原文信息：
- 标题：1969 October Letter to Limited Partners
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1969-10-09
- 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
October 9th, 1969
To My Partners:
致我的合伙人：
Here is my present estimate of the BPL calendar for the months to come:
以下是我现在对巴菲特合伙有限公司接下来几个月的日程表的估计：
(1) This letter - to tell you something of Bill Ruane, the money manager within my knowledge who ranks the highest when combining the factors of integrity, ability and continued availability to all partners. I also want to comment upon the present range of expectations involved in deciding on a bond-stock mix.
（1）这封信会告诉你们有关Bill Ruane的一些情况。综合诚信、能力以及持续能为所有的合伙人提供服务这些因素，他是我所知道的排名最高的资金管理者。我也想评论一下关于债券-股票组合投资目前可期望的收益范围。
(2) Late November - the required thirty days formal notice of my intent to retire from the Partnership at the end of the year.
（2）11月晚些时候将发出正式的解散通知，因为有要求必须在年底解散合伙公司之前30天发出。
(3) Early December - a package of publicly available material, as well as some general comments by me relating to our controlled companies. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (owning the textile business, Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company and Sun Newspapers) and Diversified Retailing Company (owning Hochschild, Kohn & Co. and Associated Cotton Shops). I want you to have ample time to study the material relating to such companies before you make any decision to hold, sell or buy such securities after distribution to you in early January. I will solicit written questions from partners (I don't want to talk to you individually about such companies, as I want all partners to obtain exactly the same information) and then have a further mailing late in December, giving all questions received relating to these companies along with my answers, if possible. I still anticipate having a plan enabling partners to promptly convert such controlled company holdings to cash, if they wish.
（3）12月早些时候会有一大堆可公开获取的资料以及我对我们所控股公司的总体评论。伯克希尔哈撒韦公司（拥有纺织业务、伊利诺伊国民银行和信托公司、国民保险公司、国民火灾和海上保险公司、太阳报）和多元零售公司（拥有两个子公司Hochschild, Kohn & Co. 和Associated Cotton Shops）。在1月份早期你们将可以分到这些公司的股票，我希望在你们做出持有、卖出或买入这些股票的决定之前，你们有充足的时间去学习这些公司的相关资料。我会向合伙人征求以书面形式反馈的问题（我不想跟你们某个人单独探讨这些公司，因为我希望所有的合伙人得到的信息都是完全一样的），然后如果可能的话，我会在12月晚些时候再写一封信，回复所有关于这些公司的问题。我仍然希望有一个计划可以使合伙人在他们想要转换的时候，能够把他们在这些公司上的持股转换成现金。
(4) About January 5th - (a) a cash distribution amounting to at least 56% (probably more - depending upon what percentage of our remaining holdings are sold before yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital, less any distributions (the regular monthly payments many of you receive) or borrowings by you during 1969, (b) your proportional share of our holdings in Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. I which, if you dispose of them, will bring 30% - 35% (my estimate of value will be made at yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital.
（4）1月5日——（a）分发的现金至少达到1969年1月1日资金金额的56%（或许会更多，这要取决于在年底前我们剩下持股的售出情况），不过会扣除“月度支付”和你们在1969年的借款；（b）合伙基金中你们对应的多元零售公司和伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股份，如果你们想卖掉它们，大概可以获得1969年1月1日所拥有资金的30%-35%（我会在年底对其进行估值）。
We may make substantial additional sales before yearend - if so, the early January cash distribution will be somewhat larger than the 56% mentioned above. If we don't, such sales will be made during the first half of 1970 and an interim distribution made. Residual assets will be sold at appropriate times and I believe not more than 10% of our present asset value will remain after June 30th, 1970 pending a final distribution when all assets and liabilities have been cleaned up.
我们或许会在年底前卖出更多的投资标的，这样的话在1月份早期分发的现金会高于上述提到的56%。如果那时没有卖出，大概也会在1970年上半年卖出，并且会在卖出后分发现金。剩下的投资将会在合适的时间卖出，我认为在1970年6月30日以后，尚未分发的投资大概不会超过我们现在资产的10%，不过这取决于所有的资产和负债什么时候能清理完毕，
Unless there is a further substantial decline in the market. I still expect about a breakeven performance before any monthly payments for 1969. We were lucky - if we had not been in liquidation this year, our results would have been significantly worse. Ideas that looked potentially interesting on a "continuing" basis have on balance performed poorly to date. We have only two items of real size left - one we are selling as I write this and the other is a holding of limited marketability representing about 7-1/2% of the outstanding stock of Blue Chip Stamps which we may sell via a registered public offering around yearend, depending upon market conditions and other factors.
