原文信息：
- 标题：Letter to Partners (1970-02-18)
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1970-02-18
- 链接：
- 翻译：Ponge
- 整理：Ponge
说明：本文原载于《Celebrating 50 Years of a Profitable Partnership》一书，原文和译文在网上均找不到电子版。感谢朋友提供书籍照片，能够将这封信变成电子版。
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
Warren E. Buffett, General Partner
William Scott
John M. Harding
February 18th, 1970
To My Partners:
致各位合伙人：
Our Partnership life ended on a symmetrical note. I consider 1957 and 1969, our beginning and terminal years, to have been the two most difficult twelve-month calendar periods that we faced during our operating history. It was fortunate our Partnership symmetry went no further than this -- an ending capital equal to our beginning capital, despite a classical aesthetic balance, might not have produced total fulfillment.
我们的合伙基金在最后一年面临着和第一年类似的境遇。我认为，1957 年，也就是我们开始运作的第一年，是我们合伙基金运营历史上面临的两个最困难的自然年之一。另一个则是去年（1969 年），也就是我们结束运作的最后一年。幸运的是，相似的仅仅是面临的环境——如果对「首尾呼应」的美学追求更加极致，那么最后一年的净值应该和第一年一样才更加完美，不过要是那样的话，恐怕大家也没什么满足感了。
The usual table appears below in final form (accompanied by a giant sigh of relief from the General Partner):
按照惯例，以下是我们业绩表现，不过，这次是最终版本了（我大大地松了一口气）：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 7.7% | 58.8% | 45.6% |
| 1969 | -11.6% | 6.8% | 6.6% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of Partnership activity.
(1) 根据道指年度涨跌计算，其中包含股息。表格中为合伙基金整年运作的年份。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the General Partner.
(2) 1957-61 年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of Partnership results allowing for allocation to the General Partner based upon the present Partnership Agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 1957-61 年的数据按前一列合伙基金收益率计算得出，按照当前合伙协议，扣除了普通合伙人分成。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
下表是累计收益率及复合收益率：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 94.9% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 - 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 - 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 - 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| 1957 - 68 | 185.7% | 2610.6% | 1403.5% |
| 1957 - 69 | 152.6% | 2794.9% | 1502.7% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 7.4% | 29.5% | 23.8% |
And the final tabulation on the usual four investment companies:
以及，和往常一样，四家投资机构的业绩表现以表格呈现如下（也是最终版了）：
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont. (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 10.3% | 8.1% | 6.7% | 6.8% | 7.7% | 45.6% |
| 1969 | -4.8% | -7.9% | -1.9% | 0.1% | -11.6% | 6.6% |
| Cumulative Results | 75.2% | 146.3% | 219.1% | 208.4% | 152.6% | 1502.7% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 8.1% | 7.2% | 9.3% | 9.0% | 7.4% | 23.8% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。
(2) From 1968 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1968. Estimated for 1969.
(2) 来源：1969 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1968。1969 年数据为估算值。
Most investors and investment managers who, until quite recently, were deriding the Dow and investment companies such as the four mentioned above fell on lean times in 1969. The year probably witnessed the worst relative performance for so-called "aggressive" money management that has occurred since such activity became fashionable. Predictably, the poor performance has been applied to huge aggregates of capital whereas the earlier brilliant results only benefited much smaller sums. Those of you with an analytical bent should give some thought as to how accurately the standard mutual fund literature portrays the investment record of a fund which has a 100% gain in one year on $1 million of assets, and a 25% loss in a subsequent year on $1 billion (attracted by the earlier performance) of assets. The "chain letter" phenomenon, whether created intentionally by a financial Machiavelli or accidentally by a public responding to its baser emotions, tends to produce an identical effect -- a few people, the ones who intentionally or accidentally mail the first letters, make a great deal of money; and a vastly greater number on the outer ring of concentric circles lose money while behaving in a manner they think is certain to succeed because of the obviously bountiful results to early participants.
