Create windows_registry_sip_provider_modification.yml

detections/endpoint/windows_registry_sip_provider_modification.yml

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+name: 'Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification'
+id: 3b4e18cb-497f-4073-85ad-1ada7c2107ab
+version: 1
+date: '2023-10-10'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+status: production
+type: TTP
+data_source:
+- Sysmon Event ID 7
+description: 'The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Sysmon Event ID 7, which logs registry modification events. The analytic specifically looks for changes in registry paths and values associated with Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This behavior is worth identifying as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a technique often used by adversaries to bypass security measures and maintain persistence in an environment. If a true positive is found, it suggests an attacker is trying to manipulate the system''s cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Upon triage, review the registry paths and values modified, and look for concurrent processes to identify the attack source. Review the path of the SIP being added. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks.'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
+  as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time)
+  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*") Registry.registry_value_name IN ("Dll","$DLL") by
+  Registry.dest , Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| `windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate applications may cause benign activities to be flagged.
+references:
+  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003/
+  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_sip_persistence.yml
+  - https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
+  - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP
+  - https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage
+  - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/11/06/hijacking-digital-signatures/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
+  asset_type: endpoint
+  atomic_guid: []
+  confidence: 80
+  impact: 80
+  message: Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification detected on $dest$.
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1553.003
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Endpoint
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  risk_score: 64
+  required_fields:
+  - Registry.dest
+  - Registry.user
+  - Registry.registry_value_name
+  - Registry.registry_value_data
+  security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+- name: True Positive Test
+  attack_data:
+  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1553.003/sip/sip_windows-sysmon.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog