


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ARISTOTLE
THE "ART" OF RHETORIC

Aristotle. Rhetorica
ARISTOTLE

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

THE "ART" OF RHETORIC

BY

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


Fig. 1. Effect of the number of individuals (N) and the number of sites (S) on the mean time to extinction (in years) for different parameter values. The parameters varied are the initial density of individuals (ρ_0), the probability of dispersal (p), the probability of survival (q) and the probability of reproduction (r). The mean time to extinction is plotted on a logarithmic scale.

INTRODUCTION

The beginnings of rhetoric—the Homeric poems—Themistocles and Pericles—the influence of the Sophists—Sicily the birthplace of rhetoric as an art—the *Western or Sicilian school* (Corax—Tisias—Gorgias—Agathon—Polus—Licynius—Evenus—Alcidamas—Lycophron—Polycrates—Callippus—Pamphilus)—Thrasymachus—the *Eastern or Ionic school* (Protagoras—Prodicus—Hippias—Theodorus—Theodectes)—decay of rhetoric—Demetrius of Phalerum—treatment of rhetoric in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*—other rhetorical works by Aristotle—date of the *Rhetoric*—Aristotle and Demosthenes—Aristotle and Isocrates—the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*—text of the *Rhetoric*.

RHETORIC, in the general sense of the use of language in such a manner as to impress the hearers and influence them for or against a certain course of action, is as old as language itself and the beginnings of social and political life. It was practised and highly esteemed among the Greeks from the earliest times. The reputation of Odysseus and Nestor as speakers, the reply of Achilles to the embassy entreating him to take the field again, the trial-scene represented on the shield of Achilles, bear witness to this, and justify the opinion of the ancient Greeks that Homer was the real father of oratory. After the age of Homer and Hesiod and the establishment of democratic institutions, the development of industry and commerce and the gradually increasing naval power of

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Athens compelled statesmen to become orators. Themistocles and Pericles were the foremost statesmen of their time. The former, although not specially distinguished for eloquence, was regarded as a most capable speaker ; the latter was a great orator. It is much to be regretted that none of his speeches has survived ; but some idea of their lofty patriotism may be gained from those put into his mouth by Thucydides, while the genuine fragments, several of which have been preserved in Aristotle, are characterized by impressive vividness.

The next step in the development of Greek prose and Rhetoric must be set down to the credit of the Sophists. Whatever opinion may be held, from a moral standpoint, of the teaching of these much-discussed professors of wisdom and of its effects on the national life and character, it is generally conceded that they have a claim to be considered the founders of an artificial prose style, which ultimately led to the highly-finished diction of Plato and Demosthenes. It is usual to make a distinction between eastern (Ionic) and western (Sicilian) sophistical rhetoric, the representatives of the former paying attention chiefly to accuracy (*ἀρθοέπεια*), those of the latter to beauty (*εὐέπεια*), of style.

The birthplace of Rhetoric as an art was the island of Sicily. According to Cicero,^a Aristotle, no doubt in his lost history of the literature of the subject (*Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν*), gives the following account of its origin. After the expulsion of the “tyrants” (467 b.c.), a number of civil processes were insti-

^a Cicero, *Brutus*, xii. 46.

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tuted by citizens, who had been previously banished and then returned from exile, for the recovery of property belonging to them which had been illegally confiscated by the tyrants. This made it necessary for the claimants to obtain assistance from others, and the Sicilians, "an acute people and born controversialists," supplied the want in the persons of Corax and Tisias (both of Syracuse), who drew up a system which could be imparted by instruction, and a set of rules dealing with such questions as were likely to arise. These two may therefore claim to have been the founders of technical Rhetoric, although Aristotle, in an early lost work called the *Sophist*, gives the credit to the philosopher Empedocles, whose pupil Gorgias is said to have been.

CORAX^a was the author of the first of the numerous "Arts" (*τέχναι*, handbooks of Rhetoric), and to him is attributed the definition of it as "the artificer of persuasion" (*πειθοῦς δημιουργός*). The speech was divided into three parts—exordium (*προοίμιον*), arguments constructive and refutative (*ἀγῶνες*), and epilogue (*ἐπίλογος*), or into five, with the addition of narrative (*διήγησις*), which followed the exordium, and *παρεκβάσεις*.^b It may be assumed that he also wrote speeches^c for his clients to learn and deliver in the courts, as it was no doubt the rule in

^a The sophists and rhetoricians here mentioned are limited (with the exception of Demetrius of Phalerum) to those whose names actually occur in the *Rhetic*.

^b Apparently not to be understood in the more usual senses of "perversions" (of forms of government), or "digressions" (in a book or speech), but in that of "auxiliaries," subsidiary aids to the speech (*πρὸς ἐπικουρίαν τῶν λεγομένων*, quoted in Stephanus, *Thesaurus*, from the Prolegomena to Hermogenes).

^c Such writers were called "logographers" (see ii. 11. 7).

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Syracuse, as at Athens, that the litigant should at least create the impression that he was conducting his own case.

His pupil TISIAS, also the author of an "Art," is said to have been the tutor of Gorgias, Lysias, and Isocrates, and to have accompanied the first-named on his embassy to Athens. He laid even greater stress than his master on the argument from probability (*εἰκός*) which he regarded as more valuable than truth ^a.

GORGIAS of Leontini (c. 483–375 B.C.) first attracted the attention of Greece proper when he visited Athens as an ambassador (427 B.C.) from his native place, with the object of obtaining assistance against Syracuse. His view of rhetoric was that it was only a means of persuasion, and he was careful to explain that his only object was to make his pupils skilful rhetoricians, able to speak on every subject, either for or against, and not, like certain other sophists, to teach them virtue or wisdom. This made him pay greater attention to the style than to the subject matter of his discourses. In addition to fragments of these, from which there are several quotations preserved in the *Rhetoric*, two extant orations (*Encomium of Helen* and *Defence of Palamedes*) are now generally considered to be his. An "Art" of Rhetoric has also been assigned to him. Regarded as the creator of artificial Greek prose, his writings were distinguished by flowery ornamentation, poetical colouring, unusual phraseology (as shown in the use of rare, compound, and poetical words), and many

^a On the relation of a fragment in Doric (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, iii. p. 27) to the *τέχναι* of Corax and Tisias see W. R. Roberts in *Classical Review*, Feb. 1904.

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new rhetorical figures, for the employment of which the contemptuous term “to gorgiaze” was invented. He further introduced an artificial and symmetrical structure of sentences and periods, which gave the impression of metre. According to Diodorus Siculus (xii. 53), the Athenians were astounded at his uncommon style, his use of antitheses, his evenly balanced clauses of equal length, and the similarity of the (beginnings or) endings of words. Gomperz^a remarks that the English counterpart of the style of Gorgias is euphuism. In the Platonic dialogue, in the first part of which Gorgias takes a prominent part, it is noticeable that he is treated more leniently than might have been expected, considering Plato’s opinion of rhetoric as taught and practised by him and his successors.

AGATHON (c. 447–401 b.c.), an Athenian, was by profession a tragedian. His beauty and affected manners made him the butt of the comic poets.^b A pupil of Gorgias, he imitated the flowery language, antitheses, and parallelisms of his master, and was fond of using the rhetorical figure antonomasia, the use of an epithet or patronymic instead of the name of a person. His first victory with a tragedy at the Lenaea is celebrated in the Platonic dialogue *Symposium*, in which he is one of the interlocutors.

POLUS, of Agrigentum, the favourite pupil of Gorgias, is one of the interlocutors in the Platonic *Gorgias*. In this he is attacked by Socrates, and the special attention paid by him to the ornamentation of his speeches and his affected style are severely criticized. He was the author of an “Art,” of

^a *Greek Thinkers*, i. 478 (Eng. tr.).

^b Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusae*, 100.

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which some fragments are preserved in Plato and Aristotle.

LICYMNIUS, pupil of Gorgias and a dithyrambic poet, was the author of an “Art.” He invented a number of unnecessary technical terms,^a and classified nouns under the heads of the proper, compound, synonymous or quasi-synonymous, and single words or periphrases intended to take the place of nouns (*κύρια, σύνθετα, ἀδελφά, ἐπίθετα*). By some he is considered to be a different person from the dithyrambic poet.

EVENUS, of Paros, elegiac poet and sophist, contemporary of Socrates, wrote an “Art” and rhetorical rules or examples in verse.^b

ALCIDAMAS, of Elaea in Aeolis in Asia Minor, was the pupil and successor of Gorgias, the chief and last representative of his rhetorical school. A rival and opponent of Isocrates, against whom his treatise *On the Sophists* (now generally accepted as genuine), is directed, he lays stress upon the superiority of extempore speeches to those written out. His writings are characterized by a bombastic style, excessive use of poetical epithets and phrases, and far-fetched metaphors. They are drawn upon in the *Rhetoric* (iii. 3. 1) to illustrate the “frigid” or insipid style.

Another critic^c describes his style as rather coarse and commonplace (*κοινότερον*). He was also the author of an “Art” and of a show-speech *Messeniacus*,^d a reply to the *Archidamus* of Isocrates.

LYCOPHRON, pupil of Gorgias, and, like Aleidamas, condemned in the *Rhetoric* for the frigidity of his style.

^a *Rhetic*, iii. 12. 2; Plato, *Phaedrus*, 267 c.

^b *Phaedrus*, 267 b.

^c Dion. Halic., *De Isaeo*, xix. (v.l. *κενότερον*, “emptier”).

^d *Rhetic*, i. 13. 2.

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He appears to have specially affected the use of periphrases. He declared that the accident of noble birth was utterly valueless, and described law as merely a compact, "a mutual guarantee among men that justice will be preserved."^a

POLYCRATES, of Athens, sophist and rhetorician, contemporary of Isocrates, whose displeasure he incurred by his *Defence of Busiris* and *Accusation of Socrates*. The former is criticized by Isocrates in his *Busiris* and its defects pointed out. A *Panegyric on Helen*, formerly attributed to Gorgias, is by some considered the work of Polycrates. He also wrote eulogies on such trifling subjects as mice (*Rhetoric*, ii. 24. 6), pots, salt, pebbles. He appears to have at one time enjoyed a certain reputation as an orator, but Dionysius of Halicarnassus severely censures his style, describing him as "empty in things that matter, frigid and vulgar in epideictic oratory, and without charm where it is needed."^b

Of CALLIPPUS and PAMPHILUS, each the writer of an "Art," nothing more seems to be known than the reference to them in the *Rhetoric*.^c They are said to have paid special attention to skill in drawing conclusions.

THRASYMACHUS, of Chalcedon (c. 457–400 b.c.), sophist and rhetorician, was regarded as the inventor of the "mixed" style of oratory, half-way between the varied and artificially-wrought style of Antiphon and Thucydides and the plain and simple style of Lysias. Its excellence consisted in condensing the ideas and expressing them tersely, which was especially necessary in genuine rhetorical contests. Although he rounded off his sentences in periods,

^a *Politics*, iii. 9. 8.

^b *De Isaeo*, 20.

^c ii. 23. 21.

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marked by a paeanic rhythm ^a at the beginning and the end, he by no means favoured the reduction of prose to rhythmical verse. He was the first to direct attention to the importance of delivery (*ὑπόκρισις*). In addition to an “Art,” and a work on common-places (*ἀφορμαί*, starting-points; or, resources), he wrote “Compassion speeches,”^b intended to excite the emotions of the hearers, a method of persuasion to which he attached great importance.

The rhetoricians mentioned above, with the exception of Thrasymachus, may be regarded as representatives of the Sicilian or western school. A brief account may here be given of the best known sophists (the name by which they distinguished themselves from the mere rhetorician) belonging to Greece proper and the eastern colonies.

V PROTAGORAS (c. 485–415 B.C.), of Abdera, was a frequent visitor to Athens and a friend of Pericles. He was the author of the famous dictum, “Man is the measure of all things,” that is, there is no such thing as absolute truth, but things are such as they appear to one who perceives them. He was the first to enter upon the scientific study of language, and wrote on accuracy of style (*օρθοέπεια*)^c; he also distinguished the genders of nouns,^d the tenses and moods of verbs, and the various modes and forms of address (interrogation, response, command, entreaty). He taught his pupils to discuss commonplaces from

^a See *Rhetoric*, iii. 8. 4–6.

^b *Rhetoric*, iii. 1. 7; cp. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 267 c.

^c Others take this to mean that he adopted a simple or straightforward style as contrasted with the affected Sicilian rhetoric (Thompson on *Phaedrus*, 267 c.).

^d See iii. 5. 5 note.

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opposite points of view and the art of making the weaker (worse) cause appear the stronger, by which success in a case which otherwise appeared hopeless was frequently attained. The first to call himself a sophist, he was the first teacher who demanded a fee for his instruction. His character is severely handled in the Platonic dialogue called after him, and his theory of knowledge attacked in the *Theaetetus*.

PRODICUS, of Ceos, an island in the Aegean, is best known for his moral analogue of the Choice of Hercules (between virtue and vice). The date of his birth and death is uncertain, but he was at any rate junior to Protagoras. He paid special attention to the use of synonyms and the accurate distinction of words of kindred meaning.

HIPPIAS, of Elis, depicted in the two Platonic dialogues (of doubtful genuineness), was a veritable polymath. His numerous studies embraced grammar and the cultivation of a correct and elevated style of expression. He also interested himself in political matters, and, by comparing the forms of government and institutions of different states, laid the foundation of political science.

THEODORUS (*fl. c. 412 B.C.*), of Byzantium, is mentioned by Plato^a as a most excellent "tricker-out" of speeches (*λογοδαΐδιος*). He was the author of an "Art," and invented a number of new terms or "novelties" (*καινά*), introducing additional divisions of the speech. According to Cicero,^b Lysias once gave lessons in rhetoric, but abandoned it for writing forensic speeches for others, on the ground that

^a *Phaedrus*, 266 E; Cicero, *Orator*, xii. 39.

^b *Brutus*, xii. 48.

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Theodorus was more subtle than himself in technicalities, although feebler in oratory.

THEODECTES (c. 380–344 B.C.), of Phaselis in Pamphylia, Greek tragic poet and rhetorician, was the pupil of Isocrates and an intimate friend of Aristotle. He at first wrote speeches for litigants, but later turned his attention to tragedy. He is said to have written at least fifty dramas. The *Mausolus* was written at the request of Artemisia, widow of the prince of Caria, to be recited at his funeral. Theodectes was the author of an "Art" in both prose and verse, and is coupled by Dionysius of Halicarnassus^a with Aristotle as the author of the division of the parts of speech into nouns, verbs, and connecting particles (conjunctions). He agreed with Aristotle as to the use of the paeanic rhythm, and supported the view that prose should be rhythmical, but not metrical.^b His extraordinary memory and skill in solving puzzles were celebrated.

After Greece had lost her freedom and Athens her independence as the result of the battle of Chaeronea (338), political oratory gradually declined, its place being subsequently taken by the rhetoric of the schools, characterized by a highly artificial and exaggerated style, the so-called Asianism. Mention may be made, however, of DEMETRIUS of Phalerum (c. 350–283 B.C.), appointed ruler of Athens by Cassander (317–307 B.C.). A versatile writer, he was the author of historical, political, and philosophical treatises, collections of the fables of Aesop and noteworthy moral maxims (*χρεῖαι*), and

^a Demosthenes, 48; Quintilian, i. 4. 18.

^b For the *Theodectea* (*Rhetic*, iii. 9. 9) see later.

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of a lost treatise on Rhetoric in two books.^a The work *On Interpretation*, dealing with the different kinds of style, the period, hiatus, and rhetorical figures, which has come down to us under his name, is really of much later date. According to Cicero,^b “he was the first who altered the character of oratory, rendering it weak and effeminate, and preferred to be thought agreeable rather than dignified. His flow of language is calm and placid, embellished by metaphor and metonymy. But his speeches seem to me to have a genuine Attic flavour.” Quintilian says: “although he was the first to alter the style of oratory for the worse, I must confess that he was an able and eloquent speaker, and deserves to be remembered as almost the last of the Attic orators worthy to be called by that name.”^c

The writers of the “Arts” which preceded the great work of Aristotle had almost entirely devoted their attention to forensic oratory, adapted to the requirements of the law courts, for which deliberative oratory, the language of the public assembly, although the nobler of the two, was neglected. Epideictic or display oratory^d may certainly be said to

^a A list of his works is given in the life of him by Diogenes Laërtius. ^b *Brutus*, ix. 38, lxxxii. 285; *Orator*, xxvii. 92.

^c *Inst. Orat.* x. i. 80.

^d The chief object of epideictic or show-speeches was to give pleasure to the hearers, whose function in regard to them is defined (*Rhetoric*, i. 3. 2) as that of “critics” of the intellectual performance and ability of the speaker, rather than that of “judges” of anything of serious importance, as in deliberative and forensic oratory. Funeral orations and speeches at the great public assemblies come under this head (see also iii. 12. 5). Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* iii. 8. 7) says that the only result or gain in epideictic oratory is praise, not anything of practical value.

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have existed since the time of Gorgias, but it is not spoken of as being on an equality with the two other branches. The creator of a systematic and scientific “Art” of Rhetorique is Aristotle. The unsatisfactory character of previous productions, whose compilers had neglected the all-important subject of “proofs” and confined themselves chiefly to appeals to the emotions and things irrelevant to the matter in hand, induced him to attack the subject from the point of view of a philosopher and psychologist, not from that of the mere rhetorician, which assuredly Aristotle was not.

Two of the Platonic dialogues, the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*, deal more or less with the subject of rhetoric, although they differ as to the manner in which it is discussed and in the attitude adopted towards it. In the *Gorgias*, the earlier dialogue, the discussion mainly turns upon the meaning of the term—the *nature* of rhetoric not its *value*, and various definitions proposed are critically examined, amended, or narrowed down. Rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, and its function is to persuade the unintelligent multitude in the law courts and public assemblies in regard to justice and injustice. But the result of such persuasion is not the acquisition of knowledge; it merely produces belief, which is sometimes false, sometimes true, whereas knowledge is always true. The time at the speaker’s disposal is not sufficient for the thorough discussion of such important subjects that leads to truth. Nevertheless, the practised rhetorician will be more successful than the expert in persuading his hearers on any subject whatever, even such matters as the building of walls

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and dockyards, although he knows nothing about them. It is sufficient for him to have acquired the power of persuasion, which will enable him to convince an ignorant audience that he knows more than those who possess real knowledge. This is sufficient to show the great power of the rhetorician, which must not, however, be abused ; but if it is, the teacher cannot be blamed.^a

Socrates himself, being asked to give *his* definition of rhetoric, replies that it is not an art at all, but a mere knack of gratifying and pleasing the hearer. It is a species of the genus flattery, like cookery (the art of making dainties), cosmetic (of adorning the person), and sophistic. Mind and body have, each of them, a really healthy condition and a condition that is only apparently healthy. The art that is concerned with the mind is the political art, its branches are legislation and justice ; that which is concerned with the body has no special name, its branches are gymnastic and medicine. Each of these true arts has a sham counterpart ; sophistic corresponding to legislation, rhetoric to justice, cosmetic to gymnastic, cookery to medicine. The end of the true arts is what is good for mind or body ; of the false, immediate gratification. Rhetoric is not a true art, and the power of the rhetorician is of the slightest, since he can only carry out what seems to him to be best, not what he really wishes to attain —happiness and well-being. The paradoxes, that it is *worse* to do wrong than to suffer wrong, and that it is *better* for the wrongdoer to be punished than to

^a Aristotle (*Rhetic*, i. 1. 13) points out that the objection that rhetoric may be abused is applicable to everything that is good and useful, except virtue.

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escape punishment, lead to the conclusion that the only use of rhetoric is, if we have done wrong, to enable us to accuse ourselves (and similarly our parents, children, friends, or country) and to bring our misdeeds to light, that we may be punished and healed ; but, if an enemy is the offender, to prevent his being punished, so that he may spend the rest of his life in misery.

The difference between Plato's treatment of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Gorgias* and his attitude towards it are obvious.^a The latter dealt chiefly with various definitions of rhetorics and its nature as expounded by its professors ; the former is a philosophical *theory* of rhetoric as it ought to be, if it is to justify its claim to be considered a true art. It is not an out-and-out condemnation of sophistical rhetoric. Although the rules contained in the "Arts" of Thrasymachus, Theodorus, and others are rejected as absurd and useless, it is admitted that there is some practical benefit in its teaching.^b But it is unsystematic and, not being based upon truth, cannot be properly called an art, but is merely a preliminary training.

The basis of the discussion is an erotic speech by Lysias (read by Phaedrus), which is criticized by Socrates with the object of showing the superiority of his own speech and method. According to him, this is chiefly shown in the due observation of the two great principles of generalization and division, which are effected by Dialectic, "the coping-stone of all learning and the truest of all sciences,"^c to

^a Cope, however, does not admit this.

^b On this cp. *Rhetoric*, i. 1. 12.

^c *Republic*, 534 E. On the relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic see Glossary.

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whieh rhetorie is indebted for nearly everything of value that it eontains.

But the most important point is that the foundation of true rhetoric is psychology, the scienee of mind (soul), as already hinted in the definition here accepted by Plato ($\psi\nu\chi\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\alpha\ \delta\iota\alpha\ \lambda\o\gamma\omega\tau$, “ winning men’s minds by words,” as contrasted with the vague $\pi\varepsilon\iota\theta\o\tilde{\nu}\ \delta\eta\mu\iota\omega\eta\gamma\o\tilde{s}$). The true rhetorieian is assumed to have already settled the question whether all mind is one, or multiform. If it is multiform, he must know what are its different varieties ; he must also be acquainted with all the different forms of argument, and know what particular forms of it are likely to be effective as instruments of persuasion in each particular case. But a merely theoretieal knowledge of this is not sufficient ; he must have praetieal experience to guide him, and must be able to decide without hesitation to which class of mind his hearers belong and to seize the opportune moment for the employment of each kind of discourse. A knowledge of the various rhetorical styles and figures of diction is also a useful accessory.

In view of these facts, the three (in partieular the first two) books of Aristotle’s *Rhetic* have been described as “ an expanded Phaedrus.”^a Thus, the first book deals with the means of persuasion, the logieal proofs based upon dialeetic ; the second with the psyhologieal or ethical proofs, based upon a knowledge of the human emotions and their causes, and of the different types of character. The questions of style and arrangement (which are only cursorily alluded to in the *Phaedrus* in reference to

^a Thompson, Introduction, p. xx.

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the superiority of oral to written instruction) are treated, but less fully, in the third book.

In addition to the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle was the author of several other rhetorical works, which have been lost. Six of these are mentioned in the Life of him by Diogenes Laërtius : (1) A collection of previous “Arts” of Rhetorique ($\Sigma\nu\nu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\tau\epsilon\xi\nu\hat{\omega}\nu$), a kind of literary history of the subject^a; (2) a dialogue called *Gryllus*, written in commemoration of his friend of that name, who was the son of Xenophon and fell in the battle of Mantinea (362 b.c.) ; (3), (4), (5) simply called “Arts” of Rhetoric in two, one, and two books respectively ; (6) the *Theodectea* (*Rhetoric*, iii. 9. 9). There has been considerable discussion as to the authorship of the last, but it is now generally agreed that it is an earlier work of Aristotle, re-edited later, dealing mainly with style and composition, and that he named it after his friend and pupil. Its identification with the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is rejected.

The date of the *Rhetoric*, which was written at Athens, is assigned to his second residence there (335–322), about 330 b.c. (at the earliest 335), although the exact year cannot be determined. The latest historical events which are referred to are : (ii. 23. 6) the embassy of Philip of Maeedon to the Thebans, asking for a free passage for his army through their territory, so that he might attack Attica (Oct. Nov. 339) ; (ii. 23. 18) the peace concluded at Corinth soon after the accession of Alexander (autumn, 336) ; (ii. 24. 8) the attribution by

^a Cicero, *De Oratore*, xxxviii. 160: *librum, in quo exposuit dicendi artes omnium superiorum.*

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Demades of the responsibility for the misfortunes of Greece to Demosthenes, but there is nothing to show whether the reference is to a time before or after Chaeronea. In this connexion it may be noted that the political opponents of Demosthenes declared that all that was best in his speeches was borrowed from Aristotle, whereas Dionysius of Halicarnassus^a endeavours to show that the *Rhetic* was not written until after the delivery of the orator's most important speeches.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, while freely drawing upon Isocrates, whose name is mentioned several times, to illustrate points of style, never once quotes from Demosthenes. The name of the latter occurs three times in the *Rhetic*: in iii. 4. 3 it is suggested that the Athenian general, not the orator, is meant; in ii. 24. 8 it occurs in reference to the fallacy of treating as a cause what is not really so; in ii. 23. 3 it is also doubtful whether the orator is referred to. Nothing is known of Nicanor, and if necessary to connect Demosthenes with the affair, it has been suggested to read Nieodemus, in whose murder he was suspected of being concerned (*Demosthenes, Midias*, p. 549).

Isocrates is most highly spoken of in the *Phaedrus*, but his relations with Aristotle were, according to ancient authorities, the reverse of friendly. The chief reason for this seems to have been that Aristotle had started a school of Rhetoric, which threatened to endanger the popularity of that of his older rival. According to Cicero,^b "Aristotle, seeing that Isocrates was prospering and had a number of distinguished pupils (the result of having removed his

^a First Letter to Ammaeus (ed. W. R. Roberts), 1901.

^b *De Oratore*, iii. 35. 141.

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disputations from forensic and political causes and transferred them to an empty elegance of style), himself suddenly changed the form of his teaching almost entirely, slightly altering a verse in the *Philoctetes*.^a The original has, ‘ It is disgraceful to remain silent and allow barbarians to speak,’ where Aristotle substituted *Isocrates* for *barbarians*. And so he ornamented and embellished the entire system of teaching rhetoric and united a knowledge of things with practice in speaking.” Further, Aristotle had attacked Isocrates, either in the *Gryllus* or the treatise on the different “ Arts ” of rhetoric, which called forth a lengthy reply from Cephisodorus, one of the pupils of Isocrates, in which various theories of Aristotle were criticized, and the philosopher himself stigmatized as a drunkard and a gourmandizer. Isocrates himself is said to have entered the lists ; for the reference to “ three or four sophists of the common herd who pretended to know everything,”^b is supposed to be meant for Aristotle, who is also attacked in the fifth *Letter* of Isocrates. The numerous citations from Isocrates in the *Rhetoric* have been explained by the assumption that, in a revised edition of his work, Aristotle retained the examples of an earlier ms., dating from a time (347) when Isocrates held the field and Demosthenes had not yet made his name. But the view is generally held that the *Rhetoric* was not published till at least ten years later, and in any case there seems no reason why a writer should not quote from the works of an unfriendly rival, if they seemed best suited for his purpose.

A brief notice must here be given of the *Rhetorica*

^a A lost play of Euripides.

^b *Panathenaicus*, 20.

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ad Alexandrum, which gets its title from the admittedly spurious letter of dedication to the great Macedonian. More than half the length of our *Rhetoric*, it was formerly printed with Aristotle's works as his. Its genuineness was first doubted by Erasmus, followed by the well-known commentator Vittorio (Victorius), who did not hesitate to ascribe it to Anaximenes (c. 380–320), an historian and rhetorician of the time of Alexander the Great, whose tutor and friend he was and his companion in his Persian campaigns. Anaximenes is said to have been the first to practise extempore speaking, to have devoted his attention to all three branches of Rhetoric, and to have written an “Art.” The question of authorship is generally regarded as settled in favour of Anaximenes by the arguments of Spengel (who certainly is obliged to take considerable liberties in some passages of the text without ms. authority) and Wendland. Cope, whose *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* contains a detailed analysis of the work and its language, and a full discussion of the question, supports Spengel's view, while admitting that “the evidence for the authorship of Anaximenes is not quite all that could be desired.” His opinion of the work itself, which he says may be fairly called “An Art of Cheating,” is in the highest degree unfavourable.

Other views are : (1) That it is a genuine work of Aristotle. This is supported by the former President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.^a (2) That it is a compilation by two, or even three hands, dating

^a Thomas Case (president 1904–1924), in his article “Aristotle” in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

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at the earliest from the first or second century A.D., and showing such numerous and striking resemblances to the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle that it must have been based upon it.^a (3) That it is a hodge-podge of very much later date. Other critics, however, maintain that the author (or authors) was unacquainted with Aristotle's work, and that the resemblances between the two are not sufficiently strong to justify the theory of dependence. Further, the historical allusions in the *Ad Alexandrum* (regarded chronologically) are taken to show that it preceded the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, and was written about 340 B.C. There is nothing about the relations of Athens with Philip and Alexander, but the Athenian naval league, Sparta, and Thebes are often mentioned. The latest event referred to is the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily by Timoleon (343). The beginning of the treatise is first definitely spoken of by Syrianus (*In Hermogenem Commentaria*, 133. 9) a Neo-Platonist of the fifth century A.D.^b

Full information concerning the mss. of our *Rhetoric* and other matters connected with the text and arrangement of the work is given by A. Roemer in his critical edition (Teubner Series, 1899). The oldest and by far the best of the first-class mss. is the Paris A^c of the eleventh century, which also contains the *Poetics*; those of the second class are all inferior. Midway between the two in point of

^a Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who includes it in his translation of the works of Aristotle, with a Preface in which he supports the above view.

^b For another account of the work consult Brzoska's article *Anaximenes* in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyklopädie*. To the Bibliography P. Wendland, *Anaximenes von Lampsakos*, 1905, may be added.

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value is placed the old Latin translation by William of Moerbeke (thirteenth century), which, being extremely literal, is frequently of considerable service in determining the text of the original ms. from which the translation was made. It is not, however, to be taken for granted that this *vetusta translatio* (Vet. Tr.) reproduces the text of only *one* ms.; further, it may represent in places a marginal gloss or conjectural reading; also, Moerbeke's knowledge of Greek is said to have been very limited. The conclusion arrived at by Roemer (p. lxix) is that the present text represents the fusion of two copies of unequal length, the shorter of which contains a number of haphazard insertions by the copyist from the longer recension or alterations of his own. The original text has perished.

The genuineness of the whole of Book III., which originally may have been an independent supplement, has been disputed, but it is now generally recognized as Aristotle's. The numerous gaps, lack of connexion and arrangement^a (a common feature, indeed, of all the Aristotelian writings), and textual errors have been attributed to the unsatisfactory manner in which the reports of three different lectures were made and put together by his pupils and to the lecturer's own faulty enunciation.

The present text (which makes no pretence of being a critical one) is based upon that of Bekker (Oxford, 1837), but numerous alterations, suggested by Roemer and others, have been incorporated. Several of these are also mentioned in the Notes to the Translation.

^a Such as the position of ii. 18-26, which should properly come before 1-17.

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^a To most of the books here mentioned the translator, in one way or another, desires to acknowledge his obligations. He ought, perhaps, to mention that his translation was completed before he consulted those of Jebb and Welldon.

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EDITIONS.—Text only: I. Bekker, Oxford, 1837; A. Roemer, ed. 2, 1898, with long critical Introduction and Notes, references to the source of quotations, and full Apparatus Criticus (see also *Zur Kritik der Rhetorik des A.*, an article by him in *Rheinisches Museum*, xxxix. 1884, pp. 491-510). With Notes: P. Victorius (Vittorio, Vettori), 1579; E. M. Cope, an exhaustive commentary in 3 vols., ed. J. E. Sandys, 1877. The last, together with Cope's *Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 1867, stands first and foremost (in fact, almost alone) as a help to the English reader of the original. It must be admitted, however, that the diffuseness, lengthy parentheses, and wealth of detail sometimes make it difficult "to see the wood for the trees," while many of the purely grammatical notes might have been shortened or omitted.^a Spengel's edition, 1867, with notes in Latin and containing William de Moerbeke's old translation, is strongest on the critical side and in illustrations from the ancient orators, but less helpful exegetically; Variorum Edition, Oxford, 1820 (the name of Gaisford, the real editor, does not appear); F. J. Parsons, Oxford, 1836.

TRANSLATIONS.—Barthélemy St. Hilaire (including *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*) in his translation of A.'s works;

^a It may be noted that Prof. W. R. Roberts, of Leeds, well known for his work in kindred fields, in the Preface to his edition of the Literary Letters of Halicarnassus, promises a critical and annotated edition of the *Rhetoric* with notes.

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The following abbreviations have been used in the Notes:

P.L.G.—T. Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, ii. (1915), iii. (1914).^a *T.G.F.*—A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 1889. *C.A.F.*—T. Koek, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, 1880–88.

^a Reference should also be made to *Lyra Graeca* (J. M. Edmonds, 1922, in the Loeb Classical Library).

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Book I

(i) RHETORIC is a counterpart of dialectic, which it resembles in being concerned with matters of common knowledge, and not with any special science. Rhetoric is also an art ; since it is possible to reduce to a system the means by which the rhetorician obtains success. Previous compilers of "Arts" of Rhetoric have neglected enthymemes, which are "the body" of proof, and have confined themselves to appeals to the passions, which are irrelevant and only have the effect of biasing the judge.

Although deliberative oratory is nobler than forensic, men prefer the latter, because it offers more opportunity for irrelevance and chicanery.

The rhetorical (as contrasted with the strictly scientific) method of demonstration is the enthymeme, which is a kind of syllogism. Therefore one who is thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the logical syllogism will be most likely to prove a master of enthymemes.

However, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory nature of previous "Arts," rhetoric is undoubtedly useful : (1) when truth and justice fail through inefficient advocates, the skilled rhetorician will set this right ; (2) it enables a man to state his case in

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popular, not in scientific language, which would be unintelligible to some of his hearers ; (3) it enables him to prove opposites, and to refute an opponent who makes an unfair use of arguments ; (4) it provides an efficient defence. If it be objected that it does much harm when unfairly used, this applies to every good thing, except virtue.

(ii) Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of discerning the possible means of persuasion in each particular case. These consist of *proofs*, which are (1) inartificial (see xv.) ; (2) artificial. The latter are of three kinds : (1) ethical, derived from the moral character of the speaker ; (2) emotional, the object of which is to put the hearer into a certain frame of mind ; (3) logical, contained in the speech itself when a real or apparent truth is demonstrated. The orator must therefore be a competent judge of virtue and character ; he must have a thorough knowledge of the emotions (or passions) ; and he must possess the power of reasoning. This being so, rhetoric must be considered as an offshoot of dialectic and of politics (including ethics).

There are two kinds of logical proof : (1) deductive—the enthymeme ; (2) inductive—the example. Enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, example a rhetorical induction.

Rhetoric does not consider what is probable for individuals, but for certain *classes* of individuals ; and derives its material from the usual subjects of deliberation, which are necessarily contingent, for no one deliberates about what is certain. Hence enthymeme and example are concerned with things which, generally speaking, admit of being otherwise than they are.

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Enthymemes are formed from (1) probabilities ; (2) signs. Signs are of two kinds : (1) necessary (*tekmeria*) ; (2) unnecessary, which have no distinctive name, and are related (*a*) as particular to universal, (*b*) as universal to particular. The example defined. Enthymemes are of two kinds : those which are deduced from (1) general truths, (2) special truths—from general or special “topics” or commonplaces.

(iii) There are three kinds of rhetoric, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers ; for the hearer must be either (1) a judge of the future ; or (2) a judge of the past ; or (3) a mere “spectator” (critic) of the orator’s skill. Hence the three kinds of rhetoric are : (1) deliberative ; (2) forensic ; (3) epideictic.

The business of the deliberative kind is to exhort or dissuade, its time the future, its end the expedient or the harmful : of the forensic to accuse or defend, its time the past, its end the just or the unjust ; of the epideictic praise or blame, its time the present (sometimes the past or the future), its end the noble or the disgraceful.

All orators must, in addition, have ready for use a stock of propositions relating to the possible and the impossible ; to the truth (or the contrary) of a past or a future fact ; to the great and small, and the greater and less.

(iv) *Deliberative* oratory deals with contingent things, not with all, but only with such as are within our control ; that which necessarily happens, or cannot possibly happen, is not a subject for consideration. Its most important topics are : (1) ways and means ; (2) war and peace ; (3) defence of the country ; (4) imports and exports ; (5) legislation.

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(v) The aim of all men is happiness, which is the subject of all exhortation and dissuasion. Definition of happiness. Its component parts are : noble birth ; many and good friends ; wealth ; the blessing of many and good children ; a good old age ; health ; beauty ; strength ; stature ; athletic skill ; a good reputation ; good fortune ; virtue.

(vi) The special end of the deliberative orator is that which is expedient ; and since that which is expedient is a good, he must establish the general principles of the good and the expedient. Definition of the good. Indisputable and disputable goods.

(vii) The greater and less degree of the expedient and the good.

(viii) The deliberative orator must also be acquainted with the different forms of government : democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, the ends of which are freedom, wealth, education in accordance with the constitution. An unrestricted monarchy is called a tyranny, and its end is personal protection.

(ix) *Epilectic* oratory deals with praise or censure, the objects of which are the noble and the disgraceful, virtue and vice. (In discussing these, incidentally the orator will be able to produce a certain impression as to his own moral character, the ethical kind of proof mentioned in ii.)

The component parts of virtue are : justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, mildness, wisdom (both practical and speculative).

For purposes of praise or censure qualities which are closely akin may be regarded as identical. We

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should consider our audience, and praise that to which they attach special importance ; and also endeavour to show that one whom we praise has acted with deliberate moral purpose, even in the case of mere coincidences and accidents.

Praise and *encomium* differ, in that the former commends the greatness of a virtue, while the latter is concerned with the things actually achieved.

Amplification also should be frequently made use of, and the person whom it is desired to praise should be compared with men of renown, or at any rate with other men generally. Amplification is most suitable to epideictic oratory ; example to deliberative ; enthymeme to forensic.

(x) *Forensic* oratory, which deals with accusation and defence, requires the consideration of (1) the motives of wrongdoing ; (2) the frame of mind of the wrongdoer ; (3) the kind of people to whom he does wrong. Wrongdoing is defined as voluntarily inflicting injury contrary to the law. A voluntary act is one committed with full knowledge and without compulsion, and as a rule with deliberate purpose. The causes of wrongdoing are depravity and lack of self-control. Its motives arise from human actions generally, which are *voluntary* or *involuntary*. There are four causes of voluntary action : habit, reason, anger, desire ; of involuntary action, three : chance, nature, compulsion. The motives of the first are the good or the apparently good, and the pleasant or the apparently pleasant. The good has been already discussed (vi.), so that it only remains to speak of the pleasant.

(xi) Definition of the pleasant and a list of pleasant things.

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(xii) The frame of mind of the wrongdoer, and the classes of people liable to suffer wrong.

(xiii) Laws being special or general, so also are just and unjust acts, according as they affect the individual or the community. Hence it is necessary to have an exact definition of acts of injustice, because it often happens that a person, while admitting the commission of an act, will deny the description of it and its application.

There are two kinds of rules in regard to just and unjust acts, *written* (prescribed by the laws) and *unwritten*. The latter refer to the excess of virtue or vice, involving praise or disgrace, honour or dis-honour ; or they supply the omissions, voluntary or involuntary, in the written law. This supplementary justice is *equity*, defined as justice independent of the written law. "Equitable" acts are such as may be treated with leniency, and equity considers the intention or moral purpose of the agent rather than the act itself.

(xiv) The degrees of wrongdoing.

(xv) *Inartificial* proofs, which are specially adapted to forensic oratory, are five in number : laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths.

BOOK II

(i) Since, in both deliberative and forensic oratory, it is a question of a decision being reached, the orator should consider, not only how to convince or persuade, but also how to create a certain impression of himself, and to put the judge into a certain frame of

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mind. The former is more important in the assembly, the latter in the law courts. The three qualities necessary to enable the speaker to convince the audience of his trustworthiness are : *practical wisdom, virtue, and goodwill*. How to obtain a reputation for wisdom and virtue will be clear from what has already been said concerning the virtues (i. 9) ; goodwill requires a knowledge of the emotions. Each of these falls under three heads : (1) the frame of mind which produces it ; (2) those who are the objects of it ; (3) the usual occasions of it.

(ii) Anger and Slight. There are three kinds of the latter : contempt, spite, and insolence. The frame of mind in which, and towards whom, men feel anger.

(iii) Mildness. The frame of mind and the situations in which, and the persons towards whom, men feel mildness.

(iv) Love or friendship. The persons for whom men feel friendship, and for what reason. Its opposite is hatred, the causes of which are anger, spite, and slander. Anger and hatred compared.

(v) Fear. Things which are objects of fear, and the feelings of those affected by it. Its opposite is boldness or confidence.

(vi) Shame and shamelessness. Persons in whose presence men feel shame, and the frame of mind in which they feel it.

(vii) Favour or benevolence. The means of disposing the hearer favourably or the reverse in regard to acts of benevolence.

(viii) Pity. Persons who are inclined to pity or the reverse. Things and persons that arouse pity. The difference between pity and horror.

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(ix) The particular opposite of pity is virtuous indignation. Envy also is an opposite of pity, but in a different way, being a pain at the good fortune of others (not because they are undeserving of it) who are our likes and equals. Those who arouse virtuous indignation, those who are likely to feel it, and on what occasions.

(x) Envy defined more at length. Persons who are liable to be the objects of envy, and the things which excite it.

(xi) Emulation. How it differs from envy. Persons likely to feel it, and the things which arouse it. Its opposite is contempt.

(xii) The characters of men must be considered with reference to their moral habits (i. 9) and their emotions (ii. 1), and their ages : youth, the prime of life, old age. Character of the young.

(xiii) Character of the old.

(xiv) Character of those in the prime of life.

(xv-xvii) Character as affected by the goods of fortune, such as noble birth, wealth, power, and good fortune.

(xviii, xix) The *topics* common to all three kinds of rhetoric are : (1) the possible and the impossible ; (2) whether a thing has happened or not ; (3) whether a thing will happen or not ; (4) greatness or smallness, including amplification and depreciation.

(xx) The *proofs* common to all three kinds of rhetoric are : *example* and *enthymeme* (maxims being included under the latter). Examples are either (1) statements of things that have actually happened ; or (2) invented by the speaker, consisting of (a) comparisons, (b) fables.

(xxi) Maxims are general statements relating to

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human actions, and teach what should be chosen or avoided. Maxims are the conclusions and premises of enthymemes, when the form of the syllogism is absent ; when the *why* and the *wherefore* are added, the result is a true enthymeme. The four kinds of maxims. Directions for their use.

(xxii) Enthymemes must be neither too far-fetched nor too general ; they must not be drawn from all opinions, but from such as are defined (*e.g.* by the judges) : and conclusions must not be drawn only from necessary, but also from probable, premises. The speaker must also be acquainted with the special elements of the case. Enthymemes are : (1) *demonstrative*, which draw a conclusion from acknowledged premises ; (2) *refutative*, which draw a conclusion which is not admitted by the opponent.

(xxiii) Twenty-eight topics or elements (for the two are identical) of demonstrative and refutative enthymemes.

(xxiv) Ten topics of apparent enthymemes (fallacies).

(xxv) Solution (refutation) of arguments may be effected by (1) counter-conclusions, (2) objections. The latter are obtained : (1) from the thing itself (the opponent's enthymeme) ; (2) from an opposite ; or (3) similar thing ; (4) from previous decisions of well-known persons. There are four sources of enthymemes : the probable ; the example ; the necessary, and the fallible, sign. As the probable is that which happens generally, but not always, an enthymeme from probabilities and examples may always be refuted by an objection, not always real but sometimes fallacious ; fallible signs also may be refuted, even if the facts are true (i. 2. 18). Infallible

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signs cannot be refuted, unless the premises can be shown to be false.

(xxvi) Amplification and depreciation are not topics of enthymemes, but are themselves enthymemes, intended to show that a thing is great or small. Refutative and constructive enthymemes are of the same kind, for each infers the opposite of what has been demonstrated by another. An objection is not an enthymeme ; it consists in stating a generally received opinion, from which it appears either that the argument is not strictly logical or that a false assumption has been made.

Examples, enthymemes, and, generally speaking, everything connected with "the intellect" (*διάροια*), the inventive part of rhetorie (*inventio*), having been discussed, there only remain the questions of style and arrangement.

Book III

(i) *Style*. It is not sufficient to know *what* to say ; we must also know *how* to say it. *Delivery* (declamation, oratorical action) is chiefly concerned with the management of the voice, and the employment of the tones and rhythms. It has hitherto been neglected, and has not yet been reduced to a system.

(ii) The two chief excellences of style are (1) clearness, (2) propriety. The first is attained by the use of terms in their proper sense ; the other terms enumerated in the *Poetics* (xxii.) contribute to elevation and ornamentation.

The language should have a "foreign" air, some-
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thing removed from the commonplace. In prose—and indeed, in poetry also—the appearance of artificiality must be concealed, and that of naturalness maintained. In prose the only terms suitable are those in general use and those used in their ordinary meaning; also metaphors, for all use metaphors in ordinary conversation. They produce clearness and a “foreign” air. They should be proportional, and, if the object be adornment, taken from the better things in the same class, if censure, from the worse; they should be euphonious; not too far-fetched; and taken from things beautiful to the ear or other senses. Epithets may be taken from the worse or from the better side.

(iii) Frigidity of style is due to the use of (1) compound words; (2) uncommon words; (3) long, misplaced, or heaped up epithets; (4) unsuitable metaphors—ridiculous, too pompous, or too tragic.

(iv) Simile is metaphor enlarged by a particle of comparison prefixed. Simile is useful in prose, but must not be used too frequently, for this gives an air of poetry.

(v) In regard to *composition* (as contrasted with the use of single words), the first consideration is purity; which is obtained by (1) the proper use of connecting particles or of clauses; (2) the use of special, not general terms; (3) of unambiguous terms; (4) correct use of genders; and (5) of numbers.

Written compositions should be easy to read and easy to utter; they should neither contain too many connecting particles, nor be badly punctuated; if there are two words referring to different senses, connecting them with a verb which denotes the operation of only one of these senses should be

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avoided ; the meaning should be stated at the outset, if a number of parentheses are to be inserted, otherwise obscurity results.

(vi) To secure *dignity* of style, one should (1) use definitions instead of names, or *vice versa* for conciseness ; (2) if there is anything indecent in the definition, use the name, and *vice versa* ; (3) illustrate by metaphors and epithets (but avoiding the poetical) ; (4) use the plural for the singular ; (5) avoid joining several terms with one article ; (6) use connecting particles or omit them for conciseness, but without destroying the connexion of ideas ; (7) amplify by using negative epithets to describe anything.

(vii) *Propriety* of style consists in its being emotional, ethical, and proportionate to the subject. The first creates a feeling of sympathy ; the second expresses character, because every condition of life and moral habit has a language appropriate to it ; the third is a caution against treating important subjects offhand or trivial matters in the grand style ; nor should voice and gesture agree too exactly, for then the artifice is obvious. Compound words, a fair number of epithets, and "foreign" words should only be used by one who is under the influence of passionate emotion.

(viii) Prose should not be *metrical*, but must have *rhythm*. Metre distracts the hearer's attention, while the absence of rhythm creates unpleasantness and obscurity. The different kinds of rhythm are : the heroic, which is too dignified ; the iambic, which is too ordinary ; the trochaic, which is too like a comic dance ; and the paean, which is of two kinds, —one (— √ √ √) suitable to the beginning, the other (√ √ —) to the end of the sentence.

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(ix) Style must be (1) continuous or (2) periodic. The former is unpleasing, because it has no end in itself; whereas in the latter the period has a beginning and end in itself and its length can be taken in at a glance, so that it is pleasant and easily imparts information. The period must end with the sense, and must not be cut off abruptly. Periods contain either several members (clauses) or one only (simple periods). But neither members nor periods must be too short or too prolix. The period of several members is (1) divided by disjunctives, or (2) antithetical; in which there is a contrast of sense (there are also false antitheses). *Parisosis* is equality of members, *Paromoiosis* similarity of sound, either at the beginning,^a or end (*Homoeoteleuton*) of the sentence. All three (or four) may occur in the same sentence.

(x) Easy learning is naturally agreeable to all, and is the result of smartness of style and argument. Those arguments are most approved, which are neither superficial (obvious at once) nor difficult to understand, but are understood the moment they are uttered, or almost immediately afterwards. Smart sayings and arguments depend upon antithesis, metaphor, and actualization. Metaphors are of four kinds, the most approved being the proportional.

(xi) Actualization (putting things before the eyes) consists in representing things in a state of activity (e.g. representing inanimate things as animate). It is produced by metaphors and similes, which must be taken from things that are familiar, but not

^a The technical term is *Homoeokatarkton*, not mentioned by Aristotle.

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obvious. Apophthegms, well-constructed riddles, paradoxes, jokes, play upon words, proverbs (which are metaphors from species to species) and hyperbole are also smart and pleasant.

(xii) Each kind of rhetoric has its own special style. The written style is most refined ; the agonistic (that of debate) is best suited for declamation, and is ethical or emotional (pathetic). The deliberative style resembles a rough sketch ; the forensic is more finished ; the epideictic is best adapted for writing and, next to it, the forensic. Unnecessary classifications of style. This concludes the treatment of the subject of style.

(xiii) *Arrangement.* There are two necessary parts of a speech : (1) *statement* of the case ; (2) *proof*. To these may be added *exordium* and *epilogue*. Further divisions are absurd ; even the epilogue is not always necessary.

(xiv) *Exordium* is the beginning of a speech, resembling the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-playing. In an epideictic speech it resembles the musical prelude, and is connected with the body of the speech by the key-note ; it is derived from topics of praise or blame. In a forensic speech, it resembles the prologue of a play or epic poem ; hence it must declare the object of the speech. In a deliberative speech, the proems are derived from those of the forensic, but they are rarest in this kind of rhetoric (deliberative), being only needed (1) on account of the speaker himself, or (2) of his opponents ; (3) to impress the hearer with the importance or otherwise of the case ; (4) for ornament.

Other exordia are collective and general. They are derived (1) from the speaker, or (2) from the

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opponent ; (3) from the hearer, to make him well-disposed towards us or ill-disposed towards the opponent ; (4) from the subject, making it out to be important or unimportant. Arousing the hearer's attention belongs to any part of a speech.

(xv) The topics that may be employed in dealing with slander or prejudice.

(xvi) *Narrative*, in epideictic speeches should not be continuous, but disjointed. In forensic, it must make the subject clear, and the speaker should narrate what tends to show his own good character or the opposite in the adversary, or is agreeable to the judges.

It is of less importance to the defendant, who should only give a summary of past events unless an account of them as actually taking place produces horror or pity. The narrative should also be ethical and show the moral purpose, and the various moral traits that accompany each particular character. The speaker should also use emotional features.

Narration finds least place in deliberative oratory.

(xvii) *Proof*, in deliberative oratory, has reference to (1) the fact, (2) the harm done, (3) the degree of harm, (4) the justification. In epideictic oratory, where there is little dispute as to the fact, *amplification* is the chief means of proof. In deliberative oratory, we must contend that what is predicted by the adversary will not take place ; or, if it does, that it will be unjust or inexpedient, for which the responsibility will rest with him ; or that it will be of less importance than he asserts. We must also look out for any false statement of his, for they are part of our proof.

Examples are best suited to deliberative, enthy-

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memes to forensic oratory. Enthymemes should not be used in a series, nor on all subjects, nor to appeal to the emotions. Maxims may be used in both proof and narrative, for maxims are ethieal.

Deliberative oratory is harder than forensic, for it deals with the unknown future, while forensic deals with the past, and has law for a foundation ; nor does deliberative oratory offer so many opportunities for digression. If you have enthymemes, you should speak both ethically and demonstratively ; if not, only ethically.

Refutative enthymemes are more highly thought of than demonstrative. In dealing with an adversary, the first speaker should give his proofs and anticipate the arguments of the other side ; the second speaker should attack the arguments of the first and draw counter-syllogisms.

The character of the speaker, since statements may be made by him that are tactless, offensive, or too favourable to himself, is best conveyed by putting them into the mouth of some other person.

Enthymemes may sometimes be stated in the form of maxims.

(xviii) *Interrogation and Ridicule.* The first should be used when the adversary has already made an admission of such a kind that, when one more question is asked, the absurdity will be complete ; when your conclusion will be established by it ; when his arguments are shown to be self-contradictory or paradoxical ; when he is reduced to giving sophistical answers. An ambiguous question should be answered by a regular definition, not too concise ; by a direct answer before the adversary has finished ; and by adding the reason for our action at the con-

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clusion. Ridicule is of some use in debate, but the jokes must be such as befit a gentleman.

(xix) The *peroration* (epilogue) is composed of four elements : (1) making the hearer favourable to yourself and unfavourable to the adversary ; (2) amplification or depreciation ; (3) putting the hearer into an emotional frame of mind ; (4) recapitulation. The speaker must begin by asserting that he has done what he promised ; he must compare his arguments with those of the adversary, by irony or by interrogation. At the end of a speech connecting particles may be omitted, to show that it is not an *oration*, but a *peroration*.



ARISTOTLE'S
“ART” OF RHETORIC

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Α

1354 a¹ 1. Ἡ ρήτορική ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ ἀμφότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσὶν ἀκοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἔστι γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῦν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἔξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῦν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἴκῃ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἔξεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὄδοποιεῦν· δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἵ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου, τὴν αὐτίαν θεωρεῦν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἥδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.

3 Νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον· αἱ γὰρ πίστεις

¹ These figures refer to the pages of Bekker's Berlin edition (1831).

^a Not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a choral ode.

ARISTOTLE'S “ART” OF RHETORIC

BOOK I

1. RHETORIC is a counterpart^a of Dialectic ; for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined^b to any special science. Hence all men in a manner have a share of both ; for all, up to a certain point, endeavour to criticize or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse. Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a familiarity arising from habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine the reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance ; and such an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art.^c

Now, previous compilers of “Arts”^d of Rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only things in it that come

^b Or “and they (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not confined.”

^c The special characteristic of an art is the discovery of a system or method, as distinguished from mere knack (*έμπειρια*).

^d Manuals or handbooks treating of the rules of any art or science.

ἐντεχνόν ἔστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἵ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἔστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὄργη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἔστιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν. ὥστ' εἰ περὶ πάσας ἦν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις τε νῦν ἔστι τῶν πόλεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς 5 εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν ἀν εἶχον ὅ τι λέγωσιν· ἀπαντεῖς γὰρ οἵ μὲν οἰονται δεῖν οὕτω τοὺς νόμους ἀγορεύειν, οἵ δὲ καὶ χρῶνται καὶ κωλύουσιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, ὄρθως τοῦτο νομίζοντες· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὄργην προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἄν εἴ τις, ὡς μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, 6 τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν. ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδέν ἔστιν ἔξω τοῦ δεῖξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης διώρικεν, αὐτὸν δή που τὸν δικαστὴν δεῖ γιγνώσκειν καὶ οὐ μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων.

7 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν προσήκει τοὺς ὄρθως κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἔνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ρᾶσιν ἢ πολλοὺς εὑ 1354b φρονοῦντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· ἔπειθ' αἱ μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκε-

^a His functions were a combination of those of the modern judge and juryman.

^b That is, forbid speaking of matters that have nothing to do with the case.

within the province of art ; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject ; for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connexion with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast.^a The result would be that, if all trials were now carried on as they are in some States, especially those that are well administered, there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say. For all men either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe,^b or in fact carry out the principle and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the court of Areopagus, and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp the dicast's feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy, or compassion, which would be like making the rule crooked which one intended to use. Further, it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not ; whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the dicast himself to decide ; it is not the business of the litigants to instruct him.

First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws, properly enacted, should themselves define the issue of all cases as far as possible, and leave as little as possible to the discretion of the judges ; in the first place, because it is easier to find one or a few men of good sense, capable of framing laws and pronouncing judgements, than a large number ; secondly, legislation is the result of long consideration, whereas

ψαμένων γίνονται, αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἔξ οὐ πογυίου, ὥστε χαλεπὸν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνοντας. τὸ δὲ πάντων μέγιστον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέρος, ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστίν, ὁ δ' ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς ἥδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν· πρὸς οὓς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἥδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον συνήρτηται πολλάκις, ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ἵκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἴδιον ἥδὺ ἦ λυπηρόν.

- 8 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύριον τὸν κριτήν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἡ μὴ γεγονέναι, ἡ ἔσεσθαι ἡ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, ἡ εἶναι ἡ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ταῦτα τὸν νομοθέτην προϊδεῖν. εἰ δὴ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τάλλα διορίζουσιν, οἷον τί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἡ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστον μορίων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτήν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστιν, ὅθεν ἂν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός.
- 10 Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς οὕσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικαιοικά, καὶ καλλίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας οὕσης ἦ

^a Systematic logical proofs (*enthymeme*, example), including testimony as to character and appeals to the emotions (2. 3), which the rhetorician has to invent (*εὑρεῖν*, *inventio*) for use in particular cases. They are contrasted with "inartificial" proofs, which have nothing to do with the rules of the art, but are already in existence, and only need to be

judgements are delivered on the spur of the moment, so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide questions of justice or expediency. But what is most important of all is that the judgement of the legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is universal and applies to the future, whereas the member of the public assembly and the dicast have to decide present and definite issues, and in their case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, so that they are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately, their judgement being obscured by their own pleasure or pain.

All other cases, as we have just said, should be left to the authority of the judge as seldom as possible, except where it is a question of a thing having happened or not, of its going to happen or not, of being or not being so ; this must be left to the discretion of the judges, for it is impossible for the legislator to foresee such questions. If this is so, it is obvious that all those who definitely lay down, for instance, what should be the contents of the exordium or the narrative, or of the other parts of the discourse, are bringing under the rules of art what is outside the subject ; for the only thing to which their attention is devoted is how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs,^a which make a man a master of rhetorical argument.

Hence, although the method of deliberative and forensic Rhetoric is the same, and although the pursuit of the former is nobler and more worthy of a statesman than that of the latter, which is limited

made use of. The former are dealt with in chs. iv.-xiv., the latter in ch. xv. of this book.

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τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης οὐδὲν λέγουσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν, ὅτι ἥττόν ἐστι πρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς καὶ ἥττόν ἐστι κακοῦργον ἡ δημηγορία δικολογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει, ὥστ’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς φησιν ὁ συμβουλεύων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαιικοῖς οὐχ ἵκανὸν τοῦτο, ἄλλὰ πρὸ ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἀκροατήν· περὶ ἄλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν σκοπούμενοι καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκροώμενοι διδόασι τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, 1955 a ἄλλ’ οὐ κρίνουσιν. διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ὁ νόμος κωλύει λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος· ἐκεῖ δ’ αὐτοὶ οἱ κριταὶ τοῦτο τηροῦσιν ἵκανῶς.

11 Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις (τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπόδεεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν), ἐστι δ’ ἀπόδειξις ρητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις, περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ὅμοίως ἄπαντος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστὶν ἴδεῖν, ἡ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἡ μέρους τινός, δῆλον δ’ ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος

^a κοινότερον: or, "more intelligible to the ordinary man."

^b The case as a rule being a matter of personal indifference, the judges are likely to be led away by the arguments which seem most plausible.

^c Exact scientific proof (*ἀπόδειξις*), which probable proof (*πίστις*) only to a certain extent resembles.

^d Dialectic here apparently includes logie generally, the

to transactions between private citizens, they say nothing about the former, but without exception endeavour to bring forensic speaking under the rules of art. The reason of this is that in public speaking it is less worth while to talk of what is outside the subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to trickery less than forensic, because it is of more general interest.^a For in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends a measure, but in the law courts this is not sufficient ; there it is useful to win over the hearers, for the decision concerns other interests than those of the judges, who, having only themselves to consider and listening merely for their own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not give a real decision.^b That is why, as I have said before, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject in the law courts, whereas in the assembly the judges themselves take adequate precautions against this.

It is obvious, therefore, that a system arranged according to the rules of art is only concerned with proofs ; that proof is a sort of demonstration,^c since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated ; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs ; and lastly, that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism. Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or of one of its parts,^d to consider every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most

"part" being either the *Analytica Priora*, which deals with the syllogism, or the *Sophistici Elenchi*, on Fallacies.

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θεωρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὗτος καὶ ἐνθυμηματικὸς ἀν εἴη μάλιστα, προσλαβὼν περὶ ποιά τ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς· τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως ἵδεν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασιν ἴκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας· διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ὅμοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσι, καὶ διότι μᾶλλον ἀπονενέύκασι πρὸς 12 τὸ δικολογεῖν, φαινερόν· χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τάληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον αἱ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχομεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥάδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πεῖσαι λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως. ἔτι δὲ τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα

^a ἔνδοξα, "resting on opinion"; defined in the *Topics* (i. 1) as "things generally admitted by all, or by most men, or by the wise, and by all or most of these, or by the most notable and esteemed."

^b διότι either=ὅτι, "that"; or, (it is clear) "why."

^c Almost equivalent to demonstration or strictly logical proof.

capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge of the subjects with which enthymemes deal and the differences between them and logical syllogisms. For, in fact, the true and that which resembles it come under the purview of the same faculty, and at the same time men have a sufficient natural capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it ; wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard to probabilities.^a

It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what is outside the subject, and ^b have rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory. Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates ; which is reprehensible. Further, in dealing with certain persons, even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction,^c but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible ; our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, as we said in the *Topics*,^d when speaking of converse with the multitude. Further, the orator should be able to prove opposites, as in logical arguments ; not that we should do both (for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong), but that the real state

^a i. 2. The *Topics* is a treatise in eight books on Dialectic and drawing conclusions from probabilities.

πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάνατία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ρήτορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὅμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὅμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τάληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὔσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἔαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ'
 1355 b οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ
 13 σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· τούτοις γάρ ἂν τις ὡφελήσειε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

14 "Οτι μὲν οὖν οὖν ἐστιν οὕτε ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ἡ ρήτορική, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἔκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γάρ ἱατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιā ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἐστι γάρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τὸ τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἴδεῖν πιθανόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλογισμόν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμόν. ὃ γάρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ

^a The early sophistical definition was "the art of persuasion."

of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them. Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites ; for both are equally concerned with them. However, it is not the same with the subject matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade. Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to defend oneself with the help of the body, but not disgraceful as far as speech is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of man than that of the body. If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, generalship ; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm.

It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application] ; also, that it is useful ; and further, that its function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of persuasion.^a The same holds good in respect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not the function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this end as far as possible ; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be properly treated. It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent syllogism. For what

ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· πλὴν ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν ρήτωρ, ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.

Περὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἥδη τῆς μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πῶς τε καὶ ἐκ τίνων δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τῶν προκειμένων. πάλιν οὖν οἶον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ὅρισάμενοι αὐτὴν τίς ἔστι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά.

2. "Εστω δὴ ρήτορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἔκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἔτέρας ἔστι τέχνης ἔργον· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐκάστη περὶ τὸ αὐτῇ ὑποκείμενόν ἔστι διδασκαλικὴ καὶ πειστική, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσερὸν καὶ γεωμετρίᾳ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμόν, ὅμοιῶς δὲ καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· ἡ δὲ ρήτορικὴ περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ὡς εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθανόν. διὸ καὶ φαμεν αὐτὴν οὐ περὶ τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικόν.

2 Τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοι εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐντεχνοι. ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι’ ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ προϋπῆρχεν, οἷον μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἐντεχνα δὲ ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν. ὥστε δεῖ τούτων τοῖς μὲν χρήσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν.

^a The essence of sophistry consists in the moral purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; when he does so deliberately, he is called a sophist. In Rhetorics, this distinction does not exist; he who uses sound arguments as well as he who uses false ones, are both known as rhetoricians.

makes the sophist is not the faculty but the moral purpose. But there is a difference : in Rhetoric, one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with moral purpose, are both called rhetoricians ; but in Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty.^a

Let us now endeavour to treat of the method itself, to see how and by what means we shall be able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were start again, and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass on to the remainder of the subject.

2. Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. This is the function of no other of the arts, each of which is able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject ; thus, medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic with number, and similarly with all the other arts and sciences. But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject. That is why we say that as an art its rules are not applied to any particular definite class of things.

As for proofs, some are artificial, others inartificial. By the latter I understand all those which have not been furnished by ourselves but were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like ; by the former, all that can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to make use of the latter, whereas we must invent the former.

- 3 Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία
^{1356 a} εἴδη ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἥθει τοῦ λέγοντος,
 αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν
 αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι
 δεικνύναι.
- 4 Διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἥθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος
 ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ
 ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάττον, περὶ
 πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μή ἔστιν
 ἄλλα τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ
 τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἄλλα μὴ διὰ τὸ
 προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ
 γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων τιθέασιν ἐν
 τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς οὐδὲν
 συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἄλλα σχεδὸν ὡς
 5 εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἥθος. διὰ δὲ
 τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προ-
 αχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὅμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυ-
 πούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες·
 πρὸς δὲ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι
 τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας. (περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
 δηλωθήσεται καθ' ἕκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν
 6 λέγωμεν.) διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν
 ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα
 πιθανῶν.
- 7 Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσί, φανερὸν ὅτι
 ταύτας ἔστι λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένουν
 καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.

The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence ; for we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character ; for it is not the case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down in their "Art," that the worth of the orator in no way contributes to his powers of persuasion ; on the contrary, moral character, so to say, constitutes the most effective means of proof. The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion by his speech ; for the judgements we deliver are not the same when we are influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate ; and it is to this alone that, as we have said, the present-day writers of treatises endeavour to devote their attention. (We will discuss these matters in detail when we come to speak of the emotions.) Lastly, persuasion is produced by the speech itself, when we establish the true or apparently true from the means of persuasion applicable to each individual subject.

Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions

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τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἔκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποιόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πῶς. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ρήτορικὴν οἵον παραφυέσ τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἡθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιον ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ρήτορικὴ καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιούμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι’ ἀπαδευσίαν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀλαζονείαν τὰ δὲ καὶ δι’ ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς· ἐστι γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ὅμοίωμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἴπομεν· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὠρισμένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλλήλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἰκανῶς.

8 Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἡ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ^{1356 b} ἐστι τὸ δὲ συλλογισμὸς τὸ δὲ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὅμοίως ἔχει· ἐστι γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴ, τὸ δὲ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, [τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός].¹ καλῶ δὲ ἐνθύμημα μὲν ρήτορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν ρήτορικήν. πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἡ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἡ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πως· ὥστ’ εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη ἡ

¹ Inserted by Spengel from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (first letter to Læmmæus, vi.).

"Rhetoric, as dealing with human actions, characters, virtues, and emotions, is closely connected with *Polities*, which includes *Ethics*. The two latter treat of the same subject from a different point of view. Both deal with happiness and virtue, but the object of *Polities* is, by com-

—the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced. Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics.^a That is why Rhetoric assumes ^b the character of Politics, and those who claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly from other human weaknesses, do the same. For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are merely faculties of furnishing arguments. We have now said nearly enough about the faculties of these arts and their mutual relations.

But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric ; for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else ; so that if, generally speaking, it is necessary to prove any

parison of the different forms of States to find the one in which man will be most virtuous. Lastly, Rhetoric, as an important factor in the training and education of the individual citizen and of the members of the State as a whole, may be described as an offshoot of Politics, with which the sophistical rhetoricians *identified* it. For the relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic see Glossary.

^a Or, “slips into the garb of” (Jebb). Probably a stage metaphor.

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- συλλογιζόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ὅτιοῦν (δῆλον δ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἔκάτερον αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι.
- 9 τίς δ' ἐστὶ διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμητικοῦ παραδείγματος, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα δὲ παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν οὗτων ἔτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἢ καθόλου ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐκεῖ μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται.
- 10 Φανερὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ ἔκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ρήτορικῆς· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις ρήτορεῖαι αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαί, καὶ ρήτορες ὁμοίως οἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἥπτον οἱ λόγοι οἱ διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ 11 μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἑκατέρῳ χρηστέον, ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.
- 'Επεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ

^a *Anal. Priora*, ii. 23; *Anal. Posteriora*, i. 1.

^b That is, enthymeme and example must be the same as syllogism and induction.

^c From the definitions of syllogism (i. 1) and induction (i. 12). No particular passage, however, explains the difference here mentioned.

^d The employment of syllogism and induction, τὸ εἶδος τῆς ρήτορικῆς being taken as simply = ἡ ρήτορική. Another rendering is: "that each kind of Rhetoric (that which de-

fact whatever either by syllogism or by induction—and that this is so is clear from the *Analytics*^a—each of the two former must be identical with each of the two latter.^b The difference between example and enthymeme is evident from the *Topics*,^c where, in discussing syllogism and induction, it has previously been said that the proof from a number of particular cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic induction, in Rhetoric example; but when, certain things being posited, something different results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either universally or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme.

It is evident that Rhetoric enjoys both these advantages^d—for what has been said in the *Methodica*^e holds good also in this case—for rhetorical speeches are sometimes characterized by examples and sometimes by enthymemes, and orators themselves may be similarly distinguished by their fondness for one or the other. Now arguments that depend on examples are not less calculated to persuade, but those which depend upon enthymemes meet with greater approval. Their origin and the way in which each should be used will be discussed later^f; for the moment let us define more clearly these proofs themselves.

Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in pends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some special advantage.”

^e A lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laërtius in his *Life of Aristotle*, xxiv., and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first letter to Ammaeus, vi. It is supposed to have dealt with some branch of Logic.

^f ii. 20-24.

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μὲν εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει δι' αὐτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ
 δὲ τῷ δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδεμίᾳ δὲ
 τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί
 Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ
 τοιῳδε ἡ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ
 δὲ καθ' ἔκαστον ἀπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν), οὐδὲ
 ἡ ρήτορικὴ τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει,
 οἷον Σωκράτει ἡ Ἰππίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῖσδε, καθ-
 ἀπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογί-
 ζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται γὰρ ἄττα καὶ τοῖς
 1357^a παραληροῦσιν), ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου
 δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ρήτορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἥδη βουλεύεσθαι
 εἰώθότων.

12 "Εστι δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περὶ τε τοιούτων περὶ^b
 ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν
 συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα
 δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως
 ἔχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἡ γενέσθαι ἡ
 ἔσεσθαι ἡ ἔχειν οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται οὕτως ὑπολαμ-
 13 βάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογί-
 ζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων
 πρότερον, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μὲν δεομένων δὲ
 συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα. ἀνάγκη δὲ
 τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ

^a Or, " by persons who are so " (Jebb).

^b Certain propositions, which seem paradoxical and improbable to a popular audience, must be proved before it is able to understand them.

reference to some one, and is persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it appears to be proved by propositions that are convincing^a; further, no art has the particular in view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art, whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons. It is the same with Dialectic, which does not draw conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen have some fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned discussion, as Rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of deliberation.

The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules; and in the presence of such hearers as are unable to take a general view of many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argument. But we only deliberate about things which seem to admit of issuing in two ways; as for those things which cannot in the past, present, or future be otherwise, no one deliberates about them, if he supposes that they are such; for nothing would be gained by it. Now, it is possible to draw conclusions and inferences partly from what has been previously demonstrated syllogistically, partly from what has not, which however needs demonstration, because it is not probable.^b The first of these methods is necessarily difficult to follow owing to its length, for

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μῆκος (ό γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔξ δύμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδ' ἐνδόξων· ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴν τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἔξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἔξ ὅν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προστίθησιν ὁ ἀκροατής. οἷον ὅτι Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενίκηκεν, ἵκανὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ὁλύμπια νενίκηκεν· τὸ δ' ὅτι στεφανίτης τὰ Ὁλύμπια, οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες.

- 14 ^aἘπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔξ ὅν οἱ ρήτορικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὅν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὅν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι, βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἔξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἐτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα ἔξ ἀναγκαίων (δῆλον δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερὸν ὅτι ἔξ ὅν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἐσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. λέγεται γὰρ ἐνθυμήματα ἔξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων, ὥστε

^a *πρῶτος*: the primary, typical syllogism of the first figure.

^b Son of Diagoras of Rhodes, and like his father celebrated for his victories in the Greek athletic contests. He played a considerable part in political and naval affairs in support of the Spartans (412–407 B.C.), whom he afterwards offended, and by whom he is said to have been put to death.

^c *Anal. Priora*, i. 8, 13-14.

the judge is supposed to be a simple person ; the second will obtain little credence, because it does not depend upon what is either admitted or probable. The necessary result then is that the enthymeme and the example are concerned with things which may, generally speaking, be other than they are, the example being a kind of induction and the enthymeme a kind of syllogism, and deduced from few premises, often from fewer than the regular ^a syllogism ; for if any one of these is well known, there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can add it himself. For instance, to prove that Dorieus ^b was the victor in a contest at which the prize was a crown, it is enough to say that he won a victory at the Olympic games ; there is no need to add that the prize at the Olympic games is a crown, for everybody knows it.

But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and examine can be other than they are, human actions, which are the subject of our deliberation and examination, being all of such a character and, generally speaking, none of them necessary ; since, further, facts which only generally happen or are merely possible can only be demonstrated by other facts of the same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions (and that this is so is clear from the *Analytics* ^c), it is evident that the materials from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only generally true ; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it follows that these two elements must corre-

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ἀνάγκη τούτων ἔκατέρω ταῦτὸ εἶναι.

15 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον,
οὐχ ἀπλῶς δέ, καθάπερ ὅρίζονται τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ
περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὗτως ἔχον πρὸς

1857 b ἐκεῦνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκός, ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ
16 μέρος· τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν
καθ' ἔκαστον τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν
καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δὲ τὸ
μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον

17 ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν. ἀναγκαῖα μὲν
οὖν λέγω ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός, διὸ καὶ
τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν σημείων ἐστίν· ὅταν
γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἴωνται λῦσαι τὸ λεχθέν, τότε
φέρειν οἴονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ πεπε-
ρασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταῦτον ἐστι
κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλώτταν.

18 "Ἐστι δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ' ἔκα-
στον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὥδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν
σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ
σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημεῖον
ἐστι, λυτὸν δέ, κανὸν ἀληθὲς ή τὸ εἰρημένον· ἀσυλ-
λόγιστον γάρ. τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον
ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, η τέτοκεν ὅτι γάλα ἔχει,
ἀναγκαῖον. ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον
ἐστίν· μόνον γάρ, ἀν ἀληθὲς ή, ἀλυτόν ἐστιν. τὸ
δὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον
εἴ τις εἴπειεν, ὅτι πυρέττει, σημεῖον εἶναι, πυκνὸν
γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, κανὸν ἀληθὲς ή·

^a That is, probabilities and signs correspond to general and necessary propositions. This is not strictly correct; only the *τεκμήρια* correspond to the necessary propositions, the other signs and the probabilities to the general or contingent propositions.

spond to these two kinds of propositions, each to each.^a For that which is probable is that which generally happens, not however unreservedly, as some define it, but that which is concerned with things that may be other than they are, being so related to that in regard to which it is probable as the universal to the particular. As to signs, some are related as the particular to the universal, others as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs are called *tekmēria*; those which are not necessary have no distinguishing name. I call those necessary signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called *tekmērion*; for when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a *tekmērion*, something as it were proved and concluded; for in the old language *tekmar* and *peras* have the same meaning (limit, conclusion).

Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal; for instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because Socrates was both wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though the particular statement is true, it can be refuted, because it cannot be reduced to syllogistic form. But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has milk, this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a *tekmērion*; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the particular, for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true, this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for

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ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα πνευστιῶν. τί μὲν οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν· μᾶλλον δὲ φανερῶς καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίν' αὐτίαν τὰ μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν.

19 Παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι μέν ἐστιν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περὶ ποῖα ἐπαγωγή, εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ οὕτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὕθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος οὕθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸν γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἢ θατέρου, παράδειγμά ἐστιν. οἶνον ὅτι ἐπιβουλεύει τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ἥτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννευσε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους ἵσασι, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου, ὃν οὐκ ἵσασί πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸν καθόλου, ὅτι δὲ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

1358 a 20 Ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν λέγονται αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις ἀποδεικτικαί, εἴρηται. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορὰ καὶ μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν πάντας ἐστὶν ἥπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ρήτορικὴν ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὖσας τὰς δ' οὕπω κατειλημμένας· διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσί τε, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

^a *Anal. Priora*, ii. 27.

a man to breathe hard without having a fever. We have now explained the meaning of probable, sign, and necessary sign, and the difference between them; in the *Analytics*^a we have defined them more clearly and stated why some of them can be converted into logical syllogisms, while others cannot.

We have said that example is a kind of induction and with what kind of material it deals by way of induction. It is neither the relation of part to whole, nor of whole to part, nor of one whole to another whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both come under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the other. For example, to prove that Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratus before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained what they asked for made themselves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason, however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet know. All these examples are contained under the same universal proposition, that one who is aiming at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard.

We have now stated the materials of proofs which are thought to be demonstrative. But a very great difference between enthymemes has escaped the notice of nearly every one, although it also exists in the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of them belong to Rhetoric, some syllogisms only to Dialectic, and others to other arts and faculties, some already existing and others not yet established. Hence it is that this escapes the notice of the speakers, and the more they specialize in a subject, the more they transgress the limits of Rhetoric and

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μᾶλλον δὲ σαφὲς ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ πλειόνων
ρῆθέν.

- 21 Λέγω γὰρ διαλεκτικούς τε καὶ ρήτορικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἶναι περὶ ὅν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ κοινῇ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡπτον τόπος: οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ τούτου συλλογίσασθαι ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαίων ἢ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὄτουσιν· καίτοι ταῦτα εἴδει διαφέρει. ἵδια δέ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἔκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεών ἔστιν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσὶ προτάσεις ἔξ ὧν οὕτε ἐνθύμημα οὕτε συλλογισμός ἔστι περὶ τῶν ἥθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἔξ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· ὅμοίως δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων. κάκενα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφρονα· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενόν ἔστιν· ταῦτα δέ, ὅσῳ τις ἀν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις, λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ρήτορικῆς· ἀν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ρήτορικὴ ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη ἔσται ἦς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς. ἔστι δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν λεγόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἴδιων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἔξ ὧν

^a The common topics do not deal with particular subject matter, as the specific topics do. In making use of the latter, the “better” (that is, in regard to a special science) the propositions chosen by a man, the more he will without knowing it quit the domain of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and become a professor of that special science whose first principles he has hit upon.

Dialectic. But this will be clearer if stated at greater length.

