原文信息：
- 标题：1961 Annual Letter to Partners
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1962-01-24
- 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
- 中文翻译参考：RanRan
- 整理：Ponge
- 校译：
1961 Letter
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
January 24, 1962
I have consistently told partners that it is my expectation and hope (it's always hard to tell which is which) that we will do relatively well compared to the general market in down or static markets, but that we may not look so good in advancing markets. In strongly advancing markets I expect to have real difficulty keeping up with the general market.
我一直告诉合伙人，我们会在下跌或平盘的市场中跑赢，但在上涨的市场中可能落后，我预期如此，也希望如此。在强劲上涨的行情中，我们应该很难跟上大盘。
Although 1961 was certainly a good year for the general market, and in addition, a very good year for us on both an absolute and relative basis, the expectations in the previous paragraph remain unchanged.
虽说 1961 年股市大涨，而且我们的绝对收益和相对收益都很高，我在上一段中所写的预期仍然不变。
During 1961, the general market as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) showed an over-all gain of 22.2% including dividends received through ownership of the Dow. The gain for all partnerships operating throughout the entire year, after all expenses of operation, but before payments to limited partners or accrual to the general partner, averaged 45.9%. The details of this gain by partnership are shown in the appendix along with results for the partnerships started during the year.
1961 年，以道指为标准，包括股息在内，市场总体收益率是 22.2%。我在全年管理的合伙人账户，扣除经营费用之后，向有限合伙人支付利息以及向普通合伙人分成之前，平均收益率是 45.9%。请查看附录，了解各个合伙人账户的收益以及 1961 年新成立的合伙人账户的收益。
We have now completed five full years of partnership operation, and the results of these five years are shown below on a year-by-year basis and also on a cumulative or compounded basis. These results are stated on the basis described in the preceding paragraph; after expenses, but before division of gains among partners or payments to partners.
我们的合伙基金已经运行了整整五年，以下是这五年的逐年业绩以及按复利计算的业绩。业绩按照上一段中所述计算：扣除经营费用之后，向合伙人支付利息以及分成之前。
| Year 年份 |
Partnerships Operating Entire Year 全年管理的合伙账户数量 |
Partnership Gain 合伙基金收益率 |
Dow-Jones Industrials Gain* 道指收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | 3 | 10.4% | -8.4% |
| 1958 | 5 | 40.9% | 38.5% |
| 1959 | 6 | 25.9% | 19.9% |
| 1960 | 7 | 22.8% | -6.3% |
| 1961 | 7 | 45.9% | 22.2% |
* Including dividends received through ownership of the Dow.
* 含股息。
On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:
按复利计算，累计业绩如下：
| Year 年份 |
Partnership Gain 合伙基金收益率 |
Dow-Jones Industrials Gain 道指收益率 |
|---|---|---|
| 1957 | 10.4% | -8.4% |
| 1957-58 | 55.6% | 26.9% |
| 1957-59 | 95.9% | 52.2% |
| 1957-60 | 140.6% | 42.6% |
| 1957-61 | 251.0% | 74.3% |
These results do not measure the gain to the limited partner, which of course, is the figure in which you are most interested. Because of the varying partnership arrangements that have existed in the past, I have used the over-all net gain (based on market values at the beginning and end of the year) to the partnership as being the fairest measure of over-all performance.
上述收益不等同于大家最关心的有限合伙人收益。由于过去几年存在不同的分成方案，我在这里使用合伙人整体净收益（根据年初和年末市值计算）来衡量整体表现。
On a pro-forma basis adjusted to the division of gains entailed in our present Buffett Partnership, Ltd. agreement, the results would have been:
| Year 年份 |
Limited Partners’ Gain 有限合伙人收益率 |
Dow Gain 道指收益率 |
|---|---|---|
| 1957 | 9.3% | -8.4% |
| 1958 | 32.2% | 38.5% |
| 1959 | 20.9% | 19.9% |
| 1960 | 18.6% | -6.3% |
| 1961 | 35.9% | 22.2% |
COMPOUNDED 复合收益率
| Year 年份 |
Limited Partners’ Gain 有限合伙人收益率 |
Dow Gain 道指收益率 |
|---|---|---|
| 1957 | 9.3% | -8.4% |
| 1957-58 | 44.5% | 26.9% |
| 1957-59 | 74.7% | 52.2% |
| 1957-60 | 107.2% | 42.6% |
| 1957-61 | 181.6% | 74.3% |
The outstanding item of importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them, has been the determination that we use the same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can adjust.
