ABDK CONSULTING

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

Risedle

Risedle


Solidity

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SMART CONTRACT AUDIT CONCLUSION

by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich 9th June 2022

We've been asked to review 2 files in a Github repository. We found 4 major, and a few less important issues.



Findings

ID	.	C .	C
ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-1	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-2	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-3	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-4	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-5	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-6	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-7	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-8	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-9	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-10	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-11	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-12	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-13	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-14	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-15	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-16	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-17	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-18	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-19	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-20	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-21	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-22	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-23	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-24	Moderate	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-25	Moderate	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-26	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-27	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-28	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-29	Major	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-30	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-31	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-32	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-33	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-34	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-35	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-36	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-37	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-38	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-39	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-40	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-41	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-42	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-43	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-44	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-45	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-46	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-47	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-48	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-49	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-50	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-51	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-52	Minor	Procedural	Fixed



Contents

1	Doc	ment properties	7
2		duction	8
	2.1	About ABDK	8
	2.2	Disclaimer	8
	2.3	Methodology	8
3	Deta	led Results	10
	3.1	CVF-1	10
	3.2	CVF-2	10
	3.3	CVF-3	10
	3.4	CVF-4	11
	3.5	CVF-5	11
	3.6	CVF-6	11
	3.7	CVF-7	12
	3.8	CVF-8	12
	3.9	CVF-9	12
	3.10	CVF-10	13
	3.11	CVF-11	13
			13
	3.13	CVF-13	14
	3.14	CVF-14	14
	3.15	CVF-15	14
			15
			15
			16
	3.19		16
			16
			17
	_		17
			18
	_		19
			19
			19
			20
			20
			20
			21
			21
			22
			22
			22
			23
			23
	3.37	CVF-37	23

Risedle Review		ABDK
3.38 CVF-3	8	. 24
3.39 CVF-3	9	. 25
3.40 CVF-4	0	. 26
3.41 CVF-4	1	. 27
3.42 CVF-4	2	. 27
3.43 CVF-4	3	. 28
3.44 CVF-4	4	. 28
3.45 CVF-4	5	. 28
3.46 CVF-4	6	. 29
3.47 CVF-4	7	. 29
3.48 CVF-4	8	. 30
3.49 CVF-4	9	. 30
3.50 CVF-5	0	. 30
3.51 CVF-5	1	. 31
3 52 CVF_5	2	31



1 Document properties

Version

Version	Date	Author	Description
0.1	June 8, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Initial Draft
0.2	June 8, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Minor revision
1.0	June 9, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Release

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2 Introduction

The following document provides the result of the audit performed by ABDK Consulting at the customer request. The audit goal is a general review of the smart contracts structure, critical/major bugs detection and issuing the general recommendations.

We have reviewed the contracts at repository:

- RiseToken.sol
- RiseTokenFactory.sol

The fixes were provided in a new commit.

2.1 About ABDK

ABDK Consulting, established in 2016, is a leading service provider in the space of blockchain development and audit. It has contributed to numerous blockchain projects, and co-authored some widely known blockchain primitives like Poseidon hash function. The ABDK Audit Team, led by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich, has conducted over 40 audits of blockchain projects in Solidity, Rust, Circom, C++, JavaScript, and other languages.

2.2 Disclaimer

Note that the performed audit represents current best practices and smart contract standards which are relevant at the date of publication. After fixing the indicated issues the smart contracts should be re-audited.

2.3 Methodology

The methodology is not a strict formal procedure, but rather a collection of methods and tactics that combined differently and tuned for every particular project, depending on the project structure and and used technologies, as well as on what the client is expecting from the audit. In current audit we use:

- **General Code Assessment**. The code is reviewed for clarity, consistency, style, and for whether it follows code best practices applicable to the particular programming language used. We check indentation, naming convention, commented code blocks, code duplication, confusing names, confusing, irrelevant, or missing comments etc. At this phase we also understand overall code structure.
- Entity Usage Analysis. Usages of various entities defined in the code are analysed. This includes both: internal usages from other parts of the code as well as potential external usages. We check that entities are defined in proper places and that their visibility scopes and access levels are relevant. At this phase we understand overall system architecture and how different parts of the code are related to each other.
- Access Control Analysis. For those entities, that could be accessed externally, access control measures are analysed. We check that access control is relevant and is done properly. At this phase we understand user roles and permissions, as well as what assets the system ought to protect.



