited partners (four family, three close friends), contributing $105,000, and the General Partner putting his money where his mouth was by investing $100. Two additional single-family limited partnerships were formed during 1956, so that on January 1, 1957 combined net assets were $303,726. During 1957, we had a gain of $31,615.97, leading to the 10.4% figure shown on page one. During 1968 I would guess that the New York Stock Exchange was open around 1,200 hours, giving us a gain of about $33,000 per hour (sort of makes you wish they had stayed with the 5-1/2 hour, 5 day week, doesn't it), or roughly the same as the full year gain in 1957.
Buffett Associates, Ltd.，现在的巴菲特合伙有限公司的前身，成立于1956年5月5日，当时只有7个有限合伙人（四个家庭和三个好朋友），他们投资了105,000美元；而普通合伙人投资了100美元。1956年又成立了2个但以家庭的有限合伙基金，所以到1957年1月1日，净资产总额达到303,726美元。在1957年，我们的收益为31,615.97美元，收益率为10.4%。到1968年，我猜测纽交所大概营业了1,200个小时，使得我们每小时的收益为33,000（这会让你们希望他们能坚持每周5天、每天5.5个小时的工作时间，不是吗？），这大概等同于1957年全年的收益。
On January 1, 1962 we consolidated the predecessor limited partnerships moved out of the bedroom and hired our first full-time employees. Net assets at that time were $7,178,500. From that point to our present net assets of $104,429,431 we have added one person to the payroll. Since 1963 (Assets $9,405,400) rent has gone from $3,947 to $5,823 (Ben Rosner would never have forgiven me if I had signed a percentage lease) travel from $3,206 to $3,603, and dues and subscriptions from $900 to $994. If one of Parkinson's Laws is operating, at least the situation hasn't gotten completely out of control.
在1962年1月1日，我们把合伙基金的办公地点从我的卧室中搬出来，并雇用了一个全职雇员。那时的净资产总额是7,178,500美元。从那时到现在净资产为104,429,431美元时，我们只增加了一个有薪雇员。从1963年（那时的净资产为9,405,400美元）开始，办公室租金从3,947美元增长到5,823美元（如果我签订了增加办公面积的租约，Ben Rosner绝不会原谅我），差旅费从3,206美元增长到3,603美元，其他费用从900美元增长到994美元。即使帕金森定律仍然有效，但至少没有完全脱离我们的掌控。
In making our retrospective survey of our financial assets, our conclusion need not parallel that of Gypsy Rose Lee who opined, when reviewing her physical assets on her fifty-fifth birthday: “I have everything I had twenty years ago - it's just that it's all lower.”
回溯我们的金融资产，我们不需要做出和Gypsy Rose Lee同样的结论。在她55岁生日时，回顾她的身体资产，她说：“我和二十年前所拥有的东西是一样的，除了一点——它们都变低了”。
Although the investment environment is difficult, the office environment is superb. With Donna, Gladys, Bill and John, we have an organization that functions speedily, efficiently and pleasantly. They are the best.
虽然投资环境变差了，但是我们的办公环境超级棒。 和Donna、Gladys、Bill、John在一起，我们的组织快速、有效且开心。他们是最棒的。
The office group, along with spouses (one apiece - I still haven't figured out how I should handle that plural) and children have over $27 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1969. Assorted sizes and shapes of aunts, uncles, parents, in-laws, brothers, sisters and cousins make the BPL membership list read like “Our Crowd” - which, so far as I am concerned, is exactly what it is.
我们的办公人员和他们的配偶们（一人一个——我还没想好如何处理复数）及孩子们于1969年1月份在巴菲特合伙有限公司拥有的份额为2700万美元。一大群叔伯阿姨兄弟子女使得巴菲特合伙有限公司的合伙人名单读起来像“我们的家族”——至今我认为好像确实如此。
Within a few days, you will receive:
接下来几天，你们会收到：
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A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1968 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
一封你们缴纳1968年联邦所得税所需要的所有关于巴菲特合伙公司信息的信。这封信中的信息只用于计税。
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An audit from Peat Marwick. Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1968, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
一封Peat, Marwick, Mitchell公司关于1968年的审计工作的信，包含对巴菲特合伙公司运营情况和财务情况以及你们个人账户的审计。
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A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1969. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
一封关于你们在1969年1月1日在合伙基金中的资金份额的信。这些金额已经通过审计。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 10th, summarizing the first half of this year.
如果关于这封信或今年发生的其他事情有任何不清楚的地方，请随时联系我。我的下一封信将会在7月10日发出，用于总结上半年的情况。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB/glk