除非股票市场急剧下跌，否则我认为在扣除“月度支付”前，我们在1969年将会收支平衡。我们很幸运，因为如果我们不是在今年清理合伙公司，我们的投资结果可能会非常差。看起来继续有获利潜力的想法目前已经非常少了。我们仅存两个真正有意义的项目，其中一个在写这封信的时候正在卖出，另一个是市场流通性有限的股票，这个公司是Blue Chip Stamps，我们持有其发行在外股票的7.5%。我们将会在年底通过注册公开募股1来出售它们，不过这要取决于市场环境和其他因素。
(5) March 1st. 1970 - John Harding expects to leave Buffett Partnership. Ltd. and open a branch office in Omaha for Ruane, Cunniff & Stires. Bill Scott and I will be available at BPL offices to help any partners who are desirous of purchasing bonds, tax-free or taxable. We will set aside the month of March to make our services available without cost to those who want to acquire bonds. Because of some experience we have in analysis and purchasing, as well as the access we have to wholesale markets. I think it is likely we can save material elements of cost as well as help select better relative values for those of you who wish to invest in bonds. After April 1st, however, we want to be out of any form of personal advisory activity.
（5）1970年3月1日—— John Harding打算离开巴菲特合伙有限公司，在奥马哈开一家Ruane, Cunniff & Stires的分支机构。我和Bill Scott将继续呆在办公室，以帮助那些想要购买免税或不免税债券的合伙人。整个3月份，我们都将会呆在办公室，为想要购买债券的人提供免费咨询。由于我们在分析和购买上的经验，以及我们在整个市场中的实践经验，我认为我们可以为想要投资债券的人，节省一些资料费并帮助这些人选择更有价值的标的。 但是4月1日以后，我们将不再提供任何形式的个人咨询活动。
(6) After March, 1970 - Bill and I will continue to office in Kiewit Plaza, spending a very minor portion of our time completing the wind-up of BPL. This will mean filing tax returns for 1970 and probably 1971 resolving minor assets and liabilities etc.
（6）1970年3月之后——我和Bill会继续呆在Kiewit广场的办公室，花一点点时间来完成巴菲特合伙有限公司剩下的收尾工作。这可能意味着，因为仍会继续清理小额的资产和负债，你们需要在1970年甚至1971年报送纳税信息。
Now, to Bill Ruane - we met in Ben Graham's class at Columbia University in 1951 and I have had considerable opportunity to observe his qualities of character, temperament and intellect since that time. If Susie and I were to die while our children are minors, he is one of three trustees who have carte blanche on investment matters - the other two are not available for continuous investment management for all partners, large or small.
现在，我来介绍一下Bill Ruane。我们于1951年在哥伦比亚大学本·格雷厄姆的课堂上认识。从那时起，我就有机会观察他的特点、品性和智慧。如果我和Susie死的时候我们的孩子还小，他会是我的三个托付人之一，将全权处理投资事宜。另外两个人无法为我们所有的、或大或小的合伙人提供持续的投资管理。
There is no way to eliminate the possibility of error when judging humans particularly in regard to future behavior in an unknown environment. However, decisions have to be made - whether actively or passively - and I consider Bill to be an exceptionally high probability decision on character and a high probability one on investment performance. I also consider it likely that Bill will continue as a money manager for many years to come.
在判断一个人未来的表现时，特别是在未知的环境中的表现时，是无法消除误判的可能的。但是，无论是主动还是被动，都必须要做出决定。而我认为，无论是从个人性格上，还是从投资表现上来看，Bill都将会是一个很好的选择。同时，我也认为Bill将会继续从事资金管理很多年。
Bill has recently formed a New York Stock Exchange firm, Ruane, Cunniff & Stires, Inc., 85 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10004, telephone number (212) 344-6700. John Harding presently plans to establish an office for the firm in Omaha about March 1st, 1970. Bill manages accounts individually on a fee basis and also executes brokerage for the accounts - presently with some portion of the brokerage commissions used to offset a portion of the investment advisory fee. His method of operation allows monthly withdrawals on a basis similar to BPL - as a percentage of capital and unrelated to realized or unrealized gain or loss. It is possible he may form some sort of pooled account but such determinations will be made between him and those of you who elect to go with him. I, of course, will not be involved with his operation. I am making my list of partners available to him and he will be writing you fairly soon regarding a trip he plans to make before yearend to Omaha, Los Angeles and Chicago, so that those of you who wish to meet him may do so. Any of you who are going to be in New York during the next few months can contact him directly.