我在最初选择合伙人，以及随后处理与合伙人的关系时，最看重的就是我们要达成一致，使用同样的衡量标准。如果我的业绩差，合伙人就该撤资，我自己也不会继续再股市投资了。如果业绩好，我明确知道自己表现出色，我可以很坦然。
The rub, then, is in being sure that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.
问题在于，什么是好，什么是差，我们一定要达成一致。衡量标准应该事先定好。事后再找参照标准，无论业绩如何，总能找到更差的。
I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
我一直把道指作为我们的衡量标准。我的个人观点是要检验投资表现，至少要看三年时间，最能检验出真实水平的是期末道指点位与期初很接近，看在此期间投资表现如何。
While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method of measurement of general market performance being used, such as other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etc.
什么衡量标准都不十全十美，道指也如此，但是参照道指的好处是，它众所周知、历史悠久，可以相当准确地反映一般投资者的表现。我不反对使用其他标准来衡量股市表现，例如，可以用其他的指数、大型基金、银行共同信托基金等。
You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks. Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companies lists performance for the 15 years 1946-60, for all leading mutual funds. There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual funds, so the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to these mutual funds.
你可能认为，道指不就是无人管理的 30 只蓝筹股吗，跑赢道指应该很容易，我选的参照标准是不是太低了。道指其实是很难战胜的。亚瑟·威辛保 (Arthur Wiesenberger) 写过一本很有名的书，是关于基金公司的，其中列出了所有大型基金从 1946 到 1960 这 15 年里的业绩。目前，美国基金掌管的资产规模是 200 亿美元，基金的整体表现可以反映几千万投资者的收益率。我没有相关数据，但我认为大多数投资咨询机构和银行信托的收益率和这些基金不相上下。
Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in his “Charts & Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general market rise), specialized industry funds, etc. Of the 32 excluded because I felt a comparison would not be fair, 31 did poorer than the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the conclusions below.
在《Charts & Statistics》中，威辛保统计了 1946 年以来有持续业绩记录的 70 只基金。我把其中 32 只基金剔除了，它们有些是平衡型基金（因此没充分参与股市上涨），有些是专门投资某个行业的基金。我觉得用这 32 只基金进行比较不合适。这 32 只基金里，有 31 只跑输道指，排除它们不会影响我们得出的结论。
Of the remaining 38 mutual funds whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and 6 did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of about $1 billion, and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about $6-1/2 billion. None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a year.
剩下的 38 只基金与道指更有可比性，其中 32 只跑输道指，6 只跑赢。1960 年末，跑赢道指的 6 只基金资产规模约为 10 亿美元，跑输的 32 只基金资产规模约为 65 亿美元。跑赢的这 6 只基金，每年领先幅度也不到几个百分点。
Below I present the year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961 for which I don't have exact data, although rough figures indicate no variance from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two largest closed-end investment companies:
以下是我们这几年的业绩与最大的两只开放式股票基金与最大的两只封闭基金的对比情况（没有 1961 年的对比，因为我没有这年的准确数据，粗略估算应该和 1957-60 差不多）：
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust | Investors Stock | Lehman | Tri-Cont. | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -12.0% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 44.1% | 47.6% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 8.2% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 19.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -0.9% | -0.1% | 2.6% | 2.8% | -6.3% | 18.6% |
(From Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961)
（来源：Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961）
COMPOUNDED 复合收益率
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust | Investors Stock | Lehman | Tri-Cont. | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -12.0% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957-58 | 26.8% | 29.3% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957-59 | 37.2% | 42.6% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.2% | 74.7% |
| 1957-60 | 36.0% | 42.5% | 38.3% | 44.8% | 42.6% | 107.2% |
Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about $1.8 billion; Investors Stock Fund about $1 billion; Tri-Continental Corporation about $ .5 billion; and Lehman Corporation about $350 million; or a total of over $3.5 billion.
