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Talk about padding-by-reserved-streams a little more #4233

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25 changes: 17 additions & 8 deletions draft-ietf-quic-http.md
Expand Up @@ -1916,19 +1916,28 @@ in {{frame-reserved}} and {{stream-grease}}. These methods of padding produce
different results in terms of the granularity of padding, how padding is
arranged in relation to the information that is being protected, whether padding
is applied in the case of packet loss, and how an implementation might control
padding. Redundant padding could even be counterproductive.
padding.

Reserved stream types can be used to give the appearance of sending traffic even
when the connection is idle. Because HTTP traffic often occurs in bursts,
apparent traffic can be used to obscure the timing or duration of such bursts,
even to the point of appearing to send a constant stream of data. However, as
such traffic is still flow controlled by the receiver, a failure to promptly
drain such streams and provide additional flow control credit can limit the
sender's ability to send real traffic.

To mitigate attacks that rely on compression, disabling or limiting compression
might be preferable to padding as a countermeasure.

Use of padding can result in less protection than might seem immediately
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obvious. At best, padding only makes it more difficult for an attacker to infer
length information by increasing the number of frames an attacker has to
observe. Incorrectly implemented padding schemes can be easily defeated. In
particular, randomized padding with a predictable distribution provides very
little protection; similarly, padding payloads to a fixed size exposes
information as payload sizes cross the fixed-sized boundary, which could be
possible if an attacker can control plaintext.
obvious. Redundant padding could even be counterproductive. At best, padding
only makes it more difficult for an attacker to infer length information by
increasing the number of frames an attacker has to observe. Incorrectly
implemented padding schemes can be easily defeated. In particular, randomized
padding with a predictable distribution provides very little protection;
similarly, padding payloads to a fixed size exposes information as payload sizes
cross the fixed-sized boundary, which could be possible if an attacker can
control plaintext.

## Frame Parsing

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