

CYBER FORENSICS (CYFO) VT 24

Lab Assignment

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Assignment 1: Introduction to Network Forensics

A virtual machine running Kali 2024.1 and Wireshark (wireshark:amd64/kali-rolling 4.2.2-1) was used to analyse the .pcap files of assignment 1.

Evidence file: 1.pcap
MD5 Hash: 47451679a42fc2a5a637886e97fd7283
SHA-1 Hash: 4623636b88b6293888a3ebcb75cffb767bd11094

Verifying the hashes

```
$ md5sum 1.pcap
47451679a42fc2a5a637886e97fd7283 1.pcap
$ sha1sum 1.pcap
4623636b88b6293888a3ebcb75cffb767bd11094 1.pcap
```

1. What is/are the source(s) (IP address) of the suspicious traffic?

192.0.2.245, 192.0.2.196, 192.0.2.207, 192.0.2.6, 192.0.2.25, 192.0.2.120,
192.0.2.83, 192.0.2.154, 192.0.2.253, 192.0.2.236

2. What is the destination (IP address) of the suspicious traffic?

192.0.2.2

3. What is the transport layer protocol used?

Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)

4. What is/are the source port(s)?

35356, 44463, 23784, 51136, 57003, 20920, 36927, 52048, 62151, 46528

5. What is/are the destination port(s)?

64354, 58034, 25895, 62694, 48897, 46680, 35104, 43120, 17166, 19043

6. What conclusions can you draw from the type of the "attack"/activity illustrated by this pcap?

The network activity observed appears to involve attempts to establish connections with various ports on the destination address 192.0.2.2. This behavior could indicate a port scan, where the scanning party seeks to identify open ports on the target system. While not inherently malicious, port scanning can be a precursor to unauthorized access attempts or reconnaissance activities. Alternatively, the repeated connection attempts to the same destination address could suggest a potential Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. However, the number of connections initiated (10 in this case) is unlikely to overwhelm a server and cause a significant disruption in service.

Evidence file: 2.pcap
MD5 Hash: 19633e3a2a3d4c315994fddc3ce7090f
SHA-1 Hash: f9d5be156ca124b46450910d2b7b1e79f2f6825c

Verifying the hashes

```
$ md5sum 2.pcap
19633e3a2a3d4c315994fddc3ce7090f 2.pcap
$ sha1sum 2.pcap
f9d5be156ca124b46450910d2b7b1e79f2f6825c 2.pcap
```

1. What is the source(s) (MAC address) of the suspicious traffic?

CIMSYS_33:44:55 (00:11:22:33:44:55)

2. What is/are the destination (MAC address[es]) of where the suspicious traffic is mostly directed towards?

- Intel_83:13:e8 (00:0e:0c:83:13:e8) received 3279 packets
- Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) received 541 packets
- all other destinations received ≤ 20 packets

3. What is the link layer protocol used?

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)

4. What is the purpose of this protocol?

The purpose of ARP is to map an IP address to a MAC address on a local network. This mapping is necessary because devices communicate using MAC addresses at the data link layer (Layer 2) of the OSI model, while IP addresses are used at the network layer (Layer 3). When a device on a LAN wants to communicate with another device, it needs to know the MAC address of the target device. ARP helps in this process by broadcasting an ARP request message to all devices on the network, asking for the MAC address corresponding to a specific IP address. The device with the matching IP address responds with its MAC address, allowing the requesting device to establish a direct communication link.^[1]

5. What conclusions can you draw from the type of the attack illustrated by this pcap? How can this attack be used for launching other kinds of attacks?

The source MAC address (CIMSYS_33:44:55) is consistently sending the suspicious traffic. This suggests that the traffic is likely originating from a single device or attacker. The suspicious traffic is directed towards various MAC addresses, including broadcasting and Intel_83:13:e8, as well as other less frequent destinations, such as ASUS_TekCOMPU_1b:32:11, AniCommunica_91:12:a8, etc. This pattern is indicative of ARP poisoning attacks. 516 packets are configured with “Duplicate IP addresses.” ARP spoofing involves sending falsified ARP messages over a local area network. Attackers may send ARP replies with their own MAC address in response to ARP requests, causing

network devices to update their ARP caches with incorrect mappings. This allows attackers to intercept, modify, or redirect network traffic. ARP spoofing can be used as a stepping stone for launching other types of attacks, including:

