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Move negotiated_version #959

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merged 4 commits into from
Dec 4, 2017
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Move negotiated_version #959

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8884c01
Move negotiated_version
martinthomson Nov 24, 2017
a5ca4b8
Explain where negotiated_version comes from
martinthomson Dec 3, 2017
8488f8b
Remove run-on sentence that runs on
martinthomson Dec 3, 2017
3359f1e
Add a brief intro
martinthomson Dec 4, 2017
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13 changes: 8 additions & 5 deletions draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
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Expand Up @@ -1219,14 +1219,17 @@ New transport parameters can be registered according to the rules in

### Version Negotiation Validation {#version-validation}

The transport parameters include three fields that encode version information.
These retroactively authenticate the version negotiation (see
{{version-negotiation}}) that is performed prior to the cryptographic handshake.
Though the cryptographic handshake has integrity protection, two forms of QUIC
version downgrade are possible. In the first, an attacker replaces the QUIC
version in the Initial packet. In the second, a fake Version Negotiation packet
is sent by an attacker. To protect against these attacks, the transport
parameters include three fields that encode version information. These
parameters are used to retroactively authenticate the choice of version (see
{{version-negotiation}}).

The cryptographic handshake provides integrity protection for the negotiated
version as part of the transport parameters (see {{transport-parameters}}). As
a result, modification of version negotiation packets by an attacker can be
detected.
a result, attacks on version negotiation by an attacker can be detected.

The client includes the initial_version field in its transport parameters. The
initial_version is the version that the client initially attempted to use. If
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