

White Outgroup Intolerance and Declining Support for American Democracy *

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Social intolerance embodies an unwillingness to associate or fraternize with individuals whose cultural, racial, or religious ideas or ways differ from one's own group. Such prejudice is a particularly thorny problem in the context of democracy, which is predicated upon extending representational access to all citizens irrespective of race or creed. To what extent, then, does this social intolerance affect individuals' support for democratic institutions? Using World Values Survey data from 1995 to 2011, we find that intolerance toward cultural, ethnic, or racial 'others' reduces the value that white Americans assign to democracy. Perhaps more troubling, these attitudes also increase white individuals' openness to undemocratic alternatives – white Americans who exhibit social intolerance are more likely to dismiss the value of separation of powers and to support army rule. We close with a discussion of how our analyses inform American politics in the age of Trump and how political scientists can better understand the connection between social intolerance and anti-democratic orientations.

Keywords: intolerance, democratic attitudes, diffuse support

We need an ethno-state so that our people can “come home again,” can live amongst family, and feel safe and secure... *We must give up the false dreams of equality and democracy*—not so that we could “wake up” to reality; reality is boring—but so that we can take up the new dreams of channelling our energies and labor towards the exploration of our universe, towards the fostering of a new people, who are healthier, stronger, more intelligent, more beautiful, more athletic. We need an ethno-state so that we could rival the ancients.

- Richard Spencer, 2013

Introduction

Democracy has been durable in the United States – so durable, in fact, that serious inquiry into Americans' attitudes toward it has been uncommon.¹ No more. A recent and growing scholarly literature raises questions regarding the depths of citizens' support for democracy (Mounk, 2018; Shattuck, Watson and McDole, 2018; Davis, 2018). In particular, a cocktail of social and cultural

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¹For example, Sullivan and Transue's (1999) review of scholarship regarding support for various aspects of democracy, ranging from tolerance to civil liberties, is the lone integrative report on such attitudes since at least the date it was published. What attention has been paid to Americans' democratic attitudes largely concerns instrumental freedoms (e.g. freedom of assembly or speech).

angst seems to underscore dissatisfaction with the evolving capacity of American democracy to extend representational access to all citizens.

Consider Spencer's epigraph above, a quote taken from a speech conspicuously titled "Facing the Future as a Minority," given to a receptive audience at the 2013 "American Renaissance" conference in Nashville. In one sense, it was timely because Barack Obama's ascendance and palatability to a wide and diverse audience appeared to promise the dawn of a "post-racial America." Instead, opposition from white Americans put racial differences at the core of assessments of Obama's presidency (Tesler, 2016), which spilled into evaluations of other parts of American politics (Tesler, 2012). This development ultimately foreshadowed the election of Donald Trump (Mutz, 2018), an increase in the number of right-wing hate groups, and an increase in the crimes and demonstrations these right-wing hate groups commit (Müller and Schwarz, 2018). The "Unite the Right" rally is perhaps the most conspicuous of these demonstrations in light of Spencer's speech. Ostensibly organized to protest the removal of Confederate monuments, the rally, inspired by Spencer's words and previous march in Charlottesville, turned violent and culminated in the murder of one counter-protester.

We do not challenge that something like the "Unite the Right" rally places a thin and poorly-disguised veneer of "appreciating history" on more insidious problems of white supremacy and prejudice. However, we do contend that what is happening in these demonstrations is more than base prejudice and that Spencer's own words speak volumes. Spencer imbues the passage we highlight from this 2013 speech with a proscriptive argument regarding which citizens deserve to participate in the polity – namely, aggrieved white Americans. This racial lens filters their perspective of American politics and society, which becomes a problem for mass-level democratic support because democracy involves the institutionalized protection of the rights of various minority groups that these persons view as unwelcome. From their perspective, democracy does little more than provide protections for emergent ethnic and racial groups that white nationalists like Spencer find undesirable or threatening – requiring a rejection of the "false dreams of equality and democracy."

In this manuscript, we explore the relationship between this social intolerance and support for democracy in the United States. We start with a review of what we know about support for democracy. We then offer an argument about how social intolerance decreases support for democracy, focusing our argument on the current and salient problem of social intolerance and democratic support among white Americans in the United States. In particular, we argue that democracy – by design – places a premium on the opportunity of access to power and politics for all citizens, irrespective of race, creed, and status as majority or minority. This leads to negative evaluations of democracy from white Americans who view these minority outgroups as unwelcome. Our analysis of white Americans across four waves of World Values Survey data finds support for argument. Social intolerance of immigrants, those who speak a different language, and those from a different race leads to increased support for strongman rule in the U.S., potential rule of U.S. government by the army, and decreases support for even having a democracy in the U.S. We then unpack how education and white outgroup intolerance interact. We find that increased education, generally one of the most robust correlates of both tolerance and support for democracy, is no panacea in moderating democratic orientations of these white Americans. The effect of white outgroup intolerance may be even stronger on the better, rather than the least, educated. We close with a discussion of the important implications of our analysis for what we know about democratic support in the U.S., the current attention to democratic

support in the U.S. in the age of Trump, and how political scientists can go about analyzing these issues with our longstanding survey data.

What Do We Know About Support for Democracy?

Scholarship on democratic attitudes is voluminous but we can generally classify these works into two related, but ultimately separable domains: 1) investigations of support for democratic institutions (e.g. [Norris, 2011](#); [Inglehart, 2003, 2016](#); [Foa and Mounk, 2016](#); [Kotzian, 2011](#)) and 2) analyses of what individuals believe democracy represents (e.g. [Baviska and Malone, 2004](#); [Ferrin and Kriesi, 2016](#)). There is obvious value in assessing whether individuals think about democracy in terms of freedoms or process-based rules, but our primary focus here regards the public support that citizens voice for democratic governance. Such discussions traditionally begin with Easton's (1965; 1975) distinction between specific and diffuse support. Whereas specific support reflects the affect that individuals attach to various regime actors throughout government (e.g. satisfaction with democracy), diffuse support reflects the value assigned to the system as a whole. Satisfaction with regime outputs is mostly independent from the importance attached to the underlying institutional framework per this typology, with the caveat that sustained positive (or negative) performance has implications for diffuse support ([Chu et al., 2008](#); [Magalhaes, 2014](#); [Pequito Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior, 2014](#)).