- **Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks:** By intercepting and redirecting network traffic, attackers can eavesdrop on communications, steal sensitive information, or modify data packets.
- **Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks:** ARP spoofing can be used to flood a network with falsified ARP messages, leading to network congestion or disruption of communication between legitimate devices.
- **Session Hijacking:** By intercepting and manipulating ARP traffic, attackers can hijack established network sessions, gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems or services.[2]

Evidence file: 3.pcap
MD5 Hash: 0944977919541d4ee176450b7ce36f9d
SHA-1 Hash: 7349e1fea8e6ed6b4dce3f89898b1c6492f3a610

Verifying the hashes

```
$ md5sum 3.pcap
0944977919541d4ee176450b7ce36f9d 3.pcap
$ sha1sum 3.pcap
7349e1fea8e6ed6b4dce3f89898b1c6492f3a610 3.pcap
```

1. What is the source (IP address) of the suspicious traffic?

10.0.23.109

2. What is the destination (IP address) of the suspicious traffic?

80.237.98.132

3. What is the transport layer protocol used?

Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)

4. This may be considered as not a direct attack but as a preparation step before an attack. Name the technique used and its purpose.

Mostly SYN connections (the first part of the TCP three-way handshake) are observed. TCP Retransmissions occur when the sender fails to receive an acknowledgment (ACK) from the receiver within a certain time period. This behavior indicates a SYN port scanning activity (stealth scan). The purpose of port scanning is to find out which of the ports of the target machine are open to investigate/attack them further in the next step.

Assignment 2: Suspicious Wireless Traffic

1 Introduction

Hello, here is some text without a meaning. This text should show what a printed text will look like at this place. If you read this text, you will get no information. Really? Is there no information? Is there a difference between this text and some nonsense like “Huardest gefburn”? Kjift – not at all! A blind text like this gives you information about the selected font, how the letters are written and an impression of the look. This text should contain all letters of the alphabet and it should be written in of the original language. There is no need for special content, but the length of words should match the language.

2 Methods

3 Results

4 Discussion

Assignment 3: Intrusion Analysis

1 Introduction

On April 28, 2023, the IT department at DSV received a concerning notification from the national computer emergency response team (CERT-SE) regarding potential unauthorized activity within the network infrastructure. The alert indicated unusual activity targeting one or more computers, with specific reference to the development test server of the Haisy student management and grade database system.

Date: Tues, 28 Apr 2023 11:29:03 +0100
From: CERT-SE <alert@cert.se>
To: CS2Lab <cs2lab@dsv.su.se>
Subject: Important Information from CERT-SE: Indications of Intrusion Attempt

CERT-SE has noticed unusual activity against one or more computers in your network. See details below.

IP: 193.10.9.5
Computer name: haisy.cs2lab.dsv.su.se
Attack type: Possible intrusion attempt
Time, from circa: 2023-04-27 23:50:25 CET

Sincerely
CERT-SE

As part of the responsibility to maintain the security and integrity of the systems, an investigation to ascertain the nature and extent of the incident was initiated. The Haisy development test server, hosted at haisy.cs2lab.dsv.su.se, is a critical component of the infrastructure, supporting the ongoing development and testing of the Haisy system, which manages student data and academic records. Any compromise to this system could have significant ramifications for the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive information.

This report documents our investigation into the potential network intrusion, with the objective of understanding the events leading up to the alert from CERT-SE, identifying any unauthorized access or malicious activity, and assessing the impact on our systems and data. By conducting a thorough analysis of the available evidence and applying appropriate forensic techniques, we aim to provide actionable insights to mitigate risks, enhance security measures, and prevent future incidents of this nature.

2 Methods

Our investigation into the possible network intrusion targeting the Haisy development test server began with a thorough confirmation of the integrity of the provided evidence files: `haisy_4000.pcap` and `haisy.raw`. We utilized their respective SHA1 and MD5 hash values to ensure that the files had not been altered or corrupted since their acquisition.

