Cracking the Pixel 8: Exploiting the Undocumented DSP to Bypass MTE

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About us

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Agenda

- Backgrounds
- Bug analysis
- DSP exploit
- MTE on Android
- Conclusion

Android Kernel mitigations

- Android 14 kernel (5.4/5.10/5.15/6.1/6.6)
- PAN/PXN
- UAO
- CFI
- PAC
- MTE
- KASLR
- CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
- CONFIG INIT ON ALLOC DEFAULT ON
- CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST/CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM/...
- Vendor independent mitigations (KNOX/DEFEX/PhysASLR/...)

- Universal exploit
- Chipset specific exploit
- Vendor specific exploit
- Model specific exploit

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 - Linux kernel bugs: net, binder, etc...
- Chipset specific exploit
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 - Mali GPU, Qualcomm GPU, etc...
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 - Samsung NPU, Xclipse GPU, Huawei Maleoon GPU, etc...
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- Model specific exploit
 - Pixel X driver A, Samsung [A/S/Z] XX driver B, etc...

- Universal exploit
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 - Pixel X driver A, Samsung [A/S/Z] XX driver B, etc...

Pixel Driver Attack Surfaces

- Pixel TPU(edgeTPU)
- Pixel LWIS(Lightweight image processing)
- Pixel GXP(DSP)
- Pixel GPU(Mali Pixel)

- First introduced in Pixel 7 (2022)
- No public informations
- No developer toolchains
- No past CVEs or exploits

- GXP can be used by untrusted_app context
- sesearch --allow policy -s untrusted_app -t gxp_device
- allow untrusted_app_all gxp_device:chr_file { getattr ioctl map read write };

- If you look carefully, you will find untrusted_app context do not have open permissions
- allow untrusted_app_all edgetpu_app_service:service_manager find;
- allow edgetpu_app_server gxp_device:chr_file { append getattr ioctl lock map open read watch watch_reads write };


- We can make edgetpu service send driver fd back
- untrusted_app open /vendor/lib64/libedgetpu_client.google.so to call
 GetDspFd that interact with com.google.edgetpu.lEdgeTpuAppService
- Everything looks fine here.

```
v19[1] = *(_QWORD *)(_ReadStatusReg(ARM64_SYSREG(3, 3, 13, 0, 2)) + 40);
v16 = 0LL;
v17 = 0LL;
v18[0] = AServiceManager_getService("com.google.edgetpu.IEdgeTpuAppService/default");
aidl::com::google::edgetpu::IEdgeTpuAppService::fromBinder(&v16, v18);
v3 = v18[0];
if ( v18[0] )
   AIBinder_decStrong(v18[0]);
```

- But edgetpu app server won't simply pass the fd to us xD
- It will check the calling process's signature, only those in allowlist will get fd

```
,, אריבבי וסיסבים וכיסבים וכיסבים והביסבים והים ויסטים והים ויסטים ביסים וליסטים ומיסבים ומיסבים וכיסבים וליסטים וליסטים והים ויסטים וליסטים ו
((void (__fastcall *)(void **, char *, __int64))loc_E5E0)(&v377, v515, 1LL);
((void ( fastcall *)(char *, const char *))loc 9170)(
    v513.
     "10:39:38:EE:45:37:E5:9E:8E:E7:92:F6:54:50:4F:B8:34:6F:C6:B3:46:D0:BB:C4:41:5F:C3:39:FC:FC:8E:C1"):
((void (__fastcall *)(void **, char *, __int64))loc_E5E0)(&v379, v513, 1LL);
((void (_fastcall *)(_BYTE *, const char *, void **))loc_E670)(v603, "com.google.android.apps.youtube.kids", &v377);
((void ( fastcall *)(char *, const char *))loc 9170)(
     v509,
     "A2:A1:AD:7B:A7:F4:1D:FC:A4:51:4E:2A:FE:B9:06:91:71:9A:F6:D0:FD:BE:D4:B0:9B:BF:0E:D8:97:70:1C:EB"):
((void ( fastcall *)(char *, const char *))loc 9170)(
    v511,
     "6A:2F:65:EC:69:4A:6A:63:2A:CD:CB:50:80:91:2A:56:5F:90:3D:4B:8D:83:F0:EB:8E:44:FB:DF:26:60:D8:E1");
((void (__fastcall *)(void **, char *, __int64))loc E5E0)(&v373, v509, 2LL);
((void ( fastcall *)(char *, const char *))loc 9170)(
     v505.
     "CA:7C:DF:89:09:2B:2C:18:5F:D3:41:35:C2:7A:F8:90:36:48:90:06:3D:88:47:47:80:DF:65:A5:68:5C:D3:11"):
((void ( fastcall *)(char *, const char *))loc 9170)(
     v507.
     "A0:E1:39:06:55:CB:DC:4A:77:FC:0E:50:9F:BC:0E:80:6B:A4:4F:93:C5:2D:63:62:C2:EC:17:BF:97:C4:67:97");
((void ( fastcall *)(void **, char *, int64))loc E5E0)(&v375, v505, 2LL);
((void ( fastcall *) ( BYTE *, const char *, void **)) loc E670) (v604, "com.google.android.apps.youtube.music", &v373);
((void ( fastcall *)(char *, const char *))loc 9170)(
```

- But with code execution in those apps we can still reach the attack surface
- The Signature check do not prevent us from installing Older/Vulnerable versions of allow list apps
- A lot of apps in the allowlist are not installed by default, which means the "Downgrade mitigation" also not work for us.



- GXP replaces the GPU in many common image processing steps, such as deblurring and local tone mapping
- It closely collaborates with the existing EdgeTPU on Pixel devices to optimize performance and efficiency.

```
/* get tpu mailbox register base */
ret = of_property_read_u64_index(np, "reg", 0, &base_addr);
of_node_put(np);
if (ret) {
    dev_warn(dev, "Unable to get tpu-device base address\n");
    goto out_not_found;
}
/* get gxp-tpu mailbox register offset */
ret = of_property_read_u64(dev->of_node, "gxp-tpu-mbx-offset", &offset);
if (ret) {
    dev_warn(dev, "Unable to get tpu-device mailbox offset\n");
    goto out_not_found;
}
gxp->tpu_dev.dev = get_device(&tpu_pdev->dev);
gxp->tpu_dev.mbx_paddr = base_addr + offset;
return;
```

- Google's Camera app can directly take advantage of GXP to do acceleration
 - allow google_camera_app gxp_device:chr_file { append getattr ioctl lock map open read watch watch_reads write };
- Interestingly, the Google TPU share exactly the same policy as GXP
 - allow google_camera_app edgetpu_device:chr_file { getattr ioctl map read write };
 - allow appdomain binderservicedomain:binder { call transfer };
 - o allow appdomain binderservicedomain:fd use;
 - allow untrusted_app_all edgetpu_device:chr_file { getattr ioctl map read write };

- For edgeTPU and GXP, the difference is edgeTPU has one reported bug
 - o CVE-2023-35645



Pixel Update Bulletin—October 2023 | Android Open Source Project

Android Open Source Project > docs > security > bulletin > pixel

1 Oct 2023 ... Edgetpu. CVE-2023-35654, A-272492131 *, EoP, Moderate, vl53l1 driver. CVE-2023-35655, A-264509020 *, EoP, Moderate, Darwinn. CVE-2023-35660, A- ...

Q Search for EdgeTpu on Google

- For edgeTPU and GXP, the difference is edgeTPU has one reported bug
 - CVE-2023-35645

- We didn't find this kind of bug in GXP
- But there's many research on other different coprocessors
 - Mali GPU
 - Qualcomm GPU
 - Qualcomm DSP
 - Lwis (Pixel light weight image processing)
 - Samsung Exynos NPU
 - Samsung Exynos GPU
 - 0 ...
- Can we migrate ideas from "XPU" attack to get easy win?

- Write to Read-Only Files
 - E.g: CVE-2022-0847 (dirtypipe)

```
diff --git a/lib/iov iter.c b/lib/iov iter.c
index b364231..1b0a349 100644
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c
+++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ static size_t copy_page_to_iter_pipe(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t by
                return 0;
       buf->ops = &page_cache_pipe_buf_ops;
       buf->flags = 0;
       get_page(page);
       buf->page = page;
       buf->offset = offset;
@@ -543,6 +544,7 @@ static size_t push_pipe(struct iov_iter *i, size_t size,
                        break;
               buf->ops = &default_pipe_buf_ops;
               buf->flags = 0;
                buf->page = page;
                buf->offset = 0;
               buf->len = min_t(ssize_t, left, PAGE_SIZE);
```

- Write on Read-Only memory
 - o E.g: <u>CVE-2021-28664</u>

```
write = reg->flags & (KBASE_REG_CPU_WR | KBASE_REG_GPU_WR);
#if KERNEL VERSION(4, 6, 0) > LINUX VERSION CODE
                                                                                                                     #if KERNEL VERSION(4, 6, 0) > LINUX VERSION CODE
    faulted pages = get user pages(current, current->mm, address, *va pages,
                                                                                                                         faulted pages = get user pages(current, current->mm, address, *va pages,
#if KERNEL VERSION(4, 4, 168) <= LINUX VERSION CODE && \
                                                                                                                     #if KERNEL VERSION(4, 4, 168) <= LINUX VERSION CODE && \
KERNEL VERSION(4, 5, 0) > LINUX VERSION CODE
                                                                                                                     KERNEL VERSION(4, 5, 0) > LINUX VERSION CODE
           reg->flags & KBASE REG CPU WR ? FOLL WRITE : 0,
           pages, NULL);
                                                                                                                                 write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages, NULL);
#else
                                                                                                                     #else
            reg->flags & KBASE REG CPU WR, 0, pages, NULL);
                                                                                                                                 write, 0, pages, NULL);
#endif
                                                                                                                     #endif
#elif KERNEL VERSION(4, 9, 0) > LINUX VERSION CODE
                                                                                                                     #elif KERNEL_VERSION(4, 9, 0) > LINUX_VERSION_CODE
    faulted pages = get user pages(address, *va pages,
                                                                                                                         faulted pages = get user pages(address, *va pages,
           reg->flags & KBASE REG CPU WR, 0, pages, NULL);
                                                                                                                                 write, 0, pages, NULL);
#else
    faulted pages = get user pages(address, *va pages,
                                                                                                                         faulted pages = get user pages(address, *va pages,
           reg->flags & KBASE REG CPU WR ? FOLL WRITE : 0,
            pages, NULL);
                                                                                                                                 write ? FOLL WRITE : 0, pages, NULL);
#endif
```

- Dangling PTE Page UaF
 - E.g: <u>CVE-2022-36449</u>

```
if (ioctl(mali_fd, KBASE_IOCTL_MEM_IMPORT, &mi) < 0) {
    err(1, "[!] mem_import failed %lx\n", cpu_rw);
}

uint64_t gpu_mapping = (uint64_t)mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mali_fd, mi.out.gpu_va);
if ((void *)gpu_mapping == MAP_FAILED) {
    err(1, "[!] gpu mapping failed\n");
}

uint64_t jc = map_resource_job(mali_fd, atom_number++, (uint64_t)gpu_mapping);
// access it
printf("[+] access mapping and trigger page fault: 0x%lx\n", *(uint64_t *)gpu_mapping);

/*
    unmap cpu_rw and release softjob, then trigger shrinker, CVE_2022_22706
    gpu mapping being shrinked, but cpu mapping not handled, physical page could be reclaimed
*/
munmap((void *)cpu_rw, MAP_SIZE);
release_resource_job(mali_fd, atom_number++, jc);</pre>
```

- Shrinker Page UaF
 - E.g: <u>CVE-2024-32929</u>

```
for (i = 0; i < info->live_ranges_count; ++i)
        struct kbase_va_region *reg;
        u64 size;
        u64 va;
        u32 index = info->live_ranges[i].index;
        if (unlikely(index >= info->buffer_count))
                continue;
        size = info->buffer_sizes[index];
        va = info->buffer_va[index];
        reg = gpu_slc_get_region(kctx, va);
        if(!reg)
                continue;
```

- Shrinker Page UaF
 - E.g: <u>CVE-2024-32929</u>

```
/**
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
 */
static void gpu_slc_unlock_as(struct kbase_context *kctx)
       kbase_gpu_vm_unlock(kctx);
        kbase_gpu_vm_unlock_with_pmode_sync(kctx);
       up_write(kbase_mem_get_process_mmap_lock());
@@ -97,6 +97,12 @@
        /* Validate the region */
       if (kbase_is_region_invalid_or_free(reg))
                goto invalid;
       /* Might be shrunk */
       if (kbase_is_region_shrinkable(reg))
                goto invalid;
       /* Driver internal alloc */
       if (kbase_va_region_is_no_user_free(reg))
                goto invalid;
```

