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Handshake deadlock #1824

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Oct 2, 2018
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6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -884,9 +884,9 @@ the Handshake keys. This limit exists to mitigate amplification attacks.
In order to prevent this limit causing a handshake deadlock, the client SHOULD
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Is SHOULD sufficient? I feel like this a MUST, or compliant implementations will never complete under certain otherwise recoverable loss scenarios. Perhaps the recovery draft is more strict?

always send a packet upon a handshake timeout, as described in
{{QUIC-RECOVERY}}. If the client has no data to retransmit and does not have
Handshake keys, it should send a packet as large as the Initial containing
only PADDING. If the client has Handshake keys, it SHOULD send a packet
containing only PADDING.
Handshake keys, it SHOULD send an Initial packet of at least 1200 octets
containing only PADDING. If the client has Handshake keys, it SHOULD send a
Handshake packet containing only PADDING.

The payload of this packet contains CRYPTO frames and could contain PADDING, or
ACK frames. Handshake packets MAY contain CONNECTION_CLOSE or APPLICATION_CLOSE
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