I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms those which are concerned with what we call "topics," which may be applied alike to Law, Physics, Politics, and many other sciences that differ in kind, such as the topic of the more or less, which will furnish syllogisms and enthymemes equally well for Law, Physics, or any other science whatever, although these subjects differ in kind. Specific topics on the other hand are derived from propositions which are peculiar to each species or genus of things ; there are, for example, propositions about Physics which can furnish neither enthymemes nor syllogisms about Ethics, and there are propositions concerned with Ethics which will be useless for furnishing conclusions about Physics ; and the same holds good in all cases. The first kind of topics will not make a man practically wise about any particular class of things, because they do not deal with any particular subject matter ; but as to the specific topics, the happier a man is in his choice of propositions, the more he will unconsciously produce a science quite different from Dialectic and Rhetoric. For if once he hits upon first principles, it will no longer be Dialectic or Rhetoric, but that science whose principles he has arrived at.^a Most enthymemes are constructed from these specific topics, which are called particular and special, fewer from those that are common or universal. As then we have done in the *Topics*,^b so here we must distinguish the specific and universal topics, from which enthymemes may be constructed.

^a *Sophistici Elenchi (Fallacies)*, 9. This treatise is really the ninth and concluding part of the *Topics*.

ληπτέον. λέγω δ' εἴδη μὲν τὰς καθ' ἔκαστον γένος
ἰδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ὁμοίως
πάντων. πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν·
πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ρήτορικῆς, ὅπως
διελόμενοι πόσα ἔστι, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς λαμ-
βάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

3. ^{1358 b} Ἔστι δὲ τῆς ρήτορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν·
τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπ-
άρχουσιν ὄντες. σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ
λόγος, ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὐ λέγει καὶ
πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτον ἔστι, λέγω δὲ
2 τὸν ἀκροατήν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἡ θεωρὸν
εἶναι ἡ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἡ τῶν γεγενημένων ἡ τῶν
μελλόντων. ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων
κρίνων οἷον ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενη-
μένων οἷον ὁ δικαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ
3 θεωρός· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν
λόγων τῶν ρήτορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικαιικόν,
ἐπιδεικτικόν.

Συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπὴ τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή·
ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἴδιᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δη-
μηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ
τὸ μὲν κατηγορία τὸ δὲ ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ
ὅποτερονοῦν ποιεῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας.
ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος.

4. Χρόνοι δὲ ἔκαστον τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν συμβου-
λεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔσομένων συμβου-

^a Propositions (or premises), the name given to the two first statements in a syllogism from which the conclusion is drawn: All men are mortal (major premise); Socrates is a man (minor premise); therefore Socrates is mortal.

^b All three kinds of hearers are regarded as judges (the

By specific topics I mean the propositions peculiar to each class of things, by universal those common to all alike. Let us then first speak of the specific topics, but before doing so let us ascertain the different kinds of Rhetoric, so that, having determined their number, we may separately ascertain their elements and propositions.^a

3. The kinds of Rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For every speech is composed of three parts : the speaker, the subject of which he treats, and the person to whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom the end or object of the speech refers. Now the hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of things to come.^b For instance, a member of the general assembly is a judge of things to come ; the dicast, of things past ; the mere spectator, of the ability of the speaker. Therefore there are necessarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.

The deliberative kind is either hortatory or dissuasive ; for both those who give advice in private and those who speak in the assembly invariably either exhort or dissuade. The forensic kind is either accusatory or defensive ; for litigants must necessarily either accuse or defend. The epideictic kind has for its subject praise or blame.

Further, to each of these a special time is appropriate : to the deliberative the future,^c for the

mere spectator as a “ critic ”), although strictly *κριτής* should be limited to the law courts.

^c In i. 6. 1 and 8. 7 the present is also mentioned as a time appropriate to deliberative Rhetoric.

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λεύει ἡ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεὶ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ' ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ παρών· κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἡ ψέγουσι πάντες, προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμιμήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες.

5 Τέλος δὲ ἔκάστοις τούτων ἔτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρίᾳ, τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἡ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἡ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δ' ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ψέγουσι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν.

6 σημεῖον δ' ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον ἔκάστοις τέλος· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίστε οὐκ ἀν ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐδέ ποτ' ἀν ὁμολογήσειεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀν ἔδει δίκης. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προΐενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύουσιν ἡ ἀπ' ὠφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἀν ὁμολογήσαιεν· ὡς δ' οὐκ

speaker, whether he exhorts or dissuades, always advises about things to come ; to the forensic the past, for it is always in reference to things done that one party accuses and the other defends ; to the epideictic most appropriately the present, for it is the existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view. It is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or of the future by way of anticipating it.

Each of the three kinds has a different special end, and as there are three kinds of Rhetoric, so there are three special ends. The end of the deliberative speaker is the expedient or harmful ; for he who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and he who dissuades advises against it as worse ; all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, honour and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this. The end of the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust ; in this case also all other considerations are included as accessory. The end of those who praise or blame is the honourable and disgraceful ; and they also refer all other considerations to these. A sign that what I have stated is the end which each has in view is the fact that sometimes the speakers will not dispute about the other points. For example, a man on trial does not always deny that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he will never admit that the act is unjust ; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary. Similarly, the deliberative orator, although he often sacrifices everything else, will never admit that he is recommending what is inexpedient or is dissuading from what is useful ; but

ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ
 τοὺς μηδὲν ἄδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντί-
 1359a ζουσιν. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ
 ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ
 βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν
 ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὐτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος ἔπραξέ τι
 καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ
 ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν,
 ἐξὸν ζῆν. τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλ-
 λιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.

7 Φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ
 τούτων ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκ-
 μήρια καὶ τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶ⁹
 ρήτορικαί· ὅλως μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προ-
 τάσεών ἔστι, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἔστι
 8 συνεστηκὼς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων προτάσεων. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ οὔτε πραχθῆναι οἶνται τε οὔτε πραχθῆσεσθαι τὰ
 ἀδύνατα ἀλλὰ τὰ δυνατά, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ
 μὴ ἐσόμενα οὐχ οἶνται τε τὰ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι τὰ δὲ
 πραχθῆσεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβούλεύοντι
 καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προ-
 τάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ
 9 μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ ἄπαντες καὶ

^a The omission of *οὐκ* before *ἄδικον* has been suggested. The sense would then be: "As to the injustice of enslaving . . . he is quite indifferent." There is no doubt a reference to the cruel treatment by Athens of the inhabitants of the island of Melos (416 B.C.) for its loyalty to the Spartans during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. v. 84-116). The Athenian envoys declined to discuss the question of right or wrong, which they said was only possible between equal powers, and asserted that *expediency* was the only thing that had to be considered. The question of justice or injustice

often he is quite indifferent about showing that the enslavement of neighbouring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is not an act of injustice.^a Similarly, those who praise or blame do not consider whether a man has done what is expedient or harmful, but frequently make it a matter for praise that, disregarding his own interest, he performed some deed of honour. For example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his comrade Patroclus,^b knowing that he was fated to die, although he might have lived. To him such a death was more honourable, although life was more expedient.

From what has been said it is evident that the orator must first have in readiness the propositions on these three subjects.^c Now, necessary signs, probabilities, and signs are the propositions of the rhetorician ; for the syllogism universally^d consists of propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the propositions above mentioned. Again, since what is impossible can neither have been done nor will be done, but only what is possible, and since what has not taken place nor will take place can neither have been done nor will be done, it is necessary for each of the three kinds of orators to have in readiness propositions dealing with the possible and the impossible, and as to whether anything has taken place or will take place, or not. Further, since all, whether they praise or blame,

(in the Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken into account, was merely accessory and intended to serve as a specious justification for the policy of might.

^a To protect his body and avenge his death (*Iliad*, xviii.).

^b The expedient, the just, the honourable, and their contraries.

^c δλως : or, reading δλος, "the syllogism as a whole."

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ἐπαιωοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρῶνται ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἡ μικρὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ τὸ κακὸν ἡ τὸ καλὸν ἡ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἡ τὸ δίκαιον ἡ τὸ ἄδικον, ἡ καθ' αὐτὰ λέγοντες ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου, οἷον τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἐλαττον ἡ ἀδίκημα ἡ δικαίωμα· ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέοντι ἴδιᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαιαι.

4. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἡ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἄπαντα ἄλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή. 2 ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐσται ἡ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἡ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. 3 οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἄλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἔστι τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ' ἔστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦ 1359 b μεν, ἔως ἂν εὕρωμεν εἰς ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἡ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι.

exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, not only endeavour to prove what we have stated, but also that the same things, whether good or bad, honourable or disgraceful, just or unjust, are great or small, either in themselves or when compared with each other, it is clear that it will be necessary for the orator to be ready with propositions dealing with greatness and smallness and the greater and the less, both universally and in particular ; for instance, which is the greater or less good, or act of injustice or justice ; and similarly with regard to all other subjects. We have now stated the topics concerning which the orator must provide himself with propositions ; after this, we must distinguish between each of them individually, that is, what the three kinds of Rhetoric, deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, are concerned with.

4. We must first ascertain about what kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises, since he cannot do so about everything, but only about things which may possibly happen or not. Everything which of necessity either is or will be, or which cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside the scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the case of things that are possible advice is not universally appropriate ; for they include certain advantages, natural and accidental, about which it is not worth while to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is limited to those subjects about which we take counsel ; and such are all those which can naturally be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose origination is in our own power ; for our examination is limited to finding out whether such things are possible or impossible for us to perform.

- 4 Καθ' ἔκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη περὶ ὃν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἔτι δ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῷ δὲ πλείω δεδόσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων.
- 5 ὅπερ γάρ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες τυγχάνομεν, ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν ἐκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πολιτικῆς, ὅμοία δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις. ὅσῳ δ' ἂν τις ἡ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἡ ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἀν δυνάμεις ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμας πειρᾶται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων,
- 7 ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὅμως δ' ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν ἐστι διελεῖν, ἔτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἴπωμεν καὶ νῦν.

Σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὃν βουλεύονται πάντες καὶ περὶ ἣ ἀγορεύουσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες, τὰ μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὃντα· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ περὶ τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἔξαγομένων, καὶ περὶ νομοθεσίας.

- 8 "Ωστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύσειν δέοι ἄν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι τίνες καὶ πόσαι, ὅπως εἴτε τις παραλείπεται προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις ἐλάττων αὐξηθῇ, ἔτι δὲ τὰς δα-

^a The analytical science is Dialectic, incorrectly regarded as a branch of Analytics, which properly implies scientific demonstration.

However, there is no need at present to endeavour to enumerate with scrupulous exactness or to classify those subjects which men are wont to discuss, or to define them as far as possible with strict accuracy, since this is not the function of the rhetorical art but of one that is more intelligent and exact, and further, more than its legitimate subjects of inquiry have already been assigned to it. For what we have said before is true ^a: that Rhetoric is composed of analytical science and of that branch of political science which is concerned with Ethics, and that it resembles partly Dialectic and partly sophistical arguments. But in proportion as anyone endeavours to make of Dialectic or Rhetoric, not what they are, faculties, but sciences, to that extent he will, without knowing it, destroy their real nature, in thus altering their character, by crossing over into the domain of sciences,^b whose subjects are certain definite things, not merely words. Nevertheless, even at present we may mention such matters as it is worth while to analyse, while still leaving much for political science to investigate.

Now, we may say that the most important subjects about which all men deliberate and deliberative orators harangue, are five in number, to wit: ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the country, imports and exports, legislation.

Accordingly, the orator who is going to give advice on ways and means should be acquainted with the nature and extent of the State resources, so that if any is omitted it may be added, and if any is in-

^b Taking *εἰς ἐπιστήμας* with *μεταβαίνειν*. If taken with *ἐπισκευάζων*, the sense will be: “by changing his ground (*μεταβαίνειν* being used absolutely) while altering their characters from faculties to sciences.”

πάνας τῆς πόλεως ἀπάσας, ὅπως εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις μείζων ἐλάττων γένηται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων. ταῦτα δ' οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν.

9 Περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὅπόση τε ὑπάρχει ἥδη καὶ πόσην ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι, καὶ ποία τις ἡ τε ὑπάρχουσά ἔστι καὶ ἥτις ἐνδέχεται προσγενέσθαι, ἔτι δὲ πολέμους τίνας καὶ πῶς πεπολέμηκεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν διμόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν, ὅπως πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρηνεύηται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς 1360^a ἥττους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἥ τὸ πολεμεῖν. καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, πότερον ὄμοιαι ἡ ἀνόμοιαι· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ταύτη πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἐλαττοῦσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν διμοίων τὰ ὄμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

10 "Ετι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακ-

sufficient, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenses of the State, that if any is superfluous, it may be removed, or, if too great, may be curtailed. For men become wealthier, not only by adding to what they already possess, but also by cutting down expenses. Of these things it is not only possible to acquire a general view from individual experience, but in view of advising concerning them it is further necessary to be well informed about what has been discovered among others.

In regard to war and peace, the orator should be acquainted with the power of the State, how great it is already and how great it may possibly become ; of what kind it is already and what additions may possibly be made to it ; further, what wars it has waged and its conduct of them. These things he should be acquainted with, not only as far as his own State is concerned, but also in reference to neighbouring States, and particularly those with whom there is a likelihood of war, so that towards the stronger a pacific attitude may be maintained, and in regard to the weaker, the decision as to making war on them may be left to his own State. Again, he should know whether their forces are like or unlike his own, for herein also advantage or disadvantage may lie. With reference to these matters he must also have examined the results, not only of the wars carried on by his own State, but also of those carried on by others ; for similar results naturally arise from similar causes.

Again, in regard to the defence of the country, he should not be ignorant how it is carried on ; he should know both the strength of the guard, its character, and the positions of the guard-houses

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τηρίων (τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον μὴ ἔμπειρον ὅντα τῆς χώρας), ἵν' εἴτ' ἐλάττων ἡ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους τηρῶσι μᾶλλον.

- 11 "Ετι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἱκανὴ τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ εἰσαγώγιμος, καὶ τίνων τ' ἔξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωνται· πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τε τοὺς κρείττους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους.
- 12 Εἰς δ' ἀσφάλειαν ἄπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα τ' ἐστὶ πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ ποῦα συμφέρει ἐκάστῃ, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐναντίων. λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτεινόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ηὗξει εἰς δλιγαρχίαν, ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνιέμενα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἄλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρυπὰ γινόμενα ἡ σιμὰ οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε

^a τούτους : those who will receive exports and send imports.

(which is impossible for one who is unacquainted with the country), so that if any guard is insufficient it may be increased, or if any is superfluous it may be disbanded, and greater attention devoted to suitable positions.

Again, in regard to food, he should know what amount of expenditure is sufficient to support the State ; what kind of food is produced at home or can be imported ; and what exports and imports are necessary, in order that contracts and agreements may be made with those ^a who can furnish them ; for it is necessary to keep the citizens free from reproach in their relations with two classes of people —those who are stronger and those who are useful for commercial purposes.

With a view to the safety of the State, it is necessary that the orator should be able to judge of all these questions, but an understanding of legislation is of special importance, for it is on the laws that the safety of the State is based. Wherefore he must know how many forms of government there are ; what is expedient for each ; and the natural causes of its downfall, whether they are peculiar to the particular form of government or opposed to it. By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself, I mean that, with the exception of the perfect form of government, all the rest are ruined by being relaxed or strained to excess. Thus democracy, not only when relaxed, but also when strained to excess, becomes weaker and will end in an oligarchy ; similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub nose reach the mean, when one of these defects is relaxed, but when it becomes aquiline or snub to excess, it is altered to such an extent that even the likeness

13 μηδὲ μυκτῆρα δοκεῦν εἶναι. χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαῖειν τίς πολιτεύα συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἀρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστι τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους), πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἴστορίαι· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ ρήτορικῆς ἔργον ἔστιν.

1360 b Περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύειν, τὰ μέγιστα τοσαῦτά ἔστιν· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, λέγωμεν πάλιν.

5. Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἴδιᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός τις ἔστιν, οὐ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἴροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν 2 ἡ τ' εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς. ὥστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἔστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἱ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ πᾶσαι εἰσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἡ τῶν μορίων τι, ἡ μεῖζον ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα ἡ ἐμποδίζοντα ἡ τὰ ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν.

3 "Εστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἡ αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἡ δὲ βίος δὲ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἡδιστος,

^a This rendering, although convenient, hardly represents

of a nose is lost. Moreover, with reference to acts of legislation, it is useful not only to understand what form of government is expedient by judging in the light of the past, but also to become acquainted with those in existence in other nations, and to learn what kinds of government are suitable to what kinds of people. It is clear, therefore, that for legislation books of travel are useful, since they help us to understand the laws of other nations, and for political debates historical works.^a All these things, however, belong to Politics and not to Rhetoric.

Such, then, are the most important questions upon which the would-be deliberative orator must be well informed. Now let us again state the sources whence we must derive our arguments for exhortation or discussion on these and other questions.

5. Men, individually and in common, nearly all have some aim, in the attainment of which they choose or avoid certain things. This aim, briefly stated, is happiness and its component parts. Therefore, for the sake of illustration, let us ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is, and what its parts consist in ; for all who exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the things which conduce or are detrimental to it. For one should do the things which procure happiness or one of its parts, or increase instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing those things which destroy or hinder it or bring about what is contrary to it.

Let us then define happiness as well-being combined with virtue, or independence of life, or the life that is most agreeable combined with security, or the Greek, which, literally translated, is “ the *investigations of those who write about human actions* ” (cf. *ἱστορικός*, § 8).

ἢ εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ἐν ἣ πλείω τὴν εὔδαιμονίαν διολογοῦσιν
 4 εἶναι ἄπαντες. εἰ δή ἔστιν ἡ εὔδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὔτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἷον ὑγίειαν, κάλλος, ἴσχύν, μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν, δόξαν, τιμήν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἔκτος ἀγαθά· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή. ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος εἴη. λάβωμεν τοίνυν δομοίως καὶ τούτων ἔκαστον τί ἔστιν.

5 Εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἔθνει μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτόχθονας ἢ ἀρχαίους εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέναι ἔξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ζηλουμένοις· ἵδιᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως τούς τε πρώτους γνωρίμους ἢ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τῶν τιμωμένων, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεβυτέρους.

^a This is the usual rendering, although it is hardly satisfactory. Jebb translates “a flourishing state . . . of body.”

^b Or, “bring about,” “effect them.”

^c i.e. of mind and body; or δυνάμεις may mean “positions of authority and influence.”

^d This was a favourite boast of the Athenians.

abundance of possessions and slaves,^a combined with power to protect and make use of them ^b; for nearly all men admit that one or more of these things constitutes happiness. If, then, such is the nature of happiness, its component parts must necessarily be: noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, wealth, good children, numerous children, a good old age; further, bodily excellences, such as health, beauty, strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good reputation, honour, good luck, virtue. For a man would be entirely independent, provided he possessed all internal and external goods; for there are no others. Internal goods are those of mind and body; external goods are noble birth, friends, wealth, honour. To these we think should be added certain capacities ^c and good luck; for on these conditions life will be perfectly secure. Let us now in the same way define each of these in detail.

Noble birth, in the case of a nation or State, means that its members or inhabitants are sprung from the soil,^d or of long standing; that its first members were famous as leaders, and that many of their descendants have been famous for qualities that are highly esteemed. In the case of private individuals, noble birth is derived from either the father's or the mother's side, and on both sides there must be legitimacy; and, as in the case of a State, it means that its founders were distinguished for virtue, or wealth, or any other of the things that men honour, and that a number of famous persons, both men and women, young and old, belong to the family.

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6 Εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἄδηλα· ἔστι δὲ
 1361^a τῷ κοινῷ μέν, νεότης ἃν ἥ πολλὴ καὶ ἀγαθή, ἀγαθὴ
 δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν σώματος, οἷον μέγεθος κάλλος ἵσχὺν
 δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν· ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ
 ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταῖ· ἴδιᾳ δὲ εὐτεκνία καὶ πολυ-
 τεκνία τὸ τὰ ἴδια τέκνα πολλὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι,
 καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρρενα· θηλειῶν δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος
 μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ
 φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἴδιᾳ
 καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναικας δεῖ
 ζητεῖν ἔκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅσοις γὰρ
 τὰ κατὰ γυναικας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις,
 σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσιν.

7 Πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος, γῆς,
 χωρίων κτῆσις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτῆσις καὶ βοσκη-
 μάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ
 κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ
 καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν
 μᾶλλον τὰ κάρπιμα, ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπό-
 λαυσιν· κάρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι, ἀπο-
 λαυστικὰ δὲ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται,
 ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον. ὅρος δὲ ἀσφαλείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα
 καὶ οὕτω κεκτῆσθαι ὥστ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν
 αὐτῶν· τοῦ δὲ οὐκεῖα εἶναι ὅταν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἥ ἀπαλ-
 λοτριῶσαι ἥ μή, λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτρίωσιν δόσιν καὶ

^a ἀνελευθερία : literally, qualities unbecoming to a free man or woman, ungentlemanly, unladylike ; hence, mean, servile, sordid.

^b A similar charge against the Spartan women is made in the *Politics* (ii. 9. 5): "Further, the looseness (*ἀνεστις*) of the Spartan women is injurious both to the purpose of the constitution and the well-being of the State . . . their life is one of absolute luxury and intemperance" (compare Euripides, *Andromache*, 595-6 "even if she wished it, a Spartan girl

The blessing of good children and numerous children needs little explanation. For the commonwealth it consists in a large number of good young men, good in bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, fitness for athletic contests ; the moral excellences of a young man are self-control and courage. For the individual it consists in a number of good children of his own, both male and female, and such as we have described. Female bodily excellences are beauty and stature, their moral excellences self-control and industrious habits, free from servility.^a The object of both the individual and of the community should be to seeure the existence of each of these qualities in both men and women ; for all those States in which the character of women is unsatisfactory, as in Lacedaemon,^b may be considered only half-happy.

Wealth consists in abundance of money, ownership of land and properties, and further of movables, cattle, and slaves, remarkable for number, size, and beauty, if they are all secure, liberal, and useful. Property that is productive is more useful, but that which has enjoyment for its object is more liberal. By productive I mean that which is a source of income, by enjoyable that which offers no advantage beyond the use of it—at least, none worth mentioning. Security may be defined as possession of property in such places and on such conditions that the use of it is in our own hands ; and ownership as the right of alienation or not,^c by which I mean giving could not be chaste"). The opinion of Xenophon and Plutarch is much more favourable.

^a ἡ μῆ : in the ms. readings these words follow τοῦ οἰκεῖα εἴναι : "ownership or non-ownership." The alteration is Spengel's.

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πρᾶσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἔστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος.

8 Εὐδοξία δ' ἔστι τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔχειν οὐ πάντες ἐφίενται ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ οἱ φρόνιμοι.

9 Τιμὴ δ' ἔστι μὲν σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης, τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμάται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν· εὐεργεσία δὲ ἡ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἢ εἰς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ὃν μὴ ῥάδια ἡ κτῆσις ἡ ὅλως ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ποτέ· πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ καιροὶ αἴτιοι. μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνήμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρίαι, τάφοι, εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δῶρα τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρόν ἔστι κτήματος δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ φιλοχρήματοι καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίενται αὐτῶν· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ ἔχει ὃν δέονται· καὶ γὰρ κτῆμά ἔστιν, οὐ ἐφίενται οἱ φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει, οὐ οἱ φιλότιμοι.

10 Σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια, αὕτη δὲ οὕτως ὥστε ἀνόσους εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὓς οὐδεὶς

^a ἐνέργεια : realization in action or fact.

^b Of Selymbria, physician and teacher of hygienic gymnastics (c. 420 b.c.). He is said to have made his patients walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles. He was satirized by Plato and by his old pupil Hippo-

the property away or selling it. In a word, being wealthy consists rather in use than in possession ; for the actualization^a and use of such things is wealth.

A good reputation consists in being considered a man of worth by all, or in possessing something of such a nature that all or most men, or the good, or the men of practical wisdom desire it.

Honour is a token of a reputation for doing good ; and those who have already done good are justly and above all honoured, not but that he who is capable of doing good is also honoured. Doing good relates either to personal security and all the causes of existence ; or to wealth ; or to any other good things which are not easy to acquire, either in any conditions, or at such a place, or at such a time ; for many obtain honour for things that appear trifling, but this depends upon place and time. The components of honour are sacrifices, memorials in verse and prose, privileges, grants of land, front seats, public burial, State maintenance, and among the barbarians, prostration and giving place, and all gifts which are highly prized in each country. For a gift is at once a giving of a possession and a token of honour ; wherefore gifts are desired by the ambitious and by those who are fond of money, since they are an acquisition for the latter and an honour for the former ; so that they furnish both with what they want.

Bodily excellence is health, and of such a kind that when exercising the body we are free from sickness ; for many are healthy in the way Herodicus^b is said to have been, whom no one would consider crates as one who killed those for whom he prescribed (*cf.* ii. 23. 29).

ἄν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων.

11 Κάλλος δὲ ἔτερον καθ' ἕκαστην ἡλικίαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τούς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἥδūν ὅντα ἵδεν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν, διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς βίαν καὶ πρὸς τάχος ἄμα πεφύκασιν· ἀκμάζοντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικούς, ἥδūν δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖν μετὰ φοβερότητος· γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἰκανόν, ἄλυπον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὥν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται.

12 Ἰσχὺς δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν ἔτερον ὡς βούλεται, ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἔτερον ἢ ἔλκοντα ἢ ὠθοῦντα ἢ αἴροντα ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἴσχυρὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τούτων τισίν ἐστιν ἴσχυρός.

13 Μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπερέχειν κατὰ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσούτῳ μείζονι ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

14 Ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετὴ σύγκειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἴσχύος καὶ τάχους· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἴσχυρός ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ρίπτεν πως καὶ κινεῖν ταχὺ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὥσαι τῇ

^a Five contests: jumping, running, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing, wrestling.

^b Or simply, " freedom from pain " (§ 15).

happy in the matter of health, because they are obliged to abstain from all or nearly all human enjoyments.

Beauty varies with each age. In a young man, it consists in possessing a body capable of enduring all efforts, either of the racecourse or of bodily strength, while he himself is pleasant to look upon and a sheer delight. This is why the athletes in the pentathlum ^a are most beautiful, because they are naturally adapted for bodily exertion and for swiftness of foot. In a man who has reached his prime, beauty consists in being naturally adapted for the toils of war, in being pleasant to look upon and at the same time awe-inspiring. In an old man, beauty consists in being naturally adapted to contend with unavoidable labours and in not causing annoyance ^b to others, thanks to the absence of the disagreeable accompaniments of old age.

Strength consists in the power of moving another as one wills, for which purpose it is necessary to pull or push, to lift, to squeeze or crush, so that the strong man is strong by virtue of being able to do all or some of these things.

Excellence of stature consists in being superior to most men in height, depth, and breadth, but in such proportion as not to render the movements of the body slower as the result of excess.

Bodily excellence in athletics consists in size, strength, and swiftness of foot ; for to be swift is to be strong. For one who is able to throw his legs about in a certain way, to move them rapidly and with long strides, makes a good runner ; one who can hug and grapple, a good wrestler ; one who can thrust away by a blow of the fist, a good boxer ;

πληγῆ πυκτικός, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος.

15 Εὐγηρία δ' ἐστὶ βραδυτὴς γήρως μετ' ἀλυπίας· οὕτε γὰρ εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὐγηρως, οὕτ' εἰ μόγις μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ τύχης· μὴ ἄνοσος γὰρ ὃν μηδὲ ἴσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθῆς οὐδ' ἄλυπος καὶ πολυχρόνιος ἄνευ τύχης διαμεύνειν ἄν. ἔστι δέ τις καὶ χωρὶς ἴσχύος καὶ ὑγιείας ἄλλη δύναμις μακροβιότητος· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν μακρόβιοι εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία χρήσιμος ἡ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ νῦν.

16 Πολυφιλία δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα τοῦ φίλου ὥρισμένου, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅστις ἂν οἴεται ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ἐκείνῳ, πρακτικός ἐστιν αὐτῶν δι' ἐκείνον. Ὡδὴ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πολύφιλος, ὧδε καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρες, χρηστόφιλος.

17 Εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, ὃν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτίᾳ, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἡ πάντα ἡ τὰ πλεῖστα ἡ τὰ μέγιστα. αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίσιν μὲν ὃν καὶ αἱ τέχναι, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις (ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι). ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτίᾳ, κάλλους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους

^a A combination of wrestling and boxing.

^b The results of art and the results due to nature are often assisted (or hindered) by the interference of the irregular operations of fortune or chance. Health may be the result of fortune, as well as of art (a sick man may be cured by a drug taken by chance, one not prescribed by the physician); beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It is parenthetically remarked that fortune may also produce unnatural monstrosities. The removal of the brackets and the substitution of a comma for the colon after φύσις have

one who excels in boxing and wrestling is fit for the pancratium,^a he who excels in all for the pentathlum.

A happy old age is one that comes slowly with freedom from pain ; for neither one who rapidly grows old nor one who grows old insensibly but with pain enjoys a happy old age. This also depends upon bodily excellences and good fortune ; for unless a man is free from illness and is strong, he will never be free from suffering, nor will he live long and painlessly without good fortune. Apart from health and strength, however, there is a power of vitality in certain cases ; for many live long who are not endowed with bodily excellences. But a minute examination of such questions is needless for the present purpose.

The meaning of numerous and worthy friends is easy to understand from the definition of a friend. A friend is one who exerts himself to do for the sake of another what he thinks is advantageous to him. A man to whom many persons are so disposed, has many friends ; if they are virtuous, he has worthy friends.

Good fortune consists in the acquisition or possession of either all, or the most, or the most important of those goods of which fortune is the cause. Now fortune is the cause of some things with which the arts also are concerned, and also of many which have nothing to do with art, for instance, such as are due to nature (though it is possible that the results of fortune may be contrary to nature) ; for art is a cause of health, but nature of beauty and stature.^b

been suggested. The meaning would then be : "for instance, such as are due to nature, but possibly may be also contrary to nature."

φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ἀπὸ τύχης, ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ὁ φθόνος. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγου ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὁ δ' εὑρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίου ἔτυχε τὸ βέλος, τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἥλθε μόνος ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἄπαξ ἐλθόντες διεφθάρησαν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐτυχήματα δοκεῖ εἶναι.

18 Περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς, ἐπείπερ οὔκειότατος ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τόπος, ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου ποιώμεθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.

6. Ὡν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομένων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὥν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τούτων ἔστιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ' ἔστι τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον ἀν εἴη στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἀπλῶς.

2 "Εστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὁ ἀν αὐτὸν ἔνεκα ἢ αἴρετόν, καὶ οὖν ἔνεκα ἄλλο αἴρούμεθα, καὶ οὖν ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν, ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν. καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἀν ἔκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἔκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἔκάστῳ, τοῦτό ἔστιν ἔκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὖν παρόντος εὖ διάκειται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὐταρκεῖ, καὶ

Speaking generally, the goods which come from fortune are such as excite envy. Fortune is also a cause of those goods which are beyond calculation; for instance, a man's brothers are all ugly, while he is handsome; they did not see the treasure, while he found it; the arrow hit one who stood by and not the man aimed at; or, one who frequented a certain place was the only one who did not go there on a certain occasion, while those who went there then for the first time met their death. All such instances appear to be examples of good fortune.

The definition of virtue, with which the topic of praise is most closely connected, must be left until we come to treat of the latter.

6. It is evident, then, what things, likely to happen or already existing, the orator should aim at, when exhorting, and what when dissuading; for they are opposites. But since the aim before the deliberative orator is that which is expedient, and men deliberate, not about the end, but about the means to the end, which are the things which are expedient in regard to our actions; and since, further, the expedient is good, we must first grasp the elementary notions of good and expedient in general.

Let us assume good to be whatever is desirable for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose something else; that which is the aim of all things, or of all things that possess sensation or reason; or would be, if they could acquire the latter. Whatever reason might assign to each and whatever reason does assign to each in individual cases, that is good for each; and that whose presence makes a man fit and also independent; and independence in

τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ὡς
ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναν-
τίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.

3 Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἄμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον
τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ
ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἄμα. καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς,
τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς σιτία
ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
4 πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν. τούτων δὲ κειμένων ἀνάγκη
τὰς τε λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ τὰς
τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολάς· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ
μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν ἄμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν
5 ὕστερον. καὶ ἡ ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος
λῆψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάττονος· ὡς γὰρ
1362 b ὑπερέχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τούτῳ γίνεται
6 τοῦ μὲν λῆψις τοῦ δ' ἀποβολή. καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ
ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διά-
κεινται οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ
καὶ πρακτικαί. περὶ ἔκαστης δέ, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία,
7 χωρὶς ῥητέον. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα
γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῶα αὐτῆς τῇ φύσει. ὥστε καὶ τὰ
ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ
αὐτὰ καθ' ἔαυτὰ αἴρετά ἐστιν.

8 Ὡς δὲ καθ' ἐν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε.
εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸν αἴρετὸν καὶ αὕτ-
9 αρκεῖ, καὶ ἐνεκα αὐτοῦ πολλὰ αἴροιμεθα. δικαιο-
σύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλο-
πρέπεια καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἔξεις· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ
60

general ; and that which produces or preserves such things, or on which such things follow, or all that is likely to prevent or destroy their opposites.

Now things follow in two ways—simultaneously or subsequently ; for instance, knowledge is subsequent to learning, but life is simultaneous with health. Things which produce act in three ways ; thus, healthiness produces health ; and so does food ; and exercise as a rule. This being laid down, it necessarily follows that the acquisition of good things and the loss of evil things are both good ; for it follows simultaneously on the latter that we are rid of that which is bad, and subsequently on the former that we obtain possession of that which is good. The same applies to the acquisition of a greater in place of a less good, and a less in place of a greater evil ; for in proportion as the greater exceeds the less, there is an acquisition of the one and a loss of the other. The virtues also must be a good thing ; for those who possess them are in a sound condition, and they are also productive of good things and practical. However, we must speak separately concerning each—what it is, and of what kind. Pleasure also must be a good ; for all living creatures naturally desire it. Hence it follows that both agreeable and beautiful things must be good ; for the former produce pleasure, while among beautiful things some are pleasant and others are desirable in themselves.

To enumerate them one by one, the following things must necessarily be good. Happiness, since it is desirable in itself and self-sufficient, and to obtain it we choose a number of things. Justice, courage, self-control, magnanimity, magnificence, and all other similar states of mind, for they are virtues

10 ψυχῆς. καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·
 ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώματος καὶ ποιητικαὶ πολλῶν, οἷον ἡ
 ὑγίεια καὶ ἥδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον
 δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι δύο τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων
 11 αἴτιόν ἔστιν, ἥδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν. πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ
 12 γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν πολλῶν. φίλος καὶ
 φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ φίλος καὶ
 13 ποιητικὸς πολλῶν. τιμή, δόξα· καὶ γὰρ ἥδεα καὶ
 ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 14 πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ' οἷς τιμῶνται. δύναμις τοῦ
 λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν· ποιητικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ
 15 τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν. ἔτι εὐφυΐα, μνήμη, εὐμάθεια,
 ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὗται
 ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἐπι-
 στῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ γὰρ
 16 μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ' αὐτὸν αἱρετὸν
 ἔστιν. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἔστιν.
 17 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ διμολογούμενα ἀγαθά
 18 ἔστιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ
 συλλογισμοί. ὥς τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν.
 19 καὶ οὖν τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἔχθροῖς συμφέρει· οἷον εἰ
 τὸ δειλοὺς εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἔχθροῖς,
 δῆλον ὅτι ἀνδρία μάλιστα ὠφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις.
 20 καὶ ὅλως ὁ οἵ ἔχθροὶ βούλονται ἦ ἐφ' ὧ χαίρουσι,
 τούναντίον τούτῳ ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εὖ εἴ-
 ρηται

^a The excellence of anything is proportionate to its success in the performance of its proper function. The function of acquisition is to get something valuable, such as money, and its "excellence" may be judged by the amount of wealth obtained.

of the soul. Health, beauty, and the like, for they are virtues of the body and produce many advantages ; for instance, health is productive of pleasure and of life, wherefore it is thought to be best of all, because it is the cause of two things which the majority of men prize most highly. Wealth, since it is the excellence of acquisition^a and productive of many things. A friend and friendship, since a friend is desirable in himself and produces many advantages. Honour and good repute, since they are agreeable and produce many advantages, and are generally accompanied by the possession of those things for which men are honoured. Eloquence and capacity for action ; for all such faculties are productive of many advantages. Further, natural cleverness, good memory, readiness to learn, quick-wittedness, and all similar qualities ; for these faculties are productive of advantages. The same applies to all the sciences, arts, and even life, for even though no other good should result from it, it is desirable in itself. Lastly, justice, since it is expedient in general for the common weal.

These are nearly all the things generally recognized as good ; in the case of doubtful goods, the arguments in their favour are drawn from the following. That is good the opposite of which is evil, or the opposite of which is advantageous to our enemies ; for instance, if it is specially advantageous to our enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that courage is specially advantageous to the citizens. And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our enemies desire or of that in which they rejoice, appears to be advantageous ; wherefore it was well said :

ἢ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐδὲν
γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταῦτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις.
ὅθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους,
1363 a ὅταν ἢ ταῦτὸ βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν.

21 Καὶ ὁ μή ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὁ δ' ἄν-
22 ἢ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ, κακόν. καὶ οὖ ἐνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνη-
ται ἢ δεδαπάνηται· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἥδη,
καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ
τέλος πολλῶν· τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν. ὅθεν ταῦτ
εἴρηται,

καὸ δέ κεν εὐχωλὴν Πριάμῳ [καὶ Τρωσὶ λίποιεν
'Αργείην 'Ελένην]

καὶ

αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν [κενεόν τε νέεσθαι],

καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν.

23 Καὶ οὖ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον
φαινόμενον· οὖ γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται, τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν
24 ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ πάντες φαίνονται. καὶ τὸ
ἐπαινετόν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ
ὅ οἱ ἔχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἥδη

^a *Iliad*, i. 255. The words are those of Nestor to Achilles and Agamemnon, in which he points out how their enemies would rejoice if they heard all the story of their quarrel.

^b Reading ὁ. The ordinary reading οὐ is taken to mean "that which does not permit of excess," that which is midway between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested rendering is, "that of which one cannot have too much."

^c *Iliad*, ii. 160. Addressed by Hera to Athene, begging her to prevent the Greeks departing from Troy and leaving Helen behind.

Of a truth Priam would exult.^a

This is not always the case, but only as a general rule, for there is nothing to prevent one and the same thing being sometimes advantageous to two opposite parties ; hence it is said that misfortune brings men together, when a common danger threatens them.

That which is not in excess ^b is good, whereas that which is greater than it should be, is bad. And that which has cost much labour and expense, for it at once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a thing is regarded as an end, and an end of many efforts ; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was said :

And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the Trojans] to boast of,^c
and,

It is disgraceful to tarry long,^d

and the proverb, “[to break] the pitcher at the door.”^e

And that which many aim at and which is seen to be competed for by many ; for that which all aim at was recognized as a good, and the majority may almost stand for “all.” And that which is the object of praise, for no one praises that which is not good. And that which is praised by enemies ; for if even

^a *Iliad*, ii. 298. Spoken by Odysseus. While sympathizing with the desire of the army to leave, he points out that it would be “disgraceful after waiting so long” to return unsuccessful, and exhorts them to hold out.

^b Proverbial for “lost labour.” Cf. French “faire naufrage au port,” and the English “there’s many a slip ‘twixt cup and lip.”

ARISTOTLE

όμολογοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες· διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν ὄμολογοῖν ἄν, ὥσπερ καὶ φαῦλοι οὓς οἱ ἔχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν. διὸ λελοιδορῆσθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος

Κορινθίοις δ' οὐ μέμφεται τὸ "Ιλιον.

25 καὶ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οἶον Ὁδυσσέα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἐλένην Θησεὺς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὄμηρος.

26 Καὶ ὅλως τὰ προαιρετά· προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν τά τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἔχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ

27 τὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά. ταῦτα δὲ διχῶς ἔστι, τά τε γενόμενα ἄν καὶ τὰ ράδίως γιγνόμενα. ράδια δὲ ὅσα ἡ ἄνευ λύπης ἡ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν δρίζεται ἡ λύπη ἡ πλήθει χρόνου. καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἡ μηδὲν κακὸν ἡ ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν ἡ λανθάνη ἡ τιμωρία ἡ μικρὰ ἡ. καὶ τὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἀμηδεῖς, καὶ τὰ περιττά· τιμὴ γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε προσήκουτα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ὅν ἐλλείπειν

^a Meaning that they cannot have done their duty against their enemies, who would then have blamed them. Another suggested reading is οὓς οἱ φίλοι ψέγονται καὶ οὓς οἱ ἔχθροι μὴ ψέγονται ("those whom their friends blame and whom their enemies do not blame").

^b In the *Iliad* Glaucon, a Corinthian, is described as an ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were meant satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed by Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of Ceos (Frag. 50, *P.L.G.* iii., where the line is differently given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as he often does, although not always accurately.

those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness, this amounts to a universal recognition of it ; for it is because of its goodness being evident that they acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies praise are worthless.^a Wherefore the Corinthians imagined themselves insulted by Simonides, when he wrote,

Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.^b

And that which one of the practically wise or good, man or woman, has chosen before others, as Athene chose Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Alexander (Paris), and Homer Achilles.

And, generally speaking, all that is deliberately chosen is good. Now, men deliberately choose to do the things just mentioned, and those which are harmful to their enemies, and advantageous to their friends, and things which are possible. The last are of two kinds : things which might happen,^c and things which easily happen ; by the latter are meant things that happen without labour or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labour or length of time. And anything that happens as men wish is good ; and what they wish is either what is not evil at all or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case for instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is unnoticed or light. And things that are peculiar to them, or which no one else possesses,^d or which are out of the common ; for thus the honour is greater. And things which are appropriate to them ; such are all things befitting them in respect of birth and power. And things which they think they lack,

^c γενόμενα ἄν : Spengel omits ἄν : i.e. "things which have happened."

^d "Or which no one else has done" (Jebb).

οἴονται, καὶ μικρὰ ἥ· οὐδέν γὰρ ἥττον προαιροῦνται
 29 ταῦτα πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατέργαστα· δυνατὰ
 γὰρ ὡς ράδια· εὐκατέργαστα δέ, ἀπάντες ἢ οἱ
 πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἢ οἱ ἥττους κατώρθωσαν. καὶ
 ἀχαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς
 ἔχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οὖς θαυμάζουσι προαιροῦνται
 πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἀεύφυεῖς εἰσὶ καὶ ἔμπειροι·
 ρᾶσιν γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴονται. καὶ ἀμηδεῖς
 φαῦλος· ἐπαινετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὅν ἐπιθυμοῦν-
 τες τυγχάνουσιν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἥδυν ἀλλὰ καὶ
 30 βέλτιον φαίνεται. καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἄ-
 1363 b τοιοῦτοι, οἷον οἱ φιλόνικοι εἰ νίκη ἔσται, οἱ φιλό-
 τιμοι εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ οἱ
 ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ
 συμφέροντος ἐκ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις.

7. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦντες ἄμφω συμ-
 φέρειν περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἀν-
 εἴη λεκτέον περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ
 2 μᾶλλον συμφέροντος. ἔστω δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν το-
 σοῦτον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον.
 καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἔλαττον, μέγα
 δὲ καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν
 πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ
 ἐλλεῖπον μικρόν, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως.
 3 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τό τε αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα

however unimportant ; for none the less they deliberately choose to acquire them. And things which are easy of accomplishment, for being easy they are possible ; such things are those in which all, or most men, or those who are equals or inferiors have been successful. And things whereby they will gratify friends or incur the hatred of enemies. And all things that those whom they admire deliberately choose to do. And those things in regard to which they are clever naturally or by experience ; for they hope to be more easily successful in them. And things which no worthless man would approve, for that makes them the more commendable. And things which they happen to desire, for such things seem not only agreeable, but also better. Lastly, and above all, each man thinks those things good which are the object of his special desire, as victory of the man who desires victory, honour of the ambitious man, money of the avaricious, and so in other instances. These then are the materials from which we must draw our arguments in reference to good and the expedient.

7. But since men often agree that both of two things are useful, but dispute which is the more so, we must next speak of the greater good and the more expedient. Let one thing, then, be said to exceed another, when it is as great and something more—and to be exceeded when it is contained in the other. “Greater” and “more” always imply a relation with less ; “great” and “small,” “much” and “little” with the general size of things ; the “great” is that which exceeds, and that which falls short of it is “small” ; and similarly “much” and “little.” Since, besides, we call good that which is

καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἵρετόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἀν καὶ φρόνησιν λαβόντα ἔλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἢ ὡς ἐπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστί, τέλος δ' ἐστὶν οὐ ἔνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τά τε πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερέχεται.

- 4 Καὶ ἔὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχῃ, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου· οἷον εἰ δὲ μέγιστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους· καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ δὲ μέγιστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γάρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπεροχαὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ
 5 ὅταν τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἐπηται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτῳ μή· ἐπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἀμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γάρ ἢ χρῆσις ἢ τοῦ ἐπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου. ἐπεται δὲ ἀμα μὲν τῷ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὕ, ὕστερον δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· δὲ γάρ ἱεροσυλήσας καν ἀποστερήσειεν. καὶ

^a The one, the smaller number, and the greater number must be of the same species. Thus, 5 pounds is a greater good than 2 pounds; but 5 farthings is not a greater good than 2 pounds, since the smaller number is not reckoned in with the greater (Buckley).

^b If B (life) follows on, is the consequent of A (health), but A is not the consequent of B, then A is a greater good than B.

desirable for its own sake and not for anything else, and that which all things aim at and which they would choose if they possessed reason and practical wisdom ; and that which is productive or protective of good, or on which such things follow ; and since that for the sake of which anything is done is the end, and the end is that for the sake of which everything else is done, and that is good for each man which relatively to him presents all these conditions, it necessarily follows that a larger number of good things is a greater good than one or a smaller number, if the one or the smaller number is reckoned as one of them ;^a for it exceeds them and that which is contained is exceeded.

And if that which is greatest in one class surpass that which is greatest in another class, the first class will surpass the second ; and whenever one class surpasses another, the greatest of that class will surpass the greatest of the other. For instance, if the biggest man is greater than the biggest woman, men in general will be bigger than women ; and if men in general are bigger than women, the biggest man will be bigger than the biggest woman ; for the superiority of classes and of the greatest things contained in them are proportionate. And when this follows on that, but not that on this [then "that" is the greater good] ;^b for the enjoyment of that which follows is contained in that of the other. Now, things follow simultaneously, or successively, or potentially ; thus, life follows simultaneously on health, but not health on life ; knowledge follows subsequently on learning [but not learning on knowledge] ; and simple theft potentially on sacrilege, for one who commits sacrilege will also steal.

6 τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι μείζω· ἀνάγκη
 7 γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μείζονος. καὶ τὰ μείζονος
 ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ μείζονος
 ποιητικῷ εἶναι. καὶ οὖν τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον, ὡσ-
 αύτως· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν αἴρετώτερον τοῦ ἥδεος
 καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἥδονῆς μείζων.

8 καὶ τὸ αἴρετώτερον καθ' αὐτὸν μὴ καθ' αὐτό,

1364a οἷον ἵσχυς ὑγιεινοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα,

9 τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν. κανὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν
 τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου ἔνεκα, τὸ
 δὲ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὗ ἔχειν τὸ

10 σῶμα. καὶ τὸ ἥπτον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ
 ἐτέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γάρ· ἥπτον δὲ προσδεῖται

11 τὸ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ῥᾳδίνων προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν
 τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ ἢ ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ἢ γενέσθαι,
 θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου· αὐταρκέστερον δὲ τὸ μὴ
 δεόμενον, ὡστε φαίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν.

12 Κανὸν δὲ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή. κανὸν δὲ αἴτιον, τὸ δ'
 οὐκ αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό· ἄνευ γὰρ αἴτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς
 ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ
 ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἴτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ μείζονος αἴτίου μεῖζον. καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὴ δυοῖν
 ἀρχαῖν ἡ τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχὴ μείζων καὶ δυοῖν αἴτίοιν

^a Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is greater than 2.

And things which exceed the same thing by a greater amount [than something else] are greater, for they must also exceed the greater.^a And things which produce a greater good are greater; for this we agreed was the meaning of productive of greater. And similarly, that which is produced by a greater cause; for if that which produces health is more desirable than that which produces pleasure and a greater good, then health is a greater good than pleasure. And that which is more desirable in itself is superior to that which is not; for example, strength is a greater good than the wholesome, which is not desirable for its own sake, while strength is; and this we agreed was the meaning of a good. And the end is a greater good than the means; for the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, the former for its own sake; for instance, exercise is only a means for the acquirement of a good constitution. And that which has less need of one or several other things in addition is a greater good, for it is more independent (and "having less need" means needing fewer or easier additions). And when one thing does not exist or cannot be brought into existence without the aid of another, but that other can, then that which needs no aid is more independent, and accordingly is seen to be a greater good.

And if one thing is a first principle, and another not; if one thing is a cause and another not, for the same reason; for without cause or first principle nothing can exist or come into existence. And if there are two first principles or two causes, that which results from the greater is greater; and conversely, when there are two first principles or two causes, that which is the first cause or principle

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13 τὸ τοῦ μεῖζονος αἴτιον μεῖζον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μεῖζόν ἔστιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δόξει μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχή, τὸ γὰρ τέλος μεῖζον καὶ οὐκ ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βουλεύσαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν πραχθῆναι μὴ βουλευσαμένου· πάλιν δὲ καὶ Χαβρίου, τὸν πράξαντα τοῦ βουλεύσαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἀν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων τούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν.

14 Καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδῆρου ἀχρηστότερος ὅν· μεῖζον γὰρ ἡ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέραν εἶναι. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἀφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει· ὅθεν λέγεται ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.

15 καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ ῥάγονος· σπανιώτερον γάρ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ῥάγον τοῦ χαλεπω-

^a A thing may be of greater importance in two ways: (*a*) that which is a first principle is superior to that which is not; (*b*) that which is not a first principle, but an end, is superior to that which is a first principle; for the end is superior to the means. In the illustration that follows: (*a*) the first principle (suggesting the plot) is said to be of more importance (worse) than the end or result (carrying out the plot); (*b*) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than the first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus the question of the amount of guilt can be argued both ways.

^b Oropus, a frontier-town of Boeotia and Attica, had been occupied by the Thebans (366 B.C.). Callistratus suggested an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by Chabrias—that the town should remain in Theban possession for the time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and

of the greater is greater. It is clear then, from what has been said, that a thing may be greater in two ways ; for if it is a first principle but another is not, it will appear to be greater, and if it is not a first principle [but an end], while another is ; for the end is greater and not a first principle.^a Thus, Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus,^b declared that the man who had given the advice was more guilty than the one who carried it out ; for if he had not suggested it, it could not have been carried out. And conversely, when accusing Chabrias, he declared that the man who had carried out the advice was more guilty than the one who had given it ; for it could not have been carried out, had there not been some one to do so, and the reason why people devised plots was that others might carry them out.

And that which is scarcer is a greater good than that which is abundant, as gold than iron, although it is less useful, but the possession of it is more valuable, since it is more difficult of acquisition. From another point of view, that which is abundant is to be preferred to that which is scarce, because the use of it is greater, for “ often ” exceeds “ seldom ” ; whence the saying :

Water is best.^c

And, speaking generally, that which is more difficult is preferable to that which is easier of attainment, for it is scarcer ; but from another point of view that which is easier is preferable to that which is more

the Thebans refused to leave, whereupon Chabrias and Callistratus were brought to trial. Leodamas was an Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his political views.

^a Pindar, *Olympia*, i. 1.

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- 16 τέρου· ἔχει γὰρ ὡς βουλόμεθα. καὶ ὁ τὸ ἐναντίον
 μεῖζον, καὶ οὐδὲ η στέρησις μεῖζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ
 ἀρετῆς καὶ κακία μὴ κακίας μεῖζων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
 17 τέλη, τὰ δὲ οὐ τέλη. καὶ ὅν τὰ ἔργα καλλίω η̄
 αἰσχίω, μεῖζω αὐτά. καὶ ὅν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ
 ἀρεταὶ μεῖζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα μεῖζω, ἐπείπερ ὡς τὰ
 αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ
 18 ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί. καὶ ὅν
 η ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετωτέρα η̄ καλλίων, οἷον τὸ ἀκριβῶς
 ὅρâν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὅψις
 1364 b ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τὸ φιλεταῖρον εἶναι τοῦ φιλοχρή-
 ματον μᾶλλον κάλλιον, ὥστε καὶ φιλεταιρία φιλο-
 χρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων
 αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους καὶ καλλιόνων καλλίους.
 19 καὶ ὅν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους η̄ βελτίους· αἱ γὰρ
 μεῖζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλλιό-
 νων δὲ η̄ καὶ βελτιόνων αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ
 καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτό.
 20 Καὶ ὅν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι καλλίους η̄ σπουδαιότεραι,
 καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότερα· ὡς
 γὰρ ἔχει η̄ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· κελεύει δὲ τὸ
 αὐτῆς ἔκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων δὲ καὶ
 21 καλλιόνων αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ ταῦτα. καὶ
 ὁ κρίνειαν ἄν η̄ κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι η̄ πάντες η̄
 οἱ πολλοὶ η̄ οἱ πλείους η̄ οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθὸν η̄

^a e.g. it is worse to be blind than deaf; therefore sight is better than hearing (Schrader).

difficult ; for its nature is as we wish. And that, the contrary or the deprivation of which is greater, is the greater good.^a And virtue is greater than non-virtue, and vice than non-vice ; for virtues and vices are ends, the others not. And those things whose works are nobler or more disgraceful are themselves greater ; and the works of those things, the vices and virtues of which are greater, will also be greater, since between causes and first principles compared with results there is the same relation as between results compared with causes and first principles. Things, superiority in which is more desirable or nobler, are to be preferred ; for instance, sharpness of sight is preferable to keenness of smell ; for sight is better than smell. And loving one's friends more than money is nobler, whence it follows that love of friends is nobler than love of money. And, on the other hand, the better and nobler things are, the better and nobler will be their superiority ; and similarly, those things, the desire for which is nobler and better, are themselves nobler and better, for greater longings are directed towards greater objects. For the same reason, the better and nobler the object, the better and nobler are the desires.

And when the sciences are nobler and more dignified, the nobler and more dignified are their subjects ; for as is the science, so is the truth which is its object, and each science prescribes that which properly belongs to it ; and, by analogy, the nobler and more dignified the objects of a science, the nobler and more dignified is the science itself, for the same reasons. And that which men of practical wisdom, either all, or more, or the best of them, would judge, or have judged, to be a greater good, must necessarily

μεῖζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἢ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔκριναν. ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ τὶ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἴποι. ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὃ λαβόντα τὰ πράγματα φρόνησιν ἔλοιτ’ ἂν ἔκαστον· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ μεῖζον, ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις 22 λέγει. καὶ τὸ τοῦς βελτίους ὑπάρχον, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἢ βελτίους, οἷον ἀνδρία ἴσχυος. καὶ ὁ ἔλοιτ’ ἂν ὁ βελτίων, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἢ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῦν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἂν 23 ἔλοιτο. καὶ τὸ ἥδιον τοῦ ἥπτον ἥδεος· τὴν γὰρ ἥδονὴν πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἥδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρισται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος. ἥδιον δὲ τό τε ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυ- 24 χρονιώτερον ἥδυ. καὶ τὸ κάλλιον τοῦ ἥπτον καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλόν ἐστιν ἥτοι τὸ ἥδυν ἢ τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ 25 αἴρετόν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἢ φίλοις βούλονται αἴτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μείζω ἀγαθά, 26 ὅσων δὲ ἥκιστα, μείζω κακά. καὶ τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγοχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα τῶν μὴ βεβαιοτέρων· ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βεβαίου.

27 Καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν ὅμοίων

be such, either absolutely or in so far as they have judged as men of practical wisdom. The same may be said in regard to everything else ; for the nature, quantity, and quality of things are such as would be defined by science and practical wisdom. But our statement only applies to goods ; for we defined that as good which everything, if possessed of practical wisdom, would choose ; hence it is evident that that is a greater good to which practical wisdom assigns the superiority. So also are those things which better men possess, either absolutely, or in so far as they are better ; for instance courage is better than strength. And what the better man would choose, either absolutely or in so far as he is better ; thus, it is better to suffer wrong than to commit it, for that is what the juster man would choose. And that which is more agreeable rather than that which is less so ; for all things pursue pleasure and desire it for its own sake ; and it is by these conditions that the good and the end have been defined. And that is more agreeable which is less subject to pain and is agreeable for a longer time. And that which is nobler than that which is less noble ; for the noble is that which is either agreeable or desirable in itself. And all things which we have a greater desire to be instrumental in procuring for ourselves or for our friends are greater goods, and those as to which our desire is least are greater evils. And things that last longer are preferable to those that are of shorter duration, and those that are safer to those that are less so ; for time increases the use of the first and the wish that of the second ; for whenever we wish, we can make greater use of things that are safe.

And things in all cases follow the relations between

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πτώσεων, καὶ τᾶλλ’ ἀκολουθεῖ· οἶνον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως
 κάλλιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρίᾳ
 σωφροσύνης αἱρετωτέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τοῦ
 28 σωφρονεῖν. καὶ ὁ πάντες αἱροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὁ
 πάντες. καὶ ὁ οἱ πλείους ἦ[δ]¹ οἱ ἐλάπτους· ἀγαθὸν
 1365 a γὰρ ἦν οὖν πάντες ἐφίενται, ὥστε καὶ μεῖζον οὐ
 μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἔχθροὶ ἢ οἱ
 κρίνοντες ἢ οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν
 εἰ πάντες φαῖεν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες.
 29 καὶ ὅτε μὲν οὖν πάντες μετέχουσι μεῖζον· ἀτιμία
 γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν· ὅτε δὲ οὖν μηδεὶς ἢ οὖν ὀλίγοι·
 30 σπανιώτερον γάρ. καὶ τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα· καλλίω
 γάρ. καὶ ὅν αἱ τιμαὶ μείζους, ὠσαύτως· ἢ γὰρ
 τιμὴ ὥσπερ ἀξία τις ἐστίν. καὶ ὅν αἱ ζημίαι
 31 μείζους. καὶ τὰ τῶν ὄμολογονμένων ἢ φαινομένων
 μεγάλων μείζω. καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη
 τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται· πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν
 φαίνεται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησι πεῖσαι τὸν
 Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι

ὅσσα κάκ’ ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἀλώη·
 λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,
 τέκνα δέ τ’ ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.

Καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὥσπερ

¹ Inserted by Spengel.

^a “Things of which the prices are greater, price being a sort of worth” (Jebb).

^b Or, “superiority over a greater number of things.”

^c After πεῖσαι all the mss. except Λ^c (Paris) have λέγουσαν. If this is retained, it must refer to Meleager’s wife Cleopatra, who “persuaded him . . . by quoting.” As the text stands, the literal rendering is: “the poet says that (the recital of the three verses) persuaded.” The passage is from *Iliad*, ix. 592-594 (slightly different). ^d See Glossary.

co-ordinates and similar inflexions ; for instance, if “courageously” is nobler than and preferable to “temperately,” then “courage” is preferable to “temperance,” and it is better to be “courageous” than “temperate.” And that which is chosen by all is better than that which is not ; and that which the majority choose than that which the minority choose ; for, as we have said, the good is that which all desire, and consequently a good is greater, the more it is desired. The same applies to goods which are recognized as greater by opponents or enemies, by judges, or by those whom they select ; for in the one case it would be, so to say, the verdict of all mankind, in the other that of those who are acknowledged authorities and experts. And sometimes a good is greater in which all participate, for it is a disgrace not to participate in it ; sometimes when none or only a few participate in it, for it is scarcer. And things which are more praiseworthy, since they are nobler. And in the same way things which are more highly honoured,^a for honour is a sort of measure of worth ; and conversely those things are greater evils, the punishment for which is greater. And those things which are greater than what is acknowledged, or appears, to be great, are greater. And the same whole when divided into parts appears greater, for there appears to be superiority in a greater number of things.^b Whence the poet says that Meleager was persuaded to rise up and fight by the recital of^c

All the ills that befall those whose city is taken ; the people perish, and fire utterly destroys the city, and strangers carry off the children.

Combination and building up,^d as employed by

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Ἐπίχαρμος, διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει (ἢ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλήν) καὶ ὅτι ἀρχὴ³² φαίνεται μεγάλων καὶ αἴτιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μεῖζον, καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα· εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ παρ’ ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὄμοίους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τόθ^b, ἔξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονίκῃ.

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ’ ὥμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν
ἰχθῦς ἔξ "Ἀργούς εἰς Τέγεαν ἔφερον.

καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἔξ ὧν
33 ὑπῆρξε ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου·
χαλεπώτερον γάρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν
αὐτοδίδακτος δ’ εἰμί.

34 καὶ τὸ μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος· οὗν Περικλῆς τὸν
ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνηρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἕαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἔξαιρεθείη.
35 καὶ τὰ ἐν χρείᾳ μείζονι χρήσιμα, οὗν τὰ ἐν γήρᾳ
καὶ νόσοις. καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους.
καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀπλῶς. καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ

^a Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.C.), writer of comedies and Pythagorean philosopher, was born at Megara in Sicily (according to others, in the island of Cos). His comedies, written in the Doric dialect, and without a chorus, were either mythological or comedies of manners, as extant titles show. Plato speaks of him as "the prince of comedy" and Horace states definitely that he was imitated by Plautus.

^b Simonides, Frag. 163 (*P.L.G.* iii.).

^c Or, the yoke to which the basket, like our milk-pails long ago, was attached.

Epicharmus,^a produce the same effect as division, and for the same reason ; for combination is an exhibition of great superiority and appears to be the origin and cause of great things. And since that which is harder to obtain and scarcer is greater, it follows that special occasions, ages, places, times, and powers, produce great effects ; for if a man does things beyond his powers, beyond his age, and beyond what his equals could do, if they are done in such a manner, in such a place, and at such a time, they will possess importance in actions that are noble, good, or just, or the opposite. Hence the epigram ^b on the Olympian victor :

Formerly, with a rough basket ^c on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.

And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, “ Look what I started from ! ” And that which is natural is a greater good than that which is acquired, because it is harder. Whence the poet says :

Self-taught am I.^d

And that which is the greatest part of that which is great is more to be desired ; as Pericles said in his Funeral Oration, that the removal of the youth from the city was like the year being robbed of its spring.^e And those things which are available in greater need, as in old age and illness, are greater goods. And of two things that which is nearer the end proposed is preferable. And that which is useful for the individual is preferable to that which is useful ab-

^a *Odyssey*, xxii. 347. The words are those of the minstrel Phemius, who was forced to sing to the suitors of Penelope.

^b Not in the oration in Thucydides (ii. 35).

ἀδυνάτου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ οὗ. καὶ τὰ ἐν
τέλει τοῦ βίου· τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει.

36 Καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν. ὅρος δὲ
1365 b τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔλοιτο.

διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν
αἴρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἄν λανθάνη αἴρή-
σεται, ποιεῖν δ’ εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἐλέσθαι.

37 καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον. διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην
φασὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἴρετώτερον·

38 τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὗ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώ-
τερον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὴν
ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλά. διὸ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος
καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἄπαντα γὰρ ἔχει

39 ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς·
πλείω γὰρ ἐνός, ὥστε ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ ἡ ἀλυπία. καὶ δυοῦν ὃ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέ-

40 μενον μεῖζον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. καὶ ἡ μὴ λανθάνει
παρόντα ἢ [ἄ] λανθάνει· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ τείνει
ταῦτα. διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν

^a Or, reading *καὶ ἀπλῶς*: “that which is useful both to the individual and absolutely is a greater good” (than that which is only useful in one way), but this necessitates a considerable ellipse.

solutely ; ^a that which is possible to that which is impossible ; for it is the possible that is useful to us, not the impossible. And those things which are at the end of life ; for things near the end are more like ends.

And real things are preferable to those that have reference to public opinion, the latter being defined as those which a man would not choose if they were likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would seem then that it is better to receive than to confer a benefit ; for one would choose the former even if it should pass unnoticed, whereas one would not choose to confer a benefit, if it were likely to remain unknown. Those things also are to be preferred, which men would rather possess in reality than in appearance, because they are nearer the truth ; wherefore it is commonly said that justice is a thing of little importance, because people prefer to appear just than to be just ; and this is not the case, for instance, in regard to health. The same may be said of things that serve several ends ; for instance, those that assist us to live, to live well, to enjoy life, and to do noble actions ; wherefore health and wealth seem to be the greatest goods, for they include all these advantages. And that which is more free from pain and accompanied by pleasure is a greater good ; for there is more than one good, since pleasure and freedom from pain combined are both goods. And of two goods the greater is that which, added to one and the same, makes the whole greater. And those things, the presence of which does not escape notice, are preferable to those which pass unnoticed, because they appear more real ; whence being wealthy would appear to be a greater good than the appearance of

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41 τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἵση ζημία, ἢν τις τὸν ἐτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δύ' ἔχοντα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφήρηται.

8. Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις φέρειν ἐν τῷ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἴρηται. μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἀπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν, τὰς πολιτείας ἀπάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἔκαστης ἔθη καὶ τὸ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα διελεῖν. πείθονται γὰρ ἀπαντεῖς τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κυρία μέν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφανσις,¹ τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας· ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν.

3. Εἰσὶ δὲ πολιτεῖαι τέτταρες, δημοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία ἀριστοκρατία μοναρχία· ὥστε τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον τούτων τί ἐστιν ἀεὶ μόριον, ἢ ὅλον τούτων. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατία μὲν πολιτείᾳ ἐν ἣν κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐν ἣν οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν ἣν οἱ κατὰ παιδείαν. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κειμένην· οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἄρχουσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους

¹ The ordinary ms. reading is ἀπόφασις, but this word appears most commonly to mean "negation" (from ἀπόφημι) in Aristotle, as opposed to "affirmation" (from κατάφημι). ἀποφανσις is from ἀπόφαινω.

^a It is difficult to see the connexion here. Munro's suggestion, τῷ δοκεῖν for τοῦ δοκεῖν, adopted by Roemer, would mean "by the show of it," that is, by its attracting notice.

^b Or, "is not punished equally."

^c The pronouncements of the supreme authority are them-

it.^a And that which is held most dear, sometimes alone, sometimes accompanied by other things, is a greater good. Wherefore he who puts out the eye of a one-eyed man and he who puts out one eye of another who has two, does not do equal injury^b; for in the former case, a man has been deprived of that which he held most dear.

8. These are nearly all the topics from which arguments may be drawn in persuading and dissuading; but the most important and effective of all the means of persuasion and good counsel is to know all the forms of government and to distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each; for all men are guided by considerations of expediency, and that which preserves the State is expedient. Further, the declaration of the authority is authoritative,^c and the different kinds of authority are distinguished according to forms of government; in fact, there are as many authorities as there are forms of government.

Now, there are four kinds of government, democraey, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, so that the supreme and deciding authority is always a part or the whole of these. Democracy is a form of government in which the offices are distributed by the people among themselves by lot; in an oligarchy, by those who possess a certain property-qualification; in an aristocracy, by those who possess an educational qualification, meaning an education that is laid down by the law. In fact, in an aristocracy, power and office are in the hands of those who have remained faithful to what the law prescribes, and selves authoritative as laying down laws and regulations for the citizens.

φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα εἴληφε τοῦτο.
 1366^a μοναρχία δ' ἔστι κατὰ τοῦνομα ἐν ᾧ εἰς ἀπάντων
 κύριος ἔστιν· τούτων δὲ η̄ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ
 βασιλεία, η̄ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννίς.

5 Τὸ δὴ τέλος ἔκάστης πολιτείας οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν·
 αἴροῦνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔστι δὲ δημο-
 κρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος,
 ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα,
 τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος ἔκάστης ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα
 διαιρετέον, εἴπερ αἴροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπανα-
 φέροντες. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι'
 ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἡθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ
 ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο
 δ' ἔστιν ἀν ἀγαθὸς φαίνηται η̄ εὔνους η̄ ἄμφω),
 δέοι ἀν τὰ ἡθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἔκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς·
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔκάστης ἡθος πιθανώτατον ἀνάγκη
 πρὸς ἔκάστην εἶναι. ταῦτα δὲ ληφθήσεται διὰ
 τῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν
 προαίρεσιν, η̄ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος.

7 Ὡν μὲν οὖν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι προτρέποντας ὡς ἐσο-
 μένων η̄ ὄντων, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεῖ τὰς περὶ τοῦ
 συμφέροντος πίστεις λαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν
 περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἡθῶν καὶ νομίμων διὰ τίνων τε
 καὶ πῶς εὐπορήσομεν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν τῷ παρόντι
 καιρῷ σύμμετρον, εἴρηται· διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 πολιτικοῖς περὶ τούτων.

^a The “end” of monarchy is wanting here.

^b iii. 7-18, iv.

who must of necessity appear best, whence this form of government has taken its name. In a monarchy, as its name indicates, one man alone is supreme over all ; if it is subject to certain regulations, it is called a kingdom ; if it is unlimited, a tyranny.

Nor should the end of each form of government be neglected, for men choose the things which have reference to the end. Now, the end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating to education and what the law prescribes, . . . ,^a of tyranny self-protection. It is clear then that we must distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each form of government, since it is in reference to this that men make their choice. But as proofs are established not only by demonstrative, but also by ethical argument—since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill, or both—it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of each form of government ; for, in reference to each, the character most likely to persuade must be that which is characteristic of it. These characters will be understood by the same means ; for characters reveal themselves in accordance with moral purpose, and moral purpose has reference to the end.

We have now stated what things, whether future or present, should be the aim of those who recommend a certain course ; from what topics they should derive their proofs of expediency ; further, the ways and means of being well equipped for dealing with the characters and institutions of each form of government, so far as was within the scope of the present occasion ; for the subject has been discussed in detail in the *Politics*.^b

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9. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ φέγοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἄμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κάκενα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοὶ τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ θῆρος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

2 ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸ τυχόν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, ὥστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

3 Καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστιν, ὃ ἂν δι' αὐτὸν αἱρετὸν ὃν ἐπαινετὸν ἥ, ἥ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἡδὺ ἥ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἔστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν

4 καλὸν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὃν ἐπαινετόν ἔστιν. ἀρετὴ

δ' ἔστι μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν

1366 5 καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα. μέρη δὲ

ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλο-

πρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρό-

6 νησις, σοφία. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς

τὰς τοῦς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ

δύναμις εὐεργετική. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ

ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ

ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. εἴτα ἡ ἐλευ-

θεριότης· προϊένται γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται

περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν μάλιστα ἐφίενται ἄλλοι.

7 ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν τὰ αὐτῶν

^{“ Or, “a faculty of doing many and great benefits to all men in all cases ” (Jebb). ”}

9. We will next speak of virtue and vice, of the noble and the disgraceful, since they constitute the aim of one who praises and of one who blames ; for, when speaking of these, we shall incidentally bring to light the means of making us appear of such and such a character, which, as we have said, is a second method of proof ; for it is by the same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or others in regard to virtue. But since it happens that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a man or a god but even inanimate things or any ordinary animal, we ought in the same way to make ourselves familiar with the propositions relating to these subjects. Let us, then, discuss these matters also, so far as may serve for illustration.

The noble, then, is that which, being desirable in itself, is at the same time worthy of praise, or which, being good, is pleasant because it is good. If this is the noble, then virtue must of necessity be noble, for, being good, it is worthy of praise. Virtue, it would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving good things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases.^a The components of virtue are justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, practical and speculative wisdom. The greatest virtues are necessarily those which are most useful to others, if virtue is the faculty of conferring benefits. For this reason justice and courage are the most esteemed, the latter being useful to others in war, the former in peace as well. Next is liberality, for the liberal spend freely and do not dispute the possession of wealth, which is the chief object of other men's desire. Justice is a virtue which assigns

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ἔκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος, ἀδικία δὲ δι’ ἦν
 8 τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος. ἀνδρία δὲ δι’ ἦν
 πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις,
 καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ·
 9 δειλία δὲ τούναντίον. σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ δι’ ἦν
 πρὸς τὰς ἥδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν
 ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ τούναντίον.
 10 ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὖ ποιητική, ἀν-
 11 ελευθερία δὲ τούναντίον. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ
 μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων, μικροψυχία δὲ
 12 τούναντίον. μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανή-
 μασι μεγέθους ποιητική· μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο-
 13 πρέπεια τάναντία. φρόνησις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας,
 καθ’ ἦν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.
 14 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ
 περὶ τῶν μορίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα και-
 ρὸν ἴκανως, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν·
 φανερὸν γάρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τά τε ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς
 εἶναι καλά (πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς
 γινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε σημεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ
 15 τὰ ἔργα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἃ
 ἐστιν ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ πάθη καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε
 ἀνδρίας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀνδρίας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρα-
 κται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα
 (πάθη δὲ οὐ· ἐν μόνῃ γάρ ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ
 ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι
 αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ

^a Or, taking *eis eudaimonian* with *βουλεύεσθαι*, “come to a wise decision conducive to their happiness.”

to each man his due in conformity with the law ; injustice claims what belongs to others, in opposition to the law. Courage makes men perform noble acts in the midst of dangers according to the dictates of the law and in submission to it ; the contrary is cowardice. Self-control is a virtue which disposes men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the law prescribes ; the contrary is licentiousness. Liberality does good in many matters ; the contrary is avarice. Magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits ; the contrary is little-mindedness. Magnificence is a virtue which produces greatness in matters of expenditure ; the contraries are little-mindedness and meanness. Practical wisdom is a virtue of reason, which enables men to come to a wise decision in regard to good and evil things, which have been mentioned as connected with happiness.^a

Concerning virtue and vice in general and their separate parts, enough has been said for the moment. To discern the rest^b presents no difficulty ; for it is evident that whatever produces virtue, as it tends to it, must be noble, and so also must be what comes from virtue ; for such are its signs and works. But since the signs of virtue and such things as are the works and sufferings of a good man are noble, it necessarily follows that all the works and signs of courage and all courageous acts are also noble. The same may be said of just things and of just actions ; (but not of what one suffers justly ; for in this alone amongst the virtues that which is justly done is not always noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful than an unjust punishment). The same applies

^a i.e. the causes and results of virtue (Cope) ; or, the noble and the disgraceful (Jebb).

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- 16 τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὡσαύτως. καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ
ἀθλα τιμὴ, καλά. καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ
χρήματα. καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα πράττει τις
17 τῶν αἰρετῶν. καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, ὅσα ὑπὲρ
τῆς πατρίδος τις ἐποίησε, παριδῶν τὸ αὐτόν. καὶ
τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά· καὶ ἂ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά· αὐτοῦ
1367 a γὰρ ἔνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
- 18 Καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ
ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι.
- 19 καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἔνεκα· ἥττον γὰρ αὐτοῦ.
καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ¹
αὐτόν. καὶ περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας· δίκαιον γάρ.
20 καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὐτόν. καὶ τὰ
ἐναντία ἢ ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰ-
σχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιῶντες καὶ μέλλοντες
ώσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ πεποίηκεν, εἰπόντος τοῦ
'Αλκαίου

θέλω τι *βειπῆν*, ἀλλά με κωλύει
αιδώς,
αἱ δὲ εἶχες ἐσθλῶν ἴμερον ἢ καλῶν
καὶ μή τι *βειπῆν* γλῶσσ' ἐκύκα κακόν,
αιδώς κεν οὐκί σ' εἶχεν ὅμματ',
ἀλλ' ἔλεγες περὶ τῷ δικαίῳ.

- 21 Καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι· περὶ γὰρ
τῶν πρὸς δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχου-
22 σιν. καὶ αἱ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλ-
23 λίους καὶ τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικός. καὶ
αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖς· διὸ τὸ

^a Frag. 55 (P.L.G. iii.).

^b Frag. 28 (P.L.G. iii.).

equally to the other virtues. Those things of which the reward is honour are noble ; also those which are done for honour rather than money. Also, those desirable things which a man does not do for his own sake ; things which are absolutely good, which a man has done for the sake of his country, while neglecting his own interests ; things which are naturally good ; and not such as are good for the individual, since such things are inspired by selfish motives.

And those things are noble which it is possible for a man to possess after death rather than during his lifetime, for the latter involve more selfishness ; all acts done for the sake of others, for they are more disinterested ; the successes gained, not for oneself, but for others ; and for one's benefactors, for that is justice ; in a word, all acts of kindness, for they are disinterested. And the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed ; for we are ashamed of what is disgraceful, in words, acts, or intention ; as, for instance, when Alcaeus said :

I would fain say something, but shame holds me back,^a
Sappho rejoined :

Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not thy tongue stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not have filled thine eyes, but thou would'st have spoken of what is right.^b

Those things also are noble for which men anxiously strive, but without fear ; for men are thus affected about goods which lead to good repute. Virtues and actions are nobler, when they proceed from those who are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man rather than from a woman. It is the same with those which are the cause of enjoyment to others

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24 δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἔχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι.
τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον
25 καλόν, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. καὶ νίκη καὶ
τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν· αἱρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ
ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῦ. καὶ τὰ μνημονευτά, καὶ
τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. καὶ ἀ μὴ ζῶντι ἔπειται. καὶ οἷς
τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ. καὶ τὰ περιττά. καὶ τὰ μόνω
26 ὑπάρχοντα καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ. καὶ
κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ'
ἔκάστοις δὲ ἵδια καλά. καὶ ὅσα σημεῖά ἔστι τῶν
παρ' ἔκάστοις ἐπαινούμενων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμονι
κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γάρ ἔστι
27 κομῶντα ράδιον οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον θητικόν. καὶ
τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· ἐλευθέ-
ρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν.

