University of Strathclyde

Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering

Learning to Trade Power

by

Richard W. Lincoln

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

2010

This thesis is the result of the author's original research. It has been composed by the author and has not been previously submitted for examination which has led to the award of a degree.

The copyright of this thesis belongs to the author under the terms of the United Kingdom Copyright Acts as qualified by University of Strathclyde Regulation 3.50. Due acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this thesis.

Signed: Date: November 11, 2010

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Professor Jim McDonald for giving me the opportunity to study at The Institute for Energy and Environment and for permitting me the freedom to pursue my own research interests. I also wish to thank my supervisors, Professor Graeme Burt and Dr Stuart Galloway, for their guidance and scholarship. Most of all, I wish to thank my parents, my big brother and my little sister for all of their support throughout my PhD.

This thesis makes extensive use of open source software projects developed by researchers from other institutions. I wish to thank Dr Ray Zimmerman from Cornell University for his work on optimal power flow, researchers from the Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA) and the Technical University of Munich for their work on reinforcement learning algorithm and artificial neural network implementations and Charles Gieseler from Iowa State University for his implementation of the Roth-Erev method.

This research was funded by the United Kingdom Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council through the Supergen Highly Distributed Power Systems consortium under grant GR/T28836/01.

Abstract

In electrical power engineering, learning algorithms can be used to model the strategies of electricity market participants. The objective of this thesis is to establish if *policy gradient* reinforcement learning algorithms can be used to create participant models superior to those involving previously applied *value function* based methods.

Supply of electricity involves technology, money, people, natural resources and the environment. All of these aspects are changing and electricity market designs must be suitably researched to ensure that they are fit for purpose. In this thesis electricity markets are modelled as non-linear constrained optimisation problems, which are solved using a primal-dual interior point method. Policy gradient reinforcement learning algorithms are used to adjust the parameters of multi-layer feed-forward artificial neural networks that approximate each market participant's policy for selecting power quantities and prices that are offered in the simulated marketplace.

Traditional reinforcement learning methods, that learn a value function, have been previously applied in simulated electricity trade, but they are mostly restricted to use with discrete representations of a market environment. Policy gradient methods have been proven to offer convergence guarantees in continuous environments and avoid many of the problems that mar value function based methods.

Five types of learning algorithm are compared in a series of Nash equilibrium and constraint exploitation simulations. Policy gradient methods are found to be a valid option for modelling the strategies of electricity market participants, but they are outperformed by a traditional action-value function algorithm in all of the tests. Further development of this research could provide opportunities for advanced learning algorithms to be used in descision support and automated energy trade applications.

Contents

A	Abstract								
$\mathbf{L}\mathbf{i}$	List of Figures ix								
Li	st of	Tables	x						
1	Intr	roduction	1						
	1.1	Research Motivation	1						
	1.2	Problem Statement	2						
	1.3	Research Contributions	3						
	1.4	Thesis Outline	4						
2	Bac	kground	5						
	2.1	Electric Power Supply	5						
	2.2	Electricity Markets	7						
		2.2.1 The England and Wales Electricity Pool	9						
		2.2.2 British Electricity Transmission and Trading Arrangements	11						
	2.3	Electricity Market Simulation	12						
		2.3.1 Agent-Based Simulation	12						
		2.3.2 Optimal Power Flow	13						
	2.4	Reinforcement Learning	19						
		2.4.1 Value Function Methods	20						
		2.4.2 Policy Gradient Methods	23						
		2.4.3 Roth-Erev Method	25						
	2.5	Summary	27						
3	Rel	ated Work	29						
	3.1	Custom Learning Methods	29						
		3.1.1 Market Power	29						
		3.1.2 Financial Transmission Rights	34						
	3.2	Simulations Applying Q-learning	34						
		3.2.1 Nash Equilibrium Convergence	34						
		3.2.2 Congestion Management Techniques	36						
		3.2.3 Gas-Electricity Market Integration	36						
		3.2.4 Electricity-Emissions Market Interactions	37						
		3.2.5 Tacit Collusion	38						
	3.3	Simulations Applying Roth-Erev	38						