Method and Tools for Analysing the Network Traffic

Kali Linux (VM)	2024.1
Wireshark	wireshark:amd64/kali-rolling 4.2.2-1
Geo Data Tool	https://www.geodatatool.com/en/ (last accessed on April 28, 2024)

We proceeded to analyze the `haisy_4000.pcap` file using a Kali 2024.1 virtual machine (VM) equipped with Wireshark 4.2.2. Our primary goal was to gain insight into the network traffic associated with the suspected intrusion. We began our analysis by identifying the number of IP addresses involved in the traffic and examining the source and destination IP addresses. We also attempted to determine which ports were experiencing the highest volume of traffic, which would provide insight into the nature of the communication. We also used the geolocation tool <https://www.geodatatool.com/en/> to determine the geographic location of the identified IP addresses. This contextual information helped us understand the potential origin or source of the suspicious network activity. Throughout our analysis, we meticulously examined DNS and HTTP packets, as well as TCP streams, looking for any indicators of compromise or anomalous behavior that might indicate an attempted network intrusion.

Method and Tools for Analysing the Linux Server Image

Windows 10 (VM)	10.0.19045 (Build 19045)
Autopsy	4.21.0

We then turned our attention to examining the `haisy.raw` file in a Windows 10 environment running Autopsy 4.21.0. The goal of this phase of the investigation was to delve deeper into the system-level activity during the incident. Our analysis covered several key areas, including user account management, command execution, and software usage. We began by identifying existing users on the system and examining their account activity for signs of unauthorized access or suspicious behavior. At the same time, we analyzed the commands executed during the relevant time period to identify any anomalies or indicators of malicious activity. In addition, we evaluated the services running on the system at the time of the incident to assess their relevance to the investigation and potential impact on system security. To supplement our analysis, we examined specific log files associated with the running services, focusing on events and activities that could provide evidence of a potential attack or compromise. By meticulously reviewing the system logs, we aimed to uncover any traces of unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or suspicious activity indicative of a network intrusion. Finally, we synthesized the results to construct a comprehensive timeline of events related to the suspected intrusion. This timeline provided a chronological sequence of activities leading up to and during the incident, allowing us to gain a clear understanding of the nature and scope of the attempted intrusion.

3 Results

3.1 Investigating the Network Traffic

```
$ sha1sum haisy_4000.pcap
5d50246cd8ed94b9d39d60b4008a2ead1e3cba50  haisy_4000.pcap
```

```
$ md5sum haisy_4000.pcap
8f7f17adf4de26e88dd2841dca174b02  haisy_4000.pcap
```

```
$ ls -l haisy_4000.pcap
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 35116793 Apr 23 08:20 haisy_4000.pcap
```

The verification of the SHA1 and MD5 hash values of the evidence file `haisy_4000.pcap` has shown that the file had not been altered or corrupted since its acquisition because the hash values match the values specified in the instructions. The file has a size of 35.1168MB.


Address	Packets	Bytes	Tx Packets	Tx Bytes	Rx Packets	Rx Bytes
10.11.2.22	22,056	12 MB	13,936	3 MB	8,120	9 MB
10.11.8.17	258	27 kB	129	15 kB	129	12 kB
10.11.8.18	298,170	30 MB	146,257	19 MB	151,913	11 MB
37.120.246.146	274,967	18 MB	137,455	7 MB	137,512	10 MB
37.120.246.151	148	153 kB	8	5 kB	140	149 kB
91.198.174.192	19	2 kB	8	1 kB	11	1 kB
130.237.157.47	20	2 kB	9	1 kB	11	1 kB
130.237.157.97	176	19 kB	81	9 kB	95	10 kB
130.237.161.25	60	7 kB	27	4 kB	33	3 kB
172.17.3.3	109	53 kB	53	6 kB	56	47 kB
193.11.30.171	92	12 kB	42	7 kB	50	5 kB
209.51.188.174	177	132 kB	113	125 kB	64	7 kB
209.51.188.233	88	55 kB	52	52 kB	36	4 kB

Screenshot 1: Statistics > Endpoints > IPv4

The file `haisy_4000.pcap` contains 300338 captured network packets in total and 13 unique IP addresses occur. Of these IP addresses, 10.11.8.18 (146k transmitted packets, 151k received packets), 37.120.246.146 (137k transmitted packets, 137k received packets), 10.11.2.22 (14k transmitted packets, 8k received packets), 10.11.8.17 (129 transmitted packets, 129 received packets), 209.51.188.174 (113 transmitted packets, 64 received packets) and 130.237.157.97 (8 transmitted packets, 140 received packets) generated the most traffic. The two internal IP addresses that occur most frequently (10.11.8.18 and 10.11.2.22) are the Linux server hosting `haisy.cs21lab.dsv.su.se` and the reverse proxy. The top five ports for Linux server (10.11.8.18) are 80, 59808, 42250, 44779, 44216 and for the reverse proxy (10.11.2.22) are 33688, 42598, 49402, 39140, 48330. The only port used for 37.120.246.146 is 60836.