Scholarship on diffuse support for democracy emphasizes how a variety of different system-level factors contribute to these democratic orientations. Here, the metrics of concern are often economic performance (e.g. [Kotzian, 2011](#)) and effectiveness (e.g. [Magalhaes, 2014](#)), such that diffuse support for democracy increases as the government delivers good policy and good economic outputs. Conversely, diffuse support for democracy craters when democratic institutions fail to meet their material or social obligations to citizens, as Pequito Teixeira and colleagues (2014) find in the case of Greece after its financial crisis and as [Miller \(2017\)](#) finds more generally since the 1990s.

These works relate to scholarly questions that ask if support for democracy is instrumental or intrinsic ([Bratton and Mattes, 2001](#)). On the one hand, these works suggest an instrumental component to democratic support in which diffuse support for democracy is conditioned on good policy performance by these institutions. The "intrinsic" scholarship, in contrast, generally contends that citizens value democracy for democracy's own sake. They want the freedoms and liberties these regimes provide more than they necessarily care about the prosperity these regimes supposedly provide over competing options. Nevertheless, a hard distinction between these approaches obscures how they are interrelated. For example, [Inglehart \(2003\)](#) argues that economic development is necessary for cultural values of self-expression, activism, and mutual tolerance to reach critical mass. At critical mass, demands for liberalization increase in an intuition consistent with Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs. Even if political "culture" arguments are difficult to separate from economic development (e.g. [Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 1991](#); [Jackman and Miller, 1996](#)), the liberalization that follows is closely wedded to consensus-making regarding procedural norms and values, like liberty, equality, and individualism ([Griffith, Plamenatz and Pennock, 1956](#)), all of which are grounded in political culture (e.g. [Almond and Verba, 1963](#); [Dahl, 1971](#); [Huntington, 1984](#)).

American citizens have not historically exhibited the sort of lofty, normative commitments to things like equality and tolerance that we might expect from one of the richest and longest-

running continuous electoral democracies in the world. As [Sullivan and Transue \(1999\)](#) note, most citizens were willing to apply double standards that afforded one set of rights to popular groups while denying rights to more extreme or less popular groups. [Parker and Barreto \(2013\)](#) find a similar story in how the Tea Party privileged liberties for its ingroup but not for those outside it. More recent socio-political events have emphasized that there is a growing sense that support for democratic principles is tenuous, if not eroding in the United States ([Foa and Mounk, 2016](#)). Popular support for democracy in the U.S. appears to be on the decline, even if Americans may value living in a democracy. In part, a divisive, partisan president may be priming co-partisans to renege on certain civil freedoms or institutional support, but this behavior also corresponds with a growth in nativist ([Young, 2017](#)) and racist sentiments within the mass public more broadly ([Tesler, 2016](#)). In fact, a growing desensitization to exclusionary rhetoric ([Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek, N.d.](#)) only draws more attention to the importance of appreciating the critical relationship between social tolerance and democratic norms and, importantly, how intolerance to the presence of ethnic/racial others might inform how individuals evaluate democracy.

What We Know About Social Tolerance and American Democracy

Political solutions regarding what is “best” or “right” for a citizenry are sure to embody different functional forms in pluralistic societies. As a result, a mutual commitment to basic norms of tolerance is necessary to establish peaceable exchange among those who disagree about the appropriate structure of government outputs. Regarding this point, however, it is vital to make an important distinction between *political* and *social* tolerance. While political tolerance involves permitting behaviors that one finds objectionable, social intolerance conveys a more general rejection of ethnic, religious, or cultural groups that are dissimilar to the group to which one belongs.

These are not insignificant differences, and it is important to briefly clarify them here. Political intolerance hinges on the *behavioral* decisions of citizens regarding whether they are willing to prohibit or interfere with legal, though objectionable, behaviors. For example, will individuals permit public demonstrations by Nazis ([Gibson and Bingham, 1985](#))? Are they willing to allow unpopular speech ([Mueller, 1988](#)) or actively restrict other civil liberties ([Gibson, 2013](#))? Will they extend the rights of citizenship to others without exceptions ([Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus, 1982](#); [Mondak and Sanders, 2003](#))? Social intolerance, on the other hand, is not a matter of active interference; instead, it resembles run-of-the-mill discrimination. Put another way, Allport’s (1954, 9) classic definition of prejudice is suitable: social intolerance resembles “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization... directed toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because he is a member of that group.”

These two forms of tolerance coexist awkwardly. [Gibson \(2011\)](#) makes this point explicit when he notes that many published works on intolerance and prejudice assume they are different sides of the same coin when this is decidedly not the case. Indeed, past research finds that people may deny citizenship to other persons or groups for which they hold little negative affect ([Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002](#)). Yet, while it is possible that prejudice – a term we use interchangeably with “social intolerance” – is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for behavioral intolerance, historical evidence of overlap is plentiful in the case of the United States.

Indeed, U.S. history is replete with examples where antipathies toward the integration and immigration into – and, more broadly, the diversity of – a pluralistic society has generated considerable political and social strife. South Carolina’s planter-politicians rebelled against extending

liberty, equality, and democracy to all bodies living in America. Nativists in the mid-1850s demanded a reduction in immigration from Catholic countries and anti-Chinese sentiment in the 1880s led to the Chinese Exclusion Act. The National Origins Act of 1924 extended the latter law and effectively barred all Asian immigrants from the opportunity to immigrate to the United States. The Ku Klux Klan, the most notorious and long-running terror group in the United States, preached anti-Semitism and racial bigotry after the Civil War and its early-1900s resurgence resulted in political assassinations and numerous terror attacks against African American churches and schools. Lynchings of African Americans even continued as late as the 1960s and instances of police brutality continue to manifest. Muslims and non-Muslim Americans of Middle East origin experienced significant levels of harassment after the September 11, 2001 bombings in New York. Most recently, then-candidate Trump began his presidential campaign declaring Mexicans were rapists and thugs and fomented violence against the predominantly ethnic/racial minorities that would protest his campaign appearances. His presidency has doubled down on these comments by intimating that immigrants entering the country without legal paperwork were “animals”, a precursor to news reports that exposed how immigration officials in the U.S. were forcibly separating U.S.-born children of immigrants from their parents and even losing track of them in the U.S. foster care system.

