


2014-05-05: ACE formed

- “Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments”
- Informational documents:
 - RFC 7744: “**Use Cases** for ACE”
 - draft-ietf-ace-actors:
“An **architecture** for ACE”, **problem statement**
- Solution drafts:
 - currently: applying OAuth framework to IoT


ACE: Scenario to be protected


- C and (R)S may not know each other
- C and (R)S may not have the same principal
- C and (R)S may be constrained nodes




Make good use of less-constrained nodes

- C and RS may be too simple to run detailed business logic
 - Much more straight-forward to employ existing web-based systems for that
- Pair C and RS with a less-constrained node for running the business logic: $C \rightarrow CAM$, $RS \rightarrow SAM$








ACE Architecture

- Covers all variants including cross-domain settings.

Legend:



- › Information flows in solid lines (actual message flow between the actors may be different).
 - Resource access (based on CoAP)
 - Control information (authorization information, keys, etc.)
 - Information flow may need to be secured end-to-end through intermediary devices





Information flows may be protected with session-based security (DTLS) or data object based security (COSE)

Comprehensive model: map to fewer components


- Roles can be combined into a single instance



OAuth
2.0



- C needs Authentication and Authorization policies for AS and RS
- These now need to be pre-installed in C
- Mechanisms for that not defined in ACE today



Shaping the Security Workflows

- Stakeholders, Principals
- Less-constrained nodes
- Constrained nodes
- Device Lifecycle
- Authorized, authenticated delegation