

## Appendix - Potential COVID-19 potential test fraud detection: Findings from a pilot study comparing conventional and statistical approaches

Michael Bosnjak<sup>1</sup>, Stefan Dahm<sup>2</sup>, Ronny Kuhner<sup>2</sup>, Dennis Weirauch<sup>2</sup>, Angelika Schaffrath Rosario<sup>2</sup>, Julia Hurraß<sup>2</sup>, Patrik Schmid<sup>2,4</sup>, Lothar Wieler<sup>2,5</sup> und Johannes Nießen<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Trier University, Department for Psychological Research Methods | [corresponding author](#)

<sup>2</sup> Robert Koch Institute, Department for Epidemiology and Health Monitoring

<sup>3</sup> City of Cologne, Health Authority, Infectious and Environmental Hygiene

<sup>4</sup> Federal Ministry of Health, Projekt Group BiPAM

<sup>5</sup> Hasso Plattner Institute, Department Digital Global Public Health

### Zitieren

Bosnjak M, Dahm S, Kuhner R, Weirauch D, Schaffrath Rosario A, Hurraß J, Schmid P, Wieler L und Nießen J (2024): Appendix - COVID-19 test fraud detection: Findings from a pilot study comparing conventional and statistical approaches. [Dataset] Zenodo. DOI:10.5281/zenodo.11241381.

The methods and results of the publication "COVID-19 test fraud detection: Findings from a pilot study comparing conventional and statistical approaches" are described in more detail in this appendix. The R-syntax for the calculation is provided, as well as a pseudo data set with which the syntax can also be tested.

### Organisational and administrative information

The publication "COVID-19 potential test fraud detection: Findings from a pilot study comparing conventional and statistical approaches", is a joined project of the Department for Psychological Research Methods - Trier University, Department 2 | Epidemiology and Health Monitoring - Robert Koch Institute, the Department Infectious and Environmental Hygiene - Health Authority of the City of Cologne and the Department Digital Global Public Health - Hasso Plattner Institute. The appendix presented here provides additional results and data for the publication and was curated by Department 2 | Epidemiology and Health Monitoring of the Robert Koch Institute. Questions regarding the content of the data can be addressed directly to the corresponding author Michael Bosnjak ([bosnjak@uni-trier.de](mailto:bosnjak@uni-trier.de)).

The publication of the data as well as the quality management of the (meta-)data is done by the department Data Research Data and Information Management. Questions regarding data management and the publication infrastructure can be directed to the Open Data Team of the Department MF4 at [OpenData@rki.de](#).

Bosnjak M, Dahm S, Kuhner R, Weirauch D, Schaffrath Rosario A, Hurraß J, Schmid P, Wieler L und Nießen J (2024): COVID-19 test fraud detection: Findings from a pilot study comparing conventional and statistical approaches.

### Data

We used data on claims for COVID-19 antigen tests submitted for reimbursement by 907 test centers operating in a German city with approximately one million residents for the timespan April 8, 2021 through August 28, 2022.

The data were transmitted on a daily basis via an online portal provided for this purpose by the ministry of a federal German state. Transmission was mandatory by law for the test centers by [CoronaTeststrukturV0](#) from 2021-03-09.

For each claim, the following information was provided: test center category (pharmacy, doctor's or dentist's office, private test center), date of testing, number of tests performed per day, number of positive tests per day.

The detailed data schema of the analysed data can be found in section [data](#) schema of the simulated data, as we provide simulated data in the same format.

### Methods and Results

We used four statistical methods to detect fraud, which are described in the following sections. All results shown are based on the original data.

• Outlier identification from the mean number of tests per day invoiced (high number of tests)

• Low positive rates identified by Poisson regression (low positive rate)

• Deviations from Benford's Law

• Deviations from the assumption of equally distributed last digits

#### Outlier identification from the mean number of tests per day invoiced (high number of tests)


In our first statistical approach aimed at identifying disproportionately high test volumes invoiced, the numbers of tests invoiced per day are classified as conspicuous if they fall outside the 90% percentile in terms of the mean number of tests performed per day within a test center category.

**Analysis script**  
The analysis on outlier identification from the mean number of tests per day invoiced was performed using an R script. The content of the script is provided as R file:

[supporting\\_material/scripts/Fraud\\_Methods\\_Description.r](#)

Figure 1 shows the corresponding distributions resulting from the analysis.

**Figure 1: Histograms of the mean number of tests performed per day (x-axis) by test center type (pharmacies, doctor's or dentist's offices, private test centers). The dashed vertical line indicates the 90% percentile of each distribution. Test centers falling on the right sides of these lines are considered statistically conspicuous. The numbers above the bars indicate the number of test centers within each bar.**



A total of 91 testing centers (6 pharmacies, 39 physician practices/dentists, and 46 private testing sites) were classified as conspicuous using this approach. Table 1 shows the basic statistics of the tests performed per day, divided into conspicuous and non-conspicuous test centers according to the statistical method.