28 Ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς
ταῦτα ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἐπαινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἷον
τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ τὸν ἡλίθιον
29 χρηστὸν καὶ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον. καὶ ἔκαστον δ'
ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον,
οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸν
1367 ὥ αὐθάδη μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν. καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς
ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν

rather than to ourselves ; this is why justice and that which is just are noble. To take vengeance on one's enemies is nobler than to come to terms with them ; for to retaliate is just, and that which is just is noble ; and further, a courageous man ought not to allow himself to be beaten. Victory and honour also are noble ; for both are desirable even when they are fruitless, and are manifestations of superior virtue. And things worthy of remembrance, which are the more honourable the longer their memory lasts ; those which follow us after death ; those which are accompanied by honour ; and those which are out of the common. Those which are only possessed by a single individual, because they are more worthy of remembrance. And possessions which bring no profit ; for they are more gentlemanly. Customs that are peculiar to individual peoples and all the tokens of what is esteemed among them are noble ; for instance, in Lacedaemon it is noble to wear one's hair long, for it is the mark of a gentleman, the performance of any servile task being difficult for one whose hair is long. And not carrying on any vulgar profession is noble, for a gentleman does not live in dependence on others.

We must also assume, for the purpose of praise or blame, that qualities which closely resemble the real qualities are identical with them ; for instance, that the cautious man is cold and designing, the simpleton good-natured, and the emotionless gentle. And in each case we must adopt a term from qualities closely connected, always in the more favourable sense ; for instance, the choleric and passionate man may be spoken of as frank and open, the arrogant as magnificent and dignified ; those in excess as

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θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει
 τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἂμα παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ
 τῆς αἰτίας· εἰ γὰρ οὖ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός,
 πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀν δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ προ-
 ετικὸς τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ
 30 ἀρετῆς τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ'
 οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐλεγεν, οὐ
 χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἔπαινεῖν. δεῖ δὲ
 τὸ παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμιον λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον
 ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσόφοις. καὶ ὅλως δὲ
 τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν εἰς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ δοκεῖ γειτνιάν.
 31 καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον, οἷον εἰ ἄξια τῶν προ-
 γόνων καὶ τῶν προϋπηργμένων· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ
 καὶ καλὸν τὸ προσεπικτᾶσθαι τιμήν. καὶ εἰ παρὰ
 τὸ προσῆκον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἷον
 εἰ εὐτυχῶν μὲν μέτριος ἀτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχος,
 ἢ μείζων γιγνόμενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώ-
 τερος. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, ἐξ οἵων
 εἰς οἷα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ' ὕμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν,
 καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου

^a Those whose qualities are extreme may be described as possessing the virtues of which these are the excess.

^b Plato, *Menexenus*, 235 D.

^c Thus, the Scythians may be assumed to be brave and great hunters; the Spartans hardy, courageous, and brief in speech; the Athenians fond of literature—and they should be praised accordingly.

^d That is, *τὸ τίμιον* looks as if it were really *καλόν*, and should be spoken of as if it were so.

^e Cp. 7. 32 above.

^f Frag. 111 (*P.L.G.* iii.).

possessing the corresponding virtue,^a the foolhardy as courageous, the recklessly extravagant as liberal. For most people will think so, and at the same time a fallacious argument may be drawn from the motive ; for if a man risks his life when there is no necessity, much more will he be thought likely to do so when it is honourable ; and if he is lavish to all comers, the more so will he be to his friends ; for the height of virtue is to do good to all. We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians.^b We ought also to speak of what is esteemed among the particular audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or philosophers,^c as actually existing there. And, generally speaking, that which is esteemed should be classed as noble, since there seems to be a close resemblance between the two.^d Again, all such actions as are in accord with what is fitting are noble ; if, for instance, they are worthy of a man's ancestors or of his own previous achievements ; for to obtain additional honour is noble and conduces to happiness. Also, if the tendency of what is done is better and nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected ; for instance, if a man is moderate in good fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when he becomes greater, he is better and more forgiving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates, "Look what I started from!"^e and of the Olympian victor :

Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.^f

and of Simonides :

ἢ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων.

32 'Επεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαιρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ προαιρεσιν. χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα. διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον· ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προφέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως.

33 "Εστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται. τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παιδεία· εὔκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας. τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἔξεώς ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἔπαινοιμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον.

34 μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς μὲν ταῦτα, τούτοις δ' οὐ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα.

35 "Εχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί· ἂν γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἂν, ταῦτα

36 μετατεθέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ
1368^a οὖν ἔχομεν ἄ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποιόν τινα εἶναι,
δεῖ ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῦν
ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὐτόν. οὕτω μὲν

^a Archedice, daughter of Hippias, tyrant of Athens, and wife of Aeantides, son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus.

Daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants.^a

Since praise is founded on actions, and acting according to moral purpose is characteristic of the worthy man, we must endeavour to show that a man is acting in that manner, and it is useful that it should appear that he has done so on several occasions. For this reason also one must assume that accidents and strokes of good fortune are due to moral purpose ; for if a number of similar examples can be adduced, they will be thought to be signs of virtue and moral purpose.

Now praise is language that sets forth greatness of virtue ; hence it is necessary to show that a man's actions are virtuous. But encomium deals with achievements—all attendant circumstances, such as noble birth and education, merely conduce to persuasion ; for it is probable that virtuous parents will have virtuous offspring and that a man will turn out as he has been brought up. Hence we pronounce an encomium upon those who have achieved something. Achievements, in fact, are signs of moral habit ; for we should praise even a man who had not achieved anything, if we felt confident that he was likely to do so. Blessing and felicitation are identical with each other, but are not the same as praise and encomium, which, as virtue is contained in happiness, are contained in felicitation.

Praise and counsels have a common aspect ; for what you might suggest in counselling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase. Accordingly, when we know what we ought to do and the qualities we ought to possess, we ought to make a change in the phrase and turn it, employing this knowledge as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that "one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are

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οῦν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δ' ἔπαινον
 “μέγα φρονῶν οὐ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ
 τοῖς δι' αὐτόν.” ὥστε ὅταν ἔπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί^a
 ἄν ὑπόθοιο, καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τί ἄν ἔπαι-
 νέσειας. ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη ἐξ ἀνάγκης,
 ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλῦον μετατεθῇ.
 38 Χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ
 μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ [δ] μάλιστα
 πεποίηκεν. ἅπαντα γάρ ταῦτα καλά. καὶ τὰ ἐκ
 τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν· ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τὸ
 προσῆκον. καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸν κατώρθωκεν·
 μέγα γάρ, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν ἄν
 δόξειεν. καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ
 τοῦτον εὑρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη. καὶ εἰς ὁν
 πρῶτον ἐγκάμιον ἐποιήθη, οἷον εἰς Ἰππόλοχον, καὶ
 Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ στα-
 θῆναι. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. καν μὴ
 καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορῆσ, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν·
 ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ
 δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· αὐξη-
 39 τικὸν γάρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων. πίπτει
 δ' εὐλόγως ἡ αὐξησις εἰς τοὺς ἔπαινους· ἐν ὑπερ-

^a In the first sentence, the statement is imperative, there is a prohibition; in the second, it is a simple affirmative, implying praise. In the one case there is forbidding, in the other not-forbidding, which are opposites.

^b Nothing more is known of him.

^c Who slew Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens.

^d Reading ἀσυνήθειαν. He had no legal practice, which would have shown the irrelevancy of comparisons in a law court, whereas in epideictic speeches they are useful. *συνήθειαν* gives exactly the opposite sense, and must refer to his having written speeches for others to deliver in the courts.

due to fortune, but on those which are due to oneself alone," when expressed in this way, has the force of a suggestion ; but expressed thus, " he was proud, not of goods which were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone," it becomes praise. Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you would suggest ; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise. The form of the expression will necessarily be opposite, when the prohibitive has been changed into the non-prohibitive.^a

We must also employ many of the means of amplification ; for instance, if a man has done anything alone, or first, or with a few, or has been chiefly responsible for it ; all these circumstances render an action noble. Similarly, topics derived from times and seasons, that is to say, if our expectation is surpassed. Also, if a man has often been successful in the same thing ; for this is of importance and would appear to be due to the man himself, and not to be the result of chance. And if it is for his sake that distinctions which are an encouragement or honour have been invented and established ; and if he was the first on whom an encomium was pronounced, as Hippolochus,^b or to whom a statue was set up in the market-place, as to Harmodius and Aristogiton.^c And similarly in opposite cases. If he does not furnish you with enough material in himself, you must compare him with others, as Isocrates used to do, because of his inexperience^d of forensic speaking. And you must compare him with illustrious personages, for it affords ground for amplification and is noble, if he can be proved better than men of worth. Amplification is with good reason ranked as one of the forms of praise, since it

οχῆ γάρ ἔστιν, ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν. διὸ καν
 μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ
 παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μηνύειν
 40 ἀρετήν. ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν ἅπασι τοῖς
 λόγοις ἡ μὲν αὔξησις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτι-
 κοῖς· τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν,
 ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος· τὰ δὲ
 παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν
 προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρί-
 νομεν· τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικαιικοῖς· αἴτιαν γὰρ
 καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γεγονὸς διὰ τὸ
 41 ἀσαφές. ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι
 λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεῖ βλέπον-
 τας ἔπαινεῦν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια
 γίγνεται καὶ τὰ δύνείδη, ταῦτ' ἔστιν· ἔχομένων γὰρ
 τούτων τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὃ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ
 τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστιν.

1368b 10. Περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ
 πόσων καὶ ποίων ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμούς,
 2 ἔχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἐν
 μὲν τίνων καὶ πόσων ἔνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ
 πῶς αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους καὶ
 3 πῶς ἔχοντας. διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν
 ἔξῆς.

"Ἐστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἔκόντα παρὰ
 τὸν νόμον. νόμος δ' ἔστιν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός.
 λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ' ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται,

consists in superiority, and superiority is one of the things that are noble. That is why, if you cannot compare him with illustrious personages, you must compare him with ordinary persons, since superiority is thought to indicate virtue. Speaking generally, of the topics common to all rhetorical arguments, amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers, whose subject is actions which are not disputed, so that all that remains to be done is to attribute beauty and importance to them. Examples are most suitable for deliberative speakers, for it is by examination of the past that we divine and judge the future. Enthymemes are most suitable for forensic speakers, because the past, by reason of its obscurity, above all lends itself to the investigation of causes and to demonstrative proof. Such are nearly all the materials of praise or blame, the things which those who praise or blame should keep in view, and the sources of encomia and invective; for when these are known their contraries are obvious, since blame is derived from the contrary things.

10. We have next to speak of the number and quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms are constructed which have for their object accusation and defence. Three things have to be considered; first, the nature and the number of the motives which lead men to act unjustly; secondly, what is the state of mind of those who so act; thirdly, the character and dispositions of those who are exposed to injustice. We will discuss these questions in order, after we have first defined acting unjustly.

Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily causing injury contrary to the law. Now, the law is particular or general. By particular, I mean the

κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες 4 ἀπαντα· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ. δι’ ἀ δὲ προαιροῦνται βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσι μοχθηρίαν ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὁ μοχθηρὸς τυγχάνουσιν ὅντες, καὶ ἄδικοι εἰσιν, οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ χρήματα, ὁ δ’ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἥδονάς, ὁ δὲ μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ράθυμα, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκαταλιμπάνοντι διὰ τὸν φόβον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμῆν, ὁ δ’ ὀξύθυμος δι’ ὀργῆν, ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ’ ἄφρων διὰ τὸ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ δ’ ἀναίσχυντος δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης. δμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστος περὶ ἔκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

5 ’Αλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ρηθησομένων· λοιπὸν δ’ εἰπεῖν τίνος ἔνεκα 6 καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ τίνας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώμεθα τίνων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύγοντες ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀδικεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τῷ μὲν

^a *προαιρεσίς* (premeditation, deliberate or moral choice) is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not pre-meditated; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment. Choice is a voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel, including the use of reason and knowledge. In the *Ethics* (iii. 3. 19) Aristotle defines *προαιρεσίς* as “a deliberate appeti-

written law in accordance with which a state is administered ; by general, the unwritten regulations which appear to be universally recognized. Men act voluntarily when they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion. What is done voluntarily is not always done with premeditation ; but what is done with premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a purpose.^a The motives which lead men to do injury and commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence. For if men have one or more vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust ; for example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to bodily pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,^b the coward in regard to dangers, for fright makes him desert his comrades in peril ; the ambitious in his desire for honour, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory, the rancorous in his desire for vengeance ; the foolish man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong, the shameless from his contempt for the opinion of others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind is unjust in regard to his special weakness.

This will be perfectly clear, partly from what has already been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the emotions. It remains to state the motives and character of those who do wrong and of those who suffer from it. First, then, let us decide what those who set about doing wrong long for or avoid ; for it is evident that the accusation of (longing for, *σπεξις*) things in our power," as to which we should necessarily be well-informed.

^a Or, "in the matter of ease," taking *τὰ πάθημα* as = *παθυλα*.

κατηγοροῦντι πόσα καὶ ποῖα τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ
 ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον, τῷ δὲ ἀπολογούμενῷ ποῖα καὶ
 7 πόσα τούτων οὐχ ὑπάρχει. πάντες δὴ πράττουσι
 πάντα τὰ μὲν οὐ δι’ αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι’ αὐτούς. τῶν
 μὲν οὖν μὴ δι’ αὐτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι
 τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ
 τὰ δὲ φύσει. ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι’ αὐτοὺς
 πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ
 βίᾳ. ὅσα δὲ δι’ αὐτούς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ
 1369 a μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι’ ὄρεξιν, καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ λογι-
 8 στικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀλόγιστον· ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ
 βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ’
 οὐδὲ τανόις οἰηθῆ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἀλογοι δὲ ὄρεξις ὄργη
 καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη
 πράττειν δι’ αἰτίας ἐπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ
 βίαν, δι’ ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν.
 9 Τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι καθ’ ἡλικίας οὐδὲ ἐξεις οὐδὲ
 ἀλλὰ ἄττα τὰ πραττόμενα περίεργον· εἰ γὰρ συμ-
 βέβηκε τοῖς νέοις ὄργίλοις εἶναι οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμητικοῖς,
 οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ
 δι’ ὄργην καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ
 πενίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν
 ἔνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρημάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις
 διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων
 ἥδονῶν. ἀλλὰ πράξουσι καὶ οὗτοι οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον
 καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ
 καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἀδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγό-

^a In the cases of the young, the poor, and the rich, their youth etc. are only “accidents,” accidental not real causes. Aristotle defines τὸ συμβεβηκός (*Metaphysica*, iv. 30) as “that which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it as true, but neither necessarily, nor in most cases; for instance, if a man, when digging a hole for a plant, finds a

must examine the number and nature of the motives which are to be found in his opponent ; the defendant, which of them are not to be found in him. Now, all human actions are either the result of man's efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance, others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some are to be attributed to compulsion, others to nature, so that the things which men do not do of themselves are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion. As for those which they do of themselves and of which they are the cause, some are the result of habit, others of longing, and of the latter some are due to rational, others to irrational longing. Now wish is a [rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything unless he thinks it is good ; irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus all the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes : chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.

But it is superfluous to establish further distinctions of men's acts based upon age, moral habits, or anything else. For if the young happen to be ^a irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not because of their youth that they act accordingly, but because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of wealth or poverty ; but the poor happen to desire wealth because of their lack of it, and the rich desire unnecessary pleasures because they are able to procure them. Yet in their case too it will not be wealth or poverty, but desire, that will be the mainspring of their action. Similarly, the just and the unjust, and all the others who are said to act in accordance with

treasure." The colour of a man's eyes is an "inseparable" accident, the fact that a man is a lawyer is a "separable" accident.

- μενοι κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις πράττειν, διὰ ταῦτα πράξουσιν.
 ἢ γὰρ διὰ λογισμὸν ἢ διὰ πάθος· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δι'
 10 ἥθη καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τάνατία. συμ-
 βαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἔξεις τὰ τοιαῦτα
 ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαῖσδε τὰ τοιάδε· εὐθὺς γὰρ
 ἵσως τῷ μὲν σώφρονι διὰ τὸ σώφρονα εἶναι δόξαι
 τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι περὶ τῶν
 ἥδεων, τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν
 11 αὐτῶν τούτων. διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις
 ἑατέον, σκεπτέον δὲ ποῖα ποίοις εἴωθεν ἐπεσθαι·
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸς ἢ μέλας ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός,
 οὐδὲν τέτακται τῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ
 νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἥδη διαφέρει.
 καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν συμβαινόντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν
 τὰ ἥθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἷον πλούτειν δοκῶν
 ἔαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ εὔτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν.
 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν
 λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.
- 12 "Εστι δ' ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα,
 ὅσων ἢ τε αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἔνεκά του γίγνεται
 καὶ μήτε ἀεὶ μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγ-
 μένως· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ
- 13 τούτων. φύσει δέ, ὅσων ἢ τ' αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ
 1369 b τεταγμένη· ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὥσαύτως
 ἀποβαίνει. τὰ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβο-
 λογεῖσθαι, πότερα κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ ἢ ἄλλην αἰτίαν
 γίγνεται· δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν
- 14 τοιούτων. βίᾳ δέ, ὅσα παρ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τοὺς λογι-

^a ii. 12-18.

their moral habits, will act from the same causes, either from reason or emotion, but some from good characters and emotions, and others from the opposite. Not but that it does happen that such and such moral habits are followed by such and such consequences ; for it may be that from the outset the fact of being temperate produces in the temperate man good opinions and desires in the matter of pleasant things, in the intemperate man the contrary. Therefore we must leave these distinctions on one side, but we must examine what are the usual consequences of certain conditions. For, if a man is fair or dark, tall or short, there is no rule that any such consequences should follow, but if he is young or old, just or unjust, it does make a difference. In a word, it will be necessary to take account of all the circumstances that make men's characters different ; for instance, if a man fancies himself rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate, it will make a difference. We will, however, discuss this later^a ; let us now speak of what remains to be said here.

Things which are the result of chance are all those of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen without any end in view, and that neither always, nor generally, nor regularly. The definition of chance will make this clear. Things which are the result of nature are all those of which the cause is in themselves and regular ; for they turn out always, or generally, in the same way. As for those which happen contrary to nature there is no need to investigate minutely whether their occurrence is due to a certain force of nature or some other cause (it would seem, however, that such cases also are due to chance). Those things are the result of com-

σμοὺς γίγνεται δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἔθει
 15 δέ, ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν.
 16 διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν
 εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττηται· ἔνια
 γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλ’
 οὐδὲ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι’ ἥδονήν. διὰ θυμὸν
 17 δὲ καὶ ὄργὴν τὰ τιμωρητικά. διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία
 καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος
 ἔνεκά ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα
 18 ἀποπληρωθῇ. τί μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ὄργη, δῆλον
 ἔσται ἐν τοῖς περὶ παθῶν, δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράτ-
 τεται ὅσα φαίνεται ἥδεα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες
 καὶ τὸ ἔθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἥδεσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν
 φύσει μὴ ἥδεων, ὅταν ἔθισθῶσιν, ἥδεως ποιοῦσιν.

“Ωστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα δι’ αὐτοὺς πράτ-
 τουσιν, ἅπαντ’ ἔστιν ἡ ἀγαθὰ ἡ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ
 ἡ ἥδεα ἡ φαινόμενα ἥδεα. ἐπεὶ δ’ ὅσα δι’ αὐτούς,
 ἔκόντες πράττουσιν, οὐχ ἔκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ δι’
 αὐτούς, πάντ’ ἂν εἴη, ὅσα ἔκόντες πράττουσιν, ἡ
 ἀγαθὰ ἡ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἡ ἥδεα ἡ φαινόμενα
 ἥδεα· τίθημι γὰρ καὶ τὴν τῶν κακῶν ἡ φαινομένων
 κακῶν ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἡ ἀντὶ μείζονος ἐλάττονος μετά-
 ληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (αἵρετὰ γάρ πως), καὶ τὴν τῶν
 λυπηρῶν ἡ φαινομένων ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἡ μετάληψιν
 ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλαττόνων ἐν τοῖς ἥδεσιν ὥσαύτως.

pulsion which are done by the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation. Things are the result of habit, when they are done because they have often been done. Things are the result of calculation which are done because, of the goods already mentioned, they appear to be expedient either as an end or means to an end, provided they are done by reason of their being expedient ; for even the intemperate do certain things that are expedient, for the sake, not of expediency, but of pleasure. Passion and anger are the causes of acts of revenge. But there is a difference between revenge and punishment ; the latter is inflicted in the interest of the sufferer, the former in the interest of him who inflicts it, that he may obtain satisfaction. We will define anger when we come to speak of the emotions.^a Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently pleasant. The things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are among pleasant things ; for men do with pleasure many things which are not naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them.

In short, all things that men do of themselves either are, or seem, good or pleasant ; and since men do voluntarily what they do of themselves, and involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all that men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or that which is or seems pleasant. For I reckon among good things the removal of that which is evil or seems evil, or the exchange of a greater evil for a less, because these two things are in a way desirable ; in like manner, I reckon among pleasant things the removal of that which is or appears painful, and the exchange of a greater pain

ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα, πόσα
 19 καὶ ποῖα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς
 συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος
 εἴπωμεν νῦν. δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἵκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ὅρους,
 ἐὰν ὥσι περὶ ἑκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς.

11. Ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν
 τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν
 εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τούναντίον.
 2 εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ^a
 1370 ἔστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ
 φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν
 3 λυπηρόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ
 φύσιν ἵέναι ως ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν
 ἀπειληφότα ἢ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ' αὐτὴν
 γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθη· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον
 ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἡδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ
 ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί,
 4 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλά-
 κις. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον· παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία.
 διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὁρθῶς εἴρηται

πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ.

τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συν-
 τονίας λυπηράς· ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα,
 ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ. τὰ
 δ' ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι
 καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις
 καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδέων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην

^a Cf. i. 6 above.

^b The true nature of the "normal state" was lost during the period of disturbance and unsettlement.

^c From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.G. ii.): see Introd.

^d Or, "rest" (bodily).

for a less. We must therefore make ourselves acquainted with the number and quality of expedient and pleasant things. We have already spoken of the expedient when discussing deliberative rhetoric ;^a let us now speak of the pleasant. And we must regard our definitions as sufficient in each case, provided they are neither obscure nor too precise.

11. Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul, a sudden and perceptible settling down into its natural state, and pain the opposite. If such is the nature of pleasure, it is evident that that which produces the disposition we have just mentioned is pleasant, and that that which destroys it or produces the contrary settling down is painful. Necessarily, therefore, it must be generally pleasant to enter into a normal state (especially when what is done in accordance with that state has come into its own again) ;^b and the same with habits. For that which has become habitual becomes as it were natural ; in fact, habit is something like nature, for the distance between “often” and “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea of “always,” habit to that of “often.” That which is not compulsory is also pleasant, for compulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is necessary is painful, and it was rightly said,

For every act of necessity is disagreeable.^c

Application, study, and intense effort are also painful, for these involve necessity and compulsion, if they have not become habitual ; for then habit makes them pleasant. Things contrary to these are pleasant ; wherefore states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amusement, recreation,^d and sleep are among pleasant things, because none of these is in any way compulsory.

ARISTOTLE

5 τούτων. καὶ οὐ ἀνήπιθυμία ἐνῆ, ἅπαν ἡδύ· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ἔστιν ὄρεξις.

Τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοι εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους μέν, ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέγονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἷον ἡ τροφῆς, δύφα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τροφῆς εἶδος ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γενοτὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἀπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμῆν καὶ ἀκοῆν καὶ ὄψιν. μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες.

6 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἔστιν αἰσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, καν¹ τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἀν φαντασία τις οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει. εἰ δὲ

¹ Keeping Bekker's κἀν=καὶ ἐν. Roemer reads κάει=καὶ ἀει, Spengel ἀεὶ ἐν.

^a There is no consideration or "definite theory" (Jebb, Welldon) of the results that may follow. The desires arise without anything of the kind; they simply come.

^b The passage ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι . . . αἰσθησίς has been punctuated in two ways. (1) With a full stop at ἐλπίζει (Roemer, Jebb). The conclusion then drawn is that memory and hope are accompanied by imagination of what is remembered or hoped. To this it is objected that what Aristotle really wants to prove is that memory and hope are a cause of pleasure. (2) With a comma at ἐλπίζει (Cope, Victorius). The steps in the argument will then be: if pleasure is the sensation of a certain emotion; if imagination is a weakened (faded) sensation; if one who remembers or hopes is attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes; then, this being so, pleasure will attend one who remembers or

Everything of which we have in us the desire is pleasant, for desire is a longing for the pleasant.

Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational. I call irrational all those that are not the result of any assumption.^a Such are all those which are called natural; for instance, those which come into existence through the body—such as the desire of food, thirst, hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular; the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due to our being convinced; for there are many things which we desire to see or acquire when we have heard them spoken of and are convinced that they are pleasant.

And if pleasure consists in the sensation of a certain emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation, then both the man who remembers and the man who hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes.^b This being so, it is evident

hopes, since there is sensation, and pleasure is sensation and a kind of movement (§ 1).

φαντασία, the faculty of forming mental images (variously translated “imagination,” “mental impression,” “fantasy”) is defined by Aristotle (*De Anima*, iii. 3. 11) as a *kind of movement*, which cannot arise apart from sensation, and the movement produced must resemble the sensation which produced it. But *φαντασία* is more than this; it is not merely a faculty of sense, but occupies a place midway between sense and intellect; while imagination has need of the senses, the intellect has need of imagination.

If *φαντασία* is referred to an earlier perception of which the sense image is a copy, this is memory. Imagination carries the sense images (*φαντάσματα*) to the seat of memory. They are then transformed into memory (of something past) or hope (of something future) and are handed on to the intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his edition of the *De Anima*.)

τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἄμα μεμνημένοις καὶ
 7 ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἰσθησις. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη
 πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἦν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα
 ἦν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἦν τῷ ἐλπίζειν
 μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέ-
 1370 μνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλ-
 8 λοντα. τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἔστιν, οὐ
 μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν,
 ἀλλ' ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἀνὴρ ἦν ὑστερον καλὸν καὶ
 ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,

ἀλλ' ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων,
 καὶ

μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνήρ
 μνήμενος, ὃς τις πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πολλὰ ἔόργη.

9 τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν.
 τὰ δ' ἐν ἐλπίδι, ὅσα παρόντα ἦν εὐφραίνειν ἦν ὀφελεῖν
 φαίνεται μεγάλα, καὶ ἀνευ λύπης ὀφελεῖν. ὅλως
 δ' ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ ἐλπίζοντας καὶ
 μεμνημένους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. διὸ καὶ τὸ ὄργι-
 ζεσθαι ἡδύ, ὥσπερ καὶ "Ομηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ
 θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο·

οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὄργιζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ
 τιμωρίας τυχεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῖς πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς τῇ
 δυνάμει· ἦν οὐκ ὄργιζονται ἦν ἥπτον.

10 Καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις
 ἡδονή· ἦν γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἦν ἐλπίζοντες

^a Euripides, *Andromeda* (Frag. 133, T.G.F.).

^b *Odyssey*, xv. 400, 401, but misquoted in the second line,
 which runs: ὃς τις δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πόλλα ἐπαληθῆ.

that there is pleasure both for those who remember and for those who hope, since there is sensation. Therefore all pleasant things must either be present in sensation, or past in recollection, or future in hope ; for one senses the present, recollects the past, and hopes for the future. Therefore our recollections are pleasant, not only when they recall things which when present were agreeable, but also some things which were not, if their consequence subsequently proves honourable or good ; whence the saying :

Truly it is pleasant to remember toil after one has escaped it,^a and,

When a man has suffered much and accomplished much, he afterwards takes pleasure even in his sorrows when he recalls them.^b

The reason of this is that even to be free from evil is pleasant. Things which we hope for are pleasant, when their presence seems likely to afford us great pleasure or advantage, without the accompaniment of pain. In a word, all things that afford pleasure by their presence as a rule also afford pleasure when we hope for or remember them. Wherefore even resentment is pleasant, as Homer said of anger that it is

Far sweeter than dripping honey ;^c

for no one feels resentment against those whom vengeance clearly cannot overtake, or those who are far more powerful than he is ; against such, men feel either no resentment or at any rate less.

Most of our desires are accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, for the recollection of a past or the hope

^a *Iliad*, xviii. 108.

ώς τεύξονται χαίρουσί τινα ήδονήν, οἶνον οἵ τ' ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἔχόμενοι ταῖς δύφαις καὶ μεμνημένοι
 ὡς ἔπιον καὶ ἐλπίζοντες πιεῖσθαι χαίρουσιν, καὶ
 11 οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες, καὶ
 ποιοῦντές τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν· ἐν
 ἅπασι γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἶνον αἰσθά-
 νεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου. καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ
 ἔρωτος αὗτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρ-
 óντος χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοι
 12 ἐρῶσιν. διὸ καὶ ὅταν λυπηρὸς γένηται τῷ μὴ παρ-
 εῖναι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐγγίνεται
 τις ήδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν,
 ήδονὴ δ' ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὄρāν πως ἐκεῖνον,
 καὶ ἀ ἔπραττε, καὶ οἷος ἦν. διὸ καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως
 εἴρηται,

ώς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἴμερον ὥρσε γόοιο.

13 Καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ήδύ· οὖ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν
 λυπηρόν, τὸ τυγχάνειν ήδύ· οἱ δ' ὁργιζόμενοι
 λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπί-
 14 ζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν. καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ήδύ, οὐ μόνον
 τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασίᾳ γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς
 γίγνεται, οὖ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἡρέμα ἢ
 15 μᾶλλον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ήδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς
 1371a παιδιὰς ήδείας εἶναι τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐρι-
 στικάς (πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ταύταις γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν)

^a Or “doing something that has to do with the beloved.”

^b *Iliad*, xxiii. 108, on the occasion of the mourning for

of a future pleasure creates a certain pleasurable enjoyment ; thus, those suffering from fever and tormented by thirst enjoy the remembrance of having drunk and the hope that they will drink again. The lovesick always take pleasure in talking, writing, or composing verses ^a about the beloved ; for it seems to them that in all this recollection makes the object of their affection perceptible. Love always begins in this manner, when men are happy not only in the presence of the beloved, but also in his absence when they recall him to mind. This is why, even when his absence is painful, there is a certain amount of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation ; for the pain is due to his absence, but there is pleasure in remembering and, as it were, seeing him and recalling his actions and personality. Wherefore it was rightly said by the poet :

Thus he spake, and excited in all a desire of weeping.^b

And revenge is pleasant ; for if it is painful to be unsuccessful, it is pleasant to succeed. Now, those who are resentful are pained beyond measure when they fail to secure revenge, while the hope of it delights them. Victory is pleasant, not only to those who love to conquer, but to all ; for there is produced an idea of superiority, which all with more or less eagerness desire. And since victory is pleasant, competitive and disputatious ^c amusements must be so too, for victories are often gained in them ; among

Patroclus ; *Odyssey*, iv. 183, referring to the mourning for the absence of Odysseus.

^c *Controversiae* or school rhetorical exercises, as well as arguing in the law courts ; unless ἐριστικά means simply “in which there is rivalry.”

- καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαιρίσεις καὶ κυβείας καὶ πεττείας. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ παιδιὰς ὅμοιώς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαι γίγνονται, ἃν τις ἥ συνήθης, αἱ δὲ εὐθὺς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευτική· ὅπου γὰρ ἄμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἔστιν. διὸ καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ ἐριστικὴ
 16 ἡδεῖα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ δυναμένοις. καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι φαντασίαν ἑκάστῳ ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὖς οἴεται ἀληθεύειν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἵ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ οἱ πολῖται τῶν ἀπαθεν, καὶ οἱ ὄντες τῶν μελλόντων, καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι ἀφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων· μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εὑρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ ὅν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἡ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τούτων τιμῆς ἡ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 δι' ἄλλο τι.
 17 Καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλοιος μὴ χαίρων οὖν) καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ· φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαι
 18 ἔστιν αὐτὸν δι' αὐτόν. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. καὶ τὸ κολακεύεσθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδύ· φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς καὶ
 19 φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἔστιν. καὶ τὸ ταῦτα

^a For the meaning of *φιλία*, *φιλεῖν* cf. ii. 4.

these we may include games with knuckle-bones, ball-games, dicing, and draughts. It is the same with serious sports ; for some become pleasant when one is familiar with them, while others are so from the outset, such as the chase and every description of outdoor sport ; for rivalry implies victory. It follows from this that practice in the law courts and disputation are pleasant to those who are familiar with them and well qualified. Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things, because every one imagines that he possesses the qualities of a worthy man, and still more when those whom he believes to be trustworthy say that he does. Such are neighbours rather than those who live at a distance ; intimate friends and fellow-citizens rather than those who are unknown ; contemporaries rather than those who come later ; the sensible rather than the senseless ; the many rather than the few ; for such persons are more likely to be trustworthy than their opposites. As for those for whom men feel great contempt, such as children and animals, they pay no heed to their respect or esteem, or, if they do, it is not for the sake of their esteem, but for some other reason.

A friend also is among pleasant things, for it is pleasant to love ^a—for no one loves wine unless he finds pleasure in it—just as it is pleasant to be loved ; for in this case also a man has an impression that he is really endowed with good qualities, a thing desired by all who perceive it ; and to be loved is to be cherished for one's own sake. And it is pleasant to be admired, because of the mere honour. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant, the latter being a sham admirer and friend. It is pleasant to do the

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πράττειν πολλάκις ἥδυ· τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες ἥδὺ ἦν.
 20 καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἥδυ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται
 μεταβάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ
 τῆς καθεστώσης ἔξεως· ὅθεν εἴρηται
 μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἥδεα ἔστι, καὶ ἄνθρωποι
 καὶ πράγματα· μεταβολὴ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος
 21 ἔστιν, ἀμα δὲ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου. καὶ τὸ
 μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἥδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ·
 ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν
 ἔστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ
 22 μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. καὶ
 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τῶν ἥδέων· τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχάνειν ἔστιν ὥν ἐπιθυμοῦσι,
 τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερέχειν, ὥν ἀμφοτέρων
 1371 b ἐφίενται. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἥδὺ εἶναι τὸ εὐποιητικόν,
 καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἥδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔστι τοὺς
 23 πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπή ἐπιτελεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ
 μανθάνειν τε ἥδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε
 ἀνάγκη ἥδεα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον,¹ ὥσπερ
 γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοπούα καὶ ποιητική, καὶ
 πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ἦ, κανὸν ἦ μὴ ἥδὺ αὐτὸ
 τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ
 συλλογισμός ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μαν-
 24 θάνειν τι συμβαίνει. καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ
 παρὰ μικρὸν σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· πάντα
 25 γὰρ θαυμαστὰ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν

¹ Roemer reads τὸ τε μιμητικόν. The meaning is much the same, only μιμούμενον is passive.

^a Euripides, *Orestes*, 234.

^b True knowledge or philosophy, which is the result of learning, is the highest condition of the intellect, its normal

same things often ; for that which is familiar is, as we said, pleasant. Change also is pleasant, since change is in the order of nature ; for perpetual sameness creates an excess of the normal condition ; whence it was said :

Change in all things is sweet.^a

This is why what we only see at intervals, whether men or things, is pleasant ; for there is a change from the present, and at the same time it is rare. And learning and admiring are as a rule pleasant ; for admiring implies the desire to learn, so that what causes admiration is to be desired, and learning implies a return to the normal.^b It is pleasant to bestow and to receive benefits ; the latter is the attainment of what we desire, the former the possession of more than sufficient means,^c both of them things that men desire. Since it is pleasant to do good, it must also be pleasant for men to set their neighbours on their feet, and to supply their deficiencies. And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them must also be pleasant ; for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant ; for it is not this that causes pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something. The same may be said of sudden changes and narrow escapes from danger ; for all these things excite wonder. And since that or settled state. Consequently, a return to this is pleasure, which is defined (§ 1) as a settling down of the soul into its natural state after a period of disturbance.

^a Or, " larger means than the person benefited."

ἥδυ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἥδέα ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπῷ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέω. ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, ώς

ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει,

καὶ

ώς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον,

καὶ

ἔγνω δὲ θῆρα θῆρα,

καὶ

ἀεὶ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν,

καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

- 26 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἥδυ ἑαυτῷ ἄπαν, μάλιστα δ’ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἡττον· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα. ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ἥδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον ἔργα καὶ λόγους. διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ φιλερασταί καὶ φιλότιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπι-
27 τελεῖν ἥδυ· αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργον ἥδη γίγνεται. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι ἥδυ· ἄρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστι δὲ ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλό-
τιμοι ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς
28 πέλας ἥδυ εἶναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν ὦ βέλτιστος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ

^a *Odysssey*, xvii. 218 ώς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ώς τὸν ὁμοῖον.

which is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and things which are akin are akin in accordance with nature, all things akin and like are for the most part pleasant to each other, as man to man, horse to horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the proverbs :

The old have charms for the old, the young for the young, ✓

Like to like,^a

Beast knows beast,

Birds of a feather flock together,^b

and all similar sayings.

And since things which are akin and like are always pleasant to one another, and every man in the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it must needs be that all men are more or less selfish ; for it is in himself above all that such conditions ^c are to be found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it follows that all find pleasure in what is their own, such as their works and words. That is why men as a rule are fond of those who flatter and love them, of honour, and of children ; for the last are their own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is wanting,^d for then it becomes our work. And since it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to be regarded as wise ; ^e for practical wisdom is commanding, and philosophy consists in the knowledge of many things that excite wonder. Further, since men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also agreeable to find fault with our neighbours. And if a man thinks he excels in anything, he likes to devote his time to it ; as Euripides says :

^b Literally, “ever jackdaw to jackdaw.”

^c Of likeness and kinship.

^d § 22.

^e Both practically and speculatively or philosophically.

κάπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων ἔκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος,
ἴν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὥν.

29 ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα
ἄνεσις, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ
1372 a γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ
ἔργα· διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ
ποιητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα,
τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά.

12. ^aΩν μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, ταῦτ' ἐστίν·
πῶς δ' ἔχοντες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν. αὐτοὶ
μὲν οὖν ὅταν οἴωνται δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα
πραχθῆναι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς δυνατόν, εἴτε ἀν λαθεῦν
πράξαντες, ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, ἢ
δοῦναι μὲν ἄλλ' ἐλάττω τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι τοῦ
2 κέρδους ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ὃν κήδονται. ποῖα μὲν οὖν
δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα ἀδύνατα ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον
ρήθησεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων),
αὐτοὶ δ' οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι μάλιστα ἀζήμιοι
ἀδικεῦν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ
οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, καν πολύφιλοι ὥσι,
3 καν πλούσιοι. καὶ μάλιστα μέν, ἀν αὐτοὶ ὥσιν
ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἴονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή,
καν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται
ἢ κοινωνοί· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ πράττειν
4 καὶ λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην. καὶ ἐὰν φίλοι
ὥσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
φίλοι ἀφύλακτοί τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσ-

^a *Antiope* (Frag. 183, T.G.F.).

^b Only the definition appears in the existing text:
“The ridiculous is an error, painless and non-destructive
ugliness (5).”

And allotting the best part of each day to that in which he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.^a

Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words, or deeds—must also be pleasant. The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the *Poetics*.^b Let this suffice for things that are pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these.

12. Such are the motives of injustice; let us now state the frame of mind of those who commit it, and who are the sufferers from it. Men do wrong when they think that it can be done and that it can be done by them; when they think that their action will either be undiscovered, or if discovered will remain unpunished; or if it is punished, that the punishment will be less than the profit to themselves or to those for whom they care. As for the kind of things which seem possible or impossible, we will discuss them later,^c for these topics are common to all kinds of rhetoric. Now men who commit wrong think they are most likely to be able to do so with impunity, if they are eloquent, business-like, experienced in judicial trials, if they have many friends, and if they are wealthy. They think there is the greatest chance of their being able to do so, if they themselves belong to the above classes; if not, if they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do; for thanks to these qualities they are able to commit wrong and to escape discovery and punishment. Similarly, if they are friends of those who are being wronged, or of the judges; for friends are not on their guard against being wronged and, besides, they

^a ii. 19.

καταλλάττονται πρὶν ἐπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἀν φίλοι ὥσι, καὶ ἡ ὅλως ἀφιᾶσιν ἡ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν.

5 Λαθητικοὶ δ' εἰσὶν οἵ τ' ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον ἀσθενῆς περὶ αἰκίας καὶ ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας. καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ καὶ ἐν ὀδύθαλμοῖς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ μηδένα 6 ἀν οἴεσθαι. καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα μηδ' ἀν εἴς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα· πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα ὕσπερ ἀρρωστήματα φυλάττονται καὶ τάδικήματα, ὁ δὲ μηδεὶς πω ἡρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς 7 εὐλαβεῖται. καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς ἔχθρὸς ἡ πολλοί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἀν ἐπιχειρῆσαι φυλαττομένοις, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν ὅτι 8 οὐκ ἀν ἐνεχείρησαν. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις ἡ τρόπος ἡ τόπος ἡ διάθεσις εὕπορος. καὶ ὅσοις μὴ λαθοῦσιν ἔστι δίωσις δίκης ἡ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἡ διαφθορὰ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία, 9 ἔστι δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἡ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος, ἡ δι' ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἔξει ὅ τι ἀπολέσῃ. καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν κέρδη φανερὰ ἡ μεγάλα ἡ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι 1372 b μικραὶ ἡ ἀφανεῖς ἡ πόρρω. καὶ ὅν μή ἔστι τιμωρία 10 ἵση τῇ ὠφελείᾳ, οἷον δοκεῖ ἡ τυραννίς. καὶ ὅσοις

^a Two different persons. If the second ὁ be omitted, the reference is to one.

^b Or, a “resourceful mind.”

prefer reconciliation to taking proceedings ; and judges favour those whom they are fond of, and either let them off altogether or inflict a small penalty.

Those are likely to remain undetected whose qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for instance, if a man wanting in physical strength were accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an ugly man^a of adultery. Also, if the acts are done quite openly and in sight of all ; for they are not guarded against, because no one would think them possible. Also, if they are so great and of such a nature that no one would even be likely to attempt them, for these also are not guarded against ; for all guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs, but no one takes precautions against those ailments from which no one has ever yet suffered. And those who have either no enemy at all or many ; the former hope to escape notice because they are not watched, the latter do escape because they would not be thought likely to attack those who are on their guard and because they can defend themselves by the plea that they would never have attempted it. And those who have ways or places of concealment for stolen property, or abundant opportunities of disposing of it.^b And those who, even if they do not remain undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or corrupt the judges. And those who, if a fine be imposed, can get payment in full set aside or put off for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have nothing to lose . And in cases where the profit is certain, large, or immediate, while the punishment is small, uncertain, or remote. And where there can be no punishment equal to the advantages, as seems to be the case in a tyranny. And when the unjust

- τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ὀνείδη
μόνον. καὶ οἵς τούναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα εἰς
ἔπαιων τινα, οἷον εἰ συνέβη ἄμα τιμωρήσασθαι
ὑπὲρ πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ
ζημίαι εἰς χρήματα ἢ φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτον τι· δι'
ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες,
πλὴν οὐχ οἵ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ' οἵ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἥθεσιν.
- 11 καὶ οἵ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μὴ ἔζημιωμένοι.
καὶ οἵ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς,
- 12 οἵοι ἀναμάχεσθαι. καὶ οἵς ἂν παραχρῆμα ἢ τὸ
ἡδὺ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ
ζημία ὕστερον· οἵ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἔστι δ'
- 13 ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται. καὶ οἵς ἂν
τούναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἡδη ἢ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ
ἡδὺ καὶ ὠφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἵ γὰρ
ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν.
- 14 καὶ οἵς ἂν ἐνδέχηται διὰ τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ δι'
ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ δι' ἔθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀμαρ-
- 15 τεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. καὶ οἵς ἂν ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς
τυχεῖν. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὥσιν. διχῶς δ' εἰσὶν
ἐνδεεῖς· ἡ γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ὥσπερ οἵ πένητες, ἡ
- 16 ὡς ὑπερβολῆς, ὥσπερ οἵ πλούσιοι. καὶ οἵ σφόδρα
εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ οἵ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦντες, οἵ μὲν
ὡς οὐ δόξοντες, οἵ δ' ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον δόξοντες.
- 17 Αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν,
ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς

^a Who Zeno was, and what the story, is unknown.

^b Some do wrong for the sake of gain, others for the sake of praise; but the former sacrifice honour for self-interest, the latter self-interest for honour.

^c " More distant " (Jebb).

acts are real gains and the only punishment is disgrace ; and when, on the contrary, the unjust acts tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father or mother, as was the case with Zeno,^a while the punishment only involves loss of money, exile, or something of the kind. For men do wrong from both these motives and in both these conditions of mind ; but the persons are not the same, and their characters are exactly opposite.^b And those who have often been undetected or have escaped punishment ; and those who have often been unsuccessful ; for in such cases, as in actual warfare, there are always men ready to return to the fight. And all who hope for pleasure and profit at once, while the pain and the loss come later ; such are the intemperate, intemperance being concerned with all things that men long for. And when, on the contrary, the pain or the loss is immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lasting^c ; for temperate and wiser men pursue such aims. And those who may possibly be thought to have acted by chance or from necessity, from some natural impulse or from habit, in a word, to have committed an error rather than a crime. And those who hope to obtain indulgence ; and all those who are in need, which is of two kinds ; for men either need what is necessary, as the poor, or what is superfluous, as the wealthy. And those who are highly esteemed or held in great contempt ; the former will not be suspected, the latter no more than they are already.

In such a frame of mind men attempt to do wrong, and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and circumstances of the following kind.^d Those who

^a With a comma or colon after τὰ τοιαῦτα ; without these render : “ those who possess such things as they . . . ”

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ἔχοντας ὥν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τάναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς
 18 ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ
 τοὺς ἐγγύς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λῆψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δ'
 ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἷον οἱ συλῶντες τοὺς Καρχη-
 19 δονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς
 ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς· ράδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν.
 καὶ τοὺς ράθυμους· ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν.
 καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλούς· οὐ γὰρ μαχητικοὶ περὶ
 20 κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικηθέντας καὶ
 μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν
 21 τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν. καὶ οὖς μηδεπώποτε καὶ
 οὖς πολλάκις· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, οἵ μὲν
 22 ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἵ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς δια-
 βεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους· οἵ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οὔτε
 προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύ-
 νανται πείθειν· ὅν οἱ μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοί
 23 εἰσιν. καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων
 1373 a ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ φίλων ἢ ποιησάντων κακῶς ἢ μελ-
 λησάντων ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ προγόνους ἢ ὅν κήδονται·
 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, προφάσεως δεῖται μό-
 24 νον ἡ πονηρία. καὶ τοὺς ἔχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς φίλους·
 τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ράδιον, τοὺς δ' ἡδύ. καὶ τοὺς
 ἀφίλους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι· ἢ
 γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ἢ καταλλάπτονται,
 25 ἢ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν. καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ δια-

^a Who were too far off to retaliate.

^b A proverb meaning "an easy prey." The Mysians were regarded as cowardly and unwarlike.

possess what they themselves lack, things either necessary, or superfluous, or enjoyable ; both those who are far off and those who are near, for in the one ease the gain is speedy, in the other reprisals are slow, as if, for instance, Greeks were to plunder Carthaginians.^a And those who never take precautions and are never on their guard, but are confiding ; for all these are easily taken unawares. And those who are indolent ; for it requires a man who takes pains to prosecute. And those who are bashful ; for they are not likely to fight about money. And those who have often been wronged but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, " Mysian booty."^b And those who have never, or those who have often, suffered wrong ; for both are off their guard, the one because they have never yet been attacked, the others because they do not expect to be attacked again. And those who have been slandered, or are easy to slander ; for such men neither care to go to law, for fear of the judges, nor, if they do, can they convince them ; to this class belong those who are exposed to hatred or envy. And those against whom the wrongdoer can pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves, or their friends, have either committed, or intended to commit, wrong either against himself, or his ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard ; for, as the proverb says, " evil-doing only needs an excuse." And both enemies and friends ; for it is easy to injure the latter, and pleasant to injure the former. And those who are friendless. And those who are unskilled in speech or action ; for either they make no attempt to prosecute, or come to terms, or accomplish nothing. And those to whom it is no

τρίβειν ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν, οἷον οἱ ξένοι
 καὶ αὐτουργοί· ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ
 26 ράδίως καταπαύονται. καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἡδικηκό-
 τας, ἢ τοιαῦτα οὖτα ἀδικοῦνται· ἐγγὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ
 τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον ἀδικηθῇ
 τις οἷον εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον
 27 εἴ τις τὸν εἰώθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο. καὶ τοὺς
 ἢ πεποιηκότας κακῶς ἢ βουληθέντας ἢ βουλο-
 μένους ἢ ποιήσοντας· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἥδυν καὶ τὸ
 28 καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ
 οἷς χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ θαυμαζομένοις ἢ ἐρω-
 μένοις ἢ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί·
 29 καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν
 ἐγκεκληκότες ὥσι καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἷον
 Κάλλιππος ἐποίει τὰ περὶ Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
 30 τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ τοὺς
 ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι
 ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσί-
 δημος Γέλωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισμένῳ,
 31 ὅτι ἔφθασεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὓς ἀδι-
 κήσαντες δυνήσονται πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς

^a *alkia* (assault) was a less serious offence than *ὑβρις* (wanton outrage).

^b *oīs*, i.e. supplying ἀδικουμένοις, “by whose being wronged.” *oīs* has been suggested, i.e. supplying ἀδικοῦντες, “wronging whom.”

^c In our relations with whom, almost = from whom. Another interpretation is: “In reference to whom there is a chance . . . consideration *from others*, meaning the judges” (Welldon).

^d Callippus was a friend of Dion, who freed Syracuse from Dionysius the Younger. He afterwards accused Dion and contrived his murder. His excuse was that Dion knew what he intended to do, and would be likely to strike first, if he did not anticipate him.

advantage to waste time waiting for the verdict or damages, such as strangers or husbandmen ; for they are ready to compromise on easy terms and to drop proceedings. And those who have committed numerous wrongs, or such as those from which they themselves are suffering ; for it seems almost an act of justice that a man should suffer a wrong such as he had been accustomed to make others suffer ; if, for instance, one were to assault a man who was in the habit of outraging others.^a And those who have already injured us, or intended, or intend, or are about to do so ; for in such a case vengeance is both pleasant and honourable, and seems to be almost an act of justice. And those whom we wrong ^b in order to ingratiate ourselves with our friends, or persons whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word, those by whom our life is ruled. And those in reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining merciful consideration.^c And those against whom we have a complaint, or with whom we have had a previous difference, as Callippus acted in the matter of Dion ;^d for in such cases it seems almost an act of justice. And those who are going to be attacked by others, if we do not attack first, since it is no longer possible to deliberate ; thus, Aenesidemus is said to have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to Gelon,^e who, having reduced a town to slavery, had anticipated him by doing what he had intended to do himself. And those to whom, after having injured them, we shall be enabled to do many acts of justice, in the

^a Aenesidemus, tyrant of Leontini, being anticipated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, in the enslavement of a neighbouring state, sent him the cottabus prize, as a compliment for having " played the game " so skilfully. The cottabus was originally a Sicilian game.

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ράδίως ἵασόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῦν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.

32 Καὶ ἂν πάντες ἢ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῦν εἰώθασιν· συγ-
 33 γνώμης γάρ οἴονται τεύξεσθαι. καὶ τὰ ράδια
 κρύψαι· τοιαῦτα δ' ὅσα ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον
 τὰ ἐδώδιμα, ἢ τὰ εὐμετάβλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώ-
 34 μασιν ἢ κράσεσιν. ἢ ἂν πολλαχοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὕπορον·
 τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ εὐβάστακτα καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις
 35 ἀφανιζόμενα. καὶ οἷς ἀδιάφορα καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ
 προϋπῆρχε τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. καὶ ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ
 ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν οἰκείων ὕβρεις
 ἢ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῦν
 δόξειεν ἀν δὲ ἐπεξιών· τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε μικρὰ καὶ
 ἐφ' οἷς συγγνώμη. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι,
 καὶ ποῖα καὶ ποίους καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἔστιν.

1373 b 13. Τὰ δ' ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα
 διέλωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν. ὥρισται
 δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδικα πρὸς τε νόμους [δύο],¹
 2 καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔστι, διχῶς. λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν
 ἴδιον τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστοις ὥρι-
 σμένον πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγραφον
 τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν.
 ἔστι γάρ, ὃ μαντεύονται τι πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν
 δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικον, καν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς

¹ Bracketed by Spengel, but retained by Roemer.

^a Tyrant of Phœreæ.

idea that it will be easy to repair the wrong ; as Jason the Thessalian ^a said one should sometimes commit injustice, in order to be able also to do justice often.

Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or many are in the habit of committing, for they hope to be pardoned for their offences. They steal objects that are easy to conceal ; such are things that are quickly consumed, as eatables ; things which can easily be changed in form or colour or composition ; things for which there are many convenient hiding-places, such as those that are easy to carry or stow away in a corner ; those of which a thief already possesses a considerable number exactly similar or hard to distinguish. Or they commit wrongs which the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages upon the women of their family, upon themselves, or upon their children. And all those wrongs in regard to which appeal to the law would create the appearance of litigiousness ; such are wrongs which are unimportant or venial. These are nearly all the dispositions which induce men to commit wrong, the nature and motive of the wrongs, and the kind of persons who are the victims of wrong.

13. Let us now classify just and unjust actions generally, starting from what follows. Justice and injustice have been defined in reference to laws and persons in two ways. Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. By particular laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves, which again are divided into written and unwritten ; by general laws I mean those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communica-

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ἀλλήλους ἥ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους
’Αντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρη-
μένον θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ώς φύσει ὃν τοῦτο
δίκαιον.

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κάχθείς, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε
ζῆται τοῦτο, κούδεις οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.

καὶ ως Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν
τὸ ἔμψυχον· τοῦτο γάρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ’
οὐ δίκαιον,

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ’ εὑρυμέδοντος
αἰθέρος ἡνεκέως τέταται διά τ’ ἀπλέτου αὖ γῆς.

καὶ ως ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας.
3 πρὸς οὓς δὲ διώρισται, διχῶς διώρισται· ἦ γὰρ
πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἦ πρὸς ἕνα τῶν κοινωνούντων, ἄ
δει πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν.

Διὸ καὶ τὰδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς
ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἦ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα
καὶ ὡρισμένον ἦ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων
καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὡρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ
4 στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν. ἀπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικη-
μάτων διηρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὅντων πρὸς τὸ
κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀνα-
λαβόντες τί ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά.
5 ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ ἀδικα
πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὡρισται πρότερον ἐκούσιον

^a *Antigone*, 456.

^b Of Elis, pupil of Gorgias. The oration is not extant, but

tion nor agreement between them. This is what Antigone in Sophocles ^a evidently means, when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices, as being naturally just :

For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from all eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came.

And as Empedocles says in regard to not killing that which has life, for this is not right for some and wrong for others,

But a universal precept, which extends without a break throughout the wide-ruling sky and the boundless earth.

Alcidamas ^b also speaks of this precept in his *Messeniacus*. . . . And in relation to persons, there is a twofold division of law ; for what one ought to do or ought not to do is concerned with the community generally, or one of its members.

Therefore there are two kinds of just and unjust acts, since they can be committed against a definite individual or against the community ; he who commits adultery or an assault is guilty of wrong against a definite individual, he who refuses to serve in the army of wrong against the State. All kinds of wrong acts having been thus distinguished, some of which affect the State, others one or several individuals, let us repeat the definition of being wronged,^c and then go on to the rest. Being wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of one who voluntarily inflicts it, for it has been established

the scholiast supplies his words : ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν (“God has left all men free ; Nature has made none a slave ”). The Messenians had revolted from Sparta.

^a i. 10. 3.

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6 εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἄδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διηρηται καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἔκούσια, 7 ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀγνοοῦντος ἢ ἄκοντος, ἢ ἔκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. 8 περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ρήθησεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴρηται πρότερον.

9 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ 1374 a τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἄλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἄλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἄλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι ἄλλ' οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἄλλ' οὐ δημόσιαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὑβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἔάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἔάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα 10 δεικνύναι, ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει

^a i. 6.

^b i. 10. 3.

^c ii. 2.

^d i. 11, 12.

that injustice is a voluntary act. And since the man who suffers injustice necessarily sustains injury and that against his will, it is evident from what has been said in what the injuries consist ; for things good and bad have already been distinguished in themselves,^a and it has been said that voluntary acts are all such as are committed with knowledge of the case.^b Hence it necessarily follows that all accusations concern the State or the individual, the accused having acted either ignorantly and against his will, or voluntarily and with knowledge, and in the latter case with malice aforethought or from passion. We will speak of anger when we come to treat of the passions,^c and we have already stated ^d in what circumstances and with what dispositions men act with deliberate purpose.

But since a man, while admitting the fact, often denies the description of the charge or the point on which it turns—for instance, admits that he took something, but did not steal it ; that he was the first to strike, but committed no outrage ; that he had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a woman ; or that he stole something but was not guilty of sacrilege, since the object in question was not consecrated ; or that he trespassed, but not on public land ; or that he held converse with the enemy, but was not guilty of treason—for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should be given of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we desire to prove that an offence has or has not been committed, we may be able to put the case in a true light. In all such instances the question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrong-doer and a worthless person, or not ; for vice and

ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαιρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε, πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἡ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἔαυτοῦ. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

- 11 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἡν δύο εἴδη (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύοντιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ’ ἀγράφων δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ’ οὓς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί, οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ 13 γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀκόντων τὰ δὲ ἐκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθη, ἐκόντων δ’ ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἡ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ἡ δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ ὅσα

^a Roemer reads, after Dittmeyer, εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ [τούτου ἀφ’ οὗ ἔλαβε] καὶ . . . from the old Latin translation.

^b Laws are special and general, the former being written or unwritten. The unwritten law, again, is of two kinds: (1) general; (2) supplementary to the special written law. This general law (not the same as the general law “based upon nature” § 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized by

wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose ; for if a man has struck, it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he has taken it to injure another ^a or to get something for himself. It is the same in all other cases as in these.

We have said that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are unwritten), and have spoken of those concerning which the laws are explicit ; of those that are unwritten there are two kinds. One kind arises from an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honour or dishonour, and rewards ; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, to help one's friends, and the like ; ^b the other kind contains what is omitted in the special written law. For that which is equitable seems to be just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the written law. These omissions are sometimes involuntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of the legislators ; involuntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary when, being unable to define for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal statement, which is not applicable to all, but only to most, cases ; and whenever it is difficult to give a remarkable degree (*καθ' ὑπερβολὴν*) of virtue or the opposite. For these laws do not prescribe any special reward or punishment, but acts are praised or blamed, honoured or dishonoured, rewarded or punished, in accordance with the general feeling of mankind.

μὴ ράδιον διορίσαι δι' ἀπειρίαν, οἶν τὸ τρῶσαι
σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποίω τινί· ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν
14 ὁ αἰών διαριθμοῦντα. ἂν οὖν ἡ ἀδιόριστον, δέη
δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε καν
δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἡ πατάξῃ,
κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ
ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ
1374 b ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἐστίν.

15 Εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν
ποιά ἐστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι
16 οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἀνθρωποι· ἐφ' οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγ-
γνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτή-
ματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἵσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ
τὰ ἀτυχήματα· ἐστι δ' ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παρά-
λογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα
μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα
δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ' ἐστίν.
17 τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῦς
ἀνθρωπίνους συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ
πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν,
καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
τοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς
18 τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖος τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ ποῖος τις ἦν
ἀεὶ ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν μᾶλλον
ῶν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἡ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὕν
ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἡ ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι
ἀδικούμενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρί-
19 νεσθαι ἡ ἔργῳ. καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἡ εἰς
δίκην βούλεσθαι ιέναι· ὁ γὰρ διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς

^a "Inexperience" (Jebb).

a definition owing to the infinite number of cases,^a as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instrument used in wounding ; for life would not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no exact definition is possible, but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms ; so that, if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually strikes, according to the written law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is not ; and this is a case for equity.

If then our definition of equity is correct, it is easy to see what things and persons are equitable or not. Actions which should be leniently treated are cases for equity ; errors, wrong acts, and misfortunes, must not be thought deserving of the same penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are unexpected and not vicious ; errors are not unexpected, but are not vicious ; wrong acts are such as might be expected and vicious, for acts committed through desire arise from vice. And it is equitable to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to the law but to the legislator ; not to the letter of the law but to the intention of the legislator ; not to the action itself, but to the moral purpose ; not to the part, but to the whole ; not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or generally ; to remember good rather than ill treatment, and benefits received rather than those conferred ; to bear injury with patience ; to be willing to appeal to the judgement of reason rather than to violence;^b to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks

^b “ To be willing that a judicial sentence should be nominal rather than real ” (Jebb).

όρᾳ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον· καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα διαιτητὴς εὑρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἴσχυῃ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

14. Ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὃσῳ ἀν ἀπὸ μεῖζονος ἥ ἀδικίας· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἷον ὁ Μελανώπον Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει, ὅτι παρελογίσατο τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἵερὰ τοὺς ναοποιούς· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης δὲ τούναντίον. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει· ὁ γὰρ τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἵερὰ κλέψας κανὸν διτοῦν ἀδικήσειεν. δότε μὲν δὴ οὕτω τὸ μεῖζον, δότε δ' ἐκ τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται.

2 καὶ οὐ μή ἔστιν ἵση τιμωρία, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὐ μή ἔστιν ἴασις· χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον.

3 καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔστι δίκην λαβεῖν τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις ἴασις. καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεγάλως ἐκόλασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μεῖζον ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος κολασθῆναι, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὔκτήμονος συνηγορῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ

1375 a τιμήσειν ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἦ οὐ ὁ παθὼν ἑαυτῷ 4 ἐτίμησεν. καὶ ὁ μόνος ἦ πρῶτος ἦ μετ' ὀλίγων πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸν ἀμαρτάνειν μέγα. καὶ δι' ὃ ἀν ζητηθῆ καὶ εὑρεθῆ τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα, οἷον ἐν "Ἄργει ζημιοῦται δι' ὃν ἀν

^a i. 7. 13. Callistratus and Melanopus were rival orators. Nothing is known of this particular charge.

^b The magistrates who superintended the building and repairing operations.

^c Understanding *iāsthai*. Or "to punish adequately," supplying *οὐ μὴ ἵση τιμωρία*.

^d An orator, not the tragic poet.

^e "Or has been seldom paralleled" (Cope, but cp. i. 9. 38).

only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail. Let this manner of defining equity suffice.

14. Wrong acts are greater in proportion to the injustice from which they spring. For this reason the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the charge brought by Callistratus ^a against Melanopus that he had fraudulently kept back three consecrated half-obols from the temple-builders ^b; whereas, in the case of just actions, it is quite the contrary. The reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the less; for he who has stolen three consecrated half-obols will commit any wrong whatever. Wrong acts are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes by the extent of the injury done. A wrong act is greater when there is no adequate punishment for it, but all are insufficient; when there is no remedy, because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it; ^c and when the person injured cannot obtain legal satisfaction, since it is irremediable; for justice and punishment are kinds of remedies. And if the sufferer, having been wronged, has inflicted some terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person deserves greater punishment; wherefore Sophocles, ^d when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered, declared that he would not assess the punishment at less than the victim had assessed it for himself. A wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, or the first of its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplices ^e; and when it has been frequently committed; or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have been sought and found: thus, at Argos the citizen owing to whom a new

νόμος τεθῆ καὶ δι' οὓς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ὡκοδο-
 5 μήθη. καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα μεῖζον.
 καὶ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἀκούοντες
 φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά
 ἔστι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνήρηκε δίκαια ἢ ὑπερ-
 βέβηκεν, οἷον ὄρκους δεξιὰς πίστεις ἐπιγαμίας·
 6 πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα
 οὖν κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ
 ψευδομαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἀν ἀδικήσειεν,
 εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ; καὶ ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη
 μάλιστα. καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφ' οὖν εὑπέπονθεν·
 πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι τε κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ
 7 εὗ. καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δίκαια· ἀμείνονος γὰρ
 μὴ δι' ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμ-
 μένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δ' ἄγραφα οὐ. ἄλλον δὲ
 τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ φοβερὰ
 ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐπιζήμια
 ἀδικήσειεν ἄν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος
 καὶ ἐλάττονος εἴρηται.

15. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων
 ἔχόμενόν ἔστι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἵδιαι γὰρ
 2 αὗται τῶν δικαιικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν,

^a And therefore the violation of them is more discreditable.

^b When he thinks of the punishment they may entail.

law has been passed, is punished, as well as those on whose account a new prison had to be built. The crime is greater, the more brutal it is ; or when it has been for a long time premeditated ; when the recital of it inspires terror rather than pity. Rhetorical tricks of the following kind may be used :—the statement that the accused person has swept away or violated several principles of justice, for example, oaths, pledges of friendship, plighted word, the sanctity of marriage ; for this amounts to heaping crime upon crime. Wrong acts are greater when committed in the very place where wrongdoers themselves are sentenced, as is done by false witnesses ; for where would a man not commit wrong, if he does so in a court of justice ? They are also greater when accompanied by the greatest disgrace ; when committed against one who has been the guilty person's benefactor, for in that case, the wrongdoer is guilty of wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong, but does not return good for good. So too, again, when a man offends against the unwritten laws of right, for there is greater merit in doing right without being compelled^a; now the written laws involve compulsion, the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way, wrongdoing is greater, if it violates the written laws ; for a man who commits wrongs that alarm him ^b and involve punishment, will be ready to commit wrong for which he will not be punished. Let this suffice for the treatment of the greater or less degree of wrongdoing.

15. Following on what we have just spoken of, we have now briefly to run over what are called the *inartificial proofs*, for these properly belong to forensic oratory. These proofs are five in number : laws,

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3 νόμοι μάρτυρες συνθήκαι βάσανοι ὅρκος. πρῶτον
 μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς χρηστέον καὶ
 προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα
 4 καὶ ἀπολογούμενον. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν
 ἐναντίος ἦ δὲ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ
 νόμῳ χρηστέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὡς δικαιο-
 5 τέροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ τοῦτ' ἔστι,
 6 τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ
 ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μετα-
 βάλλει, οὐδὲ δὲ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἔστιν), οἱ
 δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ
 Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνῃ ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε
 παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παρὰ τὸν
 ἄγραφον.

1375 b οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κάχθεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ποτε . . .
 ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

7 καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἔστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον,
 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν. ὥστ᾽ οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος·
 οὐ γάρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου· καὶ ὅτι
 ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἔστιν, ὥπως
 8 διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ
 ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἦ τοῖς
 9 γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἔμενειν. καὶ εἴ που
 ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἦ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ·
 οἷον ἐνίστε ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἄττ' ἀν-

^a Although the use of inartificial proofs is almost entirely confined to forensic oratory, they *may* be used in deliberative oratory.

^b The first line is quoted i. 13. 2. The second differs somewhat from Sophocles (*Antigone*, 458), where the passage runs, *τούτων ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς | φρόνημα δεῖσας*, *ἐν θεοῖσι τὴν δίκην | δώσειν* (“I was not likely, through fear of the

witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths. Let us first then speak of the laws, and state what use should be made of them when exhorting or dissuading,^a accusing or defending. For it is evident that, if the written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and equity, as more in accordance with justice; and we must argue that, when the dicast takes an oath to decide to the best of his judgement, he means that he will not abide rigorously by the written laws; that equity is ever constant and never changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written laws often vary (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law :

For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal . . . this I was not likely [to infringe through fear of the pride] of any man);^b

and further, that justice is real and expedient, but not that which only appears just; nor the written law either, because it does not do the work of the law^c; that the judge is like an assayer of silver, whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine justice; that it is the part of a better man to make use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the written law.^d Again, it is necessary to see whether the law is contradictory to another approved law or to itself; for instance, one law enacts that all con-

pride of any man, to incur the penalty for violating these statutes at the bar of heaven").

^a Which is the administration of real justice, not that which appears to the legislator to be such and is embodied in legal enactments.

^b Cp. 14. 7 above.

συνθῶνται, ὁ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ
 10 τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ
 ὅρᾶν ἐφ' ὅποτέραν τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφ-
 11 αρμόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἴτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ
 εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι
 μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ
 12 μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γε-
 γραμμένος ἢ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τό τε γνώμη τῇ
 ἀρίστῃ λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἔνεκα
 δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ
 νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῆ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν
 αἴρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν
 διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν
 ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι
 τὸν ἰατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀμαρτία
 τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὃσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι.
 καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι,
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγο-
 ρεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω.

13 Περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσι διττοί, οἱ
 μὲν παλαιοὶ οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν
 μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου οἱ δ' ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ
 παλαιοὺς μὲν τούς τε ποιητὰς καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων
 γνωρίμων εἰσὶ κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι
 Ὁμήρω μάρτυρι ἔχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος καὶ
 Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος Ηεριάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς

^a Άλλος δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆσος, | στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἦν
 Ἀθηναῖων ἴσταντο φάλαγγες, *Iliad*, ii. 557-8. The Lacedae-
 monians, acting as arbitrators between Athens and Megara,
 who were fighting for the possession of Salamis, decided in
 favour of Athens on the strength of the two lines in the *Iliad*,
 which were taken to show that Salamis belonged to Athens.

traets should be binding, while another forbids making contracts contrary to the law. If the meaning of the law is equivocal, we must turn it about, and see in which way it is to be interpreted so as to suit the application of justice or expediency, and have recourse to that. If the conditions which led to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while the law itself remains, one must endeavour to make this clear and to combat the law by this argument. But if the written law favours our case, we must say that the oath of the dicast "to decide to the best of his judgement" does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but is only intended to relieve him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of the meaning of the law ; that no one chooses that which is good absolutely, but that which is good for himself ; that there is no difference between not using the laws and their not being enacted ; that in the other arts there is no advantage in trying to be wiser than the physician, for an error on his part does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying the authority ; that to seek to be wiser than the laws is just what is forbidden in the most approved laws. Thus much for the laws.

Witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent ; of the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are outside it. By ancient I mean the poets and men of repute whose judgements are known to all ; for instance, the Athenians, in the matter of Salamis, appealed to Homer^a as a witness, and recently the inhabitants of Tenedos to Periander of Corinth^b

It was reported that the second line was the invention of Solon.

^b It is not known to what this refers.

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Σιγειεῖς. καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἔχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι πάλαι ἀσελγῆς ἡ οὐκία· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων

εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτίᾳ πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν.

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες,
1376 α περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἵον Θεμιστοκλῆς, ὅτι ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μαρτύρια ἔστιν· οἵον εἴ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιεῖσθαι φίλον γέροντα, τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία,

μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς νίοὺς ἀναιρεῖν ὅν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

15 Πρόσφατοι δ' ὅσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν·
χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τούτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· οἵον Εὔβουλος ἐν τοῖς
δικαστηρίοις ἔχρήσατο κατὰ Χάρητος ὁ Πλάτων
εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει
16 τὸ δόμολογεῖν πονηροὺς εἶναι. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες
τοῦ κινδύνου, ἀν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν
τοιοῦτοι τῶν τοιούτων μόνον μάρτυρες εἰσιν, εἰ

^a (Frag. 22, *P.L.G.* ii., where the line runs, *εἰπέμεναι Κριτίᾳ ξανθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν*). The Critias attacked by Cleophon is the well-known oligarch and grandson of the first. Cleophon argued from the phrase “bid him listen to his father” that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a degenerate. In reality, Solon had a high opinion of the family, and probably meant to praise the father.

^b Herodotus, vii. 141.

^c They have not been mentioned before. Spengel would therefore omit *εἴρηται*, and remove the commas: “proverbs are, as it were, evidence.”

against the Sigeans. Cleophon also made use of the elegiacs of Solon against Critias, to prove that his family had long been notorious for licentiousness, otherwise Solon would never have written :

Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.^a

One should appeal to such witnesses for the past, but also to interpreters of oracles for the future ; thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea.^b Further, proverbs, as stated,^c are evidence ; for instance, if one man advises another not to make a friend of an old man, he can appeal to the proverb,

Never do good to an old man.

And if he advises another to kill the children, after having killed the fathers, he can say,

Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the children to live.^d

By recent witnesses I mean all well-known persons who have given a decision on any point, for their decisions are useful to those who are arguing about similar cases. Thus, for instance, Eubulus,^e when attacking Chares in the law courts, made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, " that the open confession of wickedness had increased in the city." And those who share the risk of the trial, if they are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only serve to establish whether an act has taken place or

^a From the *Cypria* of Stasinus, of the "epic cycle."

^b Opponent of Demosthenes. Chares was an Athenian commander, both naval and military. Nothing is known of Archibius. Plato is probably the comic poet.

γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποῖον οὐ
 μάρτυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδικον, εἰ συμφέρον
 17 ἢ ἀσύμφορον· οἱ δ' ἄπωθεν καὶ περὶ τούτων
 πιστότατοι πιστότατοι δ' οἱ παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι
 γάρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας
 μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ
 τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἔξαπατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ
 ἀλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα φευδομαρτυριῶν. ἔχοντι δὲ
 πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ
 ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων
 18 ἴκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ
 μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος,
 καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ
 ἥθους, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέποτ' ἔθτιν ἀπορῆσαι
 μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγ-
 ματος ἢ αὐτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς
 ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα.
 19 τὰ δ' ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἔχθροῦ ἢ
 μεταξύ, ἢ εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξύ,
 καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
 τόπων λεκτέον ἐξ οἴωνπερ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα
 λέγομεν.

20 Περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρῆ-
 1376 b σίς ἔστιν ὅσον αὕξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν

^a Or, "witnesses wholly unconnected with the case."

not, whether it is or is not the case ; but if it is a question of the quality of the act, for instance, whether it is just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient, they are not competent witnesses ; but witnesses from a distance ^a are very trustworthy even in regard to this. But ancient witnesses are the most trustworthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted. In regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man has no witnesses, he can say that the decision should be given in accordance with probabilities, and that this is the meaning of the oath " according to the best of one's judgement " ; that probabilities cannot be bribed to deceive, and that they cannot be convicted of bearing false witness. But if a man has witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that probabilities incur no responsibility, and that there would have been no need of evidence, if an investigation according to the arguments were sufficient. Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our adversary, as to the fact itself or moral character ; so that it is evident that one never need lack useful evidence. For, if we have no evidence as to the fact itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor against our opponent, it will always be possible to obtain some evidence as to character that will establish either our own respectability or the worthlessness of our opponent. As for all the other questions relative to a witness, whether he is a friend, an enemy, or neutral, of good or bad or middling reputation, and for all other differences of this kind, we must have recourse to the same topics as those from which we derive our enthymemes.

As for contraets, argument may be used to the extent of magnifying or minimizing their importance,

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ἢ ἀπίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τούναντίον.

21 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὅποιοι γὰρ ἂν τινες ὥσιν οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες, τούτοις αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταὶ εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὕσης αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἔστιν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἔστιν, ὥστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ 22 συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἕκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἄλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τἄλλα δὲ ὅσα ἀρμόττει, ἐπιπολῆς ἵδεν ἔστιν.

23 ἂν δ' ἐναντία ἥ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μέν, ἅπερ ἂν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦθ' ἀρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὥσιν ἀλλ' ἔξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῦ πείθεσθαι,

24 ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἴθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἔστι βραβευτῆς ὁ δικαστής· οὕκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον,

25 ἀλλ' ὡς δικαιούτερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτῃ οὔτ' ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γάρ ἔστιν), συνθῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἔξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις

of proving that they do or do not deserve credit. If we have them on our side, we must try to prove them worthy of credit and authoritative ; but if they are on the side of our opponent, we must do the opposite. In view of rendering them worthy or unworthy of credit, the method of procedure is exactly the same as in the case of witnesses ; for contracts are trustworthy according to the character of their signatories or depositaries. When the existence of the contract is admitted, if it is in our favour, we must strengthen it by asserting that the contract is a law, special and partial ; and it is not the contracts that make the law authoritative, but it is the laws that give force to legal contracts. And in a general sense the law itself is a kind of contract, so that whoever disobeys or subverts a contract, subverts the laws. Further, most ordinary and all voluntary transactions are carried out according to contract ; so that if you destroy the authority of contracts, the mutual intercourse of men is destroyed. All other arguments suitable to the occasion are easy to see. But if the contract is against us and in favour of our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we should oppose to the law if it were against us ; that it would be strange if, while we consider ourselves entitled to refuse to obey ill-made laws, whose authors have erred, we should be obliged to consider ourselves always bound by contracts. Or, that the judge is the dispenser of justice ; so that it is not the contents of the contract that he has to consider, but what is juster. Further, that one cannot alter justice either by fraud or compulsion, for it is based upon nature, whereas contracts may be entered into under both conditions.

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σκοπεῦν εἰ ἐναντία ἔστι τινι ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων
νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ
τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις
συνθήκαις ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὑστεραι
κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὅρθαι,
αἱ δ' ὑστεραι ἡπατήκασιν, ὅποτέρως ἂν ἢ χρή-
σιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὅρâν, εἴ πῃ ἐναντιοῦται
τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα
εὐθεώρητα δόμοίως.