		3.3.1 Market Power	39										
		3.3.2 Italian Wholesale Electricity Market	40										
			42										
		3.3.4 Two-Settlement Markets	43										
	3.4	Policy Gradient Reinforcement Learning	44										
		3.4.1 Financial Decision Making	45										
			46										
	3.5		47										
4	Mod	delling Power Trade	48										
_	4.1	6	$\frac{10}{48}$										
	1.1		49										
		-	50										
	4.2		51										
	4.2		51										
			$51 \\ 54$										
		8	$\frac{54}{55}$										
		1 0											
	4.0	1	56										
	4.3	Summary	57										
5	Nas	Vash Equilibrium Analysis											
	5.1		61										
	5.2	3	62										
	5.3	Method of Simulation	62										
	5.4	Simulation Results	65										
	5.5	Discussion and Critical Analysis	66										
	5.6	Summary	71										
6	Syst	tem Constraint Exploitation	72										
	6.1	•	72										
	6.2		72										
	-	3	73										
	6.4		.s 78										
	6.5		82										
	6.6	v	83										
7	C	alassiana and Thurthan Wants	0 =										
7			85										
	7.1	y .	85										
	7.2		86										
		v v	87										
		8 0	87										
		V	88										
		1	88										
		7.2.5 Multi-Market Simulation	90										
Bi	bliog	graphy	91										

\mathbf{A}	Ope	n Source	Electr	ic F	Power	· Eng	gineerin	ıg	\mathbf{So}	ftware	;	99
	A.1	MATPOV	VER .									 99
	A.2	MATDYN	Ι									 102
	A.3	PSAT .										 102
	A.4	UWPFLC	W									 105
	A.5	TEFTS										 105
	A.6	VST										 106
	A.7	${\bf OpenDSS}$										 106
	A.8	GridLAB-	D									 107
	A.9	AMES .										 108
	A.10	DCOPFJ										 108
	A.11	PYLON										 108
В	Case	e Data										111
	B.1	6-Bus Cas	se									 111
	B.2	IEEE Reli	ability	Test	t Syste	em						 112

List of Figures

2.1	Basic structure of a three phase AC power system
2.2	UK power station locations
2.3	Pool bid structure
2.4	Nominal- π medium length transmission line model in series with
	a phase shifting, tap changing transformer model
2.5	Sequence diagram for the basic reinforcement learning model 20
2.6	Multi-layer feed-forward perceptron with bias nodes
3.1	Single-line diagram for a stylised Italian grid model
4.1	Piecewise linear active power cost function with constrained cost
	variable minims ation illustrated
4.2	Agent environment UML class diagram
4.3	Learning agent UML class diagram
4.4	Market experiment UML class diagram
4.5	Action selection sequence diagram
4.6	Sequence diagram for the reward process
4.7	Learning sequence diagram
5.1	Single-line diagram for six bus power system model 65
5.2	Average markup and standard deviation for Agent 1 under cost
F 9	configuration 1
5.3	Average markup and standard deviation for Agent 2 under cost configuration 1
5.4	Average markup and standard deviation for Agent 1 under cost
0.4	configuration 2
5.5	Average reward and standard deviation for Agent 1 under cost
0.0	configuration 2
6.1	Generator cost functions for the IEEE Reliability Test System 78
6.2	Hourly, daily and weekly load profile plots from the IEEE Relia-
0.2	bility Test System
6.3	IEEE Reliability Test System
6.4	Average rewards for Agent 1 and Agent 4, comparing the modified
J. 1	and Stateful Roth-Erev methods
6.5	Average rewards for Agent 1 under two state configurations 79
6.6	Average rewards for Agent 4 under two state configurations 80

6.7	Average rewards for Agent 1 and Agent 4 with two offers submitted per generator	81
7.1	UK transmission system	89
A.1	UKGDS EHV3 model in PSAT Simulink network editor	104

List of Tables

4.1	Example discrete action domain
5.1	Generator cost configuration 1
5.2	Generator cost configuration 2
5.3	Agent rewards under cost configuration 1
5.4	Agent rewards under cost configuration 2
6.1	Generator types and cost parameters for the simplified IEEE Re-
	liability Test System
6.2	Agent portfolios
A.1	Open source electric power engineering software feature matrix 100
B.1	6-bus case bus data
B.2	6-bus case generator data
B.3	6-bus case branch data
B.4	IEEE RTS bus data
B.5	IEEE RTS generator data
B.6	IEEE RTS branch data

Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis examines reinforcement learning algorithms in the domain of electric power trade. In this chapter the motivation for research into electricity trade is explained, the problem under consideration is defined and the principle research contributions are stated.

