

regarding general:
apsr/ajps/
what people are doing rn

17.262
Congressional Politics Graduate Seminar
Spring 2023
Wednesday, 1:30 – 3:30
E53-485

Charles Stewart III
E53-447
617-253-3127
cstewart@mit.edu

The purpose of this class is to prepare graduate students for professional research into congressional politics in particular and legislatures more generally. When the semester is finished, you should be well enough acquainted with the sweep of the congressional literature, both historical and contemporary, that you could do well on a PhD general exam question about Congress, in addition to doing original research in the field.

We will be readings excerpts from numerous books during the semester. I suggest you buy them all, so that you can read them through later on your own time, and can refer to them throughout your career. Large enough portions of the following books will be read that I strongly encourage you to purchase your own copies, rather than attempt to read them online:

- David R. Mayhew. 1974. *Congress: The electoral connection*
- Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal politics*
- David W. Rohde. 1991. *Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representatives*.
- Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*

I am also assuming that everyone is familiar with the basics of congressional politics. I will put the second edition of my textbook, *Analyzing Congress*, on reserve at Dewey. Because it is twelve years old, it is out of date with respect to recent developments, but its general approach is what I will be pursuing in this class. If you'd like a more contemporary text book to use, I'd recommend Steven S. Smith, Jason M. Roberts, and Ryan J. Vander Wilen, *The American Congress* or E. Scott Adler, Jeffery A. Jenkins, and Charles R. Shipan, *The United States Congress*.
operational level, rational agent approach

Note on scheduling: There may be a couple of weeks in the middle of April when I will need to be out of town, for reasons that will explain in class. I ask you indulgence in being flexible during this period. We may need to conduct a couple sessions via Zoom. More on this as the semester progresses.

lits are heavily theoretical
- high-conceptual level
-

Assignments

There are four assignments

1. *Attend all classes, with all the reading done, ready to discuss.* I will assign class members to take responsibility for keeping the discussion going, on a rotating basis. **There is a lot of reading. Don't get behind.**
2. *Discussion agenda memos.* You will write brief, two-page memos, uploaded to **Canvas by 5pm on the Tuesday before each class meeting**, about the points you want to discuss at the next day's seminar. **A list of bullet points is fine.** The goal is to get us thinking ahead of time about the topics that interest you.
3. **Lead your share of class discussions.** Every member of the seminar is responsible for setting the agenda for several class session. Depending on the number of people taking the class, this can range from 2 to 3 sessions (probably). I will make assignments right after the first class meeting. Rather than being on your own, I'll assign pairs of people to be in charge.
4. **"General exam" essays.** Three times during the semester, you will write a paper that poses a general-exam-type question about the congressional politics literature and then answers the question. The papers will be due on the following dates, and will cover the material associated with the indicated topics.
 - a. **March 20.** Covering Theories of legislative behavior; Congressional representation; Representation of race, gender, religion, and class; Congressional elections; Congressional candidates, careers, and the incumbency advantage; and Representation and elections.
 - b. **April 24.** Covering Committees, Parties and leadership I and II, Decisionmaking, and Internal organization.
 - c. **May 15.** Covering Policymaking and interbranch relations, Party polarization and the new "New Congress," and History and development of Congress.

Reading schedule

All readings not in the "additional readings" sections of each week are required. The "additional readings" are for your use, in case you are interested in diving in deeper, or you have read some of the required readings before. Mostly, the "additional readings" are intended to group together classic readings we don't have time to get to into the major topics of the class. **I have placed chapters from the Oxford Handbook of the American Congress** at the beginning of most additional reading sections. This is a good resource for literature reviews on the topic, published in 2011.

February 8. First class meeting. Organizational matters.

February 15. Theories of legislative behavior

What sets legislative studies apart from journalism and punditry is that it is guided by theories of behavior. Those theories have changed over time, however. This week, we'll take a tour of the theoretical landscape to gain an appreciation of how it has developed over time, and how it continues to guide academic research into Congress.

readings are organized as chronologically

Required readings

looks interesting

Donald R. Matthews. 1959. The folkways of the United States Senate.

American Political Science Review vol. 53, pp. 1064 – 1089.

Richard F. Fenno. 1962. The House Appropriations Committee as a political system. *American Political Science Review* vol. 56, pp. 310 – 324.

David R. Mayhew. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Introduction, Chap. 1, and pp. 141 – 158.

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. Positive theories of congressional institutions. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* vol. 19, pp. 149 – 179.

Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*, chaps. 1–2.

we have additional readings from oxford hb of AC for additional for each week

Additional reading

David R. Mayhew. 2011. Theorizing about Congress. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 38.

Rohde, Ornstein, and Peabody. 1958 Political change and legislative norms in the U.S. Senate, 1957 – 1974. In Glenn R. Parker (ed.) *Studies of Congress*. CQ Press.

Richard F. Fenno. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*, pp. xiii-xvii, chaps. 1–2.

okay to swap if you need

February 22. Congressional representation

representational function of congress

The principal idea behind legislatures is that they are representative in some way of the citizens. But in what way? This week, we examine one major theme in the representation literature as it has been applied to Congress: dyadic representation, which can be thought of as the policy responsiveness of legislators to the preferences of constituents.