26 Αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ
δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν.
οὕκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδε-
χόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν οἰκεῖαι αὐξεῖν
ἔστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσὶν
1377 a αὗται· ἐάν τε ὑπεναντίαι ὥσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφι-
σβητοῦντος, διαλύοι ἂν τις τάληθῆ λέγων καθ'
ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἥπτον
ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγουσιν ἢ τάληθῆ, καὶ
διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τάληθῆ, καὶ ρᾳδίως
καταψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θâττον. δεῖ δ'
ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παρα-
δείγματα ἃ ἵσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες. δεῖ δὲ λέγειν ὡς
οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ
παχύφρονες, καὶ λιθόδερμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὅντες
δυνατοὶ γενναίως ἐγκαρτεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οἱ
δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας ἴδεῖν
αὐτῶν καταθαρροῦσιν, ὥστε οὐδέν ἔστι πιστὸν ἐν
βασάνοις.¹

¹ This passage [δεῖ δ' ᔪχειν . . . βασάνοις], which is found in the best (Paris. A^c) ms., is now generally rejected, mainly as being linguistically un-Aristotelian.

In addition to this, we must examine whether the contract is contrary to any written law of our own or foreign countries, or to any general law, or to other previous or subsequent contracts. For either the latter are valid and the former not, or the former are right and the latter fraudulent ; we may put it in whichever way it seems fit. We must also consider the question of expediency—whether the contract is in any way opposed to the interest of the judges. There are a number of other arguments of the same kind, which are equally easy to discern.

Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached to it. Nor is it difficult to see what may be said concerning it, and by what arguments, if it is in our favour, we can exaggerate its importance by asserting that it is the only true kind of evidence ; but if it is against us and in favour of our opponent, we can destroy its value by telling the truth about all kinds of torture generally ; for those under compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make false charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from torture. It is also necessary to be able to quote actual examples of the kind with which the judges are acquainted. It may also be said that evidence given under torture is not true ; for many thick-witted and thick-skinned persons, and those who are stout-hearted heroically hold out under sufferings, while the cowardly and cautious, before they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough ; wherefore evidence from torture may be considered utterly untrustworthy.

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- 27 Περὶ δὲ ὅρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἡ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει, ἡ οὐδέτερον, ἡ τὸ μὲν τὸ δ’ οὗ, καὶ τούτων ἡ δίδωσι μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἡ λαμβάνει μὲν δίδωσι δ’ οὗ. ἔτι ἄλλως παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὁμώμοσται οὗτος ἡ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὑπ’ 28 ἐκείνου. οὐ δίδωσι μὲν οὗν, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ διότι ὁ μὲν ὁμόσας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὁμόσαντος οἴεται καταδικάσειν. καὶ ὡς οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς· 29 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δ’ οὗ. οὐ λαμβάνει δ’, ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημάτων ὅρκος. καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν· κρείττον γὰρ ἔνεκά του φαῦλον εἶναι ἡ μηδενός· ὁμόσας μὲν οὖν ἔξει, μὴ ὁμόσας δ’ οὗ. οὕτω δὲ δι’ ἀρετὴν ἄν εἴη, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ ἐπιορκίαν τὸ μή. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἀρμόττει, ὅτι οὐκ ἵση πρόκλησις αὕτη ἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὔσεβῆ, ἀλλ’ ὁμοία καὶ εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῆ πατάξαι 30 ἡ πληγῆναι προκαλέσαιτο. εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ’ οὗ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἵσον εἶναι ἄν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβῆς διδῷ, ὁ δὲ εὔσεβῆς ὁμονύμης δεινόν

^a In Attic legal procedure, the challenge (*πρόκλησις*) to take an oath on the question at issue was one method of deciding it. One party offered the other something to swear by (*ὅρκον*), this being the real meaning of *ὅρκος*, and the other party either accepted (*λαμβάνει, δέχεται*) it or refused it. Both parties, of their own accord, might propose to take the oath.

^b There are three reasons for not tendering the oath: (1) men are always ready to perjure themselves, if they are likely to benefit by doing so; (2) if your adversary takes the oath, he will decline to pay, trusting that he will be acquitted, whereas, if he is not on his oath, he will probably be condemned; (3) there is less risk in leaving the decision to the dicasts, who can be trusted.

As to oaths ^a four divisions may be made ; for either we tender an oath and accept it, or we do neither, or one without the other, and in the last case we either tender but do not accept, or accept but do not tender. Besides this, one may consider whether the oath has already been taken by us or by the other party. If you do not tender the oath to the adversary, it is because men readily perjure themselves, and because, after he has taken the oath, he will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does not take the oath, you think that the dicasts will condemn him ; and also because the risk incurred in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable, for you have confidence in them, but not in your adversary.^b If you refuse to take the oath yourself, you may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money ; that, if you had been a scoundrel, you would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a scoundrel for something than for nothing ; that, if you take it, you will win your case, if not, you will probably lose it ; consequently, your refusal to take it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing perjury. And the apophthegm of Xenophanes ^c is apposite—that “it is unfair for an impious man to challenge a pious one,” for it is the same as a strong man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit. If you accept the oath, you may say that you have confidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, reversing the apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the only fair way is that the impious man should tender the oath and the pious man take it ; and that it

^a Born at Colophon in Asia Minor, he migrated to Elea in Italy, where he founded the Eleatic school of philosophy.

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τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ
 31 διμόσαντας δικάζειν. εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὔσεβὲς
 τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ
 αὐτὸν ἄλλων κριτῶν δεῖσθαι· αὐτῷ γὰρ δίδωσι
 32 κρίνειν. καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν διμνύναι
 περὶ ὧν ἄλλους ἀξιοῖ διμνύναι.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ἔκαστον δῆλον πῶς λεκτέον, καὶ
 συνδυαζόμενον πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον· οἷον εἰ αὐτὸς
 μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι
 μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ
 1377 b διδόναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων
 ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγκη
 συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐὰν δὲ ἦ γεγενη-
 μένος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκίᾳ·
 ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ’ ἐπιορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν
 33 ἐστί, τὰ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια. ἐνταῦθα οὖν
 συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ,
 ἄλλ’ οὐ τῷ στόματι. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ἦ διμω-
 μοσμένος, ὅτι πάντα ἀναιρεῖ ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων οἷς
 ὥμοσεν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται
 διμόσαντες. καὶ “ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμμένειν
 οἷς διμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ δ’ οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν.”
 καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἄλλα αὔξων τις εἴπειεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν
 τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

^a The defence in such cases is: (1) that the previous oath was taken as the result of fraud or compulsion; (2) that you did not mean what you said.

would be monstrous to refuse to take the oath yourself, while demanding that the judges should take it before giving their verdict. But if you tender the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to be willing to leave the matter to the gods ; that your opponent has no need to look for other judges, for you allow him to make the decision himself ; and that it would be ridiculous that he should be unwilling to take an oath in cases where he demands that the dicasts should take one.

Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually, it is clear how we must deal with them when taken two and two ; for instance, if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to accept and tender it, or to do neither the one nor the other. For such cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is not perjury ; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary. Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not in what is said.^a But if the opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what he has sworn subverts everything, for this is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before applying the laws ; and [we may make this appeal] : “They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they themselves do not abide by theirs.” Further, we should employ all means of amplification. Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.

B

1. Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτ' ἔστιν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἔκαστον εἰπεῖν ἵδιᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων.
2 ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνεκα κρίσεώς ἔστιν ἡ ῥῆτορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἔστιν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὅρâν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν
3 ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἴτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαιis, τὸ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν πως αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ
4 αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον

^a This is Cope's interpretation. Jebb renders: "If we take each branch of Rhetoric by itself." The classes are of course the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.

^b The instructions given for enthymematic or logical proof should suffice; but since the function of Rhetoric is to find the available means of persuasion and its end is a judgement; and since an appeal to the speaker's own character and to the passions of those who are to give the judgement is bound to carry great weight, the speaker must be provided with rules for ethical and "pathetic" (emotional) proofs. In i. 5

BOOK II

1. Such then are the materials which we must employ in exhorting and dissuading, praising and blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the opinions and propositions that are useful to produce conviction in these circumstances ; for they are the subject and source of enthymemes, which are specially suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.^a But since the object of Rhetoric is judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing, but also that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character and should know how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. For it makes a great difference with regard to producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this, in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be possessed of certain qualities and that his hearers should think that he is disposed in a certain way towards them; and further, that they themselves should be disposed in a certain way towards him.^b In deliberative oratory, it is more useful that the orator Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with disapproval, but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those which are likely to bias the judges unfairly (*e.g.* stirring up envy, hatred, a desire for revenge).

εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πως
 τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται
 φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδὲ ὅργιζομένοις καὶ πράως
 ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ παράπαν ἔτερα ἡ κατὰ τὸ
 1373a μέγεθος ἔτερα· τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι, περὶ οὗ
 ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἡ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἡ μικρὰ δοκεῖ
 ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τούναντίον· καὶ τῷ μὲν
 ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὅντι, ἐὰν ἡ τὸ ἐσόμενον
 ἥδυ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται,
 τῷ δ' ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τούναντίον.

5 Τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας
 τρία ἔστι τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἔστι δι' ἂ πι-
 στεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα
 φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια· διαφεύδονται γὰρ
 περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἡ συμβουλεύουσιν ἡ διὰ πάντα
 6 ταῦτα ἡ διὰ τούτων τι· ἡ γὰρ δι' ἀφροσύνην οὐκ
 ὄρθως δοξάζουσιν, ἡ δοξάζοντες ὄρθως διὰ μοχ-
 θηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἡ φρόνιμοι μὲν
 καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλ' οὐκ εὔνοι· διόπερ ἐνδέ-
 χεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας.
 καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἄπαντα
 δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις
 7 πιστόν. ὅθεν μὲν τοίνυν φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι
 φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διηρημένων
 ληπτέον· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ κανὸν ἔτερόν τις κανὸν
 ἔαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δ' εὔνοίας
 καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον.

^a Opposed to εὐέλπιδι. Others render "in a bad humour."

^b ἐπιεικής and σπουδαῖος both = ἀγαθός. In a restricted sense ἐπιεικής is "respectable," σπουδαῖος "serious."

^c i. 9.

should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic, that the hearer should be disposed in a certain way ; for opinions vary, according as men love or hate, are wrathful or mild, and things appear either altogether different, or different in degree ; for when a man is favourably disposed towards one on whom he is passing judgement, he either thinks that the accused has committed no wrong at all or that his offence is trifling ; but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. And if a man desires anything and has good hopes of getting it, if what is to come is pleasant, he thinks that it is sure to come to pass and will be good ; but if a man is unemotional or not hopeful^a it is quite the reverse.

For the orator to produce conviction three qualities are necessary ; for, independently of demonstrations, the things which induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill ; for speakers are wrong both in what they say and in the advice they give, because they lack either all three or one of them. For either through want of sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say what they think, or, if they are sensible and good,^b they lack goodwill ; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers. The means whereby he may appear sensible and good^b must be inferred from the classification of the virtues ;^c for to make himself appear such he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others. We must now speak of goodwill and friendship in our discussion of the emotions.

8 "Εστι δὲ τὰ πάθη, δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἔπειται λύπη καὶ ἥδονή, οἶνον ὀργὴν ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα,
 9 καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία. δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν τὰ περὶ ἔκαστον εἰς τρία· λέγω δ' οἶνον περὶ ὀργῆς, πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίους· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἦ τὰ δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἄπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· δομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον.

2. "Εστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος.
 2 εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργὴ, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστόν τινι, οἶνον Κλέωνι
 1378 b ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τι πεποίηκεν ἢ ἡμελλεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἔπεισθαι τινα ἥδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἥδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἰεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὥν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δ' ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται.

^a In i. generally (cp. i. 2. 22).

^b Gomperz translates φαινομένης "real or apparent"; Jebb omits φαινομένης and translates φαινομένην "apparent"; Cope confines both to the meaning "manifest."

^c *Iliad*, xviii. 109 (cp. i. 11. 9).

The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain ; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries. And each of them must be divided under three heads ; for instance, in regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom they are usually angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger. For if we knew one or even two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse that emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then, we have given a list of propositions^a in what we have previously said, we will do the same here and divide the emotions in the same manner.

2. Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight,^b affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved. If this definition is correct, the angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally), and because this individual has done, or was on the point of doing, something against him or one of his friends ; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. For it is pleasant to think that one will obtain what one aims at ; now, no one aims at what is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry man aims at what is possible for himself. Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that

Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads in men's hearts.^c

ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι διατρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ· ἡ οὖν τότε γινομένη φαντασία ἡδονὴν ἔμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων.

3 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἔστιν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τάγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτά· ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἢ μικρόν, οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὑπολαμβάνομεν. τρία δ' ἔστιν εἴδη ὀλιγωρίας, καταφρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ 4 ὕβρις· ὅ τε γὰρ καταφρούων ὀλιγωρεῖ· ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ μηδενὸς ἀξίων ὀλιγωροῦσιν· καὶ ὁ ἐπηρεάζων φαίνεται καταφρούειν. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν οὐχ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἵνα αὐτῷ τι, ὀλιγωρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὕτε βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει· ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ὠλιγώρει· οὕτ' ὡφελῆσαι ἂν οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου· ἐφρόντιζε γὰρ ἂν ὥστε φίλος εἶναι.

5 Καὶ ὁ ὕβριζων δ' ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν¹ ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ

¹ Λε reads πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, adopted by Roemer.

^a The thought of revenge in the future, as distinguished from dwelling upon it in the present.

^b Or, "those in which this tendency does not exist, or is trifling."

^c Or, "how to make him his friend," φίλος being for φίλον by attraction.

^d In Attic law ὕβρις (insulting, degrading treatment) was

for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this reason first,^a and also because men dwell upon the thought of revenge, and the vision that rises before us produces the same pleasure as one seen in dreams.

Slighting is an actualization of opinion in regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are of no importance or trifling^b we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and insult. For he who disdains, slight^s, since men disdain those things which they consider valueless and slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man appears to show disdain; for spitefulness consists in placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes, not in order that any advantage may accrue to him who spites, but to prevent any accruing to the other. Since then he does not act in this manner from self-interest, it is a slight; for it is evident that he has no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in that case he would be afraid of him instead of slighting him; nor that he will be of any use to him worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would be how to become his friend.^c

Similarly, he who insults another also slight^s him; for insult^d consists in causing injury or annoyance a more serious offence than *aikia* (bodily ill-treatment). It was the subject of a State criminal prosecution (*γραφή*), *aikia* of a private action (*δίκη*) for damages. The penalty was assessed in court, and might even be death. It had to be proved that the defendant struck the first blow (ii. 24. 9). One of the best known instances is the action brought by Demosthenes against Midias for a personal outrage on himself, when *choregus* of his tribe and responsible for the equipment of a chorus for musical competitions at public festivals.

πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι
 ἐγένετο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἡσθῇ· οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες
 6 οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἄλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς
 ἥδονῆς τοῦς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες
 αὐτοὺς ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον. διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ
 πλούσιοι ὑβρισταί· ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρί-
 ζοντες. ὑβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δ' ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ·
 τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, οὐτ'
 ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ. διὸ λέγει ὀργιζόμενος ὁ
 Ἀχιλλεὺς

ἡτίμησεν· ἐλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς
 καὶ

ώσει τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,

7 ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος. προσήκειν δ' οἴονται
 πολυωρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ
 1379 a δύναμιν, κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν ταῦτῷ
 ὑπερέχῃ πολύ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος
 καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ρήτορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν καὶ
 ἄρχων ἄρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ
 ἄρχεσθαι ἄξιον. διὸ εἴρηται

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἔστι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων
 καὶ

ἄλλα τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον.

^a *Iliad*, i. 356.

^b *Iliad*, ix. 648. μετανάστης, lit. “one who changes his home,” used as a term of reproach (see also Glossary).

^c ταῦτῷ. Other readings are ταῦτα, or τις.

^d *Iliad*, ii. 196.

^e *Iliad*, i. 82. The words are those of the soothsayer Calchas to Achilles, and the reference is to Agamemnon.

whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one's own pleasure ; for retaliation is not insult, but punishment. The cause of the pleasure felt by those who insult is the idea that, in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing superiority. That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insults ; for they think that, in committing them, they are showing their superiority. Dishonour is characteristic of insult ; and one who dishonours another slight him ; for that which is worthless has no value, either as good or evil. Hence Achilles in his wrath exclaims :

He has dishonoured me, since he keeps the prize he has taken for himself,^a

and

[has treated me] like a dishonoured vagrant,^b

as if being wrath for these reasons. Now men think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and virtue, and generally, in whatever similar respect ^c a man is far superior to another ; for example, the rich man to the poor man in the matter of money, the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the matter of oratory, the governor to the governed, and the man who thinks himself worthy to rule to one who is only fit to be ruled. Wherefore it has been said :

Great is the wrath of kings cherished by Zeus,^d

and

Yet it may be that even afterwards he cherishes his resentment,^e

8 ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. ἔτι ὑφ' ὅν
τις οἴεται εὖ πάσχειν δεῖν· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ
πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ δι' αὐτόν τις ἢ τῶν
αὐτοῦ τις, ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐβουλήθη.

9 Φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἥδη πῶς τ' ἔχοντες
ὄργιζονται αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσι καὶ διὰ ποῖα. αὐτοὶ
μὲν γάρ, ὅταν λυπῶνται· ἐφίεται γάρ τινος ὁ
λυπούμενος· ἔάν τε οὖν κατ' εὐθυωρίαν ὅτιοῦν
ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν,
ἔάν τε μή, ὅμοίως ταῦτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν· καὶ
ἔάν τε ἀντιπράττῃ τις ἔάν τε μὴ συμπράττῃ
ἔάν τε ἄλλο τι ἐνοχλῆι οὕτως ἔχοντα, τοῖς πᾶσιν
10 ὄργιζεται. διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, [πολεμοῦν-
τες], ἐρῶντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ
μὴ κατορθοῦντες ὄργιλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὔπαρόρμητοι,
μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ὀλιγωροῦντας,
οἷον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν νόσον, πενόμενος
δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν, πολεμῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν
πόλεμον, ἐρῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα· ὅμοίως
δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· προωδοποίηται γὰρ ἔκαστος
πρὸς τὴν ἕκάστου ὄργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος
11 πάθους. ἔτι δ' ἔὰν τάναντία τύχῃ προσδεχόμενος·
λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ὥσπερ καὶ
τέρπει τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἔὰν γένηται δὲ βούλεται.

^a τοῖς πρὸς τὴν νόσον : lit. “the sick man [is angry with those who slight him] in regard to his illness,” that is, by making light of it.

^b Or, “his suffering at the moment.”

for kings are resentful in consideration of their superior rank. Further, men are angry at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to expect to be well treated ; such are those on whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits, either themselves, or some one else for them, or one of their friends ; and all those whom they desire, or did desire, to benefit.

It is now evident from these considerations what is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom they are angry, and for what reasons. Men are angry when they are pained, because one who is pained aims at something ; if then anyone directly opposes him in anything, as, for instance, prevents him from drinking when thirsty, or not directly, but seems to be doing just the same ; and if anyone goes against him or refuses to assist him, or troubles him in any other way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with all such persons. Wherefore the sick, the necessitous, [those at war], the lovesick, the thirsty, in a word, all who desire something and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and easily excited, especially against those who make light of their present condition ; for instance, the sick man is easily provoked in regard to his illness,^a the necessitous in regard to his poverty, the warrior in regard to warlike affairs, the lover in regard to love-affairs, and so with all the rest ; for the passion^b present in his mind in each case paves the way for his anger. Again, men are angry when the event is contrary to their expectation, for the more unexpected a thing is, the more it pains ; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they desire comes to pass. From this it is obvious what

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διὸ καὶ ὥραι καὶ χρόνοι καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φανεραί, ποῖαι εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὄργην καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε, καὶ ὅτι ὅτε μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις εἰσί, μᾶλλον καὶ εὐκίνητοι.

12 Αὗτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὄργην, ὄργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσι καὶ σκώπτουσιν· ὑβρίζουσι γάρ. καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα βλάπτουσιν ὅσα ὕβρεως σημεῖα. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἀ μήτε ἀντί τινος μήτ' ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ποιοῦσιν· ἥδη γὰρ δοκεῖ δι' ὕβριν.

13 καὶ τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ἀ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζουσιν, οἷον οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν ἰδέαν, ὅμοίως δὲ

14 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, ἢ ὅλως ἢ μὴ

1379 b ἵσχυρῶς, ἢ μὴ δοκεῖν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται

ὑπάρχειν ἐν τούτοις¹ ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντί-

15 ζουσιν. καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις·

οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ'

16 αὐτῶν ἢ μή. καὶ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τιμᾶν ἢ φροντί-

ζειν, ἐὰν πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὅμιλῶσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ

τούτων οἴονται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄν

¹ ἐν τούτοις is bracketed by Spengel: Cope explains it as “in those particular things” (philosophy, personal beauty, and the like).

^a εὐκίνητοι refers grammatically to διαθέσεις and ἡλικίαι.

are the seasons, times, states of mind, and conditions of age in which we are easily moved ^a to anger ; and what are the various times, places, and reasons, which make us more prone to anger in proportion as we are subject to their influence.

Such then are the dispositions of those who are easily roused to anger. As to the objects of their anger, men are angry with those who ridicule, mock, and scoff at them, for this is an insult. And with those who injure them in ways that are indications of insult. But these acts must be of such a kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to those who commit them ; for if they are, they then appear due to gratuitous insult. And men are angry with those who speak ill of or despise things which they themselves consider of the greatest importance ; for instance, if a man speaks contemptuously of philosophy or of personal beauty in the presence of those who pride themselves upon them ; and so in all other cases. But they are far more angry if they suspect that they do not possess these qualities, either not at all, or not to any great extent, or when others do not think they possess them. For when they feel strongly that they do possess those qualities which are the subject of mockery, they pay no heed to it. And they are more angry with those who are their friends than with those who are not, for they think that they have a right to be treated well by them rather than ill. And they are angry with those who have been in the habit of honouring and treating them with respect, if they no longer behave so towards them ; for they think that they are being treated with contempt by them, otherwise they would treat them as

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17 ποιεῖν. καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὖ, μηδὲ τὴν
 ἵσην ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν. καὶ τοῖς τάναντίᾳ ποιοῦσιν
 αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἥπτους ὡσιν· καταφρονεῖν γὰρ πάντες
 οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἥπτόνων οἱ
 δ' ὡς παρ' ἥπτόνων.

18 Καὶ τοῖς ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὖσιν, ἢν τι ὀλιγωρῶσι,
 μᾶλλον· ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ ὄργὴ τῆς ὀλιγωρίας πρὸς
 τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥπτοσι
 19 μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν. τοῖς δὲ φίλοις, ἐάν τε μὴ εὖ λέγωσιν
 ἡ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐὰν τάναντίᾳ, καὶ ἐὰν
 μὴ αἰσθάνωνται δεομένων, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος
 Πλήξιππος τῷ Μελεάγρῳ· ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ τὸ μὴ
 αἰσθάνεσθαι σημεῖον· ὅν γὰρ φροντίζομεν, οὐ
 20 λανθάνει. καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ
 ὅλως εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀτυχίαις· ἡ
 γὰρ ἔχθροῦ ἡ ὀλιγωροῦντος σημεῖον. καὶ τοῖς
 μὴ φροντίζουσιν, ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς
 21 κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὀργίζονται. καὶ τοῖς ἡ ἀκούοντι
 περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῦλα· ὅμοιοι
 γάρ εἰσιν ἡ ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἡ ἔχθροῖς· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι
 22 συναλγοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῦλα πάντες
 ἀλγοῦσιν. ἔτι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι πρὸς πέντε, πρὸς
 οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, πρὸς οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὑφ' ὅν
 βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἡ οὓς αἰσχύνονται, ἡ ἐν
 τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς· ἐν τούτοις ἐάν τις

^a Plexippus was the uncle of Meleager. The allusion is obscure. It may refer to Meleager giving the skin of the Calydonian boar to Atalanta, which his uncle wanted. One of Antiphon's tragedies was named *Meleager* (T.G.F. p. 792).

^b Literally, "for the things which (=the persons whom) one respects, do not escape notice."

before. And with those who do not return their kindnesses nor requite them in full ; and with those who oppose them, if they are inferiors ; for all such appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if they had received kindnesses from inferiors.

And they are more angry with those who are of no account, if they slight them ; for anger at a slight was assumed to be felt at those who ought not to behave in such a manner ; for inferiors ought not to slight their superiors. And they are angry with friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them well, and in an even greater degree, if they do the opposite. And if they fail to perceive that they want something from them, as Plexippus ^a in Antiphon's tragedy reproached Meleager ; for failure to perceive this is a sign of slight ; since, when we care for people, these things are noticed.^b And they are angry with those who rejoice, or in a general way are cheerful when they are unfortunate ; for this is an indication of enmity or slight. And with those who do not care if they pain them ; whence they are angry with those who bring bad news. And with those who listen to the tale of their faults, or look on them with indifference, for they resemble slighters or enemies ; for friends sympathize and all men are pained to see their own faults exposed.^c And further, with those who slight them before five classes of persons : namely, their rivals, those whom they admire, those by whom they would like to be admired, those whom they respect, or those who respect them ; when anyone slighted them before these, their anger is

^a The real friend, therefore, would feel as much pain as the other whose faults are exposed.

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23 ὀλιγωρῆ, ὄργίζονται μᾶλλον. καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ
τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ ὥν αὐτοῖς αἰσχρὸν μὴ
βοηθεῖν, οἶν γονεῖς, τέκνα, γυναῖκας, ἀρχομένους.
καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν· παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον
24 γὰρ ἡ ὀλιγωρία. καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς
25 σπουδάζοντας· καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία.
καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιητικοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ
αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικόν, τὸ μὴ
26 ἀξιοῦν ὥν πάντας καὶ αὐτόν. ποιητικὸν δ' ὄργῆς
καὶ ἡ λήθη, οἶν καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὕτως οὖσα
περὶ μικρὸν ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη
σημεῖον εἶναι· δι' ἀμέλειαν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γίγ-
27 νεται, ἡ δ' ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία ἔστιν. οἷς μὲν οὖν
ὄργίζονται καὶ ὡς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποῖα, ἅμα
1380 a εἴρηται· δῆλον δ' ὅτι δέοι ἄν αὐτὸν κατασκευάζειν
τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἵοι ὄντες ὄργίλως ἔχουσιν,
καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ' οἷς
ὄργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἷοις ὄργίζονται.

3. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄργίζεσθαι ἐναντίον τῷ πραῦ-
νεσθαι καὶ ὄργὴ πραότητι, ληπτέον πῶς ἔχοντες
πρᾶοι εἰσὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνας πράως ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ
2 τίνων πραῦνονται. ἔστω δὴ πράゅνσις κατάστασις
3 καὶ ἡρέμησις ὄργῆς. εἰ οὖν ὄργίζονται τοῖς
ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία δ' ἔστιν ἐκούσιον, φανερὸν
ὅτι καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἡ ἀκουσίως
4 ποιοῦσιν ἡ φαινομένοις τοιούτοις πρᾶοι εἰσιν. καὶ
τοῖς τάναντίᾳ ὥν ἐποίησαν βουλομένοις. καὶ ὅσοι

^a Cope translates “rulers and governors”; but can ἀρχεσθαι be used in a middle sense?

^b To avoid the apparent tautology (§ 17), Roemer (*Rhein. Mus.* xxxix. p. 503) boldly conjectures *χαιρεῖν*: “not to return another’s greeting.”

greater. They are also angry with those who slight such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not to defend, for instance, parents, children, wives, and dependents.^a And with those who are ungrateful,^b for the slight is contrary to all sense of obligation. And with those who employ irony, when they themselves are in earnest; for irony shows contempt. And with those who do good to others, but not to them; for not to think them worthy of what they bestow upon all others also shows contempt. Forgetfulness also is a cause of anger, such as forgetting names, although it is a mere trifle, since even forgetfulness seems a sign of slight; for it is caused by indifference, and indifference is a slight. We have thus stated at one and the same time the frame of mind and the reasons which make men angry, and the objects of their anger. It is evident then that it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence, to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined to anger, and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry.

3. And since becoming angry is the opposite of becoming mild, and anger of mildness, we must determine the state of mind which makes men mild, towards whom they become mild, and the reasons which make them so. Let us then define making mild as the quieting and appeasing of anger. If then men are angry with those who slight them, and slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild towards those who do none of these things, or do them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such; and towards those who intended the opposite of what

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καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὐτοὺς τοιοῦτοι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς 5 αὐτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλιγωρεῖν. καὶ τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ μεταμελομένοις· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεποιημένοις παύονται τῆς ὄργης. σημεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν κολάσεως· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἀρνουμένους μᾶλλον κολάζομεν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας δικαίως κολάζεσθαι πανόμεθα θυμούμενοι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι, ἢ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ καταφρόνησις· ὥν γοῦν 6 πολὺ καταφρονοῦμεν, οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα. καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγουσιν· φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ηὔτους εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ηὔτους φοβοῦνται, φοβούμενος δὲ οὐδεὶς ὀλιγωρεῖ. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινουμένους παύεται ἡ ὄργη, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δάκνοντες τοὺς καθίζοντας. 7 καὶ τοῖς σπουδάζοντι πρὸς τοὺς σπουδάζοντας· δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ καταφρονεῖσθαι. 8 καὶ τοῖς μείζω κεχαρισμένοις. καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις 9 καὶ παραιτουμένοις· ταπεινότεροι γάρ. καὶ τοῖς μὴ ὑβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλευασταῖς μηδ' ὀλιγώροις, ἢ εἰς μηδένα ἢ μὴ εἰς χρηστοὺς μηδ' εἰς τοιούτους 10 οἷοί περ αὐτοί. ὅλως δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ πραϊντικά. καὶ οὖς φοβοῦνται ἢ αἰσχύνονται· ἔως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ὄργίζονται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὄρ-

^a ἔξαπίνης δ' Ὁδυσῆα ἵδον κύνες ὑλακόμωροι· | οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον· αὐτὰρ Ὁδυσσεὺς | ἔζετο κερδοσύνη (Odyssey, xiv. 29-31).

^b That is, greater than their present disservices.

they have done, and all who behave in the same way to themselves, for no one is likely to slight himself. And towards those who admit and are sorry for a slight ; for finding as it were satisfaction in the pain the offenders feel at what they have done, men cease to be angry. Evidence of this may be seen in the punishment of slaves ; for we punish more severely those who contradict us and deny their offence, but cease to be angry with those who admit that they are justly punished. The reason is that to deny what is evident is disrespect, and disrespect is slight and contempt ; anyhow, we show no respect for those for whom we entertain a profound contempt. Men also are mild towards those who humble themselves before them and do not contradict them, for they seem to recognize that they are inferior ; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and no one who is afraid slight another. Even the behaviour of dogs proves that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit down.^a And men are mild towards those who are serious with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated seriously, not with contempt. And towards those who have rendered them greater services.^b And towards those who want something and deprecate their anger, for they are humbler. And towards those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slighting anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who resemble themselves. And generally speaking, one can determine the reasons that make for mildness by their opposites. Thus, men are mild towards those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel so towards them, for it is impossible to be afraid and

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- 11 γίζεσθαι. καὶ τοῖς δι' ὄργὴν ποιήσασιν η̄ οὐκ ὄργίζονται η̄ ἥπτον ὄργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ὄργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ·
 1380 b η̄ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, η̄ δ' ὄργὴ μετὰ λύπης.
 12 καὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς.

Καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὄργιζεσθαι δῆλον
 ὅτι πρᾶοι εἰσίν, οἷον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν
 ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει,
 ὅλως ἐν ἄλυπίᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν
 ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ. ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυιοι
 13 τῇ ὄργῃ ὄντες· παύει γὰρ ὄργὴν ὁ χρόνος. παύει
 δὲ καὶ ἑτέρου ὄργὴν μείζω η̄ παρ' ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα
 τιμωρία πρότερον· διὸ εὖ Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος
 τινὸς ὄργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου “τί οὐκ ἀπολογεῖ;”
 “οὕπω γε” ἔφη. “ἄλλὰ πότε;” “ὅταν ἄλ-
 λον ἴδω διαβεβλημένον.” πρᾶοι γὰρ γίγνονται,
 ὅταν εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὄργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, οἷον συνέβη
 ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου· μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες η̄
 Καλλισθένει ἀφεῖσαν διὰ τὸ Καλλισθένους τῇ
 14 προτεραιά καταγνῶναι θάνατον. καὶ ἐὰν ἐλεῶσιν
 καὶ ἐὰν μεῖζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὥσιν η̄ οἱ ὄργ-

^a They regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a temporary lapse.

^b πλήρωσις: lit. “filling up.” The reference may be to the “fulfilment” of one’s desires, or to “repletion” in the matter of food (L. and S.), which seems less likely; “in fulness of content” (Jebb).

^c Opponent of Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Macedonian party. Impeached for his share in the disastrous “Peace of Philocrates,” he went into exile and was condemned to death during his absence.

^d Ergophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace, while Callisthenes concluded a premature peace with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.

angry at the same time. And against those who have acted in anger they either feel no anger or in a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted from a desire to slight. For no one slights another when angry, since slight is free from pain, but anger is accompanied by it. And men are not angry with those who usually show respect for them.^a

It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in success, in abundance,^b and, in general, in freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for time appeases anger. Again, vengeance previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,^c when someone asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him, made the judicious reply, "Not yet." "When then?" "When I see someone accused of the same offence"; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.^d For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had condemned Callocrates to death on the previous day. Men also grow mild towards those whom they pity^e; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those

^a Another reading is *εὰν ἔλωσι*, "if they have convicted him." This is adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plato, *Republic*, 558 A, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed to all who live under a democracy, it is remarked that, even if a man is convicted by a court of justice, he takes no heed of the sentence, which is very often not enforced.

ζόμενοι ἀν ἔδρασαν· ὥσπερ εὐληφέναι γὰρ οἴονται
 15 τιμωρίαν. καὶ ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν οἴωνται αὐτοὶ καὶ
 δικαίως πάσχειν· οὐ γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὄργὴ πρὸς
 τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον οἴονται
 πάσχειν, ἡ δ' ὄργὴ τοῦτο ἦν. διὸ δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ
 προκολάζειν· ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ ἥπτον κολαζόμενοι
 16 καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθήσεσθαι οἴωνται
 ὅτι δι' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνθ' ὅν ἔπαθον· ἡ γὰρ ὄργη
 τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον ἔστιν· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ δρισμοῦ.
 διὸ ὄρθως πεποίηται

φάσθαι Ὁδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον,

ὡς οὐ τετιμωρημένος, εἰ μὴ ἥσθετο καὶ δφ' οὗ
 καὶ ἀνθ' ὅτου. ὥστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ
 αἰσθάνονται ὄργιζονται, οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι,
 ὡς πεπονθόσι τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν
 οὐδὲ αἰσθησομένοις, οὖν οἱ ὄργιζόμενοι ἔφίενται.
 διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ Ἔκτορος ὁ ποιητής, παῦσαι βουλό-
 μενος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τῆς ὄργῆς τεθνεῶτος,

κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεάίνων.

17 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τοῖς καταπραῦνειν βουλομένοις ἐκ
 τούτων τῶν τόπων λεκτέον, ἀντοὺς μὲν παρ-

^a Therefore, if you think that a man will never learn *who* took vengeance on him, you will be less cruel; for anger is personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry, inflicted a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know it.

^b *Odyssey*, ix. 504.

^c Or, "as if Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant . . ."

^d Or, "with any who can no longer feel their anger." Cope translates: "with all the rest (besides those actually within reach) who are out of sight."

who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were obtained reparation. And if they think that they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused against what is just ; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at punishment of this kind. And men are milder if they think that those punished will never know that the punishment comes from *them* in requital for their own wrongs ; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our definition.^a Wherefore it is justly said by the poet :

Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,^b
 as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,^c
 had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and
 for what. So that men are not angry either with
 any others who cannot know who punishes them,^d or
 with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty
 and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which
 is the aim of those who are angry.^e So then, in
 regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining
 the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well
 says :

For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.^f
 It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to
 these topics when they desire to appease their
 audience, putting them into the frame of mind

^a To make the offender *feel* pain as part of the punishment.

^f *Iliad*, xxiv. 54.

σκευάζουσι τοιούτους, οἷς δ' ὄργιζονται, ἢ φοβεροὺς ἢ αἰσχύνης ἀξίους ἢ κεχαρισμένους ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ ὑπεραλγοῦντας τοῖς πεποιημένοις.

4. Τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δρισάμενοι λέγωμεν.
 2 ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαι τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ
 1381 a δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δ' ἔστιν
 δὲ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος. οἴονται δὲ φίλοι
 εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
 3 τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον εἶναι τὸν
 συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς
 λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἔτερον ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκεῖνον. γιγνο-
 μένων γὰρ ὅν βούλονται χαίρουσι πάντες, τῶν
 ἔναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως
 4 σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. καὶ οἷς δὴ ταῦτα
 ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι, καὶ οἱ
 τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔχθροί· ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι
 ἀνάγκη, ὥστε ἃ περ αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος,
 τούτῳ φαίνεται φίλος εἶναι.
 5 Καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὖ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ
 ὅν κήδονται· ἢ εἰ μεγάλα, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ εἰ
 6 ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα· ἢ οὓς ἂν
 οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ. καὶ τοὺς τῶν φίλων
 φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ
 7 τοὺς φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων αὐτοῖς. καὶ
 τοὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ

^a φιλεῖν may be translated "to love" or "to like"; φιλία by "love," "liking," or "friendship"; for φίλος "friend" alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of *aimer* in French, and *lieben* in German.

required and representing those with whom they are angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they have done.

4. Let us now state who are the persons that men love ^a or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving. Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them for him as far as lies in our power. A friend is one who loves and is loved in return, and those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves friends. This being granted, it necessarily follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in good fortune and our sorrow in affliction, for our own sake and not for any other reason. For all men rejoice when what they desire comes to pass and are pained when the contrary happens, so that pain and pleasure are indications of their wish. And those are friends who have the same ideas of good and bad, and love and hate the same persons, since they necessarily wish the same things ; wherefore one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be the other's friend.

We also like those who have done good either to us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services are important, or are cordially rendered, or under certain circumstances, and for our sake only ; and all those whom we think desirous of doing us good. And those who are friends of our friends and who like those whom we like, and those who are liked by those who are liked by us ; and those whose enemies are ours, those who hate those whom we ourselves

μισοῦσιν, καὶ τὸν μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς
 μισουμένων· πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ φαί-
 νεται εἶναι καὶ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῖς
 8 ἀγαθά, ὅ περ ἦν τοῦ φίλου. ἔτι τὸν εὐποιητικὸν
 εἰς χρήματα καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν· διὸ τὸν ἐλευ-
 θερίους καὶ τὸν ἀνδρείους τιμῶσι καὶ τὸν δικαίους.
 9 τοιούτους δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν μὴ ἀφ' ἐτέρων
 ζῶντας· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ
 τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτ-
 10 ουργοὶ μάλιστα. καὶ τὸν σώφρονας, ὅτι οὐκ
 11 ἄδικοι. καὶ τὸν ἀπράγμονας διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ
 οὓς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἐὰν φαίνωνται βου-
 λόμενοι· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἱ τ' ἀγαθοὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 καὶ οἱ εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἀπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμαζομένοις ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυ-
 12 μάζουσιν αὐτούς. ἔτι τὸν ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ
 συνδιημερεῦσαι· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ εὔκολοι καὶ μὴ
 ἐλεγκτικοὶ τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων καὶ μὴ φιλόνεικοι
 μηδὲ δυσέριδες· πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχητικοί,
 οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τάναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι.

^a Aristotle's opinion of husbandry, in which tillage and planting, keeping of bees, fish, and fowl were included, was not nearly so favourable as that of Xenophon in his *Oeconomicus*. In two lists of the elements of a State given in the *Politics*, it comes first at the head of the lower occupations. In its favour it is said that it forms the best material of a rural democracy, furnishes good sailors, a healthy body of men, not money-grabbers like merchants and tradesmen, and does not make men unfit to bear arms. On the other hand, it claims so much of a man's time that

hate, and those who are hated by those who are hated by us ; for all such persons have the same idea as ourselves of what is good, so that they wish what is good for us, which, as we said, is the characteristic of a friend. Further, we like those who are ready to help others in the matter of money or personal safety ; wherefore men honour those who are liberal and courageous and just. And such we consider those who do not live upon others ; the sort of men who live by their exertions, and among them agriculturists, and, beyond all others, those who work with their own hands.^a And the self-controlled, because they are not likely to commit injustice ; and those who are not busybodies, for the same reason. And those with whom we wish to be friends, if they also seem to wish it ; such are those who excel in virtue and enjoy a good reputation, either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst those who are admired by us or by whom we are admired.^b Further, those who are agreeable to live or spend the time with ; such are those who are good-tempered and not given to earping at our errors, neither quarrelsome nor contentious, for all such persons are pugnaeious, and the wishes of the pugnacious appear to be opposed to ours.

he is unable to devote proper attention to political duties, and should be excluded from holding office. He further says that husbandmen, if possible, should be slaves (neither of the same race nor hot-tempered, for they will work better and are less likely to revolt) ; or, as the next best alternative, barbarians or serfs. The favourable view taken by Aristotle here and in the *Oeconomics* (probably not his) does not agree with that put forward in the *Politics*.

^a Spengel reads η ἐν οἷς θαυμάζοντιν αὐτοῖς and brackets [η ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζομένοις ὑφ' αὐτῶν]. *ἄπασιν*, *βελτίστοις*, and *οἷς* will then all be neuter.

- 13 Καὶ οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ τωθάσαι¹ καὶ ὑπομεῖναι·
 ἐπὶ ταῦτὸ γὰρ ἀμφότεροι σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον,
 δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπ-
 14 τούτες. καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀγαθά,
 καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀ φοβοῦνται μὴ ὑπάρχειν
 15 αὐτοῖς. καὶ τοὺς καθαρίους περὶ ὅψιν, περὶ ἀμπ-
 16 εχόνην, περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὀνειδι-
 1381 b στὰς μήτε τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων μήτε τῶν εὑεργε-
 17 τημάτων· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγκτικοί. καὶ τοὺς μὴ
 μνησικάκους, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων,
 ἀλλ’ εὐκαταλλάκτους· οἵους γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν
 εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἴονται.
 18 καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ
 τῶν πλησίον κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τάγαθά·
 19 ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο δρᾶ. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνον-
 τας τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδάζουσιν· μαχητικοὶ
 γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπουδαίως
 πως ἔχοντας, οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπου-
 20 δαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, καὶ
 ταῦτα μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἀ μάλιστα βού-
 λονται αὐτοὶ ἢ θαυμάζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν
 21 εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς. καὶ τοὺς ὅμοίους καὶ ταῦτα ἐπι-
 τηδεύοντας, ἐὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδ’ ἀπὸ ταῦτοῦ
 ἢ ὁ βίος· γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ
 κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.

22 καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὃν ἐνδέχεται
 ὕμα μετέχειν αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ταῦτὸ καὶ οὕτω

¹ Spengel reads τῷ παῖσαι καὶ τῷ ὑπομεῖναι (from Λ^c). Roemer (*Rhein. Mus.* xxxix. p. 504) supports this, on the ground that τωθάσιν implies gross abuse, and would hardly be spoken of as ἐμμελῶς σκώπτειν.

And those are liked who are clever at making or taking a joke, for each has the same end in view as his neighbour, being able to take a joke and return it in good taste. And those who praise our good qualities, especially those which we ourselves are afraid we do not possess ; those who are neat in their personal appearance and dress, and clean-living ; those who do not make our errors or the benefits they have conferred a matter of reproach, for both these are inclined to be censorious ; those who bear no malice and do not cherish the memory of their wrongs, but are easily appeased ; for we think that they will be to ourselves such as we suppose them to be to others ; and those who are neither given to slander, or eager to know the faults of their neighbours nor our own, but only the good qualities ; for this is the way in which the good man acts. And those who do not oppose us when we are angry or occupied, for such persons are pugnacious ; and those who show any good feeling towards us ; for instance, if they admire us, think us good men, and take pleasure in our company, especially those who are so disposed towards us in regard to things for which we particularly desire to be either admired or to be thought worthy or agreeable. And we like those who resemble us and have the same tastes, provided their interests do not clash with ours and that they do not gain their living in the same way ; for then it becomes a case of

Potter [being jealous] of potter.^a

And those who desire the same things, provided it is possible for us to share them ; otherwise the same

^a Two of a trade never agree (*Hesiod, Works and Days*, 25).

23 συμβαίνει. καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ
αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες.
24 καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. καὶ
πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφ' ἄν ζηλοῦσθαι βού-
λονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους. ἢ φιλοῦσιν ἢ
25 βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι. καὶ οἵς ἂν τάγαθὰ συμ-
πράττωσιν, ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω
26 κακά. καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς
παρόντας φιλοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶ-
τας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν.

Καὶ ὅλως τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ
ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν
27 τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς. καὶ τοὺς μὴ πλαττομένους
πρὸς αὐτούς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ φαῦλα τὰ
έαυτῶν λέγοντες. εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς
φίλους τὰ πρὸς δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ
αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι
ἔοικεν. καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν·
28 οὐδεὶς γὰρ δν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ. εἴδη δὲ φιλίας
έταιρεία οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
29 ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις, καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος
ποιῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλώσαι· αὐτοῦ
30 γὰρ οὕτως ἔνεκα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ διά τι ἔτερον.
31 Περὶ δ' ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῦν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ
1382 a τῶν ἔναντίων δεῖ θεωρεῖν. ποιητικὰ δ' ἔχθρας
δργή, ἐπηρεασμός, διαβολή. δργὴ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν

^a Those with whom we are ambitious of entering into competition "in the race for distinction" (Cope). There is no unfriendliness, whereas envy produces it.

^b A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is not thinking of merely conventional faults; if, then, one who is ashamed of these is no friend, then one who is not . . .

thing would happen again. And those with whom we are on such terms that we do not blush before them for faults merely condemned by public opinion, provided that this is not due to contempt ; and those before whom we do blush for faults that are really bad. And those whose rivals we are,^a or by whom we wish to be emulated, but not envied,—these we either like or wish to be friends with them. And those whom we are ready to assist in obtaining what is good, provided greater evil does not result for ourselves. And those who show equal fondness for friends, whether absent or present ; wherefore all men like those who show such feeling for the dead.

In a word, men like those who are strongly attached to their friends and do not leave them in the lurch ; for among good men they chiefly like those who are good friends. And those who do not dissemble with them ; such are those who do not fear to mention even their faults. (For, as we have said, before friends we do not blush for faults merely condemned by public opinion ; if then he who blushes for such faults is not a friend, he who does not is likely to be one).^b And men like those who are not formidable, and in whom they have confidence ; for no one likes one whom he fears. Companionship, intimacy, kinship, and similar relations are species of friendship. Things that create friendship are doing a favour, and doing it unasked, and not making it public after doing it ; for then it seems to have been rendered for the sake of the friend, and not for any other reason.

As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that they must be examined in the light of their contraries. The causes which produce enmity are anger, spitefulness, slander. Anger arises from acts committed

ARISTOTLE

ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν· ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὄργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἄπας. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν χρόνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἰσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὄργιζόμενος, τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δὲ οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὕ. καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἄν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δὲ οὐδενός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται φέρει τὸν ὄργιζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι. φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἔχθροὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας διαλύειν, καὶ δι' ὄργὴν ἢ δι' ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφ' ὅπότερ' ἄν προαιρῆται τις ἄγειν. ποῖα δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ὥδ' ἔσται φανερόν.

5. "Εστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἀδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἵσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀπ-

^a He wishes to see and know the result of the measures taken against those with whom he is angry. Or, it may mean that he wishes the object of his anger to feel his wrath, and to know by whom, and for what, he is punished.

against us, enmity even from those that are not ; for if we imagine a man to be of such and such a character, we hate him. Anger has always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas hatred applies to classes ; for instance, every one hates a thief or informer. Anger is curable by time, hatred not ; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil ; for the angry man wishes to see what happens ;^a to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the things which cause pain are all perceptible, while things which are especially bad, such as injustice or folly, are least perceptible ; for the presence of vice causes no pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred not ; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many cases, but one who hates, never ; for the former wishes that the object of his anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should perish. It is evident, then, from what we have just said, that it is possible to prove that men are enemies or friends, or to make them such if they are not ; to refute those who pretend that they are, and when they oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them over to whichever side may be preferred. The things and persons that men fear and in what frame of mind, will be evident from the following considerations.

5. Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain ; for men do not fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow-witted, but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote ; all know that they

θανοῦνται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

2 εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντεινούσας. διὸ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά· ἐγγύς γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν· τοῦτο 3 γάρ ἔστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός. τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὄργὴ δυναμένων ποιεῖν τι· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται, ὥστε ἐγγύς εἰσι τοῦ ποιεῖν.

4 καὶ ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα· τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι γὰρ 5 ὁ ἀδικος ἀδικος. καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη δύναμιν 1332^a ἔχουσα· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται μέν, ὅταν 6 ὑβρίζηται, ἀεί, δύναται δὲ νῦν. καὶ φόβος τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι· ἐν παρασκευῇ γὰρ ἀνάγκη 7 εἶναι καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ πολλοὶ χείροις καὶ ἥπτους τοῦ κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, φοβερὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥστε οἱ συνειδότες πεποιηκότι τι 8 δεινὸν φοβεροὶ ἢ κατειπεῖν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν. καὶ οἱ δυνάμενοι ἀδικεῖν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποι, ὅταν δύνανται. καὶ οἱ ἡδικημένοι ἢ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν. καὶ οἱ ἡδικηκότες, ἐὰν δύναμιν ἔχωσι, φοβεροί, δεδιότες τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν.

9 ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο φοβερόν. καὶ οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνταγωνισταί, ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄμα ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοῦ· ἀεὶ γὰρ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς τοὺς

^a By the definitions of anger and hatred.

^b And therefore, having the inclination to be unjust, if he has the power, he will be so.

have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they are indifferent. If then this is fear, all things must be fearful that appear to have great power of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce great pain. That is why even the signs of such misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing itself appears to be near at hand, and danger is the approach of anything fearful. Such signs are the enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any way ; for it is evident that they have the wish,^a so that they are not far from doing so. And injustice possessed of power is fearful, for the unjust man is unjust through deliberate inclination.^b And outraged virtue when it has power, for it is evident that it always desires satisfaction, whenever it is outraged, and now it has the power. And fear felt by those able to injure us in any way, for such as these also must be ready to act. And since most men are rather bad than good and the slaves of gain and cowardly in time of danger, being at the mercy of another is generally fearful, so that one who has committed a crime has reason to fear his accomplices as likely to denounce or leave him in the lurch. And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be feared by those who can be so treated ; for as a rule men do wrong whenever they can. Those who have been, or think they are being, wronged, are also to be feared, for they are ever on the look out for an opportunity. And those who have committed some wrong, when they have the power, since they are afraid of retaliation, which was assumed to be something to be feared. And those who are our rivals for the same things, whenever it is impossible to share them, for men are always contending with

10 τοιούτους. καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν φοβεροί· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναντο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τοὺς κρείττους. καὶ οὖς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττους
11 αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτό. καὶ οἱ τοὺς κρείττους αὐτῶν ἀνηρηκότες. καὶ οἱ τοῖς ἥττοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι· ἢ γὰρ ἥδη φοβεροὶ ἢ αὐξηθέντες.

Καὶ τῶν ἥδικημένων καὶ ἔχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ δξύθυμοι καὶ παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλ’ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἵρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι· ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς,
12 ὥστ’ οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω. πάντα δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτερα, ὅσα, ἂν ἀμάρτωσιν, ἐπανορθώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ’ ἡ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ ὃν βοήθειαι μή εἰσιν ἢ μὴ ράδιαι. ὡς δ’ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφ’ ἐτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, καὶ ἄ φοβοῦνται, σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ μέγιστα ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν λέγωμεν.

13 Εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἄ μὴ οἴονται παθεῖν, οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφ’ ὃν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε μὴ οἴονται. ἀνάγκη

^a Or simply, “near . . . far from us.”

such persons. And those who are feared by those who are stronger than we are, for they would be better able to injure us, if they could injure those stronger than ourselves ; and those whom those who are stronger than ourselves are afraid of, for the same reason. And those who have overthrown those who are stronger than us and those who attack those who are weaker, for they are either already to be feared, or will be, when they have grown stronger.

And among those whom we have wronged, or are our enemies or rivals, we should fear not the hot-tempered or outspoken, but those who are mild, dissemblers, and thorough rascals ; for it is uncertain whether they are on the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it.^a All things that are to be feared are more so when, after an error has once been committed, it is impossible to repair it, either because it is absolutely impossible, or no longer in our power, but in that of our opponents ; also when there is no possibility of help or it is not easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be feared which, when they happen, or are on the point of happening, to others, excite compassion. These are, so to say, nearly all the most important things which are to be feared and which men fear. Let us now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear.

If then fear is accompanied by the expectation that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is evident that none of those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those things which he does not think will happen to him, or of those from whom he does not expect them, or at a time when he does not think them likely to happen. It therefore needs be that those who think

τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ

14 τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε. οὐκ ὕονται
<sup>1383^a δὲ παθεῖν ἄν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὅντες
 καὶ δοκοῦντες, διὸ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ
 θρασεῖς (ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλούτος ἵσχὺς πολυ-
 φιλία δύναμις), οὔτε οἱ ἥδη πεπονθέναι πάντα
 νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ
 μέλλον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀποτυμπανιζόμενοι ἥδη· ἀλλὰ
 δεῖ τινὰ ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγω-
 νιῶσιν. σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς
 ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀν-
 15 ελπίστων. ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν
 ἦ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν
 οἶοι παθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον· καὶ
 τοὺς ὁμοίους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἥ πεπονθότας,
 καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ' ὅν οὐκ ὤοντο, καὶ ταῦτα
 καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ὤοντο.</sup>

16 Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερὸν τί ἐστι, καὶ τῶν
 φοβερῶν, καὶ ὡς ἔκαστοι ἔχοντες δεδίασι, φανερὸν
 ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ποῖα
 θαρραλέοι καὶ πῶς διακείμενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν-
 τό τε γὰρ θάρσος ἐναντίον τῷ φόβῳ καὶ τὸ θαρ-
 ραλέον τῷ φοβερῷ· ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἥ ἐλπὶς
 τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὅντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν
 17 ἥ μὴ ὅντων ἥ πόρρω ὅντων. ἔστι δὲ θαρραλέα

they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid, either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, or of certain things, and at certain times. Those who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do not think they are likely to suffer anything ; wherefore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number of friends, power. It is the same with those who think that they have already suffered all possible ills and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those who are being beaten to death ; for it is a necessary incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved from the cause of their distress. A sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate, whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless. So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when they did not think it likely.

Now, since we have made clear what fear and fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each case which makes men fear, one can see from this what confidence is, what are the things that give it, and the frame of mind of those who possess it ; for confidence is the contrary of fear and that which gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that the hope of what is salutary is accompanied by an impression that it is quite near at hand, while the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off. Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful

τά τε δεινὰ πόρρω ὅντα καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἐγγύς.
καὶ ἐπανορθώσεις ἐὰν ὥσι καὶ βοήθειαι, ἢ πολλαὶ
ἢ μεγάλαι ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ μήτε ἡδικημένοι μήτε
ἡδικηκότες ὥσιν, ἀνταγωνισταί τε ἢ μὴ ὥσιν
ὅλως, ἢ μὴ ἔχωσι δύναμιν, ἢ δύναμιν ἔχοντες ὥσι
φίλοι ἢ πεποιηκότες εὖ ἢ πεπονθότες. ἢ ἐὰν
πλείους ὥσιν οἷς ταῦτα συμφέρει, ἢ κρείττους, ἢ

18 ἄμφω. αὐτοὶ δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντες θαρραλέοι εἰσίν,
ἐὰν πολλὰ κατωρθωκέναι οἴωνται καὶ μὴ πεπον-
θέναι, ἢ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες εἰς τὰ δεινὰ
καὶ διαπεφευγότες ὥσιν· διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖς
γίγνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τῷ μὴ πεπειράσθαι ἢ
τῷ βοηθείας ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν
κινδύνοις οἵ τε ἄπειροι χειμῶνος θαρροῦσι τὰ μέλ-
λοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

19 καὶ ὅταν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἢ μὴ φοβερόν, μηδὲ τοῖς
ἥττοσι καὶ ὧν κρείττους οἴονται εἶναι· οἴονται δέ,
ὧν κεκρατήκασιν ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν κρειττόνων ἢ

20 τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ ἐὰν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς οἴωνται
πλείω καὶ μείζω, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροί εἰσιν.

1383 b ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλῆθος χρημάτων καὶ ἴσχὺς σωμάτων
καὶ φίλων καὶ χώρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον παρα-
σκευῶν, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν μεγίστων. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ
ἡδικηκότες ὥσιν ἢ μηδένα ἢ μὴ πολλοὺς ἢ μὴ

21 τοιούτους περὶ ὧν φοβοῦνται. καὶ ὅλως ἄν τὰ
πρὸς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχῃ, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ
ἀπὸ σημείων καὶ λογίων· θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὄργη,
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ὄργῆς ποιητικόν,

^a τὰ σωτήρια or some other word instead of τὰ θαρραλέα would be expected, to avoid the tautology. The fact of remoteness inspires confidence, because we do not expect fearful things to happen; while salutary things inspire it if near at hand, because we expect them to happen.

things, or by the nearness of things that justify it.^a If remedies are possible, if there are means of help, either great or numerous, or both ; if we have neither committed nor suffered wrong ; if we have no rivals at all, or only such as are powerless, or, if they have power, are our friends, or have either done us good or have received it from us ; if those whose interests are the same as ours are more numerous, or stronger, or both. We feel confidence in the following states of mind : if we believe that we have often succeeded and have not suffered, or if we have often been in danger and escaped it ; for men are unaffected by fear in two ways, either because they have never been tested or have means of help ; thus, in dangers at sea, those who have never experienced a storm and those who have means of help as the result of experience have confidence as to the future. We are also reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear in our equals, our inferiors, or those to whom we think ourselves superior ; and we think ourselves superior to those whom we have conquered, either themselves or their superiors or equals. And if we think we possess more or more considerable advantages, such as make their possessors formidable ; such are abundance of money, strength of body, friends, territory, military equipments, either all or the most important. And if we have never done wrong to anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be feared ; and, generally, if it is well with us in regard to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs and oracles, and everything else of the kind ; for anger inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that

ARISTOTLE

τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνεται βοηθεῦν τοῖς ἀδικου-
22 μένοις. καὶ ὅταν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἢ μηδὲν ἄν παθεῖν
μηδὲ πείσεσθαι ἢ κατορθώσειν οἴωνται. καὶ περὶ
μὲν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται.

6. Ποῖα δ' αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, καὶ
πρὸς τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
2 ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς
ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων
ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἢ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλι-
3 γωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. εἰ
δή ἔστιν αἰσχύνη ἡ ὁρισθεῖσα, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι
ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ
εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν φροντίζει· τοιαῦτα δ' ἔστιν
ὅσα ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα ἔστιν, οἷον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν
ἀσπίδα ἢ φυγεῖν· ἀπὸ δειλίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ ἀπο-
4 στερῆσαι παρακαταθήκην· ἀπ' ἀδικίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ
συγγενέσθαι οἷς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅπου οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε μὴ
5 δεῖ· ἀπ' ἀκολασίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ
μικρῶν ἢ ἀπ' αἰσχρῶν ἢ ἀπ' ἀδυνάτων, οἷον πενή-
των ἢ τεθνεώτων· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ καν
ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν· ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας γὰρ καὶ
6 ἀνελευθερίας. καὶ τὸ μὴ βοηθεῦν δυνάμενον εἰς
χρήματα, ἢ ἥπτον βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι
7 παρὰ τῶν ἥπτον εὐπόρων. καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε
δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν
ὅτε αἰτεῖν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἵνα δόξῃ αἰτεῖν, καὶ τὸ

^a It is assumed that the gods will be on our side if we have suffered wrong; suffering wrong rouses anger and at the same time inspires confidence, if our relations with the gods are such that we feel we can rely upon them for assistance.

causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those who are wronged.^a Lastly, we feel confidence when, at the beginning of any undertaking, we do not expect disaster either in the present or future, or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire fear or confidence.

6. What are the things of which men are ashamed or the contrary, and before whom, and in what frame of mind, will be clear from the following considerations. Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonour ; and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in regard to these same things. If this definition of shame is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful, either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such are all those that are due to vice, such as throwing away one's shield or taking to flight, for this is due to cowardice ; or withholding a deposit, for this is due to injustice. And illicit relations with any persons, at forbidden places or times, for this is due to licentiousness. And making profit out of what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the indigent or dead ; whence the proverb, "to rob even a corpse," for this is due to base love of gain and stinginess. And to refuse assistance in money matters when we are able to render it, or to give less than we can ; to accept assistance from those less able to afford it than ourselves ; to borrow when anyone seems likely to ask for a loan, to ask for a loan from one who wants his money back, and asking for repayment from one who wants to borrow ; to praise in order to seem to be asking for a loan, and

ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν ἥττον· πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα σημεῖα. τὸ δὲ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας, καὶ τὸ τάγαθὰ μὲν ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείφειν, καὶ τὸ ὑπεραλγεῖν ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα τοιαῦτα· κολακείας γὰρ σημεῖα.

9 Καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν πόνους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι
 1384 a ἢ οἱ τρυφῶντες ἢ οἱ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὅλως οἱ ἀδυνατώτεροι· πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα.
 10 καὶ τὸ ὑφ' ἑτέρου εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ
 ἄ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὀνειδίζειν· μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα
 11 καὶ ταπεινότητος σημεῖα. καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ
 πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τάλλοτρια
 αὐτοῦ φάσκειν· ἀλαζονείας γάρ. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἥθους κακιῶν
 τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· αἰσχρὰ γὰρ
 12 καὶ αἰσχυντικά. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν καλῶν
 ὅν πάντες μετέχουσιν ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι πάντες ἢ οἱ
 πλεῖστοι, μὴ μετέχειν. ὅμοίους δὲ λέγω ὅμοεθνεῖς,
 πολίτας, ἥλικας, συγγενεῖς, ὅλως τοὺς ἐξ Ἰσού·
 αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἥδη τὸ μὴ μετέχειν, οἶνον παιδεύσεως
 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅμοίως. πάντα δὲ
 ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ἂν δι' ἑαυτὸν φαίνηται· οὕτω γὰρ
 ἥδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἂν αὐτὸς ἢ αἴτιος τῶν
 13 ὑπαρξάντων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μελλόντων. πάσχοντες δὲ ἢ πεπονθότες ἢ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα

when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking ; for all these are signs of stinginess. And to praise people when they are present, to overpraise their good qualities and to palliate the bad, to show excessive grief at another's grief when present, and all similar actions ; for they are signs of flattery.

And not to submit to toils, which those put up with who are older or live luxuriously or hold higher positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to do so ; for all these are signs of effeminacy. To accept favours from another and often, and then to throw them in his teeth ; for all these things are signs of littleness and abasement of soul. And to speak at great length about oneself and to make all kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what another has done ; for this is a sign of boastfulness. Similarly, in regard to each of all the other vices of character, the acts resulting from them, their signs, and the things which resemble them, all these are disgraceful, and should make us ashamed. It is also shameful not to have a share in the honourable things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the majority of them, have a share in. By those who resemble us I mean those of the same race, of the same city, of the same age, of the same family, and, generally speaking, those who are on an equality ; for then it is disgraceful not to have a share, for instance, in education and other things, to the same extent. All these things are the more disgraceful, if the fault appears to be our own ; for they are at once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if we ourselves are the cause of past, present, or future defects. And we are ashamed when we suffer or have suffered or are likely to suffer things which tend

αἰσχύνονται ὅσα εἰς ἀπιμίαν φέρει καὶ ὄνείδη· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι τὰ εἰς ὑπηρετήσεις ἢ σώματος ἢ ἔργων αἰσχρῶν, ὥν ἔστι τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα (τὰ δ' εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα)· ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἡ δειλίας ἢ ὑπομονὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι.

"Α μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτ' ἔστι καὶ τὰ 14 τοιαῦτα· ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἔστιν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, οὓδεις δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους αἰσχύνεσθαι ὥν λόγον ἔχει. λόγον δ' ἔχει τῶν θαυμα-
ζόντων, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει, καὶ ὑφ' ὥν βούλεται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμεῖται, καὶ ὥν 15 μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης. θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν οὖν βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμάζουσι τούτους ὅσοι τι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμίων, ἢ παρ' ὧν τυγχάνουσι δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὥν ἐκεῖνοι κύριοι,
16 οἵον οἱ ἐρῶντες· φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δόμοίους, φροντίζουσι δ' ὡς ἀληθευόντων τῶν φρονίμων· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ τε πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι.
17 καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύ-
νονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν
1384 b ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα.
18 19 Καὶ τοὺς μὴ περὶ ταῦτα ἐνόχους· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι

^a Euripides, *Cresphontes*: αἰδὼς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι γίγνεται, τέκνον (T.G.F. frag. 457).

to ignominy and reproach ; such are prostituting one's person or performing disgraceful actions, including unnatural lust. And of these actions those that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary (the latter being those that are done under compulsion), since meek endurance and the absence of resistance are the result of unmanliness or cowardice.

These and similar things are those of which men are ashamed. And since shame is an impression about dishonour, and that for its own sake and not for its results ; and since no one heeds the opinion of others except on account of those who hold it, it follows that men feel shame before those whom they esteem. Now men esteem those who admire them and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and whose opinion they do not despise. They desire to be admired by those, and admire those who possess anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from whom they urgently require something which it is in their power to give, as is the case with lovers. And they are rivals of those who are like them ; and they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as likely to be truthful ; such are the older and well educated. They are also more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in broad daylight ; whence the proverb, The eyes are the abode of shame.^a That is why they feel more ashamed before those who are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases they are under the eyes of others.

Men are also ashamed before those who are not open to the same accusations, for it is evident that

τάναντία δοκεῖ τούτοις. καὶ τοὺς μὴ συγγνωμονικοὺς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀμαρτάνειν· ἂ γάρ τις αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοῖς πέλας οὐ νεμεσᾶν,
 20 ὥστε ἂ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι νεμεσᾷ. καὶ τοὺς ἔξαγγελτικοὺς πολλοῖς· οὐδὲν γάρ διαφέρει μὴ δοκεῖν ἡ μὴ ἔξαγγελλειν. ἔξαγγελτικοὶ δὲ οἱ τε ἡδικημένοι διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν καὶ οἱ κακολόγοι· εἴπερ γάρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας. καὶ οἵς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας ἀμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ πως οὗτοι καὶ ἔξαγγελτικοί. καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχήκασιν· ὥσπερ γάρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκεινται· διὸ καὶ τοὺς πρῶτον δεηθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται ὡς οὐδέν πω ἡδοξηκότες ἐν αὐτοῖς. τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ τε ἄρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι εἶναι (τὰ γάρ βέλτιστα τεθέανται, διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους) καὶ τῶν πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν συνειδότες.
 21 αἰσχύνονται δ' οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ρήθεντα αἰσχυντηλὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδισιάζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ. καὶ οὐ
 22 μόνον ποιοῦντες τὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες. ὅμοίως δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐτοῖς, οἷον θεράποντας
 23 καὶ φίλους τούτων. ὅλως δ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὕθ-

^a Jebb translates, “ who have never seen us break down.”

^b The Greek scholiast says : “ Euripides, having been sent as ambassador to the Syracusans, to ask for peace and friendship, when they refused said : O Syracusans, if for no other reason than that we are just feeling the need of your friendship, you ought to respect our admiration.” Nothing is known of this embassy. Hyperides has been suggested instead of Euripides.

their feelings are contrary. And before those who are not indulgent towards those who appear to err ; for a man is supposed not to reproach others with what he does himself, so it is clear that what he reproaches them with is what he does not do himself. And before those who are fond of gossiping generally ; for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts to not regarding it as a fault at all. Now those who are inclined to gossip are those who have suffered wrong, because they always have their eyes upon us ; and slanderers, because, if they traduce the innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty. And before those who spend their time in looking for their neighbours' faults, for instance, mockers and comic poets ; for they are also in a manner slanderers and gossips. And before those from whom they have never asked anything in vain,^a for they feel as if they were greatly esteemed. For this reason they feel ashamed before those who ask them for something for the first time, as never yet having lost their good opinion. Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have only seen what is best in them, which is the point of the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans),^b or old acquaintances who know nothing against us. And men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful things we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, for instance, not only of sensual pleasures, but also of the indications of them ; and not only of doing, but also of saying disgraceful things. Similarly, men are ashamed not only before those who have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them, such as their servants or friends. In a word, they are not ashamed either before those

ῶν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν
 (οὐδεὶς γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται) οὔτε
 ταῦτά τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ἀλλὰ
 τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν δοκοῦντα
 τοὺς δὲ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.

- 24 Αὐτοὶ δὲ ὁδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν, πρῶτον
 μὲν εἰς ὑπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτω τινὲς
 οἷους ἔφαμεν εἶναι οὓς αἰσχύνονται. ἡσαν δ' οὗτοι
 ἡ θαυμαζόμενοι ἡ θαυμάζοντες ἡ ὑφ' ὃν βούλονται
 θαυμάζεσθαι, ἡ ὃν δέονται τινα χρείαν ὃν μὴ
 τεύξονται ἄδοξοι ὄντες, καὶ οὗτοι ἡ δρῶντες
 (ὡσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδη-
 μηγόρησεν· ἡξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
 περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς "Ελληνας, ὡς δρῶντας
 καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἢ ὃν ψηφίσωνται), ἡ
 ὃν πλησίον ὥσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἡ μέλλωσιν αἰσθή-
 σεσθαι. διὸ καὶ δρᾶσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες ὑπὸ τῶν
 1885 a ζηλούντων ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται. θαυμασταὶ γὰρ οἱ
 25 ζηλωταί. καὶ ὅταν ἔχωσιν ἢ καταισχύνουσιν ἔργα
 καὶ πράγματα ἡ αὐτῶν ἡ προγόνων ἡ ἄλλων τινῶν
 πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγχιστεία τις. καὶ ὅλως
 ὑπὲρ ὃν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί· εἰσὶ δ' οὗτοι οἱ εἰρη-
 μένοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι, ὃν διδά-
 σκαλοι ἡ σύμβουλοι γεγόνασι, ἡ ἐὰν ὥσιν ἔτεροι

^a This rendering involves a plural neuter with a plural verb. Others take the actions or things in a good sense, "deeds and fortunes, their own or their ancestors, which they are likely to disgrace."

whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them and those who are not ; before the former, they are ashamed of things that appear really disgraceful, before strangers, of those which are only condemned by convention.

Men are likely to feel shame in the following situations ; first, if there are any who are so related to them as those before whom we said that they feel shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are admired by them or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they need some service, which they will not obtain if they lose their reputation. These, again, are either persons who directly see what is going on (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the territory of Samos, begged the Athenians to picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing round them and would not only hear, but also see what they were going to do) ; or neighbours ; or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. That is why men do not like, when unfortunate, to be seen by those who were once their rivals, for rivalry presumes admiration. Men also feel shame when they are connected with actions or things which entail disgrace,^a for which either they themselves, or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are closely connected are responsible. In a word, men feel shame for those whom they themselves respect ;^b such are those mentioned and those who have any relation to them, for instance, whose teachers or advisers they have been ; similarly, when they are

^b i.e. when they have done anything disgraceful.

26 ὅμοιοι, πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· πολλὰ γὰρ αἰσχυνόμενοι διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ 27 ποιοῦσιν. καὶ μέλλοντες ὀρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν φανερῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ μᾶλλον εἰσίν. ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητὴς μέλλων ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου εἶπεν, ἵδων τοὺς συναποθνήσκειν μέλλοντας ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς ἥεσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, “τί ἐγκαλύπτεσθε” ἔφη· “ἢ μὴ αὔριόν τις ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ τούτων;” περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνης ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυντίας δῆλον ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐπορήσομεν.

7. Τίσι δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν ἢ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, ὄρισαμένοις τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται. 2 ἔστω δὴ χάρις, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ὑπουργεῖν¹ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, μηδ' ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐκείνῳ τι μεγάλη δ' ἀν ἢ σφόδρα δεομένῳ, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος, ἢ πρῶτος, ἢ 3 μάλιστα. δεήσεις δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ὄρεξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου· τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἷον ὁ ἔρως. καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ

¹ Spengel reads καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργία “favour, in accordance with which he who has it is said to feel benevolence, is rendering a service to one who needs it.”

in rivalry with others who are like them ; for there are many things which they either do or do not do owing to the feeling of shame which these men inspire. And they are more likely to be ashamed when they have to be seen and to associate openly with those who are aware of their disgrace. Wherefore the tragic poet Antiphon,^a when he was about to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing that those who were to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the gates, said, “ Why cover your faces ? Is it because you are afraid that one of the crowd should see you to-morrow ? ” Let this account of shame suffice ; as for shamelessness, it is evident that we shall be able to obtain ample knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.

7. The persons towards whom men feel benevolent,^b and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what favour is. Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a service to one who needs it, not in return for something nor in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of the recipient. And the favour will be great if the recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree. By needs I mean longings, especially for things the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain ; such are the desires, for instance, love ; also those “ that from which the Athenians made their statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton,” Dionysius ordered him to be put to death.

^b *χάρις* may mean (1) benevolence, the feeling which prompts a favour ; (2) an actual favour conferred ; (3) gratitude.

σώματος κακώσεσι καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος. διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ φυγαῖς, κανὸν μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν 4 δοὺς. ἀνάγκη οὖν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταῦτα ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἵσα ἥ μείζω.

“Ωστ’ ἐπεὶ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτε καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τοὺς μὲν δεικνύντας ἥ ὄντας ἥ γεγενημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ δεήσει καὶ λύπῃ, τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετηκότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρείᾳ τοιοῦτόν τι ἥ 5 ὑπηρετοῦντας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῦν ἀχαρίστους· ἥ γὰρ 1385 b ὅτι αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἥ ὑπηρέτησαν (τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἥν χάρις), ἥ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἥ συνηναγκάσθησαν, ἥ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτ’ εἰδότες εἴτε μή· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὶ 6 ἀντί τινος, ὡστ’ οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀν εἴη χάρις. καὶ περὶ ἀπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκεπτέον· ἥ γὰρ χάρις ἔστιν ἥ ὅτι τοδὶ ἥ τοσονδὶ ἥ τοιονδὶ ἥ ποτὲ ἥ ποῦ. σημεῖον δέ, εἰ ἔλαττον μή ὑπηρέτησαν, καὶ εἰ τοῖς ἔχθροῖς ἥ ταῦτα ἥ ἵσα ἥ μείζω· δῆλον

^a Probably given to a beggar or vagrant who had nothing to sleep on.

^b That is, should have in view the satisfaction of urgent wants and desires (Cope).

^c Reading ὅτε; others read οἷς, “by whom.”

^d ἀχαρίστους: the word generally means “ungrateful,” and so Jebb takes it here: “and to make men ungrateful.”

^e The other five categories in Aristotle’s list are: relation, position, possession, activity, passivity.

^f Because in that ease their motives in rendering the greater service cannot be disinterested.

which arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for when a man is in pain or danger he desires something. That is why those who help a man who is poor or an exile, even if the service be ever so small, are regarded with favour owing to the urgency and occasion of the need; for instance, the man who gave the mat^a to another in the Lyceum. It is necessary then, if possible, that the service should be in the same direction^b; if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or greater need.

Since then it is evident on what occasions,^c for what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need. It is evident also by what means it is possible to make out that there is no favour at all, or that those who render it are not actuated by benevolence^d; for it can either be said that they do, or have done so, for their own sake, in which case there is no favour; or that it was mere chance; or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return, so that in this case also there is no favour. And the action must be considered in reference to all the categories; for if there is a favour it is so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or place.^e And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons have not rendered a smaller service,^f or if they have rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our enemies; for it is evident that they do not act for

γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἔνεκα. ἢ εἰ φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ δεῖσθαι φαῦλων.

8. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἴρηται· ποῖα δ’ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ 2 πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ ἐλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κανь αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἄν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον οἶνον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἶνον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ 3 παραπλήσιον. διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ) οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλ’ ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τάγαθά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν 4 μηδὲν κακόν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἵοι νομίζειν παθεῖν ἄν οἷ τε πεπονθότες ἥδη καὶ διαπεφευγότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ δὶ’ ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· 5 εὐλόγιστοι γάρ. καὶ οὓς ὑπάρχουσι γονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν 6 τὰ εἴρημένα. καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρίας πάθει ὄντες, οἶον ἐν ὄργῃ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα) μήτ’ ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι

our sake in this case either. Or if the service was insignificant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no one admits that he has need of what is insignificant.

8. Let this suffice for benevolence and the opposite. We will now state what things and persons excite pity, and the state of mind of those who feel it. Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or one similar, or nearly similar. Wherefore neither those who are utterly ruined, are capable of pity, for they think they have nothing more to suffer, since they have exhausted suffering; nor those who think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather are insolent. For if they think that all good things are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things. Now those persons who think they are likely to suffer are those who have already suffered and escaped; the advanced in age, by reason of their wisdom and experience; and the weak, and those who are rather more timid; and the educated, for they reckon rightly; and those who have parents, children, or wives, for these are part of them and likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken; and those who are not influenced by any courageous emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these emotions do not take thought of the future; and those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of

ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι), ἀλλ' οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων. μήτ' αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἵ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ

7 οἰκείῳ πάθει. καὶ οἴωνται τινας εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς·

οἱ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος πάντας οἰήσεται ἀξίους
1386 a εἶναι κακοῦ. καὶ ὅλως δὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ οὕτως ὥστε
ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν
αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

8 'Ως μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεοῦσιν, εἴρηται, ἂν δ'
ἐλεοῦσιν, ἐκ τοῦ δρισμοῦ δῆλον· ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν
λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά,
καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν
9 μέγεθος ἔχόντων. ἔστι δ' ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρ-
τικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις
10 καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια, ὅν δ' ἡ
τύχη αἰτία κακῶν, ἀφιλία, ὀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ
διεσπάσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἐλεεινόν),
αἰσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία. καὶ τὸ ὅθεν προσῆκεν
11 ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι, κακόν τι συμβῆναι. καὶ τὸ
πολλάκις τοιοῦτον. καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι
τι ἀγαθόν, οἷον Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως
τεθνεῶτι κατεπέμφθη. καὶ τὸ ἢ μηδὲν γεγενῆ-
σθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ γενομένων μὴ εἶναι ἀπόλαυσιν.

