MPC-Friendly Symmetric Key Primitives

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What is Multiparty Computation?



What is Multiparty Computation?



Take home message

Move data **securely** between clients and MPC engines.

Common to all



Linear Programming

Common to all



Linear Programming

Integer Comparison

Common to all



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



Fixed Point Arithmetic

Common to all



Linear Programming

Integer Comparison

3.141592653589793

Fixed Point Arithmetic

Easy to implement via arithmetic circuits mod p

Where is the problem?



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Why?

- Why a PRF? Because we can Enc / Dec using CTR mode (only PRF calls).
- Avoid the n fold database/key blowup by secret share the key and use a PRF mod p in MPC!
- Why mod p? Conversion between binary and arithmetic shares is expensive.

Other use cases for PRF's in MPC

- Secure database joins [LTW13].
- Oblivious RAM [LO13].
- Searchable symmetric encryption, order-revealing encryption [BCO'N11, BLRSZZ15, CLWW16, BBO'N07, CJJKRS13].

What we have done

Benchmark and **create new protocols** using PRF's within SPDZ protocol.

Why SPDZ?

- MPC protocol with active security.
- It is open source.

MPC with secret sharing 101

- Each party P_i has $[a] \leftarrow a_i$ s.t. $a = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i$.
- Triples generation: $[a] = [b] \cdot [c]$
- Random bits and squares: $[b]$, $[s^2]$.

Preprocessing Phase

MPC with secret sharing 101

- Use 1 triple for each multiplication gate.
- Number of communcation rounds is given by the circuit depth.



Online Phase

Circuit Evaluation in SPDZ

Circuit Evaluation in SPDZ



Circuit Evaluation in SPDZ



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

Circuit Evaluation in SPDZ



2 triples; 3 rounds.

What PRF's have we looked at?

- AES [DR01].
- LowMC (Low Multiplicative Complexity) [ARS+15].
- Naor-Reingold PRF [NR04].
- MiMC (Minimum Multiplicative Complexity) [AGR+16].
- Legendre PRF [Dam88].

Let's play a game

Let's play a game

AES - de-facto benchmark

- 960 multiplications
- 50 rounds



PRF on blocks

AES - de-facto benchmark

- 960 multiplications
- 50 rounds

PRF on blocks

5 ops/s

AES - de-facto benchmark

- 960 multiplications
- 50 rounds

PRF on blocks

8ms latency

AES - de-facto benchmark

- 960 multiplications
- 50 rounds

PRF on blocks

530 ops/s throughput

Naor-Reingold PRF

$$F_{\mathrm{NR}(n)}(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}) = g^{k_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} k_i^{x_i}}$$

where $\mathbf{k} = (k_0, \ldots, k_n) \in \mathbb{F}_p^{n+1}$ is the key.

Naor-Reingold PRF

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where $\mathbf{k} = (k_0, \ldots, k_n) \in \mathbb{F}_p^{n+1}$ is the key.

Fortunately, in some applications the output must be public!

Naor-Reingold PRF

- Active security version for public output.
- Why EC? Smaller modulus.
- $2 \cdot n$ multiplications.
- $3 + \log n + 1$ rounds.

EC based PRF

Naor-Reingold PRF

- Active security version for public output.
- Why EC? Smaller modulus.
- $4n + 2$ multiplications.
- 7 rounds [CH10].

EC based PRF in constant round

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EC based PRF in constant round

4.3ms latency

Naor-Reingold PRF

- Active security version for public output.
- Why EC? Smaller modulus.
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- 7 rounds [CH10].

EC based PRF in constant round

370 ops/s throughput

Naor-Reingold PRF

- Active security version for public output.
- Why EC? Smaller modulus.
- $4n + 2$ multiplications.
- 7 rounds [CH10].

EC based PRF in constant round

Results have shown that over 70% of the time was spent on EC computations.
Computation is the bottleneck, not communication!

MiMC - How does it work?



Fig. 1: r rounds of MiMC-n/n

[AGR+16]

MiMC PRF

- 146 multiplications
- 73 rounds
- 1 variant optimized for latency, other for throughput.

MiMC PRF - works in both worlds

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MiMC PRF - works in both worlds

34 ops/s

MiMC PRF

- 146 multiplications
- 73 rounds
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MiMC PRF - works in both worlds

6ms latency

MiMC PRF

- 146 multiplications
- 73 rounds
- 1 variant optimized for latency, other for throughput.

