

Exercise (IND-CPA security \Rightarrow randomised encryption). *Upper bound the probability that a t -time adversary \mathcal{A} can win the game*

$$\mathcal{G}_0 \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen} \\ m \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{pk}) \\ \textbf{return } \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m) = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m) \end{array} \right.$$

under the assumption that the cryptosystem is (t, ε) -IND-CPA secure. What restrictions this result puts on the minimal size of the randomness space used for encrypting a message?

Solution. Hint: Given an adversary \mathcal{A} construct an adversary \mathcal{B} against IND-CPA games

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathcal{Q}_0 & \mathcal{Q}_1 \\ \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen} \\ (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(\text{pk}) \\ c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_0) \\ \textbf{return } \mathcal{A}(c) \end{array} \right. & \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen} \\ (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(\text{pk}) \\ c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_1) \\ \textbf{return } \mathcal{A}(c) \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

where \mathcal{B} does a collision based decryption.