1.1 Research Motivation

Quality of life for a person is directly proportional to his or her electricity usage (Alam, Bala, Huo, & Matin, 1991). The world population is currently 6.7 billion and forecast to exceed 9 billion by 2050 (United Nations, 2003). Electricity production currently demands over one third of the annual primary energy extracted (The International Energy Agency, 2010) and as people endeavour to improve their quality of life, finite fuel resources will become increasingly scarce. Market mechanisms, such as auctions, where the final allocation is based upon the claimants' willingness to pay for the goods, provide a device for efficient allocation of resources in short supply.

Commercialisation of large electricity supply industries began two decades ago in the UK. The inability to store electricity, once generated, in a commercially viable quantity prevents trade as a conventional commodity. Trading mechanisms must allow shortfalls in electric energy to be purchased at short notice from quickly dispatchable generators. Designed correctly, a competitive electricity market promotes efficiency and drives down costs to the consumer, while design errors can allow market power abuse and elevated market prices.

The average total demand for electricity in the United Kingdom (UK) is approximately 45GW and the cost of buying 1MW for one hour is around £40 (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009). This equates to yearly trans-

action values of £16 billion. The value of electricity to society is particularly apparent when supply fails. The New York black-out in August 2003 involved a loss of 61.8GW of power supply to approximately 50 million consumers. The majority of supplies were restored within two days, but the event is estimated to have cost more than \$6 billion (Minkel, 2008; ICF Consulting, 2003).

The value of electricity to society makes it impractical to experiment with radical changes to trading arrangements on real systems. An alternative is to study abstract mathematical models with sets of simplifying approximations and assumptions and, where possible, to find analytical solutions using digital computer programs. Competition is a fundamental part of all markets, but the strategies of human participants are difficult to model. Reinforcement learning methods can be used to represent adaptive behaviour in competing players and are capable of learning complex strategies (Tesauro, 1994).

1.2 Problem Statement

Individuals participating in an electricity market (be they representing generating companies, load serving entities, firms of traders etc.) must utilise noisy, mostly continuous, multi-dimensional data to their advantage. Certain types of data, e.g. demand forecasts, are uncertain and other types, e.g. the bids of competitors, are hidden. Reinforcement learning algorithms must operate with data of this kind if they are to successfully model participant strategies.

Traditional reinforcement learning methods attempt to find the *value* of each available action in a given state. When discrete state and action spaces are defined, these methods become restricted by Bellman's Curse of Dimensionality (Bellman, 1961) and can not be applied to highly complex problems. When used with function approximation techniques (e.g. artificial neural networks) they can be applied to continuous representations of an environment. However, the greedy updates used by most techniques have been shown to cause algorithms approximating a value function to not converge or even diverge (Tsitsiklis & Roy, 1994; Peters & Schaal, 2008; Gordon, 1995; Baird, 1995).

Policy gradient reinforcement learning methods do not attempt to approximate a value function, but to approximate a *policy-function* that, given the current perceived state of the environment, returns an action. They do not suffer from many of the problems that mar value-function based methods in high-dimensional problems. They have strong convergence properties, do not require that all states be continuously visited and work with state and action spaces that

are continuous, discrete or mixed. Policy performance may be degraded by uncertainty in state data, but the learning methods do not need to be altered. They have been successfully applied in many operational settings, including: robotic control (Peters & Schaal, 2006), financial trading (Moody & Saffell, 2001) and network routing (Peshkin & Savova, 2002) applications.

