Script updating gh-pages from 7d98246. [ci skip]

forgery-limit/draft-ietf-quic-tls.html

@@ -2819,7 +2819,7 @@ <h3 id="name-minimum-key-update-frequenc">
 authenticated. Packet protection keys MUST NOT be used for removing packet
 protection after authentication fails on more than a per-AEAD limit. Endpoints
 MUST initiate a key update before reaching this limit. Applying a limit reduces
-the probability than attacker is able to successfully forge a packet; see
+the probability that an attacker is able to successfully forge a packet; see
 <span>[<a href="#AEBounds" class="xref">AEBounds</a>]</span> and <span>[<a href="#ROBUST" class="xref">ROBUST</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
 <p id="section-6.6-4">For AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, and AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 the
 number of packets that fail authentication MUST NOT exceed 2^36. Note that the

forgery-limit/draft-ietf-quic-tls.txt

@@ -2022,8 +2022,9 @@ Internet-Draft          Using TLS to Secure QUIC                May 2020
    cannot be authenticated.  Packet protection keys MUST NOT be used for
    removing packet protection after authentication fails on more than a
    per-AEAD limit.  Endpoints MUST initiate a key update before reaching
-   this limit.  Applying a limit reduces the probability than attacker
-   is able to successfully forge a packet; see [AEBounds] and [ROBUST].
+   this limit.  Applying a limit reduces the probability that an
+   attacker is able to successfully forge a packet; see [AEBounds] and
+   [ROBUST].
 
    For AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, and AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
    the number of packets that fail authentication MUST NOT exceed 2^36.
@@ -2065,7 +2066,6 @@ Internet-Draft          Using TLS to Secure QUIC                May 2020
    For example, an attacker could inject a packet containing an ACK
    frame that makes it appear that a packet had not been received or to
    create a false impression of the state of the connection (e.g., by
-   modifying the ACK Delay).  Note that such a packet could cause a
 
 
 
@@ -2074,6 +2074,7 @@ Thomson & Turner         Expires 8 November 2020               [Page 37]
 Internet-Draft          Using TLS to Secure QUIC                May 2020
 
 
+   modifying the ACK Delay).  Note that such a packet could cause a
    legitimate packet to be dropped as a duplicate.  Implementations
    SHOULD use caution in relying on any data which is contained in
    Initial packets that is not otherwise authenticated.
@@ -2124,7 +2125,6 @@ Internet-Draft          Using TLS to Secure QUIC                May 2020
 
 
 
-
 Thomson & Turner         Expires 8 November 2020               [Page 38]
 
 Internet-Draft          Using TLS to Secure QUIC                May 2020

forgery-limit/draft-ietf-quic-transport.html

@@ -9196,7 +9196,7 @@ <h3 id="name-normative-references">
 <dl class="references">
 <dt id="DPLPMTUD">[DPLPMTUD]</dt>
 <dd>
-<span class="refAuthor">Fairhurst, G.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jones, T.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Tuexen, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Ruengeler, I.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and T. Voelker</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for Datagram Transports"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-19</span>, <time datetime="2020-04-03">3 April 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-19.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-19.txt</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
+<span class="refAuthor">Fairhurst, G.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jones, T.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Tuexen, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Ruengeler, I.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and T. Voelker</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for Datagram Transports"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-20</span>, <time datetime="2020-05-07">7 May 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-20.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-20.txt</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
 <dd class="break"></dd>
 <dt id="IPv4">[IPv4]</dt>
 <dd>

forgery-limit/draft-ietf-quic-transport.txt

@@ -8579,9 +8579,9 @@ Internet-Draft           QUIC Transport Protocol                May 2020
    [DPLPMTUD] Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tuexen, M., Ruengeler, I., and
               T. Voelker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
               Datagram Transports", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
-              draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-19, 3 April 2020,
+              draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-20, 7 May 2020,
               <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tsvwg-
-              datagram-plpmtud-19.txt>.
+              datagram-plpmtud-20.txt>.
 
    [IPv4]     Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,