



# Security Council

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## Note by the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 2 of resolution [2464 \(2019\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).



## Annex

### **Letter dated 26 February 2020 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council**

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution [2464 \(2019\)](#), the final report on its work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) on 7 February 2020 and was considered by the Committee on 19 February 2020.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts established pursuant to  
Security Council resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#)

**Enclosure****Letter dated 7 February 2020 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)**

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2464 (2019), the final report on its work.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

Panel of Experts established pursuant to  
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

## Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)

### *Summary*

In 2019, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not halt its illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, which it continued to enhance, in violation of Security Council resolutions. It continued maintenance and construction of nuclear facilities, though it declared no nuclear tests and carried out no intercontinental ballistic missile launches. In 2019 it conducted 13 other launch tests, launching at least 25 missiles, including new types of short-range ballistic missile and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. It continued to develop infrastructure and capacity for its missile programme. After February 2019, no progress was reported in the diplomatic sphere and, citing this, Pyongyang announced at the end of the year that it saw no reason to continue its self-declared moratorium on intercontinental ballistic missile launches. Despite its extensive indigenous capability, it uses illicit external procurement for some components and technology.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea violates the resolutions through illicit imports of petroleum. Illicit imports of refined petroleum products have continued through ship-to-ship transfers and through direct deliveries by foreign-flagged vessels. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea increased procurement, including through a notable increase in the number of these larger foreign-flagged tankers directly delivering to the country on multiple occasions. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and foreign-flagged vessels and their owners continued elaborate evasion practices. The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) received a report from the United States of America containing imagery, data and calculations covering the period from 1 January to 31 October 2019. According to these estimated calculations, the annual cap for 2019, as set by the Security Council, of the aggregate amount of 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products was exceeded many times over. The Russian Federation and China requested more conclusive evidence to make a judgment.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to flout Security Council resolutions through illicit maritime exports of commodities, notably coal and sand. Such sales provide a revenue stream that has historically contributed to the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The Panel received imagery and information from a Member State showing numerous direct deliveries and ship-to-ship transfers of illicit coal and sand from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to another Member State on self-propelled ocean-going barges (see section II). Vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also conducted ship-to-ship transfers of coal to larger bulk carriers, which then made such deliveries. The Panel observed the purchase of a vessel that was meant for scrap but was instead used to export coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The country also continued to earn income from the illicit sale of fishing rights.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to import luxury goods and other sanctioned items, including luxury vehicles, alcohol and robotic machinery. The country's trading corporations, often subordinate to the designated Munitions Industry Department or themselves designated entities, continued to participate in trade fairs within the country. These fairs may be used to expand networks for procurement and other prohibited trade related to weapons of mass destruction.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to access international banking channels in violation of United Nations sanctions, mainly by using third-party intermediaries. It continued illegally to acquire virtual currencies and to conduct cyberattacks against global banks to evade financial sanctions. Designated entities such as the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Munitions Industry Department are actively seeking to obtain fiat currencies and virtual assets by illicit means, the former through hacking and the latter by illicitly dispatching information technology workers abroad.

The Security Council, in successive resolutions, restricted and eventually prohibited the issuance of work permits to nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from 2017, noting that such nationals frequently work overseas for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the country uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In paragraph 8 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), the Council required the repatriation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by 22 December 2019 of any nationals of the country who were earning income overseas. The Panel is investigating the country's nationals suspected of earning income overseas, irrespective of visa categories or the nature of the income; these nationals include specialists such as sports players, doctors and information technology workers, as well as manual labourers. At the time of writing, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Panel have received interim information on repatriation from about 50 Member States. All Member States are required to submit final reports on the implementation of paragraph 8 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#) by 22 March 2020.

The sanctions resolutions are not intended to have adverse consequences for the civilian population or to affect negatively the operations of humanitarian organizations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. United Nations sanctions may be assumed to have some unintended negative impact on the civilian population, although this is not precisely quantifiable and cannot readily be disaggregated from other factors, including domestic factors. Some negative impact was observed, nevertheless, including as a result of the continued absence of a banking channel. The Panel noted significant progress in reducing the processing time for humanitarian exemption requests submitted to the Committee.

The Panel recommends a series of designations and practical measures to provide the Security Council, the Committee and Member States with additional tools with which to address challenges and shortcomings in the implementation of the relevant resolutions.

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\* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

## I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 2 of its resolution [2464 \(2019\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) to provide the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) with a final report with findings and recommendations. The present report covers the period from 3 August 2019 to 7 February 2020.

## II. Sectoral and maritime sanctions

### Tanker deliveries to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

#### *Direct deliveries and ship-to-ship transfers*


2. Reports to the Panel by several Member States, combined with the Panel's own investigations, show increased imports as well as exports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of banned or restricted commodities. The country has continued to import refined petroleum through illicit ship-to-ship transfers and through illicit direct deliveries in violation of the resolutions. The procurement of refined petroleum products by foreign-flagged vessels sailing directly into Nampo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to deliver cargo (see [S/2019/691](#)) has increased considerably in terms of the frequency of deliveries and the number of vessels involved. The Marine Import Terminal at Nampo<sup>1</sup> is the primary port to which foreign-flagged vessels deliver refined petroleum. The Panel continues to observe the evolution of the evasion and circumvention techniques used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and vessels acting on its behalf.

3. The Panel received a report on 8 November 2019 from the United States of America containing updated data (covering the period from 1 January to 31 October 2019) on tanker deliveries of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In some months between June and October 2019, the estimated deliveries by foreign-flagged tankers exceeded the deliveries made by tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see figure 1 and annex 1).

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<sup>1</sup> A Member State has assessed the infrastructure at Nampo port – which is outfitted with the necessary tanker unloading support, has substantial refined petroleum product storage facilities and is serviced by rail lines that enable the transit of refined petroleum products to petroleum demand centres throughout the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – to be focused on receiving refined petroleum products.

Figure 1  
**Proportion of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vs.  
foreign-flagged tanker deliveries in 2019**



Source: Member State, the Panel.

4. The report of 8 November 2019 contains updates on the previous United States report on tanker deliveries of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a report that was dated 11 June 2019 and covered the period from 1 January to 23 April 2019.<sup>2</sup> The report of 8 November 2019 was compiled on the same basis as the 11 June 2019 report. According to the United States, as at 31 October 2019, under the one-third laden scenario, these deliveries would have amounted to almost three times the total cap of 500,000<sup>3</sup> barrels set in paragraph 5 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#). Under the half-laden scenario, the deliveries would have amounted to more than four times the cap and, under the fully laden scenario, they would have amounted to almost eight times the cap.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See [S/2019/691](#), paras. 2 to 4, footnotes 1 to 3, and annexes 1 and 2.

<sup>3</sup> In paragraph 5 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council does not specify what ratio should be used for the conversion rate for tons and barrels. Using the ton-to-barrel ratio indicated in paragraph 4 of the resolution in respect of crude oil (i.e. 7.61904762 barrels per ton), the Panel calculates that the total of the accumulated amounts submitted to the Committee by China and the Russian Federation would equal 408,575.756 barrels. Depending on the actual specific gravity of these refined petroleum products, which has not been recorded, the exact number of barrels might be higher or lower than that figure. Using this conversion rate gives a lower figure than when applying an industry standard “product basket” conversion factor of 8.0 barrels per ton (BP, “Approximate conversion factors”, in *Statistical Review of World Energy 2019*). Approximate conversion factors for specific refined petroleum products range from 6.4 barrels per ton for residual fuel oil to 8.4 barrels per ton for gasoline. A couple of experts did not agree with the basis for the above conversion rates and calculations.

<sup>4</sup> See [S/2019/691](#), para. 3. The Panel recalls that the communication of 11 June 2019, provided by the United States and supported by 25 other co-signatories, included a request for the Committee to notify Member States that, on the basis of United States calculations, the cap on refined petroleum products had been breached, and to halt all subsequent transfers of refined petroleum to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Russian Federation responded that it was premature for the Committee to make a conclusive decision on the matter, and China noted that it needed more evidence and information to make a judgment on the issue.

5. As of January 2020, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), the Russian Federation had submitted to the Committee an accumulated amount of 30,886.328 tons of refined petroleum for export to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea up to the end of November 2019. China has submitted an accumulated amount of 22,739.24 tons for 2019.

6. The Panel also received a communication dated 5 December 2019 from the Executive Director of the Maritime Administration of Sierra Leone addressed to the Chair of the Committee, a communication that included notification of deliveries of refined petroleum products by Sierra Leone-flagged vessels to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea<sup>5</sup> (see annex 2).

### **Recommendations**

7. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee agree upon a single conversion rate between tons and barrels for refined petroleum products and specify the ton measurement referred to in Security Council resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).**

8. **The Panel recommends that the Committee publish the amounts of refined petroleum deliveries converted into barrels on receipt of any notification of such deliveries.**

9. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States report in a timely manner any known transfers of refined petroleum products to the Committee, as required by resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).**

### **Foreign-flagged vessels conducting direct deliveries**

10. According to a Member State, the addition of larger foreign-flagged tankers delivering to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has expanded the illicit import of refined petroleum products. The Member State calculated that, in the first 10 months of 2019, foreign-flagged tankers alone had made a total of 64 deliveries, amounting to between 560,000 and 1.531 million barrels of refined petroleum products<sup>6</sup> (see figure 2 and annex 1).

11. Foreign-flagged tankers have also made repeated port calls to deliver their cargo, with one vessel returning up to 15 times over a seven-month period. Such direct deliveries are assessed as being more efficient than ship-to-ship transfers conducted by tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with smaller vessels before returning to port.

12. From its investigations, the Panel notes that some of the vessels conducting direct deliveries to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea changed ownership only months prior to such deliveries. In a number of these cases, the companies listed as the vessels' registered owners were dissolved or struck off company registers. As a tactic to obfuscate information and make it more difficult to identify the real owner,

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<sup>5</sup> Shipments by the *Sen Lin 01*, *Hokong*, *Vifine*, *Tianyou* and *Unica* were included in the notification. None of the shipments was notified within 30 days. Additional unnotified shipments to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were recorded for all these vessels, with the possible exception of the *Vifine* (in whose case the date of a shipment may have been misreported).

<sup>6</sup> The above-mentioned range of associated delivery volumes is based on the lower (33 per cent laden) and upper (90 per cent laden) associated delivery volume scenarios provided by the Member State.

some of the vessels had not had their information updated in a specialized maritime database<sup>7</sup> when they began conducting deliveries to the country.

13. Some of the vessels that conducted direct deliveries have been recorded as falsely flagged based on International Maritime Organization (IMO) historical data.<sup>8</sup> Some foreign-flagged vessels, such as the *Wan Heng 11* (IMO No. 8791667, currently operating as the *Kum Jin Gang 3*),<sup>9</sup> the *New Regent* (IMO No. 8312497) and the *Tianyou* (IMO No. 8817007), which had previously been involved in ship-to-ship transfers with tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, have transitioned from the status of feeder vessels to that of delivery vessels. Details of the similarities shared by suspect vessels in terms of the vessel owners, operators and managers and the vessel profiles are provided in annex 3.


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<sup>7</sup> The company IHS Markit is the originating source for the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Ship Identification Number Scheme and is the sole authority with responsibility for assigning and validating these numbers. It is also the originating source for the IMO Unique Company and Registered Owner Identification Number Scheme, which it manages on behalf of IMO.

<sup>8</sup> These vessels include the *Vifine* (IMO No. 9045962) and the *Subbllic* (IMO No. 8126082).

<sup>9</sup> The *Wan Heng 11* (IMO No. 8791667), a former Belize-flagged tanker designated on 30 March 2018 for engaging in a ship-to-ship transfer with the tanker of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea *Rye Song Gang 1* (IMO No. 7389704), was reported to have conducted two more ship-to-ship transfers with tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in January 2018.

**Figure 2**  
**Examples of direct deliveries at Nampo by foreign-flagged vessels**



*Source:* Member State; *Map:* the Panel.

*Note:* see annex 1.

## (i) Sen Lin 01


14. The Panel notes that the *Sen Lin 01* (IMO No. 8910378), which at the time was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone,<sup>10</sup> continued to directly deliver refined petroleum at Nampo, where it made a total of at least 15 separate port calls between January and July 2019.<sup>11</sup> The *Sen Lin 01* also appears to be using the facilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see figure 3 (a)), where it was dry-docked. A specialized maritime database showed the vessel with an automatic identification system gap of over 10 months, from December 2018 to October 2019.<sup>12</sup> On 13 November 2019, the *Sen Lin 01* was recorded as being in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see figure 3 (b)).<sup>13</sup>

**Figure 3 (a)**  
***Sen Lin 01* at Nampo on 20 August 2019**



Source: Member State;

**Figure 3 (b)**  
***Sen Lin 01* in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 13 November 2019**



Source: Windward.

15. Deepika Shipping and Trading Ltd. (hereafter Deepika Shipping) was listed as the registered shipowner, manager and operator<sup>14</sup> from April 2018 on a specialized maritime database. The company was annulled in November 2019 by the Registrar of the Marshall Islands, where it was incorporated. Deepika Shipping had previously listed its address as “care of Circle Ocean International Shipping Limited”,<sup>15</sup> incorporated in April 2015.<sup>16</sup> The Panel has yet to receive a response from these companies.

## (ii) Tianyou

16. The *Tianyou* (IMO No. 8817007), which at the time was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone,<sup>17</sup> made at least four port calls between July and October 2019 at

<sup>10</sup> The *Sen Lin 01* sailed under the flag of Sierra Leone from November 2018 to October 2019 (IHS Markit, accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>11</sup> The Panel has previously reported that the *Sen Lin 01* had conducted 10 deliveries to Nampo (see S/2019/691, para. 10).

<sup>12</sup> Windward (accessed on 2 December 2019).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>15</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 7 June 2019).

<sup>16</sup> Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System. Available at (accessed on 27 November 2019).

<sup>17</sup> The *Tianyou* was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone from March to September 2018 (IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019)).

Nampo and delivered refined petroleum.<sup>18</sup> The *Tianyou* was recorded on a specialized maritime database as not having transmitted an automatic identification system signal since December 2018, apart from a brief transmission on 11 April 2019.<sup>19</sup> Prior to its direct deliveries, the vessel conducted ship-to-ship transfers with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tanker *Ji Song 6* (IMO No. 8898740) on 2 January 2019 and with another Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tanker, the *Chon Ma San* (IMO No. 8660313), on 31 March 2019. Tian You Shipping Limited<sup>20</sup> (hereafter Tian You)<sup>21</sup> is listed as the registered owner, with a Singapore-registered company (hereafter management company-TY) listed on specialized maritime databases as its “care of” address and as the vessel’s ship manager, operator and technical manager.<sup>22</sup>

17. According to management company-TY, the *Tianyou* was sold on 10 May 2019 to a Hong Kong-incorporated company (hereafter buyer-TY) (see annex 4).<sup>23</sup> The vessel began making direct deliveries to Nampo two months after its sale. Management company-TY stated that, on the basis that the vessel had switched off its automatic identification system in August 2018 and on the basis of other complaints, it had “sent a letter to owner requesting termination of our management services, because of Owner’s uncooperative attitude as well as payment issue”.<sup>24</sup> Management company-TY stated the following: “We have discharged ourselves since the Owner’s dishonoured our agreement.” All communications related to the vessel were handled via the owner’s representative, a Mr. Jiang. The Panel notes that, according to the Integrated Information System of the Companies Registry (Hong Kong), the seller, Tian You, was dissolved on 22 November 2019, and buyer-TY was dissolved on 22 November 2019.<sup>25</sup> Management company-TY stated that it “did not have access to cargo fixture, shipping documents and shipping routes” and that “the later stage S&P we are not involved and we only got the documents from them after we requested a copy”. Tian You has yet to respond to the Panel’s enquiries. Investigations continue.

(iii) *Vifine*

18. The *Vifine*, also known as *Tealway FV*, which at the time was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone (IMO No. 9045962),<sup>26</sup> made at least five port calls between May and July 2019 at Nampo and delivered refined petroleum.<sup>27</sup> A specialized maritime database showed the *Vifine* began (re)transmitting an automatic identification system signal in July 2019, following a lengthy period of no transmission from November 2016.<sup>28</sup> Hongxin International Ship Management Co. Limited<sup>29</sup> (hereafter Hongxin)

<sup>18</sup> Member State information.

<sup>19</sup> Windward (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>20</sup> In Chinese: 天佑航運有限公司.

<sup>21</sup> Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System. Available at (accessed on 22 November 2019).

<sup>22</sup> Accessed on 28 November 2019.

<sup>23</sup> The Panel sought clarification on the discrepancy between the numerical amount and the amount spelled out in parenthesis, “USD 200,000 (US one dollar)”, as recorded in the bill of sale (see annex 4).

<sup>24</sup> The Panel is awaiting the requested documentation on the date of termination of the ship management services provided by management company-TY.

<sup>25</sup> Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System. Available at (accessed on 31 December 2019).

<sup>26</sup> The *Vifine* sailed under the flag of Sierra Leone from November 2018 to October 2019 (IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019)).

<sup>27</sup> Member State information.

<sup>28</sup> Windward (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>29</sup> In Chinese: 鴻信國際船舶管理有限公司. Incorporated on 18 March 2019 (Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System. Available at [www.icris.cr.gov.hk](http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk)).

is listed on specialized maritime databases as the registered owner as well as the ship manager, operator and technical manager from May 2019,<sup>30</sup> the same month in which the vessel began delivering refined petroleum at Nampo. Hongxin has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

(iv) Hokong

19. The *Hokong* (IMO No. 9006758), which at the time was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone,<sup>31</sup> made at least six port calls between May and October 2019 at Nampo and delivered refined petroleum.<sup>32</sup> All Sefety Ocean International Trading Co. Limited<sup>33</sup> (hereafter All Sefety) is listed on specialized maritime databases as the registered owner as well as the ship manager and operator as of February 2019,<sup>34</sup> with the vessel conducting direct deliveries to Nampo three months later. The company, incorporated in April 2018,<sup>35</sup> also served as the previous registered owner of the *Vifine*, which directly delivered refined petroleum to Nampo. All Sefety has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

(v) Unica

20. The *Unica* (IMO No. 8514306),<sup>36</sup> which at the time was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone, made at least five port calls between July and October 2019 at Nampo and delivered refined petroleum.<sup>37</sup> A registered company in the British Virgin Islands (hereafter company-U) is listed on specialized maritime databases as the registered owner, ship manager, operator and technical manager.<sup>38</sup> The company that holds the vessel's document of compliance, Nuwanni International Ship Management Co. Limited<sup>39</sup> (hereafter Nuwanni), incorporated in April 2018 and dissolved in July 2019,<sup>40</sup> had the same listed address as All Sefety. The British Virgin Islands authority has confirmed company-U's incorporation in October 2018 and has provided further information on the vessel's ownership. Investigations continue.

(vi) Diamond 8

21. The Sierra Leone-flagged *Diamond 8* (IMO No. 9132612)<sup>41</sup> delivered refined petroleum at Nampo on 27 October 2019<sup>42</sup> a month after it had registered under the flag of Sierra Leone and under a new owner. A company domiciled in Indonesia (hereafter management company-D8) is listed as the vessel's ship manager and operator as of September 2019<sup>43</sup> and also serves as the "care of" address of the *Diamond 8*'s registered owner. Indonesia responded to the Panel that it is currently

<sup>30</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>31</sup> The *Hokong* sailed under the flag of Sierra Leone from February 2019 to October 2019 IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>32</sup> Member State information.

<sup>33</sup> In Chinese: 全安海洋國際貿易有限公司.

<sup>34</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>35</sup> Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System. Available at [www.icris.cr.gov.hk](http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk) (accessed on 27 November 2019).

<sup>36</sup> The *Unica* sailed under the flag of Sierra Leone from October 2018 to October 2019 (IHS Market (accessed on 28 November 2019)).

<sup>37</sup> Member State information.

<sup>38</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>39</sup> In Chinese: 紐縵日國際船舶管理有限公司.

<sup>40</sup> Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System. Available at [www.icris.cr.gov.hk](http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk) (accessed on 27 November 2019).

<sup>41</sup> The *Diamond 8* has sailed under the flag of Sierra Leone since September 2019 (IHS Markit database (accessed on 28 November 2019)).

<sup>42</sup> Member State information.

<sup>43</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019).

conducting an investigation that involves an inter-agency process and that, in order to provide the Panel with the necessary information, further confirmation and supporting data from relevant agencies are still required. The results of its investigation will be conveyed in due course.

(vii) New Regent

22. The Panel first reported in March 2019<sup>44</sup> that the *New Regent* (IMO No. 8312497) had conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with a tanker of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. When the *New Regent* began directly delivering refined petroleum to Nampo,<sup>45</sup> it was already de-flagged and faced a global port ban.<sup>46</sup> Since then, the vessel has continued to deliver its cargo on at least two more occasions between May and July 2019.<sup>47</sup>

23. According to an affidavit<sup>48</sup> by a Mr. Tan, a Singapore-based ship broker for the *New Regent*, the vessel's previous owner, Mega Glory Holdings Limited, sold and delivered the vessel to Fullberg Trading Develop Limited<sup>49</sup> (hereafter Fullberg)<sup>50</sup> at Kaohsiung in April 2018 (see para. 168 and annex 5). According to Mr. Tan, the new owner failed to update the vessel's registration or to respond to further communication attempts by Mr. Tan and the previous owners following the vessel's sale, with Mr. Tan reporting that he had subsequently lost all contact information related to the buyers after he changed his mobile phone in late 2018.<sup>51</sup> Mr. Tan stated that he was contacted in his capacity as broker by a Mr. Yu, an interested party who was seeking to purchase the vessel and whom Mr. Tan had not known previously. Mr. Tan also stated that, to his knowledge, Mega Glory Holdings Limited had had no prior relationship with Fullberg. The Panel has requested further clarification and documentation from Mr. Tan, and is awaiting a response. Investigations continue.

(viii) Subblic

24. The former Togo-flagged *Subblic* (IMO No. 8126082)<sup>52</sup> made at least 10 port calls between June and October 2019 in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and delivered refined petroleum.<sup>53</sup> The vessel was registered as flag unknown two months before it began its direct deliveries.<sup>54</sup> The *Subblic*, registered under a different name and sailing under a different flag, last recorded an automatic identification system transmission over two years ago, in October 2017<sup>55</sup>. The vessel was recorded as falsely flagged under the Maldivian ship registry in December 2017.<sup>56</sup> Milyan.R

<sup>44</sup> S/2019/171, paras. 15 to 17.

<sup>45</sup> S/2019/69, para. 10.

<sup>46</sup> The vessel was designated by the Committee on 16 October 2018.

<sup>47</sup> Member State information.

<sup>48</sup> The affidavit and the related submitted documentation are held by the Panel.

<sup>49</sup> In Chinese: 丰百貿易拓展有限公司.

<sup>50</sup> Registered on the Integrated Information System of the Companies Registry (Hong Kong).

<sup>51</sup> Mr. Tan stated the following in his affidavit: "After the sale, however, the buyer refused to communicate with me about this matter. I replaced my cellphone at the end of 2018 due to system malfunction and lost all contacts and records with buyer. I am no longer in communication with buyer and I am very disappointed with how Fullberg Trading behaved after it received possession of New Regent."

<sup>52</sup> The *Subblic* sailed under the flag of Togo from October 2018 to April 2019 (IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019)).

<sup>53</sup> The *Subblic* delivered its refined petroleum to Nampo, except on 24 August 2019, when it delivered to Hungnam, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

<sup>54</sup> Windward.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> The Government of the Maldives confirmed that the vessel, known at the time as the *Xin Yuan 18*, had been falsely registered under its flag (Mariyam Shaushath, "Maldives assures MMSI number used by Xin Yuan 18 never registered", Public Service Media, 1 March 2018).

Trade International Co. Limited<sup>57</sup> (hereafter Milyan), is listed as the registered owner of the *Subbllic* and as the vessel's ship manager and operator since October 2018.<sup>58</sup> At different stages, two Filipino nationals were listed as the director for Milyan.<sup>59</sup> The company, incorporated on 26 March 2018 and dissolved on 26 July 2019,<sup>60</sup> shared the same listed address as All Sefety (the registered owner of the *Hokong*), and had, as its document of compliance company, Nuwanni,<sup>61</sup> which provided the same service to the *Unica*.

25. The *Subbllic*, under its former name, *Xin Yuan 18*, was reported by a Member State as suspected of having conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the tanker of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea *Chon Ma San* on 24 February 2018.<sup>62</sup> *Xin Yuan 18* was sold on to Milyan. The Philippines authorities have provided the Panel with some information. Investigations continue.

(ix) Bonvoy 3

26. The *Bonvoy 3* (IMO No. 8978784) made at least two port calls between August and September 2019 at Nampo and delivered refined petroleum.<sup>63</sup> The vessel has been recorded as flag unknown since April 2017,<sup>64</sup> with its last registered owner, manager and operator listed as Bright Clear Global Ltd.-HKG.<sup>65</sup> The Panel has received, from the authorities of Honduras, as the country of the vessel's last flag registry, information including confirmation that the provisional patent of navigation issued to the vessel expired on 1 March 2016 and that the vessel was not authorized to navigate under the Honduran flag from that date onwards. Investigations continue.

(x) Yun Hong 8

27. The Chinese-flagged *Yun Hong 8* (maritime mobile service identity No. 413459380)<sup>66</sup> made at least 10 port calls between February and October 2019 at Nampo and delivered refined petroleum.<sup>67</sup> During that period, the *Yun Hong 8* was also observed receiving, from other foreign-flagged vessels, refined petroleum assessed by a Member State as likely to be for delivery to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel notes that the vessel was advertised for auction in June 2018 under Ningbo Ship Trading Market Co. Ltd.<sup>68</sup> The Panel wrote to the Chinese authorities for assistance. China responded to the Panel's enquiries, stating that the serious lack of accuracy of the relevant information caused great difficulty for the

<sup>57</sup> In Chinese: 邁源紅貿易國際有限公司.

<sup>58</sup> Listed as ship manager and operator in IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019).

<sup>59</sup> Integrated Information System of the Companies Registry (Hong Kong). Available at [www.icris.cr.gov.hk](http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk) (accessed on 27 November 2019).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Listed as the *Subbllic*'s document of compliance company from October 2018 to September 2019 (IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019)). The Panel notes that the shared listed address belongs to a corporate service registry company.

<sup>62</sup> Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Suspicion of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by Chon Ma San, North Korean-flagged tanker, and Xin Yuan 18, Maldivian-flagged tanker", 24 February 2018.

<sup>63</sup> Member State information.

<sup>64</sup> The *Bonvoy 3* was last flagged under the flag of Honduras in April 2017 (IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019)).

<sup>65</sup> The company is no longer listed in the Integrated Information System of the Companies Registry (Hong Kong).

<sup>66</sup> The *Yun Hong 8*, registered in several maritime databases (accessed on 13 November 2019) as Chinese-flagged, responded to a Mandarin hail and query conducted by a Member State recording a ship-to-ship transfer involving the *Yun Hong 8* and another vessel on 23 October 2019 (see para. 31). The *Yun Hong 8* stated its home port as Zhongshan, Zhejiang, China.

<sup>67</sup> Member State information.

<sup>68</sup> See [www.shipbid.net](http://www.shipbid.net).

Chinese investigation and made it even harder for China to conduct further investigations based on the current information. China hoped that the Panel could conduct its work as mandated in Security Council resolutions and faithfully help Member States better to implement resolutions.

#### **Foreign-flagged vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers to other foreign-flagged vessels for deliveries to Nampo**

28. A Member State has assessed that some foreign-flagged vessels that delivered refined petroleum products directly to Nampo have also used ship-to-ship transfers to procure refined petroleum products on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel notes that the supplier vessels involved in such ship-to-ship transfers may or may not have information on the true intended destination of the receiver vessel. The relatively new phenomenon of ship-to-ship transfers between foreign-flagged vessels in international waters followed by the delivery of illicit cargo directly to Nampo<sup>69</sup> is a matter of serious concern. The additional obfuscation heightens the need for due diligence regarding the ultimate destination of the supplier tanker's cargo.

29. A Member State identified the following cases in which receiver vessels directly delivered refined petroleum to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after obtaining cargo by ship-to-ship transfer:

(i) *Yun Hong 8 and supplier vessel A*

30. In addition to making direct deliveries to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see para. 27), the *Yun Hong 8* was photographed by a Member State receiving a ship-to-ship transfer from a Republic of Korea-flagged vessel (hereafter supplier vessel A) on 31 August 2019 in the East China Sea (see figure 4). The *Yun Hong 8* additionally received refined petroleum on at least three other occasions through ship-to-ship transfers with supplier vessel A from July to mid-August 2019.<sup>70</sup> The Panel notes that three of these four ship-to-ship transfers between supplier vessel A and the *Yun Hong 8* were conducted within days<sup>71</sup> of the latter vessel's recorded port calls at Nampo. Supplier vessel A's registered owner assisted the Panel and provided all requested documentation<sup>72</sup> (see annex 6). Investigations continue.

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
<sup>69</sup> All the recorded foreign-flagged tanker deliveries on which information was provided by the Member State were made to Nampo, apart from a delivery made at Hungnam on 24 August 2019 by the former Togo-flagged *Subblie*.

<sup>70</sup> The three transfers with the *Yun Hong 8* were conducted on 26 and 27 June and 16 August 2019. The four transfers to the *Yun Hong 8* from supplier vessel A, including that of 31 August 2019, were recorded at a total of 4,731 tons of marine gasoil.

<sup>71</sup> From July to mid-August, the transfers were made between four and eight days before the *Yun Hong 8*'s port calls at Nampo, and the transfer of 31 August 2019 was made about a month before the next Nampo port call.

<sup>72</sup> The owner submitted documentation and relevant photographs of the following, collected for the owner's due diligence and precautionary purposes: signed and dated bunker delivery receipts, pledge and confirmation of final destination from receiving vessel, confirmation of vessel registration, discharging reports for each transaction, confirmation of vessel's certificate and nationality, photographs of flow meters, and copies of records of payment.

**Figure 4**  
**Ship-to-Ship transfer between *Yun Hong 8* and supplier vessel A,**  
**31 August 2019**



*Source:* Member State.

*(ii) Yun Hong 8 and supplier vessel B*

31. The *Yun Hong 8* was photographed by a Member State receiving a ship-to-ship transfer from an Indian-flagged vessel (hereafter supplier vessel B) on 23 October 2019 in the East China Sea (see figure 5). At the time, supplier vessel B was time-chartered to CPC Corporation Limited, an entity with an address registered in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.<sup>73</sup> In addition, supplier vessel B delivered refined petroleum to the *Yun Hong 8* on four other occasions between September and mid-November 2019<sup>74</sup> (see annex 7 (a)). The ship-to-ship transfers took place within days of the *Yun Hong 8*'s recorded subsequent port calls at Nampo.<sup>75</sup> Supplier vessel B's registered owner provided documentation and is assisting the Panel.<sup>76</sup> The owner initially submitted that the transfer of 23 October 2019 had been conducted not with the *Yun Hong 8* but with the *Yun Hong 18*<sup>77</sup> (see annex 7 (b)). However, the owner subsequently clarified the *Yun Hong 8*'s identity following a conversation with the

<sup>73</sup> Supplier vessel B was on a long-term time charter to the CPC Corporation Limited, with a charter party agreement dated 5 August 2019. Supplier vessel B's owner informed the Panel that it would "not agree to work with the same Charterer or Persons connected with the Charterer in future, CPCC, Ltd."

<sup>74</sup> The five transfers to the *Yun Hong 8* were conducted on 28 September and 5 and 23 October 2019, concluding with two transfers on 11 November 2019.

<sup>75</sup> Three of the five transfers between supplier vessel B and the *Yun Hong 8* were made in September and October 2019, while two were made after 31 October 2019, beyond the time frame of the information provided to the Panel by the Member State. The three transfers were made between two and six days before the *Yung Hon 8*'s port calls at Nampo. A total of 6,297.29 tons of gasoil with a sulphur content of 500 parts per million was recorded as being transferred to the *Yun Hong 8* from supplier vessel B.

<sup>76</sup> According to the owner, "all operation matters have been handled between the Charterers to Owners and Owners to Master, with the charterers PIC" (as sub-charterers) coordinating locally with the master of supplier vessel B.

<sup>77</sup> The owner stated that the ship-to-ship transfer had been made to the *Yun Hong 18* and not to the *Yun Hong 8* as indicated in an email transaction and a bunker delivery receipt provided by the charterer.

vessel's master.<sup>78</sup> According to the owner, the sub-charterer provided the discharge instructions related to the cargo quantity, with further instructions provided by a Mr. Looi, the charterer's representative on board. The charterer has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries. Investigations continue.

