MTAT.07.003 Cryptology II

How to Model Cryptographic Primitives and Protocols

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Abstraction is a key to successs

▷ **Cryptographic constructions are complex**

- Irrelevant techincal details obscure security proofs.
- A good abstraction clarifies what is meant by security.
- An abstraction highlights which properties are relevant for security.

▷ **Cryptographic constructions are not provably secure**

- Security of most cryptographic constructions is based on *intractability*.
- So far provable lower bounds are *trivial* for all computational problems.
- It is also *highly* unlikely that such proofs *do* exist in a *compact* form.

▷ **Abstraction allows to escape intractability issues**

- We just assume that necessary cryptographic primitives exist.
- The actual implementation of such primitives is out of our scope.

Illustrative Example

2048-bit RSA

Key generation

1. Choose two 1024-bit prime numbers p and q.
2. Compute Let $n = pq$, choose $e \xleftarrow[u]{} \mathbb{Z}^*_{\phi(n)}$ and set $d \leftarrow e^{-1} \mod \phi(n)$.
3. Public key is (n, e) and secret key is (n, e, d).

Encryption

1. Let pad : $\{0,1\}^{128} \to \mathbb{Z}^*_n$ be a predefined embedding.
2. To encrypt $m \in \{0,1\}^{128}$, output $c \leftarrow \text{pad}(m)^e \mod n$.

Decryption

1. To decrypt $c \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, compute $x \leftarrow c^d \mod n$.
2. Extract m form x and verify that $\text{pad}(m) = x$.
3. Output $\perp$ in case of failure and m otherwise.

The corresponding abstraction

RSA-2048

Key generation

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Public Key Cryptosystem



$$\forall(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{pk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen} : \mathsf{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(m)) \equiv m$$

To get rid of unnecessary details

- We split the system into algorithms and treat them as black boxes.
- Functionality is guaranteed by specifying additional conditions.
- Security is defined through specifications of tolerable attack scenarios.

Naive security requirement

Goal: It should be infeasible to derive a secret key from accessible data.



$$
\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}}
\left[\begin{array}{l}
(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{pk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen} \\
\mathsf{sk}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}) \\
\mathbf{return}\ [\mathsf{sk} \stackrel{?}{=} \mathsf{sk}^*]
\end{array}\right.
$$

The *advantage* of a *key only attack* is defined as an *average* success:

$$\mathsf{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1\right] \quad .$$

Caveat: The attack scenario does not capture the security goal in real life.

Seemingly more advanced attack scenario



$$\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}}\left[\begin{array}{l}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{pk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}\\ \mathsf{sk}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{pk})\\ \textbf{return } [\mathsf{sk} \stackrel{?}{=} \mathsf{sk}^*]\end{array}\right.$$

Caveat: The attack scenario is not more powerful than the previous.

- ▷ The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ knows what is inside $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ blocks.
- ▷ As adversary knows pk, she can compute $\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(m)$ by herself.
- ▷ The oracle access to $\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(\cdot)$ function is redundant.

Classical chosen-ciphertext attack scenario



$$\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}}\left[\begin{array}{l}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{pk})\leftarrow\mathsf{Gen}\\ \mathsf{sk}^*\leftarrow\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(\cdot),\mathsf{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(\cdot)}(\mathsf{pk})\\ \mathbf{return}\ [\mathsf{sk}\stackrel{?}{=}\mathsf{sk}^*]\end{array}\right.$$

The difference: The attacker has an implicit access to secret key.

▷ Decryption operation can leak information about secret key.

▷ This can happen only for the messages not computed by $\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(\cdot)$.

▷ Such attacks are sometimes plausible in real life.

Time-success profiles

Fix the security game and the advantage function $\mathsf{Adv}(\cdot)$. Then any concrete instantiation of a primitive can be broken with enough resources.



As a result, there exist a time-success profile $\varepsilon = \varepsilon(t)$, which captures the main security properties. Unfortunately, this profile cannot be computed nor approximated with our current knowledge.

Examples of Low-level Primitives

Discrete logarithm

- Let p be a prime such that $p = 2q + 1$ for another 2048-bit prime q.
- Fix a generator g such that $g^2 \neq 1$ and define $\mathbb{G} = \{g^i : 0 \leq i < q\}$.
- Then discrete logarithm defined below is considered intractable

$$\forall y \in \mathbb{G} : \ \log(y) = x \Leftrightarrow g^x \equiv y \pmod{p} \ .$$

Exercise. Abstract away all details under the assumptions:

- all construction based on it use only multiplication modulo p,
- strings are mapped to $\mathbb{G}$ and elements of $\mathbb{G}$ are mapped to strings.

How to model the primitive if constructions also use addition modulo p?

Discrete logarithm problem in an abstract group

$$\{0,1\}^k \longrightarrow \boxed{\text{Emb}} \longrightarrow \boxed{(\mathbb{G};\cdot)} \longrightarrow \boxed{\text{H}} \longrightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

Definition. Let $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$ be a q-element multiplicative group generated by the element g. Then for any elements $y, z \in \mathbb{G}$ the discrete logarithm $\log_z y$ is defined as the smallest integer x such that $z^x = y$ and $\perp$ if $y \notin \langle z \rangle$.

