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http: update for http-core -14 moved sections #4742

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions draft-ietf-quic-http.md
Expand Up @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ as a number of bytes in the SETTINGS_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE parameter. An
implementation that has received this parameter SHOULD NOT send an HTTP message
header that exceeds the indicated size, as the peer will likely refuse to
process it. However, an HTTP message can traverse one or more intermediaries
before reaching the origin server; see Section 3.6 of {{!SEMANTICS}}. Because
before reaching the origin server; see Section 3.7 of {{!SEMANTICS}}. Because
this limit is applied separately by each implementation which processes the
message, messages below this limit are not guaranteed to be accepted.

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ resources consumed by CONNECT requests.
Compression can allow an attacker to recover secret data when it is compressed
in the same context as data under attacker control. HTTP/3 enables compression
of fields ({{header-formatting}}); the following concerns also apply to the use
of HTTP compressed content-codings; see Section 8.5.1 of {{!SEMANTICS}}.
of HTTP compressed content-codings; see Section 8.4.1 of {{!SEMANTICS}}.

There are demonstrable attacks on compression that exploit the characteristics
of the web (e.g., {{BREACH}}). The attacker induces multiple requests
Expand Down