Massachusetts Investors Trust 的净资产有 18 亿美元左右；Investors Stock Fund 约有 10 亿美元；Tri -Continental Corporation 约 5 亿美元；Lehman Corporation 约 3.5 亿美元。它们的净资产总和是 35 亿美元以上。
I do not present the above tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching, its performance.
我整理上述表格和信息，目的不是批评基金公司。让我管这么多钱，受到种种限制，不能像管理我们的合伙基金这样投资，我的业绩也不会比它们强多少。我是想用上述数据说明战胜道指没那么容易，别说跑赢，美国大多数基金连跟上道指都很难。
Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially different from that of mutual funds.
我们的投资组合和道指的成分股完全不同。我们的投资方法和基金的投资方法差别很大。
However, most partners, as all alternative to their investment in the partnership, would probably have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable to the Dow, therefore, I feel it is a fair test of performance.
我们的大多数合伙人，如果不把资金投到我们的合伙账户中，可供选择的投资方式可能就是买基金，获得与道指类似的收益率，因此，我认为把道指作为我们的业绩衡量标准很合理。
Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.
我们的投资可以分为三个类型：这三个类型的投资各有各的特性，我们的资金在这几类投资中的分配情况，会对我们每年相对道指的业绩产生重要影响。每类投资的占比是按计划来的，但实际分配要见机行事，主要视投资机会情况而定。
The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called "generals") where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.
第一类是低估的股票。在此类投资中，我们对公司决策没话语权，也掌控不了估值修复所需时间。这些年来，在我们的投资中，低估的股票是占比最大的一类，这类投资赚的钱比其他两类都多。我们一般以较大仓位（每只占我们总资产的 5% 到 10%）持有 5、6 只低估的股票，以较小的仓位持有其他 10 或 15 只低估的股票。
Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.
此类投资有时候很快就能获利，很多时候要用几年时间。在买入时，基本不知道这些低估的股票怎么能涨，但是正因为黯淡无光，正因为短期内看不到任何利好因素带来上涨，才能有这么便宜的价格。付出的价格低，得到的价值高。在低估类中，我们买入的每只股票价值都远远高于价格，都存在相当大的安全边际。每只都有安全边际，分散买入多只，就形成了一个既有足够安全保障，又有上涨潜力的投资组合。这些年来，在时机掌控方面，我们总是在买的时候比卖的时候做的好很多。对于低估类，我们本来就没打算赚到最后一分钱，能在买入价与产业资本评估的合理价值中间的位置附近卖出，我们就很满意了。
The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
低估类的涨跌受大盘影响很大，就算便宜，也一样会下跌。当市场暴跌时，低估类的跌幅可能不亚于道指。长期来看，我相信低估类会跑赢道指，在像 1961 年这样大涨的行情中，我们的投资组合里的低估类表现最佳。在市场下跌时，这类投资也最脆弱。
Our second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.
我们的第二类投资是“套利”(work-outs)。在套利类投资中，投资结果取决于公司行为，而不是股票买卖双方之间的供给和需求关系。换言之，此类股票有具体的时间表，我们可以在很小的误差范围内，事先知道在多长时间内可以获得多少回报，可能出现什么意外，打乱原有计划。套利机会出现在并购、清算、重组、分拆等公司活动中。近些年，套利机会主要来自大型综合石油公司收购石油生产商。
This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only as an offset against work-outs.
在很大程度上，无论道指涨跌如何，套利投资每年都能带来相当稳定的收益。在某一年，如果我们把投资组合中大部分资金用于套利，这年大市下跌，我们的相对业绩会很好；这年大市上涨，我们的相对业绩会很差。多年以来，套利是我们第二大投资类别。我们总是同时进行 10 到 15 个套利操作，有的处于初期阶段，有的处于末期阶段。无论是从最终结果，还是过程中的市场表现来讲，套利类投资具有高度安全性，我相信完全可以借钱作为套利类投资组合的部分资金来源。不考虑借钱对收益的放大作用，套利类的收益率一般在 10% 到 20% 之间。我自己规定了一个限制条件，借来的钱不能超过合伙基金净值的 25%。我们一般不借钱，借钱的话，都是用于套利。
The final category is "control" situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company's stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may turn out to be control situations several years hence.
