MTAT.07.003 Cryptology II Spring 2012 / Exercise session $\ref{eq:session}$ / Example Solution

Exercise (Trivial restriction to IND-CPA adversary). Prove that that any adversary A against IND-CPA games

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{G}_0 & \mathcal{G}_1 \\ \begin{bmatrix} (\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{pk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen} \\ (m_0,m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}) \\ c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(m_0) \\ \textit{return } \mathcal{A}(c) \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} (\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{pk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen} \\ (m_0,m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}) \\ c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(m_1) \\ \textit{return } \mathcal{A}(c) \end{bmatrix}$$

can be converted to a new adversary \mathcal{B} against IND-CPA games that always outputs two different challenge messages $m_0 \neq m_1$ so that the advantage remains the same and the computational overhead is constant.

Solution.

Hint: Decompose probability wrt condition $m_0 = m_1$