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Bug analysis

 In function gxp_mapping_create, the foll_flags not associated with the dir user passed

```
struct gxp_mapping *gxp_mapping_create(struct gxp_dev *gxp,
                                         struct gcip_iommu_domain *domain,
 95
                                         u64 user_address, size_t size, u32 flags,
 96
                                         enum dma_data_direction dir)
 97
 98 {
 122
             vma = find_extend_vma(current->mm, user_address & PAGE_MASK);
             if (vma) {
 123
                     if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
 124
                            foll_flags &= ~FOLL_WRITE;
             } else {
 126
 127
                     dev_dbg(gxp->dev,
                            "unable to find address in VMA, assuming buffer writable");
 128
 129
 130
             mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
 131
                 mapping->dir = dir;
194
                 ret = sg_alloc_table_from_pages(&mapping->sgt, pages, num_pages, 0,
195
196
                                                           num_pages * PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
```

Bug analysis

 which means device might can still write to this device, thus we can write a read-only region in AP by device.

```
struct gxp_mapping *gxp_mapping_create(struct gxp_dev *gxp,
                                           struct gcip_iommu_domain *domain,
 95
                                          u64 user_address, size_t size, u32 flags,
 96
                                           enum dma_data_direction dir)
 97
98
122
             vma = find extend vma(current->mm, user address & PAGE MASK);
             if (vma) {
123
                     if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
124
                             foll_flags &= ~FOLL_WRITE;
             } else {
126
127
                     dev_dbg(gxp->dev,
                             "unable to find address in VMA, assuming buffer writable");
129
             mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
131
               mapping->dir = dir;
194
               ret = sg_alloc_table_from_pages(&mapping->sgt, pages, num_pages, 0,
195
196
                                                     num_pages * PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
```

- We have an "in theory" write read-only bug now
- But how to prove?




- Let's take a step back
- If we have a write read-only bug on GPU, how to verify?

- Write read-only on import memory from CPU side
 - Create a CPU read-only memory cpu_ro
 - Import to GPU side and create cpu_rw mapping by bug
 - Directly write to cpu_rw

- Write read-only on import memory from GPU side
 - Create a CPU read-only memory cpu_ro
 - Import to GPU side and it's marked as rw in GPU MMU
 - Use OpenCL/Reversed ioctl to submit GPU write request (a bit more complex, but not much)

- How about our case?
 - Gxp support import pages, but it won't remap to another CPU address
 - Gxp don't have public infos or toolchains, there's no OpenCL for Gxp to use



First Attempt

Emulation


- Even if there's no OpenCL, maybe we can find the firmware of the GXP
- Use gemu to emulate the GXP firmware
- Reverse firmware to find the place of write memory handler
- Use gemu to verify our test.
- Let's go!

- Emulation
- The firmware init by init_mcu_firmware_buf

- Emulation
- By dumping the buf->vaddr, we can get the firmware

```
static int init_mcu_firmware_buf(struct gxp_dev *gxp,
                 struct gxp_mapped_resource *buf)
    struct resource r;
    int ret;
    ret = gxp_acquire_rmem_resource(gxp, &r, "gxp-mcu-fw-region");
    if (ret)
        return ret;
    buf->size = resource size(\&r);
    buf->paddr = r.start;
    buf->daddr = GXP_IREMAP_CODE_BASE;
    buf->vaddr =
        devm_memremap(gxp->dev, buf->paddr, buf->size, MEMREMAP_WC);
    if (IS ERR(buf->vaddr))
        ret = PTR ERR(buf->vaddr);
    return ret:
```

- Emulation
- After load it into IDA, seems this one is what we want, let's emulate and reverse to get it work!