Bill最近成立了一个在纽交所拥有席位的公司——Ruane, Cunniff & Stires公司。该公司地址为：纽约第85大街, N.Y. 10004；电话为：(212) 344-6700。 John Harding打算1970年3月1日在奥马哈为这家公司设立一个办公室。Bill会向他管理的每个账户收取费用，同时也会向账户的股票交易业务收取佣金——现在有一部分交易佣金用于冲抵部分投资咨询费。他的运营方式允许像巴菲特合伙有限公司一样的“月度支付”，计算基础也类似——都是按照资金的一定比例，而与已实现或未实现的利得和损失无关。或许他也会成立某种集合账户，但是这种决定需要他和选择他的投资者一起共同决定。当然，我将不会干涉他的投资运营。我会列一份想要和他一起投资的合伙人名单给他。他将很快会写信给你们告知他打算年底前到奥马哈、洛杉矶和芝加哥来的具体时间，以便想要见他的合伙人能够当面见到他。如果你们在接下来的几个月打算去纽约，可以直接跟他联系。
Bill's overall record has been very good-averaging fairly close to BPL's, but with considerably greater variation. From 1956-1961 and from 1964-1968, a composite of his individual accounts averaged over 40% per annum. However, in 1962, undoubtedly somewhat as a product of the euphoric experience of the earlier years, he was down about 50%. As he re-oriented his thinking, 1963 was about breakeven.
Bill过去的整体记录基本上和巴菲特合伙有限公司差不多，但是波动更大。从1956到1961年，以及从1964到1968年，他的投资年化收益率达40%。不过在1962年，毫无疑问是因为之前年份狂热的市场状况，他的账户下跌了50%。在他调整想法后，1963年实现盈亏平衡。
While two years may sound like a short time when included in a table of performance, it may feel like a long time when your net worth is down 50%. I think you run this sort of short-term risk with virtually any money manager operating in stocks and it is a factor to consider in deciding the portion of your capital to commit to equities. To date in 1969, Bill is down about 15%, which I believe to be fairly typical of most money managers. Bill, of course, has not been in control situations or workouts, which have usually tended to moderate the swings in BPL year-to-year performance. Even excluding these factors, I believe his performance would have been somewhat more volatile (but not necessarily poorer by any means) than mine - his style is different, and while his typical portfolio (under most conditions) would tend to have a mild overlap with mine, there would always be very significant differences.
虽然对于他的整体表现来说，两年看起来是个很短的时间，但是当你的财富缩水50%时你会感觉时间很长。我认为对于任何投资于股票的人，都会遇到这类短期风险。所以在你决定布署到这些证券上的资金比例时，要考虑这个因素。1969年，到现在为止Bill所管理的资产下降了15%，我认为这是大部分资金管理者的典型表现。Bill没有涉及“Cotrols”和“Workouts”类型的投资，所以不能像巴菲特合伙有限公司那样减少年度收益的波幅。即使排除这些因素，我认为他的投资收益也会在某种程度上比我的波幅（未必是较差的表现）更大。他和我的风格不同，他的典型的投资组合（在大部分情况下）和我的也很少有重复，所以结果会有很大的不同。
Bill has achieved his results working with an average of $5 to $10 million. I consider the three most likely negative factors in his future to be: (1) the probability of managing significantly larger sums - this is a problem you are going to have rather quickly with any successful money manager, and it will tend to moderate performance; I believe Bill's firm is now managing $20 -$30 million and, of course, they will continue to add accounts; (2) the possibility of Bill's becoming too involved in the detail of his operation rather than spending all of his time simply thinking about money management. The problems of being the principal factor in a NYSE firm as well as handling many individual accounts can mean that he, like most investment advisors, will be subject to pressures to spend much of his time in activities that do nothing to lead to superior investment performance. In this connection, I have asked Bill to make his services available to all BPL partners - large or small and he will, but I have also told him he is completely a free agent if he finds particular clients diverting him from his main job; (3) the high probability that even excellent investment management during the next decade will only produce limited advantages over passive management. I will comment on this below.