Advantage. Let $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{dl}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1\right]$ be defined through the game

$$\begin{array}{l}\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}}\\ \left[\begin{array}{l} x \xleftarrow[u]{} \mathbb{Z}_q \\ \textbf{return } [x \stackrel{?}{=} \mathcal{A}(g, g^x)] \end{array}\right.\end{array}$$

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\end{array}
$$

Security. A group $\mathbb{G}$ is *(t, ε)-secure* DL-group iff for any t-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ the corresponding advantage $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{dl}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$.

Diffie-Hellman protocol



Exercise. Formalise the security requirements for Diffie-Hellman protocol.

1. Eavesdropper cannot reconstruct the common secret g^{xy}.
2. Eavesdropper learns nothing about the common secret g^{xy}.

How to convert the common secret g^{xy} to a valid secret key sk $\in \{0,1\}^n$?

Computational Diffie-Hellman problem

Security. A group $\mathbb{G}$ is (t, ε)*-secure* CDH-group iff for any t-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ the corresponding advantage $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cdh}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ where the corresponding security game is defined as follows.



$$
\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}}
\left[
\begin{array}{l}
x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \\
y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \\
z \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(g, g^x, g^y) \\
\mathbf{return}\ [g^{xy} \stackrel{?}{=} z]
\end{array}
\right.
$$

Decisional Diffie-Hellman

Security. A group $\mathbb{G}$ is (t, ε)*-secure* DDH-group iff for any t-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ the corresponding advantage $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ddh}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ where the corresponding security games $\mathcal{G}_0$ and $\mathcal{G}_1$ and the advantage are defined as follows.



$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ddh}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A}) = \left|\Pr\left[\mathcal{G}_0^{\mathcal{A}} = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathcal{G}_1^{\mathcal{A}} = 1\right]\right|$$

Factorisation

Factorisation of n-bit composite numbers is considered difficult

- $\triangleright$ Naive factorisation takes $\Theta(2^{\frac{n}{2}})$ division operations.
- $\triangleright$ Pollard ρ algorithm takes $\mathrm{O}(2^{\frac{n}{4}})$ multiplication operations on average.
- $\triangleright$ Quadratic sieve takes $\mathrm{O}(2^{c\sqrt{n}})$ multiplication operations on average.
- $\triangleright$ Number field sieve takes $\mathrm{O}(2^{c\sqrt[3]{n}})$ multiplication operations on average.

Current records

- $\triangleright$ Largest RSA challenge factored had 768 bits (2009).
- $\triangleright$ Largest number factored using quantum annealing is 4,088,459 (2018).
- $\triangleright$ Largest partially factored Mersenne number has $5,240,707$ bits (2016).
- $\triangleright$ Approximate running-times are in thousands of computer years.

Abstract distribution of RSA moduli

Definition. A *distribution of RSA moduli* $\mathfrak{N}$ is defined by an efficient algorithm Gen that outputs n, p, q such that $n = pq$ and p, q are primes.

Security. A distribution $\mathfrak{N}$ is (t, ε)*-secure* RSA-distribution iff for any t-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ the corresponding advantage $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{rsa}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \varepsilon$ where the security game is defined as follows



$$\mathcal{G}^{\mathcal{A}}$$

$$\left[\begin{array}{l}(n, p, q) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen} \\ p_*, q_* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(n) \\ \textbf{return } [p \stackrel{?}{=} p_*] \vee [p \stackrel{?}{=} q_*]\end{array}\right.$$

Example. Let $\mathfrak{P}$ be an efficiently samplable set of primes. Then the distribution of products pq where $p \leftarrow \mathfrak{P}$ and $q \leftarrow \mathfrak{P}$ is RSA distribution.

Relations Between Problems

CDH group is also DH group

Intuition: If we can compute discrete logarithm then CDH is easy.

Reduction. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a DL-finder algorithm. Then the adversary $\mathcal{B}$



is as successful as the adversary $\mathcal{A}$:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cdh}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{B}) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{dl}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A}) \ .$$

Hence (t, ε)-secure CDH group must be also (t, ε)-secure DL group.

Formal proof

The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ sees the following chain of events



As $z = g^{xy} \Leftrightarrow xy = \overline{x}y \Leftrightarrow x = \overline{x}$ we can further simplify



Simple and difficult puzzles

Intuition: A good algorithm *should* work uniformly well on each instance.



Random self-reducibility

Any instance of a discrete logarithm can be reduced to a random instance.



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

and thus the worst case advantage $\Pr[x = \mathcal{B}(g^x)] = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{dl}}_{\mathbb{G}}(\mathcal{A})$.

Consequences of random self-reducibility

Consequence: There are no hard instances but easy instances may exist.



- ▷ The average success is larger for hard instances.
- ▷ Easy instances are handled worse than by the original algorithm.
- ▷ Specialised algorithms for specific instance classes might work better.

Consequences of random self-reducibility

Consequence: There are various trade-offs between time and success.

- ▷ By repeating the DL-computations we can increase the success.
- ▷ Any estimate on parameters t, ε gives a lower bound to success.