It is proposed in this thesis that agents which learn using policy gradient methods may outperform those using value function based methods in simulated competitive electricity trade. It is further proposed that policy gradient methods may operate better under dynamic electric power system conditions, achieving greater profit by exploiting constraints to their financial benefit. This thesis will use electricity market simulation techniques to compare value function based and policy gradient learning methods to explore these proposals.

1.3 Research Contributions

The research presented in this thesis pertains to the academic fields of Electric Power Engineering, Artificial Intelligence and Economics. The principle contributions made by this thesis are:

- The first application of policy gradient reinforcement learning methods in simulated electricity trade.
- The first application of a non-linear optimal power flow formulation in agent based electricity market simulation.
- A new Stateful Roth-Erev reinforcement learning method.
- Simulation results comparing the convergence to a Nash equilibrium of policy gradient and value function based reinforcement learning methods.
- Simulation results that examine the exploitation of electric power system constraints by policy gradient reinforcement learning methods.
- An implementation of a power exchange auctions market model and multilearning-agent system for simulating electricity trade.
- The idea of applying Neuro-Fitted Q-Iteration and $GQ(\lambda)$ in simulations of competitive energy trade.
- A model of the UK transmission system derived from data in the National Grid Seven Year Statement.

The publications that have resulted from this thesis are: Lincoln, Galloway, and Burt (2009, 2007); Lincoln, Galloway, Burt, and McDonald (2006).

1.4 Thesis Outline

The presentation of this thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 2 provides background information on electricity supply, wholesale electricity markets and reinforcement learning. It describes how optimal power flow formulations can be used to model electricity markets and defines the reinforcement learning algorithms that are later compared.

In Chapter 3 the research in this thesis is described in the context of previous work that is related in terms of application field and methodology. Publications on agent based electricity market simulation are reviewed with emphasis on the reinforcement learning methods used. Previous applications of policy gradient learning methods in other types of market setting are reviewed also.

Chapter 4 describes the power exchange auction market model and the multiagent system used to simulate electricity trade. It defines the association of learning agents with portfolios of generators, the process of offer submission and the reward process.

Simulations that examine the convergence to a Nash equilibrium of systems of multiple electric power trading agents is reported in Chapter 5. A six bus test case is used and results for four learning algorithms under two cost configurations are presented and analysed.

Chapter 6 examines the ability of agents to learn policies for exploiting constraints in simulated power systems. The 24 bus model from the IEEE Reliability Test System provides a complex environment with dynamic loading conditions.

The primary conclusions drawn from the results in this thesis are summarised in Chapter 7. Shortcomings of the approach are noted and the broader implications are addressed. Some ideas for further work are also outlined, including alternative reinforcement learning methods and uses for a model of the UK transmission system.

Bibliography

- Alam, M. S., Bala, B. K., Huo, A. M. Z., & Matin, M. A. (1991). A model for the quality of life as a function of electrical energy consumption. <u>Energy</u>, 16(4), 739-745.
- Aleksandrov, V., Sysoyev, V., & Shemeneva, V. (1968). Stochastic optimization. Engineering Cybernetics, 5, 11-16.
- Amerongen, R. van. (1989, May). A general-purpose version of the fast decoupled load flow. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 4(2), 760-770.
- Application of Probability Methods Subcommittee. (1979, November). IEEE reliability test system. Power Apparatus and Systems, IEEE Transactions on, PAS-98(6), 2047-2054.
- Auer, P., Cesa-Bianchi, N., Freund, Y., & Schapire, R. E. (2003). The non-stochastic multiarmed bandit problem. <u>SIAM Journal of Computing</u>, <u>32</u>(1), 48-77.
- Baird, L. (1995). Residual algorithms: Reinforcement learning with function approximation. In <u>Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Machine Learning (p. 30-37)</u>. Morgan Kaufmann.
- Bellman, R. E. (1961). Adaptive control processes A guided tour. Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press.
- Bertsekas, D. P., & Tsitsiklis, J. N. (1996). <u>Neuro-dynamic programming.</u> Belmont, MA: Athena Scientific.
- Bhatnagar, S., Sutton, R. S., Ghavamzadeh, M., & Lee, M. (2009). Natural actor-critic algorithms. <u>Automatica</u>, <u>45</u>(11), 2471–2482.
- Bishop, C. M. (1996). <u>Neural networks for pattern recognition</u> (1st ed.). Oxford University Press, USA. Paperback.
- Bower, J., & Bunn, D. (2001, March). Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the england and wales electricity market. <u>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</u>, <u>25</u>(3-4), 561-592.
- Bower, J., Bunn, D. W., & Wattendrup, C. (2001). A model-based analysis of