Bill达到上述投资收益的资金量是500万到1000万美元。我认为对于他，将来会有以下3点负面因素：（1）资金大幅增加的可能。这个问题是任何成功的资金管理者不得不面临的问题，而且很可能会导致较为普通的表现。我想Bill现在大概管理了2000万到3000万美元的资金，这个资金量仍然会增大。（2）Bill可能会被卷入运营细节而不是将全部时间都花在思考资金管理上。这个问题或许是拥有纽交所席位的公司以及运营很多个人账户的公司面临的主要问题。这意味着，像大部分投资咨询机构一样，他或许将屈从于压力，将时间花费在与获取超高投资收益无关的活动中。关于这一点，我曾经要求Bill服务于巴菲特合伙有限公司所有的合伙人，无论是大还是小，他答应了；但是我也告诉过他，如果他认为某些特定的客户会使他从主业中分心，他可以拒绝服务他们。（3）即使最优秀的投资管理者可能在接下来的十年也只能获取比被动投资稍好的收益率。下面我会对此进行阐述。
The final point regarding the negatives listed above is that they are not the sort of drawbacks leading to horrible performance, but more likely the sort of things that lead to average performance. I think this is the main risk you run with Bill - and average performance is just not that terrible a risk.
上述负面因素的最后一点是指，这种缺点并不会导致得到糟糕的收益，而更可能会导致只能得到平均收益。我认为这是你们和Bill一起投资的主要风险——不过相对平均的收益并不是一个很大的风险。
In recommending Bill, I am engaging in the sort of activity I have tried to avoid in BPL portfolio activities - a decision where there is nothing to gain (personally) and considerable to lose. Some of my friends who are not in the Partnership have suggested that I make no recommendation since, if results were excellent it would do me no good and, if something went wrong, I might well get a portion of the blame. If you and I had just had a normal commercial relationship, such reasoning might be sound. However, the degree of trust partners have extended to me and the cooperation manifested in various ways precludes such a "hands off" policy. Many of you are professional investors or close thereto and need no advice from me on managers - you may well do better yourself. For those partners who are financially inexperienced. I feel it would be totally unfair for me to assume a passive position and deliver you to the most persuasive salesman who happened to contact you early in 1970.
在推荐Bill时，我就被卷入了我试图在巴菲特合伙有限公司避免去做的事情——那种对我个人没有好处，但可能会有坏处的事情。我的一些不在合伙公司的朋友也建议说我不需要做这种推荐，因为如果结果很好，我不会得到什么好处；但是如果结果不好，我将会受到很多指责。如果你们和我只是普通的商业关系，那么这没有问题；但是，合伙人对我的信任和配合让我无法“袖手旁观”。你们之中很多人是或接近是专业投资者，你们或许可以自己做的更好，所以无需我推荐投资管理者。但是对于其他没有什么投资经验的合伙人，如果我什么都不做，而让你们在1970年早期被某个极具说服力的销售人员偶然联系到而乱投资，我认为这极其不公平。
Finally, a word about expectations. A decade or so ago was quite willing to set a target of ten percentage points per annum better than the Dow, with the expectation that the Dow would average about 7%. This meant an expectancy for us of around 17%, with wide variations and no guarantees, of course - but, nevertheless, an expectancy. Tax-free bonds at the time yielded about 3%. While stocks had the disadvantage of irregular performance, overall they seemed much the more desirable option. I also stressed this preference for stocks in teaching classes, participating in panel discussions, etc...
最后，谈一下关于收益的期望。十年前或更早，或许可以将年化收益率目标设定在比道指高10个百分点，那时道指平均大概可以达到7%。这意味着我们的收益期望是17%，虽然无法确保但很有希望达到，即使每年可能有较大波动。免税债券在那时的收益率是3%。虽然股票不利的地方是收益波动较大，但是整体上来看仍是一个更好的选择。我曾经在课堂、在讨论会等场合，强调过股票的这种表现。
For the first time in my investment lifetime. I now believe there is little choice for the average investor between professionally managed money in stocks and passive investment in bonds. If correct. this view has important implications. Let me briefly (and in somewhat oversimplified form) set out the situation as I see it:
现在，也是我投资生涯中的第一次，我认为对于一般的投资者，在专业投资于股票的管理机构和投资于债券的被动投资机构之间，几乎没有什么选择。如果正确，这个观点有很重要的暗示。下面让我将我的看法做简短（可能过于简单）的阐述：
(1) I am talking about the situation for, say, a taxpayer in a 40% Federal Income Tax bracket who also has some State Income Tax to pay. Various changes are being proposed in the tax laws, which may adversely affect net results from presently tax-exempt income, capital gains, and perhaps other types of investment income. More proposals will probably come in the future. Overall, I feel such changes over the years will not negate my relative expectations about after-tax income from presently tax-free bonds versus common stocks, and may well even mildly reinforce them.