Required readings

- Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1963. Constituency influence in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 57, pp. 45–56.
- Richard F. Fenno. 1977. U.S. House members and their constituencies: An exploration. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 71, pp. 883–917. [The book-length treatment is *Home Style*, which you should be familiar with eventually.]
- Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. Out of step, out of office: Electoral accountability and House members' voting. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 96, pp. 127–140.
- Jamie Carson, et al. 2010. The electoral costs of party loyalty in Congress. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol 54, pp. 598 – 616.
- Justin Grimmer. 2013. Appropriators not position takers: The distorting effects of electoral incentives on congressional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol 57, pp. 624–642.
- David E. Broockman. 2016. Approaches to studying policy representation. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, pp. 181–215.

Additional readings

- Stephen Ansolabehere and Philip Edward Jones. 2011. Dyadic Representation. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 13.
- Hanna Pitkin. 1967. *The concept of representation*.
- Morris P. Fiorina. 1974. *Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies*.
- Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps. 1977. The puzzle of representation: Specifying components of responsiveness. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 2, pp. 233–254.
- Christopher H. Achen. 1978. Measuring representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 22, pp. 475–510.
- Richard F Fenno. 1978. *Home style: House members in their districts*.
- Erikson, Robert S. 1978. Constituency opinion and congressional behavior: A reexamination of the Miller-Stokes representation data. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 22, pp. 511–535.
- William T. Bianco. 1994. *Trust: Representatives and constituents*.
- Paul S. Herrnson. 1995. *Congressional elections*.
- James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. Dynamic Representation. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, pp. 543 – 565.
- Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. Explaining congressional approval. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41, pp. 175–207.

- David W. Brady, Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2007. Primary elections and candidate ideology: Out of step with the primary electorate? *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 32, pp. 79–105.
- Jeffrey J. Harden. 2013. Multidimensional responsiveness: The determinants of legislators' representational priorities. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 38, pp. 155–184.

March 1. Representation of race, gender, religion, and class

Descriptive representation has long been a topic in the study of legislative institutions. It particularly comes to the forefront of scholarship at times of social and political unrest. This appears to be such a time. Rather than subsume these important questions under the general rubric of dyadic representation, now seems an apt time to visit this literature in its own right.

Required readings

- David T. Canon. *Race, Redistricting and Representation*, chap. 4
- Michele L. Swers. 1998. Are women more likely to vote for women's issue bills than their male colleagues? *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23(3): 435–448.
- Nicholas Carnes. 2012. Does the numerical underrepresentation of the working class in Congress matter? *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, pp. 5–34.
- Nicole Asmussen Mathew. 2018. Evangelizing Congress: The emergence of evangelical Republicans and party polarization in Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 43, pp. 409 – 455.

Additional readings

- Michele L. Swers and Stella M. Rouse. 2011. Descriptive representation: Understanding the impact of identity on substantive representation of interest groups. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 11.
- Carol Swain. 1993. *Black faces, black interests: The representation of African Americans in Congress*.
- Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. Do majority-minority districts maximize substantive black representation in Congress? *American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, pp. 794–812.
- David Lublin. 1999. Racial redistricting and African-American representation: A critique of "Do majority-minority districts maximize

- substantive black representation in Congress?” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 93, pp. 183–186.
- Jane Mansbridge. 1999. Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent “yes.” *Journal of Politics*, vol. 61, pp. 628–657.
- Sarah F. Anzie and Christopher R. Berry. 2011. The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why do congresswomen outperform congressmen?” *American Journal of Political Science*, vol 55: 478 – 493.
- Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2011. Gendered perceptions and political candidacies: A central barrier to women’s equality in electoral politics.” *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 55, pp. 59–73.
- John D. Griffin, Brian Newman, and Christina Wolbrecht. 2012. A gender gap in policy representation in the U.S. Congress? *Legislative Studies Quarterly* vol. 37, pp 35 – 66.
- Michele Swers. 2013. *Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate*. University of Chicago Press.
- Danielle M. Thomsen. 2015. Why so few (Republican) women? Explaining the partisan imbalance of women in the U.S. Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 40, pp. 295 – 323.
- Jaclyn Kaslowvsky and John C. Rogowski. Under the microscope: gender and accountability in the U.S. Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 116, pp. 516 – 532.

March 8. Congressional elections

Representation in Congress is effected in the first instance by elections. Intervening between constituents and their representatives are the electoral institutions that structure how congressional seats are contested. This week we focus on those institutions, primarily districting and campaign finance.

Required readings

- Edward R. Tufte. 1975. Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 69, pp. 812 – 826.
- Gary Jacobson. 1978. The effects of campaign spending on congressional elections. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 72, pp. 769 – 783.
- Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. Salvation for the spendthrift incumbent: Reestimating the effects of campaign spending in House elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 32, pp. 884–907.

- Robert S. Erikson and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2002 Equilibria in campaign spending games: Theory and data. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, pp. 595 – 609.
- Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden. 2013. Unintentional gerrymandering: Political geography and electoral bias in legislatures. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, vol. 8, pp. 239 – 269.
- Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos and Eric M. McGhee. 2015. Partisan gerrymandering and the efficiency gap. *University of Chicago Law Review*, vol. 82, pp. 831 – 900.