- strategic consolidation in the german electricity industry. Energy Policy, 29(12), 987-1005.
- Boyd, S., & Vandenberghe, L. (2004). <u>Convex optimization</u>. Cambridge University Press. Hardcover.
- Bunn, D., & Martoccia, M. (2005). Unilateral and collusive market power in the electricity pool of England and Wales. Energy Economics.
- Bunn, D. W., & Oliveira, F. S. (2003). Evaluating individual market power in electricity markets via agent-based simulation. <u>Annals of Operations</u> Research, 57-77.
- Carpentier, J. (1962, August). Contribution à l'étude du Dispatching Economique. Bulletin de la Society Française Electriciens, 3(8), 431-447.
- Cole, S. (2010, February 4). MatDyn [Computer software manual]. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Department of Energy and Climate Change. (2009). Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2009. In (chap. 5). National Statistics Crown.
- Erev, I., & Roth, A. E. (1998). Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. <u>The</u> American Economic Review, 88(4), 848-881.
- Ernst, D., Minoia, A., & Ilic, M. (2004, June). Market dynamics driven by the decision-making of both power producers and transmission owners. In Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2004. IEEE (p. 255-260).
- Fausett, L. (Ed.). (1994). <u>Fundamentals of neural networks: architectures, algorithms, and applications</u>. Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Gieseler, C. (2005). A Java reinforcement learning module for the Repast toolkit:

 Facilitating study and implementation with reinforcement learning in social science multi-agent simulations. Unpublished master's thesis, Department of Computer Science, Iowa State University.
- Glimn, A. F., & Stagg, G. W. (1957, April). Automatic calculation of load flows.

 Power Apparatus and Systems, Part III. Transactions of the American
 Institute of Electrical Engineers, 76(3), 817-825.
- Glynn, P. W. (1987). Likelilood ratio gradient estimation: an overview. In <u>WSC</u>

 '87: Proceedings of the 19th conference on winter simulation (p. 366-375).

 New York, NY, USA: ACM.
- Goldfarb, D., & Idnani, A. (1983). A numerically stable dual method for solving strictly convex quadratic programs. Mathematical Programming, 27, 1-33.
- Gordon, G. (1995). Stable function approximation in dynamic programming. In

- Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Machine Learning (p. 261-268). Morgan Kaufmann.
- Grainger, J., & Stevenson, W. (1994). <u>Power system analysis</u>. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Guo, M., Liu, Y., & Malec, J. (2004, October). A new Q-learning algorithm based on the metropolis criterion. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on, 34(5), 2140-2143.
- ICF Consulting. (2003, August). The economic cost of the blackout: An issue paper on the northeastern blackout. (Unpublished)
- IEEE Working Group. (1973, November). Common format for exchange of solved load flow data. Power Apparatus and Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 92(6), 1916-1925.
- Kallrath, J., Pardalos, P., Rebennack, S., & Scheidt, M. (2009). Optimization in the energy industry. Springer.
- Kienzle, F., Krause, T., Egli, K., Geidl, M., & Andersson, G. (2007, September). Analysis of strategic behaviour in combined electricity and gas markets using agent-based computational economics. In <u>1st European workshop on energy market modelling using agent-based computational economics</u> (p. 121-141). Karlsruhe, Germany.
- Kietzmann, T. C., & Riedmiller, M. (2009). The neuro slot car racer: Reinforcement learning in a real world setting. <u>Machine Learning and Applications</u>, Fourth International Conference on, 0, 311-316.
- Kirschen, D. S., & Strbac, G. (2004). <u>Fundamentals of power system economics</u>. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Krause, T., & Andersson, G. (2006). Evaluating congestion management schemes in liberalized electricity markets using an agent-based simulator. In <u>Power Engineering Society General Meeting</u>, 2006. IEEE.
- Krause, T., Andersson, G., Ernst, D., Beck, E., Cherkaoui, R., & Germond, A. (2004). Nash equilibria and reinforcement learning for active decision maker modelling in power markets. In <u>Proceedings of 6th IAEE European</u> Conference 2004, modelling in energy economics and policy.
- Krause, T., Beck, E. V., Cherkaoui, R., Germond, A., Andersson, G., & Ernst, D. (2006). A comparison of Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for power markets. <u>International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy</u> Systems, 28(9), 599-607.
- Li, H., & Tesfatsion, L. (2009a, July). The ames wholesale power market test bed: A computational laboratory for research, teaching, and training. In

