add v6 SKESK

include/repgp/repgp_def.h

@@ -499,7 +499,13 @@ typedef enum {
     PGP_C_UNKNOWN = 255
 } pgp_compression_type_t;
 
-enum { PGP_SKSK_V4 = 4, PGP_SKSK_V5 = 5 };
+typedef enum {
+    PGP_SKSK_V4 = 4,
+    PGP_SKSK_V5 = 5,
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+    PGP_SKSK_V6 = 6
+#endif
+} pgp_skesk_version_t;
 typedef enum {
     PGP_PKSK_V3 = 3,
 #if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)

include/rnp/rnp.h

@@ -3164,6 +3164,17 @@ RNP_API rnp_result_t rnp_op_encrypt_add_recipient(rnp_op_encrypt_t op, rnp_key_h
  * @return RNP_SUCCESS or errorcode if failed.
  */
 RNP_API rnp_result_t rnp_op_encrypt_enable_pkesk_v6(rnp_op_encrypt_t op);
+
+/**
+ * @brief Enables the creation of SKESK v6 (instead of v4) which results in the use of SEIPDv2.
+ *        The actually created version depends on whether an AEAD algorithm has been chosen.
+ *        NOTE: This is an experimental feature and this function can be replaced (or removed)
+ *        at any time.
+ *
+ * @param op opaque encrypting context. Must be allocated and initialized.
+ * @return RNP_SUCCESS or errorcode if failed.
+ */
+RNP_API rnp_result_t rnp_op_encrypt_enable_skesk_v6(rnp_op_encrypt_t op);
 #endif
 
 /**

src/lib/rnp.cpp

@@ -2590,6 +2590,18 @@ try {
     return RNP_SUCCESS;
 }
 FFI_GUARD
+
+rnp_result_t
+rnp_op_encrypt_enable_skesk_v6(rnp_op_encrypt_t op)
+try {
+    if (!op) {
+        return RNP_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
+    }
+
+    op->rnpctx.enable_skesk_v6 = true;
+    return RNP_SUCCESS;
+}
+FFI_GUARD
 #endif
 
 rnp_result_t
@@ -2720,7 +2732,7 @@ try {
         return RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
     }
 #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH
-    if (op->rnpctx.aalg == PGP_AEAD_NONE && op->rnpctx.enable_pkesk_v6) {
+    if (op->rnpctx.aalg == PGP_AEAD_NONE && (op->rnpctx.enable_pkesk_v6)) {
         FFI_LOG(op->ffi,
                 "Setting AEAD algorithm to PGP_AEAD_NONE (%s) would contradict the previously "
                 "enabled PKESKv6 setting",

src/librepgp/stream-ctx.h

@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ typedef struct rnp_symmetric_pass_info_t {
  *  - halg : hash algorithm used during key derivation for password-based encryption
  *  - ealg, aalg, abits : symmetric encryption algorithm and AEAD parameters if used
  *  - recipients : list of key ids used to encrypt data to
- *  - enable_pkesk_v6 : if true and each recipient in the  list of recipients has the
- * capability, allows PKESKv5/SEIPDv2
+ *  - enable_pkesk_v6 : if true and each recipient in the  list of recipients, creates
+ * PKESKv6/SEIPDv2
+ *  - enable_skesk_v6 : if true and AEAD cipher is chosen, creates SKESKv6/SEIPDv2
  *  - passwords : list of passwords used for password-based encryption
  *  - filename, filemtime, zalg, zlevel : see previous
  *  - pkeskv6_capable() : returns true if all keys support PKESKv6+SEIPDv2, false otherwise
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ typedef struct rnp_ctx_t {
     bool           no_wrap{};   /* do not wrap source in literal data packet */
 #if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
     bool enable_pkesk_v6{}; /* allows pkesk v6 if list of recipients is suitable */
+    bool enable_skesk_v6{}; /* allows skesk v6 if chosen cipher is suitable */
 #endif
     std::list<pgp_key_t *> recipients{};              /* recipients of the encrypted message */
     std::list<rnp_symmetric_pass_info_t> passwords{}; /* passwords to encrypt message */

src/librepgp/stream-packet.cpp

@@ -921,11 +921,43 @@ pgp_sk_sesskey_t::write(pgp_dest_t &dst) const
     pgp_packet_body_t pktbody(PGP_PKT_SK_SESSION_KEY);
     /* version and algorithm fields */
     pktbody.add_byte(version);
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+    uint8_t s2k_len;
+    /* A one-octet scalar octet count for the 5 fields following this octet. */
+    /* TODO: unify with pgp_key_pkt_t::s2k_specifier_len() */
+    if (version == PGP_SKSK_V6) {
+        switch (s2k.specifier) {
+        case PGP_S2KS_SIMPLE:
+            s2k_len = 2;
+            break;
+        case PGP_S2KS_SALTED:
+            s2k_len = 10;
+            break;
+        case PGP_S2KS_ITERATED_AND_SALTED:
+            s2k_len = 11;
+            break;
+        default:
+            RNP_LOG("invalid specifier");
+            throw rnp::rnp_exception(RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS);
+        }
+        pktbody.add_byte(3 + s2k_len + ivlen);
+    }
+#endif
     pktbody.add_byte(alg);
-    if (version == PGP_SKSK_V5) {
+    if (version == PGP_SKSK_V5
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+        || version == PGP_SKSK_V6
+#endif
+    ) {
         pktbody.add_byte(aalg);
     }
-    /* S2K specifier */
+/* S2K specifier */
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+    /* A one-octet scalar octet count of the following field. */
+    if (version == PGP_SKSK_V6) {
+        pktbody.add_byte(s2k_len);
+    }
+#endif
     pktbody.add_byte(s2k.specifier);
     pktbody.add_byte(s2k.hash_alg);
 
@@ -944,7 +976,11 @@ pgp_sk_sesskey_t::write(pgp_dest_t &dst) const
         throw rnp::rnp_exception(RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS);
     }
     /* v5 : iv */
-    if (version == PGP_SKSK_V5) {
+    if (version == PGP_SKSK_V5
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+        || version == PGP_SKSK_V6
+#endif
+    ) {
         pktbody.add(iv, ivlen);
     }
     /* encrypted key and auth tag for v5 */
@@ -955,6 +991,82 @@ pgp_sk_sesskey_t::write(pgp_dest_t &dst) const
     pktbody.write(dst);
 }
 