• Code Logic Analysis. The code logic of particular functions is analysed for correctness and efficiency. We check that code actually does what it is supposed to do, that algorithms are optimal and correct, and that proper data types are used. We also check that external libraries used in the code are up to date and relevant to the tasks they solve in the code. At this phase we also understand data structures used and the purposes they are used for.





Detailed Results

3.1 CVF-1

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description Specifying a particular compiler version makes it harder to migrate to newer versions.

Recommendation Consider specifying as "^0.8.0".

Client Comment All contracts now use ^0.8.0.

Listing 1:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.11;

3.2 CVF-2

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description This pragma has no effect in Solidity 0.8.x.

Recommendation Consider removing it.

Client Comment All experimental pragma are removed on all contracts.

Listing 2:

3 pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;

3.3 CVF-3

• Severity Minor

Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

Client Comment These contracts only serve as interface and contract call forwarder to RariFuse and Uniswap.

Listing 3:

- 8 import { IfERC20 } from "./interfaces/IfERC20.sol"; import { IRiseTokenFactory } from "./interfaces/ → IRiseTokenFactory.sol";
- 12 import { UniswapAdapter } from "./adapters/UniswapAdapter.sol"; import { RariFusePriceOracleAdapter } from "./adapters/ → RariFusePriceOracleAdapter.sol";



3.4 CVF-4

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Recommendation The type of this variable should be "IRiseToken[]". **Client Comment** Storage data type updated.

Listing 4:

23 address[] public tokens;

3.5 CVF-5

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Recommendation The type of both keys for this mapping should be "IfERC20". The values type for this mapping should be "IRiseToken".

Client Comment Mapping data type updated.

Listing 5:

24 mapping(address => mapping(address => address)) public getToken;

3.6 CVF-6

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Fixed
- Category Suboptimal

Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description This event is emitted even if nothing actually changed.

Client Comment setFeeRecipient now revert if _newFeeRecipient is equal to existing feeRecipient. FeeRecipientUpdated only emitted when the fee recipient is updated.

Listing 6:

40 emit FeeRecipientUpdated(_newRecipient);



3.7 CVF-7

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype
- Status Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Recommendation The type of the "_fCollateral" and "_fDebt" arguments should be "IfERC20".

Client Comment Data type updated.

Listing 7:

44 function create (address _fCollateral, address _fDebt, address → _uniswapAdapter, address _oracleAdapter) external → onlyOwner returns (address token) {

3.8 CVF-8

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Recommendation The type of the "_uniswapAdater" argument should be "UniswapAdapter".

Client Comment Data type updated.

Listing 8:

44 function create (address _fCollateral, address _fDebt, address → _uniswapAdapter, address _oracleAdapter) external → onlyOwner returns (address token) {

3.9 CVF-9

• **Severity** Minor

- Status Fixed
- Category Bad datatype
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Recommendation The type of the "_oracleAdapter" should be "RariFusePriceOracleAdapter".

Client Comment Data type updated.

Listing 9:

44 function create (address _fCollateral, address _fDebt, address → _uniswapAdapter, address _oracleAdapter) external → onlyOwner returns (address token) {



3.10 CVF-10

- Severity Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description The expression "IERC20Metadata(collateral).symbol()" is calculated twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

Client Comment ERC20Metadata(collateral).symbol() is cached in collateralSymbol variable.

Listing 10:

3.11 CVF-11

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description Including the collateral and debt addresses into salt is redundant, as these values are already included into the creation code as a part of the contractor arguments. **Client Comment** Salt is removed.

Listing 11:

55 bytes32 salt = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_fCollateral, _fDebt))

→ :

3.12 CVF-12

- Severity Minor
- ·

• Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description Solidity allows creating a contract via the "CREATE2" opcode without assembly. **Recommendation** Consider using plain Solidity syntax.

Client Comment Contract creation is now use 'new RiseToken' in plain solidity.

Listing 12:

57 _token := create2(0, add(bytecode, 32), mload(bytecode), salt)



3.13 CVF-13

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseTokenFactory.sol

Description This looks redundant.

Recommendation It would be cheaper to a reader to just try both variants.

Client Comment Storage write is removed and now it checks the both variant instead.