（1）我所讨论的情况是针对那些联邦所得税的税率级别为40%，同时还要缴纳一些州所得税的投资者。各类对税法更改的提议，或许会颠覆性地影响现在的免税收入、资本利得以及其他各种形式的投资收入的税后净收益。或许将来这种提议会更多。但是，我认为多年后的这种改变不会削弱我对免税债券和普通股税后净收益的猜测，或许它会更倾向于加强这种猜测。
(2) I am talking about expectations over the next ten years - not the next weeks or months. I find it much easier to think about what should develop over a relatively long period of time than what is likely in any short period. As Ben Graham said: “In the long run, the market is a weighing machine - in the short run, a voting machine.” I have always found it easier to evaluate weights dictated by fundamentals than votes dictated by psychology.
（2）我所讨论的情况是接下来十年的情况，不是几周或几个月。我发现思考长期将会发生情况要比短期可能发生情况更为容易。就像本·格雷厄姆所说的：“长期来看，股市是个称重机；短期来看，股市是个投票机”。我一直认为从基本面来衡量重量比用心理学来推测投票结果要容易得多。
(3) Purely passive investment in tax-free bonds will now bring about 6-1/2%. This yield can be achieved with excellent quality and locked up for just about any period for which the investor wishes to contract. Such conditions may not exist in March when Bill and I will be available to assist you in bond purchases, but they exist today.
（3）纯粹的被动投资于免税债券，现在可以获得的收益率约为6.5%。这种收益可以通过投资非常优质的债券，并锁定投资者想要的任意投资期来实现。这种机会也许在3月份我和Bill能够协助你们购买债券的时候不再存在，但现在确实存在。
(4) The ten year expectation for corporate stocks as a group is probably not better than 9% overall. say 3% dividends and 6% gain in value. I would doubt that Gross National Product grows more than 6% per annum - I don't believe corporate profits are likely to grow significantly as a percentage of GNP - and if earnings multipliers don't change (and with these assumptions and present interest rates they shouldn't) the aggregate valuation of American corporate enterprise should not grow at a long-term compounded rate above 6% per annum. This typical experience in stocks might produce (for the taxpayer described earlier) 1-3/4% after tax from dividends and 4-3/4% after tax from capital gain, for a total after-tax return of about 6-1/2%. The pre-tax mix between dividends and capital gains might be more like 4% and 5%, giving a slightly lower aftertax result. This is not far from historical experience and overall, I believe future tax rules on capital gains are likely to be stiffer than in the past.
（4）以十年为期来看，作为一个整体，企业股票的收益率或许无法达到9%，也就是3%的分红加上6%的价值增长。我很怀疑每年GNP可以超过6%，我不相信企业利润的增长可以超过GNP的增长。并且，如果市盈率没有改变（在这些假设以及目前的利率水平上，它不会改变），美国所有企业的总体价值的长期年化复合增长率不会高于6%。股票市场的这种情况或许会让上文讨论过的纳税者获得1.75%的税后分红和4.75%的税后资本利得，使得总体资金收益率达到6.5%。如果税前分红和资本收益率分别为4%和5%，那么税后总体资金收益率将会稍稍下降。这和最近的历史收益率差别不大，不过我认为未来的税收条例会比过去更苛刻。
(5) Finally, probably half the money invested in stocks over the next decade will be professionally managed. Thus, by definition virtually, the total investor experience with professionally managed money will be average results (or 6-1/2% after tax if my assumptions above are correct).
（5）最后，或许下一个十年，投资于股票的资金会有50%是通过专业投资机构去投资的。所以，根据这些限定条件，通过专业投资机构进行投资的全体投资者，所能获得的收益也将会是平均收益。（如果我上述的推测是正确的，这个税后收益率是6.5%）
My judgment would be that less than 10% of professionally managed money (which might imply an average of $40 billion just for this superior segment) handled consistently for the decade would average 2 points per annum over group expectancy. So-called "aggressively run" money is unlikely to do significantly better than the general run of professionally managed money. There is probably $50 billion in various gradations of this "aggressive" category now - maybe 100 times that of a decade ago - and $50 billion just can't "perform".
