



Exercise (Security of against malicious server). Analyse security of the Aiello-Ishai-Reingold oblivious transfer for additively homomorphic encryption scheme with prime order message space:



where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $x_0, x_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ are private protocol inputs and a triple of algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. The dashed line denotes sub-protocol for fixing the commitment parameters. Prove that there exist an efficient simulator for \mathcal{P}_2 if the set of plausible attack goals consists of computationally bounded predicates.

Solution.

RIGHT IDEAL IMPLEMENTATION. As the party \mathcal{P}_2 gets no output fairness is achievable:



(A) INPUT EXTRACTOR FOR \mathcal{P}_2 .

- Construct input extractor for \mathcal{P}_2^*
- Show that outputs of \mathcal{P}_1 in real and ideal world coincide.

(B) OUTPUT EXTRACTOR FOR \mathcal{P}_2 .

- Construct output equivocator for \mathcal{P}_2^* that achieves $1/2$ statistical distance for the joint output distribution ψ_1, ψ_2 .
- Show that the construction is tight for unbounded predicates

(C) OUTPUT EXTRACTOR FOR \mathcal{P}_2 .

- Show that outputs are computationally indistinguishable for time-bounded predicates