

**Exercise (Disjunctive POP is witness indistinguishable).** Let  $(sk_0, pk_0)$  and  $(sk_1, pk_1)$  be private and public keys of an encryption scheme  $(Gen, Enc, Dec)$ . Then a disjunctive proof for the possession of secret keys  $sk_0$  and  $sk_1$  is defined as follows:

1. The verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  chooses  $m \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$  and sends the corresponding challenge  $Enc_{sk_0}(m; r_0)$  for  $r_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ , and  $Enc_{sk_1}(m; r_1)$  for  $r_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$  together with encryptions of random nonces  $Enc_{sk_0}(r_1)$  and  $Enc_{sk_1}(r_0)$  to  $\mathcal{P}$ .
2. Given challenge ciphertexts  $c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4$ , the prover  $\mathcal{P}$  uses one of the secret keys  $sk_i$  to decrypt a challenge  $\bar{m}$  and the nonce  $r_{\neg i}$  used to randomise the other encryption  $c_{\neg i}$ . If  $c_{\neg i} = Enc_{pk_{\neg i}}(\bar{m}; r_{\neg i})$ , the prover  $\mathcal{P}$  sends  $\bar{m}$  to  $\mathcal{V}$ , otherwise  $\mathcal{P}$  can halt as  $\mathcal{V}$  cheats.
3. The verifier  $\mathcal{V}$  accepts if  $\bar{m} = m$ .

Prove that even an unbounded cheating verifier cannot learn whether the prover possesses  $sk_0$  or  $sk_1$

**Solution.** Let us first formalise by games  $\mathcal{G}_0$  and  $\mathcal{G}_1$  what happens if the prover knows  $sk_0$  or  $sk_1 \dots$  Let us now modify the games so that the game pair encodes indistinguishability advantage  $\dots$  Now we can prove that in both games the honest prover rejects exactly the same challenges  $\dots$  Next note that for a valid challenge the response is the same in both games.  $\dots$