U.S. society, past and present is replete with outward displays of social intolerance and, regrettably, Americans are often not reticent enough to act on these impulses. We know these attitudes and behaviors are inconsistent with important democratic norms of mutual tolerance when we observe them but are only now piecing together the implications for how these Americans evaluate democracy in light of Donald Trump’s presidency. However, it is not abundantly clear whether or how social intolerance shapes individuals’ attitudes toward basic features of democratic governance. The next section offers an argument, rooted in the social identity framework, that democracy’s penchant for distributing access to the levers of power to disliked groups has important implications for how aggrieved white Americans evaluate democracy.

A Theoretical Argument Linking Social Intolerance to Evaluations of Democracy

Our argument that links social (in)tolerance to attitudes about democracy begins with some fundamentals regarding what we know about group identification and how group identification leads to social intolerance. First, the emergence of discriminatory attitudes requires some sort of social situation that makes categorical distinctions among groups salient because the simple development of an in-group identity is not a sufficient condition for out-group discrimination (e.g. [Brewer, 1999](#)). Instead, other factors – like the relative status of the groups to which individuals belong, the context of inter-group relations, and individuals’ psychological motivations – shape the development of social intolerance ([Turner and Reynolds, 2004](#); [Klandermans, 2014](#)). Second, individuals must value or feel connected to a particular group. This means attaching pride or significance to a group membership, along with valuing the symbols and values shared among the group.

These social identities transform into collective ones with political implications when individuals are willing to engage in a struggle for power ([Simons and Klandermans, 2001](#)). The explanations here are multiple. First, power struggles involve the sharing of grievances among in-group members, attaching fault or responsibility to out-group persons. Second, this blaming of an “other” for the group’s predicament generates demands or claims for compensation that

require something from the offending party. This process of the politicization of a collective identity can have some powerful implications for the overall social environment. It implies a cognitive restructuring of the social environment into a simplistic one in which there are only opponents and (potential) allies (Klandermans, 2014, 3). This overt simplification of the social environment is a process that leads individuals to develop intense feelings of social prejudices against those they perceive to be opponents.

The context of inter-group relations and the relative status of groups can exacerbate the natural tendencies for individuals to self-categorize and, by extension, develop politically consequential collective identities. This would comport well with what we have observed about the case of white Americans and the deep embeddedness of ethnic and racial divisions in American life, more generally. Race has long been a salient categorization of American society and American history is replete with identifying ethnic outgroups as unwelcome in the United States. More recently, the past decade included the election of the first African American president, coupled with predictions that whites' status as racial majority would disappear sooner than expected (c.f. Wazwaz, 2015). While whites' objective status within economic hierarchies is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future, polling still reveals a striking number of citizens perceive that America's prosperity and place as global leader is nevertheless in danger.² Importantly, these changes may be a threat to the stable, symbolic stature of whiteness for some citizens, which can be a threat to self-worth (Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014).

To the extent to which those same Americans assign value or associate social cache with the status of American dominance over others, these changes may contribute to perceived injuries committed by *ethnic* others. This mix of perceived socio-economic and racial threat has formed a powerful cocktail in the U.S. over the past few years that inflamed the sort of social intolerance and outgroup prejudice that would require exacting punishment on others within the social identity framework. Further, it accords well with what we have observed about how these racist, nativist, and xenophobic statements grew over the past decade, resulting in the rise of right-wing hate groups, acts of violence by these hate groups, and how these sentiments even accompanied Donald Trump's rise to power. However, the extent to which the intolerance of some white Americans toward non-white others affects assessments of the value of democracy is an open but pressing question.

"Democracy" is a fluid concept with myriad conceptual definitions, but a core feature of it involves the institutionalization of legal protections by the "majority" for the "minority" that allow the "minority" the opportunity of access in a system still otherwise characterized by some form of majoritarian decision-making (Dahl, 1989). The rationale for these protections may differ. The majority may offer these protections for the minority because they are normatively the "right thing to do." They may also anticipate a power transition in which the majority (in the context of political parties) may become the minority in the next electoral contest, which makes these legal protections necessary to guarantee that a majority today is not subject to repression and persecution tomorrow. Whatever the specific rationale, these legal protections for the minority that allow them to participate in politics and public debates is a *sine qua non* feature of democracy. In this way, democracy places a premium on the opportunity of access.

Balancing majoritarian decision-making against minority rights, however, is an exercise fraught with tension for a major reason. Fundamentally, democracy is a system of government that of-

²The extent to which America's economic dominance is "over" as a result of a changing global environment is an open empirical question (c.f. Mutz, 2018).

fers legal protections for minorities to afford them the same of opportunity of access to political discussions, which cuts against the narrow self-interest of the majority. Peaceable exchange requires a compromise from the majority to empower the minority beyond the minority's actual numerical endowment. Democracy, then, requires a foundation of mutual tolerance among its citizens, built upon the principle that "all political ideas (and the groups holding them) get the same access to the marketplace of ideas as the access legally extended to the ideas dominating the system" (Gibson, 2011, 411). Without such respect, the likelihood that majorities will run roughshod over the basic liberties of minority groups increases dramatically.

The path from white out-group intolerance to assessments of American democracy is relatively straightforward with this in mind. Social intolerance involves high levels of expressive identity (Rapp and Ackermann, 2016). People who feel threatened by diversity – prominently ethnic/racial and foreign diversity for the case of white Americans in the United States – ought to hold systems of governance that extend access to these individuals in lower regard due to both perceived material and symbolic threats to group status (Stephan and Renfro, 2002; Bahns, 2017). Democracy involves, in no small part, the allocation of both goods and power. We know that general economic threat can destabilize citizens' commitment to democracy (Miller, 2017), but we expect a particular dislike of minority groups to lead to negative summary assessments of institutions that redistribute resources from an individuals' in-group and toward a minority ethnic/racial out-group. Intolerant persons perceive that empowering such groups with political access and civil rights protections may threaten conformity to mainstream or majority values. They should be less likely to value democracy given that it necessarily extends access to disliked groups who these intolerant people view as unwelcome. Thus, we expect white Americans who exhibit social intolerance toward a variety of minority out-groups to be less accepting and supportive of democracy because it provides the *political* pretext for undesirable minority out-groups to accumulate power that they perceive might undercut their social or material stability. They should be more receptive to non-democratic alternatives of governance for the United States, a hypothesis we formalize at the end of this section and test in the following sections.