Additional readings

- Michael McDonald. 2011. Congressional redistricting. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 9.
- Robin Kolodny. 2011. Campaign finance in congressional elections. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 10.
- Gary C. Jacobson and Jamie L. Carson. 2019. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. [NB: The latest edition is a comprehensive view of the congressional elections literature.]
- Paul S. Herrnson, Costas Panagopoulos, and Kendall L. Bailey. 2019. *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington*. [NB: The latest edition of the book originally authored by Herrnson.]
- Edward R. Tufte. 1973. The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 67, pp. 540–554.
- John A. Ferejohn. 1977. On the decline of competition in congressional elections. *American Politics Review*, vol. 71, pp. 166–176.
- Gary C. Jacobson, 1990. The effects of campaign spending in House elections: New evidence for old arguments. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34, pp. 334–362.
- Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2003. Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 17, pp. 105–130.
- Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes. 1998. The hydraulics of campaign finance reform. *Texas Law Review*, vol. 77, pp. 1705–38.
- Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz. 2002. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution*.

March 15. Congressional candidates, careers, and the incumbency advantage

As they say, you can't beat someone with no one. Although recent years have seen a decline in the "personal vote" and a rise of partisanship-as-vote-queue in

congressional elections, it's still the case that *who* runs for Congress and *how* candidates behave can have important influences on the outcomes of congressional elections. This week we look at some classic and newer works that attempt to puzzle out the influence that candidates themselves have on the outcomes of elections.

Required readings

- Robert S. Erikson. 1971. The advantage of incumbency in congressional elections. *Polity*, vol. 3, pp. 395 – 405.
- David R. Mayhew. 1974. Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals. *Polity*, vol. 6, pp. 295 – 317.
- Mann, Thomas E and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1980. Candidates and parties in congressional elections, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 74, pp. 617 – 632.
- Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1984. The constituency service basis of the personal vote for US representatives and British members of parliament. *American Political Science Review* 78, pp. 110 – 125. [NB: This is essentially the same argument as the Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina book, *The Personal Vote*, in the “additional readings.”]
- Gary C. Jacobson. 1989. Strategic politicians and the dynamics of U.S. House elections, 1946–1986. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 83, pp. 773 – 793. [NB: This is essentially the same argument as the Jacobson and Kernell book, *Strategy and Choice*, in “additional readings.”]
- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2000. Old voters, new voters, and the personal vote: Using redistricting to measure the incumbency advantage. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, pp. 17 – 34.
- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 45, pp. 136 – 59.
- Jamie Carson, Eric Engstrom, and Jason Roberts. 2007. Candidate quality, the personal vote, and the incumbency advantage in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 101, pp. 289 – 301.
- Gary C. Jacobson. 2015. Its Nothing Personal: The decline of the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 77, pp. 861 – 73.

Additional readings

- Tracy Sulkin. 2011. Congressional campaigns. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 8.
- Joseph A. Schlesinger. 1966. *Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States*.
- Morris Fiorina. 1977 The case of the vanishing marginals: The bureaucracy did it. *American Political Science Review*, vol 71, pp. 177 – 181.
- David W. Rhode. 1979. Risk-bearing and progressive ambition: The case of members of the United States House of Representatives. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, pp. 1–26.
- Gary C. Jacobson, and Samuel Kernell. 1983. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2nd edition [available online for free download from the authors].
- Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher. 1985. Explaining challenger quality in congressional elections. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 47, pp. 510–529.
- Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. *The personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*.
- Andrew Gelman and Gary King. 1990. Estimating incumbency advantage without bias. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34, pp. 1142–1164.
- Richard L. Hall and Robert P. Van Houweling. 1995. Avarice and ambition in Congress: Representatives' decisions to run or retire from the US House. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, pp. 121–136.
- Gary W. Cox, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. Why did the incumbency advantage in US House elections grow? *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 40, pp. 478–497.
- Steven D. Levitt and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1997. Decomposing the sources of incumbency advantage in the U.S House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 22, pp. 45–60.

March 22. Committees

Congress, of course, is an institution. Institutions are characterized by formalized internal complexity. Despite what we observe with present-day gridlock, the American Congress has a reputation of being the most autonomous and capable of national legislatures, especially when considered against the power of the executive. Some would argue that this is because of the constitutional system of check-and-balances, but constitutional doctrines aren't self-executing. How Congress has organized itself has been of interest to political scientists since the dawn of political science. (Woodrow Wilson's classic *Congressional Government*, which explored the

practical functioning of Congress and its power in the American political system, was based on his doctoral dissertation, one of the very first dissertations written in the field of political science.) Here, we start with the committee system, which is often considered to be the source of Congress's institutional capacity.

Required readings

- Richard F. Fenno. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*, Introduction, chaps. 1 – 2.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, pp. 27 – 59.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. The institutional foundations of committee power. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 81, pp. 85 – 127.
- Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34, pp. 531 – 564. [NB: The core of this article's argument is further developed — along with a comprehensive critique of then-extant theories of legislative organization — in Krehbiel's book, *Information and legislative organization*, in the “additional reading” section.
- Forest Maltzman and Stephen S. Smith. 1994. Principals, goals, dimensionality, and congressional committees. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 19, pp. 457 – 476.
- James M. Curry. 2019. Knowledge, expertise, and committee power in the contemporary Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 44, pp. 203 – 237.

