Fix typos

src/epub/text/book-2.xhtml

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
 					<h4 epub:type="ordinal z3998:roman">VI</h4>
 					<p>We have thus found the genus to which virtue belongs; but we want to know, not only that it is a trained faculty, but also what species of trained faculty it is.</p>
 					<p>We may safely assert that the virtue or excellence of a thing causes that thing both to be itself in good condition and to perform its function well. The excellence of the eye, for instance, makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. So the proper excellence of the horse makes a horse what he should be, and makes him good at running, and carrying his rider, and standing a charge.</p>
-					<p>If, then, this holds good in all cases, the proper excellence or virtue of man will be the habit or trained faculty that makes a man good and makes him perform his function well</p>
+					<p>If, then, this holds good in all cases, the proper excellence or virtue of man will be the habit or trained faculty that makes a man good and makes him perform his function well.</p>
 					<p>How this is to be done we have already said, but we may exhibit the same conclusion in another way, by inquiring what the nature of this virtue is.</p>
 					<p>Now, if we have any quantity, whether continuous or discrete,<a href="endnotes.xhtml#note-25" id="noteref-25" epub:type="noteref">25</a> it is possible to take either a larger [or too large], or a smaller [or too small], or an equal [or fair] amount, and that either absolutely or relatively to our own needs.</p>
 					<p>By an equal or fair amount I understand a mean amount, or one that lies between excess and deficiency.</p>

src/epub/text/book-4.xhtml

@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
 					<p>An element in the character that observes the mean in these matters is tact. A man of tact will only say and listen to such things as it befits an honest man and a gentleman to say and listen to; for there are things that it is quite becoming for such a man to say and to listen to in the way of jest, and the jesting of a gentleman differs from that of a man of slavish nature, and the jesting of an educated from that of an uneducated man.</p>
 					<p>This one may see by the difference between the old comedy and the new: the fun of the earlier writers is obscenity, of the later innuendo; and there is no slight difference between the two as regards decency.</p>
 					<p>Can good jesting, then, be defined as making jests that befit a gentleman, or that do not pain the hearer, or that even give him pleasure? Nay, surely a jest that gives pleasure to the hearer is something quite indefinite, for different things are hateful and pleasant to different people.</p>
-					<p>But the things that he will listen to will be of the same sort [as those that he will say, whatever that be]: jests that a man can listen to he can, we think, make himself</p>
+					<p>But the things that he will listen to will be of the same sort [as those that he will say, whatever that be]: jests that a man can listen to he can, we think, make himself.</p>
 					<p>So then there are jests that he will not make [though we cannot exactly define them]; for to make a jest of a man is to vilify him in a way, and the law forbids certain kinds of vilification, and ought perhaps also to forbid certain kinds of jesting.</p>
 					<p>The refined and gentlemanly man, therefore, will thus regulate his wit, being as it were a law to himself.</p>
 					<p>This then is the character of him who observes the mean, whether we call him a man of tact or a man of ready wit.</p>

src/epub/text/book-5.xhtml

@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@
 				</section>
 				<section id="chapter-5-1-11" epub:type="chapter">
 					<h4 epub:type="ordinal z3998:roman">XI</h4>
-					<p>The foregoing discussion enables us to answer the question whether it be possible or not for a man to act unjustly to himself</p>
+					<p>The foregoing discussion enables us to answer the question whether it be possible or not for a man to act unjustly to himself.</p>
 					<p>That which is just in one sense of the word we found to be those manifestations of the several virtues which the law prescribes: <abbr epub:type="z3998:initialism">e.g.</abbr> the law does not order a man to kill himself; and what the law does not order it forbids: and, further, when a man, contrary to the law, voluntarily inflicts hurt without provocation, he acts unjustly (voluntarily meaning with knowledge of the person and the instrument). Now, the man who kills himself in a rage voluntarily acts thus against right reason and does what the law forbids: he acts unjustly therefore.</p>
 					<p>But unjustly to whom? To the state surely, not to himself; for he suffers voluntarily, but no one can have an injustice done him voluntarily. And upon this ground the state actually punishes him, <abbr epub:type="z3998:initialism">i.e.</abbr> it pronounces a particular kind of disfranchisement upon the man who destroys himself, as one who acts unjustly towards the state.</p>
 					<p>Again, if we take the word unjust in the other sense, in which it is used to designate not general badness, but a particular species of vice, we find that in this sense also it is impossible to act unjustly to one’s self. (This, we found, is different from the former sense of the word: the unjust man in this second sense is bad in the same way as the coward is bad, <abbr epub:type="z3998:initialism">i.e.</abbr> as having a particular form of vice, not as having a completely vicious character, nor do we mean to say that he displays a completely vicious character when we say that he acts unjustly). For if it were possible, it would be possible for the same thing at the same time to be taken from and added to the same person. But this is impossible; and, in fact, a just deed or an unjust deed always implies more persons than one.</p>

src/epub/text/book-9.xhtml

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
 					<p>But he who sees feels that he sees, and he who hears feels that he hears, and he who walks feels that he walks; and similarly, whatever else we do, there is something that perceives that we are putting forth power, so that whether we feel or think, we must be conscious of feeling or thinking.</p>
 					<p>But to be conscious of feeling or thinking is to be conscious of existence; for our existence, we found, is feeling or thinking.</p>
 					<p>But consciousness of life is a thing that is pleasant in itself; for life is naturally good, and to be conscious of the presence of a good thing is pleasant.</p>
-					<p>Life, then, is desirable, and most of all desirable to the good man, because his existence is good to him, and pleasant; for he is pleased by the consciousness of that which is good in itself</p>
+					<p>Life, then, is desirable, and most of all desirable to the good man, because his existence is good to him, and pleasant; for he is pleased by the consciousness of that which is good in itself.</p>
 					<p>But the good man stands in the same relation to his friend as to himself, for his friend is another self: just as his own existence, then, is desirable to each, so, or nearly so, is his friend’s existence desirable.</p>
 					<p>But existence, we found, is desirable because of the consciousness that one’s self is good, such a consciousness being pleasant in itself.</p>
 					<p>The good man, then, should be conscious of the existence of his friend also, and this consciousness will be given by living with him and by rational converse with him (for this would seem to be the proper meaning of living together, when applied to man, and not merely feeding in the same place, which it means when applied to beasts).</p>