**Figure 5**  
**Ship-to-Ship transfer between *Yun Hong 8* and supplier vessel B,**  
**23 October 2019**



Source: Member State.

*(iii) Vifine and New Konk*

32. A Member State photographed the *Vifine*, which at the time was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone, conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with the *New Konk*<sup>79</sup> (IMO No. 9036387) in the East China Sea on 19 June 2019 (see figure 6). The *Vifine* delivered refined petroleum on multiple occasions to Nampo (see para. 18). The Panel's investigations show that the *Vifine*'s registered owner, Hongxin International Ship Management Co. Limited, and the *New Konk*'s registered owner, New Konk Ocean International Company Limited,<sup>80</sup> share the same listed address.<sup>81</sup> The two vessels also shared the same registered owner, ship manager and operator, namely, All Sefety, before their respective new ownerships in May 2019. New Konk Ocean International Co. Ltd. has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

<sup>78</sup> According to the owner, the master, under pressure from the charterer's representative on board, agreed "that she should paint her name as *Yun Hong 18*, so that he could report to his managers that this was not the *Yun Hong 8*", and instructed the vessel's name to be logged accordingly in all documents. Elsewhere, the owners stated the following: "You will appreciate that the Master provided paint to *Yun Hong 8* so that he could act contrary to our instructions relating to the risk of damage ... and his actions did not relate to any concern on his part about a possible violation of sanctions." The *Yun Hong 8* was reported to have collided with supplier vessel B during a transfer, and the vessel's owners had denied further transfers to ensure safe vessel operation. Documentation of the incident was attached. The Panel notes that, at the same time, the master had already reported, on 20 October 2019, that a United States monitoring asset had "already taken 2 rounds of our vessel". Subsequent warnings that sanctions were in place against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that "any trade with vessels breaking sanctions is illegal" were broadcast "every few hours". Further ship-to-ship transfers were conducted on 11 November 2019.

<sup>79</sup> The *New Konk* sailed under the flag of Sierra Leone from April to October 2019 (IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019)).

<sup>80</sup> In Chinese: 新康海洋國際有限公司.

<sup>81</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 28 November 2019). The Panel notes that the listed shared address could be that of a company providing corporate registry services.

Figure 6  
Ship-to-Ship transfer between *Vifine* and *New Konk*, 19 June 2019



Source: Member State.

#### Ship-to-ship transfers involving tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

33. According to a Member State, vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea called at ports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at least 157 times to deliver refined petroleum products illegally procured via ship-to-ship transfers within the first 10 months of 2019 (see annex 1). These transfers violate Security Council resolutions and enable the country to evade sanctions on a significant scale. Many of these transfers employed obfuscation techniques previously identified by the Panel, including automatic identification system disablement, night transfers, the use of small vessels without IMO numbers, and vessel disguise.

34. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and actors acting on its behalf continue to advance, adapt and develop their evasion techniques to avoid the detection, identification and monitoring of activities prohibited by the resolutions. A relatively new practice involves vessels seeking to avoid tracking by moving into the territorial waters of Member States, knowing that they cannot be followed. Vessels observed by a Member State engaging in such activity during the period from 1 July to 30 September 2019 included vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, designated vessels and foreign-flagged vessels that conducted direct deliveries to Nampo, and foreign-flagged vessels that engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with other foreign-flagged direct delivery vessels or with tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 8).<sup>82</sup> Such foreign-flagged vessels could also be relying on their non-Democratic People's Republic of Korea flag status to obtain bunkering and other supply services facilitating their illicit operations.

<sup>82</sup> More vessels were reported, and the Panel is currently investigating these cases.

35. Examples of ship-to-ship transfers involving tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea documented by several Member States include the following:

(i) *Rui Hong 916 and Kum Un San*

36. The *Rui Hong 916* (IMO No. 9058866),<sup>83</sup> which at the time was sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone, conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea tanker *Kum Un San* (IMO No. 8720436) on 28 May 2019 in the East China Sea. The vessel was listed on a specialized maritime database as having been sold to an undisclosed entity in January 2019.<sup>84</sup> Shortly afterwards, in March 2019, the vessel was listed as registered under the Sierra Leone flag, under which it remained for three months. At the time of the transfer, the *Rui Hong 916* had sought to conceal its identity by painting out the digit "9" of its name on its hull and was not transmitting an automatic identification system signal. It conducted the transfer at night.

37. The Panel traced the ownership of the *Rui Hong 916* following the January 2019 sale of the vessel through the vessel's previous owner, who provided the Panel with documentation. The Panel was able to trace the vessel, which at the time was named *Taiyo Maru No. 2* and which was sold in January 2019 to Toei Shipping Co. Ltd.<sup>85</sup> (hereafter Toei), the Japanese representative of Ruis (HK) Marine Co. Limited<sup>86</sup> (hereafter Ruis). This transaction was conducted through the seller's broker and the buyer's broker. In the documents provided by the vessel's previous owner, Toei is described as representing both the seller<sup>87</sup> and the buyer.<sup>88</sup> Ruis, the buyer, requested the previous owner of the vessel to state that Toei was the previous owner's representative in the memorandum of agreement. According to Toei,<sup>89</sup> following the export of the *Taiyo Maru No. 2*, the vessel was actually in the possession of Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd., which carried out repair and maintenance on the vessel, after which it was sold on to the "end buyer", a Mr. Wang (see annex 9). Investigations continue.

(ii) *Sea Prima and Saebyol*

38. The former Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged *Sea Prima* (IMO No. 8617524) conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the tanker of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea *Saebyol* (IMO No. 8916293) on 25 September 2019, a month after the vessel was recorded as flag unknown.<sup>90</sup> Neither the *Saebyol* nor the *Sea Prima* transmitted automatic identification system signals, including at the time of the ship-to-ship transfer.<sup>91</sup> A Singapore-based company (hereafter management company-SP) is listed as the *Sea Prima*'s ship manager and operator as well as the "care of" address for the vessel's registered owner, a British Virgin Islands registered company.<sup>92</sup> Representatives of management company-SP replied that the vessel had been sold in July 2019 to a company with a registered address in Xiamen (hereafter buyer-SP) and delivered at Kaohsiung port (see annex 10). Thereafter, management company-SP and

<sup>83</sup> The *Rui Hong 916* sailed under the flag of Sierra Leone from March to June 2019 (IHS Markit (accessed on 22 October 2019)).

<sup>84</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 22 October 2019).

<sup>85</sup> In Japanese: 東栄汽船株式会社.

<sup>86</sup> In Chinese: 瑞仕(香港)船務有限公司.

<sup>87</sup> A memorandum of agreement dated 24 October 2018 includes references to Toei Shipping Co. Ltd. acting on behalf of the seller.

<sup>88</sup> A shipping sale contract dated 25 October 2018 includes references to Toei Shipping Co. Ltd. as the buyer on behalf of Ruis (HK) Marine Co. Limited.

<sup>89</sup> Email from Toei dated 5 November 2019.

<sup>90</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 25 November 2019).


<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

its registered owner “ceased to have any further involvement with, interest in, management or control of her”. Investigations continue.<sup>93</sup>

Figure 7 (a)

**Ship-to-ship transfers with tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: (left) Rui Hong 916 and Kum Un San; (right) Sea Prima and Saebyol**



Source: Member States; Map: the Panel.

39. The Panel continues to observe the trend of tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducting illicit transfers with unidentified vessels using subterfuge.

*(iii) Bok Un 1/Myong Ru 1 and an unidentified vessel*

40. The *Bok Un 1*, assessed by a Member State as probably the tanker of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea *Myong Ryu 1* (IMO No. 8532413), conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with an unidentified<sup>94</sup> vessel, the *Hua Shun 168* (华顺 168), on 27 October 2019 in the East China Sea (see figure 7 (b)). Panel investigations separately revealed that the *Hua Shun 168* had conducted ship-to-ship transfers with supplier vessel B,<sup>95</sup> whose owners have provided information to the Panel on these transfers, showing that at least some of the individuals and entities involved were also involved in arranging for the ship-to-ship transfers conducted with the *Yun Hong 8* (see para. 31). The Panel has previously recommended designating the *Myong Ryu 1* (see S/2019/171, para. 50). Investigations continue.

<sup>93</sup> In response to the Panel’s further enquiries, management company-SP’s representatives provided additional information on the transaction process.

<sup>94</sup> Unidentified as the vessel did not have an IMO number.

<sup>95</sup> The transfers were observed on 25, 26 and 28 October 2019. The vessel was chartered by CPC Corporation Limited, with the sub-charterer providing the discharge instructions to the master and the charterers, with further instructions provided by a Mr. Looi, the charterer’s representative on board.

**Figure 7 (b)**  
**Hua Shun 168** photographed on different occasions



Source: Member States, the Panel.

41. Examples of other such transfers are contained in annex 11.

#### **Ship-to-ship transfers between tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

42. The designated vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea *Chon Ma San* (IMO No. 8660313) and *Kum Jin Gang 3* (IMO No. 8791667) were photographed on 23 September 2019 conducting a ship-to-ship transfer (see figure 8), indicating that not all the country's tankers were returning to port to deliver their illicit cargo.

**Figure 8**  
**Case of ship-to-ship transfer between tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**



Source: Member State.

#### **Updates on vessels involved in sanctions evasion activities**

43. The Panel continued its investigations into the Viet Nam-flagged *Viet Tin 01* (IMO No. 8508838), which offloaded refined petroleum at Nampo in late February 2019 (see S/2019/691, paras. 10 to 12), and the designated *Shang Yuan Bao* (IMO No. 8126070), which was involved in identity fraud and ship-to-ship transfers with the *Paek Ma* (IMO No. 9066978) and the *Myong Ryu 1* (IMO No. 8532413), tankers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 18 May and 2 June 2018,

respectively (see [S/2019/171](#), paras. 16 and 17). Updates on the cases are contained in annex 12.

## **Recommendations**

### **To the Committee**

44. The Panel recommends the designation of the following vessels for violation of paragraph 5 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#):

- *Bonvoy 3* (IMO No. 8978784), flag unknown
- *Diamond 8* (IMO No. 9132612), Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Hokong* (IMO No. 9006758), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Sen Lin 01* (IMO No. 8910378), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Subblie* (IMO No. 8126082), formerly Togo-flagged
- *Tianyou* (IMO No. 8817007), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Unica* (IMO No. 8514306), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Viet Tin 01* (IMO No. 8508838), Viet Nam-flagged
- *Vifine* also known as *Tealway FV* (IMO No. 9045962), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Yun Hong 8* (maritime mobile service identity No. 413459380), Chinese-flagged

45. The Panel recommends that the following vessels be designated for conducting ship-to-ship transfers with vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of paragraph 11 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#):

- *Rui Hong 916* (IMO No. 9058866), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Sea Prima* (IMO No. 8617524), formerly Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged

46. The Panel reiterates its recommendations that the following vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be designated for violating paragraph 11 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#):

- *Bok Un 1/Myong Ryu 1* (IMO No. 8532413), Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged
- *Mu Bong 1* (IMO No. 8610461), Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged

### **To Member States, on best practices with regard to the activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

#### *On information sharing*

47. Member States with evidence should share with the relevant Member State authorities a list of vessels suspected of delivering petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in order for those authorities to conduct their own due diligence and deter vessels that facilitate imports of refined petroleum into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

48. Member States should encourage ship owners, operators and charterers to incorporate into their due diligence practices available data from organizations

**that provide data such as ship location, ship registry information and ship flagging information, along with available information from the Committee.**

*On promoting transparency*

49. Member States should require their relevant competent authorities to disclose beneficial ownership information related to all legal entities seeking to register vessels under their ship registry. Member States with open registries should endeavour to collect identifying and contact information for each individual that owns or exerts control over the foreign entity to which each vessel belongs, whether as a controlling shareholder, a financier of the enterprise, or a senior manager or decision-maker.

50. Member States with open registries should endeavour to collect identifying and contact information on vessel owners represented by a resident agent national, should there be no legal entity within the Member State's jurisdiction.

*On leveraging technology in support of effective implementation of maritime sanctions measures*

51. To avoid abuse of automatic identification systems, flag States and the maritime industry should consider technical solutions such as a "soft-lock" system to ensure transmission of valid vessel identification data, using a strictly controlled access code.

52. Flag States and the maritime industry should consider developing and adopting electronic document management systems to enable rapid, on-site checks for authenticity, validity or cancellation (for sanctions reasons), using a mobile phone application or by accessing the flag State website online.

*On promoting best practices in end-user certification*

53. Member States should consider adopting guidance measures for commodity traders, suppliers and brokering companies, measures pursuant to which certificates of ultimate origin and destination are required for commodities being sold, in order to apply "know your customer's customer" due diligence measures.

**Maritime trade in banned commodities from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

54. The continued violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of commodity export bans not only flouts Security Council resolutions but serves to fund a revenue stream that has historically contributed to the country's prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

55. Despite the coal ban imposed pursuant to resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#), the illicit export of coal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea increased in 2019. According to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported 3.7 million tons of coal between January and August 2019, with an estimated value of \$370 million<sup>96</sup> (see figure 9). Between May and August alone, the country was reported to have illegally exported at least 2.7 million tons of coal, an increase in volume of about 191 per cent compared to the first four months of the year, in which 928,000 tons were exported. According to the Member State, most coal exports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an estimated 2.8 million tons, were


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<sup>96</sup> The Member State supplying the information has estimated the value of coal based on a calculation of \$100 per ton.

conducted via ship-to-ship transfers from Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels to Chinese local barges.<sup>97</sup>

Figure 9

**Illicit coal exports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea between January and August 2019**



Source: Member State.

56. The Panel's research into satellite imagery<sup>98</sup> of coal ports at Nampo and Songnim, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in November and December 2019 shows that coal vessels, including those of larger dimensions, continue to call at the coal terminal, indicating ongoing trade in coal exports (see annex 13).

### Sanctions evasion methods

#### *New developments*

57. The Panel identified new methods of sanctions evasion, including: the export of banned commodities transported on self-propelled barges over 100 metres in length undertaking ocean-going voyages; the use of larger foreign-flagged bulk carriers to deliver coal from Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged vessels as opposed to the transfer of coal to smaller, lighter vessels for delivery; and the suspected acquisition by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of a bulk carrier, destined for scrap, to illicitly export coal. In addition, vessels associated with the transhipment of banned commodities originating in the country have called at more ports along the Chinese coast, as reported by a Member State.

<sup>97</sup> A couple of experts are of the view that this information can be further corroborated.

<sup>98</sup> Cargo vessels were counted when satellite imagery was available through Planet Labs and when visibility was sufficiently clear. Calculation was based on a very conservative estimate.

### *Voyage irregularities*

58. The Panel also continues to observe previously documented patterns of evasion, including indirect routing, detours, loitering and the use of false documentation when transporting commodities originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These tactics serve to obfuscate actual routes, conceal port calls and give the impression that the banned commodities were loaded in ports outside the country. The use of such tactics highlights the need for greater application of due diligence measures in confirming port call destinations as well as verification of relevant documentation related to commodity origins. The case of the *Rui Jin* (IMO No. 8919104) (see paras. 86 to 89) highlights how such tactics were employed and how its flag registry at the time, the Palau International Shipping Registry, took steps to track the vessel and determine its engagement in sanctionable activity.

### **Deliveries of banned commodities on self-propelled barges**

59. The Panel notes a new development in the illicit export of commodities from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, namely, the use of self-propelled barges to transport millions of tons of banned commodities from the country.

60. According to a Member State, the dimensions and configuration of the barges fit a specific type of vessel known as a self-propelled, ocean-going barge.<sup>99</sup> These self-propelled barges can be identified by the low profile of their superstructure compared to that of a typical bulk carrier, and the lack of covers on the holds (see figure 10). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not known to possess such barges as part of its fleet. The Panel notes that these barges have maritime mobile service identity numbers but no IMO numbers.<sup>100</sup>

**Figure 10**  
**Self-propelled barges carrying coal**



Source: Member State.

61. A Member State reported that, since May 2019, self-propelled barges<sup>101</sup> of Chinese origin have been engaged in loading coal from Nampo and Taean, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These barges directly delivered to three ports in Hangzhou Bay, China. From May to August 2019, at least 540,000 tons of coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was delivered in 47 shipments. At least 37 different barges of Chinese origin were involved in exporting

<sup>99</sup> The IMO Assembly recommends, in its resolution A.1117(30), the latest resolution adopted on the IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme, that ships, inter alia those of 100 gross tonnage and above, register an IMO number on a voluntary basis as a means to enhance maritime safety and pollution prevention and to facilitate the prevention of maritime fraud.

<sup>100</sup> The IMO number of a vessel is unique and never assigned to another vessel. The maritime mobile service identity number is an assigned number provided by the vessel's country of registration or flag Administration.

<sup>101</sup> The Member State has assessed that these barges are almost certainly Chinese-owned and operated.

coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from May to September 2019. The Member State has assessed that many of the barges that voyaged to the Yangtze River, China, delivered their cargo to facilities along the river.<sup>102</sup>

### **Coal shipments on self-propelled barges**

62. The following are examples of coal deliveries from June to November 2019:<sup>103</sup>

*Xin Da Hai delivering coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, June to August 2019*

63. The *Xin Da Hai* (maritime mobile service identity No. 413690886) loaded coal at Nampo on 18 July 2019, voyaged along the Yangtze River on 29 July 2019 and berthed at a coal pier along the river after offloading the coal (see figure 11 (a)). The Panel notes that, prior to its July 2019 voyage, the barge had also sailed to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in June 2019 along a similar route (see figure 11 (b)), indicating that at least one repeated delivery voyage was made. No automatic identification system transmission was received from the *Xin Da Hai* from 1 July 2019.<sup>104</sup>

Figure 11 (a)

***Xin Da Hai's voyage carrying coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, July to August 2019***



Source: Member State; Map: the Panel.

Figure 11 (b)

***Xin Da Hai's voyage to Nampo, June 2019***



Source: Windward.

<sup>102</sup> A couple of experts are of the view that the information in this paragraph can be further corroborated.

<sup>103</sup> Member State information received in November 2019.

<sup>104</sup> Windward (accessed on 17 November 2019).

*Snapshot of unidentified barges delivering coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, July to October 2019<sup>105</sup>*

64. On the day barge A loaded coal at Taean, 19 July 2019, barge B, also loaded with coal, was observed outside Nampo lock gate. Barges A and B then undertook ocean-going voyages to the Yangtze River and anchored there with their cargo of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 3 August 2019. On 1 September 2019, barge C loaded coal at Nampo. It was subsequently observed with another unidentified barge, barge D, on 9 September 2019, transiting Nampo lock gate carrying coal. Barges C and D offloaded their coal via ship-to-ship transfer on the Yangtze River on 20 September 2019. Barge E loaded coal at Taean on 3 October 2019, followed a similar route and offloaded coal on 9 October 2019. Figure 12 shows the cases described in paragraphs 62 to 64; such exports of coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea occur on a monthly basis.

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
<sup>105</sup> Designators A, B, C, D and E are used for the unidentified barges.

**Figure 12**  
**Voyages of self-propelled barges carrying coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, July to October 2019**

### Barges A and B



### Barges C and D



### Barge E



Source: Member State; Map: the Panel.


*Barge alpha directly delivering coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October to November 2019<sup>106</sup>*

65. Barge alpha, with empty cargo holds, undertook an ocean-going voyage to the Taedong lock gate on 22 October 2019 and was observed outbound with coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea visible in its cargo holds a

<sup>106</sup> Alpha is the designator for the unidentified barge.

week later at a position near Nampo. Close-up photographs of the barge show its voyage, identity and cargo (see figure 13).

**Figure 13  
Barge alpha's voyage route carrying coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October to November 2019**




Source: Member State; Map: the Panel.

*Barge bravo directly delivering coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 2019<sup>107</sup>*

66. Barge bravo was observed loaded with coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at Taean on 1 November 2019. On 4 November 2019, bravo undertook an ocean-going voyage through the Yellow Sea and was observed en route a day later along the Yangtze River (see figure 14).

<sup>107</sup> Bravo is the designator for the unidentified barge.

**Figure 14  
Barge bravo's voyage route carrying coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 2019**



Source: Member State; Map: the Panel.

**Additional locations of ship-to-ship transfers of coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

67. Ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Tonkin (see S/2019/691, para. 20) have decreased substantially in favour of increased deliveries to the Ningbo-Zhoushan and Lianyungang port areas in China. The increase reinforces the need for port and customs authorities to heighten scrutiny of vessels and their shipping documentation, and to impound any vessel suspected of transporting prohibited items.

68. The use by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of these locations, which are closer to its own ports than the Gulf of Tonkin, likely decreases the turnaround time for coal deliveries. This has the advantage for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of making deliveries more cost-effective, and likely contributes to reducing the country's vessels' exposure to scrutiny. The increase in the number of such activities around the affected port areas heightens the need for due diligence and countermeasures by the relevant authorities regarding prohibited cargoes exported from ports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

*(i) Continued ship-to-ship transfers with vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea near Ningbo-Zhoushan*

69. Vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued ship-to-ship activities in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area, in which, according to a Member State, multiple vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were observed at a given point in time. Figure 15 shows many vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at anchor near the Ningbo-Zhoushan area on 10 October 2019.

**Figure 15**  
**Vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea near Ningbo-Zhoushan**




Source: Member State.

(ii) *Ship-to-ship transfers with vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea near Lianyungang*


70. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is also using the Lianyungang anchorage area to conduct ship-to-ship coal transfers. The number of vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea anchored near Lianyungang (see figure 16 (a)) is indicative of the number of ship-to-ship coal transfers at a given point. Figure 16 (b) also shows how floating cranes are used to support these illicit ship-to-ship coal transfers.

**Figure 16 (a)**  
**Vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea near Lianyungang**



Source: Member State.

**Figure 16 (b)**  
**Use of floating cranes**



Source: Member State.

**(iii) Ship-to-Ship transfer with vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Gulf of Tonkin**

71. The Panel is investigating a Viet Nam-flagged vessel, the *Phuong Linh 269* (maritime mobile service identity No. 574005969), suspected of delivering coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Qisha port, China, on multiple occasions. The vessel was operating from September 2018 to February 2019 without a valid IMO number and without transmitting an automatic identification system signal.<sup>108</sup> Investigations continue into the case (see annex 14).

**Use of larger bulk carriers**

72. A new development of concern is the transfer of coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from vessels sailing under that country's flag to larger foreign-flagged bulk carriers for delivery, rather than to smaller, lighter vessels as observed in the Panel's previous report. The utilization of larger vessels,

<sup>108</sup> Windward. The *Phuong Linh 269* transmitted an invalid IMO number, 123456789.

with a carrying capacity two or three times that of the vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, suggests that much larger quantities of illicit coal can be trans-shipped on each voyage. According to information from a Member State, coal was transferred from vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and offloaded at Caofidian, China, in September 2019 (see annex 15).

### Vessel intended for scrap purchased to export illicit coal

*Fu Xing 12 (IMO No. 8605727; maritime mobile service identity No. 413621000)*

73. The Panel is investigating a case of sanctions evasion in the purchase of a bulk carrier, the *Fu Xing 12*, that was intended for scrap but was used to export coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A Member State has assessed the vessel as having been acquired by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the intention of engaging in illicit commercial activities. The vessel is currently listed in a specialized maritime database<sup>109</sup> as a vessel of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, *Su Ri Bong*. The case is significant on several counts: the identifier manipulation and multiple identity changes throughout the vessel's voyages; the purchase of a vessel that had been destined for scrap but that was transferred into active service to transport coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and the vessel's suspected transition into a vessel of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is one of several cases that the Panel has identified of vessels being acquired by new owners before transporting sanctioned cargo directly from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

#### *Manipulation of vessel identifiers*

74. The *Fu Xing 12* was advertised in Chinese commercial ship registry databases to be sold in June 2019 through Ningbo Shipping Co. Ltd., and was bought at a disproportionate price. Although the vessel was recorded on a maritime database as being broken up,<sup>110</sup> it continued to operate and adopted a chameleon persona following its sale. After being dry-docked at a shipyard near Ningbo in July 2019, the vessel set sail on or around 14 August as the Sierra Leone-flagged *Pu Zhou*, headed for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see figure 17).

**Figure 17**  
***Fu Xing 12 berthed at a shipyard near Ningbo/Fu Xing 12 at Nampo in October 2019***



Source: Member State; Map: the Panel.


<sup>109</sup> Windward.

<sup>110</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 12 November 2019).

75. According to a specialized maritime database, the vessel alternated its identity from August to November 2019, changing its call sign, maritime mobile service identity number and name on multiple occasions. During this period, the vessel was recorded as having sailed into Sinchang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It then emerged from Nampo on 9 November 2019, laden with coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and identifying as the Chinese-flagged *Hua Hai*, but using a previously recorded maritime mobile service identity number, 413621000, belonging to the *Su Tong Hai*. It sailed back to Ningbo to deliver the coal using this identity on 13 November 2019. In all, the vessel manipulated its identifiers when it sailed from Ningbo to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and back to Ningbo by employing two automatic identification systems on board, using four different ship names – *Fu Xing 12*, *Puzhou*, *Su Ri Bong*, *Hua Hai/Su Tong Hai*<sup>111</sup> – and sailing under three flags (those of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Sierra Leone)<sup>112</sup> (see figure 18 (a) and (b)). The Panel has requested information and is awaiting a response from the flag registry of Sierra Leone, under whose flag the vessel reportedly sailed. The British Virgin Islands authority confirmed that Honour Sail Ltd. (which is listed as the vessel's owner, operator and manager on a maritime database)<sup>113</sup> was incorporated in April 2019. Investigations continue.

76. Although the *Fu Xing 12*'s status was recorded as "broken up" on a maritime database,<sup>114</sup> the fact that the vessel remains in active service suggests exploitation of its recorded inactive status for sanctions evasion.

Figure 18 (a)  
***Fu Xing 12*'s identity manipulation**



Source: Windward.


<sup>111</sup> Hereafter, the Panel's references to the *Fu Xing 12* refer interchangeably to all the various identities the vessel has employed since June 2019.

<sup>112</sup> Member State information.

<sup>113</sup> IHS Markit (accessed on 12 November 2019).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. The Panel notes that IHS Markit has updated the vessel's status, which no longer reflects the vessel's being broken up (IHS Markit (accessed on 29 January 2020)).

**Figure 18 (b)**  
**Fu Xing 12's voyage to load coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**



Source: Member State.

Source: Windward/Planet Labs.

#### *Illicit vessel acquisition*

77. Under Security Council resolutions, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is prohibited from procuring new or used vessels.<sup>115</sup> In an announcement of the *Fu Xing 12*'s public auction, it is recorded that the vessel was sold for 17 million yuan (\$2,474,167) in June 2019.<sup>116</sup> The advertised book price of the vessel was 5.5 million yuan (\$800,466). The Panel has received information regarding a company based in Taiwan Province of China that may have been affiliated with the vessel's new owners or operators following the sale. Investigations continue. China responded that it is coordinating relevant authorities to investigate the cases.

#### **Other shipments of coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

##### *Investigations into the supply chain networks*

78. The Panel continues its investigations into new as well as previously reported cases of trans-shipment of coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including coal transported on board the *DN5505*, the *Dong Thanh* and vessels that were issued a national port ban by a Member State for this activity. The following text and figures detail each type of evasion and sanctions violation.

##### *(i) Coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the DN5505*

79. The Panel inspected a former Togo-flagged vessel, the *DN5505* (IMO No. 8630708) (see figure 19),<sup>117</sup> which entered the port of Pohang, Republic of Korea, on 4 February 2019, allegedly from Nakhodka, Russian Federation, and was subsequently detained by the authorities of the Republic of Korea in line with paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).<sup>118</sup> The Russian Federation confirmed that there were no records of the vessel entering Russian ports during the periods of interest for the investigation of the coal shipment. Investigations continue into the voyages made

<sup>115</sup> Resolution 2397 (2017), para. 14, and resolution 2321 (2016), para. 30.

<sup>116</sup> According to the announcement, the vessel was sold to a Ms. Liu of Zhoushan.

<sup>117</sup> Listed as flag unknown in July 2019 (IHS Markit (accessed on 7 November 2019)).

<sup>118</sup> During the inspection, the Panel found that the vessel had remained in operational use in coal transportation and had continued navigation in October 2018.

by the vessel in October 2018 and in February 2019, when coal suspected of originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was exported.

Figure 19  
***DN5505***



Left: the *DN5505*; middle: traces of coal on the deck; right: the cargo hold.

Source: the Panel.

(ii) *Coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Wise Honest*

80. The Panel continues its investigations into the supply chain of the coal that originated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was carried on board the *Wise Honest* (IMO No. 8905490) and was trans-shipped by the Viet Nam-flagged *Dong Thanh* (IMO No. 9180035) (see [S/2019/691](#), paras. 24 to 29). A total of three certificates of origin were provided for the coal shipment to the *Dong Thanh* (see *ibid.*, annex 9). Indonesia has confirmed to the Panel that a certificate of origin in which the coal is labelled as “Indonesian coal”, and which was issued to the buyers that facilitated the trans-shipment, is not authentic (see annex 16). The Panel continues to investigate the financial transactions related to the illicit coal shipment.

81. The Panel had tracked the coal on board the *Dong Thanh* and had been in touch with the vessel's time charterer following the vessel's inability to enter port with its cargo. Viet Nam informed the Panel that Vietnamese agencies had inspected the vessel and conducted investigations to establish the origin of the cargo and determine its outcome. The vessel and its full amount of cargo have been placed in custody pending a final decision in line with the relevant applicable Vietnamese laws.

(iii) *Investigations of illicit coal in third countries*

82. In October 2019, four individuals and five companies were found guilty, by the District Court of Daegu, Republic of Korea, of involvement in prohibited coal exports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through Kholmsk, Russian Federation, in 2017 (see [S/2019/171](#), para. 37). In addition, the District Prosecutor's Office of Busan, Republic of Korea, is investigating six individuals and five companies suspected of having engaged in similar activities between December 2017 and June 2018. The Republic of Korea shared the list of vessels it has placed under port entry ban due to their confirmed involvement in activities prohibited by relevant resolutions (see table 1).

**Table 1**  
**National port entry bans applied by the Republic of Korea since August 2018**

<i>Vessel name</i>	<i>IMO number</i>	<i>Flag State</i>	<i>Date of the national port entry ban</i>
<i>Hammer</i> (formerly <i>Sky Angel</i> )	9168441	Vanuatu (formerly Panama)	11 August 2018
<i>Chen Yang</i> (formerly <i>Rich Glory</i> )	8649905	Sierra Leone	11 August 2018
<i>Ga Hong</i> (formerly <i>Shinning Rich</i> )	9596923	Togo (formerly Belize)	11 August 2018
<i>Jin Long</i>	8730986	Belize	11 August 2018
<i>Yu Yuan<sup>a</sup></i>	9358694	Togo	18 August 2018
<i>An Quan Zhou 66</i>	8742240	Unknown (formerly Panama)	28 December 2018
<i>Tai Xin</i>	9088598	Unknown (formerly Togo)	28 December 2018
<i>Xin Yang 688</i>	8657809	China (formerly Belize)	28 December 2018
<i>Lucky Star</i>	9015278	Unknown (formerly Togo)	28 December 2018
<i>East River</i>	9109952	Panama	28 February 2019

*Source:* Member State, the Panel.

<sup>a</sup> Recorded on IHS Markit as broken up.

#### **Export of sand originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

83. In December 2017, the Security Council, in its resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), banned the export of earth and stone (Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System code 25), of which sand is a constituent; sand exports are therefore subject to the resolution. Chapter 25 of the Harmonized System includes the following: “25.05: Natural sands of all kinds, whether or not coloured, other than metal-bearing sands of Chapter 26.”<sup>119</sup> According to a Member State, a substantial sand-export operation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to China has been carried out since May 2019, with over 100 illicit shipments of sand originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Chinese-flagged and other foreign-flagged vessels were reported to have been loading sand in or near Haeju, Hwanghae Province, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and in the Sinchang Workers' District, Pukchong County, South Hamgyong Province, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. According to the Member State, these shipments involved at least one million tons of sand and were worth at least \$22 million.<sup>120,121</sup> The sand originating in the Democratic People's

<sup>119</sup> See World Customs Organization, “Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement”, in *Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System*, 2017 ed.

<sup>120</sup> The Member State supplying the information has calculated the value of the sand on the basis of an estimated price of \$22 per ton.

<sup>121</sup> A couple of experts are of the view that this information can be further corroborated.