'Εφ' οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά
12 ἔστιν· ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τούς τε γυνωρίμους, ἐὰν μὴ σφό-

mind, for they also take no thought of future suffering ; but it is those who are between the two extremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great fear ; for those who are panic-stricken are incapable of pity, because they are preoccupied with their own emotion. And men feel pity if they think that some persons are virtuous ; for he who thinks that no one is will think that all deserve misfortune. And, generally speaking, a man is moved to pity when he is so affected that he remembers that such evils have happened, or expects that they may happen, either to himself or to one of his friends.

We have stated the frame of mind which leads men to pity ; and the things which arouse this feeling are clearly shown by the definition. They are all painful and distressing things that are also destructive, and all that are ruinous ; and all evils of which fortune is the cause, if they are great. Things distressing and destructive are various kinds of death, personal ill-treatment and injuries, old age, disease, and lack of food. The evils for which fortune is responsible are lack of friends, or few friends (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation ; if some misfortune comes to pass from a quarter whence one might have reasonably expected something good ; and if this happens often ; and if good fortune does not come until a man has already suffered, as when the presents from the Great King were not dispatched to Diopithes until he was dead. Those also are to be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who are unable to enjoy it when it has.

These and the like things, then, excite pity. The persons men pity are those whom they know, pro-

δρα ἐγγὺς ὥσιν οἰκειότητι· περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ
 περὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν. διὸ καὶ ἩΑμασίς
 ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱῷ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ
 ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσαιτοῦντι·
 τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ
 δεινὸν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ
 13 ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον. ἔτι
 ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ δεινοῦ ὄντος. καὶ τοὺς
 ὅμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἥθη, κατὰ
 ἔξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ
 τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἀν ύπάρξαι·
 ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι, ὅσα ἐφ'
 αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ' ἄλλων γιγνόμενα
 14 ἐλεοῦσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη
 ἐλεεινά ἔστι, τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἢ
 ἐσόμενα οὕτ' ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμυημένοι ἢ ὅλως
 οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἢ οὐχ ὅμοίως, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συν-
 απεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆται
 καὶ ὅλως τῇ ύποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι· ἐγγὺς
 γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακὸν πρὸ ὀμμάτων
 15 ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὡς μέλλον ἢ ὡς γεγονός. καὶ τὰ
 1386 b γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα
 16 διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰς πράξεις,
 οἷον ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα,
 καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων,
 οἷον ἥδη τελευτώντων. καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπου-

^a Herodotus, iii. 14, where the story is told, not of Amasis, but of his son Psammenitus.

^b Jebb renders: "Again men pity when the danger is near themselves," which may mean when they see something terrible happening to others and likely soon to befall them-

vided they are not too closely connected with them ; for if they are, they feel the same as if they themselves were likely to suffer. This is why Amasis^a is said not to have wept when his son was led to execution, but did weep at the sight of a friend reduced to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former terror. The terrible is different from the pitiable, for it drives out pity, and often serves to produce the opposite feeling. Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity.^b Men also pity those who resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or family ; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in general, here also we may conclude that all that men fear in regard to themselves excites their pity when others are the victims. And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand, while those that are past or future, ten thousand years backwards or forwards, either do not excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because men neither expect the one nor remember the other, it follows that those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable ; for they make the evil appear close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either future or past. And disasters that have just happened or are soon about to happen excite more pity for the same reason. Pity is also aroused by signs and actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And

selves. Vahlen inserts *οὐ γὰρ* before *ἔτι* : "For men cease to pity when the terrible comes close to themselves."

δαίους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῦς ὅντας ἐλεεινόν· ἄπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ τὸ ἔγγὺς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ ὡς ἀναξίου ὅντος, καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους.

9. Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὁ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενόν ἔστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἥθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις. καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἥθους 2 χρηστοῦ· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον, διὸ 3 καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσᾶν. δόξειε δ' ἀν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον ὡς σύνεγγυς ὥν καὶ ταῦτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δ' ἔτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἔστι καὶ εἰς εὐπραγίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἵσου καὶ ὅμοίου. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἄπασιν ὅμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν νέμεσις τὸ δὲ φθόνος, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι 4 ἔσται φαῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας. φανερὸν δ' ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἥσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς

^a “When the men, who are in such crises, are good men” (Jebb). If they were not, their misfortune would appear deserved.

^b The signs and actions, and the demeanour of the sufferer.

when men show themselves undaunted^a at such critical times it is specially pitiable ; for all these things,^b because they come immediately under our observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the suffering is before our eyes.

9. Now what is called indignation^c is the antithesis to pity ; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions show good character, for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly ; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods. It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different ; envy also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and like. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbour ; for it will cease to be indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune. And it is evident that these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feelings ; for he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at the sight of those who are

^c νεμεσᾶν : “ the nobler brother of envy ” (Nietzsche).

έναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν· οῖον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γάρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατ' ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γάρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἄν, ἅπερ
 5 τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὐτῷ. καὶ ἔστι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἥθους ἄπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δ' ἔναντία τοῦ ἔναντίου· ὁ γάρ αὐτός ἔστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ' ὃ
 1387^a γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν. διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέον πάντα ταῦτα ἔστι, διαφέρει δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας· ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν ἄπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.

6 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν,
 τίσι τε νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες
 7 αὐτοί, εἴτα μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ γάρ ἔστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν,
 πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
 8 ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν· οὐ γάρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γάρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ [καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει
 ἔχοντες ἀγαθά, οἶον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα

^a There is justice both in the punishment of the parricide and in the deserved good fortune of others. The conclusion

deservedly so ; for instance, no good man would be pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished ; we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate ; for both these^a are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his like may also happen to himself. And all these feelings arise from the same character and their contraries from the contrary ; for he who is malicious is also envious, since, if the envious man is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they differ for the reasons stated ; so that they are all equally useful for preventing any feeling of pity.

Let us then first speak of indignation, the persons with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons, and in what frame of mind ; and then proceed to the rest of the emotions. What we have just said will make matters clear. For if indignation is being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved, in the first place it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good things ; for no one will be indignant with a man who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities),^b but men are indignant at wealth, power, in a word, at all the advantages of which good men are worthy. [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such must refer to the latter : if his like is fortunate, he hopes he may be.

^b Because it is a man's own fault, and pity is only felt for what is undeserved.

- 9 τοιαῦτα]. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔγγυς τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει, ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταῦτὸ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ λυποῦσιν οἱ νεωστὶ πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος· ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι καὶ εὔτεκνοι καὶ ὅτιον τῶν τοιούτων. καν διὰ ταῦτ’ ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλοοι ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιόπλοοι.
- 10 ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν οἱ δ’ οὗ· τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε οἱ
- 11 ἔτεροι οὐ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον, ἀλλά τις ἐστὶν ἀναλογία καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον, οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἀρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ, καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουτοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς εὐγενέσιν,—ἐὰν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὁν μὴ τοῦ ἀρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, νεμεσητόν. καὶ τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,

^a The first part of the sentence is clear: men are indignant when what good men deserve is possessed by those who are not good. The literal translation of the text as it stands is: "Men are indignant . . . at all the advantages of which good men and those who possess natural advantages are worthy"; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in *natural* advantages to arouse moral indignation, there is no question of their being deserved or undeserved. Something may have fallen out like "but they will not be indignant with those who possess natural advantages." Roemer (*Rhein. Mus.* xxxix. p. 504) suggests: οὐδὲ εἰ τὰ φύσει ἔχουσιν ἀγαθά (understanding *νεμεσήσει τούτοις*).

things.]^a And since that which is old seems closely to resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if two parties have the same good, men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes his prosperity to it; for the newly rich cause more annoyance than those who have long possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to offices of state, power, numerous friends, virtuous children, and any other advantages of the kind. And if these advantages bring them some other advantage, men are equally indignant; for in this case also the newly rich who attain to office owing to their wealth cause more annoyance than those who have long been wealthy; and similarly in all other cases of the same kind. The reason is that the latter seem to possess what belongs to them, the former not; for that which all along shows itself in the same light suggests a reality, so that the former seem to possess what is not theirs.^b And since every kind of good is not suitable to the first comer, but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to the courageous man, and distinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to the nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him, we feel indignant. Similarly, if the inferior contends with the superior, especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying of the poet,

^b *δοκεῖν* is a stronger word than *φαίνεσθαι*, indicating an intellectual operation as opposed to an impression received through the senses. The idea is that where anything has been so long in a person's possession, it has come to be regarded as his by right.

Αἴαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·
Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο.

1387 b εἰ δὲ μή, κὰν ὁπωσοῦν ὁ ἥπτων τῷ κρείττονι, οἶνον
εἰ ὁ μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ βέλτιον γάρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη^a
τῆς μουσικῆς.

Οἷς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ δι' ᾱ, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον·
12 ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἔστιν. αὐτοὶ δὲ νε-
μεσητικοί εἰσιν, ἐὰν ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν
μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα κεκτημένοι· τὸ γὰρ
τῶν ὁμοίων ἡξιώσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ δίκαιον.
13 δεύτερον δ', ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγ-
χάνωσιν· κρίνουσί τε γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσιν.
14 καὶ ἐὰν φιλότιμοι καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τινῶν πράξεων,
καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὡσιν ὃν ἔτεροι
15 ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγχάνουσιν. καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες
αὐτοὶ αὐτούς, ὃν ἔτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, νεμεσητικοὶ
τούτοις καὶ τούτων. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις
καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι οὐ νεμεσητικοί· οὐδὲν
16 γάρ ἔστιν οὐδὲντος οἴονται ἀξίους εἶναι. φανερὸν
δ' ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ κακο-
πραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνονται χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπως
ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά
ἔστι δῆλα, ὥστ' ἐὰν τούς τε κριτὰς τοιούτους
παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας ἐλεεῖ-
σθαι, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους μὲν

^a *Iliad*, xi. 542. Only the first verse is given in the received text of Homer; the second is not found in any of the mss. The reference is to Cebriones, a son of Priam slain by Patroclus.

^b It has been suggested to insert μὴ before τυγχάνωσι: "if, although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess such advantages."

He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon,^a for Zeus was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better man ;

or, if the pursuit is not the same, wherever the inferior contends with the superior in anything whatever, as for instance, the musician with the just man ; for justice is better than music.

From this it is clear, then, with whom men are indignant and for what reasons ; they are these or of such a kind. Men are prone to indignation, first, if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest advantages, for it is not just that those who do not resemble them should be deemed worthy of the same advantages ; secondly, if they happen to be virtuous and worthy,^b for they both judge correctly and hate what is unjust. And those who are ambitious and long for certain positions, especially if they are those which others, although unworthy, have obtained.^c And, in general, those who think themselves worthy of advantages of which they consider others unworthy, are inclined to be indignant with the latter and because of these advantages. This is why the servile and worthless and unambitious are not inclined to indignation ; for there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. It is evident from this what kind of men they are whose ill fortunes, calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice or at least feel no pain ; for the opposites are clear from what has been said. If then the speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves that those who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve

^a Or, " of which others happen to be unworthy."

δῦντας τυγχάνειν ἀξίους δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον
ἔλεεῖν.

10. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι
καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις
ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινομένῃ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν
περὶ τοὺς ὅμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δι'
ἔκείνους· φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὓς εἰσὶ²
τινες ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται. ὅμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ
γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ' ἡλικίαν, καθ' ἔξι,
κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. καὶ οὓς μικροῦ
ἔλλείπει τὸ μὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν. διὸ οἱ μεγάλα
πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες φθονεροί εἰσιν.³
τινας γὰρ οἴονται τὰ αὐτῶν φέρειν. καὶ οἱ
τιμώμενοι ἐπὶ τινι διαφερόντως, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ⁴
σοφίᾳ ἢ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώ-
τεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων. καὶ οἱ δοξόσοφοι· φιλό-
τιμοι γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. καὶ ὅλως οἱ φιλόδοξοι περὶ⁵
τι φθονεροὶ περὶ τοῦτο. καὶ οἱ μικρόψυχοι·
πάντα γὰρ μεγάλα δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς εἶναι.

4 Ἐφ' οὓς δὲ φθονοῦσιν, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἴρηται· ἐφ'
1388 a ὅσοις γὰρ φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλοτιμοῦνται ἔργοις ἢ
κτήμασι καὶ ὄρέγονται δόξης, καὶ ὅσα εὐτυχήματά
ἐστι, σχεδὸν περὶ πάντα φθόνος ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα
ῶν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὄρέγονται ἢ οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν,
ἢ ὡν τῇ κτήσει μικρῷ ὑπερέχουσιν ἢ μικρῷ ἐλ-
λείπουσιν.

5 Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οὓς φθονοῦσιν· ἅμα γὰρ εἴρηται·

^a If some one else possesses the one thing which they think necessary to complete their happiness, they are envious of him, because they consider it ought to be theirs.

that it should be refused them, then pity will be impossible.

10. It is equally clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious, if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be envious who have, or seem to have, others "like" them. I mean like in birth, relationship, age, moral habit, reputation, and possessions. And those will be envious who possess all but one of these advantages^a; that is why those who attempt great things and succeed are envious, because they think that every one is trying to deprive them of their own. And those who are honoured for some special reason, especially for wisdom or happiness. And the ambitious are more envious than the unambitious. And those who are wise in their own conceit, for they are ambitious of a reputation for wisdom; and, in general, those who wish to be distinguished in anything are envious in regard to it. And the little-minded, because everything appears to them to be great.

The advantages which excite envy have already been stated. Nearly all the actions or possessions which make men desire glory or honour and long for fame, and the favours of fortune, create envy, especially when men long for them themselves, or think that they have a right to them, or the possession of which makes them slightly superior or slightly inferior.

And it is evident whom men envy, for it has just been stated by implication. They envy those who

*τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ
καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν.* ὅθεν εἴρηται

τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῦν ἐπίσταται.

καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· φιλοτιμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἔτος ὄντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεῶτας οὐδείς, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ' Ἡρακλείας στήλαις. οὐδ' ὅν πολὺ οἴονται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι, οὐδ' ὅν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ὥσαύτως καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιεμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῦν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.

7 καὶ τοῖς ταχὺ οἵ ἢ μόλις τυχόντες ἢ μὴ τυχόντες 8 φθονοῦσιν. καὶ ὅν ἢ κεκτημένων ἢ κατορθοῦντων ὄνειδος αὐτοῖς· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιοι· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρ' αὐτοὺς οὐ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τὸν φθόνον.
9 καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς προσῆκεν ἢ κέκτηντο ποτέ· διὸ πρεσβύτεροι νεω-
10 τέροις. καὶ οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταῦτὸ τοῖς
11 ὀλίγα φθονοῦσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πᾶσι ἔχοντες· ὡς γὰρ

^a According to the scholiast, from Aeschylus.

^b Two rocks at the east end of the Straits of Gibraltar, supposed to be the limit westwards of the ancient world.

^c That is, no one will attempt to compete with them in their special branch of study. Roemer reads *καὶ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*, translated by Jebb as if there were a full

are near them in time, place, age, and reputation, whence it was said,

Kinship knows how to envy also ;^a

and those with whom they are in rivalry, who are those just spoken of ; for no man tries to rival those who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to be born, or are already dead ; nor those who live near the Pillars of Hercules ;^b nor those who, in his own opinion or in that of others, are either far inferior or superior to him ; and the people and things which one envies are on the same footing.^c And since men strive for honour with those who are competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those who aim at the same things, they are bound to feel most envious of these ; whence the saying,

Potter [being jealous] of potter.^d

And those who have succeeded with difficulty or have failed envy those whose success has been rapid. And those whose possessions or successes are a reproach to themselves, and these, too, are those near or like them ; for it is clear that it is their own fault that they do not obtain the same advantage, so that this pains and causes envy. And those who either have or have acquired what was naturally theirs or what they had once acquired ; this is why an older man is envious of a younger one. Those who have spent much envy those who have only spent little to obtain the same thing. And it is clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice, and in what frame of mind ; for, as when they do

stop at *ὑπερέχειν*. “ In like manner we vie with those engaged in such or such pursuits.”

^a ii. 4. 21.

οὐκ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὗτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐν-
αντίοις ἡσθήσονται. ὥστε ἀν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευα-
σθῶσιν οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ ἐλεεῖσθαι ἢ τυγχάνειν
τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιούμενοι ὥσιν οἵοι οἱ εἰρημένοι,
δῆλον ὡς οὐ τεύξονται ἐλέου παρὰ τῶν κυρίων.

11. Πῶς δὲ ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ ποῖα καὶ
ἐπὶ τίσιν, ἐνθένδ' ἔστι δῆλον. εἰ γάρ ἔστι ζῆλος
λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένη παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων
καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὅμοίους τῇ
φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἔστιν·
διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἔστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ
δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γάρ αὐτὸν
παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον· ἀνάγκη
δὴ ζηλωτικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας αὐτοὺς
1388 b ἀγαθῶν ὥν μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδεὶς γάρ ἀξιοὶ τὰ φαινό-
2 μενα ἀδύνατα. διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι
τοιοῦτοι. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἢ τῶν
ἐντίμων ἀξιά ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν· ἔστι γάρ ταῦτα πλοῦτος
καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· ὡς γάρ
προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι, ὅτι προσῆκε τοῖς
3 ἀγαθῶς ἔχοντι, ζηλοῦσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
καὶ οὖς οἱ ἄλλοι ἀξιοῦσιν. καὶ ὡς πρόγονοι ἢ
συγγενεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ τὸ ἔθνος ἢ ἡ πόλις ἔντιμοι,

^a “The same state of mind which is absent in the painful feeling will be present in the joy excited by the opposite occasions,” meaning that, if one set of circumstances produces pain, the opposite will produce pleasure (Cope). Or, omitting *οὐκ* before *ἔχοντες*, “For in the same frame of mind as they are pained (at another’s good fortune) they will rejoice in the contrary state of things” (at another’s bad fortune).

^b Something like “although they are within their grasp” is needed to complete the sense.

not possess certain things, they are pained, so when they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite circumstances.^a So that if the judges are brought into that frame of mind, and those who claim their pity or any other boon are such as we have stated, it is plain that they will not obtain pity from those with whom the decision rests.

11. The frame of mind in which men feel emulation, what things and persons give rise to it, will be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base men ; for the one, owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, while the object of the other, owing to envy, is to prevent his neighbour possessing them. Necessarily, then, those are emulous who hold that they have a claim to goods that they do not possess ;^b for no one claims what seems impossible. Hence the young and high-minded are emulous. And so are those who possess such advantages as are worthy of honourable men, which include wealth, a number of friends, positions of office, and all similar things. For, believing it their duty to be good, because such goods naturally belong to those who are good, they strive to preserve them. And those are emulous, whom others think worthy of them. Honours obtained by ancestors, kinsfolk, intimates, nation, or

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ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα· οἰκεῖα γὰρ οἴονται αὐτοῖς
 4 εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι τούτων. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ ζηλωτὰ τὰ
 ἔντιμα ἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη τάς τε ἀρετὰς εἶναι τοιαύτας,
 καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡφέλιμα καὶ εὐεργετικά·
 τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθούς.
 καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλησίον ἐστίν,
 οἷον πλούτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας.

5 Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα
 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτημένοι ζηλωτοί. ἐστι δὲ
 ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρία σοφία ἀρχή· οἱ γὰρ
 ἀρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῦν, στρατηγοί,
 6 ρήτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι. καὶ
 οἵ πολλοὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι, ἢ πολλοὶ γνώ-
 ριμοι, ἢ φίλοι πολλοί. ἢ οὓς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν,
 7 ἢ οὓς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν. καὶ ὥν ἔπαινοι καὶ
 ἔγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἢ λογογράφων.
 καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐναντίον γὰρ
 ζήλω καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ζηλοῦν τῷ κατα-
 φρονεῖν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὡστε ζη-
 λῶσαι τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι, καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι
 τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ
 ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν. διὸ πολλάκις
 καταφρονοῦσι τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐν-
 τίμων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἢ τύχη. δι’ ὥν μὲν

^a Spending one's money benefits one's neighbour to a certain extent, and beauty is always pleasant to look upon. One does not admire anyone because he is in good health, so much as because he is handsome.

^b "Who have many acquaintances or friends" (Jebb).

^c λογογράφοι means either the oldest Greek historians (or rather "chroniclers"), or the writers of speeches for use in the law courts, or of panegyries.

^d καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις. According to Cope, an unnecessary

city make men emulous in regard to such honours ; for they think that these honours really belong to them and that they are worthy of them. And if highly valued goods are the object of emulation, it necessarily follows that the virtues must be such and all things that are useful and beneficial to the rest of mankind, for benefactors and virtuous men are honoured ; to these we may add all the goods which our neighbours can enjoy with us, such as wealth and beauty, rather than health.^a

It is also evident who are the objects of emulation ; for they are those who possess these or similar goods, such as have already been spoken of, for instance, courage, wisdom, authority ; for those in authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have similar powers, can do good to many. And those whom many desire to be like, or to be their acquaintances or friends ;^b those whom many or ourselves admire ; those who are praised or eulogized either by poets or by prose writers.^c The opposite characters we despise ; for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the idea of emulation of the idea of contempt. And those who are in a condition which makes them emulate, or be emulated by, others, must be inclined to despise those persons^d (and for that reason) who suffer from defects contrary to the good things which excite emulation. That is why we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever their good fortune is not accompanied by highly valued goods. The means of producing and destroy-

parenthetical note ("and on such occasions"). Jebb refers both *τούτων* and *τούτους* to persons : "tend to show contempt to or about those who." The "reason" in the translation above is that they suffer from the want of "the highly valued goods."

οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται, ἐξ ὧν αἱ πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴρηται.

12. Τὰ δὲ ἥθη ποιοί τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας, διέλθωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ὀργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον, ἔξεις δὲ ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας· εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων πρότερον, καὶ ποῖα προαιροῦνται ἔκαστοι, καὶ ποίων ^{1389 a} πρακτικοί. ἡλικίαι δ' εἰσὶ νεότης καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ γῆρας. τύχην δὲ λέγω εὐγένειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τάναντία τούτοις καὶ ὅλως εὐτυχίαν καὶ δυστυχίαν.

3 Οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἥθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἵοι ποιεῦν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. 4 εὑμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὁξεῖαι γάρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ 5 αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δύφαι καὶ πεῖναι. καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὁξύθυμοι καὶ οἵοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὄρμῃ, καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γάρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἀγανακτοῦσιν, ἂν 6 οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι μέν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γάρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις. καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἡ φιλοχρήματοι· φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω ἐνδείας πεπειρᾶσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιττακοῦ 7 ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον. καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις

^a The πίστις ἡθική is resumed from ii. 1. 8. As the πάθη and ἔξεις have been discussed already, only the ages and their character remain.

ing the various emotions in men, from which the methods of persuasion that concern them are derived, have now been stated.

12. Let us now describe the nature of the characters of men according to their emotions, habits, ages, and fortunes. By the emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like, of which we have already spoken ; by habits virtues and vices, of which also we have previously spoken, as well as the kind of things men individually and deliberately choose and practise. The ages are youth, the prime of life, and old age.¹²³ By fortune I mean noble birth, wealth, power, and their contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune.^a

The young, as to character, are ready to desire and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure and these they are unable to control. Changeable in their desires and soon tiring of them, they desire with extreme ardour, but soon cool ; for their will, like the hunger and thirst of the sick, is keen rather than strong. They are passionate, hot-tempered, and carried away by impulse, and unable to control their passion ; for owing to their ambition they cannot endure to be slighted, and become indignant when they think they are being wronged. They are ambitious of honour, but more so of victory ; for youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority. And their desire for both these is greater than their desire for money, to which they attach only the slightest value, because they have never yet experienced want, as Pittacus^b said in his pithy remark on Amphiaraus. They are not ill-

^b One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.

ἀλλ' εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μῆπω τεθεωρηκέναι πολλὰς πονηρίας. καὶ εὕπιστοι διὰ τὸ μῆπω πολλὰ 8 ἔξηπατῆσθαι. καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γάρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὗτοι διάθερμοι εἰσιν οἵ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μῆπω πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα ἐλπίδι· ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἔστιν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παρουχομένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γάρ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεμνῆσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἶον τε, ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι εἰσι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ 9 ράδιας. καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι· θυμώδεις γάρ καὶ εὐέλπιδες, ὃν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὕτε γάρ ὀργιζόμενος οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε 10 ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι θαρραλέον ἔστιν. καὶ αἰσχυντηλοί· οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἔτερα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ 11 πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου μόνον. καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι· οὕτε γάρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὐτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο δ' εὐέλπιδος.

12 Καὶ μᾶλλον αἴροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γάρ ἦθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος 13 ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μῆπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν

^a Or, “they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a good,” i.e. they are not always ready to suspect.

^b Social convention is the only law that they know, and they are ashamed if they violate it, because as yet they have no idea of higher laws which may command them to do so.

^c ἡθος “in the widest sense, includes all that is habitual

natured but simple-natured,^a because they have never yet witnessed much depravity ; confiding, because they have as yet not been often deceived ; full of hope, for they are naturally as hot-blooded as those who are drunken with wine, and besides they have not yet experienced many failures. For the most part they live in hope, for hope is concerned with the future as memory is with the past. For the young the future is long, the past short ; for in the morning of life it is not possible for them to remember anything, but they have everything to hope ; which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily hope. And they are more courageous, for they are full of passion and hope, and the former of these prevents them fearing, while the latter inspires them with confidence, for no one fears when angry, and hope of some advantage inspires confidence. And they are bashful, for as yet they fail to conceive of other things that are noble, but have been educated solely by convention.^b They are high-minded, for they have not yet been humbled by life nor have they experienced the force of necessity ; further, there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things, a feeling which belongs to one who is full of hope.

In their actions, they prefer the noble to the useful ; their life is guided by their character^c rather than by calculation, for the latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble. At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and companions, because they take pleasure in living in company and as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their and characteristic ; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual temper or disposition " (Twining).

14 μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἄπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἀμαρτάνουσι παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον· πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσι τε γὰρ ἄγαν καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τάλλα πάντα δόμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ δισχυρίζονται· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιόν ἔστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν.

15 καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν· τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστ' ἀνάξια πάσχειν

16 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς. καὶ φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ εὐτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ἥθος.

13. Οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἥθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἔξηπατῆσθαι καὶ ἡμαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὕτε διαβεβαιοῦνται οὐδέν,

2 ἥππόν τε ἄγαν ἄπαντα ἡ δεῖ. καὶ οἴονται, ἵσασι δ' οὐδέν. καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες προστιθέασιν ἀεὶ τὸ ἵσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω,

3 παγίως δ' οὐδέν. καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἀπιστοὶ

4 δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ οὕτε φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὕτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς 5 φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ τεταπεινῶσθαι

^a One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. 'The maxim was Μηδὲν ἄγαν, *Ne quid nimis*, Never go to extremes.

^b Or, " better than they really are."

^c One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.

friends. All their errors are due to excess and vehemence and their neglect of the maxim of Chilon,^a for they do everything to excess, love, hate, and everything else. And they think they know everything, and confidently affirm it, and this is the cause of their excess in everything. If they do wrong, it is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are inclined to pity, because they think all men are virtuous and better than themselves^b; for they measure their neighbours by their own inoffensiveness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly. And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty; for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the character of the young.

13. Older men and those who have passed their prime have in most cases characters opposite to those of the young. For, owing to their having lived many years and having been more often deceived by others or made more mistakes themselves, and since most human things turn out badly, they are positive about nothing, and in everything they show an excessive lack of energy. They always "think," but "know" nothing; and in their hesitation they always add "perhaps," or "maybe"; all their statements are of this kind, never unqualified. They are malicious; for malice consists in looking upon the worse side of everything. Further, they are always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful owing to experience. And neither their love nor their hatred is strong for the same reasons; but, according to the precept of Bias,^c they love as if they would one day hate, and hate as if they would one day love. And they are little-minded, because they

ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γάρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ,
 6 ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ ἀν-
 ελεύθεροι· ἐν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων η̄ οὐσία, ἅμα
 δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἵσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ
 7 κτήσασθαι καὶ ὁράδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. καὶ δειλοὶ^{1390 α}
 καὶ πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γάρ διάκεινται
 τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί.
 ὥστε προωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γάρ
 8 ὁ φόβος κατάψυξίς τις ἐστίν. καὶ φιλόζωοι, καὶ
 μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος
 εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὖ δὲ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου
 9 μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ φίλαυτοι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ·
 μικροψυχία γάρ τις καὶ αὕτη. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμ-
 φέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ
 δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γάρ συμφέρον
 αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς.

10 Καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί· διὰ γάρ
 τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὅμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμ-
 11 φέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες
 διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γάρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων
 φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ
 12 χεῖρον· καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν. καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γάρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν
 ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς πολύ, ἐστι δὲ ἡ μὲν
 ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροιχομένων.
 ὅπερ αἴτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς· διατελοῦσι
 γάρ τὰ γενόμενα λέγοντες· ἀναμιμησκόμενοι γάρ
 13 ἔδονται. καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς δέ
 εἰσιν, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ
 δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσιν, ὥστε οὕτ’ ἐπιθυμητικοὶ οὕτε
 πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ

have been humbled by life ; for they desire nothing great or uncommon, but only the necessities of life. They are not generous, for property is one of these necessities, and at the same time, they know from experience how hard it is to get and how easy to lose. And they are cowardly and inclined to anticipate evil, for their state of mind is the opposite of that of the young ; they are chilled, whereas the young are hot, so that old age paves the way for cowardice, for fear is a kind of chill. And they are fond of life, especially in their last days, because desire is directed towards that which is absent and men especially desire what they lack. And they are unduly selfish, for this also is littleness of mind. And they live not for the noble, but for the useful, more than they ought, because they are selfish ; for the useful is a good for the individual, whereas the noble is good absolutely.

And they are rather shameless than modest ; for since they do not care for the noble so much as for the useful, they pay little attention to what people think. And they are little given to hope owing to their experience, for things that happen are mostly bad and at all events generally turn out for the worse, and also owing to their cowardice. They live in memory rather than in hope ; for the life that remains to them is short, but that which is past is long, and hope belongs to the future, memory to the past. This is the reason of their loquacity ; for they are incessantly talking of the past, because they take pleasure in recollection. Their outbursts of anger are violent, but feeble ; of their desires some have ceased, while others are weak, so that they neither feel them nor act in accordance with them, but only

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κέρδος. διὸ καὶ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικοῦτοι· αἱ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκαστι, καὶ δουλεύουσι τῷ
 14 κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἥθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ δὲ ἥθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔστιν. καὶ τάδικήματα ἀδι-
 15 κοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ ταῦτὸ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι’ ἀσθένειαν· πάντα γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἐλεητικόν. ὅθεν ὁδυρτικοί εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ
 16 ὁδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι. τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἥθη τοιαῦτα· ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἥθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὅμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

14. Οἱ δὲ ἀκμάζοντες φανερὸν ὅτι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἥθος ἔσονται, ἐκατέρων ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, καὶ οὕτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὕτε λίαν φοβούμενοι,
 2 καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὕτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὕτε πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς
 1390 β κρίνοντες μᾶλλον. καὶ οὕτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὕτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω. καὶ οὕτε πρὸς φειδὼ οὕτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς 3 τὸ ἀρμόττον. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ σώφρονες μετ’ ἀνδρίας καὶ

^a Or, “ speeches which resemble (or reflect) it ” (their character).

from motives of gain. Hence men of this age are regarded as self-controlled, for their desires have slackened, and they are slaves to gain. In their manner of life there is more calculation than moral character, for calculation is concerned with that which is useful, moral character with virtue. If they commit acts of injustice it is due to vice rather than to insolence. The old, like the young, are inclined to pity, but not for the same reason ; the latter show pity from humanity, the former from weakness, because they think that they are on the point of suffering all kinds of misfortunes, and this is one of the reasons that incline men to pity. That is why the old are querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter ; for a querulous disposition is the opposite of a love of laughter. Such are the characters of the young and older men. Wherefore, since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with their own character and to speakers who resemble them,^a it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our speeches may appear to be of such and such a character.

14. It is evident that the character of those in the prime of life will be the mean between that of the other two, if the excess in each case be removed. At this age, men are neither over-confident, which would show rashness, nor too fearful, but preserving a right attitude in regard to both, neither trusting nor distrusting all, but judging rather in accordance with actual facts. Their rule of conduct is neither the noble nor the useful alone, but both at once. They are neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but preserve the due mean. It is the same in regard to passion and desire. Their self-control is combined

ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι διῆρηται ταῦτα· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί. ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διῆρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὡφελίμων, ταῦτα ἀμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἡ ἐλλείπουσι,
 4 τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἄρμόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἕτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἔνδος δεῦν πεντήκοντα. περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γῆρας καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἥθων ἔκαστον ἔστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

15. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων ἀγαθῶν, δι’ ὅσα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἥθη ποιὰ ἄπτα συμβαίνει
 2 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς. εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν ἥθος ἔστι τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἶναι τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτήν· ἅπαντες γάρ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τι, πρὸς τοῦτο σωρεύειν εἰώθασιν, ἡ δὲ εὐγένεια ἐντιμότης τις προγόνων ἔστιν. καὶ καταφρονητικὸν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστι τοῖς προγόνοις τοῖς αὐτῶν, διότι πόρρω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἡ ἔγγυς γιγνόμενα ἐντιμότερα
 3 καὶ εὐαλαζόνευτα. ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετήν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως· ὅπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς· φορὰ γάρ τις ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, καὶ ἐνίστε ἂν ἡ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἔγγινονται διά τινος χρόνου ἀνδρεῖς περιττοί, κάπειτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν. ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφυῖα γένη εἰς μανικώτερα

^a i.e. the advantages and distinctions the family possessed
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with courage and their courage with self-control, whereas in the young and old these qualities are found separately ; for the young are courageous but without self-control, the old are self-controlled but cowardly. Speaking generally, all the advantages that youth and old age possess separately, those in the prime of life possess combined ; and all cases of excess or defect in the other two are replaced by due moderation and fitness. The body is most fully developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the mind at about forty-nine. Let this suffice for youth, old age, and the prime of life, and the characters which belong to each.

15. Let us next speak of the goods that are due to fortune, all those, at least, which produce certain characters in men. A characteristic of noble birth is that he who possesses it is more ambitious ; for all men, when they start with any good, are accustomed to heap it up, and noble birth is a heritage of honour from one's ancestors. Such men are prone to look down even upon those who are as important as their ancestors, because the same things^a are more honourable and inspire greater vanity when remote than when they are recent. The idea of noble birth refers to excellence of race, that of noble character to not degenerating from the family type, a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are good for nothing. For in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the field ; sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain period men out of the common are born in it, and then it deteriorates. Highly gifted families often of old ; such distinctions, when possessed by those of later date, are less thought of.

ἢθη, οῖον οἱ ἀπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οῖον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους.

16. Τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἂν ἔπειται ἢθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἵδεν ἄπασιν ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου· ὥστε ^{1391a} περ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἄπαντα τάγαθὰ οὗτα διάκεινται· ὁ γὰρ πλούτος οἶον τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, ² διὸ φαίνεται ὥνια ἄπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ. καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες, τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας εἰώθεναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἔρωμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῷ οἴεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἂν καὶ αὐτοί. ἅμα δὲ καὶ εἰκότως τοῦτο πάσχοντιν· πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ δεόμενοι τῶν ἔχοντων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναικα τὴν Ἱέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· πλούσιον εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὅραν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ³ πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας. καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀξίους εἶναι ἀρχειν· ἔχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὧν ἔνεκεν ἀρχειν ἀξιον. καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου εὐ-⁴ δαιμονος ἥθος πλούτου ἐστίν. διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ ἢθη τῷ ἄπαντα μᾶλλον καὶ φαυλότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλούτους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία πλούτου ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι. καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν

degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

16. The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and arrogant, being mentally affected by the acquisition of wealth, for they seem to think that they possess all good things; for wealth is a kind of standard of value of everything else, so that everything seems purchasable by it. They are luxurious and swaggerers, luxurious because of their luxury and the display of their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because all men are accustomed to devote their attention to what they like and admire, and the rich suppose that what they themselves are emulous of is the object of all other men's emulation. At the same time this feeling is not unreasonable; for those who have need of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the answer of Simonides to the wife of Hiero concerning the wise and the rich, when she asked which was preferable, to be wise or to be rich. "Rich," he answered, "for we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the rich." And the rich think they are worthy to rule, because they believe they possess that which makes them so.^a In a word, the character of the rich man is that of a fool favoured by fortune. At the same time there is a difference between the character of the newly rich and of those whose wealth is of long standing, because the former have the vices of wealth in a greater degree and more; for, so to say, they have not been educated to the use of wealth. Their unjust acts are not due to malice,

^a "What makes power worth having" (Cope).

οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ
ἀκρατευτικά, οἷον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν.

17. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ
πλεῖστα φανερά ἔστιν ἥθη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει
2 ἡ δύναμις τῷ πλούτῳ τὰ δὲ βελτίω· φιλοτιμότεροι
γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρωδέστεροι εἰσὶ τὰ ἥθη οἱ δυνάμενοι
τῶν πλουσίων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἔργων ὅσα ἔξουσία
3 αὐτοῖς πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σπουδα-
στικώτεροι διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζό-
4 μενοι σκοπεῦν τὰ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σεμνότεροι
ἡ βαρύτεροι· ποιεῖ γὰρ ἐμφανεστέρους τὸ ἀξίωμα,
διὸ μετριάζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ ἡ σεμνότης μαλακὴ καὶ
εὐσχήμων βαρύτης. καν δικῶσιν, οὐ μικραδικηταί
εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγαλάδικοι.

5 Ἡ δ' εὐτυχία κατὰ τὰ μόρια τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει
τὰ ἥθη· εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγισται
δοκοῦσαι εἶναι εὐτυχίαι, καὶ ἔτι εἰς εὐτεκνίαν καὶ
1391 β τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ παρασκευάζει ἡ εὐτυχία
6 πλεονεκτεῖν. ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀ-
λογιστότεροι διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσίν, ἐν δ' ἀκολου-
θεῖ βέλτιστον ἥθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι
καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ θεῖόν πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ
τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης. περὶ μὲν
οὖν τῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἥθῶν εἴρηται·
τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων

^a ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ : “ because they are administrators ” (Jebb).

^b The three divisions are noble birth, wealth, and power. The meaning is that the highest kinds of good fortune tend or converge to these (*i.e.* to noble birth, wealth, and power). κατὰ τὰ μόρια might also mean “ in part.” Hobbes, in his

Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, paraphrases: “ the manners

but partly to insolence, partly to incontinence, which tends to make them commit assault and battery and adultery.

17. In regard to power, nearly all the characters to which it gives rise are equally clear ; for power, compared with wealth, exhibits partly identical, and partly superior characteristics. Thus, the powerful are more ambitious and more manly in character than the rich, since they aim at the performance of deeds which their power gives them the opportunity of carrying out. And they are more energetic ; for being obliged to look after their power, they are always on the watch.^a And they are dignified rather than heavily pompous ; for their rank renders them more conspicuous, so that they avoid excess ; and this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And their wrongdoings are never petty, but great.

Good fortune in its divisions ^b exhibits characters corresponding to those which have just been mentioned ; for those which appear to be the most important kinds of good fortune tend in their direction ; further, good fortune furnishes advantages over others in the blessing of children and bodily goods. Now, although men are more arrogant and thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied by a most precious quality. Fortunate men stand in a certain relation to the divinity and love the gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits they have received from fortune. We have spoken ^c of the characters associated with different ages and fortunes ; the opposite characters to those described, of men that prosper, are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are in power, for to some of these all prosperity appertains."

^a ii. 12-14 ; ii. 15-17.

φανερά ἔστιν, οἶον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ἥθος καὶ ἀδυνάτου.

18. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν λόγων χρῆσις πρὸς κρίσιν ἔστι (περὶ ὃν γὰρ ἵσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ λόγου), ἔστι δέ, ἂν τε πρὸς ἕνα τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπῃ ἢ ἀποτρέπῃ, οἶον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἥπτον κριτὴς ὁ εἰς· ὃν γὰρ δεῖ πεῖσαι, οὗτος ἔστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κριτής), ἔάν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα ἔάν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λέγη τις, ὅμοίως· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τάνατία, πρὸς ἀ ὥσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν. ὅλως δὲ μόνος ἔστιν ἀπλῶς κριτὴς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁ τὰ ζητούμενα κρίνων· τά τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ὃν βουλεύονται. περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἥθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον. ὥστε διωρισμένοι ἄν εἴη πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἥθικοὺς ποιητέον.

^a Having dealt with ethical and pathetic proofs, Aristotle proceeds to the discussion of topics of enthymemes common to all three kinds of Rhetoric. The difficulty in the Greek lies in the absence of a suitable apodosis to the long sentence beginning ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν. Grammatically, it might be ὥστε διωρισμένοι ἄν εἴη, but it by no means follows that “since the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement . . . therefore it has been determined how . . . we must make our speeches ethical.” Spengel, regarding ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . βουλεύονται merely as an enlargement of ii. 1, 2, brackets the passage. Cope suggests that something has fallen out after βουλεύονται: “Since in all the three kinds of Rhetoric the object is to secure a judgement, [I have shown how to put the judges into a certain frame of mind in the

for instancee, of the poor, of the unfortunate, and of the weak, are obvious from their opposites.

18.^a Now the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge; if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or against some theory, it is just the same, for it is necessary to make use of speech to destroy the opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if they were the actual opponent; and similarly in epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge. Generally speaking, however, only he who decides questions at issue in civil controversies ^b is a judge in the proper sense of the word, for in judicial cases the point at issue is the state of the case, in deliberative the subjects of deliberation.^c We have already spoken of the characters of forms of government in treating of deliberative rhetoric,^d so that it has been determined how and by what means we must make our speeches conform to those characters. discussion of the characters and emotions]. I have also spoken of the characters of the forms of government; so that this part of the subject need no longer detain us.” It is generally agreed that we have not the chapter as originally arranged, although it is not supposed that any part of it is non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb’s translation).

^b Both forensic and deliberative.

^c Or, “for in both forensic and deliberative arguments the issue is the state of the case.” ^d i. 8.

2 Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἔκαστον μὲν γένος τῶν λόγων ἔτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος, περὶ ἀπάντων δ’ αὐτῶν εἰλημμέναι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσι καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπιδεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δ’ ἐξ ὧν ἡθικοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώρισται,
 3 λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν· πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔσται τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι.
 4 ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἔστι τῶν λόγων· χρῶνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες
 5 καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι. τούτων δὲ
 1392^a διορισθέντων περὶ τε ἐνθυμημάτων κοινῇ πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ περὶ παραδειγμάτων, ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀποδῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ μὲν αὔξειν οἰκειότατον τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς (περὶ τούτων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις), τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς.

19. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγωμεν. ἂν δὴ τούναντίον ἢ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι δυνατόν οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑγιασθῆναι, καὶ νοσῆσαι· ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων, ἢ ἐναντία. καὶ

^a i. 3.^b i. 4-8.^c i. 9 ; 10-15.

^d i. 9. 40. Amplification is to be understood of the exaggeration of both great and small things. It is most
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Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was said,^a has its own special end, and in regard to all of them we have gathered popular opinions and premises whence men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic, and judicial speeches,^b and, further, we have determined^c the special rules according to which it is possible to make our speeches ethical, it only remains to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of rhetoric. For all orators are obliged, in their speeches, also to make use of the topic of the possible and impossible, and to endeavour to show, some of them that a thing will happen, others that it has happened. Further, the topic of magnitude is common to all kinds of Rhetoric, for all men employ extenuation or amplification whether deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending. When these topics have been determined, we will endeavour to say what we can in general about enthymemes and examples, in order that, when we have added what remains, we may carry out what we proposed at the outset. Now, of the commonplaces amplification is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has been stated ;^d the past to forensic, since things past are the subject of judgement ; and the possible and future to deliberative.

19. Let us first speak of the possible and the impossible. If of two contrary things it is possible that one should exist or come into existence, then it would seem that the other is equally possible ; for instance, if a man can be cured, he can also be ill ; for the potentiality of contraries, *qua* contraries, is suited to epideictic oratory, in which there is no doubt as to the facts ; so that it is only necessary to accentuate their importance or non-importance.

ARISTOTLE

2 εἰ τὸ ὅμοιον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον. καὶ εἰ τὸ
 3 χαλεπώτερον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥάον. καὶ εἰ τὸ
 4 σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ ὅλως
 δυνατὸν γενέσθαι· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν
 5 ἡ οἰκίαν εἶναι. καὶ οὐδὲ η ἀρχὴ δύναται γενέσθαι,
 καὶ τὸ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδέν ἄρχεται
 γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον τὸ σύμμετρον τὴν
 διάμετρον εἶναι οὕτ’ ἀν ἄρξαιτο γίγνεσθαι οὕτε
 γίγνεται. καὶ οὐ τὸ τελος, καὶ η ἀρχὴ δυνατή·
 6 ἀπαντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται. καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον
 τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἡ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ
 πρότερον, οἷον εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ παῖδα·
 πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται· καὶ εἰ παῖδα, καὶ
 7 ἄνδρα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνη. καὶ ὅν ἔρως ἡ ἐπιθυμία
 φύσει ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔρα οὐδέν
 8 ἐπιθυμεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ ὅν ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι
 καὶ τέχναι, δυνατὰ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι.
 9 καὶ δσων η ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἀ
 ήμεῖς ἀναγκάσαιμεν ἀν ἡ πείσαιμεν· ταῦτα δ’
 10 ἐστὶν ὅν κρείττους ἡ κύριοι ἡ φίλοι. καὶ ὅν τὰ
 μέρη δυνατά, καὶ τὸ ὅλον. καὶ ὅν τὸ ὅλον δυνατόν,
 καὶ τὰ μέρη ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· εἰ γὰρ πρόσχισμα
 καὶ κεφαλὶς καὶ χιτών δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ
 ὑποδήματα δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ εἰ ὑποδήματα,
 11 καὶ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλὶς καὶ χιτών. καὶ εἰ τὸ

^a As a general rule, from their nature as contraries, although it may not be true in particular cases. If a man is ill, he may also be well, although in particular cases certain qualities may make him more liable to one or the other, e.g. he may suffer from an incurable disease (Schrader).

the same.^a Similarly, if of two like things the one is possible, so also is the other. And if the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier. And if it is possible for a thing to be made excellent or beautiful, it is possible for it to be made in general ; for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than a mere house.^b Again, if the beginning is possible, so also is the end ; for no impossible thing comes, or begins to come, into existence ; for instance, that the diameter of a square should be commensurable with the side of a square is neither possible nor could be possible. And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning ; for all things arise from a beginning. And if that which is subsequent in being or generation can come into being, so then can that which is antecedent ; for instance, if a man can come into being, so can a child, for the child is antecedent ; and similarly, if a child can come into being, so can a man, for the child is a beginning. And things which we love or desire naturally are possible ; for as a rule no one loves the impossible or desires it. And those things which form the subject of sciences or arts can also exist and come into existence. And so with all those things, the productive principles of which reside in those things which we can control by force or persuasion, when they depend upon those whose superiors, masters, or friends we are. And if the parts are possible, so also is the whole ; and if the whole is possible, so also are the parts, speaking generally ; for instance, if the front, toe-cap, and upper leather,^c can be made, then shoes can be made, and if shoes, then the above parts. And if

^b An argument *a fortiori*. If a beautiful house can be built, so can a house of any kind ; for this is easier.

The meaning of the Greek words is quite uncertain.

ARISTOTLE

1392 β γένος ὅλον τῶν δυνατῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος,
 καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι
 δυνατόν, καὶ τριήρη, καὶ εἰ τριήρη, καὶ πλοῖον.
 12 καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πεφυκότων, καὶ
 θάτερον, οἷον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ εἰ ἥμισυ,
 13 καὶ διπλάσιον. καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ παρασκευῆς
 δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας
 δυνατόν· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀγάθωνι εἴρηται

καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε χρὴ τέχνη πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ
 ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη προσγίγνεται.

14 καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροις καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις
 δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ
 Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος
 15 ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν. περὶ δὲ
 ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις
 ὑπάρχει.

16 Εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἢ μὴ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.
 πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἥττον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκὸς
 17 γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἀν εἴη καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον. καὶ εἰ τὸ
 ὕστερον εἰωθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον
 γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ ἔμαθέ ποτε
 18 τοῦτο. καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχεν
 πάντες γάρ, ὅταν δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράτ-
 19 τουσιν· ἐμποδὼν γάρ οὐδέν. ἔτι εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ

^a T.G.F. p. 765.

the whole genus is among things possible to be made, so is the species, and if the species, so the genus ; for example, if a vessel can be built, so can a trireme, if a trireme can, so can a vessel. If of two naturally corresponding things one is possible, so also is the other ; for instance, if the double is possible, so is the half, if the half, so the double. If a thing can be made without art or preparation, much the more can it be made with the help of art and carefulness. Whence it was said by Agathon ^a :

And moreover we have to do some things by art, while others fall to our lot by compulsion or chance.

And if a thing is possible for those who are inferior, or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so for those whose qualities are the opposite ; as Isocrates said, it would be very strange if he were unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had learnt [with the help of others]. As for the impossible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments to be derived from the opposite of what has been said about the possible.

The question whether a thing has or has not happened must be considered from the following points of view. In the first place, if that which is naturally less likely has happened, then that which is more likely will most probably have happened. If that which usually happens afterwards has happened, then that which precedes must also have happened ; for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he must once have learnt it. If a man was able and wished to do a thing, he has done it ; for all men do a thing, when they are able and resolve to do it, for nothing hinders them. Further, if a man wished to do it

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μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω ἐκώλυεν, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὡργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὥν ὀρέγονται, ἃν δύνωνται, καὶ ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι δι’ ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δ’ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν 20 ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ποιῆσαι. 21 καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα πεφύκει πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ ἔνεκα ἐκείνου, οἷον εἰ ἡστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἐπράξεν. καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὑστερον πεφύκει γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα γίγνεται γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἔνεκα γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἡστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπράξε, καὶ 22 ἐπείρασεν. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν ἔξ ανάγκης τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

1393 a Καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον· τό
23 τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει ὃν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ
ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὄργῃ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως
ὄντα. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ εἰ ἐν δρμῇ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ
μελλήσει, ἔσται· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται
24 μᾶλλον τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα. καὶ εἰ
προγέγονεν ὅσα πρότερον πεφύκει γίγνεσθαι, οἷον
25 εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς ὑσαι. καὶ εἰ τὸ ἔνεκα τούτου

and there was no external obstacle ; if he was able to do it and was in a state of anger ; if he was able and desired to do it ; for men as a rule, whenever they can, do those things which they long for, the vicious owing to want of self-control, the virtuous because they desire what is good. And if anything was on the point of being done, it most probably was done ; for it is likely that one who was on the point of doing something has carried it out. And if all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have happened ; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered ; and if a man has already attempted a crime, he has also committed it. And if all the natural consequences or motives of actions have happened, then the antecedent or the cause has happened ; for instance, if it has thundered, it has also lightened, and if a man has committed a crime, he has also attempted it. Of all these things some are so related necessarily, others only as a general rule. To establish that a thing has not happened, it is evident that our argument must be derived from the opposite of what has been said.

In regard to the future, it is clear that one can argue in the same way ; for if we are able and wish to do a thing, it will be done ; and so too will those things which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to do, if we have the power. For this reason also, if a man has an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it will probably be done ; since, as a rule, things that are about to happen are more likely to happen than those which are not. And if all the natural antecedents have happened ; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it will probably rain. And if one thing has been done with a view to another, it is probable that the latter

γέγονεν, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, οἷον εἰ θεμέλιος,
καὶ οἰκία.

26 Περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων
καὶ μείζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων
καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἔστι φανερόν·
εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περὶ τε με-
γέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀπλῶς καὶ
ἐλάττονος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων
τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἔστιν, οἷον τὸ συμ-
φέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι'
27 ἔκείνων ληπτέον τὰς αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ
ταῦτά τι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους ἀπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς
κενολογεῖν ἔστιν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἔστι πρὸς τὴν
χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν πραγ-
μάτων. περὶ μὲν οὖν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ
πότερον γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ
ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν
πραγμάτων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

20. Λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοιωνῶν πίστεων ἄπασιν
εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων. εἰσὶ δ'
αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, παράδειγμα καὶ
ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματος ἔστιν.
2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν·
ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δὲ ἐπ-
αγωγὴ ἀρχή.

Παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἰδη δύο· ἐν μὲν γάρ ἔστι
παραδείγματος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προ-
γεγενημένα, ἐν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. τούτου δὲ ἐν
3 μὲν παραβολὴ ἐν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Λίσώπειοι καὶ
Λιβυκοί. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν¹ τοιόνδε

¹ Spengel's alteration of the Paris ms. (A^c) reading παρα-
δείγματα λέγειν.

will also be done ; for instance, if a foundation has been laid, a house will probably be built.

What we have previously said clearly shows the nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of the greater and less, and of things great and small generally. For, when treating of deliberative rhetoric,^a we spoke of greatness of goods, and of the greater and less generally. Therefore, since in each branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good, such as the expedient, the noble, or the just, it is evident that all must take the materials of amplification from these. To make any further inquiry as to magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste of words ; for the particular has more authority than the general for practical purposes. Let this suffice for the possible and impossible ; for the question whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or not ; and for the greatness or smallness of things.

20. It remains to speak of the proofs common to all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular proofs have been discussed. These common proofs are of two kinds, example and enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme). Let us then first speak of the example ; for the example resembles induction, and induction is a beginning.^b

There are two kinds of examples ; namely, one which consists in relating things that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are subdivided into comparisons or fables, such as those of Aesop and the Libyan.^c It would be an

^a i. 7.

^b As a starting-point and first principle of knowledge.

^c The Libyan fables were of African origin. They are mentioned by Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* v. 11. 20) and belonged to the class of animal fables.

τι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρα-
 1303 ^β σκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι·
 καὶ γὰρ Δαρεῖος οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον
 λαβεῖν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν Ξέρξης οὐ
 πρότερον ἐπεχείρησε πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη·
 ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται· διὸ οὐκ
 4 ἐπιτρεπτέον. παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον
 εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν· ὅμοιον
 γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἱ
 ἂν δύνωνται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν λάχωσιν, ἢ
 τῶν πλωτήρων ὃν τινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν,
 ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον.

5 Λόγος δέ, οἶος ὁ Στησιχόρου περὶ Φαλάριδος
 καὶ Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ. Στησίχορος
 μὲν γάρ, ἐλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν
 Ἰμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελλόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι
 τοῦ σώματος, τâλλα διαλεχθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον
 ὡς ἵππος κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος, ἐλθόντος δ'
 ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος
 τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἡρώτα τινὰ ἄνθρωπον
 εἰ δύναιτ^ρ ἂν μετ' αὐτοῦ κολάσαι τὸν ἔλαφον, ὁ δ'
 ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ ἐπ'
 αὐτὸν ἔχων ἀκόντια· συνομολογήσαντος δὲ καὶ
 ἀναβάντος, ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδού-

^a The παραβολὴ as understood by Aristotle is a comparison and application of cases easily supposable and such as occur in real life, for the purpose of illustrating the point in question; the fable, on the other hand, is pure fiction.

instance of the historical kind of example, if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and not to allow him to subdue Egypt; for Darius did not cross over to Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt; but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; consequently, if the present Great King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore it must not be allowed. Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates; for instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those competent to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot, not by a man's knowledge.^a

A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to them: "A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time

λευσεν ἥδη τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. “οὗτος δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς,”^a ἔφη, “ὅρατε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι ταῦτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε ἥδη, ἐλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα· εἴαν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἥδη Φαλάριδι.” Αἰσωπος δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ συνηγορῶν δημαγωγῷ κρινομένῳ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ δυναμένην δ' ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν, καὶ κυνοραιστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς· ἔχον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν αὐτήν, κατοικτείραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰς ἀφέλοις αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραιστάς· τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν· ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν φάναι ἥδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ δλίγον ἔλκουσιν αἷμα· εἴαν δὲ τούτους ἀφέλῃ, ἔτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνται μου τὸ λοιπὸν αἷμα. “ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς,” ἔφη, “ὦ 1394 a ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι βλάψει (πλούσιος γάρ ἔστιν)· εἴαν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, ἔτεροι ἔξουσι πένητες, οἱ ύμιν ἀναλώσουσι τὰ κοινὰ 7 κλέπτοντες.” εἰσὶ δ' οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους δὲ ράον· ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἃν τις δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὅραν, ὅπερ ράον ἔστιν ἐκ φιλο- 8 σοφίας. ράω μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.

^a “ ‘Literary knowledge’” (Jebb); “literature” (Cope, 276

became the man's slave. So then," said he, "do you take care lest, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy, you be treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of Phalaris." Aesop, when defending at Samos a demagogue who was being tried for his life, related the following anecdote. "A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable to get out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a number of dog-fleas clung to her skin. A hedgehog, wandering about, saw her and, moved with compassion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. The fox refused and when the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: 'They are already full of me and draw little blood; but if you take them away, others will come that are hungry and will drain what remains to me.' You in like manner, O Samians, will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is wealthy; but if you put him to death, others will come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds." Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to find similar things that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables; for they must be invented, like comparisons, if a man is capable of seizing the analogy; and this is easy if one studies philosophy.^a Thus, while the lessons conveyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived from facts are more useful for deliberative oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past.

Introd. p. 256, who, however, in his annotated ed. explains: "intellectual study and mental exercises in general").

9 Δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι μὴ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐνθυμήματα ως ἀποδείξεσιν (ἢ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων), ἔχοντα δὲ ως μαρτυρίους, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν· προτιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ρήτορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίους, ὃ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός. διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἰκανόν· μάρτυς γὰρ πιστὸς καὶ εἰς χρήσιμος. πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε χρηστέον, εἴρηται.

21. Περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ρήθεντος τί ἔστι γνώμη, μάλιστ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἀρμόττει χρῆσθαι τῷ γνωμολογεῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖος τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἵρετὰ ἡ φευκτά ἔστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὃ περὶ τούτων συλλογισμός ἔστι σχεδόν, τά τε συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαι εἰσί, οἷον χρὴ δ' οὕ ποθ', ὃς τις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνήρ, παιδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί, ἐνθύμημά ἔστι τὸ ἄπαν, οἷον

^a If we have no enthymemes, we must use examples instead of them; for they are useful for persuasion, although they do not really demonstrate anything. If we have enthymemes, we must use examples in corroboration of them (see 21. 3 note).

If we have no enthymemes, we must employ examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these ; but if we have them, examples must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue to the enthymemes.^a For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in very few cases ; if they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to induce belief. Wherefore also it is necessary to quote a number of examples if they are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put last ; for even a single trustworthy witness is of use. We have thus stated how many kinds of examples there are, and how and when they should be made use of.

21. In regard to the use of maxims, it will most readily be evident on what subjects, and on what occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has been defined. Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general ; it does not even deal with all general things, as for instance that the straight is the opposite of the crooked, but with the objects of human actions, and with what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the enthymeme is, we may say,^b the syllogism dealing with such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example :

No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be excessively clever,^c

is a maxim ; but when the why and the wherefore are added, the whole makes an enthymeme ; for instance,

^b Putting the comma after $\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\delta\nu$.

^c Eur. *Medea*, 296.

χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἥσ εἶχουσιν ἀργίας,
φθόνον παρ' ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ.

1394 *καὶ τὸ*

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅς τις πάντ' ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ.

καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅς τις ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος
γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἔχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα.

ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλος ἔστιν ἢ τύχης.

3 εἰ δή ἔστι γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα
εἴδη εἶναι γνώμης· ἢ γὰρ μετ' ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ
4 ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου. ἀποδείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί
εἰσιν ὅσαι παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν ἢ ἀμφισβητού-
μενον· ὅσαι δὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.
5 τούτων δ' ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγγνῶσθαι
μηδὲν δεῖσθαι ἐπιλόγου, οἷον

ἀνδρὶ δ' ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἔστιν, ὡς γ' ἡμῖν δοκεῖ
φαίνεται γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω· τὰς δ' ἄμα λεγο-
μένας δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἷον

οὐδεὶς ἐραυτὴς ὅς τις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ.

6 τῶν δὲ μετ' ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος
εἰσίν, ὥσπερ

^a “The idle habits which they contract” (Cope).

^b Euripides, *Stheneloea* (frag. 661, T.G.F.).

^c Euripides, *Hecuba*, 858.

^d Maxims with an epilogue are (1) imperfect enthymemes, or (2) enthymematic in character, but not in form; those without an epilogue are (1) such as are well known, or (2) such as are clear as soon as they are uttered.

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for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against them,^a they earn jealous hostility from the citizens.

Another example :

There is no man who is happy in everything ;^b
or,

There is no man who is really free.

The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse it is an enthymeme :

for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.^c

Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it follows that maxims are of four kinds ; for they are either accompanied by an epilogue or not.^d Now all those that state anything that is contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative proof ; but those that do not, need no epilogue,^e either because they are already known, as, for instance,

Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our opinion,^f

for this is generally agreed ; or because, no sooner are they uttered than they are clear to those who consider them, for instance,

He is no lover who does not love always.^g

As for the maxims that are accompanied by an epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, as

^e Something added as a supplementary proof, the why and the wherefore ; in iii. 19 it is used for the peroration of a speech.

^f From Simonides or Epicharmus.

^g Euripides, *Troades*, 1051.

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χρὴ δ' οὐ ποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων,
αἱ δ' ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ
μέρος· αἴπερ καὶ μάλιστ' εὔδοκιμούσιν. εἰσὶ δ'
αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον,
οἷον ἐν τῷ

ἀθάνατον ὄργην μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὡν.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι μὴ δεῖν ἀεὶ φυλάττειν τὴν ὄργην
γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσκείμενον “θνητὸν ὅντα” τὸ
διὰ τί λεγει. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ τὸ

θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν
φρονεῖν.

7 Φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη
γνώμης, καὶ περὶ ποίον ἔκαστον ἀρμόττει· περὶ
μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ
ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλ' ἢ προθέντα τὸν ἐπίλογον
γνώμη χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι, οἷον εἴ τις
εἴποι “ἔγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὕτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ
οὗτ’ ἀργὸν εἶναι, οὐ φῆμι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι,” ἢ
τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπεῖν τὰ ἔμπροσθεν. περὶ
δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δέ, προστιθέντα τὸ

8 διότι στρογγυλώτατα. ἀρμόττει δ' ἐν τοῖς τοιού-
τοις καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ
αἰνιγματώδη, οἷον εἴ τις λέγει ὅπερ Στησίχορος
1395 a ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβριστὰς εἶναι, ὅπως
9 μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ἁδωσιν. ἀρμόττει δὲ
γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβυτέροις, περὶ δὲ

^a See § 2.

^b They partake of the nature of, but not of the form of, enthymemes.

^c Author unknown (T.G.F. p. 854).

No one who is sensible, etc.,^a

while others are enthymematic, but are not part of an enthymeme;^b and these are most highly esteemed. Such are those maxims in which the reason of what is said is apparent: for instance,

Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath;^c

to say that one should not always nourish immortal wrath is a maxim, but the addition “being a mortal” states the reason. It is the same with

A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.^d

It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what it is appropriate to apply them in each case. For in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary to the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary; but either the epilogue may be put first and the conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one were to say, “As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated”; or put the maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases where the statements made, although not paradoxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as concisely as possible. In such cases Laconic apophthegms and riddling sayings are suitable; as, for instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas should be forced to chirp from the ground.^e The use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced

^a According to Bentley, from Epicharmus.

^b Meaning that the land would be devastated and the trees cut down.

τούτων ὧν ἔμπειρός τις ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δ' ὧν ἄπειρος, ἡλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δ' ἵκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῦκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥαδίως ἀποφαίνονται.

10 Καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἀρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν

11 τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ἀποδείξαντα. χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὥσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοινά, ὡς ὅμολογούντων ἀπάντων, ὄρθως ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους

εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης,
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥπτους ὄντας

ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος,

καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῦν τῶν ἔχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα

νήπιος δὲ πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

12 "Ἐπι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαί εἰσιν,
13 οἷον παροιμία “Ἀττικὸς πάροικος.” δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν καὶ παρὰ τὰ δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα οἷον τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ Μηδὲν ἄγαν), ὅταν ἢ τὸ ἥθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ βέλτιον, ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη ἢ. ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μέν, οἷον εἴ τις ὄργιζόμενος φαίη ψεῦδος

^a *Iliad*, xii. 243.

^b *Iliad*, xviii. 309.

^c i. 15. 14.

^d Cf. Thucydides, i. 70, where the Corinthians complain of the lack of energy shown by the Spartans, as compared with their own restless and troublesome neighbours, the Athenians.

in years, and in regard to things in which one has experience ; since the use of maxims before such an age is unseemly, as also is story-telling ; and to speak about things of which one has no experience shows foolishness and lack of education. A sufficient proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of coining maxims and ready to make display of them.

To express in general terms what is not general is especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and then either at the beginning or after the demonstration. One should even make use of common and frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful ; for because they are common, they seem to be true, since all as it were acknowledge them as such ; for instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to brave danger before having sacrificed may say,

The best of omens is to defend one's country,^a
and if they are inferior in numbers,

The chances of war are the same for both,^b
and if advising them to destroy the children of the
enemy even though they are innocent of wrong,

Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the
children to live.^c

Further, some proverbs are also maxims ; for example, "An Attic neighbour."^d Maxims should also be used even when contrary to the most popular sayings, such as "Know thyself" and "Nothing in excess," either when one's character is thereby likely to appear better, or if they are expressed in the language of passion. It would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, "It is not

εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὐτόν· οὗτος γοῦν εἰ
ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἀν ποτε στρατηγεῖν
ἥξινος. τὸ δὲ ἥθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ
φασί, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν
14 ὡς φιλήσοντας. δεῖ δὲ τὴν λέξιν προαιρεσιν
συνδηλοῦν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, οἷον ἡ
οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι “δεῖ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν,
ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα· ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον,”
ἡ ὁδε “οὐκ ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεῖ γὰρ
τόν γ’ ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς φιλήσοντα ἀεὶ φιλεῖν.”
καὶ “οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ τούς γε κακοὺς
1395 b ἄγαν μισεῖν.”

15 “Εχουσι δ’ εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην
μίαν μὲν δὴ διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν·
χαίρουσι γάρ, ἔάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτύχη τῶν
δοξῶν ἃς ἔκεινοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ λέγω,
δῆλον ἔσται ὅδε, ἂμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθ-
όλου ἔστιν, χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὃ κατὰ
μέρος προϋπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσιν· οἷον εἴ τις
γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἡ τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀπο-
δέξαιτ’ ἀν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι

οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον,

ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡλιθιώτερον τεκνοποίας. ὥστε δεῖ
στοχάζεσθαι πῶς τυγχάνουσι ποῖα προϋπολαμ-
βάνοντες, εἴθ’ οὕτω περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν.
16 ταύτην τε δὴ ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν,

^a “Want of cultivation and intelligence” (Cope). “Amour-propre” (St. Hilaire).

^b In reference to their own particular case.

true that a man should know himself ; at any rate, such a man as this, if he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command." And one's character would appear better, if one were to say that it is not right, as men say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were bound to love. The moral purpose also should be made clear by the language, or else one should add the reason ; for example, either by saying "that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if one were going to love for ever, for the other kind of love would imply treachery" ; or thus, "The maxim does not please me, for the true friend should love as if he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve the maxim 'Nothing in excess,' for one cannot hate the wicked too much."

Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, first, because of the vulgarity^a of the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially hold.^b What I mean will be clear from the following, and also how one should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we have said, is a statement of the general ; accordingly, the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general terms the opinion which they have already specially formed. For instance, a man who happened to have bad neighbours or children would welcome any one's statement that nothing is more troublesome than neighbours or more stupid than to beget children. Wherefore the speaker should endeavour to guess how his hearers formed their preconceived opinions and what they are, and then express himself in general terms in regard to them. This is one of the advantages of the use of maxims, but another

καὶ ἔτέρων κρείττων ἡθικοὺς γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους.
 ἥθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαιρεσις.
 αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀπο-
 φαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ¹
 τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ' ἀν χρησταὶ ὁσιν αἱ γνῶμαι,
 καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.
 περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἔστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη
 αὐτῆς καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὠφέλειαν
 ἔχει, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

22. Περὶ δ' ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν,
 τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς
 τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκατέρου τούτων ἔστιν.
 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τίς ἔστιν,
 εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς συλλογισμός, καὶ τί
 3 διαφέρει τῶν διαλεκτικῶν· οὕτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν
 οὕτε πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ
 φανερὰ λέγειν. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανω-
 τέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων
 ἐν τοῖς ὅχλοις, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς
 ἀπαιδεύτους παρ' ὅχλῳ μουσικωτέρως λέγειν· οἱ
 μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἔξ
 ὧν ἵσασι, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς. ὥστ' οὐκ ἔξ ἀπάντων
 τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὀρισμένων λεκτέον,
 1396a οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται. καὶ
 τοῦτο δ', ὅτι οὕτω φαίνεται, δῆλον εἶναι ἢ πᾶσιν

^a The conclusion must not be reached by means of a long series of arguments, as it were strung together in a chain: ep. i. 2. 12, where the hearers are spoken of as unable to take in at a glance a long series of arguments or "to follow a long chain of reasoning" (*οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν*).

is greater ; for it makes speeches ethical. Speeches have this character, in which the moral purpose is clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because he who employs them in a general manner declares his moral preferences ; if then the maxims are good, they show the speaker also to be a man of good character. Let this suffice for what we had to say concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of them there are, the way they should be used, and what their advantages are.

22. Let us now speak of enthymemes in general and the manner of looking for them, and next of their topics ; for each of these things is different in kind. We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it differs from the dialectic syllogisms ; for the conclusion must neither be drawn from too far back ^a nor should it include all the steps of the argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in the second, it is simply a waste of words, because it states much that is obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in the presence of crowds ; as the poets say, “ the ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a mob.”^b For the educated use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore one must not argue from all possible opinions, but only from such as are definite and admitted, for instance, either by the judges themselves or by those of whose judgement they approve. Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion

^b Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 989.

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ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις. καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

4 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθ' ὅποιωοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ἔχειν ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· μηδὲν γάρ ἔχων ἐξ 5 οὐδενὸς ἀν ἔχοις συνάγειν. λέγω δ' οἶν πῶς ἀν δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ πολεμητέον, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυτικὴ ἢ πεζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ φίλοι καὶ ἔχθροί, ἔτι δὲ τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, καὶ τάλλα τὰ 6 τοιαῦτα; ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων; ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν 7 καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἶνον ὅτι τοὺς Ἑλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἡνδραποδίσαντο Αἰγαίητας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἀμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπού- 8 μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται. οὐδὲν δὲ

of all or most of the hearers ; and again, conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from those which are only true as a rule.

First of all, then, it must be understood that, in regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or of any other kind, it is necessary to be also acquainted with the elements of the question, either entirely or in part ; for if you know none of these things, you will have nothing from which to draw a conclusion. I should like to know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not know in what their strength consists, whether it is naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further, what wars they have already waged, with what success, and all similar things ? Again, how could we praise them, if we did not know of the naval engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other similar things ? for men always base their praise upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious deeds. Similarly, they base their censure upon actions that are contrary to these, examining whether those censured have really, or seem to have, committed them ; for example, that the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians, and all such acts, and whatever other similar offences may have been committed by them. Similarly, in accusation and defence, speakers argue from an examination of the circumstances of the case. It makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a

διαφέρει περὶ Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο δρᾶν· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ ψέγοντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον, ὥ' ἐκ τούτων λέγωμεν ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπάρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δ' ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, συμβουλεύοντες δ' εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν.

9 δομοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὅτουοῦν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ.

10 "Ωστ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὗτω φαίνονται ἀποδεικνύντες, ἐάν τε ἀκριβέστερον ἐάν τε μαλακώτερον
1396 b συλλογίζωνται (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων λαμβάνονται
ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἔκαστον ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀλλως δεικνύναι),
φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς,
πρῶτον περὶ ἔκαστον ἔχειν ἐξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν

11 ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων, περὶ δὲ τῶν
ἐξ ὑπογνίου γιγνομένων ζητεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον,
ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀόριστα ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,
περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφοντας ὅτι πλεῖστα
καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν
πλείω ἔχηται τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσούτῳ ῥᾷσον
δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ δ' ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα
12 καὶ ἡγτον κοινά. λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν
τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἀνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων

"Or, "by means of the *speech* it is impossible to prove anything otherwise" (Cope).

^b i. 14. *πρῶτον*: i.e. "the speaker's chief care should be . . ."

question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful ; defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust ; advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful. And similarly in regard to any subject whatever. For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in justice or the good.

Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly or loosely—since they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove anything in any other way ^a—it is evidently necessary, as has been stated in the *Topics*,^b to have first on each subject a selection of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable. As for those to be used in sudden emergencies, the same method of inquiry must be adopted ; we must look, not at what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the subject ; for the more facts one has, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable are they and less common.^c By common I mean, for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man,

^a The more suitable they will be, and the less they will resemble ordinary, trivial generalities.

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καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ "Ιλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην. ἴδια δὲ ἀ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἔκτορα τὸν ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς ἐκώλυσεν ἅπαντας ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὡν, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὡν ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

13 Εἰς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς καὶ πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν (στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμημάτος τὸ αὐτό). πρῶτον δ' εἴπωμεν περὶ ὃν ἀναγκαῖον

14 εἰπεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ δ' ἐλεγκτικά· καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν

15 τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἔξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομο-

16 λογούμενα συνάγειν. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ ἑκάστων τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔχονται οἱ τόποι· ἔξειλεγμέναι γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἑκαστόν εἰσιν, ὥστ' ἔξ ὃν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ ἢ καλοῦ ἢ αἰσχροῦ ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ παθημάτων καὶ ἔξεων ὠσαύτως εἰλημμένοι

17 ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον καθόλου περὶ ἀπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ

^a The demonstrative enthymeme draws its conclusion

or one of the demigods, or because he went on the expedition against Troy ; for this is applicable to many others as well, so that such praise is no more suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to no one else ; for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from disembarking, being invulnerable ; to have gone to the war when very young, and without having taken the oath ; and all such things.

One method of selection then, and this the first, is the topical. Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks. There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one demonstrative, which proves that a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions from admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the adversary.^a We know nearly all the general heads of each of the special topics that are useful or necessary ; for the propositions relating to each have been selected, so that we have in like manner already established all the topics from which enthymemes may be derived on the subject of good or bad, fair or foul, just or unjust, characters, emotions, and habits. Let us now endeavour to find topics about enthymemes in general in another way, noting in passing ^b those from facts admitted by the opponent ; the refutative draws its conclusion from the same, but the conclusion is one which is disputed by the opponent.

^a Or, "noting in addition" (Victorius) ; or, "pointing out, side by side" (Jebb).

λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεικτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ δὲ τούτων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν. δηλωθέντων δὲ τούτων, περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.

23. "Εστι δ' εἰς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῦν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν. ἡ ὥστε ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι.

εἴπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν ἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὄργην πεσεῖν, οὐδ' ἂν ἀναγκασθείσι τις εὖ δράσῃ τινά, προσῆκόν ἔστι τῷδε ὁφείλεσθαι χάριν.

ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔστιν ἐν βροτοῖς φευδηγορεῖν πιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τούναντίον, ἄπιστ' ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.

2 "Αλλος ἐκ τῶν ὄμοίων πτώσεων ὄμοίως γὰρ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἡ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ δικαίως νῦν δ' οὐχ αἱρετὸν τὸ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν.

3 "Αλλος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ καλῶς ἡ δικαίως ποιῆσαι, θατέρῳ τὸ

^a Assuming that self-control is good, then if the opposite of good (that is, bad) can be predicated of lack of self-control, this proves the truth of the first proposition; otherwise, it may be refuted.

which are refutative and those which are demonstrative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which are not really enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we will settle the question of solutions and objections, and whence they must be derived to refute enthymemes.

23. One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites ; for it is necessary to consider whether one opposite is predicate of the other, as a means of destroying an argument, if it is not, as a means of constructing one, if it is ;^a for instance, self-control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful ; or as in the *Messeniacus*,^b

If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must repair them with the aid of peace.

And,

For if it is unfair to be angry with those who have done wrong unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to one who is forced to do us good.^c

Or,

If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is true.^d

Another topic is derived from similar inflexions, for in like manner the derivatives must either be predicate of the subject or not ; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be predicate of anything that happens justly ; but to be justly put to death is not desirable.

Another topic is derived from relative terms. For if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have suffered similarly may be

^b Cf. i. 13. 2 note.