我的判断是，大概只有不到10%的专业资金管理机构（也就意味着这部分的资金大概是400亿美元），能够在下一个十年获取超过平均值2个百分点的收益。所谓的“进取型基金”很可能无法做的比普通的专业投资机构更好。目前大概有500亿美元的资金在不同类型的“进取型”投资机构上，大概是10年前的100倍——这500亿美元的资金只会表现平平。
If you are extremely fortunate and select advisors who achieve results in the top 1% to 2% of the country (but who will be working with material sums of money because they are that good), I think it is unlikely you will do much more than 4 points per annum better than the group expectancy. I think the odds are good that Bill Ruane is in this select category. My estimate . therefore, is that over the next decade the results of really excellent management for our "typical taxpayer" after tax might be 1-3/4% from dividends and 7-3/4% from capital gain. or 9 –1.2% overall.
如果你足够幸运，能够选择到全国投资收益排名1%或2%的投资机构（它们因为收益好，资金规模会很庞大），我认为你们的平均收益率也不会比平均值高出4个百分点。我认为Bill Ruane很可能处于其中。所以，我估计下一个十年，最优秀的投资管理机构也只能够带给我们“典型的纳税者”税后收益9.5%的收益，其中1.75%来自税后分红，7.75%来自税后资本利得。
(6) The rather startling conclusion is that under today's historically unusual conditions, passive investment in tax-free bonds is likely to be fully the equivalent of expectations from professionally managed money in stocks, and only modestly inferior to extremely well-managed equity money.
（6）很令人吃惊的结论是，在当前的不正常的市场状况下，被动投资于免税债券的收益率很可能和大部分投资于股票的专业投资机构的收益率差不多，只会略低于极其优秀的投资机构。
(7) A word about inflation - it has very little to do with the above calculation except that it enters into the 6% assumed growth rate in GNP and contributes to the causes producing 6-1/2% on tax-free bonds. If stocks should produce 8% after tax and bonds 4%, stocks are better to own than bonds, regardless of whether prices go up, down or sidewise. The converse is true if bonds produce 6-1/2% after tax. and stocks 6%. The simple truth, of course, is that the best expectable after-tax rate of return makes the most sense - given a rising, declining or stable dollar.
（7）通胀因素除了对假设6%的GNP增长率和免税债券利息为6.5%有所影响外，几乎对上述的计算结果没有影响。无论通货价格上升还是下降或其他，如果股票的税后收益率为8%，而债券为4%，股票无疑要好于债券。相反，如果债券的税后收益率为6.5%，而股票是6%，债券无疑要好于股票。当然，更为简单的真相是，无论美元的价值是上升、下降还是持平，税后收益率期望值最高的就是最好的。
All of the above should be viewed with all the suspicion properly accorded to assessments of the future. It does seem to me to be the most realistic evaluation of what is always an uncertain future - I present it with no great feeling regarding its approximate accuracy, but only so you will know what I think at this time.
上面的所有论述，只应该被看作是对未来的合理猜测。它确实反映了我对无法确定的未来最为真实的评估。但是对于它的准确性，我没有太大把握。我只是想让你们知道现在我是怎么想的。
You will have to make your own decision as between bonds and stocks and, if the latter, who advises you on such stocks. In many cases, I think the decision should largely reflect your tangible and intangible (temperamental) needs for regularity of income and absence of large principal fluctuation, perhaps balanced against psychic needs for some excitement and the fun associated with contemplating and perhaps enjoying really juicy results. If you would like to talk over the problem with me, I will be very happy to help.
是选择债券还是选择股票，你们必须自己做决定。如果是后者，你们还要选择由谁来向你们提供相关建议。很多情况下，我认为这个决定应该很大程度上体现出以下需求：你们有形的和无形的（品性上的）关于稳定收入和降低大幅波动的需求，以及心理需求——即追求兴奋的心理需求、追求深思熟虑的心理需求和享受丰厚收益的心理需求。如果需要我为你们解答一些问题，我非常乐意帮忙。
Sincerely,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB/glk
Footnotes
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类似国内目前的注册制公开发行股票。SEC网站关于“注册公开募股”的解释：注册公开募股通常用于描述根据《证券法》注册的证券的要约和出售。公司必须提交注册声明，在注册声明生效之前不得出售证券。 ↩