Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Jump to bottom

Document request forgery #3996

Merged
merged 13 commits into from Sep 8, 2020
Merged

Document request forgery #3996

Changes from 1 commit
Commits
Show all changes
13 commits
Select commit Hold shift + click to select a range
a66b21e
Document request forgery
martinthomson Aug 13, 2020
951da28
Use a reference with a DOI that I can find
martinthomson Aug 13, 2020
e80ca89
Many small corrections
martinthomson Aug 14, 2020
d273e12
Control is via DNS
martinthomson Aug 14, 2020
aaf51ff
We assume this limitation, though it might not be necessarily true
martinthomson Aug 14, 2020
3e64135
Take suggestions from Lucas and massage a bit
martinthomson Aug 14, 2020
718b774
Wrap suggestion
martinthomson Aug 14, 2020
5e7f92e
SHOULD NOT reuse tokens; to allow for all those exceptions
martinthomson Aug 17, 2020
dfc8827
Much JanaIyengar review feedback
martinthomson Aug 19, 2020
4252d1c
Some residual cleanup
martinthomson Aug 20, 2020
1cfbb7f
Make the preferred address change prominent
martinthomson Aug 31, 2020
a587bf0
Mention ciphertext malleability
martinthomson Aug 31, 2020
7adbc31
This is not a true defense
martinthomson Sep 1, 2020
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Diff view
Diff view
3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
View file
Open in desktop
Expand Up @@ -6506,7 +6506,8 @@ Clients are able to present a spoofed source address as part of an apparent
connection migration to cause a server to send datagrams to that address.

The Destination Connection ID field in any packets that a server subsequently
sends to this spoofed address can be used for request forgery.
sends to this spoofed address can be used for request forgery. A client might
also be able to influence the ciphertext.

A server that only sends probing packets ({{probing}}) to an address prior to
address validation provides an attacker with only limited control over the
Copy link
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

I do find it somewhat ironic that address validation might make this worse: the client sending a PATH_CHALLENGE to the server can pretty much guarantee that the server will send a PATH_RESPONSE with client-provided content to the client's spoofed source address. Should we mention that?

Copy link
Member Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

I considered it, but thought that the generic text was enough. Note also that there is no guarantee that PATH_RESPONSE is sent on the same path.

Expand Down