Republic of Korea, obtained from river dredging, has been shipped to Chinese ports.<sup>122</sup>

*Sand obtained from Haeju, Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

84. According to a Member State, in May 2019, more than 92 self-propelled barges, likely Chinese-flagged, loaded sand from offshore dredgers in the Haeju port area before sailing to Chinese ports.<sup>123,124</sup> The Panel's tracking of the coordinates and voyage route of the barges on a commercial satellite platform (see figure 20) corroborates the information provided. The number of vessels that have undertaken the voyage route as well as the amount of sand exported from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is indicative of the coordinated and organized nature of the shipments undertaken.


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<sup>122</sup> A couple of experts are of the view that this information can be further corroborated.

<sup>123</sup> The Panel has submitted a list of self-propelled barges with identifiers (name and maritime mobile service identity number) and the number of voyages that were likely involved in the export of illicit sand from Haeju, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to China from April to June 2019, and has sought assistance in the investigations.

<sup>124</sup> A couple of experts are of the view that this information can be further corroborated.

**Figure 20**  
**Self-propelled barges carrying sand originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 12 May 2019**



Source: (top) Member State, (bottom left and right) Planet; Map: the Panel.

\* Main barge cluster [N 37.84°, E 125.71°; N 37.84°, E 125.72°; N 37.85°, E 125.72°; N 37.85°, E 125.73°].

85. China responded that it attached great importance to the clues provided by the Panel in relation to the smuggling of sand originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Chinese side, however, could not trace the related vessels' voyage and was unable to confirm that the sand had been transported to Chinese ports.

*Sand obtained from Sinchang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

86. The Panel investigated the *Rui Jin* (IMO No. 8919104), suspected of having delivered sand from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Ningbo on multiple occasions while sailing under the flag of Palau.<sup>125</sup> Following its most recent undeclared voyage to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in mid-November 2019, the vessel, on its return, was detained in the Ningbo area on 3 December 2019 under a notice issued by the Palau International Shipping Registry. The *Rui Jin* remained at anchor outside Ningbo port as at 12 January 2020, pending flag State inspection.<sup>126</sup>

87. Optimum Peace Limited,<sup>127</sup> the registered owner of the *Rui Jin*, acquired the vessel on 19 June 2019, with Basement Shipping Co. Ltd.<sup>128</sup> as ship manager and operator. Since then, the *Rui Jin* has undertaken a series of voyages with a common pattern. After departing from port in China, the vessel's automatic identification system has on each voyage ceased transmission for a considerable period. Satellite imagery during one of these periods indicates that the vessel travelled to Sinchang to load river sand. Once back in international waters, automatic identification system transmission resumed and the vessel voyaged to China to offload its cargo.<sup>129</sup> Optimum Peace Limited<sup>130</sup> and Basement Shipping Co. Limited<sup>131</sup> have yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries. Investigations continue.

88. On 25 November 2019, the Palau International Shipping Registry attempted to locate the *Rui Jin* following a lack of transmission since 18 November 2019 by the vessel's automatic identification system and long-range tracking and identification system. The Registry contacted the port authority of Vladivostok, Russian Federation, the vessel's last reported destination, and the authority indicated that the vessel was not there. At the same time, the Registry contacted the owners and managers of the *Rui Jin*, requesting that they provide the vessel's location; they, in turn, claimed that the vessel was anchored in Vladivostok and that both its automatic identification system and its long-range tracking and identification system were out of order. This information concerning location was disproved by the Vladivostok port authority (see annex 17). On 2 December 2019, the Registry sent a prohibition of sailing notice to the Port State Control Committee of the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region, an intergovernmental cooperative organization. On 3 December 2019, the Registry determined that the *Rui Jin* was at Ningbo, issued a flag State detention notice and revoked the vessel's registration certificates on an interim basis (see figure 21). On 18 December 2019, the Registry

<sup>125</sup> A Member State informed the Panel that the *Rui Jin* was suspected of offloading, in China, sand originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in June, July and October 2019. The Panel was provided with images of the voyage routes and of the loading and offloading of sand for the vessel's October delivery.

<sup>126</sup> Information provided by the flag State.

<sup>127</sup> Optimum Peace Ltd., 5/F, Dah Sing Life Building, 99-105 Des Voeux Road, Central, Hong Kong, China.

<sup>128</sup> Basement Shipping Co. Ltd., Room 1302, 13/F Cheong K Building, 84-86 Des Voeux Road, Central, Hong Kong, China, incorporated on 2 January 2019 (Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System).

<sup>129</sup> The Member State providing this information has estimated that one shipment of illicit sand from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is worth approximately \$595,503.


<sup>130</sup> In Chinese: 行瑞有限公司.

<sup>131</sup> In Chinese: 務實船務有限公司.

informed the owners and managers of the *Rui Jin* that it needed to perform a safety inspection in the light of the report that the vessel's automatic identification system and long-range tracking and identification system had been malfunctioning, and to ensure that the vessel had not been involved in any unlawful activity. The Registry requested the Ningbo port authority to allow the vessel into port so that the inspection could be performed.<sup>132</sup>

89. Palau provided the Panel with updated information indicating that, on 21 January 2020, the Palau International Shipping Registry had held a hearing to address the *Rui Jin*'s purported sanctions violations and, based on evidence collected and a lack of communication from or appearance in court by the vessel's owners, had deregistered the vessel in accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 2397 (2017), effective immediately. The vessel's new registered owner, Xiang Rui Shipping Co. Ltd.,<sup>133</sup> under the name MIR (see annex 18), had attempted to register the *Rui Jin* under the flag of Sierra Leone. Following information received from the Registry on the vessel's deregistration, Sierra Leone confirmed that the vessel was no longer registered under its flag.

**Figure 21**  
**Imagery of *Rui Jin* at Sinchang and Ningbo**



Source: Member State; Map: the Panel.

### Fishing rights transfer

90. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has continued to transfer fishing rights in violation of sanctions during the reporting period.<sup>134</sup> A Member State has estimated that the revenue earned by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from this activity was \$120 million in 2018. Two other Member States provided the Panel with information including images of Chinese fishing vessels displaying fishing permit number plates of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or with documents<sup>135</sup> or interim certificates of registry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see figure 22), observed in mid-2019.<sup>136</sup>

<sup>132</sup> Letter of 18 December 2019, copied to the Panel, from the Palau International Ship Registry to the Minister of Public Infrastructure, Industries and Commerce of Palau.

<sup>133</sup> In Chinese: 祥瑞船舶運輸有限公司.

<sup>134</sup> See S/2019/171, paras. 47 to 49, and S/2019/691, paras. 30 and 31.

<sup>135</sup> Valid from May to December 2019.

<sup>136</sup> The fishing vessels interviewed and relevant companies, as stated in interviews, include 福南漁59798, 海洋9号, 魯文遠漁138, 齊遠漁51006, 人豪漁業公司, 三亞威龍水產有限公司, 舟山漁業公司 and 海分水產有限公司.

Figure 22

**Fishing vessels displaying fishing permit number plates (top), a fishing permit document (bottom left) and an interim certificate of registry (bottom right), photographed on one vessel**



Source: Member States.

91. A Member State reported that, when interviewed, a crew member indicated that the price of a fishing permit for three months was approximately 400,000 yuan (approximately \$57,594).<sup>137</sup> Analysing reports and images from Member States, the Panel notes attempts by the vessels concerned to avoid neighbouring countries' patrols by methods such as painting over the name of the ship and replacing it with another name, and receiving fishing licences in the fishing zone of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Member State reported that the crews of multiple vessels claimed to have informed their authorities that they were sailing to the fishing zone of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In response to the Panel's enquiry, China replied that, among the vessels on which the Panel had reported, several ships had carried incomplete numbers, as a Chinese ship is required to have a five-digit number in addition to the name. Nevertheless, it conducted research on ships, including possibly the ships reported by the Panel. It pointed out that some ships were operating solely in coastal areas of China and several other ships were not registered in the fishing vessel registration system. Furthermore, as an evasion tactic,

<sup>137</sup> Exchange rate as at 7 January 2020.

vessels that engage in prohibited activities use fake or counterfeit identity. Therefore, it is very difficult to verify the information provided by the Panel.

### **Recommendations**

92. **The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the *Rui Jin* (IMO No. 8919104) for violation of paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017).**

93. **To assist the efforts of Member States, the Panel reiterates its previous recommendation that a regional cooperative mechanism be established to share information on whether vessels actually docked at and loaded coal from the ports specified in their documents of cargo origin. Member States should establish a point of contact for that purpose.**

94. **The Panel recommends that Member States take all necessary measures, including the enactment of legislation mandating appropriate action against all vessels found to have violated sanctions.**

95. **The Panel recommends that Member States share with other Member States, the Committee and the Panel the list of vessels confirmed as involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by relevant resolutions.**

### **Trade statistics of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

96. Publicly available trade statistics do not reflect the totality of the external trade of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or necessarily give an accurate indication of year-to-year increases or decreases. The Panel continues to analyse exports and imports that are conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and violate relevant Security Council resolutions; in doing so, the Panel uses published trade statistics based on Member States' customs data, as reported to the Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) or obtained through commercial global trade databases such as Global Trade Atlas.<sup>138</sup> As a general trend, the recorded exports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dropped significantly in 2018, as four new resolutions adopted in 2017 came fully into force.

**Table 2  
Trade of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2016–2018**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>2016</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>
Export	2 903 099	1 958 104	330 662
Import	3 137 119	3 431 936	2 321 818
<b>Trade balance</b>	<b>(234 020)</b>	<b>(1 473 832)</b>	<b>(1 991 156)</b>

*Source:* ITC Trade Map, accessed on 14 December 2019.

97. Where available statistics indicate trade in prohibited items, the Panel wrote to Member States for additional information and verification. The detailed results of the Panel's enquiries are set out in annex 19. The data implies that, between April 2018 and September 2019, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea likely earned tens of millions of dollars through illegal exports, not including the much larger volume

<sup>138</sup> For the full list of items under sectoral ban, see annex 4 of S/2018/171 (partially amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1). This analysis does not include any exports and imports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of banned items that were undetected or unreported by Member States or in global databases or the Committee, or erroneously reported as trade with third countries other than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

of undeclared trade. The Panel's investigation and information from Member States show that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to illicitly export commodities such as coal, which does not appear in the international trade database (see paras. 54 to 56 and 78 to 82). Such exports could explain how the increase in the trade deficit in recent years has been partially offset.

*Pyongyang International Trade Fair and activities of designated entities*

98. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to host its biannual Pyongyang International Trade Fair. After the Panel's recommendation that the Korea International Exhibition Corporation, the long-standing organizer of the event and an entity affiliated with the Ministry of External Economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,<sup>139</sup> be designated, a new organization named the Korea External Economic Relations Association has reportedly emerged as the new host since 2018, while the Corporation has continued its involvement. The number of exhibitors increased from just over 200 in May 2018 to over 401 in May 2019. A total of 360 companies participated in the trade fair in September 2019.<sup>140</sup>

99. The Panel notes that designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have continued to participate in the Pyongyang International Trade Fair, affording themselves the opportunity to interact with both foreign and domestic exhibitors. Based on information from Member States,<sup>141</sup> the Panel assesses the following designated entities as having continued to participate in all or some of the four Pyongyang International Trade Fairs held between May 2018 and September 2019: Kangbong Trading Corporation (KPe.043), Pugang Trading Corporation (alias of KPe.038) and Kuryonggang Trading Corporation (alias of KPe.008). Other entities, such as Mirae Trading Co., Peace Motors Corporation and Sinhung IT Trading Co., which were reported to the Panel as companies subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department, have also participated in the trade fairs since at least May 2019.<sup>142</sup>

100. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea held the International High-Tech Product Trade Fair from 2 to 6 September 2019. The Panel investigated two companies, which displayed, respectively, a three-dimensional printer<sup>143</sup> (Harmonized System code 84) and a drone (Harmonized System code 85). In response to the Panel's enquiry, Weistek, the manufacturer of the printer, replied that, as it had numerous "agents and dealers", it could not verify how the product had been brought into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Guangdong Fexda, the manufacturer of the drone.

101. While participation in a trade fair in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not in itself a violation of Security Council sanctions unless it involves the trans-border movement of prohibited items, financial transfers, or the involvement of designated individuals or entities, the Panel cautions that trade fairs may be used to expand networks for procurement related to weapons of mass destruction. The Panel

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<sup>139</sup> The Panel recommended the Korea International Exhibition Corporation for designation in 2017, given its role in assisting designated entities in the evasion of sanctions through the Pyongyang International Trade Fair and in providing a platform to transfer, sell or supply prohibited items to or from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see S/2017/150, para. 204).

<sup>140</sup> Figures assembled from NK Pro and Korean Central News Agency articles between May 2018 and September 2019.

<sup>141</sup> See annex 30 for an updated list of trading corporations subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028) and their aliases.

<sup>142</sup> The names of the trading corporations in Korean match the Member States' information.

<sup>143</sup> Three-dimensional printing, also known as additive manufacturing, has applications related to weapons of mass destruction.

observed advertisements for graphite products<sup>144</sup> by two companies at a trade fair held in 2019 in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel has yet to receive replies to its enquiries.

### **III. Embargoes, designated individuals and entities, and overseas workers**

#### **China**

102. The Panel investigated several advertisements and exhibitions of artwork of the Mansudae Art Studio (hereafter Mansudae), a designated entity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Jinzhao Art Museum<sup>145</sup> has been advertising Mansudae artists and their artworks on its website (see annex 20). The Panel has not received a reply from the museum. In December 2019, an art gallery, Tsi Ya Chai,<sup>146</sup> held an exhibition of Mansudae artworks in Hong Kong (see annex 21). The art gallery replied to the Panel that “we did not purchase any paintings from the private collector or Mansudae Art Studio; and there was no transaction involved. All of the paintings will be returned to the private collector after the exhibition. We do not have any contact with any person from Mansudae Art Studio or North Korea. The exhibition agreement was signed with a PRC corporation, (Chinese name: 西安榮皇傳媒有限公司) owned by the private collector, Mr Jin Songhu.”

103. The Panel noted a media report, broadcast in November 2018, that showed that an exhibition hall selling Mansudae artwork continued operating within the 798 Art District, Beijing, under the name Mansudae Art Museum (朝鮮萬壽臺創作社美術館), and that Ji Zhengtai, “owner of the Mansudae Art Gallery”, was earning income from the sale of artworks acquired from the Mansudae Art Studio (see annex 21). China had previously reported that this museum had been closed in January 2018 (see S/2018/171, para. 89). In response to the Panel’s latest enquiry, China replied that “Beijing Yuan Mansudae is the parent company of Mansudae Art Museum, and used to be a joint venture between China and the DPRK. It has been converted to a solely China-owned company in early 2018 in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions and has ceased its business cooperation with the DPRK side. ... As Mansudae Art Museum had been running for over 10 years and enjoyed prestige in China, it has not changed its signage in order to keep its features and maintain business” (see annex 22).

#### **Democratic Republic of the Congo**

104. The Panel continued its investigation into the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the provision of military training and arms sales by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Presidential Guard of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

<sup>144</sup> Not all graphite products are subject to sanctions. Nuclear-grade graphite, however, is itemized in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Part 1 Guidelines (as amended in International Atomic Energy Agency document INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1). Pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013), the items contained in that document are subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006), as are the ballistic-missile-related items in the report of the Committee prepared in accordance with paragraph 21 of resolution 2094 (2013) and presidential statement S/PRST/2012/13 (see S/2014/253, annex). Consequently, the supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of nuclear-grade graphite is prohibited, as is the supply, sale or transfer to the country of fine-grain graphites that could be used for rocket nozzles and re-entry vehicle nose tips. Paragraph 27 of resolution 2270 (2016) may also be applicable.

<sup>145</sup> Address: Building A, 128-5, Binjiang Middle Road, Dandong City, Liaoning Province, China.

<sup>146</sup> Address: Cosco building, room 4614, 183 Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong, China.

(see [S/2019/171](#), para. 68). The Panel wrote to Fouad Dakhallah, who is suspected of violating Security Council resolutions by engaging with nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who were either working on behalf of entities designated by the Security Council or had been previously reported as being involved in prohibited arms-related activities in Africa and the Middle East (see [S/2019/171](#), para. 67). The Panel has requested information from the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the above cases.

### **Eritrea**

105. The Panel continued its investigation into arms-related cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Eritrea. Eritech Computer Assembly & Communication Technology PLC (also known as Eritech or Etech), “operated by the Eritrean Defence Forces” and co-located with “Asha Golgol Military Technical Centre”, was identified as a recipient of arms and related materiel from Glocom, a company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea supplying military communications equipment (see [S/2018/171](#), para. 91, and [S/2019/171](#), para. 70). The Panel also continued to investigate Kim Kwang Rim, a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea whom the Panel had previously reported to be the representative of the Green Pine Associated Corporation in Eritrea. Eritrea has not provided substantive information in its responses to the Panel’s repeated enquiries (see annex 23).

### **Islamic Republic of Iran**

106. The Panel continued its investigation of representative offices of designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Islamic Republic of Iran, namely, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and the Saeng Pil Trading Corporation (see [S/2019/691](#), para. 34). A Member State informed the Panel that two KOMID-related individuals, Ha Won Mo and Kim Hak Chol, were currently in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex 24). In addition, the Member State noted that, since 2015, KOMID had adopted the new name “221 General Bureau”, which had replaced its previous name, “Mining Development Guidance Bureau”, used since the mid-2000s.

107. In response to the Panel’s enquiry, the Islamic Republic of Iran replied that “there are no nationals of the DPRK registered to be residing in Iran other than their diplomats” and that “KOMID and Saeng Pil do not have offices or representatives in Iran.” The Islamic Republic of Iran further stated that it had “carefully looked into the matter” but had “not hitherto observed any illicit activity. The activities of the DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran” had been “in conformity with Iran’s national regulations as well as the international obligations of the DPRK” (see annex 25).

108. The Member State additionally informed the Panel on the ongoing gold and cash smuggling (see [S/2019/171](#), para. 72), by officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who are based in the Islamic Republic of Iran, between Dubai airport and Tehran airport “through diplomatic channels” since at least 2009. The Member State assesses two nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pak Sin Hyok and Ri Kuk Myong, both in the Economic and Commercial Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Tehran, as being current participants in this smuggling. The Member State further informed the Panel of multiple nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including a former diplomat, who were or had also been involved (see annex 26). The same Member State identified three Iranian citizens in the United Arab Emirates who were suspected of involvement in this smuggling. The Panel has not received a reply from these three individuals.

109. In response to the Panel's enquiry, the Islamic Republic of Iran replied that "the letter does not elaborate on the links of the alleged actions ... with DPRK-related sanctions. ... Your letter does not provide enough information and evidence for Iranian authorities to initiate an investigation and establish the necessary facts" (see annex 25).

### **Myanmar**

110. The Panel repeated its earlier request for documentation and other information concerning matters involving military cooperation between Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including ballistic missile cooperation since October 2006, as well as evidence of the return of technicians from Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to their respective home countries (see [S/2019/171](#), para. 78). The Panel has not received a response on these matters.

### **Sweden and Switzerland**

111. The Panel reviewed photographs of three white robotic machines manufactured by ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. (hereafter ABB) at Thongchon Fish Processing Station, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The photographs were first published by the country's State media on 19 November 2019 and were reportedly taken during a recent field guidance visit to the facility by Chairman Kim Jong Un (see figure 23). The Panel further noted that the State media reported the factory to be a newly built facility of the Korean People's Army. Switzerland replied to the Panel that "the model of the robotic arms is ... the model IRB 660, they must have been produced at its factory in Shanghai, China between 17 April 2017 and November 2018", stating that among the several hundred machines of this model produced in this factory, most had been "ordered by Chinese-parties". Furthermore, "ABB could not identify any delivery of an IRB 660 model to the Thongchon Fish Processing Station or any other plant/company based in the DPRK. ABB notes, however, that there is a substantial secondary market for (used) robots ... Typically, ABB is not involved in sales and purchases through the secondary market." Investigations continue.

**Figure 23  
ABB robotics at Thongchon Fish Processing Station, broadcast on  
19 November 2019**



*Source:* Korean Central News Agency.

### **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela**

112. The Panel is investigating military and technological cooperation between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. According to a media report, the President of the National Constituent Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela signed a series of agreements pledging military and technological cooperation during a visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September 2019, potentially in violation of Security Council resolutions. The Panel has requested information from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

### **Yemen**

113. The Panel continued its investigation into two cases concerning Yemen. The first case concerns a Yemeni cooperation project with the defence industry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in which Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami signed a letter dated 13 July 2016 as Deputy Chief of the General Staff inviting a delegation from the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Tosong Trading Corporation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to meet in Damascus "to discuss the issue of the transfer of technology and other matters of mutual interest". The second case concerns a project deal involving Naif Ahmad al-Qanis, who signed a protocol with a Syrian arms dealer, Hussein al-Ali, in Damascus for the supply of military equipment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel has requested information from Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami and Naif Ahmad al-Qanis, and has yet to receive any response (see [S/2019/171](#), para. 97). The Panel has requested information from the Yemeni authorities.

### **Academy of National Defense Science**

114. The Panel obtained information from a Member State indicating that in May 2019 Zhongguo Shenyang Yueji Decoration Co. Ltd.<sup>147</sup> newly hired five workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, affiliated with that country's Nam Dae Cheon Trade Co. Ltd., which is reported to be under the control of the designated Academy of National Defense Science (KPe.021) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These two companies entered into a contract in April 2019 to arrange the recruitment of the five nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Three of them are program developers and two are hardware developers, and the purpose of this contract is to develop artificial intelligence products, including both software and hardware. The Panel has yet to receive a reply from the company.

### **Reconnaissance General Bureau**

115. The Panel continued its investigations into sanctions evasion conducted through cybermeans by cyberactors of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea<sup>148</sup> controlled by the designated Reconnaissance General Bureau.<sup>149</sup> In September 2019,

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<sup>147</sup> Zhongxin C5 Guoji Maoyi Tianci-jie 5 hao Hunnan-qu Shenyang-shi, Liaoning Province, China.

<sup>148</sup> According to a Member State, the Reconnaissance General Bureau controls almost all cyberactors within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the Lazarus Group and the Kimsuky Group. The Lazarus Group (also known as Guardians of Peace, Hidden Cobra, Whois Team, Zinc, etc.) has at least two identified subgroups, Bluenoroff and Andariel. Bluenoroff (also known as APT38 and Stardust Chollima) focuses on the generation of illicit income through cyberheists and the evasion of United Nations sanctions. Andariel's main targets include foreign businesses, government entities and the defence industry. The Kimsuky Group (also known as Velvet Chollima) has been active since at least 2013 and is known for its attacks against targets of the Republic of Korea, including Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power.

<sup>149</sup> See annex 27 for the organizational and command structure of the Reconnaissance General Bureau.

the National Cybersecurity Agency of France issued a public report<sup>150</sup> on malicious activity (spearphishing) observed in August 2019 and targeted at five permanent missions of the “member countries of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Belgium, Peru, South Africa)”, pointing out the “technical links” found during the Agency’s investigations “between some infrastructure used during these attacks and technical elements reported in open-sources as being used by the following threat actors: Kimsuky and Group123”.

116. Another Member State informed that Panel that “a DPRK cyber actor associated with the Kimsuky cyber threat group posed as a foreign government’s representative to the UN in order to spearphish 38 email addresses of other foreign government representatives to the UN”, specifying that the targets included United Nations representatives of foreign Governments, all of whom were members of the Security Council at the time of the attack.<sup>151</sup>

117. The Member State informed the Panel that it assessed cyberactors of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, probably belonging to the Kimsuky Group, as being “responsible for a spearphishing operation targeting the UNSC 1718 Committee’s Panel of Experts”, and as having prepared and tested spearphishing techniques to target the Committee in 2016 and 2017, preceding the October 2017 campaign (see S/2018/171, para. 5). The Panel reiterates its view that attacks, both past and ongoing, against such United Nations bodies as the Panel and the Committee, which are mandated to monitor the implementation of United Nations sanctions, amount to sanctions evasion, considering the persistent and highly disruptive nature of the attack.

118. Malicious activities against the Panel continue. In January 2020, a Member State informed the Panel that at least three experts were being targeted by cyberactors of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Investigations continue.

119. The Panel noted reports that, in September and October 2019, the Indian Space Research Organization and the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, India, received cyberattacks using DTrack malware,<sup>152</sup> which was developed by the Lazarus Group. The Panel investigated the attacks as possible violations of the provisions of the arms embargo through cybermeans. Investigations continue.

### **Munitions Industry Department and overseas information technology workers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

120. The Panel continued its investigation into illegal activities of the designated Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028), a policy and oversight organization for the nuclear and missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

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<sup>150</sup> France, National Cybersecurity Agency, *Credentials Gathering Campaign: Large Clusters of Malicious Infrastructure Targeting Government Bodies and Other Strategic Entities* (2 September 2019).

<sup>151</sup> In one instance, on 4 August 2019, cyberactors of Kimsuky Group of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sent to at least eight official and personal email addresses associated with current or former members of the United Nations and the Security Council spearphishing emails that contained a file appearing to pertain to a briefing for the Council. The spearphishing email attachment was described as a “concept note” for a Council briefing, scheduled for later in August 2019, entitled “The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security: international humanitarian law” (see annex 28).

<sup>152</sup> DTrack is a variant of ATMDtrack, which was used in a cyberattack by the Lazarus Group against the Indian bank Cosmos Bank in 2018 (see Kaspersky, “DTrack: previously unknown spy-tool by Lazarus hits financial institutions and research centers”, 23 September 2019). A Member State informed the Panel that an Internet protocol address belonging to the Cosmos Bank had been communicating with five Internet protocol addresses believed to be command-and-control servers for the Lazarus Group malware for a few months before the attack.

As previously acknowledged by the Security Council in its resolutions [2270 \(2016\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#), overseas workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including information technology workers, contribute earnings to the country's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes. Most of the information technology workers overseas are employed by companies subordinate to the Department, in contrast to most of the country's malicious cyberactors, who are subordinate to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (KPe.031).

121. By November 2019, according to a Member State, the Munitions Industry Department was suspected to have dispatched at least 1,000 information technology workers abroad for the purpose of revenue generation, often using subordinate entities or front companies. Because of their obfuscation techniques, however, the true number of information technology workers abroad and in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is unclear. The workers used several methods to obtain freelance information technology work without revealing their identity, by setting up accounts on freelance developer platforms with unwitting clients around the world, especially in Canada, China, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Ukraine and the United States. According to a Member State, an average information technology worker overseas makes roughly \$5,000 per month, of which about one third is channelled to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the rest being used to fund the expenses of the information technology workers and their operations. This would mean that the country has been earning about \$1,700 per month from each overseas information technology worker, which amounts to \$20.4 million per year.<sup>153</sup>

122. According to information from Member States, some of the trading corporations subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department were newly found to be aliases of designated entities (see annex 30 and para. 99).

#### *Korea Computer Center*

123. The Panel investigated two companies that are subordinates of the Munitions Industry Department and are operating in China. In Dandong, China, the Korea Computer Center<sup>154</sup> has utilized the front company name of Dandong Haotong Commercial Trade Co. Ltd. The Chinese National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System shows that the Dandong Haotong Commercial Trade Co. Ltd. was registered in Dandong in 2013 (see annex 31). It is stated in the company registration information that the company is in the business of wholesale and retail transaction and the import and export of items such as metal, chemical products, machinery, electronics and textiles.

124. Another Member State informed the Panel that the stated representative of the Korea Computer Center in Yanbian, China, is Jong Song Hwa (date of birth: 5 February 1970; passport No. 927220230 정성화). According to the first Member State, Mr. Jong has been working as the Chief Executive Officer of Yanbian Silverstar Network Technology Co. Ltd. (see annex 32), a company established by the Munitions Industry Department.

125. In response to the Panel's enquiry regarding the presence and activities of the Korea Computer Center in China, the role of Mr. Jong and the measures taken against him and the Center, China replied that the Panel had offered no concrete clues or

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<sup>153</sup> The information technology workers must also abide by certain rules that drive them to maximize their income. For example, information technology workers who do not earn at least \$3,000 per month for an extended period are removed from their position (see annex 29).

<sup>154</sup> According to another Member State, the Korea Computer Center belongs to the 313 General Bureau of the designated Munitions Industry Department and has been earning hard currency by dispatching information technology workers to multiple places in China, including Dandong and Yanbian. The representative of the Center's Yanbian office is Jong Song Hwa.

evidence and that China could not initiate any targeted investigation into the case based on the Panel's fragmented information. Nevertheless, China is still coordinating relevant authorities to investigate the case.

#### *Information technology workers in Viet Nam*

126. According to a Member State, the Munitions Industry Department has been dispatching information technology workers to Viet Nam for the purpose of revenue generation, including through subordinate entities such as the Korea Sobaeksu Trading Corporation (also known as the Korea Sobaeksu United Corporation), which was also involved in procurement for the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see [S/2019/691](#), paras. 41 and 42).

127. According to the Member State, a Vietnamese company, the Albatross Company (also known as Albatross Co. Ltd.),<sup>155</sup> has been working with information technology developers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who were assessed as still working in Viet Nam as of November 2019. Albatross worked with and sourced these information technology developers from at least two companies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are related to the Munitions Industry Department: the Korea National Development Investment Company and the Korea Mangyongdae Computer Technology Corporation (hereafter Mangyongdae). Mangyongdae is assessed as collaborating with other entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on information technology projects, and also with cyberactors of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reporting to the Munitions Industry Department. Furthermore, the Albatross Company was among the 10 Vietnamese companies engaged in formal business relationships with a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Yong Su,<sup>156</sup> a shipping agent based in Ho Chi Minh City since at least 2014, who, according to the Member State, has extensive links to entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are related to weapons of mass destruction. Viet Nam replied that its authorities had not found any workers or information technology experts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea working in the Albatross Company, and that Mr. Kim had entered Viet Nam in 2017 and had left in July 2017.

#### *Information technology workers in Nepal*

128. A Member State informed the Panel that, in late 2018, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had sent nine information technology workers to the Yong Bong Chand IT Company,<sup>157</sup> one of the nine companies operated by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Nepal. The Panel notes that a business directory entry for the Yong Bong Chand IT Company was posted 3 November 2019 directly on an e-commerce website (see annex 33). Despite the alleged involvement of information technology workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the entry does not contain any reference to the country's presence, and as all the related business transactions can be done online without in-person meetings, customers may not be aware of that presence. The Panel views this as an example of how the country's information technology entities conceal their identity, leading customers unknowingly to contract with the country's information technology workers. Nepal provided the Panel with the information of seven nationals of the

<sup>155</sup> Chief Executive Officer: Tuong Phi Bang; address: 131/6B Ton Dan, Ward 14, District 4, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam; tax code/licence identity No.: 0313900312.

<sup>156</sup> Date of birth: 9 February 1969; passport No.: 654435458 (date of expiry: 26 November 2019); title: Chief Representative of the Marine Transport Office of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Viet Nam.

<sup>157</sup> House 16-A, Harmony Housing Colony, Tokha District, Nepal. According to the Member State, a Nepali citizen is the joint owner of the company.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea who worked with the Yong Bong Chand IT Company and left Nepal in July 2019<sup>158</sup> (see annex 34).

#### **Overseas workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

129. During the reporting period, the Panel continued monitoring issues regarding overseas workers, including the implementation of the requirement that nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be repatriated by 22 December 2019 pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), as well as the prohibition of the provision of work authorizations pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#). Salient cases are highlighted in paragraphs 130 to 149 below.

130. In addition to manual workers, nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been earning income overseas, including as professional athletes and medical workers. Nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who are earning income and government safety oversight attachés of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea<sup>159</sup> (hereafter workers) have also resided overseas with visa categories other than working visas. In multiple cases, workers were not repatriated to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea but moved to a third country. The Panel notes that (specified exemptions aside) the repatriation requirement to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea applies to any nationals of the country who are earning income overseas (see annexes 35 and 36).<sup>160</sup> Furthermore, in several cases, the companies arranging overseas labour are prohibited joint ventures or cooperative entities.

131. As of December 2019, only about 50 Member States had submitted midterm reports due in March 2019. Of those reports, not all contained substantive information such as the actual numbers of repatriated workers<sup>161</sup> and actions taken by Member States.

#### *Soccer players in Europe*

132. Several nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were affiliated with soccer teams in Europe. For example, in Italy, Han Kwang Song joined the youth sector of Juventus Football Club in 2019,<sup>162</sup> and Choe Son Hyok has been playing for Società Sportiva Arezzo since 2018. Pak Kwang Ryong has been playing for the Austrian club Sportklub Niederösterreich St. Pölten since 2017. All these players reportedly had contract terms extending beyond the due date for repatriation. While the Panel was awaiting the reply of Italy to its enquiry of September 2019, the Qatari team al-Duhail announced on 8 January 2020 that Mr. Han had newly joined the team from Juventus. In respect of Mr. Pak, Austria replied that its competent authorities had initiated the procedures necessary to revoke his residence and work permit and to issue a return decision based on the relevant laws. The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Italy or Qatar.