The three most common external IPs can be traced back geographically to Romania, Bucharest (37.120.246.146), United States, Boston (209.51.188.174) and Sweden, Stockholm (130.237.157.97).

When looking at the DNS related packets, it is noticeable that attempts were made to call domains that do not exist. For example, attempts were made to call up `www.daisy.dsv.su.se` or `www.daisy.dsv.su.se.cs2lab.dsv.su.se`. Domains such as `fr.wikipedia.org` or `fsf.org`, which have nothing directly to do with the daisy service, were called. In addition, there are DNS queries resolving to CNAME records such as `mimas.dsv.su.se`. CNAME records are used to alias one name to another. The presence of CNAME records isn't unusual, but it's important to verify that these canonical names are legitimate and expected within the network environment.



Screenshot 2: Filter "http"

When looking at the HTTP traffic, it is noticeable that many GET requests were made to url paths that do not exist. For example, attempts were made to call `/iissamples/issamples/fastq.idq?CiTemplate=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../winnt/win.ini`, `/readme.html` or `/admin.html` on the Linux server (10.11.8.18). This could be a sign that an attacker tried a directory/path traversal attack.

3.2 Investigating the Linux Server Image

```
$ sha1sum haisy.raw
6d08e3ec0c3caac2979070913010c1753c48f66f  haisy.raw

$ md5sum haisy.raw
89fd1b9b40f2b7793440a4a13d045837  haisy.raw

$ ls -l haisy.raw
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 16106127360 Apr 23 09:21 haisy.raw
```

The verification of the SHA1 and MD5 hash values of `haisy.raw` has shown that the file had not been altered or corrupted since its acquisition because the hash values match the values specified in the instructions. The file has a size of 16.1061GB. The image contains 5 partitions and the operating system according to the `lsb-release` file is Ubuntu 13.10 codename saucy.

