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Clarify why post-handshake client auth is banned #3044

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Oct 16, 2019
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Clarify why post-handshake client auth is banned #3044

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Clarify why post-handshake client auth is banned
DavidSchinazi Sep 17, 2019
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MT editorial pass
DavidSchinazi Sep 17, 2019
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9 changes: 7 additions & 2 deletions draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
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Expand Up @@ -612,8 +612,13 @@ MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable to authenticate when requested.
The requirements for client authentication vary based on application protocol
and deployment.

A server MUST NOT use post-handshake client authentication (see Section 4.6.2 of
{{!TLS13}}).
A server MUST NOT use post-handshake client authentication (as defined in
Section 4.6.2 of {{!TLS13}}), because the multiplexing offered by QUIC prevents
clients from correlating the certificate request with the application-level
event that triggered it (see {{?HTTP2-TLS13=I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13}}).
More specifically, servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS CertificateRequest
messages and clients MUST treat receipt of such messages as a connection error
of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.


## Enabling 0-RTT {#enable-0rtt}
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