MiMC PRF - works in both worlds

9000 ops/s throughput - **16x** AES

Legendre PRF

In 1988, Damgård conjectured that this sequence is pseuodarandom starting from a random seed k.

$$\left(\frac{k}{p}\right), \left(\frac{k+1}{p}\right), \left(\frac{k+2}{p}\right), \ldots$$

Legendre PRF - 1 bit output

- $\log p$ multiplications.
- $\log p$ rounds.

Legendre PRF - old version

Legendre PRF - 1 bit output

- ~~$\log p$~~ 2 multiplications.
- ~~$\log p$~~ 3 rounds.

Legendre PRF - new version

Legendre PRF - 1 bit output

- ~~$\log p$~~ 2 multiplications.
- ~~$\log p$~~ 3 rounds.

Legendre PRF - new version

1225 ops/s - **250x** AES

Legendre PRF - 1 bit output

- ~~$\log p$~~ 2 multiplications.
- ~~$\log p$~~ 3 rounds.

Legendre PRF - new version

0.3ms latency - **25x** faster AES

Legendre PRF - 1 bit output

- ~~$\log p$~~ 2 multiplications.
- ~~$\log p$~~ 3 rounds.

Legendre PRF - new version



202969 ops/s throughput - **380x** AES

Security of Legendre PRF

Is it secure?

Security of Legendre PRF

Is it secure?

Yes, we give a reduction to the SLS problem.

How does it work?

Protocol Π_{Legendre}

Let α be a fixed, quadratic non-residue modulo p, i.e. $\left(\frac{\alpha}{p}\right) = -1$.

Eval: To evaluate $F_{\text{Leg(bit)}}$ on input $[x]$ with key $[k]$:

1. Take a random square $[s^2]$ and a random bit $[b]$
2. $[t] \leftarrow [s^2] \cdot ([b] + \alpha \cdot (1 - [b]))$
3. $u \leftarrow \text{Open}([t] \cdot ([k] + [x]))$
4. Output $[y] \leftarrow \left(\frac{u}{p}\right) \cdot (2[b] - 1)$

Securely computing the $F_{\text{Leg(bit)}}$ PRF with shared output

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Eval: To evaluate $F_{\text{Leg(bit)}}$ on input $[x]$ with key $[k]$:

1. Take a random square $[s^2]$ and a random bit $[b]$
2. $[t] \leftarrow [s^2] \cdot ([0] + \alpha \cdot (1 - [0]))$
3. $u \leftarrow \text{Open}([s^2\alpha] \cdot ([k] + [x]))$
4. Output $[y] \leftarrow \left(\frac{u}{p}\right) \cdot (2 [0] - 1)$

Securely computing the $F_{\text{Leg(bit)}}$ PRF with shared output

Summary

- PRF's mod p in MPC are fast! Can you find other applications built on top of these?
- Using special preprocessed data can help you often in SPDZ online phase.
- For proofs, WAN timings, other details, check out our paper!

Thank you!

Thank you!

PRF	Best latency	Best throughput		Prep. (ops/s)	Cleartext (ops/s)
	(ms/op)	Batch size	ops/s		
AES	8.378	2048	552	5.097	106268670
$F_{\mathsf{NR}(128)}(\mathsf{log})$	4.375	1024	370	4.787	1359
$F_{\mathsf{NR}(128)}(\mathsf{const})$	4.549	256	281	2.384	1359
$F_{\mathsf{Leg}(\mathsf{bit})}$	0.393	1024	163400	1225	17824464
$F_{\mathsf{Leg}(1)}$	1.418	64	1331	9.574	115591
$F_{\mathsf{MiMC}}(\mathsf{basic})$	14.053	1024	6561	33.575	189525
$F_{\mathsf{MiMC}}(\mathsf{cube})$	7.267	2048	5536	33.575	189525

Table 3. Performance of the PRFs in a LAN setting

WAN results

PRF	Best latency	Best throughput		Prep. (ops/s)
	(ms/op)	Batch size	ops/s	
AES	2640	1024	31.947	0.256
$F_{\mathsf{NR}(128)}(\mathsf{log})$	713	1024	59.703	0.2359
$F_{\mathsf{NR}(128)}(\mathsf{const})$	478	1024	30.384	0.1175
$F_{\mathsf{Leg}(\mathsf{bit})}$	202	1024	2053	60.241
$F_{\mathsf{Leg}(1)}$	210	512	68.413	0.4706
$F_{\mathsf{MiMC}}(\mathsf{basic})$	7379	512	59.04	1.650
$F_{\mathsf{MiMC}}(\mathsf{cube})$	3691	512	79.66	1.650

Table 4. Performance of the PRFs in a simulated WAN setting