^c Authorship unknown.

^d Euripides, *Thyestes* (Frag. 396, T.G.F.).

πεπονθέναι, καὶ εἰ κελεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι,
οἷον ὡς ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων περὶ τῶν τελῶν “εἰ
γὰρ μηδ’ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδὲ ἡμῖν τὸ
ὤνεισθαι.” καὶ εἰ τῷ πεπονθότι τὸ καλῶς ἦ
δικαίως ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ποιήσαντι, καὶ εἰ τῷ
ποιήσαντι, καὶ τῷ πεπονθότι. ἔστι δὲ ἐν τούτῳ
παραλογίσασθαι· εἰ γὰρ δικαίως ἔπαθέν τι, δικαίως
πέπονθεν, ἀλλ’ ἵσως οὐχ ὑπὸ σοῦ. διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν
χωρὶς εἰ ἄξιος ὁ παθὼν παθεῖν καὶ ὁ ποιήσας
1307 b ποιῆσαι, εἴτα χρῆσθαι ὅποτέρως ἀρμόττει· ἐνίοτε
γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ
ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου

μητέρα δὲ τὴν σὴν οὕτις ἐστύγει βροτῶν;
φησὶ δὲ ἀποκριώμενος “ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ
σκοπεῖν.” ἐρομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀλφεσιβοίας πᾶς,
ὑπολαβών φησι

τὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν, ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν.
καὶ οἶνον ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀπο-
κτεινάντων Νικάνορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἔκριθσαν
ἀποκτεῖναι, δικαίως ἔδοξεν ἀποθανεῖν. καὶ περὶ τοῦ
Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὐ ἔκέλευσε κρῖναι εἰ
δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀδικον ὅν τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι
τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.

^a The argument is that if there was no disgrace in selling the right of farming the taxes, there could be none in purchasing this right.

^b Pupil of Plato and Isocrates, great friend of Aristotle, the author of fifty tragedies and also of an “Art” of Rhetoric. Alcmaeon murdered his mother Eriphyle. Alphesiboea, his wife, says to him, Was not your mother hated? To this he replied, Yes, but there is a distinction; they said she deserved to die, but not at my hands.

predicated of the other ; there is the same relation between having ordered and having carried out, as Diomedon the tax-gatherer said about the taxes, " If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is buying disgraceful for us."^a And if rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated of the one who inflicts suffering ; if of the latter, then also of the former. However, in this there is room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered justly, he has suffered justly, but perhaps not at your hands. Wherefore one must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves to suffer, and whether he who inflicts suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either way ; for sometimes there is a difference in such a case, and nothing prevents [its being argued], as in the *Alcmaeon* of Theodectes^b :

And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother ?

Alcmaeon replied : " We must make a division before we examine the matter." And when Alphesiboea asked " How ? ", he rejoined,

Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not for me to kill her.

Another example may be found in the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor.^c For since it was decided that they had justly slain him, it was thought that he had been justly put to death. Again, in the case of the man who was murdered at Thebes, when the defendants demanded that the judges should decide whether the murdered man deserved to die, since a man who deserved it could be put to death without injustice.

^a Nothing is known of this trial.

ARISTOTLE

- 4 "Αλλος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττου, οἷον "εἰ μηδ"
 οἱ θεοὶ πάντα ἵσασι, σχολῆς οἴ γε ἄνθρωποι."
 τοῦτο γάρ ἔστιν, εἰ ὁ μᾶλλον ἀν υπάρχοι μὴ
 υπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁ ἡττου. τὸ δὲ ὅτι τοὺς
 πλησίους τύπτει ὃς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα, ἐκ τοῦ, εἰ
 τὸ ἡττου υπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον υπάρχει, καθ'
 ὅπότερον ἀν δέη δεῖξαι, εἴθ' ὅτι υπάρχει εἴθ' ὅτι
 5 οὗ. ἔτι εἰ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἡττου· ὅθεν εἴρηται
 καὶ σὸς μὲν οἰκτρὸς παῖδας ἀπολέσας πατήρ.
 Οὐνεὺς δὲ ἄρ' οὐχὶ κλεινὸν ἀπολέσας γόνον;
 καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἡδίκησεν, οὐδὲ 'Αλέξ-
 ανδρος, καὶ εἰ μηδ' οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδὲ 'Αλέξανδρος,
 καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον "Εκτωρ, καὶ 'Αχιλλέα 'Αλέξ-
 ανδρος. καὶ εἰ μηδ' οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται φαῦλοι, οὐδὲ
 οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ εἰ μηδ' οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι,
 ὅτι ἡττῶνται πολλάκις, οὐδὲ οἱ σοφισταί. καὶ
 ὅτι "εἰ δεῖ τὸν ἴδιώτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπι-
 μελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς τῶν 'Ελλήνων."
- 6 "Αλλος ἐκ τὸν τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, οἶον ὡς
 'Ιφικράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς 'Αρμόδιον, ὅτι "εἰ πρὶν
 ποιῆσαι ἡξίουν τῆς εἰκόνος τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω,

^a The argument is that since men beat their fathers less commonly than they do their neighbours, if they beat their fathers they will also beat their neighbours, and the Paris ms. in a longer form of the argument has an explanatory addition to this effect, inserting after υπάρχει the words τοὺς γὰρ πατέρας ἡττου τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίουν.

In a similar passage in the *Topics* (ii. 10) εἰκός (or δοκοῦν) is inserted after μᾶλλον and ἡττου. Welldon suggests that here also the reading should be τὸ ἡττου εἰκός and τὸ μᾶλλον εἰκός (Grote, *Aristotle*, p. 294).

^b From the *Meleager* of Antiphon (*T.G.F.* p. 885).

Another topic is derived from the more and less. For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men ; for this amounts to saying that if a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of which it is less probably affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his father also beats his neighbours, is an instance of the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists.^a Either of these arguments may be used, according as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not. Further, if there is no question of greater or less ; whence it was said,

Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children ; is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious offspring ?^b

Other instances are : if Theseus did no wrong,^c neither did Alexander (Paris) ; if the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander ; and if Hector did no wrong in slaying Patroclus, neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles ; if no other professional men are contemptible, then neither are philosophers ; if generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated,^d neither are the sophists ; or, if it behoves a private citizen to take care of your reputation, it is your duty to take care of that of Greece.

Another topic is derived from the consideration of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says : “ If, before accomplishing anything, I had demanded the statue from you in the

^c In carrying off Helen.

^d The Paris ms. has *θανατοῦνται*, “ are put to death.”

ἔδοτε ἄν· ποιήσαντι δ' ἀρ' οὐ δώσετε; μὴ τοίνυν
μέλλοντες μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δ' ἀφαιρεῖσθε.”

1398^a καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διεῖναι Φίλιππον εἰς
τὴν Ἀττικήν, ὅτι “εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς
ἡξίου, ὑπέσχοντο ἄν· ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο
καὶ ἐπίστευσε μὴ διήσουσιν.”

7 “Αλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν
εἰπόντα· διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος, οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ·
ὡς ἔχρήσατο Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Αριστοφῶντα, ἐπ-
ερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἄν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν· οὐ
φάσκοντος δὲ “εἴτα” εἶπεν “σὺ μὲν ὡν Ἰφικράτης;
δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἄν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι
ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μή, γελοῖον ἄν φανείη, εἰ πρὸς
Αριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα τοῦτό τις εἴπειεν, ἀλλὰ
πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ
κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· τοῦτ' οὖν
ἔξελέγχειν ἀεί. καθόλου δὲ ἄτοπός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις
ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἢ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειεν ἄν, ἢ προ-
τρέπῃ ποιεῖν ἢ αὐτὸς μὴ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειεν ἄν.

^a Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to put up a statue to the famous Athenian general Iphicrates in honour of his defeat of the Spartans (392 b.c.). This was later opposed by Harmodius, probably a descendant of the tyrannicide. The speech, which is considered spurious, was called *ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος*.

^b Or, “the ways of doing this are various” (Jebb).

^c The illustration is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as well known. The *Teucer* was a tragedy of Sophocles.

^d It would be absurd to use such an argument against the accusation of a “just man” like Aristides, and to pretend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It

event of my success, you would have granted it ; will you then refuse it, now that I have succeeded ? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something, and break it when you have received it.”^a Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territory into Attica, they were told that “ if he had made this request before helping them against the Phocians, they would have promised ; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and had trusted them.”

Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves ; and this is an excellent method.^b For instance, in the *Teucer*^c . . . and Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would have betrayed the fleet for a bribe ; when Aristophon said no, “ Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “ if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so ? ” But the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime ; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as Aristides^d ; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant ; accordingly, it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself.

must only be used when the opponent’s character is suspect, and lends itself to such a retort.

- 8 "Αλλος ἐξ ὄρισμοῦ, οἶν τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν
ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἡ θεὸς ἡ θεοῦ ἔργον· καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται
θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς
εἶναι. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης, ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ
βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἀρμοδίω καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι
οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχε γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι
πρᾶξαι. καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός· "τὰ γοῦν
ἔργα συγγενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἀρμοδίουν
καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἡ τὰ σά." καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι πάντες ἀν ὁμολογήσειαν τοὺς μὴ
κοσμίους οὐχ ἔνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυσιν. καὶ
δι' ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαιον·
ὑβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι
ὅμοίως εὖ παθόντα, ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. πάντες
γὰρ οὗτοι ὄρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόντες τὸ τί ἐστι,
συλλογίζονται περὶ ὃν λέγουσιν.
- 9 "Αλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς, οἶν τὸν ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς
περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς.
- 10 "Αλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως, οἶν τοῖς πάντες τριῶν
ἐνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν· ἡ τοῦδε γὰρ ἔνεκα ἡ τοῦδε ἡ
τοῦδε· καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ
τρίτον οὐδ' αὐτοί φασιν.

^a The reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that a *daimonion* (a certain divine principle that acted as his internal monitor) checked his action in many cases. When accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove, by his definition of the *daimonion*, that he was no atheist. Similarly, Iphicrates, by his definition of *γενναῖος* and *συγγενής* could refute the allegation that he was ignoble and show that his deeds were more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton than to those of his opponents. Paris could say that he was not intemperate, because he was satisfied with Helen alone. Lastly, Socrates refused an invitation

Another topic is derived from definition. For instance, that the *daimonion*^a is nothing else than a god or the work of a god ; but he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristogiton, before they did something noble ; and, “ I myself am more akin to them than you ; at any rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours.” And as it is said in the *Alexander*^b that it would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman’s person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favour as well as an injury.^c In all these cases, it is by definition and the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question.

Another topic is derived from the different significations of a word, as explained in the *Topics*, where the correct use of these terms has been discussed.^d

Another, from division. For example, “ There are always three motives for wrongdoing ; two are excluded from consideration as impossible ; as for the third, not even the accusers assert it.”

to visit Archelaus, king of Macedonia, because he would be unable to return the benefits received, which would imply his being put to shame, and make the invitation a kind of insult.

^b Of Polycrates.

^c “ Just as it is to requite them with evil ” (Jebb).

^d Supplying [λελέκται] περὶ τοῦ δρθῶς [χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς]. Others render : “ in reference to the use of the word δρθῶς ” (but δρθῶς does not occur in the passage in the *Topics*, i. 15). A suggested reading is περὶ τούτου δρθῶς εἴρηται.

11 "Αλλος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οῖον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας,
 1398^β ὅτι περὶ τῶν τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ δι-
 ορίζουσι τάληθές· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ
 τῷ ρήτορι ἀμφισβητούντι πρὸς τὸν νιὸν ἡ μήτηρ
 ἀπέφηνεν, τοῦτο δὲ Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Στίλ-
 βωνος ἀμφισβητούντων ἡ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν
 Ἰσμηνίου τὸν νιόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θετταλίσκον
 Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ
 Θεοδέκτου, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμεληθεῖσι τῶν
 ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόσαι τοὺς οἰκείους,
 οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς· οὐκοῦν
 εἰ ὄμοιώς ἔφ' ἀπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι
 τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν
 σωτηρίαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς
 σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν· Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ
 βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι Ὁμηρον
 οὐκ ὄντα πολιτικόν, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφώ καίπερ
 γυναῖκα οὖσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα τῶν
 γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα φιλολόγοι ὄντες, καὶ
 Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξ-
 αγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσιν ἔτι καὶ
 νῦν . . . ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησά-
 μενοι εὑδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυ-
 κούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν ἄμα οἱ προστάται φιλόσοφοι
 ἐγένοντο καὶ εὑδαιμόνησεν ἡ πόλις.

^a Mantias had one legitimate son Mantithens and two illegitimate by a certain Plangon. Mantias at first refused to acknowledge the latter as his sons, until the mother declared they were.

^b The name of the mother; or simply, "the woman of Dodona," like "the woman of Peparethus."

^c Others read *πολιτην*, "although he was not their fellow-citizen" (but Chios was one of the claimants to his birthplace).

Another, from induction. For instance, from the case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that, in matters of parentage women always discern the truth ; similarly, at Athens, when Mantias the orator was litigating with his son, the mother declared the truth ;^a and again, at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis^b declared that Ismenias was its father, Thettaliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is another instance in the " law " of Theodectes : " If we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others ; then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed to preserve the safety of others." Similarly, in order to prove that men of talent are everywhere honoured, Alcidamas said : " The Parians honoured Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking ; the Chians Homer, although he had rendered no public services ;^c the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a woman ; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Chilon one of their senators ; the Italiotes honoured Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still hold him in honour. . . .^d The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus ; and at Thebes, as soon as those who had the conduct of affairs became philosophers,^e the city flourished."

^a Something has fallen out, what follows being intended to prove that the best rulers for a state are the philosophers.

^b Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect, "as soon as philosophers had the conduct of affairs."

12 "Αλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἦ δόμοίου ἦ
 ἐναντίου, μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μή,
 ἀλλ' οἵ γε πλεῖστοι, ἥ σοφοί, ἥ πάντες ἥ οἱ πλεῖστοι,
 ἥ ἀγαθοί. ἥ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἥ οὓς ἀπο-
 δέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἥ οἷς μὴ οἷόν τε ἐναντίον
 κρίνειν, οἶν τοῖς κυρίοις, ἥ οἷς μὴ καλὸν τὰ ἐναν-
 τία κρίνειν, οἶν θεοῖς ἥ πατρὶ ἥ διδασκάλοις,
 ὥσπερ τὸ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, εἰ
 ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς ἵκανως εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ
 πάγῳ δοῦναι δίκην, Μιξιδημίδῃ δ' οὐ. ἥ ὥσπερ
 Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ
 οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἥ ὡς
 Ἀρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι
 εἶπόντα, ὡς ὤετο· "ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γ' ἔταιρος ἡμῶν,
 ἔφη, "οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον," λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην.
 καὶ Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἡρώτα τὸν θεόν,
 πρότερον κεχρημένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταῦτὰ
 1399^a δοκεῖ ἄπερ τῷ πατρί, ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὃν τάνατία
 εἶπεν. καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἐλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης
 ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἶπερ Θησεὺς ἔκρινεν· καὶ
 περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὃν αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν, καὶ περὶ
 Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν.

^a Athenian ambassador to Sparta (371 b.c.), whose aggressive policy he attacked. His argument is that, if the Eumenides could agree without any loss of dignity to stand their trial before the Areopagus, as described in Aeschylus, surely Mixidemides could do the same. Nothing is known of Mixidemides, but it is clear that he refused to submit his case to it, when charged with some offence.

^b The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read here) in Xenophon, *Hellenica*, iv. 7. 2. The Argives, when a Lacedaemonian army threatened to invade their territory, were in the habit of alleging that it was festival time, when there should be a holy truce. This obviously left the door

Another topic is that from a previous judgement in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, if possible when the judgement was unanimous or the same at all times ; if not, when it was at least that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or most, or of the good ; or of the judges themselves or of those whose judgement they accept, or of those whose judgement it is not possible to contradict, for instance, those in authority, or of those whose judgement it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the gods, a father, or instructors ; as Autocles ^a said in his attack on Mixidemides, “ If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides ? ” Or Sappho, “ Death is an evil ; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would die.” Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously, said, “ Our friend at any rate never spoke like that,” referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,^b after having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, asked the god at Delphi whether his opinion was the same as his father’s, meaning that it would be disgraceful to contradict him. Helen was a virtuous woman, wrote Isocrates, because Theseus so judged ; the same applies to Alexander (Paris), whom the goddesses chose before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates open to fraud, so Agesipolis (one of the Spartan kings) consulted the oracle of Zeus at Olympia to ask whether he was to respect such a truce. The reply of the oracle was that he might decline a truce fraudulently demanded. To confirm this, Agesipolis put the same question to Apollo : “ Is your opinion as to the truce the same as that of your father (Zeus)? ” “ Certainly,” answered Apollo. Agesipolis thereupon invaded Argos. The point is that really Apollo had little choice, since it would have been disgraceful for the son to contradict the father.

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Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἥλθεν.

- 13 "Άλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, ποία κίνησις ἡ ψυχῆ· ἥδε γὰρ ἢ ἥδε. παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· "εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἡσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὅν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;"
- 14 "Άλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥσθ' ἔπεσθαι τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν. οἶνον τῇ παιδεύσει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν· οὐ τούνν δεῖ παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ· δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ. ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη προσλαβοῦσα καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὰλλα, ὡς εἴρηται.
- 15 "Άλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῦν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν ἡ προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέῃ, καὶ τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπὶ ἀμφοῦ χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τάναντία. οἶνον ἵέρεια οὐκ εἴα τὸν υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τὰ δίκαια λέγης, οἱ ἄνθρωποί σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί. δεῖ μὲν οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια

^a After his defeat at Aegospotami (405 B.C.) the Athenian general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with Evagoras, king of Cyprus—a proof, according to Aristotle, of the goodness of the latter.

^b If the genus can be affirmed of any subject, then one or other of the species, which make up the genus, must also be predicateable of it. If the proposition to be maintained is,

says, for at any rate Conon^a in his misfortune, passing over everyone else, sought his assistance.

Another topic is that from enumerating the parts, as in the *Topics*: What kind of movement is the soul? for it must be this or that.^b There is an instance of this in the *Socrates* of Theodectes: "What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods recognized by the city has he neglected to honour?"

Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather, we *should* be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the "Art" of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have been mentioned.

Another topic may be employed when it is necessary to exhort or dissuade in regard to two opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; "For if," said she, "you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will." On the other hand, "you *should* the soul is moved, it is necessary to examine whether any of the different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay, change of place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of the soul. If not, the generic predicate is not applicable, and the proposition is refuted.

λέγης, οἱ θεοί σε φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἄνθρωποι. τουτὶ δ' ἐστὶ ταῦτὸ τῷ λεγομένῳ τὸ ἔλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλας· καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίοιν ἑκατέρῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἔπηγται, ἐναντία ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις.

16 "Ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταῦτὰ φανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαινοῦσι μάλιστα, ἵδια δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βούλονται, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι συνάγειν θάτερον· τῶν γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώτατός ἐστιν.

17 "Ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν· οἷον ὁ Ἰφικράτης τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ νεώτερον ὅντα τῆς ἥλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν, λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους τῶν παιδῶν ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν παιδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται. καὶ Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ Χαρίδημον διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δ' οὐ ποιήσετε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους;

18 "Ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ἢ ταῦτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν συμβαίνει ταῦτά· οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὅμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς

^a The bad with the good. The exact meaning of *βλαίσωσις* (see Glossary) has not been satisfactorily explained. In the definition given of the retortion of a dilemma, the two opposite things would be speaking truth or untruth; the two opposite consequences, pleasing men and pleasing God.

^b e.g. a man may say that an honourable death should be preferred to a pleasant life, and honest poverty to ill-acquired wealth, whereas really he *wishes* the opposite. "If then his words are in accordance with his real wishes, he must be confronted with his public statements; if they are in accord-

speak in public ; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men will." This is the same as the proverb, " To buy the swamp with the salt "^a ; and retorting a dilemma on its proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves.

Again, since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavouring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements.^b This topic is the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.

Another topic is derived from analogy in things. For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his son to perform public services because he was tall, although under the legal age, said : " If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are boys." Similarly, Theodectes in his " law,"^c says : " Since you bestow the rights of citizenship upon mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on account of their merits, will you not banish those of them who have wrought such irreparable misfortunes ? "

Another topic consists in concluding the identity of antecedents from the identity of results.^d Thus Xenophanes said : " There is as much impiety in accordance with the latter, he must be confronted with his secret wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions" (*Sophistici Elenchi*, ii. 12, Poste's translation).

^a This " law " (already mentioned in 11) is said to have been an oration on the legal position of mercenaries.

^b Cause and effect.

θεοὺς τοὺς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἑκατέρου λαμβάνειν ὡς ταῦτὸ ἀεὶ· “μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν.” καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον. ληπτέον δ' ὁπότερον ἂν ἢ χρήσιμον.

19 "Ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταῦτὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ αἱρεῖσθαι ὕστερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, οἷον τόδε τὸ ἐνθύμημα, “εἰ φεύγοντες μὲν ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα.” ὅτε μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἥροῦντο, ὅτε δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν.

20 "Ἄλλος τὸ οὖν ἔνεκ' ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο, τούτου ἔνεκα φάναι εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι, οἷον εἰ δοίη ἄν τις τινὶ ἵν' ἀφελόμενος λυπήσῃ. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται,

πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατ' εὔνοιαν φέρων
μεγάλα δίδωσιν εὐτυχήματ', ἀλλ' ἵνα
τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,

^a Isocrates, *Antidosis*, 173.

^b The peace concluded between the Greeks (although the Laedeaemonians held aloof) and Alexander the Great after the death of Philip of Macedon (336 B.C.).

^c Lysias, xxxiv. 11.

^d i.e. after their return, they preferred to leave the city rather than fight. This is Cope's explanation, but the meaning of the clause ὅτε μὲν . . . ἥροῦντο is then somewhat obscure. A more suitable interpretation would be: "At one time they preferred to return from exile at the price of fighting: at another, not to fight, at the price of

asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die ; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist.” And, generally speaking, one may always regard as identical the results produced by one or other of any two things : “ You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy.”^a And, “ to give earth and water is slavery,” and “ to be included in the common peace ^b implies obeying orders.” Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.

Another topic is derived from the fact that the same men do not always choose the same thing before and after, but the contrary. The following enthymeme is an example : “ If, when in exile, we fought to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting ” !^c This amounts to saying that at one time they preferred to hold their ground at the price of fighting ; at another, not to fight at the price of not remaining.^d

Another topic consists in maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might, be the cause of it ; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it. Whence it has been said :

It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great blessings upon many, but in order that they may suffer more striking calamities.^e

And these verses from the *Meleager* of Antiphon : being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire),” but one does not see how this can be got out of the Greek.

^a The author is unknown.

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οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι θῆρ', ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρω πρὸς Ἑλλάδα.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Λίαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο Ὁδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἥττων ἦ δὲ ἀκολουθῶν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἔνεκα ποιῆσαι.

- 21 "Ἄλλος κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι, σκοπεῦν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ ὡν ἔνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα γάρ ἔστιν ἀ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν [ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν], οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν καὶ ράδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ φίλοις, ἢ βλαβερὸν ἔχθροῖς καὶ ἐπιζήμιον, ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ προτρέπονται δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπονται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν 1400 a αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἢ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἡ Καλλίππου.
- 22 "Ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἢ ἐγγὺς ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον· ἢ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστον καὶ μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθὲς ἄν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν δοκεῖ οὕτως. οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν δὲ Πιτθεὺς κα-

^a Frag. 2 (T.G.F. p. 792).

^b *Iliad*, x. 218; cf. T.G.F. p. 801.

^c By pointing out what is likely to deter a man from committing a crime, and *vice versa*.

^d The argument is: we accept either that which really is, or that which is probable; if then a statement is made which

Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be witnesses to Greece of the valour of Meleager.^a

And the following remark from the *Ajax* of Theodectes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all others,^b not to do him honour, but that his companion might be his inferior ; for this may have been the reason.

Another topic common to forensic and deliberative rhetorics consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they exist, determine us to act, if not, not ; for instance, if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we accuse and defend ; for what dissuades serves for defence,^c what persuades, for accusation. This topic comprises the whole "Art" of Pamphilus and Callippus.

Another topic is derived from things which are thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought so, if they had not happened or almost happened. And further, these things are even more likely to be true ; for we only believe in that which is, or that which is probable : if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will be true ; for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true.^d Thus, Androcles^e of is incredible and improbable, we assume that it would not have been made, unless it was true.

^a Athenian demagogue and opponent of Alcibiades, for whose banishment he was chiefly responsible. When the Four Hundred were set up, he was put to death. Pitthus was an Athenian deme or parish.

ηγορῶν τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι
 “δέονται οἱ νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος· καὶ
 γὰρ οἱ ἵχθυες ἀλός, καίτοι οὐκ εἴκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν
 ἐν ἄλμῃ τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι ἀλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα
 ἐλαίου· καίτοι ἀπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἐλαιον γίγνεται, ταῦτα
 δεῖσθαι ἐλαίου.”

- 23 "Αλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα σκο-
 πεῖν, εἴ τι ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ πάντων καὶ χρόνων
 καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφι-
 σβητοῦντος, οἷον “καὶ φῆσὶ μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς,
 συνώμοσε δὲ τοῖς τριάκοντα,” χωρὶς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ,
 “καὶ φῆσὶ μὲν εἶναι με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ
 ἀποδεῖξαι δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην,” χωρὶς
 δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, “καὶ οὗτος
 μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε πώποτ’ οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς
 λέλυμαι ὑμῶν.”
- 24 "Αλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις
 καὶ πράγμασιν, ἢ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν
 τοῦ παραδόξου· ἔστι γάρ τι δι’ ὃ φαίνεται. οἷον
 ὑποβεβλημένης τινὸς τὸν αὐτῆς υἱὸν διὰ τὸ ἀσπά-
 ζεσθαι ἐδόκει συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, λεχθέντος
 δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή· καὶ οἶον ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι
 τῷ Θεοδέκτου Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα,
 διότι ἀνδρειότερος ὦν τοῦ Αἴαντος οὐ δοκεῖ.
- 25 "Αλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἢν τε ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι ἔστι,
 καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀμα γὰρ τὸ αἰτίου
 καὶ οὖ αἰτιον, καὶ ἄνευ αἰτίου οὐθέν ἔστιν. οἶον
 Λεωδάμας ἀπολογούμενος ἐλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος
 Θρασυβούλου ὅτι ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ

^a Understanding διαβεβλῆσθαι. Others read μὴ (for ἢ) δοκοῦσι, “when there seems no reason to suspect them.”

Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at when he said "the laws need a law to correct them," went on, "and fishes need salt, although it is neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine; similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces oil should itself need oil."

Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words, first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, "he says that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty;" next, separately in your own case, "he says that I am litigious, but he cannot prove that I have ever brought an action against anyone"; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and yourself together: "he has never yet lent anything, but I have ransomed many of you."

Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance,^a consists in stating the reason for the false opinion; for there must be a reason for the supposition of guilt. For example, a woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with him, but when the reason was explained, the slander was quashed. Again, in the *Ajax* of Theodectes, Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although really more courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so.

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist; for the effect exists with the cause, and without cause there is nothing. For example, Leodamas, when defending himself against the accusation of Thrasybulus that his name

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ἀκροπόλει, ἀλλ' ἐκκόψαι ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, οὐκ
ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔφη· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὐτῷ
τοὺς τριάκοντα ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς
τὸν δῆμον.

- 26 "Αλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιουν ἄλλως ἢ ἐνδέχεται
ἄν ἢ συμβουλεύει ἢ πράττει ἢ πέπραχε σκοπεῦν.
1400 b φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραχεν
οὔδεις γὰρ ἕκῶν τὰ φαῦλα καὶ γιγνώσκων προ-
αιρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· πολλάκις γὰρ
ūστερον γίγνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πρᾶξαι βέλτιουν,
πρότερον δὲ ἄδηλον.
- 27 "Αλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς
πεπραγμένοις, ἀμα σκοπεῦν· οἷον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεά-
ταις ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύωσι τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσιν,
ἢ μή, συνεβούλευεν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι,
μὴ θρηνεῦν, εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν.
- 28 "Αλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἀμαρτηθέντων κατ-
ηγορεῦν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, οἶον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου
Μῆδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν ὅτι τοὺς παιδας ἀπ-
έκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς· ἥμαρτε γὰρ
ἡ Μῆδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παιδῶν· ἡ δ'

^a The names of traitors were inscribed on a brazen pillar in the Acropolis. Leodamas supported the oligarchical, Thrasybulus the democratical party. In answer to the charge that he had had his name removed from the pillar when his party came into power, Leodamas replied that, if he had been originally posted as an enemy of the people and a hater of democracy, he would have preferred to keep the record, as likely to increase the confidence of the Thirty in him, than to have it erased, even though it branded him as a traitor.

^b If a person has not taken the better course, when he had the chance of doing so, he cannot be guilty.

^c Leucothea was the name of the deified Ino. She was the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas king of

had been posted in the Acropolis ^a but that he had erased it in the time of the Thirty, declared that it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had more confidence in him if his hatred against the people had been graven on the stone.

Another topic consists in examining whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been, carried out. For it is evident that, if this has not been done,^b a person has not committed a certain action ; because no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad. However, this argument may be false ; for often it is not until later that it becomes clear what was the better course, which previously was uncertain.

Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together. For instance, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea,^c or not, he advised them that, if they believed her to be a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, but if they believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice to her.

Another topic consists in making use of errors committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the *Medea* of Carcinus,^d some accuse Medea of having killed her children,—at any rate, they had disappeared ; for she had made the mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself

Thebes. The latter went mad and, in order to escape from him, Ino threw herself into the sea with her infant son Melicertes. Both became marine deities.

^a Tragic poet, contemporary of Aristophanes (*T.G.F.* p. 798).

ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι οὐκ ἂν τοὺς παιδας ἀλλὰ τὸν
 Ἰάσονα ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμαρτεν ἂν μὴ
 ποιήσασα, εἴπερ καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δ'
 ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη
 ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη.

29 "Ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἷον ὡς ὁ Σοφοκλῆς

σαφῶς Σιδηρὼ καὶ φοροῦσα τοῦνομα,

καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν,
 καὶ ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει,
 καὶ Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον "ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος
 εἰ," καὶ Πῶλον "ἀεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἰ," καὶ Δράκοντα
 τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ
 δράκοντος χαλεποὶ γάρ. καὶ ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου
 Ἔκάβη εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην

καὶ τοῦνομ' ὄρθως ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεᾶς.

καὶ ὡς Χαιρήμων

Πενθεὺς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος.

30 Εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ
 ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν
 μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐν-
 θύμημα, παρ' ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ

^a An early edition, afterwards enlarged. It must have contained something more than the topic of "errors" to be of any use.

^b Sophocles, *Tyro*, Frag. 597 (T.G.F.). The reference is to Sidero (*σιδηρός*, iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro.

^c Thompson's rendering (Introd. to his ed. of Plato's *Gorgias*, p. 5). "Colt" refers to Polus's skittishness and frisking from one subject to another.

^d *Troades*, 990.

pleads that she would have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first "Art" of Theodorus.^a

Another topic is derived from the meaning of a name. For instance, Sophocles says,

Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.^b

This topic is also commonly employed in praising the gods. Conon used to call Thrasybulus "the man bold in counsel," and Herodicus said of Thrasy-machus, "Thou art ever bold in fight," and of Polus, "Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt by nature,"^c and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon, so severe were they. Hecuba in Euripides^d speaks thus of Aphro-dite :

And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the word aphro-syne (folly);

and Chaeremon^e of Pentheus,

Pentheus named after his unhappy future.

Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion of opposites^f in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the

^a Frag. 4 (T.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from *πένθος* (sorrow).

^b "Admitting the apparent correctness of the opposing argument, we may prove the contradictory of its conclusion by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then called an *elenchus*" (Thomson, *Laws of Thought*, § 127).

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μᾶλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα ἀρχόμενα προορώσι μὴ τῷ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι (ἄμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς χαίρουσι προαισθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσων τοσοῦτον ὑστερίζουσιν ὥσθ' ἄμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

24. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐνθύμημα, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπείπερ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις.

2 1401a Τόποι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἰς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, καὶ τούτου ἐν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό. καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος. καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δ' ἐτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δ' "Ελληνας ἡλευθέρωσεν. ἔκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἔξι ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι.

"Ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὡς τὸ φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφ' οὗ γ' ἔστιν ἡ τιμιωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη

^a Isocrates, *Evagoras*, 65-69.

^b Or equivocation, in which a single term has a double meaning.

audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.

24. But as it is possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only apparent, there must also be real and apparent enthymemes, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism.

Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no syllogistic process, “ therefore it is neither this nor that,” “ so it must be this or that ”; and similarly in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be an enthymeme ; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state the heads of several syllogisms : “ He saved some, avenged others, and freed the Greeks ” ;^a for each of these propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a fresh conclusion.

The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy.^b For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important animal, since from it is derived the most honoured of all religious festivals, namely, the

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τελετή. ἢ εἴ τις κύνα ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνει ἢ τὸν Πᾶνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν

ὦ μάκαρ, ὃν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν
καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι.

ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνα ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ κύνα δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον. καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἐρμῆν εἶναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς. καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται.

3 "Άλλος τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταῦτὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ὃν ταῦτὸν πολλάκις, ὅπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἐστίν· ἔκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα

^a Deriving *μυστήρια* (*μύειν*, to close the lips) from *μῦς* (mouse).

^b A fragment from the *Parthenia* (songs sung by maidens to the accompaniment of the flute). Pan is called "the dog of Cybele," the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as being always in attendance on her, being himself a nature-god. The fact that Pindar calls Pan "dog" is taken as a glorification of that animal.

^c κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς is a proverbial expression meaning "halves!" When anyone had a stroke of luck, such as finding a purse full of money in the street, anyone with him expected to go halves. Hermes was the god of luck, and such a find was called *έρμαλον*. *κοινωνικός* is taken to mean (1) liberal to others, or (2) sociable.

^d λόγος: (1) speech; (2) account, esteem.

mysteries^a; or if, in praising the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or Pan, because Pindar said,^b

O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great Mother, taking every form,

or were to say that the dog is an honourable animal, since to be without a dog is most dishonourable. And to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the gods, because he alone is called common;^c and that words are most excellent, since good men are considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for *λόγον ἄξιος* has a double meaning.^d

Another fallacy consists in combining what is divided or dividing what is combined. For since a thing which is not the same as another often appears to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus, to prove, for example, that a man knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the existence of two things, the Piraeus and the trireme;^e or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows

^a Very obscure and no explanation is satisfactory. The parallel passage in *Sophistici elenchi* (20. 6) is: "Do you being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the Piraeus?" The ambiguity lies in the position of "now," whether it is to be taken with "in Sicily" or with "in the Piraeus." At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot know that there are at this time triremes in the Piraeus; but being in Sicily he can certainly know of the ships in the Piraeus, which should be there, but are now in Sicily (Kirchmann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses are: Do you now, being in Sicily, see the triremes which are in the Piraeus? and, Did you when in Sicily, see the triremes which are now in the Piraeus? The fallacy consists in the two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes in Sicily), true separately, being untrue combined.

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ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ
αὐτό ἐστιν. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες,
μηδὲ τὸ ἐν φάναι ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ
τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἐν κακόν ἐστιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγ-
κτικόν, ὥδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν ἀγαθὸν
δύο κακά. ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν
τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ἃτι τριάκοντα
τυράννους κατέλυσεν· συντίθησι γάρ. ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ
Ὀρέστη τῷ Θεοδέκτου· ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν.

δίκαιον ἐστιν, ἢ τις ἀν κτείνῃ πόσιν,

ἀποθνήσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν
τὸν υἱόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα πέπρακται· συντεθέντα
1401 b γὰρ ἵσως οὐκέτι δίκαιον. εἴη δ' ἀν καὶ παρὰ τὴν
Ἐλλειψιν· ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος.

4 "Αλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ
ἀνασκευάζειν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι
ἐποίησεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι
ἢ ὡς οὔτε πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξῃ,
ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν ὀργίζηται. οὐκ-
οντιν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς
ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ δεδειγμένου.

5 "Αλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ καὶ
τοῦτο. οἶνον εἴ τις λέγοι "ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν
οἱ ἔρωντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογέίτονος

^a Thrasybulus deposed the thirty individuals and put down the single tyranny which they composed; he then claimed a thirtyfold reward, as having put down thirty tyrannies.

^b Frag. 5 (T.G.F.).

the word made of them, for word and letters are the same thing. Further, since twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount wholesome ; for it would be absurd that two halves separately should be good, but bad combined. In this way the argument may be used for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if one were to say, one good thing cannot make two bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, that he deposed thirty tyrants,^a for here he combines them ; or the example of the fallacy of division in the *Orestes* of Theodectes^b : " It is just that a woman who has killed her husband " should be put to death, and that the son should avenge the father ; and this in fact is what has been done. But if they are combined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as an example of the fallacy of omission ; for the name of the one who should put the woman to death is not mentioned.

Another topic is that of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, without having proved that any crime has actually been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact ; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage. Therefore there is no enthymeme ; for the hearer falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not, although neither has been proved.

Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this argument also is illogical. For instance, if one were to say that those who love one another are useful to States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton

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ἔρως κατέλυσε τὸν τύραννον "Ιππαρχον." ἦ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύσιος· πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γάρ καὶ τοῦτο· οὐ γάρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλ' ὁ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός.

6 "Αλλος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὁ λέγει Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῆς, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς. ἦ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώτατον· διὰ γάρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δὲ ὡς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ κληθῆναι.

7 "Αλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχος· ὑπεριδῶν γάρ τὴν πολλῶν ὄμιλίαν ἐν τῇ "Ιδῃ διέτριβε καθ' αὐτόν· ὅτι γάρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν. καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοιοῦτοι γάρ. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ἄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξεστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἄν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γάρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ὑπάρχει, δόξαιεν ἄν εὐδαιμονεῖν.

^a Herodotus, ii. 141. The story was that, when Sennacherib invaded Egypt, a host of field-mice devoured all the quivers, bowstrings and leather shield-holders of the Assyrians. Apollo was called Smintheus (*σμίνθος*, mouse) and was represented on coins with a mouse in his hand, either as the mouse-slayer and protector of crops, or because the animal was sacred to him. The story, alluded to elsewhere, was of Greek, not of Egyptian origin. Similar

overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus ; or that Dionysius is a thief, because he is a rascal ; for here again the argument is inconclusive ; not every rascal is a thief although every thief is a rascal.

Another fallacy is derived from accident ; for instance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that they rendered great service by gnawing the bowstrings.^a Or if one were to say that nothing is more honourable than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was not invited Achilles was wroth with the Achaeans at Tenedos ; whereas he was really wroth because he had been treated with disrespect, but this was an accident due to his not having been invited.^b

Another fallacy is that of the Consequence.^c For instance, in the *Alexander* (Paris) it is said that Paris was high-minded, because he despised the companionship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself ; for because the high-minded are of this character. Paris also might be thought high-minded. Or, since a man pays attention to dress and roams about at night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the temples, exiles can live where they please ; and since these things belong to those who are apparently happy, those to whom they belong may also be thought happy. But there is a difference in condi-

panegyrics on ridiculous things or animals included pots, counters, salt, flies, bees, and such subjects as death, sleep, and food.

^a Sophocles, *The Gathering of the Greeks* (T.G.F. p. 161), a satyric drama. His not being invited was a mere accident of the disrespect.

^b Assuming a proposition to be convertible, when it is not ; it does not follow, assuming that all the high-minded dwell by themselves, that all who dwell by themselves are high-minded.

διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει.

8 "Αλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἄμα ἥ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσι, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἴτιαν· μετ' ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος.

9 "Αλλος παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἐλένην· αἴρεσις γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἵσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι 1402a τούτου κύριος. ἥ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ πάντως, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων.

10 "Ἐπι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός· οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν ὅν· ἐστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὅν μὴ ὅν. καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον· ἐστι γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον. οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ρήτορικοῖς ἐστὶ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῶς εἰκός, ἀλλὰ τί εἰκός. ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει .

^a The poor want to get money; the rich dance and sing to amuse themselves, or to show that they can do as they like. Exiles can certainly live where they like in a foreign land, but would prefer to live in their own country; the rich, who are not exiles, travel to amuse themselves.

^b The first “is” means “has a real, absolute existence”; the second “is” merely expresses the identity of the terms of the proposition, and is particular; but the sophistical reasoner takes it in the same sense as the first. The same applies to the argument about the unknown.

tions ;^a wherefore this topic also falls under the head of omission.

Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened at the same time as, or after, another ; for it is believed that what happens after is produced by the other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades declared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the evils that happened, since it was followed by the war.

Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. For instance, Alexander (Paris) had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only for the first time ; for the father's authority only lasts till then. Or, if one should say that it is wanton outrage to beat a free man ; for this is not always the case, but only when the assailant gives the first blow.

Further, as in sophistical disputationes, an apparent syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not *is*, for that which is not *is* that which is not^b ; also, that the unknown can be known, for it can be known of the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly, in Rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases. But this is not to be understood absolutely, as Agathon says :

τάχ' ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι,
βροτοῦσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.

- γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκός καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκός εἰκός. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκός εἶναι μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ τί εἰκός.
- 11 ἔστι δ' ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ἢ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενῆς ὥν αἰκίας φεύγῃ· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός· κανὸν ἔνοχος ὥν, οἷον ἄν ἴσχυρὸς ὥν· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκός ἔμελλε δόξειν. διοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται. καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστιν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἔστι, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ' ἐν ρήτορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων εἴρηται.
25. Περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἔχόμενόν ἔστι τῶν εἰρημένων εἰπεῖν. ἔστι δὲ λύειν ἡ ἀντισυλλογισάμενον 2 ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλλογί-

^a This utterance of Protagoras gave particular offence as apparently implying that the weaker cause was really identical with the worse, so that to support it was to support injustice. But, considering the high moral character ascribed to Protagoras, it seems more probable to take the formula as a statement of the aim of all ancient orators—how to overcome stronger arguments by arguments weaker in themselves.

One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, that many things happen to men that are not probable ; for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless does happen, so that that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable will be probable. But not absolutely ; but as, in the case of sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular cases. The “Art” of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his defence will be that the crime is not probable ; but if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, if he is strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not probable, for the very reason that it was bound to appear so. It is the same in all other cases ; for a man must either be likely to have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what “making the worse appear the better argument” means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with the promise of Protagoras^a ; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and Sophistic. So much for real or apparent enthymemes.

25. Next to what has been said we must speak of refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism^b or by bringing an objection.

^a In which the contrary of an opponent’s conclusion is proved.

ζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων,
 3 δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν. αἱ δὲ
 ἐνστάσεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς,
 τετραχῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ὄμοίου ἡ ἐκ
 4 τοῦ ἐναντίου ἡ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων. λέγω δὲ ἀφ’
 1402 b ἑαυτοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη τὸ ἐνθύμημα
 ως σπουδαῖος, ἡ ἐνστασις διχῶς· ἡ γὰρ καθόλου
 εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἐνδεια πονηρόν, ἡ κατὰ μέρος
 ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ
 5 πονηροὶ ἔρωτες. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐνστασις
 φέρεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ
 πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ μοχθηρὸς
 6 κακῶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὄμοίου, εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα
 ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν, ὅτι ἀλλ’
 7 οὐδὲ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν. αἱ δὲ κρίσεις
 αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἷον εἰ τις ἐνθύμημα
 εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύοντι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν,
 ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἀμαρτάνουσιν, ἐνστασις ὅτι οὕκουν
 ὁ Πιπτακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἄν μείζους ζημίας
 ἐνομοθέτησεν ἔάν τις μεθύων ἀμαρτάνῃ.
 8 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων,
 τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτ’ ἔστιν εἰκὸς παράδειγμα
 τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἐστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ως ἐπὶ^a
 τὸ πολὺ ἡ ὄντων ἡ δοκοῦντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμή-

^a i.e. the *opponent's* enthymeme.

^b Love is regarded as a desire, and therefore as bad as any other desire. It is here included under the general head of want.

^c Incest : Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, ix. 454.

^d The contrary of "good men do good to all their friends" is "bad men do harm to all their friends," but this is not

It is clear that the same topics may furnish counter-syllogisms ; for syllogisms are derived from probable materials and many probabilities are contrary to one another. An objection is brought, as shown in the *Topics*, in four ways : it may be derived either from itself,^a or from what is similar, or from what is contrary, or from what has been decided. In the first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended to prove that love is good, two objections might be made ; either the general statement that all want^b is bad, or in particular, that Caunian love^c would not have become proverbial, unless some forms of love had been bad. An objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is that the good man does good to all his friends ; it may be objected : But the bad man does not do harm [to all his friends].^d An objection from what is similar is brought, if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing that those who have been benefited do not always love. The fourth kind of objection is derived from the former decisions of well-known men. For instance, if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance for those who are drunk, for their offence is the result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he would not have laid down severer punishment for a man who commits an offence when drunk.

Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, when based upon things which most commonly occur

always true. Jebb gives the objection as : “No, the bad man does not do evil to all his enemies.”

ματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς διὰ τοῦ
 ὁμοίου, ἡ ἔνδος ἡ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου
 εἴτα συλλογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος διὰ παραδείγ-
 ματος, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀναγκαίου καὶ ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου,
 τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου ἡ τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν
 τε ὃν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, τὸ δὲ εἰκός οὐ τὸ
 ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα
 μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔν-
 9 στασιν, ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεὶ·
 οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός, λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 10 οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπο-
 λογούμενον μᾶλλον ἡ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ τοῦτον
 τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν
 δι' εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταῦτὸ λύσαι
 ἡ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός ἡ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀεὶ δ' ἔχει
 ἐνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν εἰκός
 ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ὁ δὲ κριτὴς οἴεται, ἂν
 οὕτω λυθῇ, ἡ οὐκ εἰκός εἶναι ἡ οὐχ αὐτῷ κριτέον,
 παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ
 τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ
 ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν. οὕκουν ἴκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ
 ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός. τοῦτο
 δὲ συμβήσεται, ἐὰν ἢ ἡ ἐνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ
 11 τὸ πολύ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἡ

^a Translating *ἀεὶ* inserted by Vahlen before *ὄντος*.

^b That is, if the argument is shown to be not "necessary."

^c The important point in the conclusion drawn is that the judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the argument is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not about things that are necessary but about things that are probable.

or seem to occur ; from examples, when they are the result of induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and then concludes the particular by an example ; from necessary signs, when based upon that which is necessary and ever ^a exists ; from signs, when their material is the general or the particular, whether true or not. Now, the probable being not what occurs invariably but only for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes of this character can always be refuted by bringing an objection. But the objection is often only apparent, not real ; for he who brings the objection endeavours to show, not that the argument is not probable, but that it is not necessary. Wherefore, by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant always has an advantage over the accuser. For since the latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary, and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this manner,^b either that the argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide,^c being deceived by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments alone, but also upon probabilities ; for this is what is meant by deciding according to the best of one's judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an argument by showing that it is not necessary ; it must also be shown that it is not probable. This will be attained if the objection itself is specially based upon what happens generally. This may take

τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δέ, εἰ
1403 a ἀμφοῦν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλεονάκις οὗτω, τοῦτ' ἔστιν
εἰκὸς μᾶλλον.

12 Λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου
ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, κανὸν ἢ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ
ἔλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστον
ἔστι πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

13 πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ
εἰκότα· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται,
ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις
ἄλλως· ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις
οὕτω, μαχετέον, ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὄμοιον ἢ οὐχ

14 ὄμοιώς ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει. τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια
καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλό-
γιστον οὐκ ἔσται λύσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἡμῖν
ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), λείπεται δ' ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει
τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι
ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἄλυτον ἦδη γίγνεται
τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀποδείξει ἦδη φανερά.

26. Τὸ δ' αὖτειν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυ-
μήματος στοιχείον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχείον
καὶ τόπον· ἔστι γὰρ στοιχείον καὶ τόπος, εἰς ὁ

^a χρόνῳ . . . πράγμασιν. If *χρόνῳ* be taken to mean the date, there are the following alternatives. The date may be questioned, the facts admitted; both date and facts may be questioned; both date and facts may be admitted, but circumstances may have altered (a pound was worth twenty shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take *χρόνῳ* to mean the greater number of times the same fact has occurred, *πράγμασι* the more numerous facts that increase probability. But *χρόνῳ* can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb's note).

^b i. 2. 18; or, "at the beginning," i.e. of this book.

^c *Anal. priora*, ii. 27.

^d On the other side, in the opponent's favour.

place in two ways, from consideration either of the time or of the facts.^a The strongest objections are those in which both are combined; for a thing is more probable, the greater the number of similar cases.

Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated^b; for it is clear from the *Analytics*^c that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion. As for enthymemes derived from examples, they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single fact that contradicts the opponent's example, the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common occurrence, are otherwise^d; but if the majority and greater frequency of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not take place in the same way, or that there is some difference. But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the *Analytics*^c; the only thing that remains is to prove that the thing alleged is non-existent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for, by means of demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.^e

26. Amplification and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is a head under

^a That is, "when the *tekmērion* is converted into a syllogism." For *tekmērion* see i. 2. 16.

πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἔμπιπτει. τὸ δ' αὐξεῖν καὶ μειοῦν ἔστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἡ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν ἡ δίκαιον
 2 ἡ ἄδικον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτιοῦν. ταῦτα δ' ἔστι πάντα περὶ ἂν οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα· ὥστ' εἰ μηδὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνθυμήματος τόπος,
 3 οὐδὲ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν. οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμήματα εἶδός τι ἔστὶν ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λύει μὲν ἡ δείξας ἡ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκών,
 ἀνταποδεικνύουσι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ ἔδειξεν ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δ'
 ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν. ὥστε αὕτη μὲν οὐκ ἄν εἴη ἡ διαφορά· τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται ἀμφότεροι· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα
 4 φέρουσιν· ἡ δ' ἔνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς τὸ εἰπεῖν δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ἦς ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἡ ὅτι ψεῦδός
 5 τι εἴληφεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τρία ἔστὶν ἀ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε εὑπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς
 1403 b αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως.

^a “Intellectual capacity, as evinced in language (or actions), and seen when the actors argue or make an appeal to the feelings of others, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other *dramatis personae* in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do” (Bywater on the *Poetics*, 2, 1450 a 6, where the text is speaking of the *διάνοια* of the actors in a play).

which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes which serve to show that a thing is great or small, just as others serve to show that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else. All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthymemes ; so that if none of these is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation. Nor are enthymemes by which arguments are refuted of a different kind from those by which they are established ; for it is clear that demonstration or bringing an objection is the means of refutation. By the first the contrary of the adversary's conclusion is demonstrated ; for instance, if he has shown that a thing has happened, his opponent shows that it has not ; if he has shown that a thing has not happened, he shows that it has. This, therefore, will not be the difference between them ; for both employ the same arguments ; they bring forward enthymemes to show that the thing is or that it is not. And the objection is not an enthymeme, but, as I said in the *Topics*, it is stating an opinion which is intended to make it clear that the adversary's syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed some false premise. Now, since there are three things in regard to speech, to which special attention should be devoted, let what has been said suffice for examples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns the intelligence^a generally ; for the sources of a supply of arguments and the means of refuting them. It only remains to speak of style and arrangement.

Γ

1. Ἐπειδὴ τρία ἔστιν ἀ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἐν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν εἰσί, καὶ ταῦτα ποῖα, καὶ διὰ τί τοσαῦτα μόνα· ἢ γὰρ τῷ αὐτοί τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιούσι τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι πείθονται πάντες. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἴδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δὲ τόποι.

2 Περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἔχόμενόν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἀ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἔζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν, ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι· τρίτον δὲ τούτων, ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην. οὕπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ράψῳδίαν ὁψὲ παρῆλθεν· ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας

BOOK III

1. There are three things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of proofs; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangement of the parts of the speech. We have already spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in number, what is their nature, and why there are only three; for in all cases persuasion is the result either of the judges themselves being affected in a certain manner, or because they consider the speakers to be of a certain character, or because something has been demonstrated. We have also stated the sources from which enthymemes should be derived—some of them being special, the others general commonplaces.

We have therefore next to speak of style; for it is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character. In the first place, following the natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself—what gives things themselves their persuasiveness; in the second place, their arrangement by style; and in the third place, delivery, which is of the greatest importance, but has not yet been treated of by any one. In fact, it only made its appearance late in tragedy and rhapsody, for at first the poets

οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ρήτορικήν ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὕσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικήν· ὅπερ ἔτεροί τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν 4 καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήϊος. ἔστι δὲ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτῇ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἔκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλῃ καὶ πότε μικρᾷ καὶ πότε μέσῃ, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξείᾳ καὶ βαρείᾳ καὶ μέσῃ, καὶ ρύθμοῖς τίσι πρὸς ἔκαστον. τρία γάρ ἔστι περὶ ὧν σκοπούσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι μέγεθος ἄρμονία ρύθμος. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν μοχ-
5 θηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν. οὕπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀψὲ προ-
ῆλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμ-
1404 a βανόμενον. ἀλλ' ὅλης οὕσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ρήτορικήν, οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιη-
τέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιον μηδὲν πλείω ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὡς μήτε λυπεῖν μήτε εὐφραίνειν δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τάλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι περίεργα ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ
6 τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλώσαι

^a Since the authors of tragedies acted their own plays, there was no need for professional actors, nor for instruction in the art of delivery or acting. This explains why no attempt had been made to deal with the question. Similarly, the rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were at first as a rule the composers of the poems themselves.

RHETORIC, III. I. 3-6

themselves acted their tragedies.^a It is clear, therefore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in poetry, and it has been dealt with by Glaucon of Teos among others. Now delivery is a matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should be used for each particular emotion ; when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate ; and how the tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should be used ; and what rhythms are adapted to each subject. For there are three qualities that are considered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests, and as at the present day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets, it is the same in political^b contests, owing to the corruptness of our forms of government. But no treatise has yet been composed on delivery, since the matter of style itself only lately came into notice ; and rightly considered it is thought vulgar.^c But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion,^d we must pay attention to it, not as being right, but necessary ; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous ; nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer. However, in every system of instruction there is some slight necessity to pay attention to style ; for it does make a difference, for

^b In the law courts and public assembly.

^c Cope prefers : “is thought vulgar, and rightly so considered.”

^d Or, “is concerned with appearance.”

ARISTOTLE

ώδὶς ἡ ὥδὶς εἰπεῖν· οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ἄπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει.

7 'Εκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ ταῦτὸ ποιήσει τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπ’ ὄλιγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις· καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἀθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ρήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μεῖζον ἴσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἡ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

8 "Ηρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινῆσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὄνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν, ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικῶταν τῶν μορίων ἡμῶν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἡ τε ῥάφωδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι 9 γε. ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου· καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τοὺς τοιούτους οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῦ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων

^a i.e. style, delivery, and acting, which are of no use to serious students.

^b A treatise on Pathos.

the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in this or that manner; still, the difference is not so very great, but all these things ^a are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer; wherefore no one teaches geometry in this way.

Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will have the same effect as acting. Some writers have attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasy-machus, in his *Eleoi* ^b; and in fact, a gift for acting is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in regard to style it is artificial. Wherefore people who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as orators who excel in delivery; for written speeches owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the style.

The poets, as was natural, were the first to give an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias.^c Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry. And the result proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it in the same manner, but as they have changed from the tetrametric to the iambic metre, because the latter, of all other metres, most nearly resembles

^a Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician (see Introduction).

ARISTOTLE

δόμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἔστιν, οἷς οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἔξαμετρα ποιοῦντες· διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτους οἱ αὐτοὶ 10 οὐκέτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ ἄπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἵας λέγομεν. περὶ δ’ ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

1404 b 2. "Εστω οὖν ἐκεῖνα τεθεωρημένα, καὶ ὠρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι· σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον· καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἵσως οὐ ταπεινή, ἀλλ’ 2 οὐ πρέπουσα λόγω. τῶν δ’ ὀνομάτων καὶ ρήματων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τάλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ πάντα σχουσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δεῖ ποιεῦν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσὶν, ἥδū δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά τε ποιεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεῖνον πλέον γὰρ ἐξέστηκε περὶ ἣ καὶ περὶ οὓς ὁ λόγος· ἐν δὲ

^a i.e. the poetic style. See *Poetics*, 22, where the choice of words and the extent to which out-of-the-way words and phrases may be used in poetry is discussed.

^b "Nouns and verbs" is a conventional expression for all the parts of speech. Cp. Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 240, "non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum | verbaque," where *dominantia* is a literal adaptation of *κύρια* (see Glossary), the usual Latin equivalent for which is *propria*.

^c Ch. 21.

^d It is impossible to find a satisfactory English equivalent

prose, they have in like manner discarded all such words as differ from those of ordinary conversation, with which the early poets used to adorn their writings, and which even now are employed by the writers of hexameters. It is therefore ridiculous to imitate those who no longer employ that manner of writing. Consequently, it is evident that we need not enter too precisely into all questions of style, but only those which concern such a style as we are discussing. As for the other kind of style,^a it has already been treated in the *Poetics*.

2. Let this suffice for the consideration of these points. In regard to style, one of its chief merits may be defined as perspicuity. This is shown by the fact that the speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not perform its proper function; neither must it be mean, nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate to it; for the poetic style may be is not mean, but it is not appropriate to prose. Of nouns and verbs it is the proper ones that make style perspicuous^b; all the others which have been spoken of in the *Poetics*^c elevate and make it ornate; for departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and fellow-citizens. Wherefore we should give our language a “foreign^d air”; for men admire what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant. In poetry many things conduce to this and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and persons spoken of are more out of the common. But for the terms ξένος, ξενικός, τὸ ξενίζον, as applied to style. “Foreign” does not really convey the idea, which is rather that of something opposed to “home-like,”—out-of-the way, as if from “abroad.” Jebb suggests “distinctive.”

τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῷ ἐλάττοσιν· ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις
 ἐλάττων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δοῦλος καλλιεποῦτο
 ἦ λίαν νέος, ἀπρεπέστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν·
 ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπισυστελλόμενον καὶ
 4 αὐξανόμενον τὸ πρέπον. διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιουν-
 τας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ
 πεφυκότως· τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκεῦνο δὲ τούναν-
 τίον· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται,
 καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἴηντας τοὺς μεμιγμένους, καὶ
 οἶον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν
 ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν
 5 εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἄλλοτραι. κλέπτεται δ' εὖ, ἐάν τις
 ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ· ὅπερ
 Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

"Οὐτων δ' ὄνομάτων καὶ ρήμάτων ἔξ ὥν ὁ λόγος
 συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὄνομάτων τοσαῦτ' ἔχόντων
 εἴδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως,
 τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ διπλοῖς ὄνόμασι καὶ
 πεποιημένοις δλιγάκις καὶ δλιγαχοῦ χρηστέον
 (ὅπου δέ, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, τό τε διὰ τί εἴρηται·
 6 ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ ἔξαλλάττει τοῦ πρέποντος.) τὸ
 δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι
 χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. σημεῖον
 δέ, ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες χρῶνται· πάντες γὰρ
 μεταφορᾶς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς
 κυρίοις· ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἀν εὖ ποιῇ τις, ἔσται τε
 ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέχεται καὶ σαφηνιεῖ.

^a Cp. Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 46, where it is said that the choice and use of words requires subtlety and care, skill in making an old word new by clever combination (*callida iunctura*) being especially praised. ^b Chs. 3 and 7.

in prose such methods are appropriate in much fewer instances, for the subject is less elevated ; and even in poetry, if fine language were used by a slave or a very young man, or about quite unimportant matters, it would be hardly becoming ; for even here due proportion consists in contraction and amplification as the subject requires. Wherefore those who practise this artifice must conceal it and avoid the appearance of speaking artificially instead of naturally ; for that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does not. For men become suspicious of one whom they think to be laying a trap for them, as they are of mixed wines. Such was the case with the voice of Theodorus as contrasted with that of the rest of the actors ; for his seemed to be the voice of the speaker, that of the others the voice of some one else. Art is cleverly concealed when the speaker chooses his words from ordinary language^a and puts them together like Euripides, who was the first to show the way.

Nouns and verbs being the components of speech, and nouns being of the different kinds which have been considered in the *Poetics*, of these we should use strange, compound, or coined words only rarely and in few places. We will state later^b in what places they should be used ; the reason for this has already been mentioned, namely, that it involves too great a departure from suitable language. Proper and appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be employed in the style of prose ; this is shown by the fact that no one employs anything but these. For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as proper and appropriate words ; wherefore it is clear that, if a speaker manages well, there will be some-

7 αὗτη δ' ἡν τοῦ ρήτορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή. τῶν δ' ὄνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὅμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ 1405 a συνωνυμίαι. λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ συνώνυμα, οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις.

Tí μὲν οὖν τούτων ἔκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἴδη μεταφορᾶς, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, εἰρηται, καθάπερ ἐλέ-
8 γομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς τοσούτῳ δ' ἐν λόγῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοπονεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων. καὶ τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἥδυ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα ἡ μεταφορά. καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν 9 αὐτὴν παρ' ἄλλου. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἀρμοττούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπρεπὲς φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς νέω φοινικίς, οὕτω γέροντι
10 τί· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πρέπει ἐσθῆς. καὶ ἐάν τε κοσμεῖν βούλῃ, ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων τῶν ἐν ταύτῳ γένει φέρειν τὴν μεταφοράν, ἐάν τε ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων. λέγω δ' οἷον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, τὸ φάναι τὸν μὲν πτωχεύοντα εὔχεσθαι, τὸν δὲ εὐχόμενον πτωχεύειν, ὅτι ἀμφω αἰτήσεις, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν· ὡς καὶ Ἰφικράτης

^a This is a parenthetical note.

^b Chs. 21, 22.

^c The different kinds of words.

^d *Poetics*, 22. 9: "for this alone cannot be borrowed from another."

^e Begging (as a beggar does) and praying (as a priest might) are both forms of asking, and by substituting one for the other, you can amplify or deprecate.

thing "foreign" about his speech, while possibly the art may not be detected, and his meaning will be clear. And this, as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language. (In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful to the sophist, for it is by their aid that he employs captious arguments, and synonyms to the poet. Instances of words that are both proper and synonymous are "going" and "walking": for these two words are proper and have the same meaning.)^a

It has already been stated, as we have said, in the *Poetics*,^b what each of these things^c is, how many kinds of metaphor there are, and that it is most important both in poetry and in prose. But the orator must devote the greater attention to them in prose, since the latter has fewer resources than verse. It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot be learnt from anyone else;^d but we must make use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate. This will be secured by observing due proportion; otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are most evident. We must consider, as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old one; for the same garment is not suitable for both. And if we wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same genus; if to deprecate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of asking)^e is an instance of doing this; as, when

ARISTOTLE

Καλλίαν μητραγύρτην ἀλλ' οὐ δᾳδοῦχον. ὁ δ' ἔφη ἀμύνητον αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἄν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δᾳδοῦχον· ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον. καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσοκόλακας, αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω μεταφορά, ἡ μὲν ρύπαινόντων ἡ δὲ τούναντίον. καὶ οἱ μὲν λησταὶ αὐτοὺς ποριστὰς καλοῦσι νῦν· διὸ ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν, τὸν δ' ἀμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορθῆσαι. τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος Εὔριπίδου φησί,

κώπης ἀνάσσειν, κάποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν

11 ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μεῖζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐ κέκλεπται οὖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἀμαρτίᾳ, ἐὰν μὴ ἡδείας ἡ σημεῖα φωνῆς, οἷον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις

κραυγὴν Καλλιόπης

τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωναί· φαύλη δὲ ἡ μεταφορὰ ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖς.

^a See i. 7. 32.

^b Head of a distinguished Athenian family which held the office of torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries. A man of notoriously dissipated character, he took some part in politics.

^c The δᾳδοῦχος or hereditary torch-bearer ranked next to the hierophant or chief priest. In addition to holding the torch during the sacrifices, he took part in the recitation of the ritual and certain purificatory ceremonies. The μητραγύρται or mendicant priests collected alms on behalf of various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence their name). They included both men and women of profligate character, addicted to every kind of lewdness.

Iphicrates^a called Callias^b a mendicant priest instead of a torch-bearer, Callias replied that Iphicrates himself could not be initiated, otherwise he would not have called him mendicant priest but torch-bearer^c; both titles indeed have to do with a divinity, but the one is honourable, the other dishonourable. And some call actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they call themselves "artists." Both these names are metaphors, but the one is a term of abuse, the other the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves purveyors^d; and so it is allowable to say that the man who has committed a crime has "made a mistake," that the man who has "made a mistake" is "guilty of crime," and that one who has committed a theft has either "taken" or "ravaged." The saying in the *Telephus* of Euripides,

Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia,
is inappropriate, because the word "ruling" exceeds
the dignity of the subject, and so the artifice can be
seen. Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not
express an agreeable sound; for instance, Dionysius
the Brazen^e in his elegiacs speaks of poetry as

the scream of Calliope;

both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because
the sounds have no meaning.^f

^a Cf. "'convey' the wise it call" (*Merry Wives*, I. iii.). Either the euphemistic or unfavourable application of the term may be adopted.

^b According to Athenaeus, xv. p. 669, he was a poet and rhetorician who recommended the Athenians to use bronze money.

^c A scream is neither articulate nor agreeable, like the sound of poetry, although both are voices or sound, and to that extent the metaphor is correct.

12 "Ετι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν
καὶ τῶν ὅμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὡνο-
μασμένως, ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλον ἔστιν ὅτι συγγενές,
1405 b οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὔδοκιμοῦντι

ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα·

ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ' ἄμφω πρόσθεσίς
τις· κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν.
καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὖ ἥνιγμάνων ἔστι μεταφορὰς
λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς· μεταφορὰὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὥστε
13 δῆλον ὅτι εὖ μετενήνεκται. καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν·
κάλλος δὲ ὄνόματος τὸ μέν, ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος
λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ
αἰσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον, ὃ λύει τὸν
σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα
αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ^a
τοῦ τόδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι ψεῦδος· ἔστι γὰρ
ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μᾶλλον
καὶ οἰκειότερον τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὄμμάτων.
ἔτι οὐχ ὅμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε
καὶ οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχιον θετέον·
ἄμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαί-
νουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αἰσχρόν· ἢ
ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον. τὰς δὲ μετα-
φορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ
ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει.
διαφέρει δ' εἰπεῖν, οἷον ρόδοδάκτυλος ἡώς μᾶλλον
ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, ἢ ἔτι φαυλότερον ἐρυθρο-
δάκτυλος.

^a Athenaeus, p. 452.

^b Rhetorician and sophist of Heraclea in Pontus.

Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen to be akin, as in the famous enigma,

I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another.

There was no name for what took place, but as in both cases there is a kind of application, he called the application of the cupping-glass “gluing.”^a And, generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good metaphors; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the transference is clever. Metaphors should also be derived from things that are beautiful, the beauty of a word consisting, as Licymnus says, in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same. There is a third condition, which refutes the sophistical argument; for it is not the case, as Bryson^b said, that no one ever uses foul language, if the meaning is the same whether this or that word is used; this is false; for one word is more proper than another, more of a likeness, and better suited to putting the matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that does not signify a thing under the same conditions; thus for this reason also it must be admitted that one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both, indeed, signify what is fair or foul, but not *qua* fair or foul; or if they do, it is in a greater or less degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense. For it does make a difference, for instance, whether one says “rosy-fingered morn,” rather than “purple-fingered,” or, what is still worse, “red-fingered.”

14 Καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ἔστι μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, οἷον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος, οἷον ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὄρευσιν, οὐκ ἥθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἵκανὸν ἐδωκεν, ἐποίησε

χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων.

καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἥσαν. ἔτι τὸ
15 αὐτὸν ὑποκορίζεσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὁ ὑποκορισμός, ὃς ἔλαττον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης σκώπτει ἐν τοῖς Βαψυλωνίοις, ἀντὶ μὲν χρυσίου χρυσιδάριον, ἀντὶ δ' ἴματίου ἴματιδάριον, ἀντὶ δὲ λοιδορίας λοιδορημάτιον καὶ νοσημάτιον. εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.

3. Τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἐν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὄνόμασιν, οἷον Λυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς καὶ ἀκτὴν δὲ στενοπόρον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὄνόμαζε, πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ 1406 a κατευορκήσαντας. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας “μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γιγνομένην,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον ὡήθη τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενήσεσθαι,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθὴ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν,” καὶ “κυανό-

^a Euripides, *Orestes*, 1588. In the preceding line Menelaus accuses Orestes as a matricide and ready to heap murder on murder, to which Orestes replies, you should rather call me the avenger of my father Agamemnon, who had been murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, the mother

As for epithets, they may be applied from what is vile or disgraceful, for instance, “the matricide,” or from what is more honourable, for instance, “the avenger of his father.”^a When the winner in a mule-race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to write on half-asses; but when he gave him a sufficient amount, he wrote,

Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds!^b

and yet they were also the daughters of asses. Further, the use of diminutives amounts to the same. It is the diminutive which makes the good and the bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the *Babylonians* jestingly uses “goldlet, cloaklet, affrontlet, diseaselet” instead of “gold, cloak, affront, disease.” But one must be careful to observe the due mean in their use as well as in that of epithets.

3. Frigidity of style arises from four causes: first, the use of compound words, as when Lycophron^c speaks of “the many-faced sky of the mighty-topped earth,” “narrow-passaged shore”; and Gorgias of “a begging-poet flatterer,” “those who commit perjury and those who swear right solemnly.”^d And as Alcidamas says, “the soul full of anger and the face fire-coloured,” “he thought that their zeal would be end-accomplishing,” “he made persuasive words end-accomplishing,” and “the azure-coloured of Orestes. “Matricide” and “avenger of his father” show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes.

^b Frag. 7 (*P.L.G.* iii. p. 390). The winner of the mule-race was Anaxilaus of Rhegium.

^c A sophist, not the poet (author of the obscure *Alexander* or *Cassandra*), who was later than Aristotle.

^d Lobeck conjectured κατεπιορκήσαντας, “who commit out-and-out perjury.”

χρων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος·” πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιητικὰ διὰ τὴν δίπλωσιν φαίνεται.

- 2 Μία μὲν οὖν αὕτη αἰτία, μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην πέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων σύννις ἀνήρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ τῆς διανοίας ὄργῃ τεθηγμένον.
- 3 Τρίτον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις τὸ ἥ μακροῖς ἥ ἀκαίροις ἥ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιήσει πρέπει γάλα λευκὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν ἀπρεπέστερα, τὰ δέ, ἀν ἥ κατακορῆ, ἐξελέγχει καὶ ποιεῖ φανερὸν ὅτι ποίησις ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθός, καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μείζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῇ λέγειν· ἥ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἥ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἷον οὐχ ἴδρωτα ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἴδρωτα, καὶ οὐκ εἰς Ἰσθμια ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανήγυριν, καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἀλλὰ δρομαίᾳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄρμῃ, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσεῖον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός,

^a Sciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus, but Lyceophron turns Sinnis into a γλῶττα, using it adjectivally = “destructive”; cf. σῖνος, “harm”; σιντης = σιννις.

^b The meaning of παραλαβὼν is quite obscure: various renderings are “having taken to himself,” “received,” “grasped,” “inherited.” The word μουσεῖον, originally a haunt of the Muses, came to mean a school of art or literature.

floor of the sea," for all these appear poetical because they are compound.

This is one cause of frigidity ; another is the use of strange words ; as Lycophron calls Xerxes "a monster of a man," Sciron "a human scourge ^a" ; and Alcidamas says "plaything in poetry," "the audaciousness of nature," "whetted with unmitigated wrath of thought."

A third cause is the use of epithets that are either long or unseasonable or too crowded ; thus, in poetry it is appropriate to speak of white milk, but in prose it is less so ; and if epithets are employed to excess, they reveal the art and make it evident that it is poetry. And yet such may be used to a certain extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary and gives a "foreign" air. But one must aim at the mean, for neglect to do so does more harm than speaking at random ; for a random style lacks merit, but excess is vicious. That is why the style of Alcidamas appears frigid ; for he uses epithets not as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so crowded, so long, and so glaring are they. For instance, he does not say "sweat" but "damp sweat" ; not "to the Isthmian games" but "to the solemn assembly of the Isthmian games" ; not "laws," but "the laws, the rulers of states" ; not "running," but "with a race-like impulse of the soul" ; not "museum," but "having taken up the museum of nature" ^b ; and "the scowling anxiety of the soul" ; "creator," not "of favour," but "all-popular favour" ; and "dis-

The fault appears to consist in the addition of $\tauῆς φύσεως$, but it is difficult to see why. Cope confesses his inability to understand the passage. Jebb translates : "he does not say, 'having taken to himself a school of the Muses,' but 'to Nature's school of the Muses.'"

καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψεν, καὶ οὐ τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν (τοῦτο δ' ἄμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον, ὥστε ποίημα γίνεται), καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολήν. διὸ ποιητικῶς λέγοντες τῇ ἀπρεπείᾳ τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ὅταν γὰρ γιγνώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλῃ, διαλύει τὸ σαφὲς τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖν· οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι τοῖς διπλοῖς χρῶνται, ὅταν ἀνώνυμον ἦ καὶ ὁ λόγος εὔσύνθετος, οἷον τὸ 1406^b χρονοτριβεῖν· ἀλλ' ἀν πολύ, πάντως ποιητικόν. διὸ χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῆ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις· αἱ δὲ γλωτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὐθαδεῖς· ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις· τούτοις γὰρ νῦν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

4 Καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίγνεται· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταφορὰὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δέ, ἀν πόρρωθεν. οἶνον Γοργίας “χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα τὰ πράγματα”· “σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχρῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας, κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας” ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν

^a On this passage Thompson (*Gorgias*, p. 179) says: “The metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere commonplace . . . but ‘pallid and bloodless affairs’ is a phrase which would need apology even from a modern.” On the other hand, it is difficult to see what objection there is to calling the *Odyssey* “a beautiful mirror of human life.” Another reading is ἄναιμα, which Cope translates “events

penser of the pleasure of the hearers" ; " he hid," not " with branches," but " with the branches of the forest" ; " he covered," not " his body," but " the nakedness of his body." He also calls desire " counter-initiative " of the soul"—an expression which is at once compound and an epithet, so that it becomes poetry—and " the excess of his depravity so beyond all bounds." Hence those who employ poetic language by their lack of taste make the style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter produces obscurity ; for when words are piled upon one who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by a cloud of verbiage. People use compound words, when a thing has no name and the word is easy to combine, as *χρονοτριβεῖν*, to pass time ; but if the practice is abused, the style becomes entirely poetical. This is why compound words are especially employed by dithyrambic poets, who are full of noise ; strange words by epic poets, for they imply dignity and self-assertion ; metaphor to writers of iambics, who now employ them, as we have stated.

The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be found in metaphors ; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are ridiculous—for the comic poets also employ them—others because they are too dignified and somewhat tragic ; and if they are far-fetched, they are obscure, as when Gorgias says : " Affairs pale and bloodless "^a ; " you have sown shame and reaped misfortune " ; for this is too much like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy " a fresh with the blood in them." If the two extracts are taken together, it is suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope's notes) that the sense may be : " things green and unripe (flushed with sap), and this was the crop which you . . . , " the adjectives referring to green and unripe stalks of corn.

ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων, καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ “οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιῆσει προσφέρων.” ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπίθανα διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα. τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ’ αὐτοῦ πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περίττωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν· εἶπε γὰρ “Αἰσχρόν γε ὁ Φιλομῆλα.” ὅρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εὑ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰπὼν δὴν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ δὲ ἔστιν.

4. "Εστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα

ώς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν,

εἰκών ἔστιν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε,” μεταφορά· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσε 2 μετενέγκας λέοντα τὸν Ἀχιλλέα. χρήσιμον δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις δέ· ποιητικὸν γάρ. οἰστέαι δὲ ὥσπερ αἱ μεταφοραὶ· μεταφοραὶ γάρ 3 εἰσὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἰρημένῳ. εἰσὶ δὲ εἰκόνες οἷον ἦν Ἀνδροτίων εἰς Ἰδριέα, ὅτι ὅμοιος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν κυνιδίοις· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ προσπίπτοντα δάκνει, καὶ Ἰδριέα λυθέντα ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν εἶναι χαλεπόν. καὶ ὡς Θεοδάμας εἴκαζεν Ἀρχίδαμον Εὔξενῳ γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Εὔξενος Ἀρχίδαμος γεωμετρικός· καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς

^a Or, “a barrier against the laws.” This is the general meaning of ἐπιτείχισμα, a border fortress commanding an enemy’s country.

^b Compare *Iliad*, xxii. 164 ἐνάντιον ὥρτο λεὼν ὡς.

^c Pupil of Isocrates and historical writer. Idrieus was a prince of Caria, who had been imprisoned.

^d Meaning that there was no difference between Euxenus
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bulwark of the laws,"^a and the *Odyssey* "a beautiful mirror of human life," and "introducing no such plaything in poetry." All these expressions fail to produce persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for what Gorgias said to the swallow which, flying over his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in the best tragic style. He exclaimed, "Fie, for shame, Philomela!" ; for there would have been nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it would have been for a young lady. The reproach therefore was appropriate, addressing her as she was, not as she is.

