Game Theory

Stephen Lee

September 1, 2016

1 Lecture 1: Intro

1.1 Prisoner's Dilemma

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc} a & C & D \\ \hline C & -1, -1 & -5, 0 \\ \hline D & 0, -5 & -3, -3 \\ \end{array}$$

Normal Form. Pure Strategies. Mixed Strategies. Expected Utility.

Utilities & Rationality

2 Lecture 2

2.1

People tend to be $\it risk-averse-$ they choose the less risky, even if the expected value is worse.

Anchoring: People latch onto (possibly irrelevant) information and it influences decisions.

Definition 2.1. Positive affine: u'(x) = c

Positive affine transformations preserv agent behaviour (equivalent games).

Remark 2.1. Test

- Common-payoff game
- Zero-sum game
 - Matching Pennies

- Rock, Paper, Scissors
- Nonzero-sum game
 - Prisoner's Dillema