- Rich & Steven
- The governance process:
- Governance vote: starts with big discussion that leads to a formal proposal being voted on, simple yes/no. Applicable to oracles and risk teams as well
- Executive vote: after a successful governance vote, continuous voting to approve the implementation of the governance vote
Would there be a vote for a specific collateral type and an additional vote after for the specific risk parameters for that collateral type?
- The preliminary assessment of a collateral type will include the qualitative assessment of the collateral and the quantitative risk parameters associated with that collateral.
- The executive vote would implement the quantitative risk parameters on the system
- With any proposal, you’ll have [2 weeks] to review the proposal and it’s accommodating docs. Ask questions of the team, test data and discuss,.
- After [2 weeks] of discussion we can open up the proposal to a vote.
- We’ll know if the proposal has legs from the discussion. Many won’t make it off the discussion “floor”
- If there’s anything needed to be updated, a new proposal would be submitted and the outdated one would be withdrawn
- If a proposal is not well accepted it can be withdrawn
- For executive proposals, those are largely uncontested as all the decision and discussion has taken place leading up to the governance vote
- Continuous voting = By voting on an executive proposal, you’re effectively enacting an incremental change in the system
Will both votes follow the process with [2 weeks] of discussion followed by [2 weeks] for the actual vote casting?
- Yes, it should
- The executive vote is part of the continuous voting system and would include the vote and discussion in one period while the voting is taking place
- Example:
- A proposal is put forward for token ABC, the proposal is added to a Rocket Chat channel. Outlining the assessment with request for comment from the community spurs on a bunch of discussion and spills over to reddit or other social media.
- Some parties may provide critiques on the assessment.
- With encouraging reception from the community, the risk team submits the proposal to the voting structure and share to the community where to see more information about the proposal. Discussion continues for [2 weeks].
- Then for [2 weeks] everyone participates in the executive vote and after that time we’ll find out that the majority does accept that proposal to accept token ABC
- A proposal will include from the beginning the suggested risk parameters to be included with a specific collateral type
The executive vote incorporates the current system state and incorporates the new proposal with the tweak to the parameters. Many parameters could change in one executive vote that have been agreed on?
- Yes
- That parameter will be analyzed and contemplated before it gets deployed through the governance vote.
- Most executive votes will not be contentious
- Once a proposal reaches the executive vote we should be pretty sure that the community wants that proposal to be incorporated
- The governance security module will be a safeguard to malicious proposals and actors by providing a 24-hour lead on the execution of the vote's action
Will the quarterly vote allow us enough agility to respond to market pressures or the crypto-volatility?
- The general cadence will follow what the system necessitates and quarterly votes are more of an ideal long-term goal
- It will likely require more frequent improvements to grow with the ecosystem
- At critical mass, we could stretch the time between votes, but likely wouldn’t want to extend past quarterly
- Yes, the vote is locked in when the time expires so the only vote that counts is at that time
- If many proposals come in, there will be a natural limit as to the number of proposals that can be considered by the governing body, and teams will adjust their submissions to account for this limit
- None of the proposals will get enough time to be considered and won’t likely progress
If thousands of proposals coming in, then you’ll have thousands of votes coming the following weeks?
- The other hand is there could be no proposals coming in
- As MKR token holders it will depend on the availability of resources to actually consider the incoming proposals
- Consider this with ‘where to store your MKR’ (Risk #12), because each of those proposals is directly correlated with the value of the MKR you’re voting with
- MKR holders can create proposals
- Risk teams will present the entire assessment with collateral proposals, so likely would be primarily submitted by risk teams
- We can categorized them and analyze proposals for quality so ancillary assessments can be made based on data provided by the teams
- Proposals shouldn’t be filtered as we’re stepping into censorship territory
- The most valuable proposals will come from risk teams with thorough research and constructs
- There will likely be lots of votes as the system starts and gets running
Where should you store your MKR? (Cont’d from #12)
- Voting structure or in an exchange trying to sell because the system requires constant attention as an MKR holder
- It is up to us to determine the value of the system
- If you don’t see value in the proposals being put forward then you need to consider that there is no more value to be had and look for liquidity
Should MKR holders do these things for their own benefit or for the benefit of the system as a whole?
- If you are benefiting the system, then you are benefiting yourself
- The state of the system is improved through proposal’s value
- Definitely an option
- For the sake of bootstrapping we should take in any proposals put forward. Once we hit a tipping point with too many proposals then we can absolutely institute a requirement to stake on a proposal
- We have to consider what happens if someone puts forward a terrible proposal with their stake. Slashing?
- It comes down to the premise with plutocracy. With whales or cartels in the system, you want to get a sense of the system as a whole, not just those the bias of those cartels or individuals
- Most proposals will be put forward with scientific assessment in how the parameters are determined in the assessment
- It makes sense in a native token context with a broader sense of the proposals
- Our vision is narrow enough to scientifically vet the proposals
- Hopefully we don’t have to transform the votes to understand the desires of the system
There’s not a company or third party out there creating value for the MKR holders. It is up to the MKR holders to make the value happen. This is the true vision of the DAO, everything decided through the sentiment of the system.
- Waiting for the value to go up is delegating your vote for improvements, by default
- Not really, in traditional finance you’re always relying on a third party to find and incorporate that increase in value.
- Here we’ve remove the third party creating the value. It’s up to those monitoring the system
- The governance token is representative of how you want to extract value from the system
Governance vote is a signaling mechanism. After the signal is received, the Foundation (or any one motivated) can build the feature to fulfill the signal. Then an executive vote is taken to approve that implementation of that mechanism.
- Could be similar to the EIPs, our own MIPs potentially
** [2 weeks] is the time frame provided for elaboration, not set in stone **