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+rnp_result_t
+pgp_sk_sesskey_t::parse_v6(pgp_packet_body_t &pkt)
+{
+    uint8_t bt;
+    uint8_t octet_count;
+    uint8_t s2k_len;
+
+    /* A one-octet scalar octet count for the 5 fields following this octet. */
+    /* TODO: do we need to check octet_count? */
+    if (!pkt.get(octet_count)) {
+        RNP_LOG("failed to get octet count of next 5 fields");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+
+    /* symmetric algorithm */
+    if (!pkt.get(bt)) {
+        RNP_LOG("failed to get symm alg");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+    alg = (pgp_symm_alg_t) bt;
+
+    /* aead algorithm */
+    if (!pkt.get(bt)) {
+        RNP_LOG("failed to get aead alg");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+    aalg = (pgp_aead_alg_t) bt;
+    if ((aalg != PGP_AEAD_EAX) && (aalg != PGP_AEAD_OCB)) {
+        RNP_LOG("unsupported AEAD algorithm : %d", (int) aalg);
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
+    }
+
+    /* A one-octet scalar octet count of the following field. */
+    /* TODO: do we need to check s2k_len? */
+    if (!pkt.get(s2k_len)) {
+        RNP_LOG("failed to get octet count of next 5 fields");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+
+    /* s2k */
+    if (!pkt.get(s2k)) {
+        RNP_LOG("failed to parse s2k");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+
+    size_t noncelen = pgp_cipher_aead_nonce_len(aalg);
+    size_t taglen = pgp_cipher_aead_tag_len(aalg);
+    size_t keylen = 0;
+
+    if (pkt.left() > noncelen + taglen + PGP_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+        RNP_LOG("too long esk");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+    if (pkt.left() < noncelen + taglen + 8) {
+        RNP_LOG("too short esk");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+    /* iv */
+    if (!pkt.get(iv, noncelen)) {
+        RNP_LOG("failed to get iv");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+    ivlen = noncelen;
+
+    /* key */
+    keylen = pkt.left();
+    if (!pkt.get(enckey, keylen)) {
+        RNP_LOG("failed to get key");
+        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+    }
+    enckeylen = keylen;
+    return RNP_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif
+
 rnp_result_t
 pgp_sk_sesskey_t::parse(pgp_source_t &src)
 {
@@ -967,6 +1079,12 @@ pgp_sk_sesskey_t::parse(pgp_source_t &src)
     /* version */
     uint8_t bt;
     if (!pkt.get(bt) || ((bt != PGP_SKSK_V4) && (bt != PGP_SKSK_V5))) {
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+        if (bt == PGP_SKSK_V6) {
+            version = bt;
+            return parse_v6(pkt);
+        }
+#endif
         RNP_LOG("wrong packet version");
         return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
     }
@@ -1134,7 +1252,7 @@ pgp_pk_sesskey_t::parse(pgp_source_t &src)
             return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
         }
         fp.length = fp_len;
-        if (fp.length && (fp.length != (unsigned)(fp_and_key_ver_len - 1))) {
+        if (fp.length && (fp.length != (unsigned) (fp_and_key_ver_len - 1))) {
             RNP_LOG("size mismatch (fingerprint size and fp+key version length field)");
             return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
         }

src/librepgp/stream-packet.h

@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ typedef struct pgp_sk_sesskey_t {
 
     void         write(pgp_dest_t &dst) const;
     rnp_result_t parse(pgp_source_t &src);
+
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+  private:
+    rnp_result_t parse_v6(pgp_packet_body_t &pkt);
+#endif
 } pgp_sk_sesskey_t;
 
 /** pgp_one_pass_sig_t */

src/librepgp/stream-parse.cpp

@@ -1828,7 +1828,11 @@ encrypted_try_password(pgp_source_encrypted_param_t *param, const char *password
                 continue;
             }
             keyavail = true;
-        } else if (skey.version == PGP_SKSK_V5) {
+        } else if (skey.version == PGP_SKSK_V5
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+                   || skey.version == PGP_SKSK_V6
+#endif
+        ) {
 #if !defined(ENABLE_AEAD)
             continue;
 #else
@@ -1842,6 +1846,31 @@ encrypted_try_password(pgp_source_encrypted_param_t *param, const char *password
             alg = skey.alg;
 
             /* initialize cipher */
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+            if (skey.version == PGP_SKSK_V6) {
+                /* For v6 SKESK, we use the S2K derived key as input to the KDF */
+                auto kdf = rnp::Hkdf::create(PGP_HASH_SHA256);
+
+                std::vector<uint8_t> kdf_info;
+                kdf_info.push_back(PGP_PKT_SK_SESSION_KEY | PGP_PTAG_ALWAYS_SET |
+                                   PGP_PTAG_NEW_FORMAT);
+                kdf_info.push_back(skey.version);
+                kdf_info.push_back(skey.alg);
+                kdf_info.push_back(skey.aalg);
+
+                std::vector<uint8_t> kdf_input(keybuf.data(),
+                                               keybuf.data() + pgp_key_size(skey.alg));
+
+                kdf->extract_expand(NULL,
+                                    0, // no salt
+                                    kdf_input.data(),
+                                    kdf_input.size(),
+                                    kdf_info.data(),
+                                    kdf_info.size(),
+                                    keybuf.data(),
+                                    keybuf.size());
+            }
+#endif
             if (!pgp_cipher_aead_init(&crypt, skey.alg, skey.aalg, keybuf.data(), true)) {
                 continue;
             }
@@ -2285,14 +2314,12 @@ encrypted_read_packet_data(pgp_source_encrypted_param_t *param)
         }
 #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH
         else if (SEIPD_version == PGP_SE_IP_DATA_V2) {
-            /*  SKESK v6 is not yet implemented, thus we must not attempt to decrypt
-               SEIPDv2 here
-                TODO: Once SKESK v6 is implemented, replace this check with a check for
-               consistency between SEIPD and SKESK version
-            */
-            if (param->symencs.size() > 0) {
-                RNP_LOG("SEIPDv2 not usable with SKESK version");
-                return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+            for (auto symenc : param->symencs) {
+                // consistency check if SEIPDv2 is only coupled with SKESKv6
+                if (symenc.version != PGP_SKSK_V6) {
+                    RNP_LOG("SEIPDv2 not usable with SKESK version");
+                    return RNP_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
+                }
             }
 