Listing 13:

61 getToken[_fDebt][_fCollateral] = _token; // populate mapping in → the reverse direction

3.14 CVF-14

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description Specifying a particular compiler version makes it harder to migrate to newer versions.

Recommendation Consider specifying as "^0.8.0".

Client Comment Solidity version updated.

Listing 14:

2 pragma solidity 0.8.11;

3.15 CVF-15

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description This pragma has no effect in Solidity 0.8.x.

Recommendation Consider removing it.

Client Comment All experimental pragma are removed on all contracts.

Listing 15:

3 pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;



3.16 CVF-16

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Info
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

Client Comment These contracts only serve as interface and contract call forwarder to RariFuse and Uniswap.

Listing 16:

3.17 CVF-17

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description Thee variables should be declared as immutable.

Client Comment Updated to immutable storage.

Listing 17:

```
31 IWETH9
RiseTokenFactory
UniswapAdapter
RariFusePriceOracleAdapter
public uniswapAdapter;
RariFusePriceOracleAdapter public oracleAdapter;

36 ERC20 public collateral;
ERC20 public debt;
IfERC20 public fCollateral;
IfERC20 public fDebt;

51 uint8 private cdecimals;
uint8 private ddecimals;
```



3.18 CVF-18

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation The type of this argument should be "RiseTokenFactory". **Client Comment** Datatype updated.

Listing 18:

60 address _factory,

3.19 CVF-19

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation The type of these arguments should be "IfERC20". **Client Comment** Datatype updated.

Listing 19:

61 address _fCollateral, address fDebt,

3.20 CVF-20

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation The type of this argument should be "UniswapAdapter". **Client Comment** Datatype updated.

Listing 20:

63 address uniswapAdapter,



3.21 CVF-21

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation The type of this argument should be "RariFusePriceOracleAdapter". **Client Comment** Datatype updated.

Listing 21:

64 address oracleAdapter

3.22 CVF-22

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description In ERC20 the optional property "decimals" is used by UI to render token amounts in a human-friendly way. Using this property in smart contracts is discouraged.

Recommendation Consider treating all token amounts as integers.

Client Comment Dependency on .decimals() is removed.

Listing 22:

```
75 cdecimals = collateral.decimals();
    ddecimals = debt.decimals();
332 uint256 quoteDecimals = ERC20( quote).decimals();
```



3.23 CVF-23

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description Increasing allowance every time is suboptimal.

Recommendation Consider approving a large value once instead.

Client Comment Allowance increased at once.

Listing 23:

```
86 collateral.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(fCollateral),

→ collateralAmount);
102
    debt.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(fDebt), repayAmount);
129
    debt.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter), params.
       → borrowAmount);
    debt.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter), params.
159

→ debtAmount);

204
        collateral.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter),
           → params.collateralAmount);
211
        collateral.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter),
           → params.collateralAmount);
217
            weth.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(weth), wethLeft);
229
            weth.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter),
               → wethLeft);
404
        weth.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter),

→ wethLeftFromFlashSwap);
429
    collateral.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amountln
    debt.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter), borrowAmount
436
       \hookrightarrow );
442
        debt.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(fDebt), repayAmount);
    weth.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(weth), amountOut);
449
474 weth.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter), msg.value);
```



3.24 CVF-24

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation Should be "||" instead of "&&". Currently, an error is reported only when both market statuses are not zero.

Listing 24:

```
124 if (marketStatus[0] != 0 && marketStatus[1] != 0) revert

→ FuseError(marketStatus[0]);
```

3.25 CVF-25

• **Severity** Moderate

- Status Fixed
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description Underflow could happen here causing the transaction to revert.

Recommendation Consider properly handling the situation when _wethAmount < wethAmountFromBorrow. For example, transfer the excess WETH amount back to the initializer, either as WETH or as plain ether.

Client Comment The _wethAmount < wethAmountFromBorrow is now handled properly. Excess WETH is sent to initializer .

Listing 25:

```
133 uint256 owedWETH = _wethAmount - wethAmountFromBorrow;
163 uint256 owedWETH = wethAmount - wethAmountFromBorrow;
```

3.26 CVF-26

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

Category Suboptimal

Source RiseToken.sol

Description This should be executed only when excessETH > 0. **Client Comment** Now ETH is sent only if excessETH > 0.

