shim.c: add the marco switch to allow users to choose whether the next boot loader signature failure is enforced or not when secure boot is enabled. #627
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boot loader signature failure is enforced or not when secure boot is enabled. Similar to the kernel module forced signature verification configuration (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE), we can introduce a switch at compile time to each component of the secure boot (including shim) to allow users to choose whether to force signature verification and intercept the next-level bootloader that fails the signature verification(unsigned or signed incorrectly, etc.) according to their own needs. Of course, the default is still forced signature verification and interception. If there are only alarms rather than forced interception, you can add the `CFLAGS +=-DALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_ERROR` compilation option to the Makefile to control it. Signed-off-by: YiLin.Li <YiLin.Li@linux.alibaba.com>
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Similar to the kernel module forced signature verification configuration (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE), we can introduce a switch at compile time to each component of the secure boot (including shim) to allow users to choose whether to force signature verification and intercept the next-level bootloader that fails the signature verification(unsigned or signed incorrectly, etc.) according to their own needs. Of course, the default is still forced signature verification and interception. If there are only alarms rather than forced interception, you can add the
CFLAGS +=-DALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_ERRORcompilation option to the Makefile to control it.Signed-off-by: YiLin.Li YiLin.Li@linux.alibaba.com