- IEEE Proceedings, Power and Energy Society General Meeting. Alberta, Canada.
- Li, H., & Tesfatsion, L. (2009b, March). Capacity withholding in restructured wholesale power markets: An agent-based test bed study. In <u>Power systems</u> conference and exposition, 2009 (p. 1-11).
- Lincoln, R., Galloway, S., & Burt, G. (2007, May 23-25). Unit commitment and system stability under increased penetration of distributed generation. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the European Energy Market, 2007. EEM 2007. Cracow, Poland.
- Lincoln, R., Galloway, S., & Burt, G. (2009, May). Open source, agent-based energy market simulation with Python. In <u>Proceedings of the 6th International</u> Conference on the European Energy Market, 2009. EEM 2009. (p. 1-5).
- Lincoln, R., Galloway, S., Burt, G., & McDonald, J. (2006, 6-8). Agent-based simulation of short-term energy markets for highly distributed power systems. In Proceedings of the 41st International Universities Power Engineering Conference, 2006. UPEC '06. (Vol. 1, p. 198-202).
- Maei, H. R., & Sutton, R. S. (2010). $Gq(\lambda)$: A general gradient algorithm for temporal-difference prediction learning with eligibility traces. In Proceedings of the third conference on artificial general intelligence. Lugano, Switzerland.
- McCulloch, W., & Pitts, W. (1943, December 21). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. <u>Bulletin of Mathematical Biology</u>, <u>5</u>(4), 115-133.
- Micola, A. R., Banal-Estañol, A., & Bunn, D. W. (2008, August). Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets. <u>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</u>, <u>67(2)</u>, 381-393.
- Micola, A. R., & Bunn, D. W. (2008). Crossholdings, concentration and information in capacity-constrained sealed bid-offer auctions. <u>Journal of Economic</u> Behavior & Organization, 66(3-4), 748-766.
- Minkel, J. R. (2008, August 13). The 2003 northeast blackout–five years later. Scientific American.
- Momoh, J., Adapa, R., & El-Hawary, M. (1999, Feb). A review of selected optimal power flow literature to 1993. I. Nonlinear and quadratic programming approaches. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 14(1), 96-104.
- Momoh, J., El-Hawary, M., & Adapa, R. (1999, Feb). A review of selected optimal power flow literature to 1993. II. Newton, linear programming and interior point methods. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 14(1), 105-111.

- Moody, J., & Saffell, M. (2001, July). Learning to trade via direct reinforcement. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 12(4), 875-889.
- Moody, J., Wu, L., Liao, Y., & Saffell, M. (1998). Performance functions and reinforcement learning for trading systems and protfolios. <u>Journal of</u> Forecasting, 17, 441-470.
- Naghibi-Sistani, M., Akbarzadeh-Tootoonchi, M., Javidi-D.B., M., & Rajabi-Mashhadi, H. (2006, November). Q-adjusted annealing for Q-learning of bid selection in market-based multisource power systems. Generation, Transmission and Distribution, IEE Proceedings, 153(6), 653-660.
- Nash, J. F. (1950, January). Equilibrium points in *n*-person games. <u>Proceedings</u> of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36(1), 48-49.
- Nash, J. F. (1951, September). Non-cooperative games. <u>The Annals of Mathematics</u>, <u>54(2)</u>, 286-295. Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1969529
- National Electricity Transmission System Operator. (2007, September). <u>Large</u> combustion plant directive (Tech. Rep.). National Grid Electricity Transmission plc. (GCRP 07/32)
- National Electricity Transmission System Operator. (2010, May).

