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handling of KeyUpdate in other epochs are specified in RFC 8446, do not override #4412

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Dec 8, 2020
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handling of KeyUpdate in other epochs are specified in RFC 8446, do not override #4412

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31c1536
handling of KeyUpdate in other epochs are specified in RFC 8446, do n…
kazuho Nov 29, 2020
b33c487
clarify that TLS sends KeyUpdates only in 1-RTT
kazuho Nov 29, 2020
ad95f69
semi
martinthomson Dec 8, 2020
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3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
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Expand Up @@ -1424,7 +1424,8 @@ without needing to receive the first packet that triggered the change. An
endpoint that notices a changed Key Phase bit updates keys and decrypts the
packet that contains the changed value.

This mechanism replaces the TLS KeyUpdate message. Endpoints MUST NOT send a
This mechanism replaces the key update mechanism of TLS, which relies on
KeyUpdate messages sent using 1-RTT encryption keys. Endpoints MUST NOT send a
TLS KeyUpdate message. Endpoints MUST treat the receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate
message in a 1-RTT packet as a connection error of type 0x10a, equivalent to a
fatal TLS alert of unexpected_message (see {{tls-errors}}).
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IIUC, KeyUpdate is forbidden by the the TLS spec, right? Can we add a sentence here that states taht?

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PTAL at b33c487. With the change, I think the text now aligns better with what we state for EOED (section 8.3).

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