POLS 318: Theories of IR Lecture 6 (09.08.2020): A Theory of Liberalism

#### Rotem Dvir

Texas A&M University rdvir@tamu.edu

Department of Political Science Fall 2020

## Overview

- Quick review
- 2 Liberalism
- 3 Liberalism Main Elements
- 4 Liberal Theories
- 6 Extra Material

### Review

#### WHAT WE COVERED LAST MEETING?

- Neorealism:
  - The security dilemma arms races.
  - Risks from offensive military expansion.
- Power Transition Theory
  - Hierarchy, role of the SQ.
  - Relative power.
  - Satisfied and Dissatisfied states.
- Public views of Realism.

Questions?? Email me!

#### BACKGROUND

- Counter to realism.
- Cooperation not competition.
- Structural hierarchy enforcer of the rules.

Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations - the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics." (Moravcsik 1997)

### Contrasts with Realism

- (1) System structure.
- Global *hegemonic* power enforces norms and rules.
- (2) Focus on state preferences.
- So not a system theory?
- Yet:
  - State preferences = global preferences?
  - 2 Rational outcomes based on preferences.

#### Assumptions

### (1) Individual preferences drive state behavior

- "Bottom-up" theory.
- Aggregated preferences.
- ullet Purpose o individual's material and ideal welfare
- Demands  $\rightarrow$  scarce resources.
- Not a utopian approach, but a rational one.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

- (2) State aggregates individuals views
  - State is not an independent, abstract actor.
  - A representing institution of social preferences.
  - State members → constrain state behavior (policy).
  - Not an equal representation of societal groups.
- (3) The state within the international system
  - Places the state 'back into' the system.
  - Implement preferences within system constraints.

### Social Norms



VERSUS



#### Norms

- Respected patterns of behavior.
- Global acceptance of modes of conduct.
- Informal, no official laws to 'back them up'.
- Respect territorial boundaries.
- Promote cooperation sanctions for violators.

### **Norms**

### Dynamic nature of global norms

- Norms change with time and experience.
- ullet Changes o patterns of global interactions.
- ullet Not rules o easier to modify.

### Changing norms - Examples:

- Political assassinations.
- 2 Conduct towards Prisoners of Wars (POWs).
- Torture society point of view. 
  PublicViews

### International Regimes



### **Global Regimes**

- Set of international laws, rules, and organizations that are designed to promote coordination among actors with shared interests.
- Joins norms to facilitate cooperation and pursuit of wealth.
- Promote ideas and reputational costs of violations.
- International laws as constraint on behavior.
- Effects on short and long-term.

## Business Regime



## Trade Regimes



## Theory of Interdependence

### Keohane and Nye (1977)

- Political economy (IPE) ← security affairs.
- Distribution of shared interests  $\iff$  distribution of power.
- **Policy interdependence** → States preferences and behavior.
- Costs and benefits from implementing their preferred policies.
- Transnational externalities constraint on global behavior.

## Theory of Interdependence

#### INTERDEPENDENCE AND CONFLICT

What patterns of interdependence among nations lead to conflicts?

- Compatible preferences (optimal externalities).
- Zero-sum  $\rightarrow$  tensions and conflict.
- Mixed motives coordination and increase in overall welfare.

#### Commerce and trade

- Market incentives for trans-border transactions.
- ullet Aggregated preferences o incentives for open/closed market.
- ullet Changes in global and domestic economy o transnational economic exchange.
- Incentives for facilitating or blocking policies.

#### Free trade vs. Protectionism






FIGURE 1. A two-stage model of state behavior

## Recommended readings

#### More studies on Liberal theories:

- Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. "Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions." World politics 38, 1 (1985), 226-254.
- Owen, Erica, and Noel P. Johnston. "Occupation and the political economy of trade: job routineness, offshorability, and protectionist sentiment." *International Organization* 71, 4 (2017), 665-699.
- Sown, Chad. "What is NAFTA, and what would happen to US trade without it?", The Monkey Cage Blog, (2017), (Link)



## Public Views of Torture

Table 1. Survey Questions about Extreme Interrogation and Detention Techniques

Interrogation	Strongly Support (5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	Strongly Oppose (1)	No Answer	Mean	S.D.
Applying electric shocks to the suspect	8.3%	13.1%	23.6%	26.2%	26.4%	2.2%	3.40	1.40
Holding the suspect's head under water	8.6%	10.8%	22.5%	26.1%	28.9%	2.8%	3.44	1.45
Making the suspect go naked	8.7%	11.9%	25.9%	28.2%	22.1%	2.9%	3.31	1.41
Exposing the suspect to extreme heat or cold	10.2%	17.8%	27.0%	22.8%	19.1%	2.9%	3.11	1.42
Punching or kicking the suspect	6.8%	8.1%	25.8%	32.3%	24.3%	2.4%	3.49	1.34
Forcing the suspect to remain in a physically stressful position for long periods of time	13.5%	24.3%	26.0%	17.7%	15.8%	2.4%	2.88	1.40
Withholding food and water from the suspect	11.2%	21.1%	24.3%	23.7%	17.0%	2.5%	3.03	1.41
Bombarding the suspect with loud noise for long periods of time	13.3%	25.9%	27.3%	16.8%	14.0%	2.4%	2.82	1.37
Not allowing the suspect to sleep	17.3%	29.5%	25.0%	13.6%	12.0%	2.3%	2.64	1.36
Yelling at the suspect	24.4%	31.7%	27.2%	8.6%	5.4%	2.5%	2.28	1.22
Detention								
Not allowing the suspect to meet with a lawyer	8.8%	10.7%	25.9%	31.1%	21.0%	2.2%	3.36	1.35
Holding the suspect indefinitely without charge	7.6%	15.3%	26.6%	28.2%	19.7%	2.3%	3.27	1.35
Trying a suspect before a military commission instead of a criminal court	18.2%	25.5%	31.7%	11.4%	10.5%	2.4%	2.60	1.32