 2010 National Electricity Transmission System Seven Year Statement
 (Tech. Rep.). National Grid Electricity Transmission plc.
- Nicolaisen, J., Petrov, V., & Tesfatsion, L. (2002, August). Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing. Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on, 5(5), 504-523.
- Nicolaisen, J., Smith, M., Petrov, V., & Tesfatsion, L. (2000). Concentration and capacity effects on electricity market power. In <u>Evolutionary Computation</u>. Proceedings of the 2000 Congress on (Vol. 2, p. 1041-1047).
- Overbye, T., Cheng, X., & Sun, Y. (2004, Jan.). A comparison of the AC and DC power flow models for LMP calculations. In <u>System sciences</u>, 2004. Proceedings of the 37th annual Hawaii international conference on (p. 9-).
- Peshkin, L., & Savova, V. (2002). Reinforcement learning for adaptive routing. In Neural Networks, 2002. IJCNN 2002. Proceedings of the 2002 International Joint Conference on (Vol. 2, p. 1825-1830).
- Peters, J. (2010). <u>Policy gradient methods.</u> (Available online: www.scholarpedia.org)
- Peters, J., & Schaal, S. (2006, October). Policy gradient methods for robotics. In

- Intelligent Robots and Systems, 2006 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on (p. 2219-2225).
- Peters, J., & Schaal, S. (2008). Natural actor-critic. <u>Neurocomputing</u>, <u>71</u>(7-9), 1180-1190.
- Rastegar, M. A., Guerci, E., & Cincotti, S. (2009, May). Agent-based model of the Italian wholesale electricity market. In <u>Energy Market</u>, 2009. 6th International Conference on the European (p. 1-7).
- Riedmiller, M. (2005). Neural fitted Q iteration first experiences with a data efficient neural reinforcement learning method. In <u>In 16th European conference</u> on machine learning (pp. 317–328). Springer.
- Riedmiller, M., & Braun, H. (1993). <u>A direct adaptive method for faster backpropagation learning</u>: the rprop algorithm.
- Robbins, H. (1952). Some aspects of the sequential design of experiments. <u>Bulletin</u> American Mathematical Society, 58(5), 527-535.
- Roth, A. E., Erev, I., Fudenberg, D., Kagel, J., Emilie, J., & Xing, R. X. (1995). Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8(1), 164-212.
- Schaul, T., Bayer, J., Wierstra, D., Sun, Y., Felder, M., Sehnke, F., et al. (2010). PyBrain. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 11, 743-746.
- Schweppe, F., Caramanis, M., Tabors, R., & Bohn, R. (1988). <u>Spot pricing of</u> electricity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group.
- Sharpe, W. F. (1966, January). Mutual fund performance. <u>Journal of Business</u>, 119-138.
- Sharpe, W. F. (1994). The Sharpe ratio. <u>The Journal of Portfolio Management</u>, 49-58.
- Stott, B., & Alsac, O. (1974, May). Fast decoupled load flow. <u>Power Apparatus</u> and Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 93(3), 859-869.
- Sun, J., & Tesfatsion, L. (2007a). Dynamic testing of wholesale power market designs: An open-source agent-based framework. <u>Computational Economics</u>, 30(3), 291-327.
- Sun, J., & Tesfatsion, L. (2007b, June). Open-source software for power industry research, teaching, and training: A DC-OPF illustration. In <u>Power Engineering Society General Meeting</u>, 2007. IEEE (p. 1-6).
- Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). <u>Reinforcement learning: An introduction</u>. MIT Press. Gebundene Ausgabe.
- Sutton, R. S., McAllester, D., Singh, S., & Mansour, Y. (2000). Policy gra-