4. The simile also is a metaphor ; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles,^b
he rushed on like a lion,

it is a simile ; if he says, "a lion, he rushed on," it is a metaphor ; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion. The simile is also useful in prose, but should be less frequently used, for there is something poetical about it. Similes must be used like metaphors, which only differ in the manner stated. The following are examples of similes. Androton^c said of Idrieus that he was like curs just unchained ; for as they attack and bite, so he when loosed from his bonds was dangerous. Again, Theodamas likened Archidamus to a Euxenus ignorant of geometry, by proportion ;^d for Euxenus "will be Archidamus acquainted with geometry." Again, Plato in the *Republic*^e compares without a knowledge of geometry and Archidamus with a knowledge of geometry. The proportion of geometrical knowledge will remain the same, so that Archidamus can be called an ungeometrical Euxenus, and Euxenus a geometrical Archidamus (see note ^a on p. 370 for "by proportion").

^e 469 d.

τεθνεώτας σκυλεύοντες ἐοίκασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις, ἀ
τοὺς λίθους δάκνει τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἀπτόμενα.
καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἵσχυρῷ
μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ. καὶ ἡ εἰς τὰ μέτρα τῶν ποιητῶν,
ὅτι ἔοικε τοῖς ἄνευ κάλλους ὥραιοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
1407^a ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται.
καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, ἔοικέναι αὐτοὺς
τοῖς παιδίοις ἀ τὸν ψωμὸν δέχεται μέν, κλαίοντα
δέ. καὶ εἰς Βοιωτούς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις·
τούς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ' αὐτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι,
καὶ τοὺς Βοιωτούς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένους.
καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιός ἐστι τοῖς
ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυτιώσιν. καὶ ὡς ὁ Δημοκράτης
εἴκασε τοὺς ρήγτορας ταῖς τίθαις αἱ τὸ ϕώμισμα
καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία παραλείφουσιν.
καὶ ὡς Ἐπισθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν
λιβανωτῷ εἴκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὑφραίνει.
πάσας γὰρ ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς
ἔξεστι λέγειν· ὥστε ὅσαι ἀν εὔδοκιμῶσιν ὡς
μεταφορὰὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον ὅτι αὗται καὶ εἰκόνες
ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες μεταφορὰὶ λόγου δεόμεναι.
4 ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον
ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα τῶν ὅμογενῶν· οἷον

^a 488 A.^b 601 B.^c If metrical restrictions have been removed and they are read as prose.

those who strip the dead to curs, which bite stones, but do not touch those who throw them; he also says that the people is like a ship's captain who is vigorous, but rather deaf;^a that poets' verses resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty;^b for neither the one after they have lost their bloom, nor the others after they have been broken up,^c appear the same as before. Pericles said that the Samians were like children who cry while they accept the scraps.^d He also compared the Boeotians to holm-oaks; for just as these are beaten down by knocking against each other,^e so are the Boeotians by their civil strife. Demosthenes compared the people to passengers who are seasick.^f Democrats said that orators resembled nurses whogulp down the morsel and rub the babies' lips with the spittle.^g Antisthenes likened the skinny Cephisodotus to incense, for he also gives pleasure by wasting away. All such expressions may be used as similes or metaphors, so that all that are approved as metaphors will obviously also serve as similes which are metaphors without the details. But in all cases the metaphor from proportion should be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus; for instance, if the goblet is the

^a Meaning that they did not appreciate the benefits received from the Athenians, who conquered the islands (440 B.C.).

^b Or, "are cut down by axes, the handles of which are made of their own wood."

^c It is disputed whether Demosthenes is the orator or the Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War. The point of the comparison is that in a democracy the general instability of political conditions makes the people sick of the existing state of things and eager for a change.

^d Aristophanes, *Knights*, 715-718.

εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπὶς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἄρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην "Αρεος.

5. 'Ο μὲν οὖν λόγος συντίθεται ἐκ τούτων. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἐλληνίζειν· τοῦτο δ' 2 ἔστιν ἐν πέντε, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἃν ἀποδιδῷ τις ὡς πεφύκασι πρότεροι καὶ ὕστεροι γίγνεσθαι ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἔνιοι ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ μέν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μέν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δέ καὶ τὸν ὁ δέ. δεῖ δὲ ἔως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μήτε μακρὰν ἀπαρτᾶν μήτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου· ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἄρμόττει. "Ἐγὼ δ', ἐπεί μοι εἶπεν (ἥλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἀξιῶν) ἐπορευόμην παραλαβών αὐτούς." ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολλοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου προεμβέβληνται σύνδεσμοι. ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται τοῦ 3 ἐπορευόμην, ἀσαφές. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ιδίοις ὀνόμασι 4 λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν. τρίτον, μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις· ταῦτα δέ, ἃν μὴ τάναντία προαιρῆται. ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, ὅταν μηθὲν μὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ τι λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἐν

^a As the shield is to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus. Proportion is defined (*Ethics*, v. 3. 8) as "an equality of ratios, implying four terms at the least," and the proportional metaphor is one in which the second term is to the first as the fourth is to the third; for then one can by metaphor substitute the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. Let A be Dionysus, B a goblet, C Ares, D a shield. Then by the definition, the goblet is to Dionysus as the shield

shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly be called the goblet of Ares.^a

5. Such then are the elements of speech. But purity, which is the foundation of style, depends upon five rules. First, connecting particles should be introduced in their natural order, before or after, as they require ; thus, *μέν* and *ἐγὼ μέν* require to be followed by *δέ* and *οὐ δέ*. Further, they should be made to correspond whilst the hearer still collects ; they should not be put too far apart, nor should a clause be introduced before the necessary connexion^b ; for this is rarely appropriate. For instance, “As for me, I, after he had told me—for Cleon came begging and praying—set out, taking them with me.” For in this phrase several connecting words have been foisted in before the one which is to furnish the apodosis ; and if the interval between “I” and “set out” is too great, the result is obscurity. The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of connecting particles ; the second, to employ special, not generic terms. The third consists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having nothing to say, yet pretend to say something ; such people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the is to Ares. The metaphor consists in transferring to the goblet the name belonging to its analogue the shield. Sometimes an addition is made by way of explanation of the word in its new sense, and the goblet may be described as the shield of Dionysus and the shield as the goblet of Ares. The shield and the goblet both come under the same genus, being characteristics of a deity, and can therefore be reciprocally transferred (*Poetics*, 21. 4).

^a The apodosis. *ἀποδιδόναι* is used in the sense of introducing a clause answering to the *πρότασις*, and *ἀπόδοσις* for this answering clause.

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ποιήσει λέγουσι ταῦτα, οἶν· Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· φενακίζει
γὰρ τὸ κύκλω πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ
ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ
λέγωσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμπαρανεύουσιν.

Κροῖσος "Αλυν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει.

καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅλως ἔλαπτον εἶναι ἀμάρτημα, διὰ τῶν
γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν οἱ μάντεις· τύχοι
γὰρ ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἀρτια ἦ
περισσά εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ὅπι
ἔσται ἢ τὸ πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσ-
ορίζονται τὸ πότε. ἅπαντα δὴ ταῦτα ὅμοια· ὥστε
5 ἂν μὴ τοιούτου τινὸς ἔνεκα, φευκτέον. τέταρτον,
ὡς Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει,
ἀρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη· δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι
6 καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς· "ἢ δ' ἐλθοῦσα καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα
ώχετο." πέμπτον, ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ
ἐν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν· "οἱ δ' ἐλθόντες ἔτυπτόν με."

"Ολως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμ-
μένον καὶ εὑφραστον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτό. ὅπερ οἱ
πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ ἀ μὴ ράδιον

^a Of Agrigentum (c. 490-430), poet, philosopher, and physician. Among other legends connected with him, he is said to have thrown himself into the crater of Etna, so that by suddenly disappearing he might be thought to be a god. His chief work was a poem called Nature, praised by Lucretius. The principles of things are the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, which are unalterable and indestructible. Love and hate, alternately prevailing, regulate the periods of the formation of the world. The existing fragments corroborate Aristotle's statement.

^b Herodotus, i. 53, 91. Croesus consulted the Delphian oracle whether he should attack Cyrus the Persian or not.

manner of Empedocles.^a For the long circumlocution takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to the sooth-sayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, they also assent ; for example,

Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty dominion.^b

And as there is less chance of making a mistake when speaking generally, diviners express themselves in general terms on the question of fact ; for, in playing odd or even, one is more likely to be right if he says "even" or "odd" than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says "it will be" than if he states "when." This is why sooth-sayers do not further define the exact time. All such ambiguities are alike, wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason.^c The fourth rule consists in keeping the genders distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter,^d as laid down by Protagoras ; these also must be properly introduced : "She, having come (*fem.*) and having conversed (*fem.*) with me, went away." The fifth rule consists in observing number, according as many, few, or one are referred to : "They, having come (*pl.*), began to beat (*pl.*) me."

Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number of connecting particles, or when the punctua-

Encouraged by the ambiguous oracle, he did so, but was utterly defeated.

^a The deliberate intention to mislead.

^b σκείη, "inanimate things," the classification probably being male, female, and inanimate, not the grammatical one of masculine, feminine, and neuter.

διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρω πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἡ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἀνθρωποι γίγνονται·” ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ὅποτέρω 7 διαστίξαι. ἔτι δὲ ποιεῖ σολοικίζειν τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιζευγνύῃς ἀμφοῦ ὁ ἀρμόττει· οἷον ἡ ψόφον ἡ χρῶμα, τὸ μὲν ἴδων οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθόμενος κοινόν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ ἀν μὴ προθεὶς εἴπης, μέλλων πολλὰ μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν· οἷον “ἔμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεὶς ἐκείνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὅδε πορεύεσθαι,” ἀλλὰ μὴ “ἔμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεὶς πορεύεσθαι, εἴτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὅδε ἐγένετο.”

6. Εἰς ὅγκον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε, τὸ λόγω χρῆσθαι ἀντ' ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλ' ἐπίπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἵσον. εἰς δὲ συν-
2 τομίαν τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου ὄνομα. καὶ ἐὰν αἰσχρὸν ἡ ἀπρεπές· ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἦ αἰσχρόν, τοῦνομα λέγειν, ἐὰν δ' ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι,
3 τὸν λόγον. καὶ μεταφοραῖς δηλοῦν καὶ τοῖς
4 ἐπιθέτοις, εὐλαβούμενον τὸ ποιητικόν. καὶ τὸ ἐν

^a Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475). His chief work was on Nature. From the harshness of his language and the carelessness of his style he was called ὁ σκοτεινός (the obscure). According to him, fire was the origin of all things; all things become fire, and then fire becomes all other things. All things are in a constant state of flux; all is the same and yet not the same. Knowledge is founded upon sensual perception, but only the gods possess knowledge in perfection.

tion is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus.^a For it is hard, since it is uncertain to which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or that which precedes; for instance, at the beginning of his composition he says: “Of this reason which exists^b always men are ignorant,” where it is uncertain whether “always” should go with “which exists” or with “are ignorant.” Further, a solecism results from not appropriately connecting or joining two words with a word which is equally suitable to both. For instance, in speaking of “sound” and “colour,” the word “seeing” should not be used, for it is not suitable to both, whereas “perceiving” is. It also causes obscurity, if you do not say at the outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a number of details in the middle; for instance, if you say: “I intended after having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out” instead of “I intended to set out after having spoken to him,” and then this or that happened, in this or that manner.

6. The following rules contribute to loftiness of style. Use of the description instead of the name of a thing; for instance, do not say “circle,” but “a plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant from the centre.” But for the purpose of conciseness the reverse—use the name instead of the description. You should do the same to express anything foul or indecent; if the foulness is in the description, use the name; if in the name, the description. Use metaphors and epithets by way of illustration, taking care, however, to avoid what is too poetical. Use

^a Or, “although this reason exists for ever men are born . . . without understanding” (Welldon).

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πολλὰ ποιεῦν, ὅπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν· ἐνὸς ὄντος
λιμένος ὅμως λέγουσι

λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαιϊκούς

καὶ

δέλτου μὲν αἷδε πολύθυροι διαπτυχαί.

5 καὶ μὴ ἐπιζευγνύναι, ἀλλ’ ἔκατέρω ἐκάτερον,
“τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας.” ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως,
6 τούναντίον “τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός.” καὶ μετὰ
συνδέσμου λέγειν· ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, ἄνευ μὲν
1403^a συνδέσμου, μὴ ἀσύνδετα δέ, οἷον “πορευθεὶς καὶ
7 διαλεχθείς,” “πορευθεὶς διελέχθην.” καὶ τὸ Ἀντι-
μάχου χρήσιμον, ἐξ ὧν μὴ ἔχει λέγειν, ὃ ἐκεῖνος
ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Τευμησσοῦ,

ἔστι τις ἡνεμόεις ὀλίγος λόφος·

αὐξέται γὰρ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει, ὅποτέρως
ἄν ἥ χρήσιμον. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὄνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ
φέρουσι, τὸ ἄχορδον καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν
στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο
ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἷον
τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἄλυρον.

7. Τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἥ λέξις, ἐὰν ἥ παθητική
τε καὶ ἡθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν
2 ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ’ ἀνάλογόν ἔστιν, ἐὰν μήτε περὶ
εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν
σεμνῶς, μηδ’ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὄνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος.

^a Euripides, *Iphig. Taur.* 727.

^b In Boeotia. The quotation is from the *Thebaid* of Antimachus of Claros (c. 450 B.C.). The Alexandrians placed him next to Homer among the epic poets. In his eulogy of the little hill, he went on to attribute to it all the

the plural for the singular, after the manner of the poets, who, although there is only one harbour, say

to Achaean harbours,

and,

Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablet.^a

You should avoid linking up, but each word should have its own article : $\tauῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας$. But for conciseness, the reverse : $\tauῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός$. Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit it, but avoid destroying the connexion ; for instance “having gone and having conversed with him,” or, “having gone, I conversed with him.” Also the practice of Antimachus is useful, that of describing a thing by the qualities it does not possess ; thus, in speaking of the hill Teumessus,^b he says,

There is a little wind-swept hill ;

for in this way amplification may be carried on *ad infinitum*. This method may be applied to things good and bad, in whichever way it may be useful. Poets also make use of this in inventing words, as a melody “without strings” or “without the lyre” ; for they employ epithets from negations, a course which is approved in proportional metaphors, as for instance, to say that the sound of the trumpet is a melody without the lyre.

7. Propriety of style will be obtained by the expression of emotion and character, and by proportion to the subject matter. Style is proportionate to the subject matter when neither weighty matters are treated offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity, and no embellishment is attached to an ordinary good qualities it did *not* possess, a process which could obviously be carried on *ad infinitum*.

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εὶ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔντα ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν ἂν “πότνια 3 συκῆ.” παθητικὴ δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ἡ ὑβρις, ὀργιζόμενου λέξις, ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχρά, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβούμενου καὶ λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐπαινετά, ἀγαμένως, ἐὰν δὲ ἐλεεινά, ταπεινῶς, καὶ 4 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοίως. πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὥστ' οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνομοιοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῷ λέγοντι, 5 κανὸν μηθὲν λέγῃ. διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες.

6 Καὶ ἡθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ ἀρμόττουσα ἐκάστω γένει καὶ ἔξει. λέγω δὲ γένος μὲν καθ' ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἡ ἀνήρ ἡ γέρων, καὶ γυνὴ ἡ ἀνήρ, καὶ Λάκων ἡ Θετταλός, ἔξεις δέ, καθ' ἃς ποιός τις τῷ βίῳ· 7 οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἄπασαν ἔξιν οἱ βίοι ποιοί τινες. ἐάν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγῃ τῇ ἔξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἡθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα οὐδ' ὡσαύτως ἀγροῦκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν. πάσχουσι δέ τι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ὡς κατακόρως χρῶνται οἱ λογογράφοι, “τίς δ' οὐκ οἶδεν;” “ἄπαντες ἵσασιν.” ὁμο-

^a By some identified with the tragic poet spoken of in the *Poetics*, 2. His manner of expression, due to the wish to use fine language, was ridiculous owing to its being out of harmony with the subject. Others consider that he was not a poet at all but an orator. *πότνια* was a title of respect, applied to females, whether they were goddesses or ordinary women.

word ; otherwise there is an appearance of comedy, as in the poetry of Cleophon,^a who used certain expressions that reminded one of saying “ madam fig.” Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks with anger of wanton outrage ; with indignation and reserve, even in mentioning them, of things foul or impious ; with admiration of things praiseworthy ; with lowliness of things pitiable ; and so in all other cases. Appropriate style also makes the fact appear credible ; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon ^b under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them ; and the hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing. This is why speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise.

Character also may be expressed by the proof from signs, because to each class and habit there is an appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age —child, man, or old man ; to sex—man or woman ; to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I call habits those moral states which form a man’s character in life ; for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the language appropriate to each habit, he will represent the character ; for the uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated. But the hearers also are impressed in a certain way by a device employed *ad nauseam* by writers of speeches :^c “ Who does not know ? ” “ Everybody knows ” ; for the hearer agrees, because

^b Or, “ draws a wrong conclusion.”

^c Alluding to Isocrates.

λογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχῃ
οὐπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

8 Τὸ δ' εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν
9 ἀπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἔστιν. ἄκος δ' ἐπὶ πάσῃ
1408 b ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλούμενον· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ
προεπιπλήττειν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ
10 λανθάνει γε ὁ ποιεῖ τὸν λέγοντα. ἔτι τοῦς ἀνά-
λογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἀμα χρήσασθαι· οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτεται
ὅ ἀκροατής. λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐὰν τὰ ὄνόματα σκληρὰ
ἢ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς
ἀρμόττουσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, φανερὸν γίνεται ἕκαστον
ὅ ἔστιν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν
τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ
σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, ἀπίθανον γίγνεται.

11 Τὰ δὲ ὄνόματα τὰ διπλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω
καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς·
συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένω κακὸν φάναι οὐρανό-
μηκες ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν. καὶ ὅταν ἔχῃ ἥδη τοὺς
ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι ἢ ἐπαίνοις ἢ
ψόγοις ἢ ὄργῃ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἶον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ
ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει, “φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη”
καὶ “οἴ τινες ἔτλησαν.” φθέγγονται τε γὰρ τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται
δῆλον ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει
ἥρμοσεν· ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποιήσις. ἢ δὴ οὕτω δεῖ,

^a Or, “to all the special rules given above.”

^b The exaggeration should be brought forward first, by way of forestalling the objection, and accompanied by some limiting phrase. Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* viii. 3. 37) gives as examples: “so to say,” “if I may be allowed to say so.”

^c Adaptation of voice, features, etc., to the subject.

^d § 186, where *μνήμη* is the reading, translated “name” above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also

he is ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter of common knowledge.

The opportune or inopportune use of these devices applies to all kinds of Rhetoric.^a But whenever one has gone too far, the remedy may be found in the common piece of advice—that he should rebuke himself in advance ;^b then the excess seems true, since the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing. Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of correspondence^c together ; for in this manner the hearer is deceived. I mean, for instance, if the language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things connected should not be equally harsh ; otherwise what each really is becomes evident. But if you do this in one instance and not in another, the art escapes notice, although the result is the same. If mild sentiments are harshly expressed or harsh sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness.

Compound words, a number of epithets, and “foreign” words especially, are appropriate to an emotional speaker ; for when a man is enraged it is excusable for him to call an evil “high-as-heaven” or “stupendous.” He may do the same when he has gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm, either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as Isocrates does at the end of his *Panegyricus*^d : “Oh, the fame and the name!” and “In that they endured.” For such is the language of enthusiastic orators, and it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appropriate to poetry ; for there is something inspired in poetry. It should therefore be used either in this

appears in the Greek of Isocrates. All the mss. of Aristotle give γνώμην here, which shows that it is a misquotation.

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ἢ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαιδρῷ.

8. Τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε ἄρρυθμον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ) καὶ ἄμα καὶ ἔξιστησιν· προσέχειν γὰρ ποιεῖ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, πότε πάλιν ἥξει. ὡσπερ οὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνουσι τὰ παιδία τὸ “τίνα αἴρεῖται ἐπίτροπον ὁ ἀπελευθερούμενος; 2 Κλέωνα.” τὸ δὲ ἄρρυθμον ἀπέραντον, δεῖ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μέν, μὴ μέτρῳ δέ· ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον. περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῷ πάντα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ρύθμος 3 ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμήματα. διὸ ρύθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μή· ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται. ρύθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἐὰν μέχρι του ἦ.
- 4 Τῶν δὲ ρύθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς ἀλλὰ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἴαμβος αὐτή

^a 238 D, 241 E. In the first of these passages Socrates attributes his unusual flow of words to the inspiration of the nymphs, and tells Phaedrus not to wonder if he seems to be in a divine fury, for he is not far from breaking out into dithyrambs. An example of the irony (a term implying a certain amount of contempt (ii. 2. 25)) of Gorgias is given in the *Politics* (iii. 2). When asked how a person comes to be a citizen, he answers: “as those are mortars which have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made by artisans (*δημιουργούς*); for some of these were Larissa-makers (*δημιουργούς*). There is a play on the double meaning of *δημιουργός*, (1) artisan, (2) magistrate, *lit.* people-maker. Larissa-makers means makers of Larissaeans in such numbers that they might be regarded as makers of Larissa itself. It has also been suggested that *λαρισοποιούς* may mean “kettle-makers,” from *λάρισα* “a kettle,” so

way or when speaking ironically, after the manner of Gorgias, or of Plato in the *Phaedrus*.^a

8. The form of diction should be neither metrical nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it lacks persuasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same time it distracts the hearer's attention, since it sets him on the watch for the recurrence of such and such a cadence ; just as, when the public criers ask, “ Whom does the emancipated ^b choose for his patron ? ” the children shout “ Cleon.” If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited (but not by metre); for that which is unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the number belonging to the form of diction is rhythm, of which the metres are divisions.^c Wherefore prose must be rhythmical, but not metrical, otherwise it will be a poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously carried out, but only up to a certain point.

Of the different rhythms the heroic is dignified, but lacking the harmony of ordinary conversation ; the iambic is the language of the many, wherefore called from having been first made at Larissa, but this seems unnecessary. The point is that Gorgias maintained that all were citizens who were made so by the magistrates, that citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L. Newman's note on the passage, and W. H. Thompson's Appendix to his edition of Plato's *Gorgias*).

^b He did not generally possess full rights of citizenship. The point of the illustration is that the hearer looks for the cadence just as confidently as, when a freedman is asked what patron he selects, every one expects him to say “ Cleon.”

^c Bywater's emendation for $\tau\mu\eta\tau\delta$ of the mss. Aristotle seems to be referring to the Pythagorean theory that “ number ” is the regulating force in all things, and in giving shape to language “ number ” is rhythm, which reduces a formless mass of words to order.

ἐστιν ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μάλιστα πάντων
 τῶν μέτρων ἴαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεῖ δὲ
 σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος
 1409 a κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῦ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἔστι γὰρ
 τροχερὸς ρύθμος τὰ τετράμετρα. λείπεται δὲ
 παιάν, ὃ ἔχρωντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι,
 οὐκ εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν.

"Εστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παιάν, καὶ ἔχόμενος τῶν εἰ-
 ρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύ' ἔστιν, ἐκείνων δὲ ὁ
 μὲν ἐν πρὸς ἓν, ὁ δὲ δύο πρὸς ἓν. ἔχεται δὲ τῶν
 λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος· οὗτος δ' ἔστιν ὁ παιάν.
 5 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι, καὶ
 διότι μετρικοί· ὁ δὲ παιάν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου
 γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι μέτρον τῶν ρηθέντων ρύθμῶν, ὥστε
 μάλιστα λανθάνειν. νῦν μὲν οὖν χρῶνται τῷ ἐνὶ⁶
 παιᾶν καὶ ἀρχόμενοι, δεῖ δὲ διαφέρειν τὴν τελευτὴν
 τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἔστι δὲ παιάνος δύο εἴδη ἀντικείμενα
 ἄλληλοις, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀρμόττει, ὥσπερ
 καὶ χρῶνται· οὗτος δ' ἔστιν οὗ ἀρχεῖ μὲν ἡ μακρά,
 τελευτῶσι δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαι,

Δαλογενὲς εἴτε Λυκίαν
 καὶ

χρυσεοκόμα "Ἐκατε παῖ Διός.

ἔτερος δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας, οὗ βραχεῖαι ἀρχουσι τρεῖς,
 ἡ δὲ μακρὰ τελευταία.

μετὰ δὲ γάν ὑδατά τ' ὠκεανὸν ἡφάνισε νύξ.

^a The heroic rhythm (dactyls, spondees, and anapaests) is as 1 to 1, two short syllables being equal to one long; trochaic and iambic 2 to 1 on the same principle; paean, 3 to 2 (three shorts and one long), being the mean between the other two.

^b Understanding καὶ τελευτῶντες.

^c All three attributed to Simonides (Frag. 26 b: P.L.G.).

of all metres it is most used in common speech ; but speech should be dignified and calculated to rouse the hearer. The trochaic is too much like the cordax ; this is clear from the tetrameters, which form a tripping rhythm. There remains the paean, used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasy-machus, although they could not define it.

The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related to those already mentioned ; for its proportion is 3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with both of which the paean, whose proportion is $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, is connected.^a All the other metres then are to be disregarded for the reasons stated, and also because they are metrical ; but the paean should be retained, because it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned which is not adapted to a metrical system, so that it is most likely to be undetected. At the present day one kind of paean alone is employed, at the beginning as well as at the end ;^b the end, however, ought to differ from the beginning. Now there are two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The one is appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it is used. It begins with a long syllable and ends with three short :

Δᾶλδογένες | εἴτε Λύκτι|αν (“O Delos-born, or it may be Lycia”),

and

Χρυσέօκρδμ|α “Ἐκάτε | παι Διός (“Golden-haired far-darter, son of Zeus”).

The other on the contrary begins with three short syllables and ends with one long one :

μετὰ δὲ γῆν | ὅδατὰ τ' ὡκεανὸν νῆφανισε^c νύξ (“after earth and waters, night obscured ocean”).

οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ· ἡ γὰρ βραχεῖα διὰ τὸ
ἀτελῆς εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβόν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ μακρᾷ
ἀποκόπτεσθαι καὶ δήλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτὴν, μὴ
διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφήν, ἀλλὰ
7 διὰ τὸν ρύθμον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὔρυθμον δεῖ εἶναι
τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὔρυθμον
ποιοῦσι ρύθμοι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴρηται.

9. Τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἣ εἰρομένην καὶ
τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν τοῖς διθυράμβοις
ἀναβολαί, ἣ κατεστραμμένην καὶ ὅμοίαν ταῖς τῶν
ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρο-
2 μένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν· “Ἡροδότου Θουρίου
ἥδ’ ἴστορίης ἀπόδειξις.” ταύτη γὰρ πρότερον μὲν
ἀπαντεῖ, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται. λέγω· δὲ
εἰρομένην, ἡ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ’ αὐτήν, ἢν μὴ
τὸ πρᾶγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἐστι δὲ ἀηδές
διὰ τὸ ἀπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται
καθορᾶν. διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσιν ἐκπνέουσι
καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ κάμ-
3 νουσι πρότερον. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεώς
ἐστιν ἥδε, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω
δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν
1409 b αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἥδεια
δ’ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθῆς, ἥδεῖα μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως
ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι ἀεὶ τι οἴεται ἔχειν ὁ
ἀκροατὴς [καὶ] πεπεράνθαι τι αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ μηδὲν
προνοεῖν εἶναι μηδὲ ἀνύειν ἀηδές. εὐμαθῆς δέ, ὅτι
εὐμνημόνευτος. τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ

^a A dash below the first word of a line, indicating the end of a sentence.

^b καμπτῆρες, properly the turning-point of the διαυλος or double course, is here used for the goal itself.

This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being incomplete, mutilates the cadence. But the period should be broken off by a long syllable and the end should be clearly marked, not by the scribe nor by a punctuation mark,^a but by the rhythm itself. That the style should be rhythmical and not un rhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrangement of them make it of this character, has now been sufficiently shown.

9. The style must be either continuous and united by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic preludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The continuous style is the ancient one ; for example, “This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus of Thurii.” It was formerly used by all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous style I mean that which has no end in itself and only stops when the sense is complete. It is unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in sight. That explains why runners, just when they have reached the goal,^b lose their breath and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show no signs of fatigue. Such is the continuous style. The other style consists of periods, and by period I mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped. What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that which is unlimited, because the hearer at every moment thinks he is securing something for himself and that some conclusion has been reached ; whereas it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end of anything. It is easy to learn, because it can be easily retained in the memory. The reason is that

ἐν περιόδοις λέξις, ὁ πάντων εὔμημονευτότατον.
διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μημονεύουσι μᾶλλον τῶν
4 χύδην· ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει ὡς μετρεῖται. δεῖ δὲ τὴν
περίοδον καὶ τῇ διαινοίᾳ τετελειώσθαι, καὶ μὴ
διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἴαμβεῖα,

Καλυδῶν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπίας χθονός·

τούναντίον γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι,
ώσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι
τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

5 Περίοδος δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν κώλοις, ἡ δ' ἀφελής. ἔστι
δ' ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ
διηρημένη καὶ εὐανάπνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει
ώσπερ ἡ εἰρημένη περίοδος, ἀλλ' ὅλη. κώλον δ'
ἔστι τὸ ἔτερον μόριον ταύτης. ἀφελῆ δὲ λέγω τὴν
6 μονόκωλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους
μήτε μυούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
μικρὸν προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν·
ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἔτι ὄρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ
μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄρον, ἀντισπασθῆ πανσα-
μένου, οἷον προσπταίειν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντί-
κρουσιν. τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ
οἱ ἔξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος· ἀπο-
λείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας.
ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὖσαι λόγος

^a τῶν χύδην : lit. what is poured forth promiscuously : in flowing, unfettered language (Liddell and Scott).

^b Really from the *Meleager* of Euripides, Frag. 515 (T.G.F.). The break in the sense comes after *γαῖα*, Ηελοπίας χθονός really belonging to the next line: *ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πέδῃ* ἔχοντος εὐδαιμονα. As it stands in the text, the line implies that Calydon was in Peloponnesus, which of course it was not. The meaning then is: "This is the land of Calydon,

the periodic style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember ; that explains why all learn verse with greater facility than prose,^a for it has number by which it can be measured. But the period must be completed with the sense and not stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,^b

This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops ; for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose the contrary of the fact, as in the example, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

A period may be composed of clauses, or simple. The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its parts and easy to repeat in a breath, not divided like the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when it is taken as a whole.^c By clause I mean one of the two parts of this period, and by a simple period one that consists of only one clause. But neither clauses nor periods should be curtailed or too long. If too short, they often make the hearer stumble ; for when he is hurrying on towards the measure of which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked by the speaker stopping, a sort of stumble is bound to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. If too long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do not turn till past the ordinary limit leave behind those who are walking with them. Similarly long periods assume the proportions of a speech and

with its fertile plains in the country over against Peloponnesus" (on the opposite side of the strait, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf).

^c It does not consist in simply dividing off any words from the context as the speaker pleases, but the parts of the sentence as a whole are properly constructed and distinguished and the sense also is complete.

γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολῆ ὅμοιον. ὥστε γίνεται ὁ ἔσκωψε Δημόκριτος δὲ Χῖος εἰς Μελανιππίδην ποιήσαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς,

οἵ τ' αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλω κακὰ τεύχων,
ἡ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη.

ἀρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς μακροκώλους λέγειν. αἱ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίγνεται· προπετῆ οὖν ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατήν.

7 Τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἡ μὲν διηρημένη ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἀντικειμένη, διηρημένη μὲν οἷον “πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων,” ἀντικειμένη δέ, ἐν ᾧ ἔκατέρῳ τῷ κώλῳ ἡ πρὸς 1410 a ἐναντίω ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἡ ταῦτὸ ἐπέζευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἷον “ἀμφοτέρους δ’ ὕνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείω τῆς οἴκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δὲ ἵκανήν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον.” ἐναντία ὑπομονὴ ἀκολούθησις, ἵκανὸν πλεῖον. “ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις.” ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι “συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀφρονας κατορθοῦν.” “εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἡξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον.” “πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἡπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ

^a A well-known musician.

^b Of Melos. He wrote rambling dithyrambic *preludes* without strophic correspondence. Others take ἀναβολή to mean an entire *ode*.

resemble dithyrambic preludes. This gives rise to what Democritus of Chios^a jokingly rebuked in Melanippides,^b who instead of antistrophes composed dithyrambic preludes :

A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another, and a long prelude is most deadly to one who composes it ;^c

for these verses may be applied to those who employ long clauses. Again, if the clauses are too short, they do not make a period, so that the hearer himself is carried away headlong.

The clauses of the periodic style are divided or opposed ; divided, as in the following sentence : “ I have often wondered at those who gathered together the general assemblies and instituted the gymnastic contests ”;^d opposed, in which, in each of the two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another, or the same word is coupled with both contraries ; for instance, “ They were useful to both, both those who stayed and those who followed ; for the latter they gained in addition greater possessions than they had at home, for the former they left what was sufficient in their own country. Here “ staying behind,” “ following,” “ sufficient,” “ more ” are contraries. Again : “ to those who need money and those who wish to enjoy it ” ; where “ enjoying ” is contrary to “ acquiring.” Again : “ It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are unsuccessful, while fools succeed ” : “ At once they were deemed worthy of the prize of valour and not long after won the command of the sea ” : “ To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the

^a Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 265. The second line is a parody of 266, ή δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη.

^b The beginning of Isocrates’ *Panegyricus*.

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- τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἐλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ' Ἀθω διορύξας." "καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεοσθαι." "οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ' αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν." "ἰδίᾳ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας." "ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν." καὶ δὲ εἰς Πειθόλαόν τις εἶπε καὶ Λυκόφρονα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, "οὗτοι δ' ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν, ἐλθόντες δ' ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώνηνται." ἅπαντα 8 γὰρ ταῦτα ποιεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον. ἥδεῖα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, ὅτι τάνατία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παράλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικε συλλογισμῷ δὲ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν.
- 9 Ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, παρίσωσις δ' ἐὰν ἵσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δ' ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχῃ ἐκάτερον τὸ κῶλον. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἡ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἔχειν. καὶ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ ὄνόματα, ἡ δὲ τελευτὴ τὰς ἔσχάτας συλλαβὰς ἡ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνόματος πτώσεις ἡ τὸ αὐτὸν ὄνομα.

^a "To dwell with us" (Jebb). The point seems to be that the barbarian domestics were in a comfortable position as compared with those of the allies who were reduced to slavery; and there is a contrast between the desire of getting servants for private convenience, while in a matter affecting public life indifference was shown.

^b All the above quotations are from the *Panegyricus* : 1, 35, 41, 48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, 186, with slight variations. The last quotation is part of the sentence of which the beginning appears in 7. 11 above. The whole runs: "And how great must we consider the fame and the name and the

sea, bridging over the Hellespont and digging through Athos": "And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights of citizenship by law": "For some of them perished miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully": "Privately to employ barbarians as servants,^a but publicly to view with indifference many of the allies reduced to slavery": "Either to possess it while living or to leave it behind when dead."^b And what some one said against Pitholaus and Lycophron^c in the law-court: "These men, who used to sell you when they were at home, having come to you have bought you." All these passages are examples of antithesis. This kind of style is pleasing, because contraries are easily understood and even more so when placed side by side, and also because antithesis resembles a syllogism; for refutation is a bringing together of contraries.

Such then is the nature of antithesis; equality of clauses is parisosis; the similarity of the final syllables of each clause paromoiosis. This must take place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At the beginning the similarity is always shown in entire words; at the end, in the last syllables, or the inflexions of one and the same word, or the repetition of the same word. For instance, at the glory which those who have highly distinguished themselves in such deeds of valour will either have when living or will leave behind after their death."

^a They murdered Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, being instigated by their sister, his wife. Nothing is known of the case referred to. According to Cope, the meaning is: "When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves, but now they have come to buy you" (referring to bribery in court). Others take *ωνεισθαι* in a passive sense: "they have been bought," i.e. have had to sell themselves to you.

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ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα “ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ,”

δωρητοί τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν.

ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δὲ “ώήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι,” “ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν.” πτῶσις δὲ ταύτοις “ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὥν χαλκοῦ.” ταῦτὸ δ’ ὄνομα “σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἐλεγεις κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς.”

1410 b ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δὲ “τί ἀν ἐπαθεις δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ’ εἶδες ἀργόν;” ἔστι δὲ ἄμα πάντα ἔχειν ταῦτό, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι ταῦτὸ καὶ πάρισον καὶ ὅμοιοτέλευτον. αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν

10 τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἔξηριθμηνται. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει,

τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών.

10. Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον. ποιεῦν μὲν οὖν ἔστι τοῦ εὑφυοῦς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνα-
2 σμένουν, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. εἴπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα· ἀρχὴ δ’ ἔστω ἡμῖν αὕτη. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἥδū φύσει πᾶσιν ἔστι,

^a Aristophanes, *Frag.* 649 (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* i. 1880).

^b *Iliad*, ix. 526.

^c The text is obviously corrupt.

^d See Introduction.

^e Roemer's text has ἀρεταῖ (excellences).

^f There is no real antithesis, the sense of both clauses being the same.

beginning : Ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ,^a
 “ for he received from him land untilled ”;

δωρητοὶ τ' ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοι τ' ἐπέεσσιν,^b “ they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words ; ”

at the end : φύθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι,^c “ they thought that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it ” ; ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν, “ in the greatest anxiety and the smallest hopes.” Inflexions of the same word : ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὥν χαλκοῦ, “ worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass farthing.” Repetition of a word : σὺ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς, “ while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of him.” Resemblance of one syllable : τί ἀν ἐπαθεῖς δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ' εἶδες ἀργόν, “ what ill would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man ? ” All these figures may be found in the same sentence at once—antithesis, equality of clauses, and similarity of endings. In the *Theodectea*^d nearly all the beginnings^e of periods have been enumerated. There are also false antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus :

τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγών ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών, “ at one time I was in their house, at another I was with them.”^f

10. Having settled these questions, we must next state the sources of smart and popular sayings. They are produced either by natural genius or by practice ; to show what they are is the function of this inquiry. Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them, and let our starting-point be the following. Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean

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τὰ δὲ ὄνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὄνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἡδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνῶτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἵσμεν. ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησε μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ 3 γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηγθηκότα. ποιοῦσι μὲν οὖν καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτό· διόπερ ἂν εὖ, ἀστεῖον φαίνεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εἰκών, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προθέσει· διὸ ἥττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο· οὕκουν οὐδὲ ζῆτεῖ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή.

4 ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀστεῖα, ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχεῖαν. διὸ οὕτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὔδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἀμηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι), οὕτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοούμενα ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅσων ἡ ἄμα λεγομένων ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἡ μικρὸν ὑστερίζει ἡ διάνοια· γίγνεται γὰρ οἷον μάθησις, ἐκείνως δὲ οὐδέτερον.

5 Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα εὔδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται,

^a *Odyssey*, xiv. 213 ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καλάμην γέ σ’ ὁτομαι εἰσορώντα | γιγνώσκειν. The words are those of Odysseus, whom Athene had changed into an old beggar, to Eumeus, his faithful swineherd, in whose house he was staying unrecognized.

^b προσθέσει: the addition of the particle of comparison ὡς. προθέσει (the reading of the Paris ms.) would mean, (1) "manner of setting forth" (Cope), or (2) "a metaphor, with a preface" (Jebb) (but the meaning of this is not clear). The simile only says that one thing *resembles* another, not,

something, so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant. Now we do not know the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we know already. It is metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect; for when Homer^a calls old age stubble, he teaches and informs us through the genus; for both have lost their bloom. The similes of the poets also have the same effect; wherefore, if they are well constructed, an impression of smartness is produced. For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word,^b wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer; it does not say that this *is* that, so that the mind does not even examine this. Of necessity, therefore, all style and enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only those which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which the meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later; for from the latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the other.^c

In regard to the meaning of what is said, then, such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popularity of form is due to antithetical statement; for

like the metaphor, that it *is* another; since the speaker does not say this, the result is that the mind of the hearer does not go into the matter, and so the chance of instruction, of acquiring some information, is lost.

^c The meaning is: the two kinds of enthymemes mentioned last do convey some information, whereas the superficial enthymemes teach nothing, either at once, or a little later, when reflection has made the meaning clear.

οῖον “καὶ τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομίζοντων τοῖς αὐτῶν ιδίοις πόλεμον.” ἀντίκειται
 6 πόλεμος εἰρήνη. τοῖς δ’ ὄνόμασιν, ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην μήτ’ ἄλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν, μήτ’ ἐπιπόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν.
 ἔτι εὶ πρὸ ὄμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὅρâν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πρατόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας.

7 Τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὓσῶν εὔδοκιμοῦσι
 1411 a μάλιστα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἡφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἕαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἔξελοι. καὶ Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἔân περιιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας δοῦναι περὶ τὸν Ὀλυνθιακὸν πόλεμον ἡγανάκτει, φάσκων εἰς πιῆγμα τὸν δῆμον ἔχοντα τὰς εὐθύνας πειρᾶσθαι δοῦναι. καὶ παρακαλῶν

^a Isocrates, *Philippus*, 73.

^b In the *Poetics* (21) metaphor and its four classes are defined: “Metaphor consists in assigning to a thing the name of something else; and this may take place either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or proportionally. An instance of a metaphor from genus to species is ‘here stands my ship,’ for ‘standing’ is a genus, ‘being moored’ a species; from species to genus: ‘Odysseus truly has wrought a myriad good deeds,’ for ‘myriad’ is a specific large number, used for the generic ‘multitude’; from species to species: ‘having drawn off the life with the bronze’ and ‘having cut it with the unyielding bronze,’ where ‘drawn off’ is used in the sense of ‘cut,’ and ‘cut’ in the sense of ‘drawn off,’ both being species of ‘taking away.’” For the proportional metaphor see note on 4. 4 above.

instance, “accounting the peace that all shared to be a war against their private interests,”^a where “war” is opposed to “peace”; as to words, they are popular if they contain metaphor, provided it be neither strange, for then it is difficult to take in at a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer; further, if they set things “before the eyes”; for we ought to see what is being done rather than what is going to be done. We ought therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.

Of the four kinds of metaphor^b the most popular are those based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that the youth that had perished during the war had disappeared from the State as if the year had lost its springtime.^c Leptines, speaking of the Lacedae-monians, said that he would not let the Athenians stand by and see Greece deprived of one of her eyes. When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the Olynthian war examined, Cephisodotus indignantly exclaimed that, now he had the people by the throat, he was trying to get his accounts examined^d; on another occasion also he exhorted the Athenians to

^c i. 7. 34.

^d *εὐθυνα* was the technical term for the examination of accounts to which all public officers had to submit when their term of office expired. Cephisodotus and Chares were both Athenian generals. “Having the people by the throat” may refer to the condition of Athens financially and his unsatisfactory conduct of the war. But the phrase *eis πνῖγμα τὸν δῆμον ἔχοντα* is objected to by Cope, who reads *ἀγαγόντα* and translates: “that he drove the people into a fit of choking by his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way,” i.e. he tried to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them. Another reading suggested is *ἄγχοντα* (throttling so as to choke).

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ποτὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰς Εύβοιαν ἐπισιτισομένους
ἔφη δεῦ ἔξιέναι τὸ Μιλτιάδου φήμισμα. καὶ
Ίφικράτης σπεισαμένων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἐπί-
δαυρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἥγανάκτει, φάσκων
αὐτὸὺς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρηρῆσθαι. καὶ
Πειθόλαος τὴν Πάραλον ρόπαλον τοῦ δήμου,
Σηστὸν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ Πειραιέως. καὶ Περικλῆς
τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε τὴν λήμην τοῦ
Πειραιέως. καὶ Μοιροκλῆς οὐθὲν ἔφη πονηρό-
τερος εἶναι, ὅνομάσας τινὰ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ἐκεῖνον
μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρίτων τόκων πονηρεύεσθαι, αὐτὸν
δὲ ἐπιδεκάτων. καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου ἰαμβεῖον
ὑπὲρ τῶν θυγατέρων πρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐγχροι-
ζουσῶν,

ὑπερήμεροί μοι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι.

καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικόν τινα Σπεύσ-
ιππον, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑπὸ τῆς
τύχης ἐν πεντεσυρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ
Κηφισόδοτος τὰς τριήρεις ἐκάλει μύλων ποικί-
λους, ὁ Κύων δὲ τὰ καπηλεῖα τὰ Ἀττικὰ φιδίτια.

^a This may refer to a decree of Miltiades which was so speedily carried out that it became proverbial. The expedition was undertaken to assist Euboea against Thebes.

^b By making peace, Iphierates said that the Athenians had deprived themselves of the opportunity of attacking and plundering a weak maritime city, and so securing provisions for the war. The word ἐφόδια properly means provisions for a journey and travelling expenses.

^c The Paralus and Salaminia were the two sacred galleys which conveyed state prisoners.

^d It commanded the trade of the Euxine.

^e Moerocles was a contemporary of Demosthenes, and an anti-Macedonian in politics. He seems to have been a money-grubber and was once prosecuted for extortion. The

set out for Euboea without delay “and provision themselves there, like the decree of Miltiades.”^a After the Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared “that they had deprived themselves of provisions for the war.”^b Pitholaus called the Paralus^c “the bludgeon of the people,” and Sestos “the corn-chest^d of the Piraeus.” Pericles recommended that Aegina, “the eyesore of the Piraeus,” should be removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very “respectable” person by name, declared that he was as much a scoundrel as himself; for whereas that honest man played the scoundrel at 33 per cent. he himself was satisfied with 10 per cent.^e And the iambic of Anaxandrides,^f on girls who were slow to marry,

My daughters are “past the time” of marriage.

And the saying of Polyeuctus^g upon a certain paralytic named Speusippus, “that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound him in a five-holed pillory of disease.” Cephisodotus called the triremes “parti-coloured mills,”^h and [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the tavernsⁱ were “the degree of the respectability (or rather, the swindling practices) of each is calculated by their respective profits.

^g Poet of the Middle Comedy: Frag. 68 (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* ii.). The metaphor in ὑπερῆμεροι is from those who failed to keep the term of payment of a fine or debt. Cope translates: “I find (*μωι*) the young ladies are . . .”

^h Athenian orator, contemporary of Demosthenes.

ⁱ As grinding down the tributary states. They differed from ordinary mills in being gaily painted.

^a Contrasted with the Spartan “messes,” which were of a plain and simple character, at which all the citizens dined together. The tavern orgies, according to Diogenes, represented these at Athens.

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Αἰσίων δέ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἔξεχεαν· τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὄμμάτων. καὶ “ ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν ‘Ελλάδα ”· καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὄμμάτων. καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευε μὴ πολλὰς ποιήσωσι τὰς συνδρομάς. καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ οἶνον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν ‘Ελλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρῦσαι συγκαταθαπτομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ 1411b πρὸ ὄμμάτων, τὸ δὲ “ τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ” ἀντίθεσίν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης εἶπεν “ ἡ γὰρ ὁδός μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν Χαρητὶ πεπραγμένων ἔστιν ” μεταφορὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὸ διὰ μέσου πρὸ ὄμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὄμμάτων μεταφορά. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου “ οὐδὲ τὴν ἵκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν ”· μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὄμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἵκετεύει ἡ εἰκών, τὸ ἄψυχον δὴ ἔμψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ “ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες ”· τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν

^a Athenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes.

^b Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition.

^c *Philippus*, 12. Both *συνδρομάς* and *συντρέχοντας* refer to the collecting of a mob in a state of excitement.

^d The statue of Chabrias, erected after one of his victories, represented him as kneeling on the ground, the position

messes" of Attica. Aeson^a used to say that they had "drained" the State into Sicily,^b which is a metaphor and sets the thing before the eyes. His words "so that Greece uttered a cry" are also in a manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold their "concourses" too often; and in the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those "who rush together" in the assemblies.^c And as Lysias says in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom was buried along with their valour. If the speaker had said that it was fitting that Greece should weep, her valour being buried with them, it would have been a metaphor and a vivid one, whereas "freedom" by the side of "valour" produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, "The path of my words leads through the centre of the deeds of Chares"; here the metaphor is proportional and the words "through the centre" create vividness. Also, to say that one "calls upon dangers to help against dangers" is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of Chabrias said, "not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his statue of bronze,"^d a metaphor for the moment, not for all time, but still vivid; for when Chabrias is in danger, the statue intercedes for him, the inanimate becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done for the State. And "in every way studying poor-ness of spirit,"^e for "studying" a thing implies to which he had ordered his soldiers to take up when awaiting the enemy. The statue was in the agora and could be seen from the court. Lycoleon points to it, and bases his appeal on its suppliant attitude.

^a Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 151.

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αὐξεῖν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς
 ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ἄμφω γάρ δηλοῖ τι. “οὐ γὰρ
 διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους, ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα”·
 ἄμφω γάρ ἐστι μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ
 τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι
 “τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις
 γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γάρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς
 τύχης, αὗται δ’ ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου”· ἄμφω
 γάρ νίκης σημεῖα. ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόσαι· ἡ γάρ
 εὕθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν.

11. “Οτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε
 τῆς ἀνάλογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ δύματων ποιεῖν,
 εἴρηται. λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ δύματων,
 2 καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγω δὴ πρὸ
 δύματων ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει.
 οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον
 μεταφορά· ἄμφω γάρ τέλεια, ἀλλ’ οὐ σημαίνει
 ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ τὸ “ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν”
 ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ “σὲ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄφετον” ἐνέργεια,
 καὶ

τούντευθεν οὖν “Ελληνες ἀξαντες ποσίν
 τὸ ἀξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά. καὶ ὡς

^a Metaphor from species to genus (p. 398, n.), “studying” being a species of “increasing.” As a rule one studies to increase some good quality, not a bad one.

^b *Ibid.* 172. ^c *Ibid.* 180 (apparently from memory).

^d *εὐθύνα* (see note on p. 399) further implies the punishment for an unsatisfactory statement of accounts.

^e Simonides, Frag. 5 (*P.L.G.* ii.). Both a good man and a square are complete as far as they go, but they do not express actuality. ^f Isocrates, *Philippus*, 10.

^g *Ibid.* 127. This speech is an appeal to Philip to lead the Greeks against Persia. As a sacred animal could roam

increase it.^a And that “ reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul,” for both the words reason and light make something clear. “ For we do not put an end to wars, but put them off,”^b for both ideas refer to the future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a metaphor to say that such a treaty is “ a trophy far more splendid than those gained in war ; for the latter are raised in memory of trifling advantages and a single favour of fortune, but the former commemorates the end of the whole war ” ;^c for both treaty and trophy are signs of victory. Again, that cities also render a heavy account to the censure of men ; for rendering an account^d is a sort of just punishment.

11. We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of “ before the eyes,” and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality. For instance, to say that a good man is “ four-square ”^e is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but the phrase does not express actuality, whereas “ of one having the prime of his life in full bloom ”^f does ; similarly, “ thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will ”^g expresses actuality, and in

Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feet^h the word “ shooting ” contains both actuality and where it pleased within the precincts of its temple, so Philip could claim the whole of Greece as his fatherland, while other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates calls the author of Philip’s line) were tied down and their outlook narrowed by the laws and constitution of the city in which they dwelt.

^a Euripides, *Iphig. Aul.* 80, with δορὶ for ποσίν.

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κέχρηται "Ομηρος πολλαχοῦ τῷ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα
3 λέγειν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέρ-
γειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε,

αὗτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶς ἀναιδής,

καὶ

ἔππατ' ὁϊστός,

καὶ

ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων,

καὶ

1412 a ἐν γαίῃ ἵσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι,

καὶ

αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσυντο μαιμώωσα.

ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνερ-
γοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν
καὶ τάλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς
κατ' ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς
τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυν-
4 τούμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμουσαῖς
εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταῦτα.

κυρτά, φαληριόωντα· πρὸ μέν τ' ἄλλ', αὐτὰρ ἐπ'
ἄλλα.

κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἥ δ' ἐνέργεια
κίνησις.

5 Δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον,
ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλο-
σοφίᾳ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν
εὐστόχου, ὥσπερ Ἀρχύτας ἔφη ταῦτὸν εἶναι
διαιτητὴν καὶ βωμόν· ἐπ' ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ ἀδικού-

^a *Odyssey*, xi. 598, with ἔπειτα πέδονδε for ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε.

metaphor. And as Homer often, by making use of metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate ; and it is to creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the following examples :

Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain.^a

The arrow flew.^b

[The arrow] eager to fly [towards the crowd].^c

[The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh.^d

The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast.^e

For in all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the objects are represented as animate : "the shameless stone," "the eager spear-point," and the rest express actuality. Homer has attached these attributes by the employment of the proportional metaphor ; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is shamelessly treated. In his popular similes also he proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things :

Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind ;^f
for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality
is movement.

As we have said before, metaphors should be drawn from objects which are proper to the object, but not too obvious ; just as, for instance, in philosophy it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no difference between an arbitrator and an altar, for the wronged betakes itself to one or the other.

^b *Iliad*, xiii. 587. ^c *Ibid.* iv. 126. ^d *Ibid.* xi. 574.

^e *Ibid.* xv. 541.

^f *Ibid.* xiii. 799. The reference is to the "boiling waves
of the loud-roaring sea."

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μενον καταφεύγει. ἦ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρεμάθραν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι· ἀμφω γὰρ ταῦτο τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῷ ἀνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ “ώμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις” ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι ταῦτο, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἵσον.

6 “Εστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προεξαπατᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δῆλον ὅτι ἔμαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικε λέγειν ἡ ψυχὴ “ώς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἥμαρτον.” καὶ τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων δὲ τὰ ἀστεῖα ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὁ φησι λέγειν, οἷον τὸ τοῦ Στησιχόρου, ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες ἑαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ἀσονται. καὶ τὰ εὖ ἥντιμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸν ἡδέα· μάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορά. καὶ ὁ λέγει Θεόδωρος, τὸ κανὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δέ, ὅταν παράδοξον ἦ, καὶ μή, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα. ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· ἔξαπατὰ γάρ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν.

^a The anchor keeps a ship steady *below*, the pot-hook is *above*, and the pot hangs down from it.

^b Cope, retaining ἀνωμαλίσθαι (as if from ἀνομαλίζειν, *aequalitatem restituere* Bonitz, cf. ἀνομάλωσις) says: “the widely dissimilar things here compared are the areas of properties and the state offices and privileges, which are to be alike equalized,” translating: “And the re-equalization of cities, when the same principle is applied to things standing wide apart, viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices).” (*ἀν-* is not negative, but = re.) But the passage quoted by Victorius from Isocrates, *Philippus*, § 40: “for I know that all the cities of Greece have been placed on the same level (*ώμαλίσθαι*) by misfortunes” suggests this as a

Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook hung up were identical ; for both are the same sort of thing, but they differ in this—that one is hung up above and the other below.^a And if one were to say “the cities have been reduced to the same level,” this amounts to the same in the case of things far apart—the equality of “levelling” in regard to superficies and resources.^b

Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, and also from misleading the hearer beforehand.^c For it becomes more evident to him that he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to say, “How true it is ! but I missed it.” And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that “the grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the ground.”^d And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason ; for something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls “novel expressions” arise when what follows is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectation ; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter ; for they are deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose ; for instance, the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected :

preferable reading here, *ωμαλισθαι* meaning (1) have been levelled to the ground (although the Lexica give no instance of this use), (2) reduced to the same level of weakness.

^c *προεξαπατᾶν*. Or, reading *προσεξαπατᾶν*, “by adding deception.”

^a See ii. 21. 8.

ἔστειχε δ' ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα.

ὅ δ' ὥετο πέδιλα ἐρεῖν. τούτου δ' ἄμα λεγομένου
δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὁ
λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὁ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ
Θεοδώρου εἰς Νίκωνα τὸν κιθαρῳδόν “θράττει.”
προσποιεῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ “θράττει σε” καὶ
ἐξαπατᾷ· ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει· διὸ μαθόντι ἥδυ, ἐπεὶ
1412 b εἰ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνει Θράκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον
7 εἶναι. καὶ τὸ “βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι.” δεῖ δὲ
ἀμφότερα προσηκόντως λεχθῆναι. οὗτω δὲ καὶ
τὰ ἀστεῖα, οἷον τὸ φάναι Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς
θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν
ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἡ ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ
πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὁ
οὐκ ἀν ὠήθη τις ἐρεῖν, τοῦτ' εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη
ὅτι ἀληθές· τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι
οὐθὲν σοφόν· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλ' ἄλλως,
8 καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὁ εἶπεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως. ἐν
ἄπασι δὲ τούτοις, ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκη
ὅμιωνυμίᾳ ἡ μεταφορᾶ, τότε τὸ εὖ. οἷον “Ἀνά-

^a According to Cope, Θρᾶττ' εἶ, “you are no better than a Thracian slave-girl.”

^b There is obviously a play on πέρσαι (aor. 1 infin. of πέρθω) and Πέρσαι (Persians), but no satisfactory interpretation of the joke has been suggested.

^c The paradoxical and verbal. “Suitably” may refer to the manner of delivery; to being used at the proper time; or to taking care that the word is one that may be used in the two senses.

^d *Philippus*, 61; *De Pace*, 101. The point in the illustrations lies in the use of ἀρχή, first in the sense of “empire,” then in that of “beginning.” It could be said that the

And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains,

whereas the hearer thought he was going to say “sandals.” This kind of joke must be clear from the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara, “you are troubled” (*θράττει*); for while pretending to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us; for he means something else.^a Therefore the joke is only agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it. Similarly, “you wish to destroy him (*πέρσαι*).”^b Jokes of both these kinds^c must be suitably expressed. Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that “the empire of the sea” was not “the beginning of misfortunes” for the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with Isocrates,^d that “empire” was “the beginning of misfortunes for the city”; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said is said, and recognized as true. For, in the second example, to say that “empire is empire” shows no cleverness, but this is not what he means, but something else; in the first, the *ἀρχή* which is negated is used in a different sense. In all these cases, success is attained when a word is appropriately applied, either by homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the phrase *Anaschetos* (Bearable) is Unbearable,^e there

“empire” of the sea was or was not “the beginning of misfortunes” for Athens; for at first it was highly beneficial to them, but in the end brought disaster, and thus was the “beginning” of evil.

^a Usually translated, “There is no bearing Baring.”

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σχετος οὐκ ἀνασχετός·” δύμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν,
ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἀηδής. καὶ

οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ ξένος ξένος·

ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σὲ δεῖ, τὸ αὐτό. καὶ “οὐ δεῖ τὸν
ξένον ξένον ἀεὶ εἶναι·” ἀλλότριον γάρ καὶ τοῦτο.
τὸ αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον,

καλόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον·

ταῦτὸν γάρ ἔστι τῷ εἰπεῖν ἄξιον γάρ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ
ὄντα ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ
θανάτου ἄξιον ὄντα, ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια.

9 τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸν τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλ'
ὅσῳ ἂν ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσούτῳ
εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ
μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν δύλιγῳ
10 θᾶττον γίνεται. δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς
ὅν λέγεται ἢ τὸ ὄρθως λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον
ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον· ἔστι γάρ ταῦτα χωρὶς
ἔχειν, οἷον “ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἀμαρτάνοντα”·
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀστεῖον. “τὴν ἄξιαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν
ἄξιον·” ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀστεῖον. ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄμα ἄμφω
ἔχῃ· “ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ
ἀποθανεῖν.” ὅσῳ δ' ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ, τοσούτῳ
ἀστειότερον φαίνεται, οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὄνόματα

^a Kock, C.A.F. iii. 209, p. 448. In the two first examples “stranger” refers to a distant and reserved manner, as we say “don’t make yourself a stranger”; in the third *ξένος* is apparently to be taken in the sense of “alien.” Cope translates: “for that too is of a different kind” (foreign, alien to the two others; *ἀλλότριον*, belonging to something or somebody else, opposed to *οἰκεῖον*). But the whole passage is obscure.

is a contradiction of the homonym, which is only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, "Thou shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger," or "not more than you should be," which is the same thing. And again,

The stranger must not always be a stranger, for here too the word repeated is taken in a different sense.^a It is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides,

It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death ;^b

for this is the same as saying that "it is worthy to die when one does not deserve to die," or, that "it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death," or, "when one does nothing that is worthy of death." Now the form of expression of these sayings is the same ; but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed, the greater is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly. Further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial, it must always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed ; for it is possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance, "One ought to die guiltless of any offence," "The worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife." There is no smartness in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are fulfilled : "It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of death." The more special qualities the expression possesses, the smarter it appears ; for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a

^a Kock, *C.A.F.* ii. Frag. 64, p. 163.

μεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ καὶ ἀντίθεσις
καὶ παρίσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.

11 Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄνω, ἀεὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοράι.
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῦ λέγονται, ὥσπερ η ἀνάλογον
μεταφορά· οἷον η ἀσπὶς φαμέν ἐστι φιάλη "Αρεος,
1413 a καὶ τόξον φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν
οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δ' εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα η τὴν
12 ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἀπλοῦν. καὶ εἰκάζουσι δὲ οὕτως,
οἷον πιθήκῳ αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ φακαζομένῳ μύωπα·
13 ἅμφω γὰρ συνάγεται. τὸ δὲ εὖ ἐστὶν ὅταν μετα-
φορὰ η· ἐστι γὰρ εἰκάσαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλη "Αρεος
καὶ τὸ ἐρείπιον ράκει οἰκίας, καὶ τὸν Νικήρατον
φάναι Φιλοκτήτην εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος,
ώσπερ εἴκασε Θρασύμαχος ἴδων τὸν Νικήρατον
ἡττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ράψῳδοῦντα, κομῶντα
δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι. ἐν οἷς μάλιστα ἐκπίπτουσιν
οἱ ποιηταί, ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν.
λέγω δ' ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν,

ώσπερ σέλινον οὐλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ,
ώσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντ' εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δ' εἰκόνες
ὅτι μεταφοραί, εἴρηται πολλάκις.

^a Or, reading *ai* for *aei*, "approved similes are. . . ."

^b In the simple metaphor "goblet" is substituted for "shield," but sometimes additions are made to the word as differently applied, such as "of Ares" and "without strings." These additions, besides involving greater detail (a characteristic of the simile), distinctly bring out the contrast of the two terms and make a simile, whereas the metaphor simply transfers the meaning.

^c In posture.

metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality.

Similes also, as said above, are always in a manner approved metaphors;^a since they always consist of two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of Ares, and the bow a lyre without strings. But such an expression is not simple, but when we call the bow a lyre, or the shield a goblet, it is.^b And similes may be formed as follows : a flute-player resembles an ape,^c a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp ; for in both cases there is contraction.^d But they are excellent when there is a proportional metaphor ; for it is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of Ares and a ruin to the rag of a house ; to say that Niceratus is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of Thrasymachus, when he saw Niceratus, defeated by Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with his hair uncut.^e It is herein that poets are especially condemned if they fail, but applauded if they succeed. I mean, for instance, when they introduce an answering clause :^f

He carries his legs twisted like parsley,
or again,

Like Philammon punching the leather sack.

All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has been often said, are metaphors of a kind.

^a Contraction of eyelids and flame.

^b Like Philoctetes on Lemnos after he had been bitten by the snake.

^c When the concluding corresponds with the introductory expression. This “answering clause” is called apodosis (p. 371), not restricted, as in modern usage, to the conclusion of a conditional sentence.

14 Καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι μεταφοραὶ ἀπ' εἴδους ἐπ' εἶδός εἰσιν· οἷον ἂν τις ώς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγάγηται, εἴτα βλαβῆ, ώς ὁ Καρπάθιός φησι τὸν λαγώ· ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα λέγεται καὶ διότι, σχεδὸν εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον.

15 Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι ὑπερβολαὶ μεταφοραί, οἷον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον “ῳήθητε δ’ ἂν αὐτὸν εἶναι συκαμίνων κάλαθον”. ἐρυθρὸν γάρ τι τὸ ὑπώπιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ σφόδρα. τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ καὶ τό, ὑπερβολὴ τῇ λέξει διαφέρουσα.

ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.
ῳήθης δ’ ἂν αὐτὸν Φιλάμμωνα εἶναι μαχόμενον τῷ κωρύκῳ.

ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖν.

ῳήθης δ’ ἂν οὐ σκέλη ἀλλὰ σέλινα ἔχειν οὕτως οὖλα.
16 εἰσὶ δὲ ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γάρ δηλοῦσιν. διὸ ὄργιζόμενοι λέγουσι μάλιστα.

οὐδ’ εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὅσα φάμαθός τε κόνις τε.
κούρην δ’ οὐ γαμέω ’Αγαμέμνονος ’Ατρεΐδαο,
οὐδ’ εἰ χρυσείη ’Αφροδίτῃ κάλλος ἐρίζοι,
ἔργα δ’, ’Αθηναίη.

1413 b χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτω οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ρήτορες.
διὸ πρεσβυτέρῳ λέγειν ἀπρεπές.

^a Or, “he says it is a case of the Carpathian and the hare.” An inhabitant of the island of Carpathus introduced a brace of hares, which so multiplied that they devoured all the crops and ruined the farmers (like the rabbits in Australia).

^b *Iliad*, ix. 385.

^c This must be taken as a parenthetical remark, if it is Aristotle's at all.

Proverbs also are metaphors from species to species. If a man, for instance, introduces into his house something from which he expects to benefit, but afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as the Carpathian^a says of the hare; for both have experienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and the reasons which make them so.

Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, "you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries," because the black eye is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole. Again, when one says "like this or that" there is a hyperbole differing only in the wording :

Like Philammon punching the leather sack,
or, "you would have thought that he was Philammon
fighting the sack";

Carrying his legs twisted like parsley,

or, "you would have thought that he had no legs,
but parsley, they being so twisted." There is something youthful about hyperboles; for they show vehemence. Wherefore those who are in a passion most frequently make use of them :

Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as the sand and dust . . . but a daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, I will not wed, not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.^b

(Attic orators are especially fond of hyperbole.^c) Wherefore^d it is unbecoming for elderly people to make use of them.

^a Because they are boyish.

12. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἐκάστῳ γένει
 ἀρμόττει λέξις. οὐ γάρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ
 ἀγωνιστική, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ καὶ δικανική. ἅμφω
 δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἔστιν ἐλληνίζειν
 ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν,
 ἃν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ
² πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν. ἔστι δὲ
 λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ
 ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἴδη· ἡ μὲν
 γάρ ἡθικὴ ἡ δὲ παθητική. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ
 τοὺς τοιούτους. βαστάζονται δὲ οἱ ἀναγνωστικοί,
 οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβῆς γάρ ὥσπερ λογογράφος)
 καὶ Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παρα-
 βαλλόμενοι οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι
 στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ρήτορων εὖ λεχθέντες
 ἴδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι
 ἀρμόττει· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφηρημένης τῆς
 ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται
 εὐήθη, οἷον τά τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ
 αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὄρθως ἀποδοκιμάζεται,
 ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ρήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι
³ γὰρ ὑποκριτικά. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸν
 λέγοντας· ὅπερ ὡς προοδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι·
 “οὗτός ἔστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὗτός ἔστιν ὁ ἔξ-
 απατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἔσχατον προδοῦναι ἐπιχειρή-
 σας.” οἷον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐποίει ἐν

^a See 2. 13 of this book.

^b What follows, to the end of § 3, is of the nature of a parenthesis, not immediately connected with the subject of the chapter.

^c The variation in the form of the expression suggests a similar variation in the form of the delivery or declamation.

12. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric. That of written compositions is not the same as that of debate ; nor, in the latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both ; for the one requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we wish to communicate something to others, which happens to those who do not know how to write. The style of written compositions is most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the latter there are two kinds, ethical and emotional ; this is why actors are always running after plays of this character, and poets after suitable actors. However, poets whose works are only meant for reading are also popular, as Chaeremon, who is as precise as a writer of speeches, and Licynnius^a among dithyrambic poets. When compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre in public debates, while those of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are amateurish when read. The reason is that they are only suitable to public debates ; hence speeches suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not fulfil their proper function and appear silly. For instance, asyndeta and frequent repetition of the same word are rightly disapproved in written speech, but in public debate even rhetoricians make use of them, for they lend themselves to acting.^b (But one must vary the expression when one repeats the same thing, for this as it were paves the way for declamation :^c as, “ This is he who robbed you, this is he who deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you.”) This is what Philemon the actor

τε τῇ Ἀναξανδρίδου γεροντομανίᾳ, ὅτε λέγει
 “‘Ραδάμανθυς καὶ Παλαμίδης,” καὶ ἐν τῷ προ-
 λόγῳ τῶν Εὐσεβῶν τὸ “ἐγώ.” ἐὰν γάρ τις τὰ
 τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίνεται “ὅ τὴν δοκὸν
 φέρων.”

4 Καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὥσαύτως· “ἡλθον, ἀπήντησα,
 ἐδεόμην” ἀνάγκη γάρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς
 ἐν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἥθει καὶ τόνῳ εἰπεῖν. ἔτι
 ἔχει ἴδιόν τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἵσῳ γάρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ
 δοκεῖ εἰρῆσθαι· ὁ γάρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά,
 ὥστ’ ἐὰν ἔξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τούναντίον ἔσται τὸ
 ἐν πολλά. ἔχει οὖν αὕξησιν· “ἡλθον, διελέχθην,
 1414 a ἵκέτευσα.” πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἰπεν.
 τοῦτο δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ “Ομηρος ἐν τῷ

Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν,
 Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης,
 Νιρεὺς ὃς κάλλιστος.

περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴρηται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις
 εἰρῆσθαι· εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ,
 ὥστε ηὗξησεν ἅπαξ μνησθεὶς διὰ τὸν παραλογισμόν,

^a The meaning of this has not been satisfactorily explained. On the face of it, it seems to mean that the excellency of Philemon's delivery consisted in his way of declaiming passages in which the same words were repeated. Philemon is not to be confused with the writer of the New Comedy, the rival and contemporary of Menander.

^b Used of a stiff, ungraceful speaker.

^c Spengel's reading here is: πολλὰ δοκεῖ “ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον,” πολλὰ δοκεῖ being parenthetical, and ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα

did in *The Old Man's Folly* of Anaxandrides, when he says "Rhadamanthus and Palamedes," and when he repeats the word "I" in the prologue to *The Pious*.^a For unless such expressions are varied by action, it is a case of "the man who carries the beam"^b in the proverb.)

It is the same with asyndeta: "I came, I met, I entreated." For here delivery is needed, and the words should not be pronounced with the same tone and character, as if there was only one clause. Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic; for in an equal space of time many things appear to be said, because the connecting particle makes many things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that the contrary will be the case, and that the one will become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces amplification: thus, in "I came, I conversed, I besought," the hearer seems to be surveying many things, all that the speaker said.^c This also is Homer's intention in the passage

Nireus, again, from Syme . . .,
Nireus son of Aglaia . . .,
Nireus, the most beautiful . . .;^d

for it is necessary that one of whom much has been said should be often mentioned; if then the name is often mentioned, it seems as if much has been said^e; so that, by means of this fallacy, Homer has increased

εἰπον part of the quotation. Jebb translates: "I came, I spoke to him, I besought" (these seem *many* things); "he disregarded all I said" (which certainly gives a more natural sense to *ὑπερεῖδεν*).

^a *Iliad*, ii. 671 ff.

^b Cope translates: "they think that, if the name is often repeated, there *must be a great deal to say* about its owner"; but can this be got out of the Greek (*εἰρῆσθαι*)?

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καὶ μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον ποιησάμενος.

5 'Η μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικε τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ἡ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρωτέρω ἡ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περίεργα καὶ χείρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ἐνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γάρ ἔστιν ρήτορικῆς· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ἀγών ἅπεστιν, ὥστε καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εὐδοκιμοῦσι ρήτορες· ἀλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἔνι. τοῦτο δέ, ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης.

6 'Η μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις· δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανική· τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περίεργον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἡ σώφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη ἥθους ἀρετή; τὸ γὰρ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὁρθῶς ὥρισται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δεῖ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ἄλλα πρέπουσαν; ἂν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῆ, οὐ

^a Intended to produce the effect of finished work at a distance before a large number of spectators.

^b The meaning apparently is that there is no discussion, as might be the case when there were several judges, so that the decision is clear and unbiased. ἀγών and ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις are terms used for debate (*e.g.* in the law courts) and the style suited to it (*cf.* § 1). Cope's editor refers to Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, i. 16. 8 "remoto illo studio contentionis, quem vos [you Athenians] ἀγῶνα appellatis." Jebb translates: "the

the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions him in one passage ; he has perpetuated his memory, although he never speaks of him again.

The deliberative style is exactly like a rough sketch,^a for the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view ; wherefore in both too much refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. But the forensic style is more finished, and more so before a single judge, because there is least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it ; there is no discussion,^b so the judgement is clear. This is why the same orators do not excel in all these styles ; where action is most effective, there the style is least finished, and this is a case in which voice, especially a loud one, is needed.

The epideictic style is especially suited to written compositions, for its function is reading ;^c and next to it comes the forensic style. It is superfluous to make the further distinction that style should be pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than temperate, liberal, or anything else that indicates moral virtue ? For it is evident that, if virtue of style has been correctly defined, what we have said will suffice to make it pleasant. For why, if not to please, need it be clear, not mean, but appropriate ? If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be

turmoil is absent, so that the judgement is serene" (in a note, "unclouded").

^a This does not seem to agree with the general view. Funeral orations of the nature of panegyrics, for instance, were certainly meant to be spoken ; but the *έργον* or proper function of an epideictic may be said to consist in reading, in its being agreeable to read. Its *τέλος* or end is to be read.

σαφής, οὐδὲ ἀν σύντομος. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἄρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἀν εὖ μιχθῆ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ἔνεικόν, καὶ ὁ ρυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἴρηται, καὶ κοινῇ περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ ἴδιᾳ περὶ ἔκαστον γένος· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τάξεως εἰπεῖν.

13. "Εστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τότ' ἀποδεῖξαι. διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδεῖξαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι μὴ προειπόντα ἀδύνατον· ὃ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι 2 προλέγει. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσίς ἐστι τὸ δὲ πίστις, ὥσπερ ἀν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα 3 τὸ δὲ ἀπόδειξις. νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις γάρ που τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν, ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ καὶ δημηγορικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἷαν λέγουσιν, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντί-
1414 b δικον, ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν; προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται, ὅταν ἀντιλογία ἦ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολλάκις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή· ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός, οἶον ἔαν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος, ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα

^a The generally accepted divisions are: *προοίμιον* (exordium), *διήγησις* (narrative), *πίστις* (proof), *ἐπίλογος* (peroration). (*διήγησις* is a species of *πρόθεσις*, which is used instead of it just before.) Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the forensic speech which requires a regular *διήγησις*, a full and detailed statement of what has happened before. In epideictic and demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the

clear ; but it is plain that the mean is most suitable. What we have said will make the style pleasant, if it contains a happy mixture of proper and “foreign” words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting from propriety. This finishes what we had to say about style ; of all the three kinds of Rhetoric in general, and of each of them in particular. It only remains to speak of arrangement.

13. A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without first putting it forward ; for both he who proves proves something, and he who puts something forward does so in order to prove it. The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the proof, a similar division to that of problem and demonstration. But the division now generally made is absurd ; for narrative only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in epideictic or deliberative speech how is it possible that there should be narrative as it is defined, or a refutation; or an epilogue in demonstrative speeches ?^a In deliberative speeches, again, exordium, comparison, and recapitulation are only admissible when there is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation and defence are often found in deliberative, but not *qua* deliberative speech. And further, the epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is short, or the matter is easy to object of which is to prove something, there is no need of another existing division called the refutation of the adversary, and in the demonstrative there can be no room for an epilogue, which is not a summary of *proofs and arguments*. Thus the necessary divisions of a speech are really only two : $\pi\rho\theta\epsilon\sigma\tau$ and $\pi\iota\sigma\tau$, or at most four.

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εύμνημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

4 Ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις. ἵδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν πίστεών ἔστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὕξησις τῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων· ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδὲ 5 ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλ' ἀναμιμνήσκει. ἔσται οὖν, ἂν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἔτερον καὶ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὄνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὅζους.

14. Τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν ἔστιν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὅπερ ἐν ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ' εἰσί, καὶ οἵον ὀδοποίησις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ὅμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίῳ· καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταί, ὃ τι ἀν εὑ ἔχωσιν αὐλῆσαι, τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτω γράφειν· ὃ τι γὰρ ἂν βούληται εὐθὺν εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάψαι. ὅπερ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἐλένης

^a i.e. its use is to recall the main facts briefly (§ 4 end), which in a short speech is needless.

^b Plato, *Phaedrus*, 266 D, where the additional kinds of narrative are omitted, and their place taken by *πίστωσις* and *ἐπιπίστωσις* (confirmation of the proof).

recollect ; for in the epilogue what happens is that there is a reduction of length.^a

So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium, statement, proof, epilogue ; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of the proofs ; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory. Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following Theodorus ^b and his school, who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a real difference ; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms introduced by Licymnius in his “Art,” where he speaks of “being wafted along,” “wandering from the subject,”^c and “ramifications.”^d

14. The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-playing ; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving the way for what follows. The prelude resembles the exordium of epideictic speeches ; for as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note, so also in epideictic speeches should be the composition of the exordium ; the speaker should say at once whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject. And all do this, an example being the exordium of the *Helen* of Isocrates ; for

^a Or, “ diverting the judge's attention.”

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προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰκεῖον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἐλένῃ. ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ, ἀρμόττει μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι.

2 Λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἡ ψόγου· οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὁλυμπικῷ λόγῳ “ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἐλληνες·” ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας· Ἰσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν, τοῦς

3 δ' εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὐθὲν ἀθλον ἐποίησαν. καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς, οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἡ τοὺς τοιούτους οἵ μήτε εὐδοκιμοῦσι μήτε φαῦλοι, ἀλλ' ὅσοι

1415 a ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἀδηλοι, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ

4 Πριάμου· οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει. ἔτι δ' ἐκ τῶν δικαιικῶν προοιμίων· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, εἰ περὶ παραδόξου λόγος ἡ περὶ χαλεποῦ ἡ περὶ τεθρυλημένου πολλοῖς, ὥστε συγγνώμην ἔχειν, οἷον Χοιρίλος

νῦν δ' ὅτε πάντα δέδασται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ τούτων, ἐξ ἐπαίνου, ἐκ ψόγου, ἐκ προτροπῆς, ἐξ ἀποτροπῆς, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· δεῖ δὲ ἡ ἔνα ἡ οἰκεῖα εἶναι τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ.