#### *Medical workers in Asia and Africa*

133. According to several Member States, workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including about 20 medical staff who entered under a bilateral

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<sup>158</sup> Nepal also informed the Panel about three information technology workers affiliated to Himal Chilbo IT (see annex 34).

<sup>159</sup> See resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), para. 8.

<sup>160</sup> The Panel is investigating nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suspected of earning income overseas, irrespective of visa categories or the nature of the income earned.

<sup>161</sup> The Panel further noted that multiple countries only stated the expiration of work authorizations and visas instead of the numbers actually being repatriated.

<sup>162</sup> He had been playing for two other Italian teams since 2015.

medical cooperation arrangement, were present in Angola. The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its enquiries.

134. In Mozambique, a media outlet reported that six medical doctors of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who were assigned to Pemba Provincial Hospital for medical cooperation, were prosecuted for setting up an illegal private clinic, allegedly using materials from the national health system of Mozambique.<sup>163</sup>

135. The Panel investigated nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea working at Ne-Koryo hospital in Nepal, closed in 2019. It has been reported that the Nepalese authorities did not renew the hospital's licence as 6 of its 10 staff, including doctors, had entered with tourist visas and had been working without authorization. Nepal provided information on its repatriation of seven workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Ne-Koryo hospital (see annex 34).

136. The Panel recently obtained from a Member State information on medical workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Nigeria, information that has also been reported in the media. The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its enquiries.

137. The Panel investigated a hospital network related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Tanzania. Nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been employed at Maibong Sukidar Medical Co. Ltd. (also known as Maibong Sukida Medical Co.), and are likely still to be working in this company and at six associated clinics.<sup>164</sup> Furthermore, according to the public notice regarding work permits on the website of the Prime Minister's Office of Labour, Youth, Employment and Persons with Disability, about 40 work permits (including two possibly duplicated work permits for which applications were submitted using different spellings of the same individuals' names) for the workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who are employed by Maibong Sukidar Medical Co. Ltd. were provided or renewed in 2019 (see annex 37). The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its enquiries.

138. The Panel is investigating at least two medical practitioners of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Uganda as of 2017.<sup>165</sup> The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its enquiries.

#### *Restaurants of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

139. The Panel continues to investigate nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea working at the country's restaurants overseas. The Panel requested information from Cambodia on named restaurants of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Cambodia.<sup>166</sup> It replied that the restaurants had been shut down and the licences revoked (see annex 38). Cambodia also stated that there had been 115 workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Phnom Penh and Siem

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<sup>163</sup> Club of Mozambique, "Mozambique: North Korean doctors arrested in Pemba on charges of setting up clandestine clinic", 14 November 2019.

<sup>164</sup> Magomenni Upendo, Maibong Sukida Temeke Municipal Council, Maibong Sukida Kinondoni Municipal Council, Maibong Sukida Illemala Municipal Council (also known as Maibong Sukida General Dispensary), Star and Maibong Sukida Dispensary.

<sup>165</sup> Song Ung Hong, in the Ugandan People's Defence Forces, and Kim Yu Song, at the Kampala International University Teaching Hospital.

<sup>166</sup> Such as Pyongyang Restaurant (National Route 6, Krong Siem Reap), Pyongyang (Koryo) Restaurant (300 Preah Monivong Blvd (93), Phnom Penh), Pyongyang Ariang Restaurant (215, 32 Jawaharlal Nehru Blvd (215) Phnom Penh), Pyongyang Unhasu Restaurant (#10A, Street 315, Sangkat Beung Kok I, Khan Toulkork, Phnom Penh).

Reap province. Cambodia also stated that all the workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been repatriated as at 22 December 2019.

140. The Panel investigated workers, company management structures and money transfers of restaurants of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Nepal.<sup>167</sup> Nepal informed the Panel of 23 restaurant workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who had left Nepal in 2019 (see annex 34).

141. The Panel continues to investigate restaurants of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Thailand, including Haemaji Restaurant and Mokran Korean Restaurant (see S/2019/171, para. 154). It was reported in December 2019 that the Thai authorities had conducted an on-site investigation at Haemaji Restaurant and arrested seven workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its enquiries.

*Mansudae Overseas Project Group, Korea General Corporation for External Construction and other entities related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

142. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of Mansudae New Tech Corporation Ltd. (hereafter Mansudae New Tech) and affiliated workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including those listed as directors, in Cambodia.<sup>168</sup> This company has been involved in the construction and operation of the Grand Angkor Panorama Museum (see S/2019/171, para. 64). Cambodia replied that the Angkor Panorama Museum in Siem Reap province, established by an agreement between Mansudae New Tech and the Authority for the Protection and Safeguarding of Angkor and the Region of Angkor, had been shut down since 4 December 2019, and that the assets of the Museum, including the building, were under the control of relevant authorities. Furthermore, Mansudae New Tech was deregistered on 30 December 2019. The Panel also noted the repatriation by Cambodia of workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see para. 139).

143. The Panel requested information from Nigeria on the media-reported deportation in October 2019 of seven nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea<sup>169</sup> who were possibly connected to the Korea General Corporation for External Construction (KOGEN/GENCO) or other State organizations. The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

144. The Panel continued investigation into the activities of the "Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Senegal-SUARL" (hereafter MOP Senegal). MOP Senegal has been engaged in multiple construction projects in Senegal, including a public construction project and a factory for a major food processing company. Based on information obtained during its investigation, including that previously provided by Senegal, the Panel identified at least six nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who have worked as representatives of MOP Senegal.<sup>170</sup> MOP Senegal may have changed its name to "Corman Construction and Commerce Senegal Sural". About 30 workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who entered

<sup>167</sup> Botonggang Restaurant and Bar, Himalayan Soje Restaurant, Minas Restaurant and Bar, Pyongyang Ogruywan (Akugyan) Nepal and Pyongyang Arirang restaurant.

<sup>168</sup> Including Kim Chol Song, Kim Sok Sam, Ri Chol and Ri Kyong Il.

<sup>169</sup> Jo Sun Phil, Jang Sung Chol, Che Chun Hyok, Pak Yong Gon, Ri Yong Il, Ri Hak Su and Ri Tong Nam.

<sup>170</sup> So Yong, Choe Song Chol, Sun Song, Kim Yong Su, Choe Song Il and Ri Won Chol. Mr. So, Mr. Choe Song Chol and Mr. Sun are the MOP Senegal representatives listed in the letter from Senegal dated 21 February 2017. Mr. Kim appears as general manager of MOP Senegal on the contract for a public construction project signed on 11 July 2013. Mr. Choe Song Il also appears on the same contract, but his position is not specified. Mr. Ri appears as Vice-President of MOP Senegal on the contract for factory construction signed on 24 May 2016.

Senegal in January and February 2019 may currently be working for this entity. The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its enquiries.

#### *Visa categories*

145. The Panel has received a report from a Member State alleging that 2,000 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea recently entered China on visitor visas for the purpose of earning income. In response to the Panel's enquiry, China replied that it "could not verify that 2,000 DPRK nationals entered China on visitor visa for the purpose of earning income, engaging in activities aimed at earning income in China by foreigners using tourist visa is illegal. If any party possesses hard evidence and provides information to China, it will deal with in accordance with law."

146. According to statistics of the Russian Federation, there was a sharp increase in the number of tourist and student visas granted to nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2019 (see annex 39). In reply to the Panel's enquiry on the matter, Russia stated that "its final report will be provided in due course", in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

147. Another Member State reported to the Panel that, in 2019, Shandong Guannuo Food Co. Ltd.<sup>171</sup> had signed a new three-year contract with the Chosun Pusong Company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,<sup>172</sup> hiring workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for production and technical cooperation in the field of food processing, and that, by early November 2019, government safety oversight attachés of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for this project had arrived at the production site. According to the Member State, under the contract, the amount of remuneration is 5,000 yuan per month for managers, 3,500 yuan per month for deputy managers and 2,500 yuan per month for other workers. This contract includes coverage of the cost of repeated visa applications as workers exit and re-enter regularly in lieu of seeking to obtain official working visas. The Panel has not received a reply to its enquiries from this company.

#### *Exit to third country*

148. According to information from a Member State and press reports,<sup>173</sup> since 2018 several hundred workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have moved from the Russian Federation to Abkhazia, and transfers have been facilitated by individuals and entities in the Russian Federation. In response to the Panel's enquiry, the Russian Federation replied that it had no data on the issue and that the Panel could "approach its authorities directly". The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Georgia.

#### *Invited scholars*

149. The Panel noted several academic exchanges in 2019, including long-term exchange programmes hosted by academic institutes in Canada and China. The Panel enquired about the sponsorship of the programmes, especially the income earned overseas by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the programmes. In response to the Panel's enquiry, a Canadian institute responded that the Canadian authorities were being consulted. China replied that two scholars of the

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<sup>171</sup> 山东冠诺食品有限公司, Caoling qian village, Enanthem, Junan County, Linyi City, Shandong Province, China.

<sup>172</sup> Registered address: 2 Bulgung Street, Botonggang guyeok, Pyongyang; representative: Park Young Wook.

<sup>173</sup> Washington Post, "In breakaway Abkhazia, a loophole for North Korean workers amid beaches and Soviet relics", 13 October 2019 (accessed on 10 January 2020).

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, newly invited to an institute, had entered for academic exchange, not for work.

### **Recommendations**

150. Member States should exercise vigilance in screening all categories of visa application by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to prevent the entry of nationals of that country who are intending to earn income overseas.

151. Member States, pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), should submit in a timely manner reports containing complete information on repatriation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of all nationals of that country who are earning income.

152. To enhance the efficiency of Member State implementation of reporting requirements, the Committee should consider issuing implementation assistance notices.

### **Implementation of luxury goods ban**

153. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to circumvent the ban on luxury goods stipulated in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#). The Panel notes that the measures to ban the import of such goods may carry more significance than the goods' monetary value, as the ban affects the elites, which are responsible for the emergence of the issues that led to the imposition of sanctions. The Panel continues to observe the delivery of numerous items that can be classified as luxury goods (for example, luxury watches) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including for retail purposes (see figure 24). The Panel finds that multiple entities, some designated, engage in the illegal imports of such items.

**Figure 24**  
**Advertisements for luxury watch brands visible in Taesong Department Store, Pyongyang**



Source: Korean Central News Agency.

154. The Panel investigated several such cases, focusing on networks and supply chains. These cases demonstrate the ability of the country to obtain luxury goods, including vehicles, despite most manufacturers' compliance programmes<sup>174</sup> that are intended to prevent trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

#### *Mercedes-Benz*

155. The Panel continued its investigation of the case of the illegal importation of two Mercedes-Benz S-Class 600 Sedan Long Guard VR9 vehicles (see [S/2019/691](#), para. 46) and has established that the vehicles were shipped from the factory in Germany to an Italian armouring company, European Cars & More, SRL, in February 2018, and registered in Italy (see annex 40). However, in June 2018, cars with the same vehicle identification numbers were shipped by another Italian company with past contacts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL (using several forwarders and shippers), from Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The cargo was initially addressed to a company in Dalian, China, but later the consignees were changed twice, as the initial plan to transport the vehicles further by break bulk ship was not approved by the Dalian port authorities. As a result, the cars first went to Osaka, Japan (addressed to Zuisyo Co. Ltd.)<sup>175</sup> and then, at the end of August 2018, were shipped to Busan, Republic of Korea. There they were loaded on the vessel *DN5505* (the owner of which was Do Young Shipping Co.), which at the time was sailing under the flag of Togo (see paragraphs 81 and 82). The vessel left Busan on 1 October with the stated destination of Nakhodka but, soon afterwards, ceased transmitting its automatic identification system signal (resuming transmission only on 19 October at a nearby location). The Russian Federation recorded no arrival or departure of the *DN5505* between October 1 and 19 in any of its Far East ports.<sup>176</sup> Investigations continue.

#### *Lexus*

156. Japanese-manufactured third-generation Lexus LX 570 vehicles (model produced since August 2017) were observed in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in November 2019 in the presence of Kim Jong Un and his entourage. In response to the Panel's enquiries, the manufacturer determined that the vehicles were LX 570 models with the Sports Package, as they had aero parts, a 5.7 litre engine and all-wheel drive.

**Figure 25**  
**Lexus vehicles observed in the DPRK in 2018 and 2019**



Source: North Korea News.

#### **Alcohol supplies**

<sup>174</sup> Including the compliance programmes of the manufacturers of the vehicles investigated.

<sup>175</sup> Mr. Jo Seiken responded to the Panel's enquiries and provided documentation.

<sup>176</sup> The *DN5505* was detained in February 2019 by the authorities of the Republic of Korea on suspicion of illegally transporting coal originating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

157. According to information received by the Panel, shipments to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of alcoholic beverages – whisky, cognac, brandy, vodka, wine and beer – continued in 2019. Not all Member States classify the same alcoholic beverages as luxury goods (for example, vodka as well as beer are considered luxury goods under European Council regulation (EU) 2017/2062, but are not considered luxury goods in many other supplier countries).

**Figure 26**

**Imported spirits in Taesong Department Store, Pyongyang, December 2019**



*Source:* North Korea News.

158. The Panel continued investigating the export of vodka by Minsk Grape Wine Factory, Belarus (see [S/2019/171](#), paras. 105 and 106), vodka that was seized by a Member State in 2018 en route to China, with the suspected final destination of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and with intermediaries including Hongkong Jiaming Industrial Co. (see [S/2019/691](#), annex 14) and a Singaporean company, Aspen Resources Pte. Ltd. (owner Sai Keong Cheang, also known as Jordan Cheang), as payer. In reply to the Panel, the producer of the vodka stated that, according to the contract, the consignee performs customs clearance at the point of destination (Dalian), and, under the contract, sale is restricted to the territory of China, without resale to other countries (see annex 41). The importer has not replied.

159. The Panel investigated a shipment of ninety thousand 100-ml bottles of vodka from Niva Distillery Company Limited, Russian Federation, a shipment seized by a Member State on 21 February 2019 based on information that the cargo was ultimately destined for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 42 and [S/2019/691](#), annex 14). The consignee was listed as Manzhouli Kesheng Trade Co. Ltd., which promotes itself as a Russian food importer in Inner Mongolia. The Russian Federation replied that the shipment was made under free carrier terms to the port of Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, and that the ownership was transferred upon receipt of the goods to the carrier on 19 January 2019. The Panel has not received a reply from the importer. Investigation continues.

160. The Panel investigated two separate beer shipments from Baltika Breweries Co. of Saint Petersburg (see annex 43). The first shipment, consisting of 957 cases, was addressed to Hunchun Huihe Economic and Trade Co. Ltd. and was dispatched in April 2019. The second shipment, consisting of 3,100 cases, was shipped in May to Liaoning Pilot Free Trade Zone Yurong Warehouse Co. Ltd. Both shipments were seized en route in the port of Rotterdam by a State member of the European Union

(where beer is categorized as a luxury good) on suspicion that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was the final destination (see annexes 44 and 45). The Panel contacted all the entities along these two chains of delivery, but so far only the Russian Federation has responded, explaining that the Security Council sanctions regime relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not ban the supply to the country of products of the brewing industry and that there are likewise no bans of this kind in Russian legislation. According to this information, Baltika Breweries never provided authorization for buyers in China to transport its products beyond its borders, in accordance with the contractual terms and conditions.

161. According to information from Singapore, on 22 November 2019 a district court in that country fined and sentenced to imprisonment Ng Kheng Wah and Wang Zhiguo (for 36 and 12 months, respectively), and also imposed an S\$880,000 fine on a local company, T Specialist International (S) Pte. Ltd. The defendants were found guilty of engaging in prohibited trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including supplying luxury items exceeding S\$6 million (until 2017) to the Korean Bugsae Shop in the country, and of money-laundering.<sup>177</sup> The court documents further revealed the companies and individuals involved in the cases, including Pinnacle Offshore Trading Inc. and Mars-Rock Offshore Trading (both registered in the British Virgin Islands); Li Ik and his son, Li Hyon, nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and Sherly Muliawan, an Indonesian national who is the shipping manager and purchaser of T Specialist (see annex 46). The Panel's investigation of T Specialist started in 2018.<sup>178</sup>

162. According to the information from Singapore, a local company, Sun Moon Star (SINSMS) Pte. Ltd., an affiliate of Dalian Sun Moon Star International Logistics Trading Co., was charged in August 2019 with facilitating trans-shipments of wines and spirits as well as other luxury goods worth approximately S\$665,000 to Nampo, at the alleged behest of Mun Chol Myong, a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Mr. Mun was arrested in May 2019 in Malaysia and, in December, a Malaysian court approved his extradition to the United States<sup>179</sup> (see annex 47). The Panel has requested information from Member States.

### **Recommendations**

**163. Member States should encourage their nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent re-sale to sanctioned jurisdictions.**

**164. The Committee should prepare a more detailed list of prohibited luxury goods (where possible, with specific Harmonized System commodity codes) for consideration by the Council.**

**165. Member States should harmonize their export control lists to reflect the list of prohibited luxury goods.**

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<sup>177</sup> For the court sentence, see State Courts of the Republic of Singapore, *Public Prosecutor v. Ng Kheng Wah, T Specialist International (S) Pte. Ltd. and Wang Zhiguo*, Case No. [2019] SGDC 249, Judgment, 22 November 2019. T Specialist devised a fraudulent invoicing financing scheme to steal \$95 million from local banks. Between January 2014 and August 2016, Mr. Ng conspired with Mr. Wang to submit fictitious commercial invoices to five banks in order to secure loans. The five banks, believing the commercial invoices to be genuine, made payment of the invoice amounts to Pinnacle Offshore Trading Inc., the British Virgin Islands registered company owned by Mr. Wang. In order to launder the ill-gotten loans, a third company, Mars-Rock Offshore Trading, would "round-trip" the money back into T Specialist's accounts.

<sup>178</sup> See S/2019/171, paras. 142 to 144 and annex 72.

<sup>179</sup> See Asia Times, "KL court: extradition in N. Korea money laundering", 13 December 2019.

**166. Member States and relevant international organizations should encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide thorough systems for checking consignees, bearing in mind the risk of trans-shipment.**

## IV. Finance

### **Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to evade financial sanctions**

167. Although Member States have made progress in implementing Security Council resolutions, the Panel's investigations show that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to access the international financial system and evade sanctions through both novel and well-documented methods. These methods include bulk cash and gold smuggling (see paragraphs 109 and 110), the use of offshore and joint ventures to hide beneficial ownership information, and the continued theft and use of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin to evade sanctions and fund global cyberattacks.

*Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to access global banking through shell and front companies*

168. To obfuscate payments, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea uses third-party companies. The purchase of the maritime vessel the *New Regent* (see paragraphs 22 and 23), for example, involved a third-party company – HK Xiang Long Trading Group Ltd. – that was not mentioned in the purchasing agreement (see annexes 48 and 49).<sup>180</sup>

169. In a similar investigation, which involved the export of luxury vodka, the owner of a human resources company, Aspen Resources Pte. Ltd., arranged for a payment of approximately \$14,000 to the supplier, a Belarusian spirits manufacturer, on behalf of the buyer, Hongkong Jiaming Industrial Co. (see annex 41).<sup>181</sup> In his reply to the Panel, the owner and director of Aspen Resources stated that the company does not engage in commercial trading activities and that the payment for the vodka was arranged at the request of an acquaintance who “has problems paying out from China due to currency controls”.

170. Evidence obtained by the Panel suggests that obfuscating beneficial ownership information through shell companies has also allowed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to form joint ventures with unsuspecting foreign companies. In the course of its investigation, the Panel found that Dandong Haotong (a suspected front company of the Korea Computer Center (see paragraphs 123 to 125) had formed a joint venture with a Bulgarian-registered company (see annex 50). According to information provided by Bulgaria, TH Co. LLC (Ти Ейч Ко. ООД) – a Bulgarian company registered in October 2013 and deregistered in April 2019 – had operated as a joint venture with Dandong Haotong.<sup>182</sup> In early 2017, Bulgarian authorities undertook measures to ensure that nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea connected with TH Co. OOD and Dandong Haotong had left Bulgaria. Investigation continues.

*Financial activities of diplomatic and other personnel of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

<sup>180</sup> The purchasing agreement listed Mega Glory as the seller and Fullberg Trading Development Ltd. (丰百貿易拓展有限公司) as the buyer.

<sup>181</sup> The Panel highlighted Aspen Resources in its 2019 midterm report (see S/2019/691, annex 14).

<sup>182</sup> According to the corporate registry of Bulgaria, the company lists its business as software development. The Bulgarian customs agency noted that TH Co. OOD has not conducted any import or export transactions within the last five years and is currently in liquidation status.

171. The Panel continued to investigate diplomatic or official personnel of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who act on behalf of the country's sanctioned financial institutions to establish illicit banking networks and provide the country with access to global banking systems (see annex 51).

172. The Panel investigated reports that Jo Kwang Chol, an accredited member of the administrative and technical staff at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Austria since 2016, had engaged in sanctions evasion activities on behalf of the designated Foreign Trade Bank (KPe.047). According to information provided by Austria, Mr. Jo had attempted to gain access to Korea Ungum Corporation's frozen accounts at an Austrian bank (see [S/2019/691](#), para. 56 and annex 20). Austrian authorities froze the accounts in July 2015 owing to suspected money-laundering activity. At the time, the total balance was approximately \$1,895,633.

173. In February 2016, the Korea Ungum Corporation requested a cash withdrawal from the frozen accounts.<sup>183</sup> Austrian authorities denied this request. On 9 January 2017, the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea requested the release of funds in order to pay an outstanding salary to Mr. Jo. According to Austrian authorities, Mr. Jo's labour contract with this Corporation was fabricated. Consequently, the bank rejected the Embassy's request and the request was subsequently withdrawn. Austrian authorities concluded, however, that although Mr. Jo was the intended beneficiary, there was no evidence that he was directly acting on behalf of Korea Ungum Corporation or the Foreign Trade Bank. This case highlights the continued efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to exploit embassy personnel in order to access funds, including through the use of suspect documents.

174. In its 2019 midterm report, the Panel highlighted the ongoing financial activities of Reconnaissance General Bureau agents, including Mr. Kim Sou Gwang, Ms. Kim Su Gyong, Mr. Kim Yong Nam and their respective family members (see [S/2019/691](#), paras. 54 to 56). According to information provided to the Panel by a Member State, Ms. Kim Su Gyong was the Director of the International Relations Department of the Korean United Development Bank and was responsible for establishing clandestine financial networks throughout Europe in order to hide transactions between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, specifically.

175. In April 2017, Mr. Kim Yong Nam, reported by a Member State to be an agent of the Fifth Department of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, closed his bank accounts in France (see *ibid.*). The remaining funds (approximately €3,500) were transferred to overseas accounts (see [S/2019/171](#), para. 126) held in the name of his wife, Ms. Kim Tcheul Hy. The Member State newly identified an account in a Russian bank.<sup>184</sup> Consistent with its previous recommendations, the Panel notes that Member States are obligated to freeze the assets of all individuals working for or on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, to include accounts established in the names of family members.

#### *Overseas bank representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

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<sup>183</sup> The Korea Ungum Corporation was designated by a Member State in August 2013 for acting as a front for the Foreign Trade Bank (see United States, Department of the Treasury, "Treasury targets Russian bank and other facilitators of North Korean United Nations Security Council violations", press release, 3 August 2018).

<sup>184</sup> The Panel requested further information from the Russian Federation on the status of the account in the Russian bank. The Russian Federation responded that, "in order to investigate Mr Kim Yong Nam, the Russian Federation needs a stronger evidence of his involvement in the activities of the Reconnaissance General Bureau".

176. The Panel continued to investigate the activities of financial institutions and representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operating abroad and notes that Member States must expel any individual determined to be working on behalf of or at the direction of a bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

177. Following the Panel’s enquiries into Han Jang Su (see [S/2019/171](#), para. 125), the Russian Federation informed the Panel that Mr. Han had left Russia in 2019.

178. The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that it had closed Kumgang General Trading Company on 19 April 2019 for “violations of Security Council resolutions”. Investigation into the company’s past activities continues.

### **Sanctions evasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through cyberattacks**

179. Based on Member State and open source information, the Panel concludes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to perpetrate cyberattacks against financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges globally. These attacks have resulted in monetary losses and have provided illicit revenue for the country, in violation of financial sanctions. These attacks are low-risk, high-reward and difficult to detect, and their increasing sophistication can frustrate attribution.<sup>185</sup> According to several Member States, jurisdictional concerns and the lack of legal frameworks can pose significant challenges to investigations and prosecution.

180. In April 2019, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea hosted an international “cryptocurrency conference” in Pyongyang. According to the conference’s website (see annex 52), “international experts in the Blockchain and Crypto industry gathered in Pyongyang to share their knowledge and vision, established long lasting connections, discussed business opportunities and signed contracts in the field of Information Technology”. According to a United States court document, Virgil Griffith, a United States national who attended the conference, stated that the organizer told him that “during his presentation, [he] should stress the potential money laundering and sanction evasion applications of cryptocurrency and blockchain technology”.<sup>186</sup>

181. The Panel notes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is becoming increasingly sophisticated in terms of its attack vectors against both financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges. According to an analysis by one cybersecurity research firm, a Lazarus-backed attack against one cryptocurrency exchange relied on a “trojanized cryptocurrency trading application, which had been recommended to the company over email”.<sup>187</sup> This pattern is consistent with social engineering tactics, techniques, and procedures highlighted by the Panel (see [S/2019/691](#), para. 61). Notably, this hack by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used a legitimate-looking website and company name – Celas Limited – to

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<sup>185</sup> The act of generating revenue with cybertools and obfuscating and laundering through cybermeans constitutes sanctions evasion. For previous Panel reporting, see [S/2019/171](#), paras. 109 to 118, and [S/2019/691](#), paras. 57 to 71. According to a Member State, actors of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea use cyberspace as an asymmetric means to engage in the theft of military technology in violation of an arms embargo; revenue operations; cyberblackmail and extortion campaigns; hacking for pay; and the movement of money.

<sup>186</sup> Mr. Griffith has pleaded not guilty to violating United States sanctions. See Southern District of New York, *United States of America v. Virgil Griffith*, Case No. 19MAG10987, Complaint, 21 November 2019.

<sup>187</sup> See Kaspersky, “Operation AppleJeus: Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with fake installer and macOS malware”, 23 August 2018.

distribute the malware-infected application.<sup>188</sup> According to an archive of the website, Celas Limited “produces resilient client-server blockchain solutions for the enterprise market” and listed its location as Cedar Springs, Michigan, United States (see annex 53). The application, Celas Trade Pro, executed a malicious update package when a user installed the application. The malware contained a “full-featured” backdoor trojan, which allowed full control over the victim’s system and theft of the cryptocurrency.

182. In a new development, in 2019, several security firms reported links between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and an Eastern European cybercrime group known as the Trickbot Group. Trickbot is a set of malware tools originally developed in 2016 to target banking institutions. Trickbot actors recently developed an all-in-one attack framework, known as the Anchor Project. According to cybersecurity research firms, the Lazarus Group used Anchor Project tools to deploy malware. Specifically, researchers discovered PowerRatankba, a suite of malware tools developed by Lazarus that was delivered to victims via the Anchor Project.<sup>189</sup> This attack is significant because it represents the first known instance where Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-linked cybergroups have partnered with non-state actors.

### **Recommendations**

183. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities, contained in paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).**

184. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Security Council consider explicitly addressing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s evasion of sanctions through cybermeans if drafting additional sanctions measures in the future.**

185. **The Panel recommends that all Member States exercise vigilance over their nationals who may be traveling to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to provide training and advice on using virtual currencies and related technologies to evade United Nations sanctions.**

186. **The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation that Member States ensure their legal and regulatory frameworks cover virtual assets (e.g. cryptocurrency) and virtual asset service providers (e.g. cryptocurrency exchanges).**

187. **The Panel specifically highlights a recurring trend whereby Democratic People’s Republic of Korea diplomats and their family members establish bank accounts for the purpose of United Nations sanctions evasion, and recommends Member States exercise enhanced vigilance.**

188. **The Panel encourages Member States to implement the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, with special attention given to measures associated with targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation and transparency and**

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<sup>188</sup> The Kaspersky report indicated that the applications had been modified for different operating systems, including macOS, Windows and Linux. This was a possible first for the Lazarus Group and represents a leap forward in sophistication and intent.

<sup>189</sup> PowerRatankba is thought to have been used in the December 2018 cyberattack by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against the Chilean interbank network, Redbanc (see Vitali Kremez, “Disclosure of Chilean Redbanc intrusion leads to Lazarus ties”, Flashpoint, 15 January 2019).

*beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements (FATF Recommendations 7, 24, and 25).*

## V. Recent activities related to the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes

### Nuclear

189. The Panel continues monitoring the ongoing nuclear-related activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, such as activities in nuclear facilities and possible nuclear-related procurements.

190. The Panel has not observed any indication of operation of the 5 MW (e) reactor in Yongbyon since the end of 2018. Although the period has been sufficient for discharge and refuelling, a Member State informed the Panel that discharge of fuel had not been confirmed.<sup>190</sup> Operation of the steam plant at the radiochemical laboratory for reprocessing was not observed from satellite imagery.<sup>191</sup> This suggests the longest interval between activities related to plutonium production campaigns since the second half of 2018.

191. Several Member States indicated that construction of the Yongbyon light water reactor was ongoing. Construction of a building near the reactor and dredging along the Kuryong River<sup>192</sup> were observed from satellite imagery (see annex 54). Satellite imagery also showed activities including the demolition of a building at the abandoned Yongbyon 50 MW (e) reactor (see annex 55).

192. A Member State informed the Panel that it assessed the Pyongsan yellow-cake production plant as having been in operation in 2019. The Panel continues monitoring other nuclear-related sites. Operational activity at the test site in Punggye-ri was not observed (annex 56).<sup>193</sup>

193. The Panel continues monitoring the nuclear programmes of, and procurement from overseas sources by, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex 57).

### Ballistic missiles

194. In 2019, the ballistic missile development programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was characterized by its intensity, diversity and coherence. Progress was built on the programme's multi-year planning process, with 2015 and 2017 as major milestones.<sup>194</sup> As a result, the country now demonstrates the

<sup>190</sup> According to a Member State, complete discharge required a reactor shutdown for approximately two months. Also, the previously observed operational cycle of the reactor was two years.

<sup>191</sup> In September 2019, movements of containers were observed at the radiochemical laboratory, but the purpose is undetermined.

<sup>192</sup> A Member State observed that the purpose of this activity could be to address accumulation of sand.

<sup>193</sup> On 29 January 2020, the Korea Meteorological Administration of the Republic of Korea announced that it had detected a 2.5-magnitude earthquake at Kilju, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It further stated that this was a natural earthquake consequent to the sixth nuclear test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

<sup>194</sup> The year 2015 was notable for the advances of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the field of short-range ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (see S/2016/157). In 2017, the strategic intent of the country's weapons of mass destruction programme was revealed, with the tests of its most powerful nuclear device on 3 September 2017 and of its most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile, Hwasong-15, on 29 November 2017 (see S/2018/171, paras. 1 and 7 to 17). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted no further missile launches until 4 May 2019, but the Panel has no evidence that it has decelerated the programme.

autonomous capacity to produce and launch different types of new solid-propellant short-range missiles,<sup>195</sup> combining ballistic missile and guidance technologies, as well as a new-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile – medium-range ballistic missile (see annexes 58 and 59). During the series of 13 launch tests between 4 May and 28 November 2019, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched at least 25 missiles (see table 3 and annex 59), a frequency comparable with that of 2016, when more than 26 ballistic missiles were fired (see [S/2017/150](#)).

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<sup>195</sup> The new KN-23 short-range ballistic missile was launched eight times with two types of trajectory, depressed and depressed with pull-up. The pull-up is performed to extend the range. The new KN-24 short-range ballistic missile was also launched four times with two types of trajectory, depressed and depressed with pull-up. The new KN-25 short-range ballistic missile was launched at least six times between August and October 2019 with classical ballistic trajectories, and twice in November 2019 (see annex 59).