- dient methods for reinforcement learning with function approximation. In Advances in neural information processing systems (Vol. 12, p. 1057-1063).
- Tellidou, A., & Bakirtzis, A. (2007, November). Agent-based analysis of capacity withholding and tacit collusion in electricity markets. <u>Power Systems, IEEE</u> Transactions on, 22(4), 1735-1742.
- Tesauro, G. (1994). TD-Gammon, a self-teaching backgammon program, achieves master-level play. Neural Computation, 6(2), 215-219.
- Tesfatsion, L., & Judd, K. L. (2006). <u>Handbook of computational economics</u>, volume 2: Agent-based computational economics (handbook of <u>computational economics</u>). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland Publishing Co.
- The International Energy Agency. (2010, September). <u>Key world energy</u> statistics 2010. Paris.
- Tinney, W., & Hart, C. (1967, November). Power flow solution by Newton's method. <u>Power Apparatus and Systems, IEEE Transactions on</u>, <u>86</u>(11), 1449-1460.
- Tsitsiklis, J. N., & Roy, B. V. (1994). Feature-based methods for large scale dynamic programming. In Machine learning (p. 59-94).
- United Nations. (2003, December 9). World population in 2300. In <u>Proceedings</u> of the United Nations, Expert Meeting on World Population in 2300.
- U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force. (2004, April). Final report on the august 14, 2003 blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and recommendations (Tech. Rep.). North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
- Veit, D., Weidlich, A., Yao, J., & Oren, S. (2006). Simulating the dynamics in twosettlement electricity markets via an agent-based approach. <u>International</u> Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, 1(2), 83-97.
- Vengerov, D. (2008). A gradient-based reinforcement learning approach to dynamic pricing in partially-observable environments. <u>Future Generation</u> Computer Systems, 24(7), 687-693.
- Visudhiphan, P. (2003). An agent-based approach to modeling electricity spot markets. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Visudhiphan, P., & Ilic, M. (1999, February). Dynamic games-based modeling of electricity markets. In <u>Power Engineering Society 1999 Winter Meeting</u>, IEEE (Vol. 1, p. 274-281).
- Wang, H., Murillo-Sanchez, C., Zimmerman, R., & Thomas, R. (2007, Aug.). On

- computational issues of market-based optimal power flow. <u>Power Systems</u>, IEEE Transactions on, 22(3), 1185-1193.
- Wang, J., Koritarov, V., & Kim, J.-H. (2009, July). An agent-based approach to modeling interactions between emission market and electricity market. In Power Energy Society General Meeting, 2009. PES 2009. IEEE (p. 1-8).
- Weidlich, A., & Veit, D. (2006, July 7-10). Bidding in interrelated day-ahead electricity markets insights from an agent-based simulation model. In Proceedings of the 29th IAEE International Conference.
- Weidlich, A., & Veit, D. (2008, July). A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models. Energy Economics, 30(4), 1728-1759.
- WG 31.04. (1983). Electric power transmission at voltages of 1000 kV and above plans for future AC and DC transmission. Electra. (ELT_091_3)
- Williams, R. J. (1992). Simple statistical gradient-following algorithms for connectionist reinforcement learning. In Machine learning (p. 229-256).
- Wood, A. J., & Wollenberg, B. F. (1996). <u>Power Generation Operation and Control</u> (second ed.). New York: Wiley, New York.
- Yao, J., Adler, I., & Oren, S. S. (2008). Modeling and computing two-settlement oligopolistic equilibrium in a congested electricity network. Operations Research, 56(1), 34-47.
- Yao, J., Oren, S. S., & Adler, I. (2007). Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and cournot generation firms. <u>European Journal of Operational</u> Research, 181(3), 1279-1296.
- Zimmerman, R. (2010, March 19). MATPOWER 4.0b2 User's Manual [Computer software manual]. School of Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853.
- Zimmerman, R., Murillo-Sánchez, C., & Thomas, R. J. (2009, July). MAT-POWER's extensible optimal power flow architecture. In <u>IEEE PES</u> General Meeting. Calgary, Alberta, Canada.