

POLS 318: Theories of IR

Lecture 19 (10.22.2020): Audience Costs: The Public Angle

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Overview

- 1 Quick review
- 2 Audience Costs theory
- 3 Deeper Dive
- 4 Multiple Inconsistencies
- 5 Extra Material

Review

WHAT WE COVERED LAST MEETING?

- Audience costs theory.
- The political costs of backing down from promises.
- Strategic angle - democracies and credible threats.
- Why costs? reputation, honor and credibility.
- The observation problem.
- The measures if information flow and crisis reciprocation.
- Beyond democracies - dictator have audience as well.

Questions?? Email me!

Politics in the real world

- 2020 elections and concerns over violence in the US ([Link](#))

MORE WEB SOURCES

- The *Monkey Cage* blog (Washington Post).
- War on the Rocks - military focus.
- Political violence in a glance (POV).
- Podcasts:
 - IS: Off the Page Pod
 - Terrorism 360 Podcast
 - Brookings cafeteria
 - Paul Poast Podcast - IR focus

Audience Costs

Main Challenge

- How can we 'view' audience costs?
- Strategic state behavior.
- Measures → reciprocation in conflict.
- The public - fundamental element in AC...
- Do citizens matter in IR? How?

Audience Costs

Tomz (2007)

- Test public opposition to leaders' empty threats.
- Do citizens reject inconsistent behavior by leaders?
- Evidence for microfoundations of IR behavior.
- Method: experiment (isolate causal effect - inconsistency).
- Factors:
 - 1 Regime type.
 - 2 Motivation for attack.
 - 3 Power relations with the US.
 - 4 Interests at stake.

Audience Costs - public evidence

Tomz (2007)

	<i>Public reaction to empty threat (%)</i>	<i>Public reaction to staying out (%)</i>	<i>Difference in opinion (%)</i>	<i>Summary of differences (%)</i>
<i>Disapprove</i>				
<i>Disapprove very strongly</i>	31 (27 to 35)	20 (17 to 23)	11 (6 to 17)	} 16 (10 to 22)
<i>Disapprove somewhat</i>	18 (14 to 21)	13 (10 to 16)	5 (0 to 9)	
<i>Neither</i>				
<i>Lean toward disapproving</i>	8 (6 to 11)	9 (7 to 11)	0 (-3 to 3)	} -4 (-9 to 2)
<i>Don't lean either way</i>	21 (17 to 24)	21 (18 to 24)	0 (-5 to 4)	
<i>Lean toward approving</i>	8 (6 to 11)	11 (9 to 14)	-3 (-6 to 0)	
<i>Approve</i>				
<i>Approve somewhat</i>	8 (5 to 10)	13 (11 to 16)	-6 (-9 to -2)	} -12 (-17 to -8)
<i>Approve very strongly</i>	6 (4 to 9)	13 (10 to 16)	-7 (-10 to -3)	

Audience Costs - public evidence

LEVEL OF ESCALATION

<i>Level of escalation</i>	<i>Absolute audience cost (%)</i>	<i>Relative risk of disapproval (%)</i>
<i>Threat of force</i>	16 (10 to 22)	1.5 (1.3 to 1.7)
<i>Display of force</i>	16 (10 to 22)	1.5 (1.3 to 1.7)
<i>Use without U.S. casualties</i>	23 (16 to 29)	1.7 (1.5 to 2.0)
<i>Use with U.S. casualties</i>	32 (26 to 39)	2.0 (1.7 to 2.3)

Audience Costs - public evidence

Tomz (2007)


MORE ELEMENTS

- Overall → disapproval for backing-down.
- Less criticism for 'stay-out' option.
- Stronger effect for politically engaged.


Why reject backing-down?

- 'Right thing to do'.
- Credibility, reputation.

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Audience Costs - public evidence

Levendusky and Horowitz (2012)

- Explore the situation and effects on AC.
- Focus → domestic political conditions.
- How changes the extent of audience costs?

(1) Elite reactions

- Opposition → view of resolve.
- Elites, info advantage and signal for public.
- Split vs. consensus to president's actions.

Audience Costs - public evidence

(2) Partisanship

- Political affiliation and criticism on leader.
- Security crisis as immediate threat.
- Framing by president - the national interest.

(3) Justification

- How new information changes views?
- Information to justify backing-down.
- Competent leader → reduced costs.


Audience Costs

Information and domestic politics


MAIN RESULTS:

- Effects on approval of president. ▶ Approval
- New information and elite views affect public opinion.
- Partisanship has limited effect.
- Reputation and incompetence.
- The process of AC formation.

Finding audience costs: POLS 318



Finding audience costs: POLS 318





Probing Inconsistency

More than backing-down

- Empty threat → reputation and credibility costs.
- Backing-In??

Fort Sumter April-June 1861




Compare Inconsistent actions

Back-down vs. Back-in (Levy et al. 2015)

- Consistency → foundation of AC.
- Domestic costs for failure to honor promise to 'stay-out'.
- Game setting - expand the 'stay-out' node:
 - Remain out.
 - Backing in: intervene and break promise.

Back-down and Back-in



Back-down and Back-in

Results

- Inconsistency and growing audience costs.
- New information.
- Rewarding the leader for 'backing-out'.
- Small punishment for 'backing-in'.
- Competence, reputation and credibility.

Inconsistency and the public

Kertzer and Brutger (2016)

- Extend debate on costs of inconsistency.
- Punishment for initial intervention decision.
- The 'belligerence costs' (a sunk cost).
- The two elements of audience costs.

A double barreled gun

Belligerence costs:

- Citizens oppose using force in IR.
- Fears of escalation, isolationist views.

Heterogeneous Audience

- Different views of AC elements.
- Public characteristics matter for signal of resolve.

Audience costs and public


Heterogeneous Audience

- Military assertiveness.
- International trust.
- Nationalism.
- Political ideology.

Results

- Backing down and approval ratings.
- Decompose audience costs - inconsistency (67%) and belligerence (33%).

Decompose audience costs and public



Recommended readings

More studies on audience costs:

- 1 Schwartz, Joshua A., and Christopher W. Blair. "Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining." International Organization (2020): 1-24.
- 2 Li, Xiaojun, and Dingding Chen. "Public opinion, international reputation, and audience costs in an authoritarian regime." Conflict Management and Peace Science (2018).
- 3 Weiss, Jessica Chen, and Allan Dafoe. "Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China." International Studies Quarterly 63.4 (2019): 963-973.

President Approval