Additional readings

- C. Lawrence Evans. 2011. Congressional committees. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 18.
- Christopher Deering and Steven S. Smith. *Committees in Congress*. Last edition published in 1997.
- Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. Collective decisionmaking and standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, vol. 3, pp. 287 – 335.
- Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall. 1988. The industrial organization of Congress: Or, why legislatures, like firms, are not

organized as markets. *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 96, pp. 132 – 163.

Richard L. Hall, and Bernard Grofman. 1990. The committee assignment process and the conditional nature of committee bias. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, pp. 1149 – 1166.

Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, pp. 797 – 820.

Keith Krehbiel. 1991. *Information and legislative organization*.

Charles Stewart III. Congressional committees in a partisan era: The end of institutionalization as we know it? 2012. in *New Directions in Congressional Politics*, ed. Jamie Carson, pp. 85–110. (First edition)

Hong Min Park, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen. 2018. *Politics over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress*. University of Michigan Press.

March 29. Spring break. No class

April 5. Parties and leadership I

The second major institutional feature of Congress is leadership. The leadership of both chambers is organized around the political parties, which has been true pretty much since the Civil War. Because of the close association of leadership and party, we consider both together. However, this association has waxed and waned over the years, which justifies separating it out into two sessions. We start here by focusing on the organization of the leadership system and the notion of “conditional party government.”

Required readings

David W. Rohde. 1991. *Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representatives*. Chaps. 1 – 3, skim the rest.

Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady. 1981. Institutional context and leadership style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 75, pp. 411 – 425.

David W. Brady. 1985. A reevaluation of realignments in American politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, pp. 28 – 49.

Jason M. Roberts and Steven S. Smith. 2003. Procedural contexts, party strategy, and conditional party voting in the U.S. House of

Representatives, 1971 – 2000. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 47, pp. 305 – 317.

David R. Rohde. 2013. Reflections on the practice of theorizing: Conditional party government in the twenty-first century. *Journal of Politics*, vol 75, pp. 849–864.

Sarah Binder. 2018. Dodging the rules in Trump’s Republican Congress. *Journal of Politics*, vol 80, pp. 1454 – 1463.

Andrew Ballard and James Curry. 2021. Minority party capacity in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 115, pp. 1388 – 1405.

Additional readings

Randall W. Strahan. 2011. Party leadership. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 17.

David W. Brady, Joseph Cooper, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1979. The decline of party in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1887–1968. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 4, pp. 381–407.

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation*.

Barbara Sinclair. 1998. *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era*.

Steven S. Smith. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*. Cambridge University Press.

John H. Aldrich. 2011. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. [While not about Congress, per se, it provides a framing for parties that is embraced by most students of Congress.]

C. Lawrence Evans. 2017. *Politics over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress*. University of Michigan Press.

April 12. Parties and leadership II

One of the topics that has provided focus for research into congressional leadership has been that of agenda setting. Here, we are introduced to the “cartel theory” of Cox and McCubbins, and other efforts to explore in a focus way the implications of having party and leadership so closely aligned.

Required readings

Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*, chaps. 1 and 2.

- Keith Krehbiel. 1993. Where's the party? *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, pp. 235 – 266.
- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. The effects of party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 26, pp. 533 – 72.
- Frances E. Lee. 2009. *Beyond Ideology*, chap. 1, 7, 8
- Andrew J. Clarke. 2020. Party sub-brands and American party factions. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol 64, pp. 452 – 470.

Additional reading

- Douglas Dion and John D. Huber. 1996. Procedural choice and the House Committee on Rules. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 58, pp. 25–53.
- Keith Krehbiel. 1999. Paradoxes of parties in Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 24, pp. 31 – 64.
- Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. Uncovering the hidden effect of party. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 61, pp. 815 – 831.
- Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. The hunt for party discipline in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 95, pp. 673–688.
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative leviathan*, 2nd ed. [NB: This book has a similar argument to their *Setting the Agenda*, which is assigned this year.]
- Steven S. Smith. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*.
- Eric Schickler and Kathryn Pearson. 2009. Agenda control, majority party power, and the House Committee on Rules, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34, pp. 455 – 491.
- Edward H. Stiglitz and Barry R. Weingast. 2010. Agenda control in Congress: Evidence from cutpoint estimates and ideal point uncertainty. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 35, pp. 157 – 185.

April 19. Decisionmaking (Beginning of uncertain scheduling period)

most about roll call voting

What happens on the floor of the two chambers of Congress is but the most visible part of legislative behavior. Political scientists have long been interested in explaining the decisions made by members of Congress, particularly their roll call behavior. This has led to rich literatures that have focused both on the decisionmaking process itself and on the evidentiary trail the process leaves, that is, roll call votes.

Required readings

- John Jackson and John W. Kingdon. 1992. Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 36, pp. 805 – 823.
- John Kingdon. 1973. *Congressmen's voting decisions*. Reads chaps. 1 and 10, and then skim through chaps. 2–8.
- Clyde Wilcox and Aage Clausen. 1991. The dimensionality of roll-call voting reconsidered. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 16, pp. 393 – 406.
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. Patterns of congressional voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 35, pp. 28 – 78.
- Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. The statistical analysis of roll call data. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 98, pp. 355 – 370.
- Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. D-NOMINATE after 10 years: A comparative update to *Congress: A political-economic history of roll-call voting*. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 26, pp. 5 – 29.
- Jason M. Roberts, Steven S. Smith, and Stephen R. Haptonstahl. 2015. The dimensionality of congressional voting reconsidered. *American Politics Research*, vol. 44, pp. 794 – 815.
- Devin Caughey and Eric Schickler. 2016. Substance and change in congressional ideology: NOMINATE and its alternatives. *Studies in American Political Development*, vol. 30, pp. 128 – 146.

