serde_derive with pre-compiled binary does not work when building via Bazel with rules_rust #2530
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You would need to sort this out with other Bazel users. I am using serde_derive successfully from Buck which is a conceptually similar system, so it is definitely usable. |
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Sorry, I was not precise enough: I mean only the recently added feature to use a pre-compiled binary in |
kiron1
changed the title
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I would also like to mention that it does not work with cargo2nix either. |
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I'm also a nix user, investigating the problem. It's not that hard to make the binary from crates.io visible but it just segfaults straight away on my CPU with "invalid instruction". So whatever fixes, including whatever suggested in #2526 are done, this is just not going to work. Presumably there should simply be a feature to opt-into from-source code path instead of picking based on platform and crossing fingers. |
In meantime we'll just be maintaining a fork with a patch to just use the source version I guess... |
kayabaNerve
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Achieves three notable updates. 1) Resolves RUSTSEC-2022-0093 by updating libp2p-identity. 2) Removes 3 old rand crates via updating ed25519-dalek (a dependency of libp2p-identity). 3) Sets serde_derive to 1.0.171 via updating to time 0.3.26 which pins at up to 1.0.171. The last one is the most important. The former two are niceties. serde_derive, since 1.0.171, ships a non-reproducible binary blob in what's a complete compromise of supply chain security. This is done in order to reduce compile times, yet also for the maintainer of serde (dtolnay) to leverage serde's position as the 8th most downloaded crate to attempt to force changes to the Rust build pipeline. While dtolnay's contributions to Rust are respectable, being behind syn, quote, and proc-macro2 (the top three crates by downloads), along with thiserror, anyhow, async-trait, and more (I believe also being part of the Rust project), they have unfortunately decided to refuse to listen to the community on this issue (or even engage with counter-commentary). Given their political agenda they seem to try to be accomplishing with force, I'd go as far as to call their actions terroristic (as they're using the threat of the binary blob as justification for cargo to ship 'proper' support for binary blobs). This is arguably representative of dtolnay's past work on watt. watt was a wasm interpreter to execute a pre-compiled proc macro. This would save the compile time of proc macros, yet sandbox it so a full binary did not have to be run. Unfortunately, watt (while decreasing compile times) fails to be a valid solution to supply chain security (without massive ecosystem changes). It never implemented reproducible builds for its wasm blobs, and a malicious wasm blob could still fundamentally compromise a project. The only solution for an end user to achieve a secure pipeline would be to locally build the project, verifying the blob aligns, yet doing so would negate all advantages of the blob. dtolnay also seems to be giving up their role as a FOSS maintainer given that serde no longer works in several environments. While FOSS maintainers are not required to never implement breaking changes, the version number is still 1.0. While FOSS maintainers are not required to follow semver, releasing a very notable breaking change *without a new version number* in an ecosystem which *does follow semver*, then refusing to acknowledge bugs as bugs with their work does meet my personal definition of "not actively maintaining their existing work". Maintenance would be to fix bugs, not introduce and ignore. For now, serde > 1.0.171 has been banned. In the future, we may host a fork without the blobs (yet with the patches). It may be necessary to ban all of dtolnay's maintained crates, if they continue to force their agenda as such, yet I hope this may be resolved within the next week or so. Sources: serde-rs/serde#2538 - Binary blob discussion This includes several reports of various workflows being broken. serde-rs/serde#2538 (comment) dtolnay commenting that security should be resolved via Rust toolchain edits, not via their own work being secure. This is why I say they're trying to leverage serde in a political game. serde-rs/serde#2526 - Usage via git broken dtolnay explicitly asks the submitting user if they'd be willing to advocate for changes to Rust rather than actually fix the issue they created. This is further political arm wrestling. serde-rs/serde#2530 - Usage via Bazel broken serde-rs/serde#2575 - Unverifiable binary blob https://github.com/dtolnay/watt - dtolnay's prior work on precompilation
kayabaNerve
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Aug 21, 2023
* dalek 4.0 * cargo update Moves to a version of Substrate which uses curve25519-dalek 4.0 (not a rc). Doesn't yet update the repo to curve25519-dalek 4.0 (as a branch does) due to the official schnorrkel using a conflicting curve25519-dalek. This would prevent installation of frost-schnorrkel without a patch. * use half-aggregation for tm messages * fmt * fix pr comments * cargo update Achieves three notable updates. 1) Resolves RUSTSEC-2022-0093 by updating libp2p-identity. 2) Removes 3 old rand crates via updating ed25519-dalek (a dependency of libp2p-identity). 