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ne2000: fix possible out of bound access in ne2000_receive
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In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts
from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of
for both buf and buf1.

Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.

CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <daniel@twistlock.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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jasowang committed Oct 19, 2018
1 parent 7da2d99 commit fdc89e9
Showing 1 changed file with 2 additions and 2 deletions.
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions hw/net/ne2000.c
Expand Up @@ -174,15 +174,15 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
{
NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int size = size_;
size_t size = size_;
uint8_t *p;
unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx;
uint8_t buf1[60];
static const uint8_t broadcast_macaddr[6] =
{ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };

#if defined(DEBUG_NE2000)
printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size);
printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size);
#endif

if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s))
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