Hypothesis 1 *White Americans who are socially intolerant of ethnic/racial out-groups are more receptive to the idea of non-democratic forms of government for the United States than white Americans who are socially tolerant of these same ethnic/racial out-groups.*

Research Design

An empirical test of our argument in the case of the United States across time is difficult for multiple reasons. For one, the U.S.' status as one of the longest-running continuous democracies in the world leads to an almost unquestioned confidence that democracy is stable in the United States and that the questions we might ask of Nigerians or Venezuelans about democratic orientations are not worth asking in the American context. Thus, the American National Election Studies (ANES), General Social Survey (GSS), and even the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) do not ask questions of interest to decades of scholarship on democratic support. The few data sets that do ask these questions of Americans, like AmericasBarometer, do so because it is a small marginal cost to add American responses to a cross-national public opinion data set where democratic orientations are more interesting in the other cross-national units. However, these cross-national data sets that include American responses tend to not ask

the more granular and specific questions about attitudes toward matters of race and tolerance, which are salient in the American context but not easily applicable outside it.

The World Values Survey (WVS) offers the best possible means to test this argument across time in the United States. Its depth of questions on democratic support is well-traveled and robust (Ariely and Davidov, 2011), informing much of what we know about how individuals evaluate democracy vis-a-vis other alternatives. Further, WVS data in the United States shows considerable detail to questions of tolerance and white grievance that we address here. Our analysis ultimately uses the third, fourth, fifth, and six waves of WVS data in the United States, spanning observations from 1995 to 2011. We select on those respondents in these four waves that self-identify as white to test our argument linking white grievance and intolerance to democratic orientations.³

Dependent Variables

We leverage three survey items that have been used widely throughout the literature on mass-level support for democracy. The three questions constitute particularly severe breaks with diffuse support for democracy where individuals are asked whether they thought the following were good or bad ways of governing the United States:

1. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
2. Having the army rule the government
3. Having a democratic political system

The benefits of these metrics are multiple.⁴ On the one hand, these items reflect a generalized preference for authoritarian systems (e.g. Ariely and Davidov, 2011; Magalhaes, 2014). Yet, they are also interesting on their own merits. Consider that the first item taps into general support for whether democratic governance is good by proposing an alternative in which a strongman governs the U.S. without oversight from the national legislature (i.e. Congress) or regular elections. This question is as timely as ever given President Trump's open infatuation with similar leaders like Rodrigo Duterte and Vladimir Putin, who are not subject to the same institutional limitations. The third item, meanwhile, literally proposes waiving away democracy altogether in favor of an unspecific alternative. Outright opposition to American democracy also coincides with a meaningful preference for authoritarian leadership, however unspecified in the prompt.

The second item captures the acceptability army rule. On balance, Americans may have little grasp of the idea that military rule often means bloodshed. Autocratic regimes in which a military coup installs leadership rarely end well (e.g. Svolik, 2013). Yet, the glorification of militancy by persons who harbor out-group intolerance in America is as common as it is normatively troubling. From the manifestos of individuals who commit murderous acts against non-white persons to the rhetoric of neo-Nazis, the regalia of violence often accompanies out-group intolerance.

³We ran additional analyses on the respondents in the WVS who do not self-identify as white and find no robust support for the contention that the outgroup tolerance we measure generally leads to a decrease in support for democratic governance in the U.S. The argument we offer about how social intolerance leads citizens to devalue democracy because of democracy's opportunity of access is ultimately unique to white Americans.

⁴These metrics communicate measure support for democracy though we will also reference them as anti-democratic "orientations" or "attitudes" as we describe the results in the next section.

The original scale of these variables is ordinal in which the respondent could think such a system is very bad, bad, good, or very good for the United States. We condense each of these variables to a binary indicator. Responses equal a 1 for those people who thought a strong leader or army rule was “good” or “very good” for those two dependent variables. We choose to recode the “having a democratic political system” variable to be a 1 if the respondent thought it was “very bad” or “bad.” We do this to facilitate reading the direction of the regression results across all three models.

Primary Independent Variable

We proxy white outgroup intolerance through questions at the core of the tolerance literature. Tolerance researchers in the United States learned after several years that assuming least-liked groups (e.g. atheists and communists in Stouffer’s (1955) classic case) was an important form of measurement bias that showed Americans were becoming more tolerant over time even as it was simultaneously measuring ideology and improving relations with the Soviet Union (Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus, 1982). Thus, most tolerance researchers allow respondents to name groups they like the least before respondents proscribe various liberties and rights to members of those groups.


WVS does something similar with a battery of questions of interest to researchers on questions of tolerance and race in the United States. The survey prompts its respondents to say what types of people that the respondent would not like to have as neighbors. The respondent can name any they like from a set list of familiar groups. The prompt itself has also evolved over time and is sensitive to different countries and contexts but available responses in the U.S. include: criminals, members of a different race, heavy drinkers, emotionally unstable people, Muslims, immigrants/foreign workers, people with AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, Jews, people of a different religion, people of the same religion, militant minorities, political extremists, unmarried couples living together, and people who speak a different language.

Notice the variety that WVS has included in this battery on tolerance. It does not coerce a response easily construed as prejudiced toward an ethnic/racial minority unless this represented the respondent’s earnest preference. Indeed, most responses focused on groups like drug addicts, heavy drinkers, and criminals. Figure 1 shows that over 84% of respondents included drug addicts as a type of neighbor a white respondent would not want. The next most frequently mentioned groups are heavy drinkers, criminals, and emotionally unstable people.⁵

Our review of right-wing hate group literature and a review of language that white nationalists use identifies the responses of members of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers, and those who speak a different language as responses of interest. White nationalists and nativists routinely single out these groups, with varying levels of subtexts, as symbolic threats to status. We code a dummy that equals a 1 if a respondent identified any one of those as an unwelcome neighbor.⁶ Whereas these responses are not mutually exclusive and a respondent could conceivably list every single person on this list as an unwelcome neighbor, the measure we have for

⁵“Criminal” is a label that is easy to imbue with ethnic or racial overtones, but we suggest, for the sake of this analysis, that this priming would not easily occur and we could not measure it in a survey data set like this without additional context.

⁶We considered the option of “militant minority”, for which 13.3% of white respondents listed as an unwelcome potential neighbor, but we have a few misgivings with this option. The term is fundamentally loaded and biased. A person who does not want a “militant minority” as a neighbor could be prejudiced against minorities or reacting negatively to the “militant” qualifier. WVS provides no additional documentation as to what it means here.



