

# Democracy Does Cause Growth

## Presentation of the ANRR (2019) Paper

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Empirical Economics

# Introduction

## Publication:

- Journal of Political Economy (JPE)
- Working Paper (NBER): 03/2014
- Final Publication: 02/2019

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Figure 1: Cover of JPE

# Literature on Growth and Democracy

Table 1: Literature Examples

| Authors                       | Relationship                                |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Lipset (1959)                 | growth $\rightarrow$ democracy              |
| Barro (1996)                  | democracy $\rightarrow$ $\downarrow$ growth |
| Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) | democracy $\nrightarrow$ growth             |
| Acemoglu et al. (2019)        | democracy $\implies$ growth                 |

# Data

## Democracy Measure

- constructed from different sources
- dichotomous
- 1960 - 2010, 184 Countries




Figure 2: Democratization Events 1960-2010

## Problem: GDP Diversity and Dip




Figure 3: GDP Movement around Democratization

# Method

## 3 Approaches

- 1 **Dynamic Linear Panel Model** with *Within Estimator*
- 2 Semiparametric Estimation (*Appendix*)
- 3 Instrument Variable Regression (*Appendix*)

## Panel Formula

$$\mathbf{y}_{ct} = \beta \mathbf{D}_t + \sum_{j=1}^p \gamma_j y_{ct-j} + \alpha_c + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ct}$$

with  $p = \{1, 2, 4, 8\}$

# Fixed Effects Model

Table 2: Effect of Democracy on (Log) GDP per Capita

|                        | <i>Dependent variable:</i> |                      |                      |                      |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                        |                            | Log GDP per Capita   |                      |                      |
|                        | (1)                        | (2)                  | (3)                  | (4)                  |
| Democracy              | 0.973***<br>(0.240)        | 0.651***<br>(0.229)  | 0.787***<br>(0.228)  | 0.887***<br>(0.239)  |
| lag1                   | 0.973***<br>(0.003)        | 1.266***<br>(0.012)  | 1.238***<br>(0.013)  | 1.233***<br>(0.013)  |
| lag2                   |                            | -0.300***<br>(0.012) | -0.207***<br>(0.020) | -0.214***<br>(0.021) |
| lag3                   |                            |                      | -0.026<br>(0.019)    | -0.021<br>(0.021)    |
| lag4                   |                            |                      | -0.043***<br>(0.012) | -0.039*<br>(0.020)   |
| lag5                   |                            |                      |                      | -0.019<br>(0.020)    |
| Persistence:           | 0.973                      | 0.967                | 0.963                | 0.96                 |
| Long run effect:       | 35.587                     | 19.599               | 21.24                | 22.008               |
| Effect after 25 years: | 17.791                     | 13.8                 | 16.895               | 17.715               |
| Observations           | 6,790                      | 6,642                | 6,336                | 5,688                |

Note:

Coefficient on democracy is multiplied by 100

# Trend Estimate




Figure 4: Over-Time Estimate of Democratization Effects



# Interlude: Replication in R

- Figure Democratizations
- Model Specification
- Results Table
- Figure Trend
- Channels

Table 3: Effects of Democracy on Potential Mechanisms

|                 | <i>Dependent variable:</i> |                   |                        |                  |                     |                        |                          |                      |                      |
|-----------------|----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                 | Log Investment             | Log TFP           | Index Economic Reforms | Log Trade Share  | Log of Gov. Exp.    | Log Primary Enrollment | Log Secondary Enrollment | Log Child Mortality  | Dummy Unrest         |
|                 | (1)                        | (2)               | (3)                    | (4)              | (5)                 | (6)                    | (7)                      | (8)                  | (9)                  |
| Democracy       | 2.391***<br>(0.928)        | -0.205<br>(0.255) | 0.687**<br>(0.282)     | 0.689<br>(0.503) | 3.311***<br>(1.078) | 1.042***<br>(0.230)    | 1.345***<br>(0.393)      | -0.253***<br>(0.051) | -7.832***<br>(1.764) |
| Long Run Effect | 9.11                       | -2.88             | 5.58                   | 5.45             | 16.06               | 21.91                  | 18.96                    | -34.26               | -11.94               |
| Persistence     | 0.74                       | 0.93              | 0.88                   | 0.87             | 0.79                | 0.95                   | 0.93                     | 0.99                 | 0.34                 |
| Observations    | 5,665                      | 3,879             | 4,692                  | 5,738            | 4,511               | 3,714                  | 2,883                    | 6,084                | 5,646                |

Democratization => **state capacity & human capital building**

see online Appendix for Replication

# Critique

- Dichotomous Measure of Democracy ([Pelke 2023](#))
- Short Time Frame
- Sensitivity to Sample Selection ([Eberhardt 2019](#))

# Summary




Figure 5: Effects of Democracy

# Discussion

- 1 Are there **alternative political frameworks** that could also facilitate these mechanisms (state capacity and education expansion) or is it easier in democracies?
- 2 What actionable **policy recommendations** can be drawn from the observed link between democracy and economic growth?

# References

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## Appendix: Semiparametric




Figure 6: Semiparametric Estimates

## Appendix: IV

First Stage:

$$y_{ct} = \beta D_{ct} + \sum_{j=1}^p \gamma_j y_{ct-j} + \alpha_c + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ct}$$

Second Stage: with D as IV:

$$D_{ct} = \sum_{j=1}^p \pi_j Z_{ct-j} + \sum_{j=1}^p \phi y_{ct-j} + \Phi_c + \mu_t + v_{ct}$$

$Z$  = average of democracy in Region  $\times$  initial regime cell

Results see [Online Appendix](#)