最后一类是“控制类”。在此类投资中，我们或是拥有控股权或者是大股东，对公司决策有话语权。衡量此类投资肯定要看几年时间。当我们看好一只股票，在收集筹码时，它的股价最好长期呆滞不动，所以在一年中，控制类投资可能不会贡献任何收益。此类投资同样受大盘影响相对较小。有时候，一只股票，我们是当做低估类买入的，但是考虑可能把它发展成控制类。如果股价长期低迷，很可能出现这种情况。如果我们还没买到足够的货，这只股票就涨起来了，我们就在涨起来的价格卖掉，成功完成一笔低估类投资。我们现在正在买入的一些股票，再过几年可能发展成控制类。
We are presently involved in the control of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company of Beatrice, Nebraska. Our first stock was purchased as a generally undervalued security five years ago. A block later became available, and I went on the Board about four years ago. In August 1961, we obtained majority control, which is indicative of the fact that many of our operations are not exactly of the "overnight" variety
我们目前拥有登普斯特风车制造公司的控股权，它位于内布拉斯加州比阿特丽斯。我们最开始是五年前把这家公司作为低估类买入，后来买到一大笔股份，四年前，我进入了董事会。1961 年 8 月，我们取得了绝对控股权。从这笔投资就可以看出来，我们的很多投资确实都不是一蹴而就的。
Presently we own 70% of the stock of Dempster with another 10% held by a few associates. With only 150 or so other stockholders, a market on the stock is virtually non-existent, and in any case, would have no meaning for a controlling block. Our own actions in such a market could drastically affect the quoted price.
目前，我们拥有登普斯特 70% 的股份，一些人联合持有 10%。剩余股东人数只有 150 名左右，这只股票几乎没什么成交量，这个对控股股东来说也没任何意义。在这种情况中，我们的举动就可以令股价发生巨大变化。
Therefore, it is necessary for me to estimate the value at yearend of our controlling interest. This is of particular importance since, in effect, new partners are buying in based upon this price, and old partners are selling a portion of their interest based upon the same price. The estimated value should not be what we hope it would be worth, or what it might be worth to an eager buyer, etc., but what I would estimate our interest would bring if sold under current conditions in a reasonably short period of time. Our efforts will be devoted toward increasing this value, and we feel there are decent prospects of doing this.
因此，我很有必要估算我们的控股权益在年末的价值。无论是新合伙人买入，还是老合伙人卖出，他们的权益变动都以这个价格为依据，所以我的估算很重要。估算的价值不应是我们认为它将来会值多少钱，也不应是很想收购它的人愿意出多少钱，而应该是在较短时间内按照当前情况出售大概能卖多少钱。我们将致力于提升这家公司的价值，我们看好它价值提升的前景。
Dempster is a manufacturer of farm implements and water systems with sales in 1961 of about $9 million. Operations have produced only nominal profits in relation to invested capital during recent years. This reflected a poor management situation, along with a fairly tough industry situation. Presently, consolidated net worth (book value) is about $4.5 million, or $75 per share, consolidated working capital about $50 per share, and at yearend we valued our interest at $35 per share. While I claim no oracular vision in a matter such as this, I feel this is a fair valuation to both new and old partners. Certainly, if even moderate earning power can be restored, a higher valuation will be justified, and even if it cannot, Dempster should work out at a higher figure. Our controlling interest was acquired at an average price of about $28, and this holding currently represents 21% of partnership net assets based on the $35 value.