Additional readings

- Nolan McCarty. 2011. Measuring legislative preferences. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 4.
- Duncan Black. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*
- Donald R. Matthews. 1960. *U.S. Senators and their World*.
- Aage R. Clausen. 1973. *How Congressmen Decide*.
- Richard D. McKelvey. 1976. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. *Journal of Economic Theory*, vol. 12, pp. 472–482.
- Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. *Public Choice*, vol. 33, pp. 27–43.
- Steven S. Smith. 1989. *Call to order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate*.
- Stanley Bach. 1990. Suspension of the rules, the order of business, and the development of congressional procedure. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, pp. 49–63.
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. Patterns of congressional voting, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 35, pp. 228–278.

- James M. Snyder, Jr. 1992. Artificial extremism in interest group ratings. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 17, pp. 319–342.
- Wendy J. Schiller. 1995. Senators as political entrepreneurs: using bill sponsorship to shape legislative agendas. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 39, pp. 186–203.
- Keith Krehbiel. 1995. Cosponsors and wafflers from A to Z. *American Journal of Political Science*, pp. 906–923.
- Daniel Kessler, and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. Dynamics of cosponsorship. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, pp. 555–566.
- Steven D. Levitt. 1996. How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology. *American Economic Review*, vol. 86, pp. 425–441.
- Keith Krehbiel. 1997. Restrictive rules reconsidered. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 62, pp. 144–168.
- James J. Heckman and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1997. Linear probability models of the demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators. *Rand Journal of Economics*, vol. 28 (sp. iss.), pp. S142–S189.
- Douglas Dion and John D. Huber. 1997. Sense and sensibility: The role of rules. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41, pp. 945–957.
- Timothy Groseclose, Steven Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1999. Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: Adjusted ADA scores for the U.S. Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 93, pp. 33–50.
- Gregory Wawro. 2001. *Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives*.
- Gregory Koger. 2003. Position-taking and cosponsorship in the U.S House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 28, pp. 225–246.
- Richard L. Hall. 2006. *Participation in Congress*.
- Michael A. Bailey. 2007. Comparable preference estimates across time and institutions for the Court, Congress, and presidency. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 51, pp. 433 – 48.
- Clifford Carrubba, Matthew Gabel, and Simon Hug. 2008. Legislative voting behavior, seen and unseen: A theory of roll-call vote selection. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, pp. 543–572.
- Gregory Koger. 2010. *Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate*.
- Will Lowe, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2011. Scaling policy preferences from coded political texts. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 36, pp. 123– 55.
- Barbara Sinclair. 2016. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*, 5th ed.

Sarah Binder. 2018. Taking the measure of Congress. *Political Analysis*, vol. 16, pp. 213 – 225.

April 26. Policymaking and interbranch relations

Congress doesn't act alone, of course. It exists in a system of power relations at the nation level. Despite the fact that one of the hallmarks of American institutions is the separation of power system — or more accurately, the system of separated institutions sharing power — the dynamics of this system are only occasionally the subject of scholarship. This week, we examine several of the most important approaches to this difficult subject of making sense of the consequences of this power-sharing arrangement in the constitutional system.

Required readings

- Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 28, pp. 165 – 179.
- Terry M. Moe. 1987. An assessment of the positive theory of congressional dominance. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 28, pp. 475–520.
- Nolan M. McCarty and Keith T. Poole. 1995. Veto power and legislation: An empirical analysis of executive and legislative bargaining from 1961 to 1986. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, vol. 11, pp. 282 – 312.
- Jeffrey A. Segal. 1997. Separation-of-powers games in the positive theory of Congress and courts. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 91, pp. 28 – 44.
- Charles M. Cameron and Nolan McCarty. 2004. Models of vetoes and veto bargaining. *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 7, pp. 409–435.
[NB: This article contains much of the core of Cameron's book, *Veto Bargaining*, which is listed among the additional readings.]
- Jans J. G. Hassell and Samuel Kernell. 2015. Veto rhetoric and legislative riders. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 60, pp. 845 – 859.

Additional readings

- B. Dan Wood. 2011. Congress and the executive branch. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 34.
- Michael A. Bailey, Forrest Maltzman, and Charles R. Shipan. 2011. The amorphous relationship between Congress and the Courts. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 36.
- Barry R. Weingast. 1979. A rational choice perspective on congressional norms. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, pp. 245–262.
- Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 89, pp. 642–664.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. Political preferences for the pork barrel: A generalization. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 25, pp. 96–111.
- Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran. 1983. Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 91, pp. 765–800.
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, vol. 3, pp. 243–277.
- David Mayhew. 1988. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946 – 1990*. Yale University Press.
- John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan. 1990. Congressional influence on bureaucracy. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, vol. 6, pp. 1–20.
- R. Douglas Arnold. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*.
- Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1994. Congressional elections and the pork barrel. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 56, pp. 377–399.
- Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder. 1995. Political parties and the distribution of federal outlays. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 39, pp. 958–980.
- Charles M. Cameron. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*.
- William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann. 2000. Divided government and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945–94. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 25, pp. 285–312.
- John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*.
- William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2005. Presidents, Congress and the use of force. *International Organization*, vol. 59, pp. 209 – 232.

- Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2006. Delivering the goods: Legislative particularism in different electoral and institutional settings. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 68, pp. 168–179.
- Joshua D. Clinton & John S. Lapinski. 2006. Measuring legislative accomplishment, 1887-1994. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 50, pp. 232–249.

May 3. Party polarization and the new “New Congress”

Two related questions have drawn the attention of scholars for at least a quarter of a century. The first is the presence of “gridlock” in the policymaking process since at least the Carter Administration. The second is the presence of “polarization” since at least the Reagan Administration. Both are phenomena that are front-and-center in both popular discourse and research. Here, we examine a set of readings that mostly attempt to locate the source of polarization/gridlock in public opinion and elections.

Required readings

- Sarah A. Binder. 1999. The dynamics of legislative gridlock, 1947 – 96. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 93, pp. 519 – 533.
- Erik Schickler, Eric McGhee, and John Sides. 2003. Remaking the House and Senate: Personal power, ideology, and the 1970s reforms, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 28, pp. 297 – 333.
- Nolan M. McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal riches*, chap. 2.
- Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2009. Does gerrymandering cause polarization? *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 53, pp. 666 – 680.
- Thomas L. Brunell and Justin Buchler. 2009. Ideological representation and competitive congressional elections. *Electoral Studies*, vol. 28, pp. 448 – 457.
- Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron. 2010. Leapfrog representation and extremism: A study of American voters and their members in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 104, pp. 519 – 542.
- Marc Trussler. 2020. Get information or get in formation: The effects of high-information environments on legislative elections. *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 51, pp. 1529 – 1549.

Additional readings

- Brian F. Schaffner. 2011. Party polarization. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 23.
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. The polarization of American politics. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 46, pp. 1061–1079.
- John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. 1997. The transition to Republican rule in the House: Implications for theories of congressional politics. *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 112, pp. 541–567.
- David R. Mayhew. 2005. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–2002*.
- Sean M. Theriault. 2008. *Party Polarization in Congress*.
- Bertram Johnson. 2010. Individual contributions: A fundraising advantage for the ideologically extreme? *American Politics Research*, vol. 38, pp. 890–908.
- Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. 2012. *It's Even Worse than it Looks*.
- Francis E. Lee. 2016. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign*. University of Chicago Press.
- Gregory Koger and Matthew Lebo. 2017. *Strategic Party Government*. University of Chicago Press.
- Nolan McCarty. 2019. *Polarization*. Oxford University Press
- Julian Zelizer. 2020 *Burning Down the House*.
- Marc Trussler. 2022. The effects of high-information environments on legislative behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 45, pp. 495 – 526.

May 10. History and Development of Congress

I typically finish up the semester with the topic near and dear to my heart, congressional history. There is something about the institutional development of Congress that has drawn virtually every prominent congressional scholar to its study, at least once. Furthermore, in a period when institutional scholarship has languished, developmental scholarship about Congress has continued to flourish. The following readings provide an introduction to the developmental/historical study of Congress, which should be examined by anyone serious about understanding the institution.

Required readings

- Nelson W. Polsby. 1968. The institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 62, pp. 144 – 168.
- Jeffery A. Jenkins and Charles Stewart III. 2018. The deinstitutionalization (?) Of the House of Representatives: Reflections on Nelson Polsby's "The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives" at Fifty. *Studies in American Political Development*, vol. 32, pp. 166 – 187.
- Jonathan N. Katz and Brian R. Sala. 1996. Careerism, committee assignments, and the electoral connection. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, pp. 21–33.
- Sarah Binder. 1996. The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789 – 1990. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, pp. 8 – 20. [NB: This is a boiled-down version of her book, *Minority rights, majority rule*, in the "additional readings" section for this week.]
- Eric Schickler. 2000. Institutional change in the House of Representatives, 1867 – 1998. *American Political Science Association*, vol. 94, pp. 269 – 288.
- Sarah Binder. 2006. Parties and institutional choice revisited. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vo. 31, pp. 413 – 532.
- Eric Schickler and Gregory Wawro. 2004. Where's the pivot? Obstruction and lawmaking in the pre-cloture Senate. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 48, pp. 758–774. [NB: This is a boiled-down version of their book, *Filibuster*, in the "additional readings" section for this week.]
- Sarah Binder. 2019. How we (should) study Congress and history. *Public Choice*, vol. 185, pp. 415 – 427.

Additional readings

- Ira Katznelson. 2011. Historical approaches to the study of Congress: Toward a congressional vantage on American Political Development. In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress*, chap. 6.
- Samuel Kernell. 1977. Toward understanding 19th century congressional careers: Ambition, competition, and rotation. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 21, pp. 669–693.
- Gerald Gamm and Kenneth Shepsle. 1989. Emergence of legislative institutions: Standing committees in the House and Senate, 1810 – 1825 *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol 14, pp. 39 – 66.
- Barbara Sinclair. 1989. The transformation of the U.S. Senate.
- Sarah A. Binder. 1997. *Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress*.