**Table 3  
Launches of ballistic missiles or systems using ballistic missile technology by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2019 (see annex 58)**

	<i>Date and time (local)</i>	<i>Reported type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Reported launch location</i>	<i>Reported distance travelled (kilometres)</i>	<i>Reported apogee (kilometres)</i>	<i>Remark</i>	<i>Korean Central News Agency classification</i>
I.	4 May 0830 and 1050 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as II, III and VI	2	Hodo Peninsula N 39°24'32.25", E 127°31'53.63" (see annexes 58.1 and 59)	200-(?) (possibly 240 to 400)	50-(?) (possibly 40 to 60)	- One launch probably not fully successful - Four-axle wheeled TEL type 1 <sup>a</sup> - TBL: 2h20	Tactical guided weapons
	4 May	MLRS 240 mm 300 mm (KN-09)			70-240		Rockets were tested	Large-calibre long-range multiple rocket launchers
II.	9 May 1630 and 1650 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, III and VI	2	Kusong area N 40°01'47", E 125°13'38"	420; 270	50; (?) Possibly 40	Tracked TEL similar to T-72 tank <sup>b</sup> TBL: 20 minutes	Long-range strike means
III.	25 Jul. 0530 and 0600 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, II and VI	2	Hodo Peninsula N 39°24'31", E 127°32'03"	430; 690	50; 50	Wheeled TEL type 2 <sup>c</sup> TBL: 30 minutes	New-type tactical guided weapon
IV.	31 Jul. 0510 and 0530 hours	New SRBM (possibly KN-23) or new MLRS (possibly 400 mm); same as V	2	Wonsan/Kalma area	250; 250	30; (?)	Tracked- TEL TBL: 20 minutes	New-type large-calibre multiple launch guided rocket system
V.	2 Aug. 0300 and 0320 hours	New SRBM (possibly KN-23) or new MLRS (possibly 400 mm); same as IV	2	Hamhung area (possibly Yonghung area)	220; (?)	25; (?)	KCNA pictures show blurry MRL image not verified as for this test; possibly tracked TEL TBL: 20 minutes	New-type large-calibre multiple launch guided rocket system

	<i>Date and time (local)</i>	<i>Reported type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Reported launch location</i>	<i>Reported distance travelled (kilometres)</i>	<i>Reported apogee (kilometres)</i>	<i>Remark</i>	<i>Korean Central News Agency classification</i>
VI.	6 Aug. 0520 and 0540 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, II and III	2	Kwail airfield N 38°24'54.98", E 125°1'43.00"	450; 450	37; 37	Wheeled TEL type 2; the missile flew over DPRK territory from west to east  TBL: 20 minutes (see annex 58.2)	New-type tactical guided missiles
VII.	10 Aug. 0530 and 0550 hours	New tactical missile similar to ATACMS (KN-24); <sup>d</sup> same as VIII	2	Hamhung/ Hungnam N 39°48'44.32", E 127°39'49.68"	400; 400 (possibly 430)	48; 48	Tracked TEL <sup>e</sup> (see annex 58.3)  TBL: 20 minutes	New weapon
VIII.	16 Aug. 0800 and 0820 hours	New tactical missile similar to ATACMS (KN-24); same as VII	2	Tongchon area N 39°03'33", E 127°46'44"	230; 230	30; 30	Tracked TEL <sup>e</sup>  TBL: 16 minutes (see annex 58.4)	New weapon
IX.	24 Aug. 0640 and 0700 hours	New MLRS <sup>f</sup> using "super-large" heavy rocket (600 mm, KN-25); same as X	2	Sondok airfield N 39°44'37.05", E 127°28'23.79"	380; 380	97; 97	Eight-axle wheeled TEL <sup>g</sup>  TBL: 17 minutes (see annex 58.5)	Super-large multiple rocket launcher
X.	10 Sept. 0650 and 0710 hours	New MLRS using "super-large" heavy rocket (600 mm, KN-25); same as IX	2	Kaechon airfield N 39°45'8.46", E 125°53'59.06"	330; 330	50; 60	One flight test failed <sup>h</sup> Eight-axle wheeled TEL; KCNA picture of 31 Oct. launch was in fact from 10 Sept.  TBL: 19 minutes (see annex 58.6)	Super-large multiple rocket launcher

	<i>Date and time (local)</i>	<i>Reported type</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Reported launch location</i>	<i>Reported distance travelled (kilometres)</i>	<i>Reported apogee (kilometres)</i>	<i>Remark</i>	<i>Korean Central News Agency classification</i>
XI.	2 Oct. 0710 hours	New SLBM/MRBM <sup>i</sup> Pukguksong-3  Estimated potential range 1,700 km  (see annex 58.7)	1	Wonsan - Yonghung Bay	450	910	Submerged barge	New-type SLBM Pukguksong-3
XII.	31 Oct.	New MLRS <sup>j</sup> using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, KN-25)	2	Sunchon airfield  N 39°24'48”, E 125°53'18”	370; 370	90; 90	Wheeled TEL  TBL: 3 minutes	Super-large multiple rocket launcher
XIII.	28 Nov.	New MLRS using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, KN-25)	2	Ryonpo area of Sondok airfield or Ryonpo airfield	380; (?)  (possibly 380)	97; (?)  (possibly 50)	Wheeled TEL  TBL: 30 seconds	Super-large multiple rocket launcher

Source: Member States, the Panel.

Abbreviations: ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System; DPRK, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; KCNA, Korean Central News Agency; MLRS, multiple-launch rocket system; MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile; MRL, multiple rocket launcher; SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile; SRBM, short-range ballistic missile; TBL, time between launches; TEL, transporter erector launcher.

<sup>a</sup> According to a Member State, the transporter erector launcher may have been inspired by a Russian Iskander. Both transporter erector launchers used a WS200 chassis. In the assessment of another Member State, “the caterpillar version is just a prototype” and “the wheeled chassis that was used is new and could be derived from Belarusian or Chinese chassis. The organization or the design is inspired by Iskander TEL.”

<sup>b</sup> According to a Member State, this tracked or caterpillar transporter erector launcher version could be just a prototype.

<sup>c</sup> According to a Member State, this wheeled transporter erector launcher type 2 could be a future operational version.

<sup>d</sup> The Panel notes that the system resembles such surface-to-surface missile systems as the Army Tactical Missile System or the King Dragon 300 (see annex 59).

<sup>e</sup> Built on the Pokpung-ho battle-tank chassis, which was designed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and resembles the T-62.

<sup>f</sup> Four launch tubes; ballistic missile trajectory not aerodynamic, but small canards attached. The rocket is a guided battlefield missile.

<sup>g</sup> According to a Member State, the eight-axle wheeled transporter erector launcher of KN-25 is based on the KN-23 chassis (stretched chassis) with an armoured cabin specifically designed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

<sup>h</sup> Several Member States stated that one flight test had failed and crashed inland, but that the other had headed towards Alsom Island; three out of four tubes had been used. One tube could have been defective (a Korean Central News Agency photograph shows that the upper cap was off but that the missile had not been fired, as the bottom cap was still in place).

<sup>i</sup> The submarine-launched ballistic missile is the naval adaptation of the Pukguksong-2 medium-range ballistic missile, but with a different re-entry vehicle and payload section.

<sup>j</sup> The Korean Central News Agency picture of the 31 October 2019 launch is in fact a picture from 10 September 2019. What was fired on 31 October 2019 was a new large-calibre canister-launched short-range ballistic missile, according to a Member State.

195. As well as the sustained pace of launches and the variety of launch locations (see table 3), 2019 saw the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea enhance the industrial and operational dynamics of the programme, with new weapon systems brought almost to operational effectiveness, increased diversity of missile types and launchers, and augmentation of the medium-range ballistic missile and intercontinental ballistic missile types tested through 2017 (see [S/2019/691](#), para. 80).

196. On 23 July 2019, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea presented a submarine potentially capable of carrying ballistic missiles (called Sinpo-C by the United States, and possibly derived from the Romeo-class/type 033 submarine) under construction in the building of the Sinpo south shipyard (see annex 60). This would complete a major diversification of the ballistic missile programme.<sup>196</sup>

197. A launch test was conducted, on 2 October 2019, of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, identified as Pukguksong-3 (see annex 58.7), from a submersible platform in Wonsan Bay. According to Japan, the missile fell into the Japanese exclusive economic zone, the first such occurrence since 29 November 2017.<sup>197</sup> This launch once again demonstrates the approach of simultaneous and interrelated development taken by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with a new type of submarine (see para. 196) and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (see [S/2016/157](#) and [S/2019/691](#)).

198. In parallel with the development of new weapons systems, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has continued to develop the infrastructure and production capacity for its ballistic missile programme. The Panel has observed the evolution or adaptation of different sites, including the Sinpo south shipyard (see annex 61), the Sohae satellite launching ground (see annex 62), the Chamjin military-industrial complex (see annex 63), the No. 17 Explosives Factory in Hungnam (solid propellant production) (see annex 64) and the March 16th Automotive Plant in Pyongsong (see annex 65 and [S/2019/171](#)). Member States reported to the Panel on continuous activity observed on various ballistic missile bases (see [S/2019/691](#)).

199. The recent missile engine tests on 7 and 13 December 2019 (the latter test, which lasted seven minutes, was claimed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to be a “crucial test”) were held following the renovation of the Sohae vertical engine test site (see annex 62). The tests may have been aimed at qualifying new intercontinental ballistic missile engines (liquid propellant) or checking existing engine batches (possibly solid propellant). Either way, they point to a new phase in the ballistic missile programme.<sup>198</sup>

200. The need for high-specification consistency in the ballistic missile programme requires the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to maintain a constant supply of specific components identified by Member States as choke-point items (see annex 66). According to Member States, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will continue to further enhance, from a technical standpoint, firstly solid propellant

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<sup>196</sup> The period from 2013 to 2014 was marked by the development of the experimental Gorae-class submarine launch platform named Sinpo-B by the United States (see [S/2016/157](#), paras. 41 to 44, and [S/2017/150](#), para. 40), followed by successive submarine-launched ballistic missile tests such as that on 8 May 2015 (missile with liquid fuel engine), followed by those on 23 April (solid fuel engine), 9 July and 24 August 2016, fired east of Sinpo, some from a submersible platform and others from the Sinpo-B submarine.

<sup>197</sup> Japan further suggested the possibility that the missile had separated into two pieces (see Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, “Ballistic missile launch by North Korea (2)”, press conference, 2 October 2019 (available at [https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201910/2\\_a2.html](https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201910/2_a2.html), webpage in Japanese), and [S/2018/171](#), para. 9).

<sup>198</sup> A couple of experts expressed the view that the nature of the projectiles launched by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2019 and the nature of the “crucial tests” in December 2019 were not clear.

production (which involves mixing, mass production, casting and curing) and, secondly, precision and guidance systems (which involve high-precision control and miniaturized guidance control devices). Furthermore, the production and moulding of carbon or aramid fibre remain paramount.

### **Intangible transfer of technology**

201. At the same time, the search for technological solutions to manufacture components or overcome technical challenges inherent in the design, production and adaptation of weapon systems leads the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to seek knowledge and technical capability that its technicians and scientists lack. The country's long-term programme planning guides its strategy in prospecting for the intangible transfer of technology. Member States have identified needs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in relation to such transfer in several fields.<sup>199</sup>

202. The Panel, on the basis of reports produced by scientific institutes and think tanks, has been conducting an investigation of international scientific collaborations involving scientists of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in particular fields of activity (see para. 201 and annex 67). Furthermore, the Panel considers that, for the development of the weapons of mass destruction programme, in addition to direct blueprints or data, know-how for the operation of plants and laboratories is also important.

203. In addition to seeking inward technology transfer, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to be an outward source of proliferation of technology, conventional weapons and items for supply chains related to weapons of mass destruction. It is known for transferring blueprints. A Member State reported that it remains very active in the provision of services in the field of artillery rocket system improvement. Despite the constraints on missile sales, it continues to seek opportunities for defence materiel sales as well as blueprints and data. For example, the wheeled and truck transporter erector launchers for two of the short-range ballistic missile systems tested in 2019 were sand or tan coloured, possibly for marketing purposes.

### **Recommendations**

**204. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise vigilance regarding the risk of sanctions violation through exchanges, including joint research with researchers and institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in sensitive areas.**

**205. The Panel recommends that Member States be vigilant in monitoring intangible technology transfer, including the transfer of know-how.**

**206. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise higher vigilance regarding the supply of items prohibited under relevant resolutions, and further emphasizes the importance of stringent export control by all relevant parties, such as producers, brokers and end users.**

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<sup>199</sup> According to Member States, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to be interested in the behaviour of advanced composite materials in special environments, and in aerospace-related technology, rocket- and missile-related technology, precision processing technology from advanced countries, and solar, wind and other clean energy technologies.

## VI. Unintended impact of sanctions

207. According to paragraph 25 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), United Nations sanctions measures are “not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK” or “to affect negatively … the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK”.

208. The humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is grim and not improving. According to the *Global Humanitarian Overview 2020* of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, approximately 10.4 million people in the country – over 40 per cent of the population – need humanitarian assistance. Chronic food insecurity and the lack of access to life-saving medical essentials has had a profound impact on the most vulnerable populations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular women and children.

209. There can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation and aid operations, although access to data and evidence is limited and there is no reliable methodology that disambiguates United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic factors within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, the latest United Nations sanctions could exacerbate an already difficult situation in the country for those employed in sectors directly or indirectly affected by sanctions, as well as potentially disrupting supplies of necessities to the civilian population. The unintended consequences of sanctions on the humanitarian needs of the civil population might include the following:

- The disappearance of, or a decrease in, sources of livelihood for those employed in industries affected by United Nations sanctions and for repatriated overseas workers; this effect may be up to hundreds of millions of dollars, based on rough estimates<sup>200</sup> (see annex 68).
- An increase in social marginalization as the elites respond to both United Nations and other sanctions by increasing control over scarce resources, including the “new market economy”, in some cases channelling these resources to purposes other than the needs of the population.
- Continued shortages of agricultural equipment and lack of fuel, exacerbating already low levels of mechanization in agriculture, which can limit harvest windows and compound food insecurity caused by adverse environmental conditions and mismanagement of domestic resources (see annex 69).
- Increases in the disruption of medical supply chains, which can significantly impact the chronically underfunded and inadequate health-care system in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
- The collapse of the United Nations banking channel and the subsequent lack of access to consistent and reliable financing jeopardizes supply chain operations and results in projects being suspended or stopped altogether. It has also created risky situations for humanitarian personnel.
- Financial institutions and private-sector entities continue to refrain from transactions tied to a high-risk jurisdiction. Moreover, some financial institutions draw no distinction between United Nations and unilateral sanctions. This affects the humanitarian operations in the Democratic People’s

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<sup>200</sup> Estimates from the Bank of Korea (see <https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/main/contents.do?menuNo=200091>, webpage in Korean).

Republic of Korea of the United Nations and other organizations, to include increased costs.

210. The Panel notes that the Committee has made significant progress in reducing the time taken to approve humanitarian exemption requests. In 2019, the Committee approved 38 exemptions for organizations and decreased the exemption approval time by 71 per cent (see annex 70). Considerable sanction-related challenges to humanitarian assistance nevertheless remain. Complicated procedures for exemption applications and delays in approval requests, as well as rapidly changing geopolitical contexts, may result in changes in lead times, delays in funding and modifications in the delivery of exempted humanitarian assistance.

### **Recommendations**

211. **The Committee should continue efforts for the prompt resumption of a stable banking channel for humanitarian activities, including the identification of financial channels and institutions as possible alternatives for fund transfers.**

212. **The Committee should continue the practice of biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions on the civilian population and on their operations within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.**

213. **The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that affect the mitigation of the unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations.**

214. **The Committee should continue to discuss simplifying the exemption application and no-objection procedures for United Nations humanitarian organizations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.**

215. **The Committee should work to streamline the procedure for applying for exemptions under the terms of Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 and to simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved and the frequency of requests and submissions.**

216. **In order to help humanitarian organizations' planning and budgeting processes, the Committee should publish detailed quarterly statistics on the exemption approvals and the approval process.**

## **VII. Member State reporting**

217. As at 31 January 2020, 77 Member States had submitted reports on their implementation of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#); 92 Member States on resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#); 89 Member States on resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#); 106 Member States on resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#); and 114 Member States on resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#).<sup>201</sup> Despite the increase in overall reporting, the Panel notes that the number of non-reporting States (116, 4 of which served as non-permanent members of the Security Council in 2019) for resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#) remains significant.

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<sup>201</sup> See United Nations, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#), "Implementation reports"<http://s/> (accessed on 31 January 2020). The Panel notes that, since the adoption of resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#), the submission of national implementation reports has become obligatory.

218. The Panel recalls that Member States are to submit their reports in a timely manner in accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

### **VIII. Recommendations**

219. For a consolidated list of recommendations, see annex 73.

## Annex 1: US Non-paper dated 8 November 2019 shared with the Panel

### NON-PAPER FOR UN PANEL OF EXPERTS

November 8, 2019

- As covered in the recently published UN Panel of Experts Midterm Report on North Korea, the DPRK widely employs illicit means to import refined petroleum products outside of the purview of UN 1718 Committee monitoring. As a result, the DPRK imports volumes of refined petroleum that far exceed the 500,000 barrel per annum limitation imposed under UNSCR 2397, as the Midterm Report indicated.
- The Panel of Experts (POE) also reported information that foreign flagged vessels are contributing to these illicit import volumes of refined petroleum to the DPRK.
- The United States has information to supplement that which the POE reported. We have images and import volume data for vessels that have made deliveries to the DPRK, but which have not been reported to the UN, through the end of October.
- These deliveries have significantly contributed to a gross violation of the 500,000 barrel annual cap under UNSCR 2397. We now estimate that the DPRK has imported more than 3.89 million barrels as of October 31. The ability of the DPRK to import illicit volumes of refined petroleum products that far exceed the annual cap is greatly enhanced by the addition of larger, foreign-flagged tankers to its import regimen.
- The table below provided lists each of the port calls that we have observed and associated delivery volume scenarios, which have grown substantially since our previous submissions and, in all cases, exceed the UNSCR 2397 annual quota by a wide margin.

Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden (BBL)	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	1-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	4-Jan-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Ji Song 6	6-Jan-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	8-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	8-Jan-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	11-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Ji Song 6	12-Jan-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	12-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25

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Nampo	Chong Ryong San	14-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	14-Jan-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Najin	Song Won	16-Jan-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	7,878.75	14,181.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	17-Jan-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	18-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Kum Un San	19-Jan-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	19-Jan-19	7389704	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Pu Ryong	22-Jan-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Nampo	An San 1	23-Jan-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	23-Jan-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	23-Jan-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	24-Jan-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	25-Jan-19	7389704	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Songnim	Yu Phyong 5	26-Jan-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	28-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Chong Rim 3	30-Jan-19	8665131	DPRK	2,042.00	5,053.95	7,657.50	13,783.50
Songnim	Yu Phyong 5	30-Jan-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	4-Feb-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Yu Son	4-Feb-19	8691702	DPRK	3,398.00	8,407.50	12,742.50	22,936.50
Nampo	Pu Ryong	5-Feb-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Najin	Song Won	5-Feb-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	1,715.18	2,598.75
Chongjin	Nam San 8	6-Feb-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Najin	Kum Un San	7-Feb-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50

Nampo	Saebyol	9-Feb-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,850.00	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	18-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	22-Feb-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	23-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	25-Feb-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Viet Tin 01	25-Feb-19	8508838	VNM	5,453.00	13,496.18	20,448.75	36,807.75
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	4-Mar-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Saebyol	8-Mar-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,850.00	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	10-Mar-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	11-Mar-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	11-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	12-Mar-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Chon Ma San	16-Mar-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	19-Mar-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Chongjin	An San 1	20-Mar-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Nam San 8	22-Mar-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	22-Mar-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	23-Mar-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Chongjin	Kum Jing Gang 3	25-Mar-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Chongjin	Kum Jing Gang 3	27-Mar-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Nampo	Yu Son	28-Mar-19	8691702	DPRK	3,398.00	8,407.50	12,742.50	22,936.50

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Nampo	New Regent	29-Mar-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	29-Mar-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Wonsan	Un Pha 2	2-Apr-19	8966535	DPRK	1,205.00	2,985.00	4,518.75	8,133.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	3-Apr-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Kum Un San	3-Apr-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	3-Apr-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	8-Apr-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Saebyol	8-Apr-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,850.00	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	8-Apr-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	New Regent	10-Apr-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Pu Ryong	10-Apr-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	11-Apr-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Chong Rim 3	12-Apr-19	8665131	DPRK	2,042.00	5,053.95	7,657.50	13,783.50
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	15-Apr-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Chongjin	Nam San 8	17-Apr-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	17-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	18-Apr-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Nampo	Kum Jing Gang 3	18-Apr-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	19-Apr-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Najin	Chon Myong 1	27-Apr-19	8712362	DPRK	3,565.00	8,823.38	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	30-Apr-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Chongjin	An San 1	2-May-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25

Nampo	Chon Ma San	2-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	2-May-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	2-May-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	5-May-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	5-May-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	8-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	10-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Tong Hung 5	12-May-19	8151415	DPRK	600.00	1,500.00	2,250.00	4,050.00
Hungnam	Ma Du San	13-May-19	8021579	DPRK	949.00	2,348.78	3,558.75	6,405.75
Nampo	Hokong	14-May-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	New Regent	15-May-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Paek Ma	15-May-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Hungnam	Sam Ma 2	15-May-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	15-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	16-May-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Chongjin	An San 1	20-May-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	21-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	21-May-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,945.05	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Chon Ma San	24-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	24-May-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	24-May-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	25-May-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,945.05	7,492.50	13,486.50
Songnim	Chon Ma San	27-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75

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Nampo	Chong Ryong San	28-May-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Saebyol	28-May-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	30-May-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	31-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	31-May-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	2-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	5-Jun-19	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	2,920.50	4,425.00	7,965.00
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	6-Jun-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Jun-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	8-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Pu Ryong	9-Jun-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	10-Jun-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Hokong	12-Jun-19	9006758	SLE	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	12-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Chongjin	Kum Un San	18-Jun-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Najin	Sam Ma 2	20-Jun-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	21-Jun-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Ji Song 6	21-Jun-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Najin	Song Won	21-Jun-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	1,715.18	2,598.75
Nampo	Subblic	26-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	27-Jun-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	28-Jun-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Kimchaek	Sam Jong 2	2-Jul-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25

Nampo	Subblic	2-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Hungnam	Sam Ma 2	3-Jul-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	3-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	3-Jul-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Chongjin	Pu Ryong	5-Jul-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Nampo	Saebyol	5-Jul-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	7-Jul-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	11-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	12-Jul-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	New Regent	13-Jul-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Chongjin	Paek Ma	13-Jul-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Hungnam	Sam Ma 2	14-Jul-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Hokong	19-Jul-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Wonsan	Kum Un San	18-Jul-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Tong Hung 5	18-Jul-19	8151415	DPRK	600.00	1,500.00	2,250.00	4,050.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	20-Jul-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	20-Jul-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	23-Jul-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Unica	23-Jul-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Wonsan	Ma Du San	24-Jul-19	8021579	DPRK	949.00	2,348.78	3,558.75	6,405.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	25-Jul-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	26-Jul-19	7389704	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	27-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75

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Chongjin	Yu Jong 2	28-Jul-19	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	2,920.50	4,425.00	7,965.00
Chongjin	Kum Un San	30-Jul-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Wonsan	Un Pha 2	30-Jul-19	8966535	DPRK	1,205.00	2,985.00	4,518.75	8,133.75
Nampo	Hokong	1-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	2-Aug-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	2-Aug-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Wonsan	Paek Ma	2-Aug-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2-Aug-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	2-Aug-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Subblic	8-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Unica	8-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	13-Aug-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	14-Aug-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Wonsan	Kum Un San	15-Aug-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Chongjin	Paek Ma	15-Aug-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Chongjin	Yu Jong 2	15-Aug-19	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	2,920.50	4,425.00	7,965.00
Nampo	Chon Ma San	19-Aug-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	20-Aug-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Unica	20-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	20-Aug-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Saebyol	21-Aug-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Chongjin	An San 1	22-Aug-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25
Hungnam	Subblic	24-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Songnim	Chil Bo San	26-Aug-19	8711021	DPRK	1,999.00	4,947.53	7,496.25	13,493.25


Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	26-Aug-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Saebyol	26-Aug-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	26-Aug-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	26-Aug-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Nam San 8	27-Aug-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Hokong	29-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Paek Ma	31-Aug-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Unica	5-Sep-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	8-Sep-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Saebyol	14-Sep-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Subblic	14-Sep-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	14-Sep-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	15-Sep-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	16-Sep-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Hokong	19-Sep-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Hungnam	Kum Un San 2	19-Sep-19	unknown	DPRK	558.00	1,381.05	2,092.50	3,766.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	21-Sep-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Wonsan	Kum Un San 2	23-Sep-19	unknown	DPRK	558.00	1,381.05	2,092.50	3,766.50
Chongjin	Kum Un San	25-Sep-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Paek Ma	25-Sep-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Saebyol	25-Sep-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Najin	Song Won	27-Sep-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	7,878.75	14,181.75
Nampo	Kum Jing Gang 3	27-Sep-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Chongjin	Kum Un San	30-Sep-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50

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Chongjin	Pu Ryong	30-Sep-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Kimchaek	Sam Jong 2	1-Oct-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Chongjin	Chon Ma San	2-Oct-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	2-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Subblie	3-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	7-Oct-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Tianyou	7-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	7-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	11-Oct-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Hokkong	11-Oct-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	11-Oct-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	11-Oct-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Ji Song 6	12-Oct-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Chongjin	Paek Ma	12-Oct-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	An San 1	13-Oct-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Subblie	13-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Saebyol	17-Oct-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Munchon Up	Paek Ma	20-Oct-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	23-Oct-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Chongjin	Chil Bo San	24-Oct-19	8711021	DPRK	1,999.00	4,947.53	7,496.25	13,493.25
Wonsan	Kum Un San	24-Oct-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Diamond 8	27-Oct-19	9132612	SLE	9,273.00	22,950.68	34,773.75	62,592.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	29-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Subblie	31-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75

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Nampo	Tianyou	31-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
<b>Totals</b>	<b>Totals (Barrels)</b>					<b>1,436,411.55</b>	<b>2,164,112.85</b>	<b>3,894,426.00</b>



- To emphasize the impact that the foreign flagged vessel deliveries are having on the DPRK's import volumes, we are isolating those deliveries into an independent table. As the table demonstrates, these deliveries began to gain pace in the late spring (May/June), and, as an isolated source of imports also breach the cap in all three projected volume scenarios. Between January 1 and October 31, foreign flagged tankers made 64 deliveries comprising between 560,000 and 1.531 million barrels of refined petroleum products to the DPRK.

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Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden (BBL)	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	1-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	12-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	18-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	18-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	22-Feb-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	23-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Viet Tin 01	25-Feb-19	8508838	VNM	5,453.00	13,496.18	20,448.75	36,807.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	11-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	New Regent	29-Mar-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	New Regent	10-Apr-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	15-Apr-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	17-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	5-May-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	10-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Hokong	14-May-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	New Regent	15-May-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25

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Nampo	Sen Lin 01	15-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	16-May-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	1-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Jun-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	8-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	10-Jun-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Hokong	12-Jun-19	9006758	SLE	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	12-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Subblic	26-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Subblic	2-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	3-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	3-Jul-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	7-Jul-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	11-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	12-Jul-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	New Regent	13-Jul-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Hokong	19-Jul-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	23-Jul-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	27-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Hokong	1-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	2-Aug-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Unica	8-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75

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Nampo	Subblic	8-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	20-Aug-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Unica	20-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Hungnam	Subblic	24-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Hokkong	29-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	5-Sep-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Tianyou	14-Sep-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Subblic	14-Sep-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	16-Sep-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Hokkong	19-Sep-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	2-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Subblic	3-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	7-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	7-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Hokkong	11-Oct-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	11-Oct-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Subblic	13-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Diamond 8	27-Oct-19	9132612	SLE	9,273.00	22,950.68	34,773.75	62,592.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	29-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Tianyou	31-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Subblic	31-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
<b>Totals</b>	<b>Totals (Barrels)</b>					<b>561,401.55</b>	<b>850,672.50</b>	<b>1,531,210.50</b>

## **Annex 2: Communication dated 5 December 2019 from the Executive Director of Sierra Leone Maritime Administration addressed to the Chair of the Committee**

Sierra Leone presents its compliments to the chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), has the honor to communicate the following:

For the period 1 January 2019 to 31 August 2019, exports of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) by vessels flagged by Sierra Leone totaled 176,493.08 barrels:

- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 (IMO 8910378) to Nampo, DPRK on January 12, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on January 18, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on February 22, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on March 6, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on March 11, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on March 23, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on April 6, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on April 17, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on April 23, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on May 6, 2019.

- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on May 10, 2019.
- The supply of 9,887.63 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG (IMO: 9006758) to Nampo, DPRK on May 14, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on May 15, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE (IMO 9045932) to Nampo, DPRK on May 16, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on June 2, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on June 6, 2019.
- The supply of 9,887.63 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG to Nampo, DPRK on June 12, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on June 12, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on July 3, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on July 7, 2019.
- The supply of 5,209.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged TIANYOU (IMO: 8817007) to Nampo, DPRK on July 12, 2019.
- The supply of 5,209.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG to Nampo, DPRK on July 19, 2019.
- The supply of 12,040.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged UNICA (IMO: 8514306) to Nampo, DPRK on July 23, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on July 27, 2019.

- The supply of 12,040.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged UNICA to Nampo, DPRK on August 8, 2019.
- The supply of 12,040.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged UNICA to Nampo, DPRK on August 20, 2019.
- The supply of 9,887.63 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG to Nampo, DPRK on July 19, 2019.

Sierra Leone will share any additional information it receives regarding the above exports with the Committee.

Sierra Leone takes this opportunity to convey to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.



.....  
Executive Director  
Sierra Leone Maritime Administration

Signed in Freetown, on 5<sup>th</sup> December 2019

*Source:* Member State

## Annex 3: Vessel profiles

### *Vessel owners, operators and managers*

Several vessels involved in direct deliveries to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea share similar corporate ownership and management profiles. The companies involved generally have a single shareholder and frequently change directors. Several of these companies were dissolved within a year or two of being registered. In several cases, the vessels' companies can be traced back to common corporate registry companies in Hong Kong, China. In several cases, the vessels were transferred to new owners and operators a few months before the vessels first conduct of sanctionable activities.

### *Vessel profiles*

Many of the foreign-flagged vessels engaged in sanctionable activity share similar profiles. This consists of coastal, product and general-purpose tankers that operate within waters in East Asia and South-east Asia. The vessels have a deadweight tonnage range of between 1,000 and 10,000 tons. They are generally older ships that score poorly in port state control safety inspections or have not had recent inspections. They have been insured or reinsured by protection and indemnity companies registered in Europe, North America and East Asia and in several cases were recorded on maritime databases with unknown or not updated insurance information. They have been classed by classification societies registered in Europe, North America and East Asia. These vessels have a recorded history of significant gaps in their AIS transmissions.

Source: The Panel

**Annex 4: Bill of Sale of previously Sierra Leone-flagged *Tianyou* (IMO: 8817007) that conducted direct deliveries to Nampo between July and October 2019**

Prescribed by the  
Commissioners of  
Customs & Excise  
with the consent of  
the Secretary of  
State for Trade  
and Industry

Form No. 10A

X.S. 79A

**BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)**

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship		Horse power of engines (if any)
8817007	TIAN YOU	SLR10669, Built 1988, Freetown	Motor ship		1330KW
Length			Meters	Centimetres	
Breadth			69	81	GRT
Depth			12	00	NRT
			5	55	1009 577

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, TIAN YOU SHIPPING LIMITED (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our principal place of business at UNIT 04.7F BRIGHT WAY TOWER 3, MONGKOK ROAD, KOWLOON HONG KONG in consideration of the sum of USD 200,000.00 (USD one dollar) or other good and valuable consideration paid to us by [REDACTED] Hong Kong (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL (100%) shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from ANY ENCUMBRANCES, ALL MORTGAGES, ENCUMBRANCES, MARITIME LIENS, CLAIMS, CHARTERS, TAXES AND ANY OTHER DEBTS WHATSOEVER.

In witness whereof we have executed this Bill of Sale on 10<sup>th</sup> May 2019.

For and on Behalf of  
**TIAN YOU SHIPPING LIMITED**  
For and on behalf of  
Tian You Shipping Limited  
天佑有限公司  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Title: Representative / Directorized Signature(s)

- (a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate, (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her", or "their".  
 (d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".  
 (e) Description of Witnesses: Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).