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
(...)
postgres:x:107:114:PostgreSQL administrator,,:/var/lib/postgresql:/bin/bash
whoopsie:x:108:115::/nonexistent:/bin/false
tomcat7:x:109:117::/usr/share/tomcat7:/bin/false
erika:x:1000:1000:Erika Thuning,,:/home/erika:/bin/bash
```

The file `etc/passwd` contains entries for 29 user accounts whereby a home directory exists only for the user `erika`. The `.bash_history` of the user `erika` reveals several activities that could be considered suspicious:

- Repeated SSH Service Commands (`sudo /etc/init.d/ssh status`, `sudo status /etc/init.d/ssh`, `sudo start /etc/init.d/ssh`, `sudo /etc/init.d/ssh`): The frequent stopping, starting, and status checking of the SSH service could indicate trouble with the SSH service, or it might suggest that someone was trying to gain persistent access.
- Network Interface Cycling (`sudo ifconfig eth0 down`, `sudo ifconfig eth0 up`, ...): Regularly bringing the network interface `eth0` down and back up is unusual and could be an attempt to evade network monitoring or reset network connections after unauthorized activities.
- Bypassing SSL Certificate Verification (`wget --no-check-certificate http://daisy.dsv.su.se`, `wget --no-check-certificate dsv.su.se`, ...): The use of `--no-check-certificate` with `wget` could suggest And HTTP (no encryption) is used.
- Editing Apache Configuration Files (`nano /etc/apache2/apache2.conf`, `cd /etc/apache2/`, `nano apache2.conf`, ...): Changes to the Apache configuration could be legitimate, but they can also indicate an attempt to alter the web server's behavior for malicious purposes, such as setting up a reverse proxy for traffic redirection.

- Direct Interaction with MySQL Database (`mysql -u erika -p < haisy_students_2023.sql`, `mysql -u root -p haisy < haisy_students_2023.sql`, ...): Importing/exporting data using the MySQL command line with root access can be a standard administrative task, but it can also be a way to inject malicious data or exfiltrate information.

Examination of `/var/log/syslog` shows that routine tasks such as DHCP renewals and periodic cron jobs were executed. Nevertheless, several segfaults occurred at different times. Segfaults indicate that a program has attempted to access memory for which it did not have permission, or that it has attempted to execute a process that was not allowed. The affected processes include QIRCK-vwYm, oymZYryK, wbMEAsyiwVoHrV, GmBxfGdRbZmmDc, rvqSmSIKwxGhuXI, LkAjRzqB, gBWWFnVPKxb, zrrleSXSDfxI and LqqCzyBp. These processes appear to have been deleted, which could indicate that they are temporary files or malware.

`/var/log/auth.log` also contains suspicious entries. The entry at Apr 24 00:03:46 indicates that the user "erika" executed the nano command with root privileges. The user "erika" seems to have edited a file (`index.php`) using nano. Another log entry at Apr 24 00:04:07 shows the user "erika" using sudo to run nano on the file `index.php`, again with root privileges. The entry at indicates that a cron session was opened for the root user. However, there is no corresponding "session closed" entry. It's unusual for a session to remain open without being closed properly. This might indicate a potential issue or anomaly.

According to the IT department, the Linux server was only running Tomcat and Apache services. In the `/etc/init.d` directory we found indication that also mysql, postgresql and samba were running. Especially the last one could be of interest, because samba is a file sharing service, that could potentially be used to exfiltrate information from the system.

Investigating the Tomcat log files showed that numerous HTTP requests attempting to include or execute a remote file (`cirt.net/rfiinc.txt`) on the server were executed. These requests are generating 404 errors, indicating that the requested files were not found on the server. This pattern of requests is indicative of an attempted Remote File Inclusion (RFI) attack. In an RFI attack, the attacker tries to exploit vulnerabilities in web applications by including and executing remote files hosted on external servers. Given the frequency and consistency of these requests, it's likely that there's an automated script or bot attempting to exploit potential vulnerabilities in the server or web application.

The log entries of the Apache server indicate several HTTP requests made by the IP address 10.11.2.22 to various endpoints on a server. The requests include attempts to access the root directory (`"/`), `"admin.html"`, `"index.php"`, `"php"`, `"info.php"`, and many other endpoints that do not exist on the server, resulting in 404 Not Found errors. Additionally, there are requests made by a tool called Nikto/2.1.6, which appears to be a web vulnerability scanner. It tries various URLs with different extensions and parameters, likely attempting to find vulnerabilities or discover sensitive files on the server. This is consistent with the findings in network traffic with HTTP filter.

3.3 Timeline of Interesting Events

- **23/Apr/2023 22:17:13 (Apache Log File)** "GET /admin.html HTTP/1.1" 404 499 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Android 13; Mobile; rv:109.0) Gecko/112.0 Firefox/112.0" start of attack against Apache Server (potential path traversal attack to find vulnerabilities or public files)
- **24/Apr/2023 00:03:46 (System Log Files):** The user "erika" executed the nano command with root privileges. The user "erika" seems to have edited a file (index.php) using nano.
- **24/Apr/2023 00:04:07 (System Log Files):** The user "erika" used sudo to run nano on the file index.php, again with root privileges.
- **24/Apr/2023 06:25:01 (System Log Files):** A cron session was opened for the root user. However, there is no corresponding "session closed" entry. It's unusual for a session to remain open without being closed properly. This might indicate a potential issue or anomaly.
- **27/Apr/2023:23:49:17 (Tomcat Log Files):** "GET /ckHkKicT.db HTTP/1.1" 404 973 (start of potential remote file inclusion attack)

4 Discussion

References

- [1] “An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or Converting Network Protocol Addresses to 48.bit Ethernet Address for Transmission on Ethernet Hardware.” RFC 826, 1982.
- [2] V. Ramachandran and S. Nandi, “Detecting ARP Spoofing: An Active Technique,” in *Information Systems Security* (S. Jajodia and C. Mazumdar, eds.), (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 239–250, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.