**Table 1: Basic statistics of the mean number of tests per day and test centers by facility type, statistically conspicuous and statistically not conspicuous of fraud**

Facility type	Statistically conspicuous			Statistically not conspicuous			Total		
	N	Median	Max	N	Median	Max	N	Median	Max
Pharmacy	6	252.2	679.3	54	64.1	161.5	60	71.0	679.3
Doctor's or dentist's office	39	51.7	1.032.0	351	3.5	23.0	39	3.8	1.032.0
Private test center	46	515.4	5.520.0	411	106.6	342.2	457	116.3	5.520.0

#### Low positive rates identified by Poisson regression (low positive rate)

The positive rates were modeled by a Poisson regression model with random effects using the logarithms of the number of positive tests per day and per test center as dependent variable and the logarithms of the respective total number of tests as offset. The variability between the test centers were modeled by random intercepts for test centers. In addition, to account for changes in the positive rates over time for example induced by changing incidence, calendar week specific random intercepts were introduced in the model. Differences in rates between the facility types were controlled by fixed effects.

$$\log(pos_{ijkl}) = \log(test_{ijkl}) + A + \beta_j + \gamma_k + t_{ijkl}$$

$pos_{ijkl}$ : Number of positive tests at day  $i$  in test center  $j$  ( $j = 1, \dots, 907$ ) in week  $k$  ( $k = 1, \dots, 73$ ) and in facility type  $l$  ( $l = 1, \dots, 3$ )

$t_{ijkl}$ : Test center-specific deviation from the global intercept (random effect)

$\gamma_k$ : Calendar week specific deviation from the global intercept (random effect)

$t_{ijkl}$ : Facility type (pharmacy, doctor's or dentist's office or private test center) (fixed effect)

$\alpha_l$ : Factor accounting for differences in positive rates by facility type (fixed effect)

$\varepsilon_{ijkl}$ : Residual at day  $i$  in test center  $j$  in week  $k$  and facility type  $l$  not explained by the regression.

#### Analysis script

The analysis to identify low positive rates by Poisson regression was performed with an R script. The content of the script is provided as R file:

[supporting\\_material/scripts/Fraud\\_Methods\\_Poisson\\_Regression.r](#)

Corona tests were performed in the time span April 8, 2021 through August 28, 2022 on 73 weeks respective 500 days in 907 test centers, but not all centers operated for the entire period. This resulted in a total of N = 118.008 positive rates.

**Table 2: Statistics of estimated fixed effects**

Variable	Estimate	Standard Error	P-value
$A$ (global intercept)	-5.004	0.257	< 0.0001
$t_{ijkl}$ (Facility type: doctor's or dentist's office)	0.149	0.192	0.45
$t_{ijkl}$ (Facility type: private test center)	-0.477	0.182	0.0086

The differences between the mean positive rates by facility type (Table 2) ( $\beta_j$ ) were significant by 0 and had a variance of 1.65. The variance of the 73 week specific random intercepts ( $\gamma_k$ ) was estimated to be 2.67. Both variables ( $\beta_j$  and  $\gamma_k$ ) were significant with P < 0.001

A low center-specific random intercept ( $t_{ijkl}$ ) indicates a low mean positive rate for the tests in resp. center. Therefore, the reporting of tests conducted by a test center was considered conspicuous if its estimated random intercept was significantly low. The estimated test center intercepts ( $\beta_j$ ) and their standard deviations  $sd(\beta_j)$  were used to generate test values comparable to the t-values of the t-test:

$$r_j = \frac{\beta_j}{sd(\beta_j)}, j = 1, \dots, 907$$

The test values  $r_j$  ranged from -23.0 to 49.0 corresponding to positive rates of 0.5% resp. 10.6%. A value of  $r_j < -6$  was regarded as significant. According to this criterion, the 907 test centers could be classified to 88 conspicuous and 819 not conspicuous test centers (s. Table 3), where the mean positive rate in conspicuous test centers amounted to 0.6% and the not conspicuous test centers had a mean positive rate of 2.3%.

**Table 3: Summary of classifications into statistical conspicuous versus not conspicuous test centers according to the Poisson regression model used**

Facility type	Statistically conspicuous			Statistically not conspicuous			Total
	Number	Positive rate	Total	Number	Positive rate	Total	
Pharmacy	11	0.88	60	49	2.82	60	2.44
Doctor's or dentist's office	16	0.59	39	374	3.95	390	2.75
Private test center	61	0.54	46	396	2.24	457	1.95
Total	88	0.58	907	819	2.33	907	2.02

#### Deviations from Benford's Law

##### Requirements for Benford Analysis:

For data to undergo Benford analysis, it must exhibit a specific range and be reported over a certain number of days. The Benford principle may be compromised if test centers frequently operate at maximum capacity, leading to the reporting of similar test numbers. This can lead to a false positive result for a test center according to Benford's Law. Test centers reporting tests on only a few days are ineligible for Benford analysis because the distribution of the first digit lacks the necessary variability for evaluation. To address this, we stipulate that the number of tests must be reported over a minimum of 30 days.

##### Analysis script

The analysis for deviations from Benford's Law was performed using an R script. The content of the script is provided as R file:

[supporting\\_material/scripts/Fraud\\_Methods\\_Benford.r](#)

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the leading digit according to Benford's law and the distribution over all data available for the observation period. Overall, there is good agreement. The leading 1 as well as the 2 occur slightly disproportionately according to Benford's law.

**Figure 2: Distribution of leading digit of total reporting numbers (line) versus expected values of Benford's law (bars).**

A chi-square test is calculated for each of these 665 test centers. The chi-square test value determines the degree of deviation.

Figure 3: Illustration of the distribution of the leading digit of the five test centers (lines) with the largest deviations from Benford's law.



In table 4, we have summarized the number of test centers classified by conventional methods and Benford's Law. The threshold for test centers considered to be conspicuous according to Benford's Law was set to those 10% with the largest chi-square test value.

**Table 4: Number of test centers by facility type, (non) suspected of fraud by the conventional approach, and (non) suspected of fraud by the statistical approach focusing on the deviation from Benford's law.**