- Eric Schickler. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and Development of the U.S. Congress*.
- Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler. 2006. *Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate*.
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. *Ideology and Congress*. (Update and re-release of *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting* [1997].)
- Jenkins, Jeffery A. and Charles Stewart III. 2013. *Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government*

Some Ways to Think about the Most Important Congressional Literature

The 25 (or so) most important books in the congressional field (mostly based on citation counts over the past ten years, with some judgment thrown in):

- John H. Aldrich. 1995. *Why parties? The origin and transformation of political parties*. (University of Chicago Press).
- R. Douglas Arnold. 1990. *The logic of congressional action*. (Yale University Press).
- Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. *The personal vote: Constituency service and electoral independence*. (Harvard University Press).
- Charles M. Cameron. 2000. *Veto bargaining: Presidents and the politics of negative power*. (Cambridge University Press).
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative leviathan*. (University of California Press).
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. (Cambridge University Press).
- James M. Curry. 2015. *Legislating in the Dark*. (University of Chicago Press).
- Lawrence Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, *Congress reconsidered* (many editions—keep current with the most recent. Larry Evans has now been added as an editor, to keep the franchise going.)
- Richard F. Fenno. 1973 *Congressmen in committees*. (Little, Brown).
- Richard F. Fenno. 1978. *Home style*. (Little, Brown)
- Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell. 1981. *Strategy and choice in congressional elections*. (Yale University Press).
- Richard Hall. 1996. *Participation in Congress*. (Yale University Press).
- Keith Krehbiel. 1991. *Information and legislative organization* (University of Michigan Press).
- Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal politics*. (University of Chicago Press).
- Frances E. Lee. 2009. *Beyond Ideology*. (Cambridge University Press).
- Frances E. Lee. 2016. *Insecure Majorities*. (University of Chicago Press).
- David R. Mayhew. 1974. *Congress: The electoral connection*. (Yale University Press).
- Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. *The concept of representation*. (University of California Press).
- Keith T. Poole 2005. *Spatial models of parliamentary voting*. (Cambridge University Press.)
- Keith T. Pool and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting*. (Oxford University Press). (The second, revised edition of this book is titled *Ideology and Congress*.)
- David W. Rohde. 1991. *Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representatives*. (University of Chicago Press).

The 10 most important articles that are not associated with these books (mostly based on citation counts, with some judgment thrown in):

- Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 136 – 159.
- Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron. 2010. Leapfrog representation and extremism: A study of American voters and their members in Congress. *American Political Science Review* 104: 519 – 542.
- Steven J. Balla, Eric D. Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, and Lee Sigelman. 2002. Partisanship, blame avoidance, and the distribution of legislative pork. *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 515 – 525.
- Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. Out of step, out of office: Electoral accountability and House members' voting. *American Political Science Review* 96: 127 – 140.
- Jamie L. Carson, Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young. 2010. The electoral costs of party loyalty in Congress. *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 598 – 616.
- Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. The statistical analysis of roll call data. *American Political Science Review* 98: 355 – 370.
- James H. Fowler. 2006. Connecting the Congress: A study of cosponsorship networks. *Political Analysis* 14: 456 – 487.
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165 – 179.
- Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. Constituency influence in Congress. *American Political Science Review* 57: 45 – 56.
- Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall. The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. *Journal of Political Economy* 96: 132 – 163.

Winners of the Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Prize from the Legislative Studies Section of the APSA (and some of the competition that didn't win):

2022. Christian Dyogi Phillips. *Nowhere to Run: Race, Gender, and Immigration in American Elections*. (Oxford University Press).
2021. Beth Reingold, Kerry L. Haynie, and Kirsten Widner. *Race, Gender, & Political Representation: Toward A More Intersectional Approach*. (Oxford University Press).

2020. Bryan D. Jones, Sean M. Theriault, and Michelle Whyman. *The Great Broadening: How the Vast Expansion of the Policymaking Agenda Transformed American Politics*. (University of Chicago Press).
2019. C. Lawrence Evans. *The Whips: Building Party Coalitions in Congress*. (University of Michigan Press).
2018. Sarah A. Binder and Mark Spindel. *The Myth of Independence: How Congress Governs the Federal Reserve*. (Princeton University Press).
2017. Douglas Kriner and Eric Schickler. *Investigating the President: Congressional Checks on Presidential Power*. (Princeton University Press).
2016. Sven-Oliver Proksch and Jonathan B. Slapin. *The Politics of Parliamentary Debate: Parties, Rebels and Representation* (Cambridge University Press).
2015. Craig Volden and Alan E. Wiseman. *Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress: The Lawmakers*. (Cambridge University Press).
2014. Justin Grimmer. *Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters*. (Cambridge University Press).
2013. Lynda Powell *The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legislatures* (University of Michigan Press).
2012. Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. *Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance* (Oxford University Press).
2011. Gregory Koger. *Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate*. (University of Chicago Press).
2010. Frances Lee. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate*. (University of Chicago Press).
- 2009 Damon C. Cann. *Sharing the Wealth: Member Contributions and the Exchange Theory of Party Influence in the U.S. House of Representatives*. (SUNY Press).
2008. Simon Hix, Abdul G. Noury, and Gerard Roland, *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament* (Cambridge University Press).
2007. Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler, *Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate* (Princeton University Press)

