

The Root Canary: Monitoring and Measuring the DNSSEC Root Key Rollover

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What?


DNSSEC turns the DNS into a **Public Key Infrastructure**, where the root of trust is the so-called **Key Signing Key (KSK)** for the **root of the DNS**. This year, **for the first time ever**, this key will be replaced in a so-called **key rollover**.

Why?

This **unique event** can have significant **operational impact on the Internet**. Thousands of **validating DNS resolvers** serving **tens of millions of Internet users** **rely on this key** to validate DNSSEC signatures. These **resolvers** must **pick up the new key** through **automated or manual** processes. **Failure to pick up the new key** can lead these **resolvers** to become **inoperative**.


How?

We **combine** (figure below) four sources of **active** and **passive measurements** to get **maximum visibility** of the DNS resolver ecosystem. Using this data we perform **near real-time monitoring** during the entire rollover process (figure below right) and will **analyse the impact of the rollover** after the process completes.




Preliminary Results

Support for DNSSEC signing algorithms




portal.rootcanary.org/rcmstats.html

Live probe status reports



monitor.rootcanary.org/live.html

Online algorithm support test



rootcanary.org/test.html