*NOTE:- A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship, and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.*

*NOTE:- Registered Owners or Mortgagors are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their port.*

See. F. 2058 (Oct 1971)

1548-934992-12M-772-817-NP

Source: The Panel

**Annex 5: Bill of Sale of designated *New Regent* (IMO: 8312497) that conducted direct deliveries to Nampo between March and July 2019**

Prescribed by the  
Commissioners of Custom  
& Excise with the consent  
of the Secretary of State  
for Trades

Form No. 10a

X.S. 79

**BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)**

IMO Number/Official Number	Name of Ship	Year and Port of Registry	Whether a Sailing, Steam or Motor Ship	Horse Power of Engines, (if any)
8312497/46483-15	New Regent	1983, Panama	Motor Ship	3253.35 HP
		METERS	Number of Tons (Where dual tonnages are assigned the higher of these should be stated )	
Length		96	00	Gross
Main breadth		15	00	2998
Depth		7	80	1600

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book

We, (a) **Mega Glory Holdings Limited** having our registered office at 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor J & C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola VG1110, British Virgin Islands (hereinafter called "the Transferors") in consideration of the sum of United States Dollars One (US\$1) paid to us by (b) **Fullberg Trading Develop Limited** having our registered office at 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor, Room 2A, Cheung Sun Tower, 116-118 Wing Lok Street, Sheung Wan, Western District, Hong Kong Island (hereinafter called "the Transferees") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL (100%) of the shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats, and appurtenances, to the said Transferees.

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and (c) their assigns, that we have the power to transfer in the manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from (d) encumbrances and maritime liens and any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have caused this Bill of Sale to be executed on 05<sup>th</sup> April 2018.

Signed and delivered by \_\_\_\_\_ as Attorney-In-Fact for and on behalf of Mega Glory Holdings Limited

By: \_\_\_\_\_  
Attorney-In-Fact

05 APR 2018

(a) Name in full of the Body Corporate (b) full name(s) and addresses of transferee(s) with their description in the case of individuals, and adding "as joint owners" where such is the case (c) "his", "their" or "its". (d) if any subsisting encumbrance add "save as appears by the registry of the said ship". (e) Signatures and description of witnesses, i.e. Director, Secretary, etc (as the case may be).

*NOTE -A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship: and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.  
NOTE -Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British ships informed of any change of residence on their part.*

S4544 (23046) Dd 8095571 20m4/80 G.W.B.Itd Gg810

F.2058 (August 1975)

Source: The Panel

## Annex 6: Sample of compliance documentation provided to the Panel by supplier vessel-A

[REDACTED] transferred ①MGO ②1,150 MT to Order NO. 6099 (③Vessel Name : Yun Hong 8)  
 at 1635LT  
 1) Bunker Delivery Receipt of Order No.6099

BUNKER DELIVERY RECEIPT (BDR)			BDR No. 7	
Order No. (订单序号)	6099		Bunkering Date (供港日期)	31 Aug. 2019
Tanker's Name (供油船名)	[REDACTED]		Commenced Pumping (开泵)	14:50 (GMT+8)
Delivery Location (交货港所)	30°46'0" N / 124°33'0" E		Completed Pumping (收油)	16:35 (GMT+8)
Gauge Before (供油前测量)	Kilometer	0.00	Product Name (名称)	MGO (海上轻油)
Gauge After (供油后测量)	Kilometer	1350.000	③ Prouduct: MGO (Marine Gasoil)	
Quantity Gross Supplied (供油总量)	MTons	1150.000	② Quantity: 1,150 MT	
Receiver's Confirmation (受货船确认)			Supplier's Confirmation (供油船确认)	
<p>The Bunker warrants that the product will not be traded directly or indirectly with or in any nation, vessel, Govt, OFAC's specially designated vessels or North Korea vessels etc.; entry &amp; destination prohibited by the United Nations and illegal transactions of oilader such as smuggling trade.</p> <p>我们不允许产品直接或间接地运送到在被禁止的国家、船舶、政府等，也不允许产品直接或间接地运送到联合国禁止的国家、船舶。非法交易如军火交易或毒品交易等。</p> <p>并且如果本法所禁制之（如多国制裁之船舶和船只）以及目的地，我们不进行贸易。</p>				
Order No. (订单序号)	6099		Full Name & Rank (姓名及军衔)	[REDACTED]
SHIP'S NAME (船名)	YUN HONG 8		Signature (署名)	[REDACTED]
Signature (署名)	① Vessel name: YUN HONG 8 [Signature]		Master or Chief Engineer (船长或大副)	[REDACTED]
Remarks:				

[REDACTED] received pledge about UN Sanctions and confirmed final destination of Order No.6099 (Yun Hong 8) which is Shandong, China.  
1) The pledge of "Yun Hong 8"

The buyer warrants that the product will not traded directly or indirectly with or to any nation, vessel, entity or destination prohibited by the united antions and illegal transactions of product, such as smuggling trade.

**誓约书**

买方不允许产品直接地或间接地买卖到任何被联合国禁止的国家、船舶(比如美国指定惩罚船舶或者北朝鲜船舶)、地区或者目的地，并且如何非法的贸易。

船名 红云 8号 YUN HONG 8

Vessel name : YUN HONG 8

船舶国籍 : 中国

Nationality : China

签名 : 张海平


Signature :

目的地 : 山东半岛渔船作业

Destination : Discharging to Fishing boats in Shandong, China

日期 : 2019年 08月 31日

1)Communication with vessel before discharging



For the ship-to-ship operation with YUN HONG No. 8 and 14: 25LT 31st Aug.2019  
The detail of E-mail that reported to the company to check the photo of the ahead, the stern, the top bridge, the pledge of letter and the ship's national certificate

## 2) Communication with vessel after discharging

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO : [REDACTED]  
FM : [REDACTED]  
AUG 31, 2019

GOOD DAY SIRS,

ORDER NO.6069 - 1150NT(1380KL) COMPLETED DISCH 7 SHTS.  
TOTAL ROB : 3727.712KL

REMARKS : nil

THANKS.

B.RGDS/MSTR

The commenced discharging at 14: 50LT, the completed discharging at 16: 35LT, and the partner ship's signature on the cargo volume was reported to the company [REDACTED]

## 3)Communication with vessel for movement report (anchored)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO : [REDACTED]  
CC : [REDACTED]  
FM : [REDACTED]  
AUG 31, 2019

Re: [REDACTED] MOVEMENT REPORT / Shifted & Anchoring

31st AUG 2019  
1830LT : S.B.E  
1900LT : Dropped Anchor @ 30-45N 124-50E 1920LT : F.W.E & Preparing EQUIP' for Order No. 8758/6069/7795.

[REDACTED]

B.RGDS MSTR.

Vessel dropped Anchor at 30-45N 124-50E for next ship-to-ship operation with other vessel after completion of ship-to-ship with YUN HONG 8 and reporting it to the company [REDACTED]

- Never turned off the ship's AIS  
1) Daily Morning Report on 31 Aug. 2019

[REDACTED]

To : [REDACTED]  
Cc : [REDACTED]  
FM : [REDACTED]  
AUG 31 , 2019

GOOD MORNING SIRS,

Please be Advised that Daily Morning(0800LT)Report as follows:


1. Ship Name/Date/Time(LT): [REDACTED] 31 AUG 2019/0800LT(GMT+8)
2. Position : 30501N/124300E
3. Present Speed/Course : ANCHORING
4. Daily Sailing /Miles : -
5. Total Sailing Miles : 102H 15M /1173
6. RPM/Slip(%) : -
7. ROB/Daily cons : HFO/265.45/0.80, MGO/9.10/1.50, MESys/6200/0.0,  
MECy/5770/0.0, GESys/6195/0.0, FW/344/8
8. Distance To Go : -
9. Destination / ETA : -
10. Weather & Sea cond : NE/5,C/5
11. AIS status : GOOD WORKING CONDITION

12.REMARK : Waiting for STS Order.

THANKS,  
B.RGDS, [REDACTED] MASTER.

Every morning, when the ship's captain sends the Daily Morning Report to the company, he checks the operation of the AIS. On 31st Aug Daily morning report E-MAIL reported to [REDACTED] as a company on 2019 09: 09LT. AIS is reported to be operating normally

## STS Bunkering Manual : Flow Chart



Source: The Panel

**Annex 7a: Sample of sales and purchase contract from supplier-vessel B to the *Yun Hong 8*, October 2019**

**买卖合约书**  
**Sales and Purchase Contract**  
**(CONTRACT REF: NWI-CHT\_1910002)**

■ SELLER 卖方:

[REDACTED]

■ BUYER 买方:

[REDACTED]

After negotiation, the sales contract is confirmed as follows:

1. PRODUCT NAME 品名 : GASOIL 500PPM/10PPM SULPHUR
2. DATE OF DISCHARGING 卸货日期 : 16<sup>TH</sup> OCT 2019 TO 31<sup>ST</sup> OCT 2019 (2<sup>ND</sup> HALF OF OCTOBER)  
: 2019 年 10 月 16 日至 10 月 31 日 (10 月下半月)
3. QUANTITY 数量 : 3,000.00 MT, ALLOWING PARTIAL DISCHARGE  
: 3,000.00 吨, 允许分批卸货
4. PLACE OF DISCHARGING 卸货地点 : DES WEST PACIFIC  
: DES 西太平洋
5. PRICING METHOD : THE DES WEST PACIFIC PRICE SHALL BE THE AVERAGE OF THE MEAN OF PLATTS QUOTATION FOR "10PPM GASOIL" UNDER THE HEADING 'FOB SINGAPORE' AS PUBLISHED IN PLATTS ASIA PACIFIC/ARAB GULF MARKETSCAN FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 2019 WITH A PREMIUM OF USD 4.80 PER BBL. THE CONVERSION FACTOR FROM BBL TO MT OF 7.5 SHALL BE APPLIED.  
计价方式 : 船上交货价应为 PLATTS ASIA PACIFIC/ARAB GULF MARKETSCAN 于 2019 年 10 月发布的“新加坡离岸价”标题下“10ppm 柴油”的 PLATTS 每桶平均价+贴水 4.80 美元。以上价格应于 7.5 桶 : 1 吨的转换率为准。
6. PAYMENT METHOD : ONE WORKING DAY BEFORE DISCHARGING, THE BUYER SHALL WIRE THE ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF SHIPMENT TO THE BANK ACCOUNT DESIGNATED BY THE SELLER  
付款方式 : 卸货前一个工作日, 买方需将当船之预估货款电汇至卖方指定银行

7. ACCOUNT NAME : [REDACTED]  
 (账号名称)
- BANK NAME : [REDACTED]  
 (银行名称)
- SWIFT CODE : [REDACTED]
- BANK ADDRESS : [REDACTED]  
 (银行地址)
- USD BANK ACCOUNT NO. : [REDACTED]  
 (美金银行账号)
8. QUANTITY CONFIRMATION : BASED ON THE QUANTITY OF MOTHER SHIP OIL GAUGE  
 数量确认 : 以母船油表数量为依据
9. RISK & TITLE : TITLE TO AND RISKS WITH RESPECT THERETO SHALL PASS TO  
 FROM SELLER TO BUYER WHEN THE PRODUCT PASSES THE  
 FLANGE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DELIVERY HOSE AND  
 THE PERMANENT HOSE CONNECTION OF THE VESSEL AT THE  
 DISCHARGE LOCATION, AT WHICH POINT OF DELIVERY  
 SELLER'S RESPONSIBILITY SHALL CEASE.  
 权利及风险 : 当产品在卸货地点通过运输软管和容器永久软管连接之  
 间的法兰连接时, 相关的所有权和风险应从卖方转移到  
 买方, 此时, 卖方的责任应终止。
10. BUYER'S CONFIRMATION AND GUARANTEE TERMS  
 THE PREVIOUS AND NEXT PORT OF THE SHIP DESIGNATED BY THE BUYER FOR DISCHARGING IS  
 NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OR/AND TERRITOTY OF ANY ENTITY OR/AND GOVERNMENT  
 SANCTION (COLLECTIVELY REFERRED TO AS "SANCTIONED JURISDICTION"), THE ENTITY THAT  
 IMPOSED THE SANCTIONS OR/AND THE GOVERNMENT INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, THE  
 UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND/OR THE US TRASURY'S OFFICIE OF OVERSEAS ASSET CONTROL;  
 SANCTIONED JURISDICTIONS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOLE'S  
 REPUBLIC OF KOREA, IRAN AND SYRIA.  
 买方指派用来卸货的船舶的上一个和下一个港口不在受任何实体或/和政府制裁的管辖  
 区或/和领土范围内(统称为“受制裁管辖区”), 实施制裁的实体或/和政府包括但不仅  
 限于联合国安全理事会和/或美国财政部海外资产控制办公室; 受制裁管辖区包括但不  
 仅限于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国,伊朗和叙利亚。  
 SHIPS DESIGNATED BY THE BUYER FOR DISCHARGING AND THEIR OWN LESSESS, AGENTS  
 AND RELATED INSURERES (COLLECTIVELY REFERRED TO AS "RELATED PARTIES") ARE NOT  
 SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS AND/OR TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON SHIPS, INDIVIDUALS AND/OR  
 ENTITIES.  
 买方指派用来卸货的船舶及其船东, 承租人, 代理, 和与此相关的保险商(统称为“有  
 关方面”)不是受制裁和/或贸易限制的船舶, 个人和/或实体。

GOODS SHALL NOT BE UNLOADED IN THE JURISDICTION UNDER SANCTION. GOODS SHALL NOT BE SOLD/TRANSFERRED/DELIVERED TO ANY SANCTIONED ENTITY, AS WELL AS TO SHAREHOLDERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, OR ANY OTHER ENTITY ENJOYING COMMON INTERESTS IN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE GOODS, WHICH IS NOT A SANCTIONED ENTITY.

货物不得在被制裁的司法辖区卸载，货物不出售/转让/或交付给任何被制裁的实体货物以及货物的股东，董事，雇员，代理，或者其他任何在股权和控制方面享有共同利益的主体不是被制裁的实体。

**11. FORCE MAJEURE**

EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF FORCE MAJEURE, SUCH AS FIRE, FLOOD, STRIKE OR MARKET CONTRACTION, THE BUYER AND SELLER SHALL BE LIABLE FOR THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT.

**不可抗力**


买卖双方除发生不可抗力事件，诸如火灾、水灾、罢工或市场萎缩，否则都应当承担合同条款的责任。

**12. OTHERS**

THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. ALL DISPUTES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE FINALLY SETTLED IN LONDON UNDER THE RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BY ONE OR MORE ARBITRATORS APPOINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH RULES. ANY AWARD RESULTING THEREFROM SHALL BE FINAL AND BINDING ON THE PARTIES THERETO.

**其它**

本协议受英国法律管辖并按照英国法律解释。与本协议有关的所有争议应根据国际商会的调解和仲裁规则，由一名或多名为根据该规则指定的仲裁员在伦敦最终解决。由此产生的任何裁决均为最终裁决，对双方均具有约束力。



*Source:* The Panel

## **Annex 7b: Falsified Bunker Delivery Receipt for the transfer from supplier vessel-B to the *Yun Hong '18* on 23 October 2019**

Voyage 02

**Bunker Delivery Receipt**

Recipient/Vessel :	<b>YUN HONG 18</b>	Flag :	CHINA
Date :	23/10/2019	BDR No :	VOY02-03
Ticket No :	2717	Location :	30°51' 124°30'
Supplying Tanker :			
Commenced Hrs :	1248	Completed Hrs :	1612

Bunker Product		Gas Oil	Remarks
Quantity	Supplied Qty KLs	2,052.000	
	Supplied Qty MTs	1,710.000	
Density @ 15 Celsius, kg/m3		0.8380	

We hereby declare that the fuel oil supplied is in conformity with regulation 14(1) and 18(1) of the Marpol Annex VI.

Who require to stop ?

Tanker  Vessel

Did you carry out watching tanker's flowmeter ?

Yes  No

Did you observe water content at tanker side ?

Yes  No

Did you receive sealed IMO Sample ?

Yes  No

**BUYER'S DECLARATION NOTICE (买方确认及保证条件)**

1. None of my vessel's previous and Next port are in any jurisdictions and/or territories sanctioned by any entity and/or government (collectively, the "sanctioned jurisdictions"), including but not limited the United Nation Security Council but are not limited to,

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and Syria.

1. 我方指派来装货的船舶的上一个和下一个港口不在受任何实体或政府制裁的管辖区域和领土范围（统称为“受制裁管辖区”），实施制裁的实体或政府包括但不限于联合国安全理事会和/或美国财政部海外资产控制办公室；受制裁管辖区包括但不仅限于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国、伊朗和叙利亚。

2. Each and all of the interested parties are not vessel(s), individuals and/or entities which are the subject of sanctions and/or trade restrictions imposed by any of the sanctioned jurisdictions (collectively, "sanctioned entities"), including but not limited to OFAC's specially designated nationals and blocked persons list and/or second sanction identifications list, and/or the United Nations Security council Sanction list.

The cargo presently laden on board the vessel was not loaded out of, nor bound for, any the sanctioned jurisdictions.

2. 我方指派来装货的船舶及其船东、承租人、代理、和与此相关的保险公司（统称为“有关方面”）不是受制裁和/或贸易限制的船舶、个人/或实体我方认得货物不得在制裁的司法辖区卸货。货物不得出售/转让/或交付给任何被制裁的实体。

个人/或实体卖方认得货物不得在制裁的司法辖区卸货。货物不得出售/转让/或交付给任何被制裁的实体。

货物以及货物的股东、董事、雇员、代理或者其他任何在权限和操作方面享有共同利益的主体不是被制裁的实体。

We certify that the above products were delivered and the measurements are correct.


We confirm receipt of the above products in good condition and quantity are correct

Master of

Chief Engineer of

*Source:* The Panel

**Annex 8: Examples of DPRK and suspect vessels' sanctions evasion activities moving into waters near Shidao, Ningbo and Sandu Dao, China, 1 July to 30 September 2019**



Source: Member State, The Panel

**DPRK Vessels designated by the UN Security Council**

Vessel name	IMO number	Dates of entry	Date of designation
An San 1	7303803	3 August 2019 (near Ningbo); 07 August – 13 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	30 March 2018
Sam Jong 2	7408873	20 September – 22 September 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	30 March 2018
Yu Jong 2	8604917	17 July – 19 July 2019 (near Shidao)	30 March 2018
Nam San 8	8122347	12 July – 19 July 2019 (near Ningbo); 02 August – 13 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	30 March 2018
Sam Jong 1	8405311	14 July – 17 July 2019 (near Ningbo)	30 March 2018
Chon Ma San	8660313	25 September – 27 September 2019 (near Ningbo)	30 March 2018
Ji Song 6	8898740	25 September – 30 September 2019 (near Ningbo)	30 March 2018

<i>Kwang Chon</i> aka <i>Yu Phyong 5</i>	8605026	21 September – 25 September 2019 (near Shidao)	30 March 2018
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#### Vessel designated by the UN Security Council

<b>Vessel name</b>	<b>IMO number</b>	<b>Dates of entry</b>	<b>Date of designation</b>
<i>New Regent</i>	8312497	25 July – 30 September 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	16 October 2018

#### Other DPRK Vessels

<b>Vessel Name</b>	<b>IMO number</b>	<b>Dates of entry</b>
<i>Kum Un San</i>	8720436	05 – 06 July 2019 (near Ningbo); 08 July – 11 July 2019 (near Sandu Dao)
<i>Chong Ryong San</i>	[7803389] - Recorded as ‘unknown’ by Member State	24 September – 25 September 2019 (near Ningbo)

#### Non-DPRK flagged vessels

<b>Vessel Name</b>	<b>IMO Number</b>	<b>Dates of entry</b>	<b>Flag state</b>
<i>Hokong</i>	9006758	07 August – 11 August 2019 (near Ningbo); 14 August (near Sandu Dao); 11 September -12 September 2019 (near Sandu Dao); 29 September 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Sierra Leone
<i>New Konk</i>	9036387	07 July – 14 July 2019 (near Sandu Dao); 07 August – 11 August 2019 (near Ningbo); 22 August – 27 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao); 04 September – 05 September 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Sierra Leone
<i>Vifine</i>	9045962	09 July – 17 July 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Sierra Leone
<i>Unica</i>	8514306	29 September – 01 October 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Sierra Leone

**Suspicious vessel of unknown name and flag**

Vessel	IMO number	Flag	Dates of entry	Flag State
<i>Rui Hong 916</i>	9058866	Unknown	02 August – 13 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Unknown flagged

Source: Member State; Table: The Panel

**Annex 9: Bill of Sale of then-Sierra Leone-flagged *Rui Hong 916* (IMO: 9058866) that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK tanker *Kum Un San* (IMO: 8720436)**


Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of state for Trade and Industry	<b>Form No.10A</b> <b>BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)</b>			
IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official Number, year and port of Registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engine (if any)
9058866	TAIYO MARU NO.2	133683,1993, Waki-gun, Okayama-Pref., Japan	Motor Ship	735KW
		Meters	Centimeters	Number of Tons
Length		60	04	Gross
Breadth		10	00	Net
Depth		4	50	498.00
and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.				
I, RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our registered office at OFFICE 3A 12/F KAISER CENTRE NO.18 CENTRE STREET SAI YING PUN HK in consideration of the sum of USD 1.00 (United States Dollars One Only) paid to us by WANG(hereinafter called "the Transferees") having their registered office at [REDACTED] FUJIAN PROVINCE P.R.CHINA the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged transfer all (100%) the shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferees.				
Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, mortgages and maritime liens or any other debts or claims whatsoever.				
In witness whereof we have hereunto executed this Bill of Sale on <u>20 MARCH 2019</u> .				
For: [REDACTED] RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED				
By: Name: [REDACTED]				

Note:- A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.

Note:- Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.  
Sec. F. 2058 (Oct. 1971)

Source: The Panel

Contract of sales for the then *Taiyo Maru No.2*

<small>(英文船売買契約書取次)</small> 発行 1965年 12月 16日 改定 1971年 7月 13日 改定 1977年 3月 16日 改定 1983年 9月 9日 改定 1999年 11月 2日		<small>版権:社団法人 日本海運集会所</small>  <b>船 舶 売 買 契 約 書</b> <small>10,000円</small> コードネーム: ニッポンセール 1999 (第1部)	
<small>契約締結地及び日時</small> 2018年 10月 25日		2. 買主(前文) <small>RUIS (HO) MARINE CO., LIMITED の日本国代理人東栄汽船株式会社</small>	
1. 売主(前文) 		3. 本船の名称(前文) <small>第二太陽丸</small>	
		4. 国旗/登録(前文、第3条(a)(ii)) <small>日本國/横須賀市</small>	
5. 船級(前文、第6条(b)) <small>NK</small>		6. 建造(年及び建造者名)(前文) <small>1993年1月 山陽造船</small>	
7. 船総トン数(前文) <small>100トン</small>		8. 夏期載貨量トン(前文) <small>1,198.00トン</small>	
9. 観査の場所及び日時(前文、第5条(a)、第10条) <small>2018年 10月 18日 場</small>		10. クラスレコードの検査の場所及び日時(前文)	
11. 売買価格(第1条) <small>21,000,000円(海外売船のため非課税とする)</small>			
12. クロージングの場所(第3条(c)) 13. 項記載の引渡し区域			
14. 引渡し期間(第4条(a)及びキャンセル・デイト(第4条(a)、(d)、(e)) <small>2019年1月7日～2019年1月18日(引渡し期日については売主買主双方合意の上、決定するものとする。)</small>			
15. 場所(第2条(a)、第4条(c)) <small>日本國</small>			
16. 1日あたりの予定損害賠償額(第7条(c)) <small>100,000円</small>		<small>第16条から〔23〕条の追加条款は、これがあるときは、そのまま本契約書に採用されたものと看做す。</small>	
売主 		買主 <small>RUIS (HO) MARINE CO., LIMITED の日本国代理人</small> <small>〒108-0022 東京都港区海岸3-33-17</small> <small>東京ベイサイドビル</small> 	
役職: <small>による:</small>		役職: <small>による:</small>	
<small>-1-</small>			

Source: The Panel

## Provisional Certificate of Registration for the 'Taiyo'



### REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY  
Sierra Leone Maritime Administration hereby grants this certificate  
of navigation to the vessel whose particulars are described below,  
in accordance with the Merchant Shipping Act, 2003.



Certificate No.

VHQ-200-18-3394

#### GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Name of Vessel	TAIYO	Official No.	SLR10839
Call Sign	9LU 2852	IMO No.	9058866
Owner's Name and Address	RUIS (HK) MARINE CO.,LIMITED, OFFICE 3A 12/F KAISER CENTRE NO 18 CENTRE STREET SAI YING FUN., Hong Kong	Shares	64 / 64

#### MAIN PARTICULARS OF THE VESSEL

Length (m) <sup>1</sup>	Breadth (m) <sup>1</sup>	Depth (m) <sup>1</sup>	Gross Tonnage	Net Tonnage
60.04	10.0	4.5	496	288
Power (kW)	Year of Build		Vessel Type	Oil Tanker
735	1993			

#### Builders and place of build

SANYO ZOSEN CO.,LTD., JAPAN

#### Place and Date of issuance

Piraeus, Greece on 27 December, 2018

#### Valid until

28 March, 2019

#### Remarks (if any)

THE VESSEL WILL UNDERTAKE A SINGLE DELIVERY VOYAGE FROM ONOMICHI, JAPAN TO NINGDE, FUJIAN, CHINA.

This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.

<sup>1</sup>In accordance with the International Tonnage Certificate.

To Whom it may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administrator's website at [www.slmared.com](http://www.slmared.com) based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.



Sierra Leone Maritime Administration SLMARAD  
[info@slmared.com](mailto:info@slmared.com) [www.slmared.com](http://www.slmared.com)

VHQ-200-18-3394

Page 1 of 1

Source: The Panel

**Annex 10: Bill of Sale of formerly Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged *Sea Prima* (IMO: 8617524) that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK tanker *Saeb yol* (IMO: 8916293)**

Form No. 10A <b>BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)</b>				
Official Number	Name of Ship	Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of e.
Call Sign: V4EP2 IMO: 8617524	SEA PRIMA	Year Built: 1987 PORT OF REGISTRY: BASSETERRE	MOTOR TANKER	1765 KW
Registered Length from fore-part-of-stem, to the aft-side of the head of the stern-post/fore-side of the rudder-stock Registered Main Breadth to outside of plating Registered Depth in hold from tonnage-deck to ceiling amidships			Meters	Number of Tons
			85.00	Gross Register
			18.00	2734 1349
			6.00	
and as described in more detail in the Register Book				
We, (a) _____ having our principal place of business at _____ BRITISH VIRGINS <b>ISLANDS</b> in consideration of the sum of <b>US\$580,000.00 (UNITED STATES DOLLARS FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY THOUSAND ONLY)</b> paid to us by _____ having its registered address at _____ XIAMEN, CHINA (b) the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer <b>ALL 100%</b> shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her ship particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances to the said transferee(s).				
Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said transferee(s) and (c) <b>their</b> assigns that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from encumbrances (d) <b>mortgages and maritime liens, taxes or any other debts or claims whatsoever.</b>				
In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our common seal executed this Bill of Sale on 19 <sup>th</sup> day of July 2019				
Was affixed hereunto in the presence of _____ THE SELLER:  			Witnessed by: 	
<small>(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate. (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her" or "their".            (d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".            (b) Description of Witnesses: Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).</small>				
<small>NOTE: - A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship, and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.            NOTE: - Registered Owners or Mortgagors are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.</small>				
<small>Sec. F.2058 (April 1965)</small>				

Source: The Panel

## Annex 11: Ship-to-ship transfers between DPRK tankers and unidentified vessels

The Panel continues to observe the trend of DPRK tankers conducting illicit transfers with unidentified vessels using subterfuge:

### Mu Bong 1 and an unidentified vessel, 13 November 2019

The *Mu Bong 1* (IMO: 8610461) conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with an unidentified smaller vessel on 13 November 2019 in the East China Sea. The smaller vessel had an item draped over part of its stern, likely to prevent identification. The Panel previously recommended designating the *Mu Bong 1*<sup>1</sup> for having conducted another ship-to-ship transfer with an unidentified tanker.




Source: Member State

### Saebiyol and unidentified vessels

11 November 2019

On 11 November 2019, the *Saebiyol* (IMO: 8916293) conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with an unidentified vessel in the East China Sea. The Panel featured the designated *Saebiyol*, one of the most active DPRK tankers involved in illicit procurement of refined petroleum, disguised as the '*Venus*'<sup>2</sup>. Photographs below showed the letter 'E' on the '*Venus*' hull was painted over. An unidentified vessel that was supplying the *Saebiyol* similarly had its name painted over.



Source: Member State

<sup>1</sup> Paragraph 8(b) of S/2019/691.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraphs 13 and 14 of S/2019/691.

3 December 2019

On 3 December 2019, the *Saebyol* conducted two ship-to-ship transfers with two separate small vessels in the East China Sea, indicating that DPRK tankers continue to meet with multiple vessels to ensure fuller loads before returning to deliver their illicit cargo. Again, on 11 December 2019, the *Saebyol* was photographed conducting a nighttime transfer with an unidentified vessel in the East China Sea. That vessel appears to resemble the unidentified vessel that conducted transfers with the *Nam San 8* (see below).



Source: Member State

11 December 2019



Source: Member State

Nam San 8 and unidentified vessel

16 and 17 December 2019

The designated *Nam Sam 8* (IMO: 8122347) conducted ship-to-ship transfers with an unidentified vessel on 16 and 17 December 2019 in the East China Sea. The unidentified vessel involved in the ship-to-ship transfers on consecutive days appear to be identical.



Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

## Annex 12: Updates on vessels involved in sanctions evasion activities

### *Viet Tin 01*

- The Panel previously listed the Vietnamese-flagged *Viet Tin 01* (IMO: 8508838) as one of three foreign-flagged vessels that off-loaded refined petroleum at Nampo in late February 2019<sup>3</sup>. The vessel, which was bareboat chartered to Happy Shipping Co. Ltd based in Fujian<sup>4</sup>, was reported detained<sup>5</sup> by Malaysian authorities along with one crew member in December 2019 as a result of anchoring without authorization<sup>6</sup>. The Panel has written to Malaysia for assistance. The Panel had informed Viet Nam of the vessel's location when it was intermittently transmitting an AIS signal between July and August 2019 as it transited the South China Sea. Viet Nam responded that since the vessel had turned off its AIS and ceased communicating with its owner, Vietnamese authorities had no further information on the vessel, and that the owner has been a victim of fraudulent and unlawful appropriation of the vessel's use "undertaken by foreign entities". The Panel continues to await responses from Mr Kwek who facilitated the transaction on information relating to the individuals involved in the chartering of the vessel<sup>7</sup>. The Panel has repeated its request for information from T Energy International Co. Ltd, a company located in Taiwan Province of China, as purchaser of the refined petroleum at the *Viet Tin 01*'s last registered port of call and has yet to receive a response. Investigations continue.

### *Shang Yuan Bao*

- The Panel investigated the designated *Shang Yuan Bao* (IMO: 8126070) that was involved in identity fraud and ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers *Paek Ma* (IMO: 9066978) and the *Myong Ryu I* (IMO: 8532413) on 18 May and 2 June 2018, respectively<sup>8</sup>. Panel investigations prompted the vessel's removal from its Panamanian flag registry and its subsequent designation in October 2018, along with a Member State's designation of the vessel's owners, operators and managers<sup>9</sup>. Since then, a Member State reported the vessel as having run aground close to Guanling, China<sup>10</sup>. Coordinates and imagery recorded by the Panel from commercial data-bases show the *Shang Yuan Bao* transmitted its last AIS signal in July 2019, while satellite imagery showed the vessel remained at the same location in late September 2019. China replied that it is coordinating relevant authorities to investigate the cases.

### *Shang Yuan Bao* run aground



Source: Member State

Source: Windward

Source: The Panel

<sup>3</sup> Paragraphs 10 to 12, S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.

<sup>4</sup> The company with no accessible information available, did not respond to the Panel's emails.

<sup>5</sup> According to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, the vessel was detained in waters south of Tanjung Penyusop, Johor.

<sup>6</sup> "Malaysia seizes Vietnamese tanker that was tracked in North Korea, Reuters, 12 December 2019.

<sup>7</sup> Paragraph 11, S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Paragraphs 16 and 17, S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.

<sup>9</sup> On 30 August 2019, the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two individuals, three entities and identified the *Shang Yuan Bao* as blocked property in implementing Security Council sanctions, on 30 August 2019, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm762>.

<sup>10</sup> Information from a Member State and by the Panel from open source databases.