在过去，大多数投资者和投资经理看不上道琼斯指数和大型投资机构（比如我们之前提到的四家基金）的业绩表现，但如今，这些人的业绩表现终于在 1969 年迎来了「均值回归时刻」。自从所谓的「进取型」基金管理风格流行以来，去年（指 1969 年）可能是他们表现最差的一年。而且，可以想象得出，在表现很差的时候，基金的规模很大，大量客户承受了亏损，但是在基金表现很好时，规模很小，只有少量客户受益。假设一个基金第一年赚了 100%，第二年亏了 25%，按照一般的共同基金报告，基金的业绩应该还不错。但是，对于那些有分析能力、爱思考的人，你们应该可以想到，这种对基金投资业绩的表述有多么地不准确，因为第一年的 100% 是在 100 万美元的资金体量上实现的，而第二年亏损 25% 是在 10 亿美元的资金体量上实现的（大部分的资金被基金之前的业绩所吸引）。无论是金融界的「马基雅维利」（译者注：就是说特别聪明的人，有点像说，金融界的「诸葛孔明」）有意为之，还是普罗大众下意识地被深层的情绪引导，这种具有庞氏特征的「连环信」现象往往会产生类似的效果——早早参与的少数人（有意或无意地）赚了大钱，而蜂拥而至的后来者则亏掉了钱。他们之所以冲进来，是因为看到早期参与者获得了丰厚的回报，并且认为自己也一定能赚到钱。
Eighteen months ago I sent you a reprint of an article by Marvin M.May describing the chain letter effect of "funny money" acquisitions. In the stock market of 1969, the roof fell in on this sort of activity and the implications of Mr. May's article were validated. Many of the better investment management records in the 1964-1968 period were at least partial beneficiaries of corporate chain letter activity and, to the extent they over-stayed their hand in 1969, a substantial bath was taken.
18 个月前，我给你们寄去了马文·梅（Marvin M.May）一篇文章的复印件，文中描述了「凭空创造资金（funny money）」进行收购这一具备庞氏特征的现象。在 1969 年，这类行为在股票市场上遭遇了重创，梅先生那篇文章所揭示的可能后果得到了证实。在过去 5 年（1964~1968 年），很多业绩较好的基金或多或少地受益于这种庞氏并购活动，但到了 1969 年，他们没有及时「金盆洗手」，遭受了巨大的损失。
In winding up the Partnership, I have wanted to give you cash or cash equivalent, since that is the way you entered BPL. As you know, we have distributed about $99 million of the December 31, 1969 assets of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. in the form of cash and your proportional share of controlled companies. Those partners who wanted to sell their share of the controlled companies for cash at yearend valuation prices have been able to do so. Those who wish to stay with them, as I am doing, have been able to maintain their proportional interest without incurring a capital gains tax on the unrealized appreciation over BPL's cost.
在清算合伙基金时，我希望给你们现金或现金等价物，因为你们就是拿着钱加入巴菲特合伙基金的。正如你们了解的，我们已将巴菲特合伙基金资产中的约 9,900 万美元（截至 1969 年 12 月 31 日）进行了分配，分配包含了现金和各人在控制类公司应占比例的股份。如果有的合伙人想将收到的公司股份以年末估值价格变现，现在就可以进行操作。如果有的合伙人想像我一样继续持有这些股份，则可以保持各自的股权比例，未兑现的增值（最新价格减去合伙基金的成本价）部分不必缴纳资本利得税。
We are down to about $6 million of net assets, largely represented by our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps. However, we have miscellaneous other items, including such little gems as about 90% of a fractional interest in the royalty under a gas well in Bee County, Texas (producing less than $4,000 per year) and 80% of a small store building in South Chicago. It is much easier to get into business than to get out of it. My expectation is that we will get everything finally wound up during 1971, but this is very tentative -- in any event, I think it unlikely we make a further distribution in 1970. The office will be maintained at Kiewit Plaza (although perhaps on a different floor) through 1971 when our lease expires.
我们的净资产现在只剩下大约 600 万美元，主要是我们持有的蓝筹印花（Blue Chip Stamps）股票。除此以外，我们还有其他一些杂项资产，包括德克萨斯州比县（Bee County, Texas）一口天然气井（每年产生不到 4,000 美元的收入）特许权使用费约 90% 的权益，以及芝加哥南部一家小型商店 80% 的产权。进入一个生意比退出一个生意要容易得多。我预计我们最终将在 1971 年清算一切，但这只是一个初步的想法——无论如何，我都认为我们不太可能在 1970 年就作进一步的分配。在 1971 年我们的租约到期之前，我们将继续在 Kiewit Plaza 办公（尽管可能在不同的楼层）。
BPL held large amounts of commercial paper due in the early days of January, 1970, on which substantial interest was received at maturity. The entire amount will be reported by cash basis taxpayers (which you and I are) in the year received rather than when accrued. Thus, you will have taxable interest income in 1970 equal to about 1-1/4% of your January 1, 1969 capital, although you received the economic benefit almost entirely in 1969. In early 1971, you will receive full tax information applicable to your 1970 BPL investment, just as in past years.