Listing 26:



3.27 CVF-27

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description This should be executed only when owedWETH > 0. **Client Comment** Now ETH is converted to WETH only if owedWETH > 0.

Listing 27:

```
142 weth.deposit{ value: owedWETH }(); // Wrap the ETH to WETH
171 weth.deposit{ value: owedWETH }();
```

3.28 CVF-28

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source RiseToken.sol

Description This should be executed only when _wethAmount > 0. **Client Comment** Now the flashloan is only repay when _wethAmount > 0.

Listing 28:

- 143 weth.safeTransfer(address(uniswapAdapter), _wethAmount);
- 182 weth.safeTransfer(address(uniswapAdapter), _wethAmount);

3.29 CVF-29

• **Severity** Major

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source RiseToken.sol

Description For a single swap, the "in" tokens are transferred 5 times: two times here, two times inside the Uniswap adapter, and one more time inside the Uniswap router. This consumes lots of gas.

Recommendation Consider calculating the exact input amount to be swapped and transferring this amount once directly from the buyer to the Uniswap pair.

Client Comment This is no issue because RiseToken only runs on L2.

Listing 29:

- 173 params.tokenIn.safeTransferFrom(params.buyer, address(this),

 → params.amountInMax);
- params.tokenIn.safeTransfer(params.buyer, params.amountlnMax \rightarrow amountln);



3.30 CVF-30

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description This should only be executed when collateralLeft > 0. **Client Comment** If collateralLeft = 0 now reverted.

Listing 30:

208 collateral.safeTransfer(params.recipient, collateralLeft);

3.31 CVF-31

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source RiseToken.sol

Description This should be executed only when wethLeft > 0. **Client Comment** wethOut and amountOut is now checked.

Listing 31:

```
weth.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(weth), wethLeft);
217
        weth.withdraw(wethLeft);
        (bool sent, ) = params.recipient.call{value: wethLeft}("");
220
        if (!sent) revert FailedToSendETH(params.recipient, wethLeft
           \hookrightarrow );
    if (address(params.tokenOut) != address(0) && (address(params.
228
       → tokenOut) != address(debt))) {
        weth.safeIncreaseAllowance(address(uniswapAdapter), wethLeft
           \hookrightarrow );
230
        uint256 amountOut = uniswapAdapter.swapExactWETHForTokens(
           → address(params.tokenOut), wethLeft, params.
           → amountOutMin);
        params.tokenOut.safeTransfer(params.recipient, amountOut);
    }
```



3.32 CVF-32

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description There are no range checks for the arguments.

Recommendation Consider adding appropriate checks.

Client Comment Input is now checked.

Listing 32:

```
248 function setParams (uint256 _minLeverageRatio, uint256 

→ _maxLeverageRatio, uint256 _step, uint256 _discount, 

→ uint256 newMaxBuy) external onlyOwner {
```

3.33 CVF-33

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation This could be simplified as: if (isInitialized) revert (...);

Listing 33:

259 if (isInitialized == true) revert AlreadyInitialized();

3.34 CVF-34

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Readability

• Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation Should be "} else if (...) {" for readability.

Listing 34:

```
276    return;
}

if (flashSwapType == FlashSwapType.Buy) {
```



3.35 CVF-35

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Readability

• Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation Should be "} else if (...) {" for readability.

Listing 35:

282 }

if (flashSwapType == FlashSwapType.Sell) {

3.36 CVF-36

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation Should be "} else revert (...);" for completeness.

Listing 36:

287 }

3.37 CVF-37

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source RiseToken.sol

Description The precision of the returned values for these functions depends of the numbers of decimals of underlying tokens. This could cause problems with tokens that have little decimals.

Recommendation Consider using the same precision for all tokens, say 18 decimals.

Client Comment The _dps and _cps base units is designed to follow the base units of the collateral and debt tokens.

Listing 37:

297 function collateralPerShare() public view returns (uint256 _cps) \leftrightarrow {

303 function debtPerShare() public view returns (uint256 _dps) {



3.38 CVF-38

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation Consider extracting these checks to a modifier. **Client Comment** Modifier whenInitialized is added.