Note: no white respondent in the data listed "people of the same religion" as an unwelcome potential neighbor.

Figure 1: Percent of White Americans in WVS Who Would Not Want This Type of Person as a Neighbor (WVS, 1995-2011)

social intolerance ultimately codes a 1 for 17.11% of all white respondents across the four waves we use here.⁷

Control Variables

We also include several control variables, which are all at the micro-level and come from the WVS data. Several basic sociodemographic indicators appear in the model. We include the respondent's age in years as well as a square term for age to discern if there is a curvilinear effect of age on attitudes toward these anti-democratic preferences. We include a dummy if the respondent was a woman or unemployed. We proxy income on the ten-point "scale of incomes" question in which the WVS prompts its respondents to conceptualize their income as deciles relative to the respondent's own country. Higher values indicate more perceived household income.

We offer a special comment here on education as basic sociodemographic control, given its outsized role as basic correlate of both tolerance and democratic support (e.g. [Lipset, 1959](#); [Vogt, 1997](#); [Henry and Napier, 2017](#)). Our analysis will offer several additional estimations that unpack signals from the noise in how white outgroup intolerance is moderated at different levels of education among white Americans but our primary treatment for the major set of analyses will condense education levels into a binary variable that equals a 1 if the respondent completed a four-year college degree. Those with at least some college experience, or even less than that, are

⁷We consider alternate estimations for a white outgroup intolerance variable that includes responses for Jews, Muslims, and even the "militant minority" response. We report those in the appendix and note here that they do not meaningfully change the results of our models.

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We included controls that proxy political values. We use the ten-point ideology continuum, in which the respondent lists her or his ideology from left to right on a unidimensional scale. We also include a square term for ideology to test for a curvilinear effect. We include fixed effects for partisanship that controls the effect of being a Republican or Democrat relative to a baseline of third-party supporters and self-described independents. Our final control variable is Welzel's (2013) "emancipative values" index. Welzel's emancipative values consists of four components of "autonomy" (i.e. the child autonomy index), "choice" (i.e. the justifiability of abortion, divorce, and homosexuality), "equality" (i.e. attitudes toward gender equality on the job, in politics, and educational opportunities), and "voice" (i.e. how much the respondent believes having a say in government is a political and personal priority). Miller (2017) finds a robust effect of this index on democratic orientations across the world, for which the strength of this effect could influence the effect of the primary independent variable that concerns this analysis.

Model Notes

The three dependent variables we use are binary, making a logistic transformation of regression coefficients appropriate. However, we address additional concerns about temporal heterogeneity in the data. We are using only American responses from the WVS data, but we note that there is concern for variation over time in the data. Thus, we include a random effect for the survey year (i.e. 1995, 1999, 2006, 2011) and mollify the issue of the relatively small number of years by estimating all models in this analysis with weakly informative Wishart priors on the covariance matrices (c.f. Chung et al., 2015).⁸ We additionally standardize all coefficients by two standard deviations. This is considered both good practice, in general, for those who run mixed effects models and it has the added effect of putting all variables, roughly, on a common scale (Gelman, 2008). This allows for a preliminary comparability of coefficient sizes across the models we run.

Results

This section contains the results of our analysis of the covariates of democratic orientations among white Americans in the WVS data from 1995 to 2011. We start first with an analysis of the main hypothesis of interest before performing an additional analysis in the second half of this section where we unpack white outgroup intolerance's effect on anti-democratic orientations at varying levels of education.

We start with Figure 2, a dot-and-whisker plot of three regressions that explain attitudes toward support for a strong leader, support for army rule of the government, and opposition to democracy in which the dots are coefficient estimates and the whiskers correspond with 95% intervals around the point estimate. A vertical line at zero represents the null hypothesis for which no overlap with a whisker communicates a statistically significant effect.

Age has a consistent negative effect on attitudes in favor of various authoritarian alternatives to democratic governance in the United States even though the insignificance of age's square term suggests we cannot discern a curvilinear effect in the data. This is *prima facie* consistent

⁸The appendix includes multiple estimations that consider issues of spatial heterogeneity in the data with random effects for Census regions. We also subset the analyses to just the individual survey years (i.e. separate models for 1995, 1999, 2006, and 2011). We also include region and/or year fixed effects. Ultimately, these other estimations do not change the inferences and results we report in this manuscript.





Figure 2: Dot-and-Whisker Plots of the Covariates of Democratic Orientations of White Americans in the World Values Survey (1995-2011)

with the worrying trends that [Foa and Mounk \(2016\)](#) report in their analysis on democratic deconsolidation even though others may reasonably disagree what this trend communicates or if age has anything to do with it (c.f. [Journal of Democracy, 2017](#)). College education also has a mostly robust, negative effect on anti-democratic orientations. The coefficient is negative and discernible from zero in both the opposition to democracy analysis and the analysis on support for a strong leader unencumbered by legislative or electoral oversight. This is consistent with a wide body of scholarship on the importance of education to democracy (e.g. [Lipset, 1959](#)). We will return to a more thorough analysis of the nexus between education, white outgroup intolerance, and democratic support later in this section.

There are few consistent effects across all three models, which suggest the effect of several predictors on anti-democratic orientations may have substantial variation even if all three dependent variables we use proxy latent support for authoritarianism or opposition to democracy. There are a few discernible differences between men and women. White women are more likely than white men to oppose democracy in the United States and they are more open to rule of government by the army, though there is no discernible difference between men and women on support for strongman rule in the U.S. There is no real income difference we were able to discern. Generally, white Americans higher in the income decile scale are less likely to oppose having democracy but the effect of income scale on support for army rule and strongman rule is effectively zero.

Controls for social and political values also have some inconsistent effects. Increasing ideology has a significant (negative) effect in the two models explaining attitudes in favor of army rule or attitudes opposing democracy for the United States. The square term for ideology has a significant and negative effect in the models explaining attitudes in favor of strongman rule and army rule. Generally, these communicate that increasing ideology to the right decreases the likelihood of an anti-democratic orientation and that the effect might be a little stronger on those white respondents furthest to the right. However, there is considerable variation in these parameters and our analyses do not suggest this effect is robust. The emancipative values variable, which otherwise has some of the strongest effects that [Welzel \(2013\)](#) and [Miller \(2017\)](#) report in their cross-national analyses, has much more muted effects in the U.S. The coefficient is insignificant in the second model that explains variation in attitudes toward army rule. Partisanship explains relatively little in our analyses as well. White Republicans are less likely than white independents and third-party supporters to support a strong leader and white Democrats are less likely than white independents and third-party supporters to oppose having a democracy for the United States.