登普斯特生产农具和供水系统，1961 年的销售额是 900 万美元左右。近年来，与投入的资本相比，经营利润微不足道。这一方面是因为管理不力，另一方面是因为行业困难。目前，该公司的合并净资产（账面价值）是 450 万美元左右，相当于每股 75 美元，合并营运资金是每股 50 美元左右，我们估算我们的权益在年末价值每股 35 美元。我不敢说我的估值准确无误，但是我认为对新老合伙人而言，这是一个公允估值。只要盈利能力恢复到中等水平，这家公司的价值就能有所提升；就算盈利能力恢复不了，我们将来也能从登普斯特实现更高的价值。我们买入控股权的平均成本价是 28 美元左右，按 35 美元的价值计算，这只股票目前占合伙基金净值的 21%。
Of course, this section of our portfolio is not going to be worth more money merely because General Motors, U.S. Steel, etc., sell higher. In a raging bull market, operations in control situations will seem like a very difficult way to make money, compared to just buying the general market. However, I am more conscious of the dangers presented at current market levels than the opportunities. Control situations, along with work-outs, provide a means of insulating a portion of our portfolio from these dangers.
我们的这部分投资，不可能只是因为通用汽车 (General Motors)、美国钢铁 (U.S. Steel) 涨了，也跟着涨。在火热的大牛市中，与买入大盘股相比，控制类投资似乎很难赚钱。但是，在当前的市场点位上，我看到的更多是风险，而不是机会。控制类和套利类可以保证我们的投资组合中有一部分是与这些风险绝缘的。
The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.
从上述三类投资中，你可以对我们投资组合的保守程度有个大概了解。很多年以前，许多人买了中期或长期市政债券或国债，以为自己很保守。这些债券的市值多次大跌，这些人很多肯定也没做到资产保值或提升实际购买力。
Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.
现在，很多人意识到通货膨胀的问题了，但可能又担心过头了，他们几乎不看市盈率或股息率就买入蓝筹股，以为自己很保守。那些以为买债券就是保守的人，我们看到他们后来的结果了，现在以为买蓝筹股就是保守的人，结果如何还不得而知，但我认为这么投资风险很大。猜测贪婪善变的大众会给出多高的市盈率，毫无保守可言。
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
不是因为很多人暂时和你意见一致，你就是对的。不是因为重要人物和你意见一致，你就是对的。当所有人都意见一致时，正是考验你的行为是否保守的时候。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在很多笔投资的过程中，只要你的前提正确、事实正确、逻辑正确，你最后就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智，才能实现真正的保守。
I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.
我们的投资组合和一般人的不一样，完全不能证明我们是否比一般人更保守。是否保守，必须看投资方法如何，投资业绩如何。
I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 1/2 of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.
我认为，要客观评判我们投资的保守程度，就应该看我们在市场下跌时业绩如何，最好是看我们在市场大跌时的表现。1957 年和 1960 年，市场温和下跌，从我们的业绩可以看出来，我说的没错，我们的投资方法确实极为保守。我欢迎任何合伙人提出客观评判保守程度的方法，看一下我们做的如何。我们实现的亏损从来没超过净资产总额的 0.5%，我们实现的收益总额与亏损总额之比约为 100 ：1。这表明我们一直处在上行的市场中，但是，在这样的市场里，一样可能出现很多亏钱的交易（你自己就能找到一些例子），所以我觉得这个比例还是能说明一些问题的。
Aside from the question as to what happens upon my death (which with a metaphysical twist, is a subject of keen interest to me), I am probably asked most often: "What affect is the rapid growth of partnership funds going to have upon performance?”
合伙人问我最多的有两个问题，一个是我死了怎么办（我觉得这东西很玄，我也经常想），另一个就是“合伙人资金迅速增长，会对业绩产生什么影响？”
Larger funds tug in two directions. From the standpoint of "passive" investments, where we do not attempt by the size of our investment to influence corporate policies, larger sums hurt results. For the mutual fund or trust department investing in securities with very broad markets, the effect of large sums should be to penalize results only very slightly. Buying 10,000 shares of General Motors is only slightly more costly (on the basis of mathematical expectancy) than buying 1,000 or 100 shares.
资金规模增长有利有弊。就“被动型”投资而言，我们不打算通过大量持股来影响公司决策，资金规模增长会降低我们的收益率。基金或信托公司投资大盘股，庞大的资金规模对收益率的影响很小。买入 10,000 股通用汽车 (General Motors) 的成本（按数学预期值计算）只比买入 1,000 股或 100 股略高。
In some of the securities in which we deal (but not all by any means) buying 10,000 shares is much more difficult than buying 100 and is sometimes impossible. Therefore, for a portion of our portfolio, larger sums are definitely disadvantageous. For a larger portion of the portfolio, I would say increased sums are only slightly disadvantageous. This category includes most of our work-outs and some generals.