Failed First Attempt

- Qemu didn't support this arch, many instructions just failed or didn't work as expected even after some patch
- We are a bit lazy to reverse the no symbol firmware xD


- Record and Replay
 - Basic idea is using some tool to hook the process using the GXP driver and observe how it send the ioctl to write the memory




- Record and Replay
 - First to figure out which app can use gxp device.
 - From previous explore, we already know it's Google Camera and those apps in allow list
 - But to perform record and replay, we better choose the one do the heavy usage on it
 - allow google_camera_app gxp_device:chr_file { append getattr ioctl lock map open read watch watch reads write }

- Record and Replay
 - From google_camera_app process's maps, there is a interesting library named libgxp.so
 r-xp 00000000 fe:0b 3854 /vendor/lib64/libgxp.so
 - It should be the core library to use gxp device driver

- Record and Replay
 - In libgxp.so, we can roughly know something from function name



- Record and Replay
 - Use Frida to trace the function usage
 - Frida is a dynamic instrumentation toolkit for developers, reverse-engineers, and security researchers




FRIDA

- Record and Replay
 - Hook target process's ioctl function call
 - Interceptor.attach(Module.getExportByName(null, 'ioctl')

Interceptor

• Interceptor.attach(target, callbacks[, data]): intercept calls to function at target. This is a NativePointer specifying the address of the function you would like to intercept calls to. Note that on 32-bit ARM this address must have its least significant bit set to 0 for ARM functions, and 1 for Thumb functions. Frida takes care of this detail for you if you get the address from a Frida API (for example Module#getExportByName()).



- Record and Replay
 - Hook process's libgxp.so external function call
 - var m = Process.findModuleByName("libgxp.so")
 - o for (var i = 0; i < Ex.length; i++) {</pre>
 - Interceptor.attach(Module.getExportByName("libgxp.so", Ex[i].name)

Interceptor

• Interceptor.attach(target, callbacks[, data]): intercept calls to function at target. This is a NativePointer specifying the address of the function you would like to intercept calls to. Note that on 32-bit ARM this address must have its least significant bit set to 0 for ARM functions, and 1 for Thumb functions. Frida takes care of this detail for you if you get the address from a Frida API (for example Module#getExportByName()).

- Record and Replay
 - With Frida, we can trace how app using loctly to interact with gxp device.
 - With Frida, we can know the correct function sequence to interact with gxp device
 - We just record a successful function calls pattern to reach our vulnerable driver code, which is from GxpCapi_OpenNamedLibraryFromBuffer

```
if( name.indexOf("GxpCapi_OpenNamedLibraryFromBuffer")!=-1){
    //console.log(arg[1].readCString());
    var f = new File("/data/local/tmp/lib8", "wb");
    f.write(arg[1].readByteArray(arg[2].toInt32()));
    console.log("Write lib done");
    trace_ioctl = 1;
} else {
    trace_ioctl = 0;
}
```

Verify the bug

- Record and Replay
 - Pass read-only memory to GxpCapi_OpenNamedLibraryFromBuffer, we can successfully write our PoC to reproduce write read-only files.

Bug patch

 Google refactored the whole code in GXP, the driver now will first get the gup_flags from host_address's vma

```
static unsigned int gcip_iommu_get_gup_flags(u64 host_addr, struct device *dev)
        struct vm_area_struct *vma;
       unsigned int gup_flags;
       mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
       vma = vma_lookup(current->mm, host_addr & PAGE_MASK);
       mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
       if (!vma) {
               dev_dbg(dev, "unable to find address in VMA, assuming buffer writable");
                gup_flags = FOLL_LONGTERM | FOLL_WRITE;
       } else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) {
                gup_flags = FOLL_LONGTERM | FOLL_WRITE;
       } else {
                gup_flags = FOLL_LONGTERM;
        return gup_flags;
```

Bug patch

 Then it will setup gcip_map_flags based on the gup_flags and pass to gxp mmu setup function

```
if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)) {
        gcip_map_flags &= ~(((BIT(GCIP_MAP_FLAGS_DMA_DIRECTION_BIT_SIZE) - 1)
                             << GCIP_MAP_FLAGS_DMA_DIRECTION_OFFSET));
        gcip_map_flags |= GCIP_MAP_FLAGS_DMA_DIRECTION_TO_FLAGS(DMA_TO_DEVICE);
sgt = kzalloc(sizeof(*sgt), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sgt) {
        ret = -ENOMEM;
        goto err_unpin_page;
ret = sg_alloc_table_from_pages(sgt, pages, num_pages, 0, num_pages * PAGE_SIZE,
                                GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret) {
        dev_err(domain->dev, "Failed to alloc sgt for mapping (ret=%d)\n", ret);
        goto err_free_table;
mapping = gcip_iommu_domain_map_buffer_sgt(domain, sgt, orig_dir, offset, iova,
                                           gcip_map_flags);
```