Our primary concern in this analysis is the effect of white outgroup intolerance, which we operationalize as whether a white American in the WVS data does not want members of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers, and those who speak a different language as neighbors. Here we find a robust, positive effect. A respondent that lists one or more of these groups as unwelcome potential neighbors is much more likely to support a strong leader who is unencumbered by legislative checks and balances, is much more open to rule of government by the army, and is much more likely to outright oppose having democracy in the United States. This is consistent with our argument that white Americans prejudiced against ethnolinguistic difference are much more likely to see democracy as empowering these minority groups beyond their numerical endowment, extending rights and liberties to groups that these white Americans see as unwelcome.



Note: each ridge annotated with the mean of first differences, 95% intervals around the mean (in parentheses), and the proportions of simulations with negative first differences [in brackets].

Figure 3: Ridgeline Plots of Various Indicators of White Outgroup Intolerance on Democratic Orientations

We illustrate the effects of white outgroup intolerance on anti-democratic orientations as faceted ridgeline plots in Figure 3. Here, we set all the controls at zero, which creates rows for employed male independents/third-party supporters without a college education of average age with the average social and political values. Thereafter, we allow the binary indicator for white outgroup intolerance to vary from 0 to 1 for the white outgroup intolerance measure we devise. We run 1,000 simulations of the model to get an expected likelihood (i.e. a probability) of observing a 1 on the dependent variable (i.e. supporting strongman rule, army rule, or opposing democracy for the United States). We do the same process iterating out the white outgroup intolerance measure and adding instead an individual component of our white outgroup intolerance measure (e.g. respondent would not want an immigrant/foreign worker as a neighbor, a person of a different race as neighbor, etc.). We calculate average first differences between those expected values and communicate the results as probability distributions for which 95% intervals around the mean are enclosed in brackets and shaded darker than the entire distribution. We also annotate each ridge in the plot with the mean of the first differences, the 95% intervals around the mean (in parentheses), and the proportion of simulations with negative first differences [in brackets]. Negative first differences are results of simulations in which a socially tolerant average white male had a higher likelihood of an anti-democratic orientation than a socially intolerant average white male, which would be inconsistent with our hypothesis.

The results show that the 95% intervals around these distributions exclude 0 in all but two estimations. Those two exceptions are the effect of a white American not wanting a neighbor who spoke a different language on opposition to democracy and the effect of not wanting a neighbor of a different race on support for rule of the U.S. government by the army. We qualify the latter case because the 95% intervals we report surround the mean of the distribution. These

simulations are ultimately one-tail and only 2.8% of the simulated first differences in that case were negative.

Elsewhere, the distributions of simulated first differences we report in the ridgeline plots in Figure 3 lend support for our argument. We ran 3,000 combined simulations of the effect of our white outgroup intolerance measure on support for strongman rule, rule of the U.S. government by the army, and opposition to democracy. None of those 3,000 simulations yielded a negative first difference in which a socially tolerant white male was more likely to express an anti-democratic orientation than a socially intolerant white male. The effect of not wanting an immigrant or foreign worker as a neighbor was comparably as robust. Only four of the 3,000 total simulations we ran yielded first differences inconsistent with our expectation that white Americans who view immigrants/foreign workers as unwelcome are more likely to express anti-democratic orientations because democracy means empowering these groups with the opportunity of access. While the effect of not wanting a member of a different (non-white) race on support for rule of the U.S. government by the army may not be as precise as some of the other effects we analyze, none of the 2,000 simulations we ran on its effect on support for strongman rule or opposition to democracy yielded negative first differences. We observe a similar precision for the effect of not wanting a neighbor who spoke a different language as a neighbor. More than 7% of the simulations of its effect on opposition to democracy in America yielded negative first differences, but there were only 24 negative first differences in the 2,000 combined simulations we ran on support for a strong leader and support for rule of government by the army. There were just two negative first differences in the 1,000 simulations we ran on support for a strong leader. All told, the analyses we report in Figure 2 and Figure 3 lend strong support to argument that the effect of white outgroup intolerance on anti-democratic orientations is positive and precise.

The Nexus Between Education and Intolerance

We offer a special section of our analysis to an exploration of the multifaceted relationship between education and intolerance and support for democracy. We do this for a few reasons. One, scholarship identifies that education is a substantively important correlate for both democracy and tolerance. Some of the earliest scholarship on the topic classified an educated citizenry as sine qua non feature for democracy to flourish, bolstering its importance by identifying formal education as a necessary condition for democracy itself (Dewey, 1916; Lipset, 1959). More recent analyses on the determinants of democracy have largely bolstered this assertion that education is an important determinant of democracy and the public demand for more democracy (e.g. Barro, 1999). These arguments invariably draw in scholarship that highlights how education socializes young people. Education involves rote book-learning but also lowers the cost of some social interactions (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007), promotes good citizenship by emphasizing involvement and participatory behavior (Holmes, 1979), and teaches people how to acquire knowledge through reasoned and peaceable debate (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). In essence, education also promotes tolerance and tolerance also promotes democracy. Conventional wisdom holds that all three are mutually reinforcing.

Questions remain about this conventional wisdom in light of current events and more recent scholarship. For example, increasing education may lower social intolerance toward ethnic/racial minorities, as our Figure 2 also shows, but it coincides with an increasing political intolerance (Henry and Napier, 2017) that is *symmetrical* across the political left and political right. It suggests a form of selection because increasing education is itself a form of selection. Individuals

select into increasing education and increasing education, especially at the collegiate level, may do well to socialize most students about the importance of democracy, equal opportunity of access for majorities and minorities within a democratic design, and how to accept the presence of ethnic/racial out-groups as co-equals. However, students who still hold those views after selecting into advanced levels of education could conceivably be more likely to have a firm grasp on the “undesirable” equality-building features of democracy. This would square with some of Federico’s (2005; 2006) research that finds negative racial perceptions decreases with more education but the effect of these same negative racial perceptions tends to be stronger among the better educated. It would also square with what we observed in Charlottesville in 2017, where a “Unite the Right” rally inspired by Richard Spencer (a two-time college graduate) attracted a significant number of college students who still appeared to hold these views even after exposure to college-level instruction. In other words, the effect of holding onto prejudiced views after higher levels of education may make social intolerance’s effect on attitudes against democracy even stronger even if we typically assume these effects cluster on the less educated.