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

**Annex 13: Sample of satellite images of cargo vessels docked at coal terminals at Nampo and at Songnim in November and December 2019**

Twenty-seven days of usable satellite imagery out of 60 days in November and December of 2019 show that coal vessels, including those of larger dimensions, continue to call at Nampo coal terminal, indicating the on-going trade in coal exports. For these months, at least 16 cargo ships were observed to have docked during these 27 observable days at Nampo, with around 87 ships observed anchored near the port. During 29 days of usable satellite imagery, at least 17 ships were observed at Songnim,<sup>11</sup> with around 17 ships observed anchored near the port. These cargo ships are counted on a conservative basis, taking into account the days where satellite images were useless because of cloud cover, avoiding double counts, and counting only cargo ships that had coal visible in the cargo hold. The full count was more than 103 in the Nampo coal terminal area and 34 in Songnim area during the observed days.

*Source:* The Panel


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<sup>11</sup> The cargo vessels counted to have docked at Nampo's coal terminal and at Songnim's coal terminal were counted only on days when satellite images were available on Planet Labs. Taking into account the days where satellite photos were not taken due to cloud cover and avoiding double counts, the Panel assesses that the actual number of cargo vessels calling at these ports is higher.

Planet ref. UTC	<u>Summary of the analysis presented below</u>	site Nampo Coal, dock WEST / 38°43'33.83"N 125°24'53.81"E	Length (m)	Width (m)	Observation ships berthed observed: 16 berthed and 16 left	Observation ships waiting observed: 87 berthed and 74 left	
<b>From the 01 November to the 31 December (27 days of IMSAT observable):</b>							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>From 1 to 3 coal ships were always berthed at the coal dock (except 3 days 0)</li> <li><b>more than 16 ships berthed at and left from the coal dock</b></li> <li>More than 87 ships berthed in and left from the bay</li> <li>The difference between the number of berthed and anchored ships is because           <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The chain of ships continues out of <u>imsat coverage</u></li> <li>Several sister ships could be counted only one time</li> <li>Some anchored ships waited for a berth at <u>Songnim</u></li> <li>Some anchored ships were not dedicated to shipment coal</li> </ol> </li> </ul>							
20191101 02 23 19 UTC		site Nampo Coal, dock EAST / 38°43'39.74"N 125°25'4.80"E	+100	25	Coal ship: 2 4 holds opened	Coal Ships: 9	Cargo
		1 small 2 holds 0 crane (left)	-100	20	2 holds opened		Coal
20191103 02 27 58 UTC		1 Medium 4 holds 3 cranes (right same 2019 11 01)	+100	25	Coal ship: 2 (+0-0) 4 holds opened	Coal Ships: 8 (+1 -2 from Nov 1)	Coal
		1 Medium 2 holds 0 crane (left) new from Nov 1	+100	20	2 holds opened		coal



Planet ref.	<u>Summary of the analysis presented below</u>	site <u>Songnim</u> Coal, doc 38°43'41.71"N 125°37'39.30"E	Length	Width	Observation ships call in. observed: 17 berthed and 15 left	Observation ships waiting. Observed: 17 berthed and 16 left	Cargo
	<p>From the 01 November 2019 to the 1 January 2020 (29 days of IMSAT observable) in <u>Songnim</u>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• From 1 to 3 coal ships were always berthed at the coal dock (except 7 days 0) <b>more than 17 ships berthed at and left from the coal dock</b></li><li>• <b>More than 17 ships berthed at and left from the golf</b></li></ul>						
		1 small 2 holds 1 crane (north)	100	20	Coal ships: 3 (+3) 1 hold opened	Coal Ships: 2 (+2) holds opened empty	Coal
		2 small 2 holds 1 crane	100	20	1 hold opened		Coal
		1 large 4 holds 4 cranes (south)	160	25	5 holds closed		Coal
20191103 05 17 26							



Source: The Panel (Image: Planet)

## Annex 14: Ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, *Phuong Linh 269* (MMSI: 874005969)

The *Phuong Linh 269* delivered a shipment of DPRK coal to Qisha port in September 2018, exported by a Vietnamese company<sup>12</sup>. A Member State provided information that the vessel's owner or operator may have owned or operated the *Tan Phat 36* that was detained on 12 September 2018 by Viet Nam receiving coal from a DPRK vessel. While shipping documents claimed that the coal's origin was from Viet Nam, satellite imagery provided by a Member State showed the vessel engaging in ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged *Pho Phyong* (IMO: 8417962) on 21 September in the Gulf of Tonkin, with the *Phuong Linh 269* docked near Qisha port on 24 September 2018. The vessel's docked coordinates closely align with the Panel's previous report of an anchorage area frequented by DPRK-associated vessels<sup>13</sup>. The *Phuong Linh 269* was also recorded as involved in another ship-to-ship transfers of DPRK coal with the *Pho Phyong* on 24 October 2018<sup>14</sup> in the Gulf of Tonkin and docked near Qi-sha port on 25 October 2018 (see satellite images). According to satellite imagery from a Member State, the *Phuong Linh 269* was again anchored near Qisha port on 3 March 2019 and on 20 March 2019. Data from a specialized maritime platform corroborated the vessel's location. Viet Nam replied that while a vessel named "*Phuong Linh*" appeared in the Gulf of Tonkin near Qisha port between August 2018 and September 2019, the vessel did not enter or leave ports, or conducted ship-to-ship transfers or unloaded coal in the Gulf of Tonkin. A search on the Vietnamese ship data management also failed to turn up any vessel registered under the provided name, IMO and call sign, and that "it is possible that the vessel used the fake name, IMO number, call sign and Viet Nam flag to operate". Vietnamese authorities have also not found any connection between the *Tan Phat 36*'s owner, Tan Phat Limited Company, and the *Phuong Linh*.

### **Phuong Linh 269 conducting coal transfers with DPRK vessels**



Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

<sup>12</sup> "Công Ty Trách Nhiệm Hữu Hạn (TNHH) 1 TV Thương Mại Quốc Tế Thuận An"

<sup>13</sup> Paragraph 20, Figure XI, S/2019/691.

<sup>14</sup> The Panel in paragraph 22(c) of its report S/2019/691 recommended that the Committee designate the *Pho Phyong*.


## Annex 15: Use of larger bulk carriers

1. A new development of concern is the use of larger foreign-flagged bulk carriers to deliver DPRK coal from DPRK-flagged vessels as opposed to transferring coal to smaller lighter vessels for delivery as observed in the Panel's previous report. The utilization of larger vessels that have a carrying capacity two or three times that of the DPRK vessels suggests that much larger quantities of illicit coal can be transshipped per voyage. According to information from a Member State, coal was transferred from DPRK vessels and offloaded at Caofeidian in September 2019.

(i) Bulk carrier *Lao Chuan Zhang 717*

2. Satellite images below shows the unknown-flagged vessel *Lao Chuan Zhang 717 / Yun Zhou 9* (IMO: 8661123/MMSI 413850000)<sup>15</sup> preparing to conduct a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK vessel *Jin Hung 9* (IMO: 9035967), in tandem with the DPRK vessel *Ever Glory* (IMO: 8909915) on 5 September 2019 near Lian-yungang. According to the Member State, the vessel then proceeded to Caofeidian to offload its coal. *Lao Chuan Zhang 717*'s gross tonnage is roughly three times that of the two DPRK vessels.<sup>16</sup> China informed the Panel that it is claimed the unknown-flagged vessel *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* delivered DPRK coal to Caofeidian on 5 September 2019. According to investigation, this vessel had been operating from one Chinese domestic port to another throughout September 2019 without any record of foreign voyage and there was nothing abnormal in its voyage trace. In particular, this vessel did not enter the sea area near Caofeidian and its AIS stayed turned on. Panel investigations continue into differing information received from Member States<sup>17</sup>.


### Tandem transfers of coal from DPRK vessels to larger bulk carrier



<sup>15</sup> Vessel name as recorded on IHS Markit. Windward database shows the *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* and *Yun Zhou 9* as sharing the same IMO and MMSI. The Member State that provided the information lists the vessel using both names but references the vessel per its path as the *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* as per its AIS transmit.

<sup>16</sup> *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* has a recorded gross tonnage of 11,883 on IHS Markit database, while the *Jin Hung* is recorded at 4,290 gross tonnage and the *Ever Glory* at 3,546 gross tonnage.

<sup>17</sup> In its research, the Panel notes that the *Lao Chuan Zhang 717 / Yun Zhou 9* (IMO: 8661123/MMSI 413850000) was operating on a coastal route. The Panel notes that the mentioned ship-to-ship transfer that took place on 5 September 2019 took place near Lianyungang. Panel research on a specialized maritime database show that the vessel, reporting an AIS transmission, was at Caofeidian on 8 September 2019.



Source: Member State, Map: The Panel

(ii) Bulk carrier *Fu Xing 9* (MMSI: 413208740)

3. According to a Member State, a vessel broadcasting an AIS as the *Fu Xing 9* (MMSI: 413208740)<sup>18</sup> was located on 15 September 2019 in the vicinity where several DPRK vessels near Lianyungang were anchored. The *Fu Xing 9* was subsequently observed discharging coal at Caofeidian port on 29 September 2019.



Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

<sup>18</sup> According to a specialized maritime database, a vessel broadcasting the same MMSI 413208740 and listed on the maritime database as Chinese-flagged, displayed an AIS transmission route consistent with the information provided by the Member State.

**Annex 16: Indonesia's Note Verbale on a falsified certificate of origin for coal on board the *Dong Thanh***



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

No. 352/POL-202/IX/19

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to its letter No. S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.87 of 15 July 2019 has the honor to convey the following:

- The registered Certificate of Origin No. 0001965/SMD/2019 is not issued for PT. Bara Makmur Sadayana;
- The barcode on the top left of the document is not in conformity with the standard format of original certificate of origin; and
- Invoice No. JLHK-ES-190302 IC, dated 12 April 2019, that was mentioned on the document is not registered.

Given the above information, the Certificate of Origin No. 0001965/SMD/2019 as attached to the Panel's letter is not authentic.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 17 September 2019



Panel of Experts established pursuant  
to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)  
New York



325 East 38<sup>th</sup> Street, New York, NY 10016 • Tel.: (212) 972-8333 • Fax: (212) 972-9780  
[www.indonesiamission-ny.org](http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org) • email:[ptri@indonesiamission-ny.org](mailto:ptri@indonesiamission-ny.org)

Source: Member State

**Annex 17: Letter from the Harbour Master of Sea Port Vladivostok, 18 December 2019**

Ministry of transport of the Russian Federation  
Federal agency of maritime and river transport  
FSBI «AMP of Primorsky region and Eastern Arctic»

**HARBOUR MASTER**  
**OF SEA PORT VLADIVOSTOK**  
Nizhneportovaya str., 3, Vladivostok,  
690003, Russia  
Tel: +7 (423) 279-15-21, fax: +7 (423) 249-65-52  
E-mail: [amp@pma.ru](mailto:amp@pma.ru); [www.pma.ru](http://www.pma.ru)

Our ref.: 3-1/610P  
Date: 18 December 2019

Attention:  
Palau International Ship Registry  
E-mail:  
[Ioannis.Kyriakopoulos@palaureg.com](mailto:Ioannis.Kyriakopoulos@palaureg.com)

Dear Sirs,

I would like to advise you that vessel "RUI JIN" IMO No. 8919104 has not been at the port of Vladivostok between November 25<sup>th</sup> to November 27<sup>th</sup> 2019.

Best regard's,  
Aleksandr Vanukov



*Source:* Member State

**Annex 18: Letter from the Permanent Mission of Palau to the United Nations on updates on the *Rui Jin* (IMO: 8919104), 24 January 2020**



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

24 January 2020  
8-PMUN-20

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator

Panel of Experts Established

Pursuant to UNSCR 1874 (2009)  
United Nations Headquarters  
New York, NY 10017

Re: M/V *Rui Jin* (IMO No. 8919104)

I write to provide an update to The Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSCR 1874 (2009) regarding the Republic of Palau's actions with respect to the vessel *M/V Rui Jin*.

In accordance with the Republic of Palau's Administrative Procedure Act, on January 21, 2020, Palau International Ship Registry (PISR), in its capacity as Administrator of Palau's Open Ship Registry, held a hearing to address the *Rui Jin*'s purported violations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). At this hearing, PISR considered the evidence it had collected, including the evidence that the Panel provided. Despite having received notice, no one from the *Rui Jin* participated in the hearing. Furthermore, despite repeated communications, there has been no response from the vessel's owners regarding arrangements for an inspection.

In light of the evidence considered, PISR found that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the *Rui Jin* was involved in activities prohibited by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). Therefore, in accordance with Paragraph 12 of that Resolution, PISR de-registered the vessel effective immediately. PISR also imposed a fine of \$200,000 for the vessel's violation of the Resolution; certificates of deregistration will be withheld until payment of the fine is received.

Finally, please note that the *Rui Jin*'s AIS device has not transmitted a signal since January 14, 2020, while it was under a flag state detention. As such, the Republic of Palau does not know if the vessel is still located near the port at Ningbo, China, its last reported location. The Republic of Palau has also recently been informed by IHS Markit Maritime & Trade that the *Rui Jin* has obtained conditional

866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 575, New York, NY 10017 Phone: (212) 813-0310 Email: mission@palauuh.org

certificates of registration from Sierra Leone under the name *MIR*. According to HIS Markit Maritime & Trade's records, the new owner of the vessel is Xiang Rui Shipping Co Ltd; this company is also listed as the manager and operator.

The Republic of Palau stands ready to provide any further assistance you may require with this matter.

Sincerely,

Ngdikes Olai Utudong  
Ambassador,  
Permanent Representative

Source: Member State

## Annex 19: Recorded trade between the DPRK and some Member States

### 1. Methodology

To monitor prohibited exports and imports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2016), paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2371 (2017), paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2375 (2017) and paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel analysed Member States' customs data, as reported to the International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map or obtained through commercial global trade databases such as the Global Trade Atlas (GTA). The Panel used the list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) in Annex 4 of S/2018/171 (amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1). In this section, the Panel did not cover refined petroleum products and crude oil.

The Panel notes that the DPRK does not release statistics on its external trade and only mirror statistics are available on DPRK exports and imports. The figures listed below are the total of all exports and imports of ostensibly prohibited items by the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019, as obtained by the Panel prior to its requests for information to the relevant Member States between November and December 2019. In cases where discrepancies were found in the trade records, the Panel asked Member States to explain the statistics.

### 2. Results of the Panel's Inquiries

**Algeria:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Algeria	DPRK	72	160,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Textiles (HS 50-63)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Algeria	DPRK	50-63	43,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Algeria	DPRK	84	16,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Bolivia:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

**Electrical equipment (HS 85)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	Bolivia	DPRK	85	11,000
October 2018			85	10,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Machinery (HS 84)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Bolivia	DPRK	84	53,000
June 2018			84	64,000
March 2019			84	1,179,000
April 2019			84	228,000
July 2019			84	16,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

**Botswana:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

**Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Botswana	DPRK	72-73	320,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Brazil**

The Panel asked Brazil for data on imports of iron and iron ore (HS 72-73), electrical equipment (HS 85), and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$298,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019, and the export of \$1,179,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83) in 2018 and 2019. Brazil replied that the information provided by the Panel “is incorrect, and that none of the trade operations in question originated from or were destined to the DPRK. Such inaccuracies are due to errors committed by customs brokering agents while inserting data in the declarations of import or export submitted through SISCOMEX (Integrated Foreign Trade System).”

**China**

The Panel asked China for data on import of iron, iron and steel products (HS 72-73), textiles (HS 50-63), electrical equipment (HS 85), and earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS 25) worth \$50,838,800 from the DPRK in 2018, and export of \$2,050,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83), vehicles (HS 86-89) and industrial machinery (HS 84-85) between 2018 and 2019.

China replied that “The Chinese import and export data is worked out by the Chinese Customs according its Customs Law and other Chinese laws and regulations. The data is completely transparent, open and is the most authoritative data that accurately reflects Chinese imports and exports. On trade data involving China, the official data published by the Chinese government shall prevail. China has been strictly implementing the supervision measures on commodities imports from and exports to

the DPRK, and conducting inspections according to relevant laws and regulations,” and provided following specific explanation to the Panel.

[ Import ]

- 1) Import of \$50,298,000 worth of iron, iron ore and steel products (HS 72-73): China stated its view that UNSCR 2371 (2017) prohibited the import of “iron and iron ore”, but not all items under HS Code Chapters 72 and 73, and it considers these imports to be in compliance with UNSCR 2371 (2017).<sup>19</sup>

**Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	China	DPRK	72-73	2,035,000
May 2018			72-73	2,668,000
June 2018			72-73	2,333,000
July 2018			72-73	3,365,000
August 2018			72-73	2,941,000
September 2018			72-73	2,995,000
October 2018			72-73	3,260,000
November 2018			72-73	2,944,000
December 2018			72-73	3,282,000
January 2019			72-73	2,948,000
February 2019			72-73	2,257,000
March 2019			72-73	3,020,000
April 2019			72-73	2,184,000
May 2019			72-73	2,226,000
June 2019			72-73	2,572,000
July 2019			72-73	3,199,000
August 2019			72-73	3,179,000
September 2019			72-73	2,890,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 2) Import of \$44,000 worth of textiles (HS 50-63): China confirmed four cases of imports, which were (i) a case of mis-reporting of the country of origin (ii) a case of import before UNSCR 2375 (2017) entered in force (iii) a case of previous export to the DPRK returned to China for quality reasons, and (iv) imports of textile related materials but not textile products.
- 3) Import of \$15,000 worth of electrical equipment (HS 85): China stated this was a technical error in reporting.
- 4) Import of \$481,000 worth of earth and stone (HS 25): China stated this was a technical error in reporting.

[ Export ]

<sup>19</sup> The Panel notes that some Member States’ views on HS Code allocation are not same with the Panel’s list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions, which the World Customs Organization (WCO) has recommended to the Panel (see S/2017/150, paragraph 257, S/2018/171 Annex 4 and S/2018/171/Corr.1).

- 5) Export of \$383,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83): China clarified that these are exempted items used by NGOs and international organizations conducting humanitarian work in the DPRK.

### Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	China	DPRK	72-83	27,000
September 2018			72-83	21,000
October 2018			72-83	10,000
November 2018			72-83	93,000
February 2019			72-83	13,000
March 2019			72-83	24,000
April 2019			72-83	12,000
May 2019			72-83	28,000
June 2019			72-83	60,000
July 2019			72-83	52,000
August 2019			72-83	43,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 6) Export of \$487,000 worth of vehicles (HS 86-89): China clarified that these are exempted items used by NGOs and international organizations conducting humanitarian work in the DPRK.

### Vehicles (HS 86-89)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	China	DPRK	86-89	68,000
February 2019			86-89	59,000
April 2019			86-89	44,000
June 2019			86-89	107,000
August 2019			86-89	209,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 7) Export of \$1,180,000 worth of industrial machinery (HS 84-85): China clarified that these are exempted items used by NGOs and international organizations conducting humanitarian work in the DPRK.

### Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	China	DPRK	84-85	71,000
June 2018			84-85	21,000
September 2018			84-85	14,000
October 2018			84-85	44,000
December 2018			84-85	142,000
February 2019			84-85	62,000
March 2019			84-85	64,000

April 2019			84-85	25,000
May 2019			84-85	20,000
June 2019			84-85	87,000
July 2019			84-85	214,000
August 2019			84-85	355,000
September 2019			84-85	61,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Colombia:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### **Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2018			73	28,000
February 2019	Colombia	DPRK	73	63,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### **Textiles (HS 50-63)**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Colombia	DPRK	54	30,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### **Electrical equipment (HS 85)**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	Colombia	DPRK	85	10,000
September 2018			85	11,000
November 2018			85	61,000
December 2018			85	23,000
February 2019			85	86,000
March 2019			85	38,000
April 2019			85	32,000
July 2019			85	83,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

#### **Machinery (HS 84)**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	Colombia	DPRK	84	18,000
July 2018			84	39,000
July 2019			84	38,000
August 2019			84	67,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, GTA

**Costa Rica:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### **Electrical equipment (HS 85)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2019	Costa Rica	DPRK	85	10,000
June 2019			85	147,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Costa Rica	DPRK	84	25,000
July 2019			84	21,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Cote d'Ivoire:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Côte d'Ivoire	DPRK	73	18,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### Seafood (HS 03, 1603-1605)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2018	Côte d'Ivoire	DPRK	03, 1603-1605	51,000
January 2019			03, 1603-1605	59,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

#### Electrical equipment (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2019	Côte d'Ivoire	DPRK	85	12,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**El Salvador:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	El Salvador	DPRK	72-73	32,000
February 2019			72-73	38,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	El Salvador	DPRK	84	16,000
September 2018			84	54,000
November 2018			84	79,000
May 2019			84	45,000
July 2019			84	264,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

### Germany

The Panel asked Germany for data on the import of iron and iron ore (HS 72-73), textiles (HS 50-63), electrical equipment (HS 85), and earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS 25) worth of \$2,668,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019, and export of \$811,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83), vehicles (HS 86-89) and industrial machinery (HS 84-85) between 2018 and 2019.<sup>20</sup> Germany provided following specific explanation to the Panel.

#### [ Import ]

- 1) Import of \$1,071,000 worth of iron, iron and steel products (HS 72-73): Germany stated its view that “HS chapter 73 comprises a wide range of ‘articles of iron and steel’, HS chapter 72 refers to ‘iron and steel’ while UNSCR 2371 (2017) para. 8 refers to inter alia ‘iron’ without giving reference to HS codes, and that, consequently, not all items under HS chapters 72 and 73 fall under UNSCR 2371 (2017) para. 8.”<sup>21</sup>

#### **Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Germany	DPRK	72, 73	147,000
May 2018			72, 73	53,000
June 2018			73	109,000
July 2018			72, 73	102,000
August 2018			73	102,000
September 2018			73	16,000
October 2018			73	29,000
November 2018			73	35,000
December 2018			73	13,000
April 2019			73	15,000
August 2019			72, 73	450,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 2) On other imports recorded in the ITC Trade Map, Germany replied that its customs authorities are currently reviewing four exports to Germany (by the DPRK) that may have constituted violations of sanctions regime: one audio CD (EUR 42.98, August 2018), one electric engine for a dishwasher (EUR 36.36, August 2018), and two exports under HS 84 (EUR 3,500, January 2019). Germany further stated that the review by its customs authorities “has not yielded any other cases that may constitute a violation of applicable sanctions.”

#### **Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Germany	DPRK	84	684,000

<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, the Global Trade Atlas showed only exports of industrial machinery (HS 84-85) worth of \$716,494 and metals (HS 72-83) worth of \$95,537 during the same period, with no imports. Such discrepancies were not found in any other Member States’ data the Panel investigated.

<sup>21</sup> The Panel further notes that some Member States’ views on HS Code allocation are not same with the Panel’s list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions, which the World Customs Organization (WCO) has recommended to the Panel (see S/2017/150 paragraph 257, S/2018/171 Annex 4 and S/2018/171/Corr.1). The Panel notes that the EU maintains a different list of HS Codes in implementing relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

December 2018			84, 85	17,000
April 2019			85	15,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[ Export ]

- 3) On Germany's exports to the DPRK, it replied that its customs authorities "identified one instance of a possible DPRK import of industrial machinery in 2018 (bottling and brewery equipment) that is subject to investigation [...] For 2019, there is no indication of any DPRK import from Germany in violation of applicable sanctions". Germany, however, informed that it had found two items under HS chapter 85 with a declared value of EUR 13,334.50 where the DPRK was "erroneously reported declared to be the destination while the destination was, in fact, the Republic of Korea."

#### Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Germany	DPRK	84	684,000
December 2018			84, 85	17,000
April 2019			85	15,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Ghana: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Ghana	DPRK	72-73	227,000
June 2018			72-73	562,000
July 2018			72-73	110,000
August 2018			72-73	11,000
September 2018			72-73	173,000
October 2018			72-73	23,000
January 2019			72-73	349,000
April 2019			72-73	10,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Textiles (HS 50-63)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Ghana	DPRK	50-63	16,000
May 2018			50-63	60,000
June 2018			50-63	26,000
July 2018			50-63	14,000
August 2018			50-63	92,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Seafood (HS 03, 1603-1605)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
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April 2018	Ghana	DPRK	03, 1603-1605	777,000
November 2018			03, 1603-1605	61,000
December 2018			03, 1603-1605	82,000
January 2019			03, 1603-1605	167,000
February 2019			03, 1603-1605	43,000
March 2019			03, 1603-1605	20,000
April 2019			03, 1603-1605	36,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Ghana	DPRK	85	247,000
July 2018			85	13,000
December 2018			85	34,000
April 2019			85	100,000
May 2019			85	679,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Ghana	DPRK	84	13,000
June 2018			84	38,000
July 2018			84	48,000
August 2018			84	37,000
September 2018			84	16,000
November 2018			84	15,000
January 2019			84	176,000
April 2019			84	22,000
May 2019			84	2,417,000
July 2019			84	20,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Guatemala:** Guatemala informed the Panel that its government has ordered an investigation into the case queried by the Panel and is waiting for the results of the investigation.

[ Import ]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2019	Guatemala	DPRK	72-73	62,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
March 2019	Guatemala	DPRK	84	36,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[ Export ]

**Metals (HS 72-83)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Guatemala	DPRK	72-83	28,000
June 2018			72-83	29,000
February 2019			72-83	22,000
March 2019			72-83	23,000
May 2019			72-83	22,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Honduras:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

**Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2018	Honduras	DPRK	72-73	11,000
May 2019			72-73	11,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Electrical equipment (HS 85)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Honduras	DPRK	85	23,000
May 2018			85	37,000
June 2018			85	6,000
July 2018			85	3,000
August 2018			85	0
September 2018			85	8,000
October 2018			85	9,000
November 2018			85	6,000
December 2018			85	8,000
January 2019			85	2,000
February 2019			85	4,000
March 2019			85	7,000
April 2019			85	28,000
May 2019			85	14,000
June 2019			85	23,000
July 2019			85	2,000
August 2019			85	4,000
September 2019			85	5,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Machinery (HS 84)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Honduras	DPRK	84	14,000
May 2018			84	21,000
June 2018			84	118,000
July 2018			84	4,000

August 2018			84	1,000
September 2018			84	145,000
October 2018			84	13,000
November 2018			84	22,000
December 2018			84	7,000
January 2019			84	42,000
February 2019			84	18,000
March 2019			84	65,000
April 2019			84	12,000
May 2019			84	59,000
June 2019			84	9,000
July 2019			84	50,000
August 2019			84	12,000
September 2019			84	14,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[ Export ]

#### Metals (HS 72 – 83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2018	Honduras	DPRK	72-83	22,000
February 2019				98,000
March 2019				49,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Honduras	DPRK	84-85	21,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**India:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	73	24,000
May 2018			73	10,000
September 2018			72	99,000
October 2018			72	115,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### Zinc (HS 79)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	79	439,000
May 2018			79	1,833,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### Electrical equipment (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	85	449,000
June 2018			85	17,000
September 2018			85	114,000
October 2018			85	10,000
February 2019			85	10,000
August 2019			85	119,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	India	DPRK	84	37,000
June 2018			84	125,000
July 2018			84	61,000
August 2018			84	40,000
October 2018			84	15,000
January 2019			84	26,000
April 2019			84	12,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[ Export ]

#### Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	India	DPRK	73	16,000
January 2019			72	38,000
February 2019			73	21,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	84, 85	36,000
July 2018			84, 85	11,000
August 2018			84	50,000
March 2019			84	70,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Indonesia:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	73	20,000
November 2018			73	20,000
January 2019			73	138,000
April 2019			73	147,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

**Copper (HS 74, 2603)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2019	Indonesia	DPRK	74, 2603	2,388,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Textiles (HS 50-63)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	54	37,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Electrical equipment (HS 85)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
November 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	85	12,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Machinery (HS 84)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	84	50,000
June 2018			84	64,000
July 2018			84	65,000
August 2018			84	287,000
October 2018			84	64,000
November 2018			84	68,000
December 2018			84	31,000
February 2019			84	50,000
April 2019			84	18,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

**Kazakhstan:** The Panel asked Kazakhstan for data on the import of iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73), textiles (HS 50-63), electrical equipment (HS 85) and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$798,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019. Kazakhstan replied that its State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance “has conducted a thorough re-examination and identified gross errors in the filing of customs declaration of 28 goods” because of 28 declarants “mistakenly indicated KP (DPRK) as instead of the code KR (Republic of Korea) [...] After detecting these technical errors in the system, the Kazakh authorities immediately undertook the necessary measures to rectify the codes. All accompanying documents, as well as certificates proving the origin of the goods, confirm that the actual import of the rechecked goods was from the Republic of Korea, not the DPRK.”

**Kenya:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

**Textiles (HS 50-63)**

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2018	Kenya	DPRK	54, 59	15,000
September 2018			63	21,000

October 2018			50-63	30,000
May 2019			50-63	11,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

#### Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2018	Kenya	DPRK	85	11,000
February 2019			85	82,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Kenya	DPRK	84	25,000
June 2019			84	31,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**Luxembourg:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Export ]

#### Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Luxembourg	DPRK	85	11,000
June 2019			84	270,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Russia:** The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	73	12,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### Electrical equipment (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	85	13,000
October 2018			85	24,000
January 2019			85	20,000
August 2019			85	13,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	84	95,000
February 2019			84	49,000

May 2019			84	22,000
July 2019			84	12,000
August 2019			84	21,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

[ Export ]

#### Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	73	56,000
June 2018			73	81,000
July 2018			72,73,83	23,000
August 2018			72,73,83	19,000
July 2019			72,73,76,83	161,000
August 2019			72-83	28,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

#### Vehicles (HS 86-89)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	86	16,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	84-85	167,000
August 2018			84-85	77,000
September 2018			84-85	22,000
November 2018			84	22,000
December 2018			84-85	55,000
January 2019			84-85	63,000
April 2019			84	11,000
June 2019			84	11,000
July 2019			84-85	977,000
August 2019			84-85	48,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Senegal: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

#### Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Senegal	DPRK	84	104,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[ Export ]

#### Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2019	Senegal	DPRK	72-83	271,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

**South Africa:** South Africa informed the Panel that the Panel's inquiry has been forwarded to its capital for action.

[ Import ]

#### Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2019	Senegal	DPRK	72-83	271,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[ Export ]

#### Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	South Africa	DPRK	73	27,000
August 2019			73	11,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

#### Industrial Machinery (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	South Africa	DPRK	85	22,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Spain:** The Panel asked Spain for data on the import of electrical equipment (HS 85) worth of \$34,000 from the DPRK in 2018. Spain replied that "the economic actor responsible for this transaction acknowledged that an error had been made [...] and has provided documents confirming the correct origin of the merchandise [...] listing the Republic of Korea, designated by the code KR, as the origin of the goods."

**Ukraine:** The Panel asked Ukraine for data on the import of machinery (HS 84) and export of industrial machinery (HS 84-85) worth of \$83,000 from/to the DPRK in 2018 and 2019. Ukraine replied to the Panel that "According to the State Custom Service of Ukraine there is no data on export and import to/from the DPRK of the goods mentioned in [the Panel's] letter during the period between April 2018 and September 2019."

**United Kingdom:** The Panel asked the UK for data on the import of electrical equipment (HS 85) and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$324,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019. UK replied that "These were actually shipments from [the ROK], but [...] it was mistakenly given the wrong code." It further confirmed that both shipments were inspected by its customs service and were confirmed to be legal imports.

**Uruguay:** The Panel asked Uruguay for data on the import of textiles (HS 50-63) and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$66,000 in 2018. Uruguay explained that the products originated from the DPRK but were brought into Uruguay through third countries. The Panel requested further documentation from Uruguay as the explanation could not be substantiated by trade statistics or original documentation.

#### Textiles (HS 50-63)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Uruguay	DPRK	50-63	18,000


Source: Global Trade Atlas

#### Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Uruguay	DPRK	84	23,000
June 2018			84	15,000
November 2018			84	10,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

## **Annex 20: Mansudae artists advertized at Jinzhao Art Museum website**



*Source:* Jinzhao Art Museum website <http://www.jzmsg.com/> (last viewed on 31 January 2020)

**Annex 21: Sign and building of Mansudae Art Museum and interview with its owner**





Source: YouTube

## Annex 22: China's reply to the Panel

### 4. OC. 141 (MOP Gallery follow-up)

According to an in-depth investigation by China, Beijing Yuan Mansudae is the parent company of Mansudae Art Museum, and used to be a joint venture between China and the DPRK. It has been converted to a solely China-owned company in early 2018 in accordance with relevant Security Council resolution, and has ceased its business cooperation with the DPRK side. Currently it has no subordination or cooperation relationship with the DPRK. As Mansudae Art Museum had been running for over 10 years and enjoyed prestige in China, it has not changed its signage in order to keep its features and maintain business.