3) Sets serde_derive to 1.0.171 via updating to time 0.3.26 which pins at up to 1.0.171. The last one is the most important. The former two are niceties. serde_derive, since 1.0.171, ships a non-reproducible binary blob in what's a complete compromise of supply chain security. This is done in order to reduce compile times, yet also for the maintainer of serde (dtolnay) to leverage serde's position as the 8th most downloaded crate to attempt to force changes to the Rust build pipeline. While dtolnay's contributions to Rust are respectable, being behind syn, quote, and proc-macro2 (the top three crates by downloads), along with thiserror, anyhow, async-trait, and more (I believe also being part of the Rust project), they have unfortunately decided to refuse to listen to the community on this issue (or even engage with counter-commentary). Given their political agenda they seem to try to be accomplishing with force, I'd go as far as to call their actions terroristic (as they're using the threat of the binary blob as justification for cargo to ship 'proper' support for binary blobs). This is arguably representative of dtolnay's past work on watt. watt was a wasm interpreter to execute a pre-compiled proc macro. This would save the compile time of proc macros, yet sandbox it so a full binary did not have to be run. Unfortunately, watt (while decreasing compile times) fails to be a valid solution to supply chain security (without massive ecosystem changes). It never implemented reproducible builds for its wasm blobs, and a malicious wasm blob could still fundamentally compromise a project. The only solution for an end user to achieve a secure pipeline would be to locally build the project, verifying the blob aligns, yet doing so would negate all advantages of the blob. dtolnay also seems to be giving up their role as a FOSS maintainer given that serde no longer works in several environments. While FOSS maintainers are not required to never implement breaking changes, the version number is still 1.0. While FOSS maintainers are not required to follow semver, releasing a very notable breaking change *without a new version number* in an ecosystem which *does follow semver*, then refusing to acknowledge bugs as bugs with their work does meet my personal definition of "not actively maintaining their existing work". Maintenance would be to fix bugs, not introduce and ignore. For now, serde > 1.0.171 has been banned. In the future, we may host a fork without the blobs (yet with the patches). It may be necessary to ban all of dtolnay's maintained crates, if they continue to force their agenda as such, yet I hope this may be resolved within the next week or so. Sources: serde-rs/serde#2538 - Binary blob discussion This includes several reports of various workflows being broken. serde-rs/serde#2538 (comment) dtolnay commenting that security should be resolved via Rust toolchain edits, not via their own work being secure. This is why I say they're trying to leverage serde in a political game. serde-rs/serde#2526 - Usage via git broken dtolnay explicitly asks the submitting user if they'd be willing to advocate for changes to Rust rather than actually fix the issue they created. This is further political arm wrestling. serde-rs/serde#2530 - Usage via Bazel broken serde-rs/serde#2575 - Unverifiable binary blob https://github.com/dtolnay/watt - dtolnay's prior work on precompilation * add Rs() api to SchnorrAggregate * Correct serai-processor-tests to dalek 4 * fmt + deny * Slash malevolent validators (#294) * add slash tx * ignore unsigned tx replays * verify that provided evidence is valid * fix clippy + fmt * move application tx handling to another module * partially handle the tendermint txs * fix pr comments * support unsigned app txs * add slash target to the votes * enforce provided, unsigned, signed tx ordering within a block * bug fixes * add unit test for tendermint txs * bug fixes * update tests for tendermint txs * add tx ordering test * tidy up tx ordering test * cargo +nightly fmt * Misc fixes from rebasing * Finish resolving clippy * Remove sha3 from tendermint-machine * Resolve a DoS in SlashEvidence's read Also moves Evidence from Vec<Message> to (Message, Option<Message>). That should meet all requirements while being a bit safer. * Make lazy_static a dev-depend for tributary * Various small tweaks One use of sort was inefficient, sorting unsigned || signed when unsigned was already properly sorted. Given how the unsigned TXs were given a nonce of 0, an unstable sort may swap places with an unsigned TX and a signed TX with a nonce of 0 (leading to a faulty block). The extra protection added here sorts signed, then concats. * Fix Tributary tests I broke, start review on tendermint/tx.rs * Finish reviewing everything outside tests and empty_signature * Remove empty_signature empty_signature led to corrupted local state histories. Unfortunately, the API is only sane with a signature. We now use the actual signature, which risks creating a signature over a malicious message if we have ever have an invariant producing malicious messages. Prior, we only signed the message after the local machine confirmed it was okay per the local view of consensus. This is tolerated/preferred over a corrupt state history since production of such messages is already an invariant. TODOs are added to make handling of this theoretical invariant further robust. * Remove async_sequential for tokio::test There was no competition for resources forcing them to be run sequentially. * Modify block order test to be statistically significant without multiple runs * Clean tests --------- Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com> * Add DSTs to Tributary TX sig_hash functions Prevents conflicts with other systems/other parts of the Tributary. --------- Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
Thank you for this. I've been looking for a fork of some kind to use. |
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When building some crate which using or depending serde_derive 1.0.172 via Bazel using rules_rust on x86_64 GNU Linux the build will fail with:
It does not find the precompiled binary used in the derive macro.
Would it be possible to add an opt-out option to not use the precompiled binary for
serde_derivewhich can be set until a proper solution is found?Issue in the rules_rust repository: bazelbuild/rules_rust#2071
Somehow related issue: #2526
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