GPG-based chat network, resistant to traffic analysis
Python
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firehose
.gitignore
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README.md
cli.py
gnupg.py
gui.py
register.py
server.py

README.md

firehose

GPG-based chat client

Notes

I am not a cryptographer, this is an experiment, don't bet your life on it.

Why?

Because the people on Hacker News keep pointing out the same flaws in all sorts of supposedly secure systems; I want to fix those, so that they can have a different set of flaws to complain about :P

Firstly, I haven't rolled my own encryption, I'm using GPG and leaving the settings at what I presume are sane defaults.

Encrypted email still has "To:" and "From:" in clear text, which is enough to get you in trouble. The firehose is broadcast, so everyone gets all messages, you can't tell who's talking to who from the headers.

Tech Notes

Protocol Version 0:

 * connect to firehose.shishnet.org:9988
 * send packets, receive packets

 * packet =
   * byte: data type
   * unsigned short: length of data
   * byte[$length]: data

 * data type =
   * 0: GPG-encrypted message to be / being broadcasted
   * 1: firehose settings (trickle rate, etc - not implemented yet)

 * message =
   * cmd args

 * cmds:
   * MSG <text>
     - "Bob: hello"
   * ACT <text>
     - "* Bob acts"
   * PING <nonce>
     - request client status
   * PONG <nonce> <status>
     - announce client status
   * CHAT <keydata>
     - send one private key to several friends so they can all
       decode chatroom messages
       (TODO: detect that a message was decoded using a group
       key rather than a personal key; show the message in the
       group window rather than one-to-one window)

If the GPG message is signed, and the recipient has your public key, you'll show up in a window of your own at their end; if not, you'll show up as "Unknown". This is pretty much using your GPG keyring as an IM buddy list.

TODO:

Traffic analysis (A sends a message, then B sends a message, then A sends a message) would allow an attacker to infer that those two people are chatting. To combat this, clients send a constant ~0.1kbps stream of data 24/7 - small / empty messages are padded with random[1] data, large messages are buffered and dripped out slowly.

How to handle message splitting / recombining?

[1] does encrypted random data look like encrypted real data? If the data is compressed before encryption, then real data would be shorter than random.