

# An Immediate Multi-Party Generalization of ID-NIKE from Constrained PRF

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# Asymmetric Crypto Overview



Eve




Bob




Alice


# Asymmetric Crypto Overview




# Asymmetric Crypto Overview




# Asymmetric Crypto Overview



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


# Constrained PRF

## Definition

A PRF is a function  $F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  such that there is a polynomial algorithm to evaluate  $F(k, \cdot)$ ,  $k \in \mathcal{K}$

- A constrained PRF (cPRF) is similar to a PRF, with an additional set of constrained keys  $\mathcal{K}_c$  such that a key  $k_s \in \mathcal{K}_c$  enables the evaluation of  $F$  only in a certain subset  $S \in \mathcal{X}$ .





# Left/Right cPRF, Bit-Fixing cPRF

## Definition

Let  $F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X}^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  be a PRF. Then,  $\forall w \in \mathcal{X}$ , a left/right cPRF supports two constrained keys  $k_w^L$  and  $k_w^R$  that enable the evaluation of  $F$  at all points  $(w, x) \in \mathcal{X}^2$ , respectively  $(x, w) \in \mathcal{X}^2$ .

# Left/Right cPRF, Bit-Fixing cPRF

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## Definition

Let  $F : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^N \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  be a PRF. Then,  $\forall v \in \{0, 1, ?\}^N$ , a bit-fixing cPRF supports a constrained key  $k_v$  that enables the evaluation of  $F$  at all points  $x \in \{0, 1\}^N$  that satisfy the pattern  $v$ .

# Left/Right cPRF, Bit-Fixing cPRF

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## Example

When  $v := 0?1$ ,  $k_{0?1}$  enables the evaluation of  $F(k_{0?1}, 011)$  and  $F(k_{0?1}, 001)$

# Boneh-Waters ID-NIKE [BW'13]



Bob



Alice

# Boneh-Waters ID-NIKE [BW'13]



Bob

$$F(k_{Bob}, (Bob, \cdot))$$
$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, Bob))$$



Alice

# Boneh-Waters ID-NIKE [BW'13]



Bob

$$\begin{aligned} &F(k_{Bob}, (Bob, \cdot)) \\ &F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, Bob)) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, \cdot)) \\ &F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, Alice)) \end{aligned}$$



Alice

# Boneh-Waters ID-NIKE [BW'13]

We have a common secret key:

$$F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, Bob))$$



Bob

$$\begin{aligned} F(k_{Bob}, (Bob, \cdot)) \\ F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, Bob)) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, \cdot)) \\ F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, Alice)) \end{aligned}$$



Alice

- $\text{Setup}(\lambda)$ :
  - let  $F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X}^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  be  $\text{PRF}^{L/R}$ ,  $\text{msk} \leftarrow^R \mathcal{K}$
  - outputs  $\text{msk}$
- $\text{Extract}(\text{msk}, id_i)$ :
  - computes  $F.\text{constrain}(\text{msk}, \{(id_i, \cdot)\})$  to obtain  $k_{id_i}^L$  and  $F.\text{constrain}(\text{msk}, \{(\cdot, id_i)\})$  to obtain  $k_{id_i}^R$
  - outputs  $sk_{id_i} = (k_{id_i}^L, k_{id_i}^R)$
- $\text{KeyGen}(sk_{id_i}, id_j)$  outputs:

$$k_{id_i, id_j} = \begin{cases} F(\text{msk}, (id_i, id_j)) & \text{if } id_i < id_j \\ F(\text{msk}, (id_j, id_i)) & \text{if } id_i > id_j \end{cases}$$



# Multi-Party ID-NIKE from cPRF

$$F(k_{Bob}, (Bob, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, Bob, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, \cdot, Bob))$$



Bob

$$F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, Alice, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, \cdot, Alice))$$



Alice

# Multi-Party ID-NIKE from cPRF


$$F(k_{Bob}, (Bob, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, Bob, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, \cdot, Bob))$$



Bob



John



Alice

$$F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, Alice, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, \cdot, Alice))$$

# Multi-Party ID-NIKE from cPRF

$$F(k_{Bob}, (Bob, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, Bob, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, \cdot, Bob))$$




Bob

$$F(k_{John}, (John, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{John}, (\cdot, John, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{John}, (\cdot, \cdot, John))$$



John

$$F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, Alice, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, \cdot, Alice))$$



Alice

# Multi-Party ID-NIKE from cPRF

$$F(k_{Bob}, (Bob, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, Bob, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Bob}, (\cdot, \cdot, Bob))$$



Bob

$$F(k_{John}, (John, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{John}, (\cdot, John, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{John}, (\cdot, \cdot, John))$$



John

$$F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, \cdot, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, Alice, \cdot))$$

$$F(k_{Alice}, (\cdot, \cdot, Alice))$$



Alice

Secret Shared Key:

$$F(k_{Alice}, (Alice, Bob, John))$$

# Multi-Party ID-NIKE from cPRF

- $\text{Setup}(\lambda)$ :
  - let  $F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X}^N \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  be  $\text{PRF}^{bf}$ ,  $\text{msk} \leftarrow^R \mathcal{K}$
  - outputs  $\text{msk}$
- $\text{Extract}(\text{msk}, \text{id}_i)$ :
  - computes  $F.\text{constrain}(\text{msk}, \{(id_i, \cdot, \dots, \cdot)\})$  to obtain  $k_{id_i}^1$ ,  
 $F.\text{constrain}(\text{msk}, \{(\cdot, id_i, \cdot, \dots, \cdot)\})$  to obtain  $k_{id_i}^2, \dots$ ,  
 $F.\text{constrain}(\text{msk}, \{(\cdot, \dots, \cdot, id_i)\})$  to obtain  $k_{id_i}^N$
  - outputs  $sk_{id_i} = (k_{id_i}^1, \dots, k_{id_i}^N)$
- $\text{KeyGen}(sk_{id_i}, \{id_1, \dots, id_N\})$  outputs:

$$k_{id_1, \dots, id_N} = F(\text{msk}, (id_{\pi(1)}, id_{\pi(2)}, \dots, id_{\pi(N)}))$$

where  $id_{\pi(1)} < id_{\pi(2)} < \dots < id_{\pi(N)}$  (in lexicographic order)

# Thank you!