在我们买的股票里，有些股票（不是所有股票）买入 10,000 股比买入 100 股难多了，甚至根本买不到。因此，对我们的一部分投资来说，资金规模增长肯定是不利的。我认为，对我们更大的一部分投资来说，资金增长产生的不利影响很小，包括大部分套利类和一些低估类。
However, in the case of control situations increased funds are a definite advantage. A "Sanborn Map" cannot be accomplished without the wherewithal. My definite belief is that the opportunities increase in this field as the funds increase. This is due to the sharp fall-off in competition as the ante mounts plus the important positive correlation that exists between increased size of company and lack of concentrated ownership of that company's stock.
但是，就控制类投资而言，资金规模增加绝对是有利的。没足够的资金实力，我们不可能做成“桑伯恩地图”这笔投资。我深信，随着资金规模增长，控制类投资机会也更多。原因有两点：第一，需要的资金量越大，就会有更多竞争对手被拒之门外；第二，公司规模越大，股权越分散。
Which is more important -- the decreasing prospects of profitability in passive investments or the increasing prospects in control investments? I can't give a definite answer to this since to a great extent it depends on the type of market in which we are operating. My present opinion is that there is no reason to think these should not be offsetting factors; if my opinion should change, you will be told. I can say, most assuredly, that our results in 1960 and 1961 would not have been better if we had been operating with the much smaller sums of 1956 and 1957.
被动型投资获利减少，控制类投资获利增加，哪个更重要呢？这个问题，我无法明确回答，因为这主要取决于我们处于什么样的市场中。我现在的想法是，这两方面肯定会此消彼长。如果以后我有新想法，会再和大家说。有一点我是非常肯定的，1960 年和 1961 年，如果不是因为我们的规模比 1956 和 1957 年大了，业绩不会有这么高。
Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.
老读者（我王婆卖瓜，自卖自夸了）可能很奇怪，我怎么一反常态开始预测了呢？我一直都不预测，现在我一般也不预测。
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.
我肯定不会预测明后年宏观经济或股市行情会怎么样，我根本不知道。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.
我认为今后十年，有几年，大盘最多涨 20% 或 25%，有几年，大盘最多跌 20% 或 25%，其余年份则在二者之间。我完全不知道哪年涨、哪年跌，长期投资者也不关心某一年的涨跌。
Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
长期来看，算上股息和市值增长，道指的年复合收益率可能在 5% 到 7% 之间。虽然这几年道指涨得很多，但如果你期望道指的年复合收益率高于 5% 到 7%，道指很可能让你失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.
我们的工作是年复一年的超越道指，集小胜为大胜，不是特别在意某一个年的绝对收益率是正是负。与我们和指数都上涨 20% 的年份相比，我认为，在指数下跌 30% 而我们下跌 15% 的年份，我们的表现更出色。我和合伙人强调这一点的时候，能看得出来，他们有的深信不疑，有的将信将疑。你一定要完全理解我为什么这么想，不但要在脑子里认同，而且要在心底里认同。
For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
在讲我们的投资方法时，我已经说过了，与道指相比，我们表现最好的年份可能出现在下跌或平盘的市场中。因此，我们取得的相对收益可能时高时低，相差很大。有些年份，我们肯定会落后道指，但是如果长期来看，我们能平均每年战胜道指 10 个百分点，我觉得我们的业绩就很好了。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
具体来说，假如某一年市场下跌 35% 或 40%（我觉得今后十年里某一年出现这种情况的概率是很大的，谁都不知道是哪年），我们应该只下跌 15% 或 20%。假如某一年道指平盘，我们应该上涨 10%。假如道指上涨超过 20%，我们很难跟上。长期来看，只要我们能有上述表现，如果道指的年化复合收益率在 5% 到 7% 之间，我们的业绩应该是每年 15% 到 17%。
The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!