2006. Tracy Sulkin, *Issue Politics in Congress* (Cambridge University Press)
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, *Setting the agenda* (Cambridge University Press)
2005. Diana Evans, *Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress* (Cambridge University Press)
2004. Sarah A. Binder, *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock* (Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
2003. John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, *Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
2002. Eric Schickler, *Disjointed pluralism: Institutional innovation and development of the U.S. Congress* (Princeton University Press, 2001)
2001. Charles M. Cameron, *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2000)
2000. David Canon, *Race Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts* (University of Chicago Press, 1999)
1999. Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* (University of Chicago Press, 1998)
1998. No selection
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting* (Oxford University Press, 1997)
1997. Richard Hall, *Participation in Congress* (Yale University Press, 1996)
1996. No selection.
- John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Congress as public enemy* (Cambridge University Press)
- Barbara Sinclair, *Legislators, leaders, and lawmakers* (Johns Hopkins University Press)

1995. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, *Quiet Revolution in the South* (Princeton University Press)

1994. Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (University of California Press)

Carol Swain, *Black faces, black interests* (Harvard University Press)

1993. Frank Sorauf, *Inside Campaign Finance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)

1992. Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization* (University of Michigan Press, 1991)

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, *The logic of delegation* (University of California Press)

David R. Mayhew, *Divided we govern* (Yale University press)

David W. Rohde, *Parties and leaders in the postreform House* (University of Chicago Press)

1991. R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (Yale University Press)

Jon R. Bond, *The president in the legislative arena* (Chicago University Press)

David T. Canon, *Actors, athletes, and astronauts* (University of Chicago Press)

Gary C. Jacobson, *The electoral origins of divided government* (Westview Press)

1990. Barbara Sinclair, *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989)

Steven S. Smith, *Call to Order* (Brookings Institution Press)

1989. No award

David W. Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (Stanford University Press)

1988. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (Harvard University Press, 1987).

Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections* (Little, Brown).

The 25 most-cited articles (on a per-year basis) in *Legislative Studies Quarterly* since 1973

- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. The effects of party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26: 533–572.
- Lisa Baldez. 2004. Elected bodies: The Gender Quota Law for legislative candidates in Mexico.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29: 231–258.
- Tiffany D. Barnes, Victoria D. Beall, and Mirya R. Holman. 2021. Pink-collar representation and budgetary outcomes in US states. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46: 199 – 154.
- David W. Brady, Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2007. Primary elections and candidate ideology: Out of step with the primary electorate?” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 32: 79 – 105.
- David E. Broockman. 2016. Approaches to studying policy representation. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41: 181 – 215.
- John M. Carey, Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell, and Gary F. Moncrief. 2006. The effects of term limits on state legislatures: A new survey of the 50 states.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31: 105–134.
- Nicholas Carnes. 2012. Does the numerical underrepresentation of the working class in Congress matter? *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 37: 5 – 34.
- Clifford Carrubba, Matthew Gabel, and Simon Hug. 2008. Legislative voting behavior, seen and unseen: A theory of roll-call vote selection. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33: 543–572.
- Simon Hix and Abdul Noury. 2009. After enlargement: Voting patterns in the sixth European Parliament.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34: 159–174.
- Mirya Holman and Anna Mahoney. 2018. Stop, collaborate, and listen: Women's collaboration in US state legislatures 43: 179 – 206.
- Jonathan Homola. 2022. The effects of women's descriptive representation on government behavior. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 47: 295 – 308.
- William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann. 2000. Divided government and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945–94. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25: 285–312.
- Gregory Koger. 2003. Position taking and cosponsorship in the U.S. House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28: 225 – 246.

- Steven D. Levitt and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1997. Decomposing the sources of incumbency advantage in the U.S. House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22: 45–60.
- Will Lowe, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2011. Scaling policy preferences from coded political texts. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36: 123 – 55.
- Richard E. Matland. 1998. Women’s representation in national legislatures: Developed and developing countries.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23: 109 – 125.
- David R. Miller. 2022. On whose door to knock? Organized interests' strategic pursuit of access to members of Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 47: 157 – 192.
- Terry M. Moe. 1987. An assessment of the positive theory of congressional dominance. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 12: 475–520.
- Sven-Oliver Proksch, Will Lowe, Jens Waeckerle, and Stuart Soroka. 2019. Multilingual sentiment analysis: A new approach to measuring conflict in legislative speeches. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 44: 97 – 131.
- Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. 2009. Making quotas work: The effect of gender quota laws on the election of women.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34: 5 – 28.
- Peverill Squire. 1992. Legislative professionalization and membership diversity in state legislatures. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17: 69 – 79.
- Michele L. Swers. 1998. Are women more likely to vote for women’s issue bills than their male colleagues?” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23: 435 – 448.
- Danielle M. Thomsen. 2015. Why So few (Republican) women? Explaining the partisan imbalance of women in the U.S. Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40: 295 – 323.
- Jessica Troustine. 2011. Evidence of a local incumbency advantage. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36: 255–280.
- Thomas Zittel, Dominic Nyhuis, and Markus Baumann. 2019. Geographic representation in party-dominated legislatures: a quantitative text analysis of parliamentary questions in the German Bundestag. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 44: 681 – 711.