Listing 38:

```
if (!isInitialized) return 0;

if (!isInitialized) revert NotInitialized();

if (!isInitialized) revert NotInitialized();
```



3.39 CVF-39

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source RiseToken.sol

Description The value "10**cdecimals" is calculated every time.

Recommendation Consider calculating once in constructor and storing in an immutable variable.

Client Comment The base units is now abstracted.

```
Listing 39:
    _{cps} = (totalCollateral * (10**cdecimals)) / totalSupply();
299
    dps = (totalDebt * (10**cdecimals)) / totalSupply();
305
    uint256 collateralAmount = ( shares * collateralPerShare()) /
313
       \hookrightarrow (10**cdecimals);
    uint256 debtAmount = ( shares * debtPerShare()) / (10**cdecimals
321
    uint256 collateralValue = (collateralAmount * cPrice) / (10**

→ cdecimals);
343
    nav = value(10**cdecimals);
    uint256 collateralValue = (collateralPerShare() *
350

→ collateralPrice) / (10**cdecimals);
370
        collateralAmount: (newShares * collateralPerShare()) / (10**

→ cdecimals),
        debtAmount: (newShares * debtPerShare()) / (10**cdecimals),
393
        collateralAmount: (newShares * collateralPerShare()) / (10**

→ cdecimals),
        debtAmount: (newShares * debtPerShare()) / (10**cdecimals),
432 uint256 borrowAmount = ((step * value((10**cdecimals), address(
       \hookrightarrow debt)) / 1e18) * totalSupply()) / (10**cdecimals);
466
    amountOut = (msg.value * (10**cdecimals)) / price;
473 uint256 repayAmount = ((step * value((10**cdecimals), address(
       \hookrightarrow debt)) / 1e18) * totalSupply()) / (10**cdecimals);
```



3.40 CVF-40

- Severity Minor
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description Phantom overflow is possible here, i.e. a situation when the final calculation result would fit into the destination type, while some intermediary calculation overflows.

Recommendation Consider using the muldiv function as described here: https://2.com/21/muldiv/index.html or some other approach that prevents phantom overflow.

Client Comment All computation now use FixedPointMathLib from Rari Capital Solmate library.

Listing 40:

```
cps = (totalCollateral * (10**cdecimals)) / totalSupply();
299
    dps = (totalDebt * (10**cdecimals)) / totalSupply();
305
    uint256 collateralAmount = ( shares * collateralPerShare()) /
313
       \hookrightarrow (10**cdecimals);
    uint256 debtAmount = ( shares * debtPerShare()) / (10**cdecimals
       \hookrightarrow );
321 uint256 collateralValue = (collateralAmount * cPrice) / (10**

→ cdecimals);
    uint256 debtValue = (debtAmount * dPrice) / (10**ddecimals);
334
    uint256 amountInETH = (valueInETH * 1e18) / quotePrice;
337
    value = (amountlnETH * (10**quoteDecimals)) / 1e18;
    uint256 collateralValue = (collateralPerShare() *
350

→ collateralPrice) / (10**cdecimals);
    lr = (collateralValue * 1e18) / nav();
    uint256 fee = ((fees * shares) / 1e18);
362
370
        collateralAmount: (newShares * collateralPerShare()) / (10**

→ cdecimals),
        debtAmount: (newShares * debtPerShare()) / (10**cdecimals),
    uint256 fee = ((fees * shares) / 1e18);
385
        collateralAmount: (newShares * collateralPerShare()) / (10**
393

→ cdecimals),
        debtAmount: (newShares * debtPerShare()) / (10**cdecimals),
    (... 422, 432, 465, 473)
```



3.41 CVF-41

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description Silently returning zero when a functions is called on an uninitialized smart contract is error-prone, as the calling contract may forget to perform a check.

Recommendation Consider reverting instead.

Client Comment Now reverted in the modifier whenInitialized.

Listing 41:

```
298 if (!isInitialized) return 0;
304 if (!isInitialized) return 0;
310 if (!isInitialized) return 0;
342 if (!isInitialized) return 0;
348 if (!isInitialized) return 0;
```

3.42 CVF-42

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation This formula is equivalent to: _shares * totalCollateral * 10**cdecimals / totalSupply / 10**cdecimals and could be reduced to: _shares * totalCollateral / totalSupply. **Client Comment** The collateral amount calculation is now simplified.