             param->auth_type = rnp::AuthType::AEADv2;

src/librepgp/stream-write.cpp

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include <time.h>
 #include <algorithm>
 #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH
+#include "crypto/hkdf.hpp"
 #include "v2_seipd.h"
 #endif
 
@@ -784,7 +785,11 @@ encrypted_add_password(rnp_symmetric_pass_info_t * pass,
 
     skey.s2k = pass->s2k;
 
-    if (param->auth_type != rnp::AuthType::AEADv1) {
+    if (param->auth_type != rnp::AuthType::AEADv1
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+        && param->auth_type != rnp::AuthType::AEADv2
+#endif
+    ) {
         skey.version = PGP_SKSK_V4;
         if (singlepass) {
             /* if there are no public keys then we do not encrypt session key in the packet */
@@ -821,6 +826,33 @@ encrypted_add_password(rnp_symmetric_pass_info_t * pass,
         skey.ivlen = pgp_cipher_aead_nonce_len(skey.aalg);
         skey.enckeylen = keylen + pgp_cipher_aead_tag_len(skey.aalg);
 
+#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_REFRESH)
+        if (param->auth_type == rnp::AuthType::AEADv2) {
+            skey.version = PGP_SKSK_V6;
+
+            auto kdf = rnp::Hkdf::create(PGP_HASH_SHA256);
+
+            std::vector<uint8_t> kdf_info;
+            kdf_info.push_back(PGP_PKT_SK_SESSION_KEY | PGP_PTAG_ALWAYS_SET |
+                               PGP_PTAG_NEW_FORMAT);
+            kdf_info.push_back(skey.version);
+            kdf_info.push_back(skey.alg);
+            kdf_info.push_back(skey.aalg);
+
+            std::vector<uint8_t> kdf_input(pass->key.data(),
+                                           pass->key.data() + pgp_key_size(skey.alg));
+
+            kdf->extract_expand(NULL,
+                                0, // no salt
+                                kdf_input.data(),
+                                kdf_input.size(),
+                                kdf_info.data(),
+                                kdf_info.size(),
+                                pass->key.data(),
+                                pgp_key_size(skey.alg));
+        }
+#endif
+
         try {
             param->ctx->ctx->rng.get(skey.iv, skey.ivlen);
         } catch (const std::exception &e) {
@@ -1063,6 +1095,12 @@ init_encrypted_dst(pgp_write_handler_t *handler, pgp_dest_t *dst, pgp_dest_t *wr
     if (handler->ctx->enable_pkesk_v6 && handler->ctx->pkeskv6_capable() && pkeycount > 0) {
         param->auth_type = rnp::AuthType::AEADv2;
     }
+
+    /* Use SEIPDv2 for SKESK if enabled and preconditions are met */
+    if (handler->ctx->enable_skesk_v6 && handler->ctx->aalg != PGP_AEAD_NONE &&
+        skeycount > 0) {
+        param->auth_type = rnp::AuthType::AEADv2;
+    }
 #endif
     param->aalg = handler->ctx->aalg;
     param->ctx = handler->ctx;