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- Write read-only files exploits is already very strong exploit primitive, we can follow the <u>DirtyPipe exploit path on Android</u>
 - Trigger write-ro to overwrite libc++.so
 - Hijack init by setprop and trigger write-ro again to write kernel module payload
 - Fork from init and change context to modprobe and load kernel module
 - Use kernel module to bypass selinux and get root

- Trigger write-ro to overwrite libc++.so
- Hijack init by setprop and trigger write-ro again to write kernel module payload



- In DirtyPipe the bug resides in syscall, and init do not have seccomp
- In our case, the policy is allow init gxp_device:chr_file setattr;

- After some time exploring the selinux policy, we found another path
 - allow hal_camera_default gxp_device:chr_file { append getattr ioctl lock map open read watch watch_reads write };
 - type_transition init hal_camera_default_exec:process hal_camera_default;
 - allow hal_camera_default vendor_file_type:dir { getattr ioctl lock open read search watch watch_reads };
 - allow hal_camera_default vendor_file_type:file { execute getattr map open read };


- So we now need hijack android.hardware.camera.provider to exploit write-ro again to put kernel module payload
 - Android.hardware.camera.provider (hal_camera_default) not like init can be stably triggered by setprop
 - We found that it will automatically do some log when it restarts
 - Maybe we can force restart it and use liblog.so to hijack it?

- Force restart android.hardware.camera.provider
 - If attack from untrusted_app, we won't know the pid of it
 - o In the hijacked init process, we have namespace isolation, also can't use pidof to get it
- But we found android.hardware.camera.provider is a system service which launched at the early boot stage
- Because of that, the pid of it is in a small range across each boot
- After forcing init to kill the pid range, we can successfully hijack android.hardware.camera.provider to do the second stage attack


Summary the exploit flow

- Overwrite libext2fs.so with our library's content
- Overwrite libc++.so to hijack init and android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7-service-google
- init kill android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7-service-google to trigger the hijack, the hijack will dlopen libext2fs.so
- android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7-service-google exploit the bug again to overwrite /vendor/bin/modprobe(reverse shell payload) and /vendor/lib64/libExynosC2Vp9Dec.so(kernel module payload)
- Init then execute modprobe to load ko to disable selinux and launch reverse shell

DSP Exploit Demo



DSP Exploit Demo



Agenda


- Backgrounds
- Bug analysis
- DSP exploit
- MTE on Android
- Conclusion

Arm Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)

- The Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) is a security feature on newer Arm processors(Armv8.5a) that uses hardware implementations to check for memory corruptions or other bug types.
- For Android, it first introduced in Pixel8 as a non default feature.
- adb shell setprop arm64.memtag.bootctl memtag,memtag-kernel


Arm Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)

It's been a hot topic for security researchers since first out



Arm Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)

MTE store tags in unused higher bits in address space



Will MTE end the game in Real World?

- For memory corruption bugs, it seems the end of the game
- But Android is famous for the Lego Ecosystem. Besides Google, there's Samsung/Xiaomi/Huawei/Vivo/Oppo/Oneplus/...
- Most vendors will choose not open it by default for better performance

MTE bypass

- MTE is born for memory corruption bugs
- For logic vulnerabilities, MTE can not prevent attacker to do privilege escalate

Agenda

- Backgrounds
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Conclusion

- Record and replay to break closed source devices
- Page level memory corrupt with coprocessor or logic bugs are also "born to bypass MTE"
- Logic bugs like write read-only will always win if there's no runtime signature check

Timeline

- Found bug and write exploit at mid 2024
- Report to Google at Sep 2, 2024
- Asked for non pre-compiled lib at Oct 17, 2024
- Send back new one to Google at Oct 19, 2024
- Google announced bug bounty reward at Nov 9, 2024
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- Bug addressed in 25Q1 update of Android release
- ...
- Not the end of story~

References

- HITCON 2022 How we use Dirty Pipe to get reverse root shell on Android Emulator and Pixel 6
- Memory Tagging Extension: Enhancing memory safety through architecture
- Two Bugs With One PoC: Rooting Pixel 6 From Android 12 to Android 13
- <u>Dynamic instrumentation toolkit for developers, reverse-engineers, and security researchers.</u>
- Project Zero Race conditions issues for edgeTPU

Q&A

Thanks for listening