5 Τὰ δὲ τοῦ δικαιικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι

^a The subject of the oration was the praise of Helen, but Isoerates took the opportunity of attacking the sophists. This exemplifies his skill in the introduction of matter not strictly proper to, or in common with, the subject. The key-note is Helen; but the exordium is an attack on the Eristics, with special allusion to the Cynics and Megarians.

^b Of Samos, epic poet, author of a poem on the Persian

the eristics and Helen have nothing in common.^a At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from the point, this is more appropriate than that the speech should be monotonous.

In epideictic speeches, the sources of the exordia are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the *Olympiacus*, says, "Men of Greece, you are worthy to be admired by many," where he is praising those who instituted the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand blames them because they rewarded bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of wisdom. Exordia may also be derived from advice, for instance, "one should honour the good," wherefore the speaker praises Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor worthless, but who, although they are good, remain obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam; for this is a piece of advice. Again, they may be derived from forensic exordia, that is to say, from appeals to the hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, difficult, or commonly known, in order to obtain indulgence, like Choerilus^b:

But now when all has been allotted.

These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer. And these exordia^c may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech.

As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it must

war, from which this half-line and the context preserved in the Scholiast are taken. He complains that whereas the poets of olden times had plenty to write about, the field of poetry being as yet un-tilled, it was now all apportioned, and he, the last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find "a new chariot for the race-course of his song."

^a ἐνδόσιμα here = προοίμια.

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ταῦτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν διηθυράμβων ὅμοια τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς.

διὰ σὲ καὶ τεὰ δῶρα εἴτε σκῦλα.

6 ἐν δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐπεσι δεῦγμά ἔστι τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὐδὲν ὃ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμηται ἡ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾶ· ὃ δοὺς οὖν ὕσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἔχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά,

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε μοῦσα,

ἥγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὅπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης ἥλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.

καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δρᾶμα, κανὸν μὴ εὐθὺς ὕσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που, ὕσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς

ἔμοι πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος.

καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία ὡσαύτως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο, δηλῶσαι τί ἔστι τὸ τέλος οὐ ἔνεκα ὃ λόγος. διόπερ ἂν δῆλον ἦ καὶ μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐ χρηστέον προοιμίῳ. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα εἴδη οἷς χρῶνται, ιατρεύ-

^a A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic exordia are different. Those of a forensic speech are like prologues and epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic, which may be wild, high-flown, as in the example given from an unknown author.

^b That is, forensic speeches. *δράμασι* has been suggested for λόγοις.

^c *Iliad*, i. 1.

^d *Odyssey*, i. 1.

be noted that they produce the same effect as dramatic prologues and epic exordia (for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia :

For thee and thy presents or spoils).^a

But in speeches ^b and epic poems the exordia provide a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about, and that the mind may not be kept in suspense, for that which is undefined leads astray ; so then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story. Hence the following exordia :

Sing the wrath, O Muse.^c

Tell me of the man, O Muse.^d

Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into Europe.^e

Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their drama, if not at the outset, like Euripides, at least somewhere in the prologue, like Sophocles,

My father was Polybus.^f

It is the same in comedy. So then the most essential and special function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech ; wherefore it should not be employed, if the subject is quite clear or unimportant. All the other forms of exordia in use are only remedies,^g and are common to all three

^a From Choerilus (§ 4).

^b Sophocles, *Oed. Tyr.* 774. But this can hardly be called the prologue.

^c That is, special remedies in the case of the hearers suffering from "inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like" (Cope).

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ματα καὶ κοινά. λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου, ὅσα περὶ διαβολὴν λῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι, ἔστι δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως· ἀπολογουμένῳ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν, κατηγοροῦντι δ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ. δι' ὃ δέ, οὐκ ἄδηλον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὐτόν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀνελεῖν τὰ κωλύοντα, ὥστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολήν· τῷ δὲ διαβάλλοντι ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ διαβλητέον, ἵνα μνημονεύσωσι μᾶλλον.

Τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐκ τε τοῦ εὔνουν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίστε δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τούναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικόν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα πειρῶνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἄπαντα ἀνάξει, ἐάν τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικῆ φαίνεσθαι· προσ-
1415 β ἔχουσι γὰρ μᾶλλον τούτοις. προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἴδιοις, τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν· διὸ δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ὡς περὶ τοιούτων ὁ λόγος. ἐάν δὲ μὴ προσεκτικούς, ὅτι μικρόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ὅτι λυπηρόν.

8 Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος

branches of Rhetorie. These are derived from the speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the opponent. From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps to destroy or create prejudicee. But this must not be done in the same way ; for the defendant must deal with this at the beginning, the accuser in the epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant, when about to introducee himself, must remove all obstaeles, so that he must first clear away all prejudicee ; the accuser must create prejudice in the epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier recollection of it.

The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make him well disposed or to arouse his indignation, and sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite ; for it is not always expedient to engage his attention, whieh is the reason why many speakers try to make their hearers laugh. As for rendering the hearers traetable, everything will lead up to it if a person wishes, including the appearance of respectability, because respectable persons command more attention. Hearers pay most attention to things that are important, that concern their own interests, that are astonishing, that are agreeable ; wherefore one should put the idea into their heads that the speech deals with such subjects. To make his hearers inattentive, the speaker must persuade them that the matter is unimportant, that it does not concern them, that it is painful.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that all such things are outside the question, for they are only addressed to a hearer whose judgement is poor and who is ready to listen to what is beside the case ; for if he is not a man of this kind, there is no need

ἢ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλ' ἡ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλήν.
 9 ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικοὺς ποιεῦν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν, ἐὰν δέη· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιᾶσι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρχόμενοι. διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται. ὥστε ὅπου ἂν ἡ καιρός, λεκτέον “καὶ μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἡ ὑμέτερον” καὶ “ἔρω γὰρ ύμῖν οἶον οὐδεπώποτε” ἀκηκόατε δεινόν ἡ οὕτω θαυμαστόν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρόδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρ-
 10 εμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν οὐχ ἥπερ ἀκροατής, δῆλον· πάντες γὰρ ἡ διαβάλλουσιν ἡ φόβους ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις.

ἄναξ, ἔρω μὲν οὐχ ὅπως σπουδῆς ὅποι.

τί φροιμιάζῃ;

καὶ οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἡ δοκοῦντες· πανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἡ ἐν τῷ πράγματι. διὸ οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἔρωτά μενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ
 11 κύκλω, καὶ προοιμιάζονται. πόθεν δ' εὔνους δεῖ ποιεῖν, εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ δ' εὖ λέγεται

^a i.e. to claim the hearer's attention at the beginning, for every one is keen to listen then, but later on attention slackens.

^b The hearer *qua* hearer should be unbiased, but in fact

of an exordium, except just to make a summary statement of the subject, so that, like a body, it may have a head. Further, engaging the hearers' attention is common to all parts of the speech, if necessary ; for attention slackens everywhere else rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is ridiculous to put this ^a at the beginning, at a time when all listen with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one must say, " And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as myself" ; and, " I will tell you such a thing as you have never yet" heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus used to do ; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture. But it is clear that one does not speak thus to the hearer *qua* hearer ; ^b for all in their exordia endeavour either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own apprehensions :

O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come breathless].^c

Why this preamble ? ^d

This is what those also do who have, or seem to have, a bad case ; for it is better to lay stress upon anything rather than the case itself. That is why slaves never answer questions directly but go all round them, and indulge in preambles. We have stated ^e how the hearer's goodwill is to be secured and all other similar states of mind. And since it is rightly said,

hearers often suffer from the defects referred to in § 7, for which certain forms of exordia are remedies.

^c Sophocles, *Antigone*, 223.

^d Euripides, *Iphig. Taur.* 1162.

^e ii. 1. 7, 8.

δός μ' ἐσ Φαιήκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἡδ' ἐλεεινόν,
τούτων δεῖ δύο στοχάζεσθαι.

'Εν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς οἵεσθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν συνεπαινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀκροατήν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ γένος ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ἀμῶς γέ πως· ὁ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις.

12 Τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικαιικοῦ λόγου ἔστιν, φύσει δ' ἥκιστα ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οὐδὲν ἵσασι, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα προοιμίου, ἀλλ' ἢ δι' αὐτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ἡλίκον βούλει ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον. διὸ ἢ διαβάλλειν ἢ ἀπολύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἢ αὐξῆσαι ἢ μειώσαι. τούτων δὲ ἔνεκα προοιμίου δεῖται, ἢ κόσμου χάριν, ὡς αὐτοκάθιδα λα^{1416a} φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ. τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείους· οὐδὲν γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἄρχεται “Ἡλις πόλις εὐδαιμων.”

15. Περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὅν ἂν τις ὑπόληψιν δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιτο· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἴτε εἰπόντος τινὸς εἴτε μή, ὥστε τοῦτο καθόλον.
2 ἄλλος τρόπος ὥστε πρὸς τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἀπαντᾶν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ βλαβερόν, ἢ οὐ τούτῳ, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικοῦτον ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον ἢ οὐ μέγα

^a *Odyssey*, vii. 327.

^b See i. 9. 30.

^c Another reading is *τόπος* (topic) and so throughout.

Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friendship or compassion,^a

the orator should aim at exciting these two feelings.

In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares the praise, either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that “it is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of Lacedaemonians.”^b

Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except for the orator’s own sake, or on account of his adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too little importance to the question according to his idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia; or else they merely serve the purpose of ornament, since their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For such is the encomium on the Eleans, in which Gorgias, without any preliminary sparring or movements, starts off at once, “Elis, happy city.”

15. One way of removing prejudice is to make use of the arguments by which one may clear oneself from disagreeable suspicion; for it makes no difference whether this suspicion has been openly expressed or not; and so this may be taken as a general rule. Another way^c consists in contesting the disputed points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness, at least to the plaintiff; or by asserting that its importance is exaggerated; or that it is not unjust

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ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἢ οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· περὶ γὰρ τοιούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, ὥσπερ Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ναυσικράτην· ἔφη γὰρ ποιῆσαι δὲ ἐλεγε καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀδικεῦν. ἢ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι ἀδικοῦντα, εἰ βλαβερὸν ἀλλὰ καλόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν ἀλλ’ ὠφέλιμον ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

3 "Ἄλλος τρόπος ὡς ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα ἢ ἀτύχημα ἢ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς διαβάλλων ἔφη, ἵνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἔκόντι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἔτη ὄγδοηκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δὲ διεβάλλετο ποιῆσαι, συνέβη δὲ βλαβῆναι· "δίκαιον δὲ μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν."

4 "Ἄλλος, εἰ ἐμπειρείληπται δὲ διαβάλλων, ἢ νῦν 5 ἢ πρότερον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπειριλαμβάνονται, οὓς ὅμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ διαβολῇ, οἷον εἰ ὅτι καθάριος μοιχός, καὶ δὲνα καὶ δὲνα ἄρα.

6 "Ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους διέβαλεν, ἢ ἄλλος αὐτούς, ἢ ἄνευ διαβολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο ὥσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἵ πεφήνασιν οὐκ ἔνοχοι.

^a Sophocles had two sons, Iophon and Ariston, by different wives; the latter had a son named Sophocles. Iophon, jealous of the affection shown by Sophocles to this grandson, summoned him before the *phratores* (a body which had some jurisdiction in family affairs) on the ground that his age rendered him incapable of managing his affairs. In reply to the charge, Sophocles read the famous ehoric ode on Attica from the *Oedipus Coloneus*, beginning Εὐπίπου, ξένε, τᾶσδε | χώρας (668 ff.), and was acquitted. The story in this form is probably derived from some comedy, which introduced the case on the stage (see Jebb's Introd. to the tragedy).

^b In the reading in the text, αὐτούς must apparently refer

at all, or only slightly so ; or neither disgraceful nor important. These are the possible points of dispute : as Iphicrates, in answer to Nausierates, admitted that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and inflicted damage, but denied that he had been guilty of wrongdoing. Again, one may strike the balance, when guilty of wrongdoing, by maintaining that although the action was injurious it was honourable, painful but useful, or anything else of the kind.

Another method consists in saying that it was a case of error, misfortune, or necessity ; as, for example, Sophocles said that he trembled, not, as the accuser said, in order to appear old, but from necessity, for it was against his wish that he was eighty years of age.^a One may also substitute one motive for another, and say that one did not mean to injure but to do something else, not that of which one was accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental : “I should deserve your hatred, had I acted so as to bring this about.”

Another method may be employed if the accuser, either himself or one closely related to him has been involved in a similar charge, either now or formerly ; or, if others are involved who are admittedly not exposed to the charge ; for instance, if it is argued that so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is a dandy, then so-and-so must be.

Again, if the accuser has already similarly accused others, or himself been accused by others ;^b or if others, without being formally accused, have been suspected as you are now, and their innocence has been proved.

to the defendant, and one would rather expect *αὐτόν*. Spengel's suggested *ἢ ἄλλος ἢ αὐτός* for *ἢ ἄλλος αὐτούς* : “if he (*i.e.* the adversary) or another has similarly accused others.”

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- 7 "Αλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν διαβάλλοντα· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὃς αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ τούτου λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοί.
- 8 "Αλλος, εἰ γέγονε κρίσις, ὥσπερ Εὔριπίδης πρὸς 'Τγιαίνοντα ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβῆς, ὃς γ' ἐποίησε κελεύων ἐπιορκεῖν
 ή γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ', ή δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος.
 ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγῶνος κρίσεις εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἄγοντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδωκέναι λόγον ἢ δώσειν, εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.
- 9 "Αλλος ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκου, καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι ἄλλας κρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι.
- 1416 b Κοινὸς δ' ἀμφοῖν ὁ τόπος τὸ σύμβολα λέγειν, οἶνον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι οἴκειος τῷ Πριάμῳ· ἡ γὰρ Ἰσιόνη ἀδελφή· ὁ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἔχθρος τῷ Πριάμῳ, δὲ Τελαμών, καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατεῖπε τῶν κατασκόπων.

^a When a citizen was called upon to perform a "liturgy" or public service (*e.g.* the equipment of a chorus), if he thought that one richer than himself had been passed over he could summon him and compel him to exchange properties.

^b *Hippolytus*, 612. This well-known verse is three times parodied in Aristophanes (*Thesmophoriazusae*, 275; *Frogs*, 101, 1471). In the first passage, the sense is reversed: Euripides has dressed up a certain Mnesilochus as a woman in order that he may attend the Thesmophorian assembly. Mnesilochus first requires Euripides to take an oath that he will help him out of any trouble that may arise. Euripides takes an oath by all the gods, whereupon Mnesilochus says to Euripides: "Remember that it was your mind that swore, but not your tongue."

When Euripides was engaged in a lawsuit, his adversary quoted the line, implying that even on oath Euripides could

Another method consists in counter-attacking the accuser ; for it would be absurd to believe the words of one who is himself unworthy of belief.

Another method is to appeal to a verdict already given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange of property ;^a when Hygiaenon accused him of impiety as having advised perjury in the verse,

My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,^b

Euripides replied that his accuser did wrong in transferring the decisions of the court of Dionysus to the law courts ; for he had already rendered an account of what he had said there,^c or was still ready to do so, if his adversary desired to accuse him.

Another method consists in attacking slander, showing how great an evil it is, and this because it alters the nature of judgements,^d and that it does not rely on the real facts of the case.

Common to both parties is the topic of tokens, as, in the *Teucer*,^e Odysseus reproaches Teucer with being a relative of Priam, whose sister his mother Hesione was ; to which Teucer replied that his father Telamon was the enemy of Priam, and that he himself did not denounce the spies.^f

not be believed ; Euripides replied that his adversary had no right to bring before the law courts a matter which had already been settled by the theatrical judges.

^a In the great Dionysiac theatre.

^b Or, "makes extraneous points the subject of decision" (Cope), "raises false issues" (Jebb).

^c Of Sophocles.

^f Who had been sent to Troy by the Greeks to spy upon the Trojans. It seems that he was afterwards accused of treachery, the *token* being the fact that Teucer was a near connexion of Priam ; to which he replied with another *token* that his father was an enemy of Priam, and further, when the Greek spies were in Troy, he never betrayed them.

10 "Άλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, τὸ ἐπαινοῦντι μικρὸν μακρῶς φέξαι μέγα συντόμως, ἢ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα προφέρει ἐν φέξαι. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι· τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ βλάπτει πειρῶνται, μιγνύντες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ.

Κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἔνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· οἶνον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσσέα προείλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, τῷ δ' ὅτι οὕ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῦλον. καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

16. Διήγησις δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος· σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον (οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων) τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς τέχνης· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἐστὶ δεῖξαι, ἐὰν ἢ ἅπιστον, ἢ ὅτι 2 ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐφεξῆς δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι πάντα, ὅτι δυσμνημόνευτον τὸ δεικνύναι οὕτως. ἐκ μὲν οὖν

^a Jebb refers *τοιοῦτοι* to the accusers, translating *τεχνικοί* “artistic,” certainly the commoner meaning.

^b Involving a continuous succession of proofs.

Another method, suitable for the accuser, is to praise something unimportant at great length, and to condemn something important concisely ; or, putting forward several things that are praiseworthy in the opponent, to condemn the one thing that has an important bearing upon the case. Such methods ^a are most artful and unfair ; for by their use men endeavour to make what is good in a man injurious to him, by mixing it up with what is bad.

Another method is common to both accuser and defender. Since the same thing may have been done from several motives, the accuser must disparage it by taking it in the worse sense, while the defender must take it in the better sense. For instance, when Diomedes chose Odysseus for his companion, it may be said on the one hand that he did so because he considered him to be the bravest of men, on the other, that it was because Odysseus was the only man who was no possible rival for him, since he was a poltroon. Let this suffice for the question of prejudice.

16. In the epideictic style the narrative should not be consecutive, but disjointed ; for it is necessary to go through the actions which form the subject of the speech. For a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being in no way the author of the actions which he relates), and of another that does depend upon art. The latter consists in showing that the action did take place, if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three together. This is why it is sometimes right not to narrate all the facts consecutively, because a demonstration of this kind ^b is difficult to remember. From some facts a man

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τούτων ἀνδρεῖος, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε σοφὸς ἢ δίκαιος.
 καὶ ἀπλούστερος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ποικίλος
 3 καὶ οὐ λιτός. δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀνα-
 μιμνήσκειν· διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως,
 οἷον εἰ θέλεις Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖν· ἵσασι γὰρ πάντες
 τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς δεῖ. εἰὰν δὲ
 4 Κριτίαν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἵσασιν. . . . νῦν δὲ
 γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασι δεῦν εἶναι ταχεῖαν.
 καίτοι ὥσπερ ὁ τῷ μάττοντι ἔρομένω πότερον
 σκληρὰν ἢ μαλακὴν μάξη, “τί δ”; ἔφη, “εὖ
 ἀδύνατον;” καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὄμοιώς δεῖ γὰρ μὴ
 μακρῶς διηγεῖσθαι ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προοιμιάζεσθαι
 μακρῶς, οὐδὲ τὰς πίστεις λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθά
 ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ τὸ ταχὺ ἢ τὸ συντόμως, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μετρίως· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ λέγειν ὅσα δηλώσει
 1417 a τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ ὅσα ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν γεγονέναι ἢ
 βεβλαφέναι ἢ ἡδικηκέναι, ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἡλίκα
 5 βούλει· τῷ δὲ ἐναντίῳ τὰ ἐναντία. παραδιηγεῖσθαι
 δὲ ὅσα εἰς τὴν σὴν ἀρετὴν φέρει, οἷον “ἔγὼ δ'
 ἐνουθέτονν ἀεὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγων, μὴ τὰ τέκνα
 ἐγκαταλείπειν.” ἢ θατέρου κακίαν· “οὐδὲ ἀπεκρί-
 νατό μοι ὅτι οὐδὲν ἦν ἢ αὐτός, ἔσται ἀλλα παιδία.”
 ὁ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους Αἴγυπτίους ἀποκρίνασθαι
 φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος. ἢ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς δικασταῖς.
 6 Ἀπολογουμένω δὲ ἐλάττων ἡ διήγησις, αἱ δ'

^a Something has been lost here, as is shown by the transition from epideictic to forensic Rhetoric. All the mss. have a gap, which in several of them is filled by introducing the passage ἔστι δ' ἐπαινος . . . μετατεθῆ (i. 9. 33-37).

^b ii. 30. The story was that a number of Egyptian soldiers had revolted and left in a body for Ethiopia. Their king Psammetichus begged them not to desert their wives

may be shown to be courageous, from others wise or just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, whereas the other is intricate and not plain. It is only necessary to recall famous actions ; wherefore most people have no need of narrative—for instance, if you wish to praise Achilles ; for everybody knows what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of it. But if you wish to praise Critias, narrative is necessary, for not many people know what he did. . . .^a

But at the present day it is absurdly laid down that the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man said to the baker when he asked whether he was to knead bread hard or soft, “What ! is it impossible to knead it well ?” so it is in this case ; for the narrative must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the proofs either. For in this case also propriety does not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a due mean ; that is, one must say all that will make the facts clear, or create the belief that they have happened or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish to make them. The opposite party must do the opposite. And you should incidentally narrate anything that tends to show your own virtue, for instance, “ I always recommended him to act rightly, not to forsake his children ” ; or the wickedness of your opponent, for instance, “ but he answered that, wherever he might be, he would always find other children,” an answer attributed by Herodotus ^b to the Egyptian rebels ; or anything which is likely to please the dicasts.

In defence, the narrative need not be so long ; for

and children, to which one of them made answer (*τῶν δέ τινα λέγεται δέξαντα τὸ αἰδοῖον εἰπεῖν, ἐνθα ἀν τοῦτο γέ, ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖσι ἐνθαῦτα καλ τέκνα καλ γυναῖκας*).

ἀμφισβητήσεις ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ βλαβερὸν εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἄδικον ἢ μὴ τηλικοῦτον, ὥστε περὶ τὸ ὅμολογούμενον οὐδὲ διατριπτέον, ἐὰν μή τι εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνῃ, οἷον εἰ πέπρακται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ 7 ἄδικον. ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν, ὅσα μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οἴκτον ἢ δείνωσιν φέρει. παράδειγμα δὲ Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἔξήκοντα ἔπεσι πεποίηται. καὶ ὡς Φάϋλλος τὸν κύκλον, καὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ Οἰνεῖ πρόλογος.

8 Ἡθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἥθος ποιεῖ· ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαιρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἥθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαιρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἵ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἥθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαιρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ’ οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν.

9 ἄλλα ἥθικὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἥθει, οἷον ὅτι ἀμα λέγων ἐβάδιζεν· δηλοῦ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν ἥθους. καὶ μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως. “ἐγὼ δὲ ἐβουλόμην· καὶ προειλόμην γὰρ τοῦτο· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ὡνήμην, βέλτιον.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ φρονίμου τὸ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ· φρονίμου μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ ὡφέλιμον διώκειν, ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸ καλόν. ἀν δὲ ἀπιστον ἥ, τότε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, ὥσπερ Σοφοκλῆς ποιεῖ παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον

^a *Odysssey*, xxiii. 264-284, 310-343. The title referred to the narrative in Books ix.-xii. It became proverbial for a long-winded story.

^b He apparently summarized it.

^c Of Euripides. It was apparently very compact.

the points at issue are either that the fact has not happened or that it was neither injurious nor wrong nor so important as asserted, so that one should not waste time over what all are agreed upon, unless anything tends to prove that, admitting the act, it is not wrong. Again, one should only mention such past things as are likely to excite pity or indignation if described as actually happening; for instance, the story of Alcinous, because in the presence of Penelope it is reduced to sixty lines,^a and the way in which Phayllus dealt with the epic cycle,^b and the prologue to the *Oeneus*.^c

And the narrative should be of a moral character, and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this. One thing is to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose. For this reason mathematical treatises have no moral character, because neither have they moral purpose; for they have no moral end. But the Socratic dialogues have; for they discuss such questions. Other ethical indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each individual character; for instance, "He was talking and walking on at the same time," which indicates effrontery and boorishness. Nor should we speak as if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day orators, but from moral purpose: "But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if I profited nothing, it is better." The first statement indicates prudence, the second virtue; for prudence consists in the pursuit of what is useful, virtue in that of what is honourable.^d If anything of the kind seems incredible, then the reason must be added; of this Sophocles gives an example, where his Antigone says

τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολόμενα,

μητρὸς δ' ἐν ἄδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων
οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅς τις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.

ἔὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ἀπιστα-
λέγων, ἀλλὰ φύσει τοιοῦτος εἶ· ἀπιστοῦσι γὰρ
ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἔκοντα πλὴν τὸ συμφέρον.

10 "Επι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγειν, διηγούμενοι
καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα καὶ ἀ ἵσασι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἢ αὐτῶν
ἢ ἐκείνῳ προσόντα· "ό δ' ὥχετό με ὑποβλέψας."

1417 b καὶ ὡς περὶ Κρατύλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων
καὶ τοῦ χεροῦ διασείων· πιθανὰ γάρ, διότι σύμ-
βολα γίνεται ταῦτα ἀ ἵσασιν ἐκείνων ὥν οὐκ ἵσασιν
πλεῖστα δὲ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὁμήρου ἔστιν.

ώς ἄρ' ἔφη, γρηγὸς δὲ κατέσχετο χερσὶ πρόσωπα·

οἱ γὰρ δακρύειν ἀρχόμενοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῷ
ὅφθαλμῷ. καὶ εὐθὺς εἰσάγαγε σεαυτὸν ποιό-
τινα, ἵνα ὡς τοιοῦτον θεωρῶσι καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον
λανθάνων δὲ ποίει. ὅτι δὲ ράδιον, ὄρāν δεῖ ἐν
τῷ ἀπαγγελλόντων· περὶ ὧν γὰρ μηθὲν ἵσμενον
ὅμως λαμβάνομεν ὑπόληψίν τινα.

11 Πολλαχοῦ δὲ δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐ-

^a *Antigone*, 911-912, where the mss. have κεκευθτον instead of Aristotle's βεβηκότων.

^b Whereas this man makes his temperament responsible for the strange things he does; he is built that way and cannot help it.

^c Supposed to be Aeschines called Socratiens from his intimate friendship with Socrates. A philosopher and writer of speeches for the law courts, he had a great reputation as an orator.

that she cared more for her brother than for her husband or children ; for the latter can be replaced after they are gone,

but when father and mother are in the grave, no brother can ever be born.^a

If you have no reason, you should at least say that you are aware that what you assert is incredible, but that it is your nature ; for no one believes that a man ever does anything of his own free will except from motives of self-interest.^b

Further, the narrative should draw upon what is emotional by the introduction of such of its accompaniments as are well known, and of what is specially characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary : “ And he went off looking grimly at me ” ; and as Aeschines^c says of Cratylus, that he hissed violently and violently shook his fists. Such details produce persuasion because, being known to the hearer, they become tokens of what he does not know. Numerous examples of this may be found in Homer :

Thus she spoke, and the aged nurse covered her face with her hands ;^d

for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on their eyes. And you should at once introduce yourself and your adversary as being of a certain character, that the hearers may regard you or him as such ; but do not let it be seen. That this is easy is perfectly clear^e from the example of messengers ; we do not yet know what they are going to say, but nevertheless we have an inkling of it.

Again, the narrative should be introduced in several

^a *Odyssey*, xix. 361.

^c δεῖ (omitted by others) = “ one cannot help seeing.”

ἀρχῆ. ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἥκιστα διήγησίς ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγεῖται· ἀλλ' ἔάν περ διήγησις ἦ, τῶν γενομένων ἔσται, ἵν' ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλεύσωνται περὶ τῶν ὕστερον. ἢ διαβάλλοντες, ἢ ἐπαινοῦντες. ἀλλὰ τότε οὐ τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον. ἂν δ' ἦ ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι [τε] καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθύς, καὶ διατάττειν οἷς βούλονται, οἷον ἡ Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι ἀεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν νίον. καὶ ὁ Αἴμων ὁ Σοφοκλέους.

17. Τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι· ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ χρή, ἐπεὶ περὶ τεττάρων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητουμένου φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· οἷον εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν ἀμφισβητεῖ, ἐν τῇ κρίσει δεῖ τούτου μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν, εἰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαψεν, τούτου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τοσόνδε ἡ ὅτι δικαίως, ὥσαντως καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι 2 τοῦτο ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις. μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνη τὸν

^a Omitting *τε*. The difficulty is διατάττειν, which can apparently only mean “arrange.” Jebb retains *τε*, and reads ὡς for οἷς: “the speaker must make himself responsible for the fact . . . and marshal his reasons in a way acceptable to the hearers.” The old Latin translation *vadiare quibus volunt* suggested to Roemer διαιτητᾶς, “to the arbitrators they approve.”

^b According to Jebb, Jocasta tells the inquirer incredible things about her son, and pledges her word for the facts. Cope says: “promises (to do something or other to satisfy him).”

^c *Antigone*, 683-723. On this Cope remarks: “This last example must be given up as hopeless; there is nothing in the extant play which could be interpreted as required here.”

places, sometimes not at all at the beginning. In deliberative oratory narrative is very rare, because no one can narrate things to come ; but if there is narrative, it will be of things past, in order that, being reminded of them, the hearers may take better counsel about the future. This may be done in a spirit either of blame or of praise ; but in that case the speaker does not perform the function of the deliberative orator. If there is anything incredible, you should immediately promise both to give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the judgement of any whom the hearers approve ;^a as, for instance, Jocasta in the *Oedipus* of Carcinus^b is always promising, when the man who is looking for her son makes inquiries of her ; and similarly Haemon in Sophocles.^c

17. Proofs should be demonstrative, and as the disputed points are four, the demonstration should bear upon the particular point disputed ; for instance, if the fact is disputed, proof of this must be brought at the trial before anything else ; or if it is maintained that no injury has been done ; or that the act was not so important as asserted ; or was just, then this must be proved, the three last questions being matters of dispute just as the question of fact. But do not forget that it is only in the case of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of

According to Jebb, the “incredibility” consists in the fact that Haemon, although in love with Antigone, and strongly opposed to the sentence pronounced upon her by his father Creon, still remains loyal to the latter. Haemon explains the reason in lines 701-3, where he says that he prizes his father’s welfare more than anything else, for a father’s good name and prosperity is the greatest ornament for children, as is the son’s for the father.

ARISTOTLE

ἔτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία,
ῶσπερ ἂν εἴ τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῦν,
ῶστ' ἐν τούτῳ χρονιστέον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐ.

3 'Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς τὸ πολύ, ὅτι καλὰ καὶ
ώφελιμα, ἡ αὐξῆσις ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα δεῖ
πιστεύεσθαι· ὀλιγάκις γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις
φέρουσιν, ἐὰν ἀπιστα ἥ ἥ ἐὰν ἄλλος αἰτίαν ἔχῃ.

4 'Ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς ἡ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμφι-
σβητήσειν ἂν τις, ἡ ὡς ἔσται μὲν ἀ κελεύει, ἀλλ'
οὐ δίκαια ἡ οὐκ ὠφελιμα ἡ οὐ τηλικαῦτα. δεῖ
δὲ καὶ ὄραν εἴ τι ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ πράγματος·
τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι
1418a φεύδεται.

5 "Εστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτατα,
τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα δικαιικώτερα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ
τὸ μέλλον, ὡστ' ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παρ-
δείγματα λέγειν, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἡ μὴ ὄντων,
οὐ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξίς ἔστι καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ
6 τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ

^a Aristotle's argument is as follows. But it must not be forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue. For ignorance is not the cause (of there being a dispute about the fact, e.g. "you hit me," "no, I didn't," where both know the truth), as it might be in a dispute on what was right or wrong, so that this is the topic on which you should spend some time (*i.e.* because here you can prove or disprove that A is *πονηρός*).

The passage is generally taken to mean that when it is a question of fact it is universally true that one of the disputants must be a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes any comment. In his note he says: "all that is meant is that there is a certain class of cases which fall under this

the two parties must necessarily^a be a rogue ; for ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question of right or wrong were the issue ; so that in this case one should spend time on this topic, but not in the others.

In epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honourable or useful ; for the facts must be taken on trust, since proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they are incredible or the responsibility is attributed to another.^b

In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary recommends will happen, but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important as supposed. But one must also look to see whether he makes any false statements as to things outside the issue ; for these look like evidence that he makes misstatements about the issue itself as well.

^f Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned with the future, so that its examples must be derived from the past ; the second with the question of the existence or non-existence of facts, in which demonstrative and necessary proofs are more in place ; for the past involves a kind of necessity.^c One should not introduce a series of enthymemes continuously issue, in which this topic may be safely used.” For instance, A may on justifiable grounds charge B with theft ; B denies it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is strongly against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is necessarily *πονηρός*.

^b Or, reading *ἄλλως*, “ if there is some other reason.”

^c It is irrevocable, and it is possible to discuss it with some degree of certainty, whereas the future is quite uncertain, and all that can be done is to draw inferences from the past.

ARISTOTLE

ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ' ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μή, κατα-
βλάπτει ἄλληλα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος·

ω̄ φίλ', ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσ' ἀν πεπνυμένος ἀνήρ,

7 ἀλλ' οὐ τοιαῦτα. καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα
ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, ποιήσεις ὅπερ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν
φιλοσοφούντων, οἱ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα
8 καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν. καὶ ὅταν πάθος
ποιῆσι, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ
πάθος ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα·
ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας αἱ ἄμα, καὶ
ἢ ἀφανίζουσιν ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν. οὐδέν ὅταν
ἡθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ δεῖ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἄμα·
οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὕτε ἥθος οὕτε προαιρεσιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

9 Γνώμαις δὲ χρηστέον καὶ ἐν διηγήσει καὶ ἐν
πίστει ἡθικὸν γάρ. “καὶ ἐγὼ δέδωκα, καὶ ταῦτ'
εἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεῖ πιστεύειν.” ἐὰν δὲ παθητικῶς,
“καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἡδικημένω· τούτῳ
μὲν γὰρ περίεστι τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον.”

10 Τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι,
εἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ μέλλον· ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ τὸ
γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἥδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς
ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν
ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονό-

but mix them up ; otherwise they destroy one another. For there is a limit of quantity ; thus,

Friend, since thou hast said as much as a wise man would say,^a

where Homer does not say *τοιαῦτα* (such things as), but *τόσα* (as many things as). Nor should you try to find enthymemes about everything ; otherwise you will be imitating certain philosophers, who draw conclusions that are better known and more plausible than the premises from which they are drawn.^b And whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or it will be useless ; for simultaneous movements drive each other out, the result being their mutual destruction or weakening. Nor should you look for an enthymeme at the time when you wish to give the speech an ethical character ; for demonstration involves neither moral character nor moral purpose.

Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used in both narrative and proof ; for they express moral character ; for instance, " I gave him the money and that although I knew that one ought not to trust." Or, to arouse emotion : " I do not regret it, although I have been wronged ; his is the profit, mine the right."

Deliberative speaking is more difficult than forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with the future ; whereas forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known, even by diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said ; for he used to divine, not the future, but only things that were past

^a *Odyssey*, iv. 204.

^b For this passage see i. 2. 12-13. The meaning is that it is absurd to prove what every one knows already.

των μὲν ἀδήλων δέ· καὶ ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς δικαινικοῖς ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ρᾶσιν εὑρεῖν ἀπόδειξιν· καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' ἡκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἔξιστηται. δεῖ οὖν ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ρήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖν, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δ' ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ.

11 Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνους, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ ὁ ἔλεγε Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο ἐστιν· εἰ γάρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει, Πηλεα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὄμοιώς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν, ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ

12 ποιεῖ ἢ τοιόνδε ἐστίν. ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις
1418 b καὶ ἡθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἡθικῶς· καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπεικεῖ ἀρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.

13 Τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὔδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἐλεγχον ποιεῖ,

^a The remark of Epimenides is by many editors interpreted as a sarcasm upon the fraternity of soothsayers, who pretended to be able to *foretell the future*. But how is this to be got out of the Greek? The point is perhaps something like: "it is easy enough to talk about the past, for even soothsayers know it." What Aristotle says here is that Epimenides practised a different kind of divination, relating to the obscure phenomena of the past. The following is an instance. After the followers of Cylon, who tried to make himself tyrant of Athens (c. 632) had been put to death by the Alemaeonid archon Megacles, in violation of the terms of surrender, a curse rested upon the city and it was devastated by a pestilence. On the advice of the oracle,

but obscure.^a Further, the law is the subject in forensic speaking ; and when one has a starting-point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. Deliberative speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance, attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion. In this branch of Rhetoric there is less room for these than in any other, unless the speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when at a loss for topics, one must do as the orators at Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when deliberating, he brings accusations against the Lacedaemonians, for instance, in the *Panegyricus*,^b and against Chares in the *Symmachikos* (On the Peace).^c

Epidictic speeches should be varied with laudatory episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always bringing somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant when he said that he was never at a loss for something to say ; for, if he is speaking of Peleus, he praises Achilles, then Aeacus, then the god ; similarly courage, which does this and that,^d or is of such a kind. If you have proofs, then, your language must be both ethical and demonstrative ; if you have no enthymemes, ethical only. In fact, it is more fitting that a virtuous man should show himself good than that his speech should be painfully exact.

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative, because, in all cases of refutation, it

Epimenides was summoned from Crete, and by certain rites and sacrifices purified the city and put a stop to the pestilence.

^b 110-114.

^c 27.

^d He enumerates all the deeds that proceed from courage. Another reading is ἡ τὰ καὶ τά, ποιεῖ δὲ τοιόνδε ἔστιν, i.e. when praising courage, and this or that, he is employing a method of the kind mentioned.

μᾶλλον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελόγισται· παράλληλα γὰρ
 14 μᾶλλον τάναντία γνωρίζεται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν
 ἀντίδικον οὐχ ἔτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεων
 ἔστι τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ.
 δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν
 λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ
 πρὸς τάναντία ἀπαντᾶν λύοντα καὶ προδιασύροντα.
 ἀν δὲ πολύχους ἥτις ἐναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ
 ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος ἐν τῇ Μεσ-
 σηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελῶν οὕτως
 15 τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν. ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον
 τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ
 ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον, καὶ μάλιστα ἀν εὑδοκιμηκότα
 ἥτις ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδιαβεβλημένον οὐ
 δέχεται ἡ ψυχή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον,
 εἰὰν δὲ ἐναντίος εὖ δοκῇ εἰρηκέναι. δεῖ οὖν χώραν
 ποιεῦν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἔσται
 δέ, ἀν ἀνέλησ. διὸ ἥτις πρὸς πάντα ἥτις τὰ μέγιστα ἥτις
 τὰ εὑδοκιμοῦντα ἥτις τὰ εὐέλεγκτα μαχεσάμενον
 οὕτω τὰ αὐτοῦ πιστὰ ποιητέον.

^a There is no difference in form between the demonstrative and refutative enthymeme, but the latter draws opposite conclusions; and opposites are always more striking when they are brought together, and a parallel drawn between them. It is then easy to see where the fallacy lies. Cf. ii. 23.30: "Refutative enthymemes are more effective (popular) than demonstrative, because they bring opposites together in a small compass, which are more striking (clearer) to the hearer from being put side by side."

is clearer that a logical conclusion has been reached ; for opposites are more noticeable when placed in juxtaposition.^a The refutation of the opponent is not a particular kind of proof ; his arguments should be refuted partly by objection, partly by countersyllogism.^b In both deliberative and forensic rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own proofs and afterwards meet the arguments of the opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces beforehand. But if the opposition is varied,^c these arguments should be dealt with first, as Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly ; in fact, it was only after he had first refuted what his opponents were likely to say that he put forward his own proofs. He who replies should first state the arguments against the opponent's speech, refuting and answering it by syllogisms, especially if his arguments have met with approval. For as the mind is ill-disposed towards one against whom prejudices have been raised beforehand, it is equally so towards a speech, if the adversary is thought to have spoken well. One must therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the speech one intends to make ; and for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by the adversary. Wherefore it is only after having combated all the arguments, or the most important, or those which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that you should substantiate your own case :

^a In the translation $\tauῶν πλοτεῶν$ is taken with $\epsilon\sigma\tauι$: it is the business of, the proper function of, proofs. Others take it with $\tauὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ$: some . . . other (of the opponent's arguments).

^c If the opponent's arguments are numerous and strong, by reason of the varied nature of the points dealt with.

ARISTOTLE

ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι.
ἔγὼ γὰρ Ἡραν . . .

ἐν τούτοις ἥψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου.

16 Περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἥθος,
ἐπειδὴ ἔνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ
μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ
λοιδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἔτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν,
ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ
ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἀρχιλοχος φέγει· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν
πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ

χρημάτων δ' ἄελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἀπώμοτον,
καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ οὐδὲ
ἀρχὴ

οὕ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.

17 καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης
πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ

^a Euripides, *Troades*, 969-971. Hecuba had advised Menelaus to put Helen to death; she defends herself at length, and is answered by Hecuba in a reply of which these words form part. Her argument is that none of the three goddesses who contended for the prize of beauty on Mt. Ida would have been such fools as to allow Argos and Athens to become subject to Troy as the result of the contest, which was merely a prank.

^b 4-7. Isocrates says that *his friends* thought very highly of one of his addresses, as likely to bring peace.

^c 132-139, 141-149. Here again Isocrates puts compliments on his composition into the mouth of an imaginary friend.

^d Archilochus (*c.* 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule, the daughter of Lycambes. Her father broke off the engagement, whereupon Archilochus pursued father and daughter with furious and scurrilous abuse. It is here said

I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not think] that Hera . . .^a

in this passage the poet has first seized upon the weakest argument.

So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates does in the *Philippus*^b and in the *Antidosis*.^c Archilochus uses the same device in censure ; for in his iambics he introduces the father speaking as follows of his daughter :

There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be sworn impossible,^d

and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse beginning

I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges ;^e

Sophocles, also,^f introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as if quoting the opinion that, instead of attacking the daughter directly, he represented her as being attacked by her father. The meaning of *ἀελπτον* is not clear. It may be a general statement : the unexpected often happens ; or, there is nothing so bad that you may not expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates : "There is nothing that money cannot procure," meaning that the father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag. 74).

^e The line ends : *τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει*. Archilochus represents Charon the carpenter as expressing his own disapproval of the desire for wealth and of the envy caused by others possessing it.

^f Here again, Haemon similarly puts his own feelings as to Creon's cruel treatment of Antigone into the mouth of the people of the city, and refers to popular rumour.

καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίστε, οἶον “χρὴ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῦεν.” ἐνθυμηματικῶς δέ “εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὡφελιμώταται ὥσι καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι.”

18. Περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὔκαιρον ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἔτερον εἰρηκὼς ἦ, ὥστε ἐνὸς προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον· οἶον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἱερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἶον τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἥρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δὲ “καὶ πῶς ἀτέλεστος ὦν;” δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ἦ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ἦ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἶον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν [ἥρετο] εἰ δαιμόνιόν τι λέγοι, ὅμολογήσαντος δὲ ἥρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἥτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἴεν ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δὲ “ἐστιν οὖν,” 3 ἔφη, “ὅστις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοὺς

^a The words *ὅταν . . . ἦ* have been variously translated: (1) when one of the two alternatives has already been stated; (2) when the opponent has stated what is different from the fact; (3) when the opponent has already conceded so much, “made one admission” (Jebb).

^b Reading *ἥρετο*.

of others. One should also sometimes change enthymemes into moral maxims ; for instance, “Sensible men should become reconciled when they are prosperous ; for in this manner they will obtain the greatest advantages,” which is equivalent to the enthymeme : “If men should become reconciled whenever it is most useful and advantageous, they should be reconciled in a time of prosperity.”

18. In regard to interrogation, its employment is especially opportune, when the opponent has already stated the opposite, so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdity^a ; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated Lampon about initiation into the sacred rites of the saviour goddess. On Lampon replying that it was not possible for one who was not initiated to be told about them, Pericles asked him if he himself was acquainted with the rites, and when he said yes, Pericles further asked, “How can that be, seeing that you are uninitiated ?” Again, interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident, and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should not make an additional question of what is evident, but should state the conclusion. For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods, asked^b whether he did not say that there was a divine something ; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined, “Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the same time admitting

ARISTOTLE

- δὲ οὐ;” ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἡ ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξειν
 4 ἡ παράδοξον. τέταρτον δέ, ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλ’ ἡ
 σοφιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λῦσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως
 ἀποκρίνηται, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ’ οὐ, ἡ τὰ μὲν τὰ
 δ’ οὐ, ἡ πῆ μὲν πῆ δ’ οὐ, θορυβοῦντιν ὡς ἀποροῦντος.
 ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχειρεῖν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατήσθαι
 δοκεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἶν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν διὰ τὴν ἀ-
 σθένειαν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ. διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα
 ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ.
- 5 ’Αποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα
 διαιροῦντα λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ
 δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ
 ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ ἐπιὸν ἡ συλλογίσα-
 σθαι· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ λόγος.
 φανερὸν δ’ ἡμῖν ἔστω ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο
 6 καὶ αἱ λύσεις. καὶ συμπεραινόμενον, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα
 ποιῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν· οἶον
 Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν
 αὐτῷ ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προβούλοις, κατα-
 στῆσαι τοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἔφη. “τί δέ; οὐ
 πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἐδόκει εἶναι;” ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν

^a For the first of the quibbles Sandys refers to Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 396, where Cephisophon, being asked if Euripides was indoors, replies, “Yes and no, if you understand me”; and he gives the explanation, his mind is outside, collecting scraps of poetry, while he himself is upstairs (*ἀναβάδην*, unless it means “with his legs up”) composing a tragedy. The reference in the second instance is to the adversary being reduced to such a position that he cannot answer without having recourse to sophistical divisions and distinctions, which seem to imply uncertainty. Aristotle himself is fond of such “cautiously limited judgements” (Gomperz).

The translation is that of the reading *ἀποροῦντος*, a conjecture of Spengel’s. The audience will be ready to express
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that the gods exist ? ” Thirdly, when it is intended to show that the opponent either contradicts himself or puts forward a paradox. Further, when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical solution ; for if he answers, “Partly yes, and partly no,” “Some are, but some are not,” “In one sense it is so, in another not,” the hearers cry out against him as being in a difficulty.^a In other cases interrogation should not be attempted ; for if the adversary raises an objection, the interrogator seems to be defeated ; for it is impossible to ask a number of questions, owing to the hearer’s weakness. Wherefore also we should compress our enthymemes as much as possible.

Ambiguous questions should be answered by defining them by a regular explanation, and not too concisely ; those that appear likely to make us contradict ourselves should be solved at once in the answer, before the adversary has time to ask the next question or to draw a conclusion ; for it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument. Both this, however, and the means of answering will be sufficiently clear from the *Topics*.^b If a conclusion is put in the form of a question, we should state the reason for our answer. For instance, Sophocles.^c being asked by Pisander whether he, like the rest of the Committee of Ten, had approved the setting up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. “What then ? ” asked Pisander, “did not this appear to you to be a wicked thing ? ” Sophocles admitted it. its disapproval of his shuffling answers, which are evidence of his perplexity. The ordinary reading *ἀποροῦτες* attributes the “perplexity” to the hearers. Or, “the hearers, thinking he is puzzled, *applaud us* [the interrogator]” (Jebb).

^a viii. 4.^c Cp. i. 14. 3.

σὺ ταῦτα ἔπραξας τὰ πονηρά;” “ναι,” ἔφη· “οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω.” καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολωλέναι ἄτεροι, ἔφη. ὁ δὲ “οὐκοῦν σὺ τούτοις ταῦτὰ ἔθου;” καὶ ὃς ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἀν,” ἔφη, “καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο;” “οὐ δῆτα,” ἔφη. “οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ’ οὐ, ἄλλὰ γνώμη.” διὸ οὕτ’ ἐπερωτᾶν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὗτε τὸ συμ-
1419 b πέρασμα ἐπερωτᾶν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ πολὺ περιῆ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

7 Περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδή τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῦν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὥρθως λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἴδη γελοίων ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὅν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρω τὸ δ’ οὐ. ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ’ ή εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου.

19. ‘Ο δ’ ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ τε τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινώσαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστῆσαι, καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως. πέφυκε γὰρ μετὰ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι αὐτὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον ψευδῆ, οὕτω τὸ ἐπαινέν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπιχαλκεύειν. δυοῖν δὲ θατέρου δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι τούτοις ἀγαθὸς ἢ ὅτι ἀπλῶς, ὁ δ’ ὅτι κακὸς τούτοις

^a The chapters are lost (cp. i. 11. 29).

^b Or, “mould the hearers to one’s will” (L. and S.).

“ So then you did what was wicked ? ” “ Yes, for there was nothing better to be done.” The Lacedaemonian, who was called to account for his ephoralty, being asked if he did not think that the rest of his colleagues had been justly put to death, answered yes. “ But did not you pass the same measures as they did ? ” “ Yes.” “ Would not you, then, also be justly put to death ? ” “ No ; for my colleagues did this for money ; I did not, but acted according to my conscience.” For this reason we should not ask any further questions after drawing the conclusion, nor put the conclusion itself as a question, unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in our favour.

As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to confound the opponents’ earnest with jest and their jest with earnest. We have stated in the *Poetics*^a how many kinds of jests there are, some of them becoming a gentleman, others not. You should therefore choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery ; for the first is employed on one’s own account, the second on that of another.

19. The epilogue is composed of four parts : to dispose the hearer favourably towards oneself and unfavourably towards the adversary ; to amplify and deprecate ; to excite the emotions of the hearer ; to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you are truthful and that the adversary is false, the natural order of things is to praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches.^b One of two things should be aimed at, to show that you are either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary

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ἢ ὅτι ἀπλῶς. ἐξ ὧν δὲ δὴ τοιούτους κατασκευάζειν δεῖ, εἴρηνται οἱ τόποι πόθεν σπουδαίους δεῖ κατα-
2 σκευάζειν καὶ φαύλους. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο δεδειγ-
μένων ἥδη αὐξεῖν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ταπεινοῦν·
δεῖ γὰρ τὰ πεπραγμένα ὅμολογεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλει
τὸ ποσὸν ἐρεῦν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων αὐξῆσις
ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων ἐστίν. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ αὐξεῖν καὶ
3 ταπεινοῦν, ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι πρότερον. μετὰ
δὲ ταῦτα, δήλων ὄντων καὶ οὖα καὶ ήλίκα, εἰς τὰ
πάθη ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροατήν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἔλεος
καὶ δείνωσις καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ
ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις. εἴρηνται δὲ καὶ τούτων οἱ τόποι
4 πρότερον. ὥστε λοιπὸν ἀναμνῆσαι τὰ προειρη-
μένα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀρμόττει ποιεῦν οὕτως ὥσπερ
φασὶν ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες.
ἴνα γὰρ εὔμαθῆ ἦ, κελεύουσι πολλάκις εἰπεῖν.
ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν, ίνα μὴ λανθάνῃ
περὶ οὗ ἡ κρίσις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ δι' ὧν δέδεικται
κεφαλαιωδῶς.

5 Ἀρχὴ δέ, διότι ἀ ὑπέσχετο ἀποδέδωκεν· ὥστε
. ᾧ τε καὶ δι' ὃ λεκτέον. λέγεται δὲ ἐξ ἀντιπαρ-
βολῆς τοῦ ἐναντίου. παραβάλλειν δὲ ἦ ὅσα περὶ
τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμφω εἶπον, ἢ μὴ καταντικρύ. “ἀλλ'
οὗτος μὲν τάδε περὶ τούτου, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί, καὶ διὰ
1420 a ταῦτα.” ἢ ἐξ εἰρωνείας, οἷον “οὗτος γὰρ τάδ'
εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε. καὶ τί ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε
ἔδειξεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταδί;” ἢ ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως. “τί

^a i. 9.

^b ii. 19.

^c ii. 1-11.

either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which serve to represent men as good or bad have already been stated.^a After this, when the proof has once been established, the natural thing is to amplify or deprecate ; for it is necessary that the facts should be admitted, if it is intended to deal with the question of degree ; just as the growth of the body is due to things previously existing. The topics of amplification and depreciation have been previously set forth.^b Next, when the nature and importance of the facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to certain emotions—pity, indignation, anger, hate, jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The topics of these also have been previously stated,^c so that all that remains is to recapitulate what has been said. This may appropriately be done at this stage in the way certain rhetoricians wrongly recommend for the exordium, when they advise frequent repetition of the points, so that they may be easily learnt. In the exordium we should state the subject, in order that the question to be decided may not escape notice, but in the epilogue we should give a summary statement of the proofs.

We should begin by saying that we have kept our promise, and then state what we have said and why. Our case may also be closely compared with our opponent's ; and we may either compare what both of us have said on the same point, or without direct comparison : “ My opponent said so-and-so, and I said so-and-so on this point and for these reasons.” Or ironically, as for instance, “ He said this and I answered that ; what would he have done, if he had proved this, and not simply that ? ” Or by interrogation : “ What is there that has not been proved ? ”

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οὐ δέδεικται; ” ἢ “οὗτος τί ἔδειξεν; ” ἢ δὴ
οὗτως ἐκ παραβολῆς, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ἐλέχθη,
οὗτω τὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, χωρὶς τὰ
6 τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγου. τελευτὴ δὲ τῆς λέξεως
ἀρμόττει ἡ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ
λόγος ἦ· “εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.”

^a Reading *τελευτὴ*, a conjecture of Victorius. With *τελευτὴ*, the sense will be: “as a conclusion, the asyndetic style is appropriate.”

^b It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable

or, “What has my opponent proved?” We may, therefore, either sum up by comparison, or in the natural order of the statements, just as they were made, our own first, and then again, separately, if we so desire, what has been said by our opponent. To the conclusion of the speech^a the most appropriate style is that which has no connecting particles, in order that it may be a peroration, but not an oration : “I have spoken ; you have heard ; you know the facts ; now give your decision.”^b

peroration is an echo of the conclusion of the speech of Lysias *Against Eratosthenes*.

SELECT GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL AND OTHER TERMS

[As a rule, only the meanings of words in Aristotle's "Rhetic" are noticed, without reference to later rhetoricians.]

ἀγωνιστικός (i. 5. 14) : “fit for athletic contests”; (iii. 12. 1) of style: “suited to debate” (*ἀγών*), including both deliberative and forensic speeches. It is opposed to *γραφική*, the style of compositions meant to be read.

ἀκρίβεια (iii. 12. 5), *ἀκριβολογία* (i. 5. 15), *ἀκριβής* (iii. 17. 12) : of style, “precise,” “nicely finished,” “highly correct”; of statements, “exact,” “closely reasoned.”

ἀπολλάνησις (iii. 13. 5) : throwing dust in the eyes of the judge and diverting his attention from what is unfavourable; unless it is taken in a neuter sense, wandering from the subject, “digression.”

ἀρμονία (iii. 1. 4) : lit. joining; here, pitch or tone, accent, modulation of the voice.

ἀρχή . . . αἰτιον (i. 7. 12) : the latter (cause) precedes the former (first principle or beginning). “In a plant, the seed is the *ἀρχή*, the power of vegetation the *αἰτιον*.”

ἀτεχνοι (i. 2. 2; 15. 1); of proofs, those which are independent of art, being already in existence and ready for use; *ἐντεχνοι* are those which have to be invented by the orator: *alias esse probationes quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet orator, alias quas ex causa traheret ipse et quodammodo gigneret*; *ideoque illas ἀτέχνους, inartificiales, has ἐντέχνους, artificiales, vocaret* (Quint. *Inst. Orat.* v. 1. 8).

αὔξησις (i. 9. 39), *αὔξητικά* (i. 9. 38), *αὔξειν* (ii. 18. 4) : “amplification.” Its object is to increase the rhetorical effect and importance of a statement by intensifying the circumstances of an object or action.

αὐτοκαθάλως (iii. 7. 2) : “off-hand, lightly, at random;”

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αὐτοκάβδαλος (iii. 14. 11) is used of a hastily built ship by the poet Lycophron (see note on iii. 3. 1). It is said to be properly applied to badly kneaded meal.

ἀφελῆς (iii. 9. 5): “simple,” the equivalent of *ἀπλοῦς* or *μονόκωλος* as applied to the period; that is, consisting of only one *κῶλον* (member, clause) as opposed to the complex, which allowed more than one, but was not supposed to exceed four *κῶλα*.

βλαισωτις (ii. 23. 15): retortion of a dilemma upon the proposer of it: a form of enthymeme in which, from each of two contraries, some good or evil follows, each contrary to the other. The adj. *βλαισός* is translated (1) bow-legged, or (2) bandy-legged; but the connexion of this with the examples given is obscure. Cope suggests that the word properly means “straddling of the legs”; “legs irregularly diverging” (Welldon).

γλῶττα (iii. 3. 2): an obsolete, foreign, or dialectal word, in any way out of the common, which needs to be explained.

γνώμη (ii. 21. 2): a moral maxim or sentiment; a general (not particular) statement relating to the conduct of life. Maxims are to enthymemes as premises are to syllogisms, not in the case of every enthymeme, but only those that deal with the actions and passions of ordinary life.

γραφικὴ λέξις (iii. 12. 1): “suited for writing,” “literary,” opposed to *ἄγωνιστικὴ λ.*

δεῖγμα (iii. 14. 6): “sample, pattern”; the prologue or proem in an epic poem or drama, so called from its giving a sample of what is to follow, thus making the hearer acquainted with the nature of the subject to be treated of.

δεικτικὰ ἐνθυμήματα (ii. 22. 14): direct arguments (as opposed e.g. to the *reductio ad absurdum*), the object of which is to demonstrate or explain: they are opposed to *ἐλεγκτικὰ έ.*, the object of which is refutation; *δεῖξις* (iii. 7. 6): “method of proof.”

δείνωσις (ii. 21. 10): “exaggeration,” “intensification,” defined by Longinus as a form of *αὔξησις*; also “indignation,” or the arousing of this feeling. Cicero (*De inventione*, i. 53. 100) describes it as a form of speech whereby intense hatred of a person or disgust at anything is aroused.

διαιρεσις (ii. 23. 10): distribution or division into parts or

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heads, dealing with the different bearings of the case ; in *Poetics* (1461 a 23) it is more or less equivalent to punctuation, although it includes every kind of break. $\deltaιαιρεῖν$ τῷ λόγῳ (iii. 18. 5) is used of giving a detailed explanation, as opposed to $\sigmaυντόμως$, one that is concise.

$\deltaιαλεκτική$ (i. 1. 1) : logical discussion, properly by way of question and answer ; here and elsewhere in Aristotle, the logic of probabilities, as opposed to strict demonstration or scientific proof ($\alphaπόδειξις$). The premises of the latter being incontrovertibly true, the conclusions drawn from them must be equally true. The premises of the dialectic syllogism and the rhetorical enthymeme on the other hand are only probable, such as *appear* to be true to certain persons, and therefore the conclusions drawn from them can only be probable.

Rhetoric is here stated to be a counterpart of, not absolutely identical with, Dialectic (Cicero, *Orator*, 114, *quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae*), since there are points of difference as well as resemblance between them. Elsewhere it is called an offshoot, or likeness, of Dialectic. Both are, theoretically, of universal application (although practically Rhetoric is limited to Politics in the widest sense, including the ethical sciences) and deal with material which to a certain extent is within the knowledge of all and belongs to no separate science. Neither has any special first principles, like those of a particular science, which cannot be transferred to another.

Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, whereas Rhetoric sets forth its ideas in a continuous speech, addressed, not to a select audience, but to a miscellaneous crowd with the object of persuading them to embrace a certain opinion. While the dialectical syllogism leads to general conclusions, the rhetorical, dealing rather with individual questions, leads to particular conclusions ; for instance, whether punishment is to be inflicted in a particular case.

Both take either side of a question and are ready to prove either a negative or affirmative, whereas the conclusions of demonstrative proof are universal and necessary, and cannot be used to support one view or its opposite indifferently.

$\deltaιάνοια$ (i. 13. 17 ; iii. 10. 4, 5) : "meaning," "intention" ;

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(ii. 26. 5 ; iii. 1. 7) : "thought," the logical or inventive part of Rhetoric ; (iii. 16. 9) : "intellectual capacity," contrasted with the moral purpose.

διαστίξειν (iii. 5. 6) : "to punctuate" (see *διαίρεσις*).

διατριβή (iii. 17. 10) : opportunity for dwelling on a subject (*commoratio*) ; occasion for digression.

διηρημένη (iii. 9. 7) : disjointed (of style), in which the members or clauses of a period are marked off by a connecting particle.

δύναμις : (1) power, strength, of body or authority : (2) faculty, natural capacity, cleverness : (3) potentiality, virtual existence or action, as opposed to *ἐνέργεια*, actuality, actual existence or action.

ἔγκλωμον (i. 9. 33) : eulogy of achievements, bodily or mental, distinguished from *ἔπαινος*, praise of virtuous qualities.

εἶδος : (1) form, appearance ; (2) particular kind, sort : (3) species, as contrasted with genus : (4) "special topics."

εἰκός (i. 2. 15) : probability, a proposition in contingent matter, which is true in the greater number of cases (Envious men hate those whom they envy), but not in all. Its relation to the conclusion to be drawn is that of the universal to the particular.

εἰκών (iii. 4. 3) : a metaphor with the addition of the particle of comparison "as," "like." Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* viii. 6. 8, 9 *metaphora est brevior similitudo, eoque distat, quod illa comparatur rei, quam volumus exprimere, haec pro ipsa re dicitur.*

εἰρομένη λέξις (iii. 9. 1) : continuous, running style (lit. strung together), such as that of Herodotus, in which the only connexion is that of the *συνδεσμοί* ; the sentences resemble straight lines which may be produced indefinitely, keeping an uninterrupted course.

ἐνδόσιμον (iii. 14. 1) : the key-note in music ; (iii. 14. 4) the key-note in a speech, almost the same as *προοίμιον*.

ἐνέργεια (iii. 11. 2) : actualization, vividness, representing things inanimate as animate (see *δύναμις*).

ἐνθύμημα (i. 2. 8) : an enthymeme (lit. thought, argument) in the *Rhetoric* is a rhetorical syllogism, that is, it is drawn from probable premises and is therefore not a strictly demonstrative proof. The use of the term for a syllogism in which one of the premises is suppressed is due to a misunderstanding of the word ἀτελῆς [unless

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this is an interpolation], "incomplete," in *Anal. Priorā*, ii. 29 [27]. 2, which refers to its logical value, not to its form. In the same treatise Aristotle defines an enthymeme as a syllogism from probabilities or signs (see R. C. Seaton in *Classical Review*, June, 1914).

ἐνστασίς (ii. 25. 1): in logic, an objection directed not against an opponent's conclusion, but to the proposition advanced by him. This being universal if his conclusion is to be universal, the objection may be universal or particular. The establishment of the denial of one particular is sufficient to destroy the universal.

ἐντεχνοι πίστεις (i. 2. 2): see *ἀτεχνοι πίστεις*.

ἔξις (ii. 12. 2): a formed and permanent habit of mind, the result of *πρᾶξις*; it tends to the production of certain actions and is bound to produce them, unless external circumstances prevent it.

ἔπαινος (i. 9. 33): see *έγκώμιον*.

ἔπεισοδοιοῦν (iii. 17. 11): to introduce an *ἔπεισόδιον* or accessory incident.

ἔπιεικής, ἔπιείκεια (i. 2. 4): goodness; (i. 13. 13): reasonable treatment, equity.

ἔπιθετον (iii. 2. 14; iii. 3. 3): not limited to adjectives, but used for any strengthening, descriptive, or ornamental addition (*e.g.* Tydides).

ἔπιλογος (iii. 13. 3): peroration, winding-up of a speech, in which the chief points are recapitulated.

ἔπιστημη (i. 1. 1), *ἔπιστητός* (ii. 24. 10): science, that which can be scientifically known, opposed to *τέχνη*, a system or set of rules, and to *ἔμπειρλα*, experience, knack, without knowledge of principles.

ἔποικοδομεῖν (i. 7. 31): "building up of one phrase upon another, one rising above another step by step like the rounds of a ladder, *κλῖμαξ*" (Cope). They are so arranged that the last important word of one is repeated as the first of the next, as in Romans, v. 3-4 Tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope. "Climax" is hardly a suitable rendering, which in modern popular language generally implies the highest point, culmination.

ἔρωτησις (iii. 18. 1): a question put to the adversary, which only requires a simple affirmative or negative answer, opposed to *πεῦσις* or *πύσμα*, which needs an explanation.

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εὐήθης (ii. 12. 7) : good-natured, simple, opposed to *κακοήθης* ;
(iii. 1. 9 ; 12. 2) : of speeches and style, foolish, lacking force, empty.

εύογκος (iii. 7. 2) : lit. bulky : of style, " weighty," " important," opposed to *εύτελής*, " cheap," " poor," " meagre."

εύφυής (i. 6. 29) : possessed of good natural gifts, as distinct from powers that are the result of practice and study.

ἦθος : originally, a man's natural bent, his habitual temper or disposition, moral character ; it furnishes an indirect proof (1) from the character of the speaker, who wants to convince his hearers of his own virtue (i. 2. 3) ; (2) from the characters of the different forms of government (i. 8. 6) and the various conditions of men (ii. 12-17), to which different language and methods of conciliation are suitable ; in style (iii. 7. 6 ; 16. 8, 9), from exhibiting a knowledge of and due regard for the characteristics of individuals.

ἰατρεύματα (iii. 14. 7) : " correctives," " antidotes " to the listlessness and indifference of the hearer, of general application, capable of being used in any part of a speech.

ἴδια ὀνόματα (iii. 5. 3) : " specific," opposed to *περιέχοντα*, " general " terms.

κατασκευάζειν (ii. 24. 4) : " to construct " an argument, opposed to *ἀνασκευάζειν*, *ἀναιρεῖν*, " to demolish " ; (ii. 2. 27 ; iii. 19. 1) " to put into a certain frame of mind " ; *κατασκευαστικός* (ii. 26. 3) : " constructive."

κατεστραμμένη λέξις (iii. 9. 3) : " close " or periodic style, in which the period, as distinguished from sentences in the *εἰρομένη λ.*, resembles a circular line, which returns and ends at a certain point.

κύριος (i. 1. 11 ; i. 8. 1, 2 ; 15. 9, 21) : " authoritative," " effective " ; (i. 3. 4) " opportune," " appropriate " ; (iii. 2. 2) of words, " established," " vernacular," used in their natural sense, opposed to " foreign," figurative, or archaic words, in fact, to any that are unusual or out of the common.

κῶλον (iii. 9. 5) : " member," " clause," a subdivision of the period.

λεκτικός (iii. 8. 4) : belonging to the language of ordinary life and conversation.

λίτρός (iii. 16. 2) : lit. smooth ; of style, " plain," " unadorned." *λόγος* : " speech," " oration " ; (iii. 6. 1) " description," " de-

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- finition," opposed to *δνομα*, the noun or term; (iii. 2. 7) prose; (ii. 20. 2) "story," "fable"; (ii. 2. 18) "account," "consideration" (*λόγως ἐν μηδένι εἶναι*).
- μαλακός* (i. 10. 4): "effeminate"; (ii. 17. 4) "mild," "unimpassioned"; (ii. 22. 10) of reasoning, "slack," "loose."
- μέγεθος* (i. 5. 13): "stature"; (iii. 1. 4) of style, "grandeur."
- μειοῦν* (ii. 18. 4): "to extenuate," "depreciate," opposed to *αὔξειν*, *αὔξησις*.
- μείουρος*, *μύουρος* (iii. 9. 6): "docked," "curtailed," of a clause or period which seems to end too soon.
- μειρακιώδης* (iii. 11. 16): of style, characterized by youthful force and vehemence and therefore not becoming to the old. In other rhetorical writers, "puerile."
- μείωσις* (*μειοῦν*, ii. 18. 4; 26. 1): "depreciation," "extenuation," opposed to *αὔξησις*, *αὔξειν*.
- μετανάστης* (ii. 2. 6): "immigrant," "vagrant," opposed to a native. It appears to be the same as the later *μέτοικος* (resident alien): cp. *Politics*. iii. 5. 9, where *ἀτιμητος* is explained as "having no share of office." It might also mean "of no value," one whom anybody could kill with impunity (see Leaf on *Iliad*, ix. 648).
- μεταφορά* (iii. 10. 7): "transference," "metaphor." "Metaphor is the application to a thing of a name that belongs to something else, the transference taking place from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or proportionally" (*Poetics*, 21).
- μέτρον*: "metre," "measure": see *ρυθμός*.
- μονόκωλος* (iii. 9. 5): of a period, consisting of only one clause or member.
- νόμος*: sometimes used in the sense of "convention," as opposed to *φύσις*.
- δγκος* (iii. 6. 1): "weight," "importance," "dignity." It also has the sense of "bombast" (Longinus, iii. 4).
- οἰκεῖος* (i. 5. 7): "one's own," that which one can dispose of as one wishes; (i. 4. 12), that which is peculiar to something, as to a form of government; (iii. 2. 6; 7. 4): of style and the use of words, "appropriate," much the same as *κύριος*.
- όμωνυμία* (ii. 24. 2; iii. 2. 7): the use of words in an equivocal sense and such words themselves, i.e. those that have the same sound but a different sense.
- δνομα*: as a general term, includes nouns, adjectives, articles,

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and pronouns; as a special term, "noun" opposed to "verb."

πάθος, πάσχειν (ii. 16. 1, 2): mental condition or affection generally; (ii. 1. 8; iii. 17. 8), "passion," "emotion"; (i. 2. 1) "quality," "property" of things; (i. 9. 15) "suffering"; (iii. 7. 3) a pathetic style; so *παθητική λέξις* and *παθητικῶς λέγειν*.

παραβολή (iii. 19. 5): "placing side by side," "comparison"; (ii. 20. 4) "illustration."

παράδειγμα (ii. 20. 1, 2): "example," "instance," including both the historical (*παραβολή*) and the fictitious (*λόγος*); (i. 2. 8) proof from example, "rhetorical induction," contrasted with *ἐνθύμημα*.

παράλογος (i. 13. 16): "beyond calculation," "unexpected;" *παραλογίζεσθαι* (i. 14. 1), "to cheat," "defraud"; (ii. 24. 4) "to reason falsely, or be led astray by false reasoning" (also in an active sense); *παραλογιστικός* (i. 9. 29), "fallacious," *παραλογισμός* (iii. 12. 4), "fallacy."

παρίσωσις (iii. 9. 9): "balancing of clauses;" *πάρισος*, of a clause, "exactly balanced."

παρομοίωσις (iii. 9. 9): "making like," "assimilation" of sounds at the beginning or end of clauses.

πεποιημένον δνομα (iii. 2. 5): a word coined or invented for the occasion.

περίοδος (iii. 9. 3): a complete sentence, composed of several clauses, from one full stop to another; *π. τῆς γῆς* (i. 4. 13): a traveller's description of the countries visited by him.

περιπέτεια (i. 11. 24): sudden change or reverse of fortune. In tragedy, the word implies "a complete change or reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or act" (Bywater on *Poetics*, 10).

πίστις (i. 14. 5): pledge of good faith, distinguished from *ὅρκος* and *δεξιά*; (i. 1. 11. and elsewhere): means of persuasion, "probable" opposed to "demonstrative" proof.

πρακτικός (i. 6. 11): "able to do," followed by the genitive, unless here it be translated "efficient," "practical," not connected grammatically with *τῶν ἀγαθῶν*.

πρόθεσις (iii. 13. 2): "setting forth," "statement of the case," like a problem (*πρόβλημα*) in geometry.

προοίμιον (i. 1. 9; iii. 14. 1): "preamble," "exordium," compared to the *πρόλογος* in tragedy and comedy, "all that

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part of the play which comes before the first song of the chorus" (*Poetics*, 12. 4).

πρότασις (i. 3. 7): "proposition," "premise" of a syllogism; combined with *δόξα*, "notion," "popular opinion" as useful for producing persuasion (ii. 1. 1).

πτῶσις (i. 7. 27): used by Aristotle as a general term for the inflexions, not only of a noun, but also of a verb, generally marked by a difference of form; thus, the adjective *χαλκοῦς* from *χαλκός* (iii. 9. 9) and the adverb *ἀνδρεῖω* from *ἀνδρία* (i. 7. 27) are instances of "inflexions" (Bywater on *Poetics*, 20. 10).

ῥῆμα: (1) generally, that which is spoken; (2) grammatically, a verb as opposed to a noun (*δνουμα*). The term also appears to be applied to an adjective when used as a predicate.

ῥητορική: see *διαλεκτική*.

ρυθμός (iii. 1. 4, 8. 2): "time"; in general, any regular, harmonious movement, in sound or motion, which can be measured by number; thus, it may be applied to the tramp of a body of soldiers, the flapping of birds' wings, the dance, music, and writing, in the last expressed in long and short syllables. "Rhythm consists of certain lengths of time, while metre is determined by the order in which these lengths are placed. Consequently, the one seems to be concerned with quantity, the other with quality [the syllables must be in a certain order] . . . rhythm has unlimited space over which it may range, whereas the spaces of metre are confined; . . . further, metre is concerned with words alone, while rhythm extends also to the motion of the body" (Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* ix. 4. 45, Loeb Series translation).

σαφῆς λέξις (iii. 2. 1): "clear," "perspicuous," defined (iii. 12. 6) as the mean between *ἀδολεσχία* (garrulity, prolixity) and *συντομία* (excessive conciseness).

σεμνὴ λέξις (iii. 2. 2): "noble," "majestic," "dignified."

σημεῖον (i. 2. 16): "sign," a probable argument as proof of a conclusion. Signs are of two kinds, one having the relation of particular to universal, the other that of universal to particular. *τεκμήριον*, on the other hand, is a necessary sign, and such signs can be made into a demonstrative syllogism, which cannot be refuted. Thus, "sign" is both a general and special term. As a general

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term, it embraces the *τεκμήρια*; as a special term, the two kinds of signs, which are capable of refutation.

σόλοικος (ii. 16. 2): “one who offends against good taste or manners”; also one who speaks incorrectly (*σολοικίσειν*, iii. 5. 7).

στενός (iii. 12. 2): of style, “thin,” “meagre,” “jejune.”

στοιχέῖον (ii. 22. 13; 26. 1): “element” of an enthymeme, identified by Aristotle with *τόπος*.

στρογγύλος (ii. 21. 7): “rounded”; of style, “terse,” “compact.”

συκοφαντία (ii. 24. 10): “false accusation,” here used for “sophism,” a specious but fallacious argument.

σύμβολον (iii. 15. 9, 16. 10): “sign,” “token”; not to be confused with *συμβολή* (i. 4. 11), “contract.” *σύμβολον* itself elsewhere = mutual covenant.

συνάγειν (i. 2. 13; ii. 22. 3, 15): “to conclude,” “draw an inference”: (iii. 11. 12) “draw together,” “contract.”

σύνδεσμος (iii. 5. 2): “connecting particle”: it includes the preposition, the copulative conjunctions, and certain particles.

συνεστραμμένως (ii. 24. 2): “twisted up,” “compactly” (cp. *συστρέψειν*, iii. 18. 4).

σύνστοιχα (i. 7. 27): “conjugates,” “co-ordinates”: λέγεται δὲ *σύνστοιχα* μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὁ δίκαιος τῇ δίκαιῳ σύνη καὶ τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τῇ ἀνδρίᾳ (*Topics*, ii. 9. 1).

σχετλιασμός (ii. 21. 10): “passionate complaint” of injustice or ill-fortune: one of the parts of the peroration, in which we endeavour to secure the commiseration of the hearer, the first thing necessary being to put him into a sympathetic and pitying frame of mind (Forcellini, s.v. *conquestio*).

σχῆμα (ii. 24. 2; iii. 8. 1): “form,” “figure” of a speech. It does not correspond to the modern expression “figure of speech,” but is an “attitude” or “turn of meaning given to the language when it comes to be actually spoken” . . . “a difference of sense resulting from a difference of some kind in the mode of enunciation” (Bywater, *Poetics*, 19. 7).

τάξις (iii. 13-19): the arrangement or distribution of the parts of a speech.

ταπεινὴ λέξις (iii. 2. 1): “low,” “poor,” “mean”; in a moral sense, “base,” “vile” (*ταπεινότης*, ii. 6. 10).

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τεκμήριον (i. 2. 16, 17): see *σημεῖον*.

τέχνη (i. 1. 3): set of rules, "handbook" of Rhetoric: elsewhere of the "tricks" of rhetoricians; *τεχνολογεῖν* (i. 1. 9): to bring under the rules of art, reduce to a system.

τόπος (ii. 26. 1): lit., a place to look for a store of something, and the store itself; a heading or department, containing a number of rhetorical arguments of the same kind (*τόπος. εἰς δὲ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει*). These are all classified and placed where they can be easily found ready for use. *τόποι* are of two kinds: (1) *κοινοὶ τόποι* ("commonplaces") or simply *τόποι*, the topics common to the three kinds of Rhetoric (i. 2. 21; ii. 18. 3-5); (2) *εἰδη* or *ἴδια* (i. 2. 21), specific topics, propositions of limited applicability, chiefly derived from Ethics and Politics.

ὑπόκρισις (iii. 1. 3): "delivery" of a speech, under which declamation, gesticulation, expression, and everything connected with acting are included; *ὑποκρητικὴ λέξις* (iii. 12. 2), "style suited for delivery," "lending itself to acting"; [*τέχνη*] (iii. 1. 7): "the art of acting."

χώρα (iii. 17. 15): "room" for our own arguments as well as those of the adversary in the hearer's mind, "to get a footing" for what we are going to say; (ii. 24. 2): the proper place, province.

ψιλὸς (iii. 2. 3): "bare," "bald," of prose as opposed to poetry.

ψυχρός (iii. 3. 1): "cold," "frigid," "insipid." As a noun, *τὸ ψυχρόν* means generally any defect of style as opposed to *ἀρετὴ λέξεως*.

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¹ In both these passages it is proposed to read *Prodicus*.

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
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
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