We explore this nexus between education and intolerance with two different estimations of our main analyses. The first alternate estimation allows the effect of college education and white outgroup intolerance to interact. The second alternate estimation drops the college education variable but treats education as a category, or “random effect”, by which the slope of white outgroup intolerance can vary. We present the important results from these models as Figure 4 and Figure 5 and save the full results for the appendix.

Figure 4 contains two components. The top component is an abbreviated dot-and-whisker plot that shows just the effect of college education, white outgroup intolerance, and its interaction, noting that the other covariates in the model are estimated but ultimately put in the appendix to draw the reader’s attention to the main covariates of interest. The bottom component is a ridgeline plot of simulated probabilities of the likelihood of observing a 1 in the model by different categories of college education and white outgroup intolerance. We annotate the top right of each ridge with 95% confidence intervals surrounding the expected value (i.e. mean probability) from the simulations.

We note that the dot-and-whisker plot does show one important difference between the main results we presented in Figure 2. Namely, allowing college education to interact with the white outgroup intolerance measure creates a statistically significant effect on support for army rule for the constituent term of college education that we did not observe in Figure 2. Formally, it communicates that the effect of increasing college education on those for whom our white outgroup intolerance measure is zero decreases the likelihood of thinking rule of government by the army would be good for the United States. However, the interaction is statistically insignificant by conventional thresholds. Indeed, only one interactive effect has an effect that can we discern from zero. The interaction between college education and white outgroup intolerance is positive and discernible from zero in the model that explores the outright opposition to having a democracy for the United States.

The thousand simulations we run for each of these three analyses yields some interesting findings. Namely, they offer some illustrative evidence that the effect of white outgroup intolerance on anti-democratic orientations may be higher on those with more education than those with less education. Ultimately, the simulations we run show a lot of overlap among the two-by-two matrix connecting college education and white outgroup intolerance to attitudes in support of a military government for the United States. Generally, white outgroup intolerance has a some-




Figure 4: Regression Results (a) and Simulated Probabilities (b) of the Interaction Between College Education and Intolerance on Anti-Democratic Orientations

what large, positive effect on the likelihood of thinking a military government for the United States is good even though the 95% intervals surrounding the mean of the estimations clearly overlap. However, our simulations suggest that the effect of white outgroup intolerance seems to be larger on the college-educated.

We see even more interesting, illustrative evidence suggesting this divergent effect of white outgroup intolerance by level of education in the models simulating the likelihood of opposing democracy and thinking strongman rule would be good for the United States. Here, the bottom two ridges (i.e. simulations for the college-educated) show much starker effects of white outgroup intolerance on the college-educated than on those who did not complete a college degree. The 95% intervals barely overlap, for which we will note that we are not making an inferential statement here, but the movement we see serves as another noisy signal that the effect of white outgroup intolerance may be higher on the college-educated than on those without at least a four-year university degree. Indeed, the simulations put the college-educated, but prejudiced, white Americans closer to those non-prejudiced white Americans without a college degree. Whereas we commonly assume that a university education opens up minds to appreciate democracy and the importance of broadly enfranchising citizens to participate in matters of governance, the effect of intolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers, people of a different race, and those who speak a different language seems to negate that effect.

Figure 5 offers further evidence that the effect of white outgroup intolerance may actually be stronger at higher levels of education. Here, we re-estimate the three main models from Figure 2, but drop the college education fixed effect and substitute instead education categories as random effects. These education random effect categories are for those respondents without formal education or did not complete primary education, those who stopped their education after primary school, those who did not finish high school/secondary education, high school grads that never went to college, those that went to college but did not complete a four-year degree, those with a bachelors or equivalent four-year degree, and those with an advanced university degree (e.g. J.D., Ph.D., M.D., etc.).⁹ This estimation allows the slope of the fixed effect of white outgroup intolerance to vary by these levels of the random effect. After estimating these three models, we ran a thousand simulations on each, calculating expected values of the likelihood of an anti-democratic orientation while allowing the white outgroup intolerance fixed effect to vary from 0 to 1 at each level. We report the results of these simulations as expected values (i.e. mean probabilities of an anti-democratic orientation in our simulations) with 95% intervals at each level of education.

The simulations offer further evidence that the effect of white outgroup intolerance may be stronger at higher levels of education. Notice that white outgroup intolerance appears to have little effect at lower levels of education. Consider the categories for white Americans who never had any exposure to college. The simulations all unequivocally suggest a positive effect of white outgroup intolerance; i.e. white outgroup intolerance increases the likelihood of an anti-democratic orientation even at lower levels of education. However, the effect is rather small and the 95% intervals surrounding the mean probability from our simulations clearly overlap between those who are tolerant and those who are intolerant of immigrants/foreign workers, members of a different race, and people who speak a different language. Only one category in our simulations of white Americans at lower levels of education appeared to show a near

⁹The “Some College, No Four-Year Degree” category includes respondents with a traditional two-year associates degree.




Figure 5: The Effect of White Outgroup Intolerance (as Random Slopes), by Level of Education, on Anti-Democratic Orientations

discernible difference between the tolerant and intolerant. White outgroup intolerance appears to noticeably increase the likelihood of a preference for rule of government by the U.S. army among high school dropouts. This is the lone category that emerges from our simulations of white outgroup intolerance’s effect at lower levels of education.

Differences start to become clearer at higher levels of education among those with at least some exposure to college. The effect of white outgroup intolerance starts to appear among those with at least some college experience in the army rule and strong leader models, certainly comparing the effect in that category relative to those with a high school diploma and no college experience whatsoever. We start to see clear and discernible differences among the college graduates. There is no overlap in the simulated effect of white outgroup intolerance among those with a bachelors degree or equivalent in the model estimating opposition to democracy. We see only a little overlap in the model estimating support for army rule. We see similar discernible effects emerge among those with an advanced university degree. The 95% intervals do not overlap in the strong leader model, which suggests a clear and discernible effect of white outgroup intolerance on attitudes in support of strongman rule among the most educated white people in the United States. We see only slight overlap in the model estimating support for rule of government by the U.S. army among those with an advanced university degree.