合伙基金持有大量于 1970 年 1 月初到期的商业票据，到期时收到了大量利息。收付实现制纳税人（你我都是）将在收到利息的当年，而不是应计利息的当年，申报全部利息税款。因此，你在 1970 年的应税利息收入约等于你 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本的 1.25%，尽管这笔钱绝大部分已经计入 1969 年的投资收益。在 1971 年初，您将收到适用于您 1970 年合伙基金投资的完整税务信息，就像往年一样。
We will only be able to give you completely accurate figures pertaining to the tax basis of your Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. and Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. stock in early 1971. This is due to some complexities of the tax law whereby 1970 BPL figures could have a minor effect on the basis of these items. Since no one sold his holdings until 1970, and since supporting detail for the Internal Revenue Service is not required until April 15, 1971, our final figures will be available to you in ample time. Anyone needing close approximations as to the tax basis of these securities should get in touch with John Harding prior to March 31, 1970.
到 1971 年初，我们才能提供给你持有股票（包括伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司与多元零售公司）计税基础完整、准确的数字。这是由于税法的一些复杂性，因为 1970 年的合伙基金数字可能会对这些项目的计税基础产生微小的影响。由于没有人在 1970 年之前出售他们的股份，而且直到 1971 年 4 月 15 日才需要向美国国税局提供详细的证明材料，因此我们将有足够的时间向你提供最终的数字。如果有人需要这些证券计税基础的近似数字，请在 1970 年 3 月 31 日之前与约翰·哈丁（John Harding）联系。
This is not the last time you will hear from me, since there are bound to be a few winding-up communications. I also will be sending out a letter on about February 25th to those who have requested it, dispensing an elementary general education on bonds with the emphasis on the tax-free area.
这不会是你们最后一次收到我的来信，因为肯定会有一些清算函件。我还将于 2 月 25 日左右向提出要求的人寄出一封信，就债券问题进行基本的普及教育，重点是免税领域。
Normally, the liquidation of an enterprise implies institutional or personnel weaknesses. Our own case represents the opposite extreme. I consider the BPL staff to be superior to that of any organization I have seen. Gladys, Donna, John and Bill have done everything asked of them -- and sometimes it was plenty -- in the most accurate, prompt and pleasant manner possible. They are exceptionally high-grade, talented people. Don't get any ideas about hiring them -- John is going with Bill Ruane -- I expect Gladys and Bill to become employed by Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., primarily in connection with the bond activities of the bank and insurance company -- and Donna will be keeping tab on the run-out of BPL over the next couple of years.
通常情况下，企业清算说明机构或人员存在不足或缺陷。而我们的情况却恰恰相反。我认为巴菲特合伙基金的工作人员比我所见过的任何组织都要优秀。格拉迪斯（Gladys）、唐娜（Donna）、约翰（John）和比尔（Bill）以最准确、最迅速和最令人愉快的方式完成了要求他们做的每一件工作，有时甚至是很多工作。他们都是非常优秀的人才。不要对聘用他们有任何想法：约翰（John）要去和比尔·鲁安（Bill Ruane）共事；格拉迪斯（Gladys）和比尔（Bill）将被伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司聘用，主要从事银行和保险公司的债券业务；而唐娜（Donna）将会在接下来的几年里监督合伙基金的清算工作。
Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwalt have done extraordinary jobs for BPL since acquisition of their companies by DRC and BH. Their efforts over the past three years have contributed to a significant degree to the increased valuations applied to the controlled companies at each yearend. Our figures would have been considerably poorer had they turned in only the normal managerial job.
自从多元零售公司和伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司收购本·罗斯纳（Ben Rosner）和杰克·林沃特（Jack Ringwalt）的公司以来，他们为合伙基金做了大量出色的工作。他们过去三年的努力在很大程度上提高了控制类公司每年年末的估值。如果他们只完成了正常的管理工作，我们的数据就会大打折扣。
Without the right group of partners, there would have been no BPL. Efforts can only be productive in the proper environment, and that is what you have provided. I have probably been able to utilize my time and energy more effectively than virtually any money manager working with comparable sums. My activity has not been burdened by second-guessing, discussing non sequiturs, or hand holding. You have let me play the game without telling me what club to use, how to grip it, or how much better the other players are doing. I've appreciated this, and the results you have achieved have significantly reflected your attitudes and behavior. If you don't feel this is the case, you underestimate the importance of personal encouragement and empathy in maximizing human effort and achievement.
如果没有合适的合伙人，就不会有巴菲特合伙基金的今天。只有在适当的环境中，努力才能取得成效，而这正是你们提供给我的。我在利用时间和精力方面，可能比任何管理类似规模的资产管理人都要有效。我的投资工作没有被事后猜疑、阴谋论式的讨论或各种「投资建议」所累。你们给予我信任，让我参与这项比赛，而且不会指导我该用什么球杆、该如何握杆，也不会在我身边念叨其他玩家的表现有多好。我很感激这一点，合伙基金能有如此成绩，也是合伙人们良好态度和行为的结果。如果您没有这样的感觉，那是您低估了个人鼓励和同理心的重要性，这能够极大地激励人们努力工作，取得成就。
Cordially,
衷心感谢
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·E·巴菲特
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