

Exercise (Coin-fixing and semantic-security). Let \mathcal{S} be a distribution of secret values. Then the semantic security of a function f against predicting a function g is defined through an advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{A}(f(s)) = g(s)] - \max_{y_* \in \mathcal{Y}} \Pr[s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} : g(s) = y_*] .$$

Show that we cannot a priori postulate that deterministic functions are easier to predict. In particular, show that there may exist \mathcal{A} and a randomised function $g : \mathcal{S} \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ such that

$$\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \max_{\omega \in \Omega} \{ \text{Adv}_{f,g_\omega}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \} \quad (1)$$

where $g_\omega : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is a deterministic function defined as $g_\omega(s) = g(s, \omega)$.

Solution. Let us first express definitions in terms of corresponding security games. The advantage $\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A})$ can be expressed as the distance between the following games

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathcal{G}_0 & \mathcal{G}_1 \\ \left[\begin{array}{l} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \\ x \leftarrow f(s) \\ \textbf{return } [g(s) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathcal{A}(x)] \end{array} \right. & \left[\begin{array}{l} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \\ x \leftarrow f(s) \\ \textbf{return } [g(s) \stackrel{?}{=} y_*] \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

where y_* is the most probable outcome of $g(s)$. Now for a fixed random value ω , the advantage $\text{Adv}_{f,g_\omega}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A})$ can be expressed as the distance between the following games

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathcal{G}_{0\omega} & \mathcal{G}_{1\omega} \\ \left[\begin{array}{l} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \\ x \leftarrow f(s) \\ \textbf{return } [g(s, \omega) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathcal{A}(x)] \end{array} \right. & \left[\begin{array}{l} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \\ x \leftarrow f(s) \\ \textbf{return } [g(s, \omega) \stackrel{?}{=} y_o] \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

where y_o is the most probable outcome of $g_\omega(s) = g(s, \omega)$. Note that while y_* might be the most probable outcome of $g(s)$ it does not have to be the most probable outcome of $g_\omega(s)$. Hence y_o does not have to be equal to y_* . Consequently, we need yet another pair of games

$$\begin{array}{ll} \bar{\mathcal{G}}_{0\omega} & \bar{\mathcal{G}}_{1\omega} \\ \left[\begin{array}{l} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \\ x \leftarrow f(s) \\ \textbf{return } [g(s, \omega) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathcal{A}(x)] \end{array} \right. & \left[\begin{array}{l} s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \\ x \leftarrow f(s) \\ \textbf{return } [g(s, \omega) \stackrel{?}{=} y_*] \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

to define the semantical advantage as the average:

$$\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) = \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \Pr[\omega] \cdot (\Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{0\omega}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] - \Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{1\omega}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1]) .$$

The coin-fixing argument tells us that by taking

$$\omega_* = \operatorname{argmax}_{\omega \in \Omega} \Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{0\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] - \Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{1\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1]$$

we guarantee

$$\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{0\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] - \Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{1\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] \leq \Pr[\mathcal{G}_{0\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{G}_{1\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] ,$$

since the game $\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{0\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}}$ is identical to $\mathcal{G}_{0\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}}$. However, the game $\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{1\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}}$ does not have to be identical to $\mathcal{G}_{1\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}}$, since y_* can be different from y_o . In fact, it is straightforward to show that the inequality (1) does not hold in

general. As a concrete example, consider a randomised function $g(s)$ that returns uniformly chosen integer ω from the range $\{0, \dots, 7\}$. Then obviously the knowledge of $f(s)$ does not help in predicting and thus the best strategy is to output a fixed guess say 3. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of differences

$$\Delta(\omega) = \Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{0\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] - \Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{1\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1]$$

that are averaged to get the advantage $\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A})$. Note that for fixed $\omega = 3$, the output of g_3 is also fixed and thus the advantage $\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) = 0$.




Figure 1: Counter example that shows that the inequality (1) cannot be satisfied by coin-fixing argument

The presented counter example does not show that it is impossible to choose $\omega \in \Omega$ such that

$$\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \max_{\omega \in \Omega} \{\text{Adv}_{f,g_\omega}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A})\}$$

it just shows that there is no easy way to find such coins. To show impossibility of other more clever choice of ω consider the counter example depicted on Figure 2. In this example, the three secrets $\mathcal{S} = \{0, 1, 2\}$ and four equiprobable random values $\Omega = \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$. The function f is deterministic and the adversary \mathcal{A} is deterministic with the outputs depicted on the figure. Note that guesses of \mathcal{A} must coincide on the same row.




Figure 2: Counter example that shows that the inequality (1) cannot be satisfied at all. All squares are equiprobable in the experiment. The number inside the square marks the output of $g(s, \omega)$. Correct guesses are marked with blue and incorrect guesses are marked with red squares.

Since \mathcal{A} guesses the value $g(s, \omega)$ on eight squares and there are equal number of ones and zeros, we get

$$\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) = \frac{8}{12} - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{6}.$$

As \mathcal{A} guesses correctly only two values in each row, $\Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{0\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] = \frac{2}{3}$. If the randomness is fixed then the best choice for y_0 can be determined by majority voting and thus $\Pr[\bar{\mathcal{G}}_{1\omega_*}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1] \geq \frac{2}{3}$. The latter implies that $\text{Adv}_{f,g_\omega}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 0$ for any $\omega \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and thus $\text{Adv}_{f,g}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A}) > \text{Adv}_{f,g_\omega}^{\text{sem}}(\mathcal{A})$.