Listing 42:

```
313 uint256 collateralAmount = (\_shares * collateralPerShare()) / \hookrightarrow (10**cdecimals);
```



3.43 CVF-43

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation This formula is equivalent to: _shares * totalDebt * 10**cdecimals / totalSupply / 10**cdecimals and could be reduced to: _shares * totalDebt / totalSupply. **Client Comment** The debt amount calculation is now simplified.

Listing 43:

314 uint256 debtAmount = (_shares * debtPerShare()) / ($10**cdecimals \leftrightarrow$);

3.44 CVF-44

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description The value "10**ddecimals" is calculated every time.

Recommendation Consider calculating once in the constructor and storing in an immutable variable.

Client Comment (10**ddecimals) is no longer used, simplified as base units.

Listing 44:

322 uint256 debtValue = (debtAmount * dPrice) / (10**ddecimals);

3.45 CVF-45

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description This cannot return a negative value and will just revert in case debt exceeds collateral..

Recommendation Consider supporting negative values.

Client Comment The value can't be negative because the collateral value will always > debt value due too rebalancing mechanism.

Listing 45:

325 value = collateralValue - debtValue;



3.46 CVF-46

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• **Category** Bad datatype

• Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation The value "1e18" should be a named constant. **Client Comment** 1e18 replaced with 'ether'.

Listing 46:

```
uint256 amountInETH = (valueInETH * 1e18) / quotePrice;
334
    value = (amountlnETH * (10**quoteDecimals)) / 1e18;
337
    lr = (collateralValue * 1e18) / nav();
351
    uint256 fee = ((fees * shares) / 1e18);
362
    uint256 fee = ((fees * shares) / 1e18);
385
    price += (discount * price) / 1e18;
422
    amountOut = (amountln * price) / (1e18);
    uint256 borrowAmount = ((step * value((10**cdecimals), address(
432
       \hookrightarrow debt)) / 1e18) * totalSupply()) / (10**cdecimals);
    price -= (discount * price) / 1e18;
465
    uint256 repayAmount = ((step * value((10**cdecimals), address())
473
       \hookrightarrow debt)) / 1e18) * totalSupply()) / (10**cdecimals);
```

3.47 CVF-47

• **Severity** Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source RiseToken.sol

Description The value "10**quoteDecimals" is calculated every time.

Recommendation Consider calculating once in the constructor and storing in an immutable variable.

Client Comment (10**ddecimals) is no longer used, simplified as base units.

Listing 47:

```
337 _value = (amountlnETH * (10**quoteDecimals)) / 1e18;
```



3.48 CVF-48

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description The name is confusing, as this function actually calculates the NAV per share value, rather than just NAV value.

Client Comment nav() is renamed to price().

Listing 48:

341 function nav() public view returns (uint256 _nav) {

3.49 CVF-49

- Severity Major
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description This function calculates the leverage ratio using the per-share collateral value and per-share NAV.

Recommendation It would be more efficient to use total collateral value and total NAV instead. Also, this would make the result more precise.

Client Comment Leverage ratio calculation is simplified.

Listing 49:

347 function leverageRatio() public view returns (uint256 lr) {

3.50 CVF-50

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation Brackets are redundant here.

Client Comment Fee calculation now use mulWadDown.

Listing 50:

```
362 uint256 fee = ((fees * \_shares) / 1e18);
```

385 uint256 fee =
$$((fees * _shares) / 1e18);$$



3.51 CVF-51

- Severity Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source RiseToken.sol

Description This formula calculates the share price in debt token terms, dividing the total collateral and debt amount by the total supply, and then multiplies the result by total supply. This is suboptimal and could be optimized.

Recommendation Consider refactoring.

Client Comment Calculation is simplified.

Listing 51:

```
432 uint256 borrowAmount = ((step * value((10**cdecimals), address( \rightarrow debt)) / 1e18) * totalSupply()) / (10**cdecimals);
```

```
473 uint256 repayAmount = ((step * value((10**cdecimals), address( \hookrightarrow debt)) / 1e18) * totalSupply()) / (10**cdecimals);
```

3.52 CVF-52

• Severity Minor

Status Fixed

Category Procedural

• Source RiseToken.sol

Recommendation It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

Client Comment added.

Listing 52:

485 receive() external payable {}