Conclusion and Implications

Our manuscript started with a passage from a Richard Spencer speech, titled “Facing the Future as a Minority” and given at the “American Renaissance” conference in 2013. A first read of this passage places it within a context where a racialized perspective conditioned opposition to

President Obama, the first black president, and in which demographic shifts will make the U.S. a “minority-majority” country in the intermediate future. This coincided with a visible racial backlash in the years surrounding Spencer’s speech, including demonstrations, prominently in Charlottesville, that were explicitly inspired by his words. Our second read of this passage highlights something more troubling. Spencer imbues his words with a proscriptive argument about who deserves to participate in the polity – i.e. aggrieved white Americans. From this perspective, “the false dreams of equality and democracy” do little more than enfranchise and empower ethnic/racial minorities with the same opportunity of access to politics as those who Spencer deems society’s only deserving participants. Spencer’s social intolerance toward ethnic/racial outgroups is clear, and we do not suggest his words or the rallies he inspires are anything other than a thin and poorly disguised veneer of white supremacy and prejudice. Yet, we do contend his passage yearning for a white ethno-state “to rival the ancients” is signaling an outright rejection of democracy in the United States.

We generalize the implications of Spencer’s words and what we are observing about American politics and society in the age of Trump into an analysis of the anti-democratic orientations of white Americans across four waves of WVS data from 1995 to 2011. We construct an argument linking social intolerance to anti-democratic orientations, highlighting how perceived outgroup threat to status and material well-being leads to an intolerance from white Americans toward the presence of ethnic/racial outgroups. This becomes a problem for attitudes about democracy since democracy requires extending the “opportunity of access” to politics to these same outgroups that aggrieved white Americans perceive as threatening them. Our analysis of four waves of WVS data finds support for our argument. White Americans who would not want an immigrant/foreign worker, someone who spoke a different language, or someone from a different race as a neighbor are more likely to support strongman rule in the United States, rule of the U.S. government by the army, and are more likely to outright reject having a democracy for the United States. These findings are robust across multiple model specifications we analyze and report in the appendix as well.

Bridging scholarship on social tolerance and democratic attitudes was our primary academic goal in this manuscript. We know there is a substantial overlap between both topics. Indeed, democracy institutionalizes mutual tolerance for competing viewpoints. Scholarship that explores how citizens privilege democracy for democracy’s “intrinsic” value emphasize how ingrained these views of equality and tolerance are in democracies and among citizens who highly value living under democratic institutions. However, we know the American context is one in which its citizens have not exhibited, past or present, the sort of lofty commitment to these values even as the U.S. itself is one of the longest-running continuous democracies in the world. Our manuscript contributes to these academic discussions by building on the past and current events and formalizes an argument of how social intolerance among white Americans feeds anti-democratic orientations *because* of democracy’s institutionalization of tolerance and the extension of the opportunity of access to these unwelcome ethnic/racial outgroups. Our findings on this end are robust. White Americans who do not welcome the presence of immigrants/foreign workers, people who speak a different language, or people from a different race, are much more likely to value an institutional alternative to democracy in the United States.

We believe we also make some important insights to discussions of education’s role in promoting tolerance and emphasizing the importance of living in a democracy. We note education is an important correlate in these arguments but we should be careful of attributing causal argu-

ments to education. Education in the United States is in large part a selection effect, certainly at higher levels. Citizens select into pursuing a college education, which we identify as key arenas in which students get more exposure to ethnic/racial outgroups and can learn even more detailed information about the virtues of democratic governance. We do not discount these are beneficial. Indeed, a college education is reliably negative fixed effect that decreases the likelihood of an anti-democratic orientation in our analyses. We also do not doubt the volume of scholarship that highlights how education promotes tolerance as well (see: [Henry and Napier, 2017](#)). Yet, our analyses imply even stronger effects of white outgroup intolerance on anti-democratic orientations at *higher*, not lower, level of education, which is consistent with some of Federico's (2005; 2006) earlier research on how the effect of negative racial perceptions on policy preference is stronger on the better, and not the least, educated. This circles us to the problem of selection in these arguments. Citizens who still hold these views even after higher levels of education may better understand that democracy enfranchises ethnic/racial minorities with the opportunity of access to politics. Toward that end, it is no surprise to us that some of the most violent demonstrations for the cause of white nationalism are happening on college campuses and advocates for white nationalism, like Richard Spencer, are college graduates themselves.

However, our immediate audience are those concerned citizens and academics who want to understand and better contextualize our current discussions of democracy's trajectory in the age of Trump. These are important concerns the academic community have been raising since Trump started his presidential campaign in the summer of 2015. We want to emphasize that our analyses concern data that happened before Trump's campaign started and thus what we propose here does not speak to how Trump himself affects these trends. That said, we think the most troubling and most important implication of our analysis is the fact these are trends we observed *before* Trump. We observe these trends as early as 1995 in the WVS data, a full 20 years before Trump first descended his gilded escalator and began his campaign for president by declaring that Mexicans were "rapists." Thus, our analysis is as unique as it is troublesome. We show that the new scholarly concern with American democracy's trajectory in the age of Trump belies that these trends have been hiding in plain sight in the WVS data for over 20 years. Our scholarly interest in democracy's development and growth elsewhere in the world may have glossed over democracy's gangrene in the United States.

Thus, we believe it is plausible, in light of current events, that our analysis might undersell the strength of the relationship between intolerance and anti-democratic attitudes. The results in the appendix that show stronger effects in more recent survey waves underlines that intuition. However, the extent is difficult to ascertain given the data limitations and this lack of data speaks to a related issue we wish to highlight. For too long, the study of democratic attitudes has been largely relegated to the cross-national context. It is clear, however, that the omission of scholarly investigation into Americans' attitudes toward democracy works against our ability to benchmark the severity of the current situation. Recent survey efforts by the Bright Line Watch and Voter Study Groups are welcome additions to this research. Yet, we encourage other, long-running survey houses like the ANES and GSS to begin collecting data on democracy that helps assess the health of citizens' affect toward government. It is one thing to be critical of governmental institutions (e.g. Congress, elites); it is another to throw out the proverbial baby with the bath water. Our impression is that a non-trivial proportion of Americans harbor deeply intolerant views that spill into support for democracy. Our analyses support that impression. We think it is incumbent now for our more focused and granular American survey data sets like the

ANES and GSS to ask the same questions of Americans about a commitment to democracy and democratic orientations that outlets like the WVS would ask of citizens in countries like Pakistan and Venezuela.

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