你可能觉得我的预测不对，等到 1965 年或 1970 年时回过头来看，我的预测可能就是不对，甚至是完全错的。我觉得合伙人有权知道我的真实想法，但是投资这行就是这样，预期总是有很可能出错。单独某一年，波动幅度可能相当大。过去的 1961 年就是如此，幸运的是向上波动。不可能每年都这样！
We are now installed in an office at 810 Kiewit Plaza with a first-class secretary, Beth Henley, and an associate with considerable experience in my type of securities, Bill Scott. My father is sharing office space with us (he also shares the expenses) and doing a brokerage business in securities. None of our brokerage is done through him so we have no "vicuna coat" situation.
我们现在搬到了基威特大厦 810 室办公，还聘请了一个专业的秘书 Beth Henley，还有一个帮我调研股票多年的同事 Bill Scott。我父亲和我们共用一个办公室（他也分摊费用）做券商业务。我们没有一笔券商业务是通过我父亲做的，所以没有利益输送的问题。
Overall, I expect our overhead, excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska Intangibles Tax, to run less than 1/2 of 1% of net assets. We should get our money's worth from this expenditure, and you are most cordially invited to drop in and see how the money is being spent.
除了借款利息和内布拉斯加州无形资产税，我估计我们的开支不到净资产的 0.5%。我们的这笔开支应该是值得的，欢迎你随时到访视察。
With over 90 partners and probably 40 or so securities, you can understand that it is quite a welcome relief to me to shake loose from some of the details.
现在我们有 90 多位合伙人，40 多只股票，相信你能理解，我很高兴能从一些琐碎的日常工作中解脱出来。
We presently have partners residing in locations from California to Vermont, and net assets at the beginning of 1962 amounted to $ 7,178,500.00. Susie and I have an interest in the partnership amounting to $1,025,000.00, and other relatives of mine have a combined interest totaling $782,600.00. The minimum for new partners last year was $25,000, but I am giving some thought to increasing it this year.
从加州到佛蒙特，现在我们的合伙人遍布各地，1962 年初的净资产达到了 7,178,500 美元。苏茜和我在合伙基金中的权益是 1,025,000 美元，我的其他亲属权益合计 782,600 美元。去年新合伙人的投资门槛是 25,000 美元，今年我考虑要提升这个限额。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company did an excellent job of expediting the audit, providing tax figures much earlier than in the past. They assure me this performance can be continued.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company 出色地完成了审计工作，与往年相比，更早地给出了报税数字。他们说今后一定会继续如此。
Let me hear from you regarding questions you may have on any aspects of this letter, your audit, status of your partnership interest, etc. that may puzzle you.
关于这封信的内容、审计、你的合伙权益，如有任何疑问，请随时找我。
Cordially Warren E. Buffett.
Partnerships Operating Throughout 1961 1961 年管理的合伙人账户
| Partnership 合伙人账户 |
1/1/61 Capital at Market 1961 年 1 月 1 日资产市值 |
Overall Gain in 1961* 1961年收益 |
Percentage Gain 收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Buffett Associates | 486,874.27 | 225,387.80 | 46.3% |
| Buffett Fund | 351,839.29 | 159,696.93 | 45.4% |
| Dacee | 235,480.31 | 116,504.47 | 49.5% |
| Emdee | 140,005.24 | 67,387.28 | 48.1% |
| Glenoff | 78,482.70 | 39,693.80 | 50.5% |
| Mo-Buff | 325,844.71 | 149,163.71 | 45.8% |
| Underwood | 582,256.82 | 251,951.26 | 43.3% |
| 2,200,783.34 | 1,009,785.25 | 45.9% |
Partnerships Started in 1961 1961 年成立的合伙人账户
| Partnership 合伙人账户 |
Paid-in 投入资金 |
Overall Gain in 1961 1961年总收益 |
Percentage Gain 收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ann Investments | 100,100 (1-30-61) | 35,367.93 | 35.3% |
| Buffett-TD | 250,100 ($200,100 on 3-8-61, $50,000 on 5-31-61) | 70,294.08 | 28.1% |
| Buffett-Holland | 125,000 (5-17-61) | 16,703.76 | 13.3% |
* Gain in net assets at market values plus payments to limited partners during year.
* 收益等于净资产市值加当年合伙人收到的利息