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Cross-protocol attacks are maybe possible #4427

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16 changes: 10 additions & 6 deletions draft-ietf-quic-http.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -128,8 +128,9 @@ control, similar to that provided by the HTTP/2 framing layer. By providing
reliability at the stream level and congestion control across the entire
connection, QUIC has the capability to improve the performance of HTTP compared
to a TCP mapping. QUIC also incorporates TLS 1.3 ({{?TLS13=RFC8446}}) at the
transport layer, offering comparable security to running TLS over TCP, with the
improved connection setup latency of TCP Fast Open ({{?TFO=RFC7413}}).
transport layer, offering comparable confidentiality and integrity to running
TLS over TCP, with the improved connection setup latency of TCP Fast Open
({{?TFO=RFC7413}}).

This document defines a mapping of HTTP semantics over the QUIC transport
protocol, drawing heavily on the design of HTTP/2. While delegating stream
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1811,10 +1812,13 @@ of establishing authority are discussed in Section 16.1 of {{!SEMANTICS}}.
## Cross-Protocol Attacks

The use of ALPN in the TLS and QUIC handshakes establishes the target
application protocol before application-layer bytes are processed. Because all
QUIC packets are encrypted, it is difficult for an attacker to control the
plaintext bytes of an HTTP/3 connection, which could be used in a cross-protocol
attack on a plaintext protocol.
application protocol before application-layer bytes are processed. This ensures
that endpoints have strong assurances that peers are using the same protocol.

This does not guarantee protection from all cross-protocol attacks. Section
21.5 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}} describes some ways in which the plaintext of QUIC
packets can be used to perform request forgery against endpoints that don't use
authenticated transports.

## Intermediary Encapsulation Attacks

Expand Down