*Source:* Member State

## Annex 23: Reply from Eritrea to the Panel's inquiry

ቀዢሚ ማኅበን ቤት አርቲራ  
አዲ መድሃት ስጋብርት ቤት : ፳፭ ዓርብ



البعثة الدائمة لدولة إريتريا  
لدى الأمم المتحدة - نيويورك

### Permanent Mission of The State of Eritrea To the United Nations, New York

19 December 2019

[REDACTED]

I refer to your letter, Ref. N. S/Ac. 49/2019/PE/OC.234, of 2 December this month.

Allow me to avail of the occasion to remind you that the Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the UN has duly responded to all your previous letters; I am specifically referring to the communications of S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC430, AC.49/2017/PE/OC.268, S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.917, and SCA/R/18/ (2), with relevant reference numbers, of all the letters sent.


In our letter of 3 October 2017 in particular, we had expounded in greater detail the deplorable victimization of Eritrea through fallacious reports of “an expert panel” and the imposition of unwarranted sanctions by the UNSC in 2009 and 2011 respectively. Although lifted belatedly last year, these sanctions have nonetheless inflicted considerable damage to the country.

Against this backdrop of inexcusable wrongs meted to a small Member State, we are baffled why the Panel seems intent to hark back to the dark days of injustice against our country. What are the underlying reasons for resuscitating today matters that were addressed fully in previous communications? What are the reasons for this apparent pattern of considering Eritrea as a soft prey and political punch bag for intermittent harassment on the basis of spurious and presumptive allegations?

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)  
United Nations, New York, NY, 10017

This cannot be acceptable by any standards. Indeed, Eritrea merits redress for past wrongs; not incessant harassment by invoking wild accusations.

Sincerely,



Amanuel Giorgio  
Deputy Permanent Representative of Eritrea  
to the United Nations  
New York

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 24: Member State's information concerning activity of KOMID**

According to a Member State, the following DPRK nationals are in Iran and working as KOMID representatives:

**Ha Won Mo**

Chief Representative to Iran

DOB: 15/01/1965

Passport: 836310022

**Kim Hak Chol**

Deputy Chief Representative to Iran

DOB: 13/04/1977

Passport: 836310107

Passport: 108210148

*Source:* Member States, The Panel

## Annex 25: Iran's reply to the Panel



Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 ny.mfa.gov.ir Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: Iran@un.int

In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

No. 113361

15 January 2020

Dear Sir,

I am writing in response to your letter dated 6 December 2019 (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.277) with regard to the implementation of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) for the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

I would like to inform you that Iranian authorities have meticulously reviewed the information provided in your letter regarding the "alleged illicit activities of DPRK officials in Iran". Accordingly, the following comments are hereby presented:

1. With respect to the claim regarding the "smuggling of gold and cash by DPRK individuals in Iran":
  - a. The letter does not elaborate on the links of the alleged actions (possible transfers of gold and cash from the UAE to Iran) with DPRK-related sanctions (transfer of cash and gold transiting to and from the DPRK). However, such activities in certain conditions could be against the Iranian national legislation, including the law on the fight against the smuggling of goods and foreign currency. Meanwhile, your letter does not provide enough information and evidence for Iranian authorities to initiate an investigation and establish the necessary facts. Therefore, it is kindly requested to advise the Member State that has submitted the information to directly provide us with verifiable information and credible evidence, especially regarding those activities that "are still ongoing".
  - b. Having reviewed the information in the Panel's most recent reports regarding the DPRK diplomats, Iranian authorities have carefully looked into the matter but have not hitherto observed any illicit activity. The activities of the DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran have been in conformity with Iran's national regulations as well as the international obligations of the DPRK.
  - c. With regard to the claim that certain DPRK citizens "in Iran are or have also been involved", I would like to refer to our letters dated 19 December 2018 (No.106192) and 30 July 2019 (No.110731) that there are no nationals of the DPRK registered to be residing in Iran other than their diplomats.



## Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 ny.mfa.gov.ir Tel:+1(212)667-2020 Fax:+1(212)667-7086 E-mail: iran@un.int

- d. The Panel's letter dated 29 November 2018 was duly responded to on 19 December 2018 (No.106192).
- 2. With respect to the claim regarding "KOMID representatives in Iran":
  - a. I would like to refer to our letters dated 19 December 2018 (No.106192) and 30 July 2019 (No.110731) that there are no nationals of the DPRK registered to be residing in Iran other than their diplomats.
  - b. KOMID and Saeng Pi'l do not have offices or representatives in Iran.
  - c. Since "a Member State" is constantly and continuously challenging this finding with no credible evidence or information that could be appropriately followed, the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot shed more light on this unless and until the concerned State engages in a bilateral cooperation with us.
  - d. Previous letters of the Panel are already replied to, and we consider them concluded.

I would like to reiterate that the inclusion of those baseless claims in your report would damage its credibility, requiring the panel to avoid reporting "on this case in its next report to the Security Council".

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to constructive engagement and full cooperation with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and would review any viable evidence and credible information with regard to any alleged actions in violation of the relevant Security Council sanctions.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
 Majid Takht Ravanchi  
 Ambassador  
 Permanent Representative

[REDACTED]  
 Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established  
 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Source: Member State

## **Annex 26: Member State's information concerning gold and cash smuggling**

A Member State assessed that the following DPRK nationals are or have been involved in gold and cash smuggling:

### **Pak Sin Hyok**

Economic and Commercial Counselor, DPRK Embassy in Iran,  
Dispatched from the Ministry of External Economic Relations (MEER)  
DOB: April 06, 1970  
Passport: 108110066

### **Ri Kuk Myong**

Economic and Commercial Secretary, DPRK Embassy in Iran  
DOB: March 07, 1977  
Passport number: 927410035

### **Mun Chol Yong**

Former DPRK Secretary-level diplomat to Tehran

### **Kim Yong Chol<sup>22</sup>**

Former Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) chief representative to Tehran

### **Jang Yong Son**

Former KOMID deputy representative to Tehran  
DOB: February 20, 1957  
Designated by UN Security Council in 2016 (KPi: 017)

### **Han Chol Ho**

Former Saeng Pil Trading Corporation (SPTC) chief representative to Tehran

### **Yang Thae Ho**

Former SPTC deputy representative in Tehran

*Source:* Member State, The Panel

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<sup>22</sup> See para 72, Annex 23 of S/2019/171 and table 8 of S/2017/150.

## Annex 27: The organizational and commanding structure of the RGB

According to the Member State, the RGB is organized under the General Staff Department, which exercises operational command and control over the Korea People's Army. As the General Staff Department is directly subordinate to the State Affairs Commission, the highest governmental body for military policy and political leadership, the line of control over the RGB stems directly from the top leadership. The RGB's hierarchical proximity to the top leadership of the DPRK demonstrates not only its high degree of strategic importance but also delineates the close bureaucratic oversight by the highest levels of leadership. Notwithstanding the presence of GSD between itself and the SAC, the RGB has historical and operational links directly to the SAC. RGB's overarching role in cyber operations of the DPRK and its proximity to the country's top leadership has been pointed out before.<sup>23</sup>

*Source:* Member State

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<sup>23</sup> For example, see Jun, LaFoy and Sohn, *North Korea's Cyber Operations: Strategy and Responses*, A Report of the CSIS Korea Chair, 2015, p.45. [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/publication/151216\\_Cha\\_NorthKoreasCyberOperations\\_Web.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf).

## **Annex 28: Kimsuky Group's cyberattacks to the UN Security Council Members**

According to a Member State, DPRK cyber actors have launched “file sharing”-themed spearphishing campaigns against the UN including the Security Council. The spearphishing emails contained a link which would redirect the victim to a malicious domain that is probably used to steal usernames and passwords of victims. Spearphishing emails for UN-affiliated targets included fraudulent requests to download a software update with hidden malware or reset log-in credential. The Member State further stated that Kimsuky sent spearphishing emails spoofing<sup>24</sup> a systems administrator to trick victims into downloading malware in August 2017.<sup>25</sup>

*Source:* Member State

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<sup>24</sup> Kimsuky Group often used spoofing, which is a technique in which the cyber actor generates a fake email or social media account to closely resemble or mimic the legitimate account of a real person or organization that the cyber actor is impersonating. This technique allows the cyber actors to take advantage of trusted relationships of the primary target.

<sup>25</sup> The ANSSI also pointed out that this hacking campaign can be traced back to 2017.

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**Annex 29: *Modus Operandi* of DPRK IT workers**

According to a Member State, there is a functional difference between DPRK IT workers and malicious cyber actors, and each group has a separate and distinct bureaucratic organization, education, and skill sets. DPRK IT workers focus on generating revenues for designated entities and individuals, and are expressly forbidden from conducting malicious activities and face punishment if they do it. According to the Member State, this DPRK does not want to draw attention to its overseas IT workers through an employee being arrested for hacking, reflecting of their defined role as a revenue-generating operative. However, some workers, anxious to make as much money as they can are tempted to fill requests from clients to hack targets. Some do this in spite of warnings against it. The Member State further stated that nearly all malicious cyber activity for the DPRK now comes from inside the DPRK itself and is conducted by the malicious cyber actors themselves.

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 30: List of DPRK Trading Corporations subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028) and its relations to the designated entities**

Kuryonggang Trading Corporation (구룡강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Ryungseng Trading Corporation (릉성무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Tangun Trading Corporation (단군무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Hangryon Trading Corporation (항련무역회사)	
Ryonbong General Corporation (련봉총회사)	*alias of KPe.002
5 Trading Corporation (5무역회사)	
Pugang Trading Corporation (부강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.038
Mirae Trading Corporation (미래무역회사)	
Ryonhap Trading Corporation (련합무역회사)	
Advanced Technology Trading Corporation (첨단기술무역회사)	
Jinhung Joint Production Corporation (진흥합작회사)	
Sobaeksu United Corporation (소백수련합회사)	
Pihosan Trading Corporation (비호산무역회사)	
Sinhung IT Trading Corporation (신흥정보기술무역회사)	
Chonryong Trading General Corporation (천룡무역총회사)	
Taesong Trading Corporation (조선태성무역회사)	
Peace Motors Corporation (평화자동차회사)	
Taeryonggang Trading Corporation (대령강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.004

*Source:* Member States

\*KPe.008: Korea Tangun Trading Corporation (조선단군무역회사)

\*KPe.002: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (조선련봉무역회사)

\*KPe.038: Korea Pugang Trading Corporation (조선부강무역회사)

\*KPe.004: Namchongang Trading Corporation (남천강무역회사)

## Annex 31: Chinese Business Registry Information of Dandong Haotong Commercial-Trade Co. Ltd.

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请输入企业名称、统一社会信用代码或注册号

---

**丹东浩通商贸有限公司** 存续（在营、开业、在册）  
 统一社会信用代码： 912106000598283394  
 法定代表人： 李毅  
 登记机关： 丹东市振兴区市场监督管理局  
 成立日期： 2013年01月24日

[发送报告](#)  
[信息分享](#)  
[信息打印](#)

基础信息

[行政许可信息](#)
[行政处罚信息](#)
[列入经营异常名录信息](#)
[列入严重违法失信企业名单（黑名单）信息](#)

**营业执照信息**

· 统一社会信用代码： 912106000598283394	· 企业名称： 丹东浩通商贸有限公司
· 类型： 有限责任公司(自然人投资或控股)	· 法定代表人： 李毅
· 注册资本： 80.000000万人民币	· 成立日期： 2013年01月24日
· 营业期限自： 2013年01月24日	· 营业期限至： 2033年01月24日
· 登记机关： 丹东市振兴区市场监督管理局	· 核准日期： 2018年10月26日
· 登记状态： 存续（在营、开业、在册）	
· 住所： 辽宁省丹东市振兴区青年大街133号2单元704室	
· 经营范围： 批发、零售：金属材料(不含稀贵金属)、化工产品及原料(不含危险品)、建筑材料、装饰材料、矿产品、机械设备、五金工具、电子产品、仪器仪表(不含计量器具)、汽车及配件、针纺织品、服装鞋帽、办公用品；农畜产品收购；货物及技术进出口(法律、法规禁止的不得经营；法律、法规限制的取得许可证后方可经营)(依法须经批准的项目，经相关部门批准后方可开展经营活动。)	

**股东及出资信息**

序号	股东名称	股东类型	证照/证件类型	证照/证件号码	详情
正在加载，请稍候					

**主要人员信息**

李俊 监事	李毅 执行董事兼经...
----------	-----------------

共计 2 条信息

**分支机构信息**

暂无分支机构信息	
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**“多证合一”信息公示**

提示：该企业下列证照事项通过“多证合一”已整合至该企业营业执照

序号	备案事项名称	备注
1	单位办理住房公积金缴存登记	

共 查阅到 1 条记录 共 1 页

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清算信息				
暂无清算信息				
变更信息				
序号	变更事项	变更前内容	变更后内容	变更日期
1	地址变更（住所地址、经营场所、驻在地址等变更）	丹东市滨江中路97号301室	辽宁省丹东市振兴区青年大街133号2单元704室	2018年10月25日
2	高级管理人员备案（董事、监事、经理等）	1李毅监事;2李俊执行董事兼总经理;	1李毅执行董事兼总经理;2李俊监事;	2018年6月3日
3	负责人变更（法定代表人、负责人、首席代表、合伙事务执行人等变更）	李俊	李毅	2018年6月3日
4	高级管理人员备案（董事、监事、经理等）	1李俊监事;2李毅执行董事兼总经理;	1李毅监事;2李俊执行董事兼总经理;	2015年3月16日
5	负责人变更（法定代表人、负责人、首席代表、合伙事务执行人等变更）	李毅	李俊	2015年3月16日

共查询到 5 条记录 共 1 页

首页 上一页 1 下一页 尾页

点击或下拉加载更多信息

主办单位：国家市场监督管理总局  
 地址：北京市西城区三里河东路八号 邮政编码：100820 备案号：京ICP备16053442号-1  
[业务咨询与技术支持联系方式](#)

Source : Chinese National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System(国家企业信用信息公示系统)

## Annex 32: Chinese Business Registry Information of Yanbian Silverstar Network Technology Co.

The screenshot displays the business registration information for Yanbian Silverstar Network Technology Co. on the Chinese National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System. Key details include:

- 统一社会信用代码:** 91222401MA0Y31E659
- 法定代表人:** 元吉秀
- 登记机关:** 延吉市市场和质量监督管理局
- 成立日期:** 2015年10月13日

On the right side of the header, there are three buttons: "发送报告" (Send Report), "信息分享" (Information Share), and "信息打印" (Information Print).

The main content area is divided into several sections:

- 基础信息:** Includes basic company information like name, code, legal representative, and registration date.
- 行政许可信息:** Shows administrative permits, such as business license information.
- 行政处罚信息:** Lists any administrative penalties or fines imposed on the company.
- 列入经营异常名录信息:** Details about being listed in the 'Business Abnormal Registration List'.
- 列入严重违法失信企业名单(黑名单)信息:** Details about being listed in the 'List of Severe Violations and Dishonesty Enterprises (Blacklist)'.
- 营业执照信息:** Detailed business license information, including address and scope of operation.
- 股东及出资信息:** Shows the shareholders and their capital contributions. Two shareholders are listed: Wang Zhiyu (自然人股东) and Yuan Jixiu (自然人股东).
- 主要人员信息:** Lists key personnel: Wang Zhiyu (监事) and Yuan Jixiu (执行董事兼经理).
- 右侧操作栏:** Includes buttons for "关注" (Follow), "订阅" (Subscribe), "异议" (Objection), and "返回" (Back).

At the bottom, there is a footer with contact information for the system's operators.

Source : Chinese National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System(国家企业信用信息公示系统)

## Annex 33: Business Entry for the Yong Bong Chand IT Company

**Biskoon®**  
Integrated Digital Marketing Solution

Classified Job Business Review

POST FREE Classified Job Business

Classified Search Job Search Business Search Review Search

### Business & Directory

Y E L L O W P A G E

Home > Business > Yong bong Chand I.T.Company

Business Directory | Yellow Pages of Nepal | Biskoon® Directory

**Yong bong Chand I.T.Company**

Claim this listing

Write the first review!

Posted by **Biskoon** on 11-03-2019 20:41:15 in Computer, IT & Internet never

**Send a message**

Description

Software consultancy and supply | Data Processing

Details

District Kathmandu

Location Map

The map displays the geographical location of the company in Kathmandu, Nepal. The city is marked with a red pin on a detailed map of the region, which includes parts of India and China. Labels for various states and provinces are visible, such as Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh. The map also shows major rivers like the Brahmaputra and Ganges.

315 hits Print Recommend: Report

Source: <https://www.biskoon.com/business/entry/view/8987-yong-bong-chand-i-t-company> (Last accessed on 28 January 2020)

## Annex 34: DPRK workers repatriated from Nepal

## INVENTORY OF DPRK CITIZENS IN BUSINESS AND DEPENDENT VISA

S.N.	NAME	COMPANY NAME	STATUS	DEPARTURE	ARRIVAL ON	P.P. NO.
1.	KIM JONG GWAN	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2015-11-10	2017-12-01	927331463
2.	AN HI HANG	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-11-10	2017-12-01	927432302
3.	RI CHOL RYONG	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2016-12-11	936438059
4.	MRS. SONG HUJIRI	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	N/A	308231166
5.	MR. SONG CHOLCHOE	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2016-03-27	936132128
6.	RI YOUNG MAN	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	Departed before 2014.			
7.	SONG KUC SONI	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-11-10	2017-10-10	94434704
8.	JONG NAM WON	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2019-01-18	927330573
9.	JONG SON CHOE	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2019-01-18	927330576
10.	JIN HYOK PAE	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2019-04-20	345234954
11.	YUN PHYONG	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2018-11-19	927330578
12.	PAEK SONG HYOK	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2018-11-19	927330581
13.	SUN YONG KIM	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2018-11-05	927330574
14.	MILYU SONG JON	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2017-12-19	927330580
15.	UN HIA HWANG	BOT ON GANG RES TAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232867
16.	YONG IM SIN	BOT ON GANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232865
17.	CHANG HAM ILU	BOT ON GANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2019-03-21	308232800
18.	KYONG IL JI	BOT ON GANG RES TAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232813
19.	WON MONG KIM	BOT ON GANG RES TAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232811
20.	UN JONG KIM	BOT ON GANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232870
21.	HYO SON KIM	BOT ON GANG RES TAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232872
22.	YON HUJI	BOT ON GANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232873
23.	HYON HUI CHOE	BOT ON GANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232868
24.	MI SONG CHOE	BOT ON GANG RES TAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232869
25.	HO KWANG	BOT ON GANG RESTAURANT	Departed	2019-12-15	2019-03-07	308331208
26.	HEY SONG KIM	BOT ON GANG RES TAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-10-18	2018-11-22	308130437
27.	YONG GYONG HO	BOT ON GANG RES TAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-10-18	2018-11-22	934432333
28.	UN GYONG KIM	BOT ON GANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232848
29.	SON HUI PAK	MINAS RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-07-17	308232866
30.	IL RAN HO	MINAS RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-07-17	308237871
31.	JONG KUM YONG	MINAS RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-07-17	308237850
32.	MS. RI OK MI	PYONGYANG AIRIANG	DEPARTED	2019-03-19	N/A	745130660
33.	MS. JONG SONG MI	PYONGYANG AIRIANG	DEPARTED	2019-05-02	2015-01-25	745130659
34.	HO KWANG	PYONGYANG AIRIANG	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2019-03-07	308331210
35.	CHONG OK JU	PYONGYANG AIRIANG	Departed before 2014.			
36.	MS. JU OK HWANG	HIMALAYAN SOUE	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-04-03	308230406
37.	MS. ILHYANG KANG	HIMALAYAN SOUE	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-04-03	927337511
38.	JUN MIN KWON	HIMAL CHILBO IT	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-06-25	308441360
39.	KWANG SUK RI	HIMAL CHILBO IT	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-06-25	308441370
40.	CHONG RYONG AN	HIMAL CHILBO IT	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-06-25	40441271

41	RI SUN HYONG	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN
42	KIM THAE SONG	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN
43	KIM JONG SU	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN
44	CHOE SONG HUI	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN
45	KUM HUI RYU	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN
46	YONG JU KIM	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN
47	CHANG SUK RYU	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN
48	HAN SON NYO	PYONGYANG OKRUHWAN

Source: Member State

## Annex 35: Joint letter regarding DPRK overseas workers and Member States' obligations under relevant resolutions

**Annex to the letter dated 2 January 2020 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

We are writing in order to draw your attention to the issue of overseas workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Member States' obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. In paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council decided that Member States shall repatriate to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea all the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction, subject to limited exceptions. The Council unanimously agreed this action should be completed by 22 December 2019.

This decision was not taken lightly but reflected the continuous violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of Security Council resolutions with the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile weapons programme. This was a proportionate, targeted and appropriate response to address fundraising by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for such programmes. It was and still is a vital step for international peace and security.

Two years later, the deadline for repatriation has arrived. Democratic People's Republic of Korea nationals' earning income within the jurisdiction of a Member State now needs to have been fully repatriated, in a manner consistent with Security Council resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), regardless of their occupation (e.g. student, trainee, medical personnel, athlete), employer (including foreign entities), type of visa (e.g. tourism) and date at which they obtained work authorizations, visas or contracts.

Responsible States around the globe have been working to repatriate qualifying Democratic People's Republic of Korea nationals, often in the face of attempts to conceal or obscure their presence or to conduct their business on the black market. We commend the diligence and efforts of so many States to meet their obligations.

We would like to take this opportunity to remind States that, as of this date, the presence of Democratic People's Republic of Korea workers' earning income in their jurisdiction, as explained in Security Council resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), is a violation of international law. We encourage States to submit any information pertaining to the continued presence of Democratic People's Republic of Korea workers outside the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) for proper investigation and reporting, at [dpa-poel874@un.org](mailto:dpa-poel874@un.org).

All States need to provide final reports to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#), at [sc-1718-committee@un.org](mailto:sc-1718-committee@un.org), no later than 22 March 2020, to confirm they have completed their checks against these obligations. Those Member States that failed to meet the midterm report deadline in 2019 still have an opportunity to comply with the final reporting requirement of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#) by providing their final reports by the 22 March 2020 deadline.

(*Signed*) Mitchell Fifield  
Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve  
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Marc-André Blanchard  
Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

(Signed) Marie Chatardová  
Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the United Nations

(Signed) Martin Bille Hermann  
Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

(Signed) Sven Jürgenson  
Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations

(Signed) Jukka Salovaara  
Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations

(Signed) Anne Gueguen  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

(Signed) Christoph Heusgen  
Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

(Signed) Antonios Papakostas  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations

(Signed) Katalin Annamária Bogyay  
Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations

(Signed) Geraldine Byrne Nason  
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations

(Signed) Ishikane Kimihiro  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

(Signed) Ivars Liepnieks  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations

(Signed) Audra Plepytė  
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Lithuania  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Christian Braun  
Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations

(Signed) Giovanni Battista Buttigieg  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malta to the United Nations

(Signed) Amatlain Elizabeth Kabua  
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Marshall Islands  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Jane J. Chigiyal  
Permanent Representative of the Federated States of Micronesia

(Signed) Karel Jan Gustaaf van Oosterom  
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Craig John Hawke  
Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations

(Signed) Néstor Popolizio  
Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations

(Signed) Joanna Wronecka  
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations

(Signed) Ondina Blokar Drobic  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations

(Signed) Agustin Santos Maraver  
Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations

(Signed) Yuriy Vitrenko  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations

(Signed) Karen Pierce  
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

(Signed) Kelly Craft  
Permanent Representative of the United States of America  
to the United Nations

Source: The Panel

**Annex 36: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department Commentary (English translation)**

*Translated from Russian*

**Comments by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation regarding the letter sent by a group of States to the General Assembly on the issue of overseas workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

146-30-01-2020

We have taken note of the letter, sent by the Permanent Mission of Germany on behalf of 28 States and circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, regarding the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions on the repatriation of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea working abroad.

It is not entirely clear why a group of countries, most of which are not represented on the Security Council, has decided to impart lessons to others on how to implement the decisions of the principal international body responsible for maintaining international peace and security and taken it upon itself to assess the “diligence” of some and urge others that are “lagging behind” to catch up.

It is interesting to note that the prime mover behind the letter was the Permanent Mission of the State that currently chairs the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). Germany, like any other State, naturally has its own position concerning international political issues. Nonetheless, the role of Chair of a Security Council sanctions committee requires a modicum of restraint and presupposes detachment, impartiality and, in general, a particular sense of responsibility for creating an atmosphere of trust and conditions conducive to reaching consensual solutions.

Unfortunately, the situation regarding Security Council sanctions on North Korea as they apply to overseas workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been distorted in the “letter of the twenty-eight”. In particular, students, trainees, athletes and tourists, as well as North Koreans working abroad for employers who are natural or legal persons of third countries,

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are included in that category without the slightest justification. Following the logic of the letter's authors, therefore, the restrictions imposed by the Security Council apply to nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea merely by virtue of their presence in the territory of other States, regardless of the nature of their occupation. That is a misreading of paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), which in fact refers to the repatriation within specified periods of North Koreans working and earning income in the jurisdiction of other States.

This broad interpretation by the “group of twenty-eight” of the resolution’s provisions is clearly in keeping with the desire of the United States and its allies to exert “maximum pressure” on Pyongyang by whatever means. Whether such a hard line is conducive to making progress on reaching a settlement on the Korean Peninsula is doubtful in the extreme.

Source:

[https://www.mid.ru/foreign\\_policy/news/-/asset\\_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4014034](https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4014034)

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**Annex 37: DPRK workers affiliated to Maibong Sukidar Medical Co. Ltd.  
whose work permit has been granted/renewed**

(underlined applications are possibly intentionally duplicated using different spelling)

	Work Permit Number	Title	Name	Type	date permit granted
1	WPB. 9138/17	Dr	Sola Pak	Renewal	2019/11/1
2	WPB.9146/17	Dr	Kyong Il Ju	Renewal	2019/11/1
3	WPB. 9136/17	Dr	Myong Hui Choe	Renewal	2019/11/1
4	WPB. 9137/17	Dr	Kyong Song Kim	Renewal	2019/11/1
5	WPB/2614/19	Mrs	<u>Yon Sim Ryang</u>	New	2019/10/8
6	WPB 2614/19	Mrs	<u>Yon Sin Ryang</u>	New	2019/9/16
7	WPB.3280/19	Ms	Sun Yong Choe	New	2019/9/17
8	WPB 3281/19	Mr	Jong Hui Kim	New	2019/9/13
9	WPB 3279/19	Mr	Son Hui Song	New	2019/9/13
10	WPB3278/19	Mr	Kwang Jin Ho	New	2019/9/13
11	WPB 7427/17	Mr	Un Ju Pak	Renewal	2019/9/6
12	WPB 7432/17	Mr	Sung Chol Kim	Renewal	2019/9/6
13	WPB 7424/17	Mr	Hyon Chol Ri	Renewal	2019/9/3
14	WPB 7428/17	Ms	Song Hwa Pyon	Renewal	2019/9/3
15	WPB 5100/17	Dr	Hyang Ryu	Renewal	2019/8/27
16	WPB 5097/17	Dr	Insu Kim	Renewal	2019/8/15
17	WPB 5096/17	Dr	Ok Slin Kim	Renewal	2019/8/15
18	WPB 5095/17	Dr	Kwon Il Pak	Renewal	2019/8/16
19	WPC 1185/19	Dr	<u>Sin Chol Ho</u>	New	2019/7/10
20	WPB 1185/19	Mr	<u>Chol Ho Sin</u>	New	2019/7/19
21	WPB 4840/17	Mr	Chol Ho Tong	Renewal	2019/5/31
22	WPB 3445/17	Mr	Ok Ju Won	Renewal	2019/5/31
23	WPB3560/17	Mr	Thae Gil Ham	Renewal	2019/5/31
24	WPB 3444/17	Mr	In Hak Pak	Renewal	2019/5/31
25	WPB/1836/17	Ms	Myong suk Ro	Renewal	2019/3/12
26	WPB/5104/17	Mr	Tryong Ju Kwon	Renewal	2019/3/12
27	WPB/1835/17	Mr	Kwang Chol Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12
28	WPB/1834/17	Ms	Yong Hui Kang	Renewal	2019/3/12
29	WPB/1839/17	Mr	Myong Sim Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12

30	WPB/1838/17	Mr	Myong Chol Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12
31	WPB/1840/17	Mr	Kwang Il Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12
32	WPB1837/17	Mr	Su chol Kim	Renewal	2019/3/15
33	WPB/1397/19	Dr	Ryon Hong Kang	New	2019/4/16
34	WPB/1398/19	Dr	Jong Ae Kim	New	2019/4/16
35	WPB/1426/19	Dr	Song Hui Ri	New	2019/4/16
36	WPB/1401/19	Mr	Hyon Su Ri	New	2019/5/03
37	WPB 3554/17	Mr	Yun sop Sim	Renewal	2019/5/17
38	WPB 3555/17	Mr	Sun Nyo Kim	Renewal	2019/5/17
39	WPB/1186/19	Mr	Ho ILl Mun	New	2019/5/24

*Source:* Tanzanian Prime Minister's Office of Labour, Youth, Employment and Persons with Disability,  
The Panel

## Annex 38: Cambodia's Declaration on the deregistrtration of company from Register of Commerce

<p>KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA Nation Religion King សាស្ត្រ សាគរ</p> <p>Ministry of Commerce No. 317</p> <p><b>Declaration on the deregistration of company from Register of Commerce</b></p> <p><u>Reference:</u> -UNSC's resolutions No. 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) on the sanctions against North Korea. -Letter No. 7824 dated 06 September 2019 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. -Decision made by the interministerial working group for national report writing concerning the implementation of UNSC's resolutions on the sanction against North Korea, at a meeting dated 24 December 2019. -Joint Declaration No. 1326 dated 25 December 2019 on the formation of the interministerial working group for national report writing concerning the implementation of UNSC's resolutions on the sanctions against North Korea.</p> <p><u>Hereby decide</u></p> <p><b>Article 1:</b> To deregister below enterprises/companies from Register of Commerce:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. PYONGYANG UNHASU CO., LTD. with registration No. 00009590 dated 27 April 2016</li><li>2. SUNRISE HORIZON CO., LTD. with registration No. 00021223 dated 03 August 2015</li><li>3. UJ IMPORT EXPORT CO., LTD. with registration No. 00027520 dated 24 August 2017</li><li>4. THE BRANDS CLASSIC CO., LTD. with registration No. 00029623 dated 27 November 2017</li><li>5. MANSUDEA NEW TECH CORPORATION LTD. with registration No. 00030642 dated 29 December 2010</li><li>6. JUPIC (CAMBODIA) TRADING CO., LTD. with registration No. 00007363 dated 01 July 2014</li><li>7. HAEGEUM RIVER SOFT DRINK SHOP with registration No. 50005582 dated 16 January 2018</li><li>8. SACH ANG SING PYONG with registration No. 50007276 dated 04 October 2018</li><li>9. HO SERYONG PYONG YANG ARIRANG with registration No. 50005111 dated 18 December 2017</li><li>10. PYONG YANG TRADITIONAL NOODLE with registration No. 50004694 dated 12 December 2003</li><li>11. PYONG YANG RESTAURANT with registration No. 50005187 dated 04 December 2017</li></ol> <p><b>Article 2:</b> The Cabinet Director, Director General of Trade Services, Director of Business Registration and the above-mentioned companies must implement this PRAKAS from the date of signature onward.</p> <p><u>CC:</u> - Members of Interministerial Working Group for national report writing concerning the implementation of UNSC's resolutions on the sanctions against North Korea. - Phnom Penh Capital Hall - As in Article 2 "for implementation" - Documentation-Archives</p> <p>Done in Phnom Penh, Monday, 30 December 2019 Minister of Commerce (Signed &amp; Sealed): PAN SORASAK</p> <p>No. ០០៣៧៥/២០២០/៩៨៩៨៧ Certified correct translation with the Khmer text. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. General Department of Legal, Consular and Border Affairs, Phnom Penh, 09 January 2020.</p> <p>IN DARA Deputy Director-General General Department of Legal, Consular and Border Affairs</p>
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Source: <https://www.biskoon.com/business/entry/view/8987-yong-bong-chand-i-t-company> (Last accessed on 28 January 2020)

### Annex 39: Visa issued to DPRK nationals in 2019

According to the website of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation issued 7,703 tourist visas to DPRK nationals in the third quarter of 2019, some 12 times more than for the same period in 2017. From first quarter to the third quarter of 2017, 1,326 DPRK nationals received Russian tourist visas. The figure for the same period in 2019 was 12,834, an increase of 868 percent. Also, the Russian Federation issued 3,611 more student visas to DPRK nationals in third quarter 2019 than in the same period in 2017. From first to third quarter 2017, 162 DPRK nationals received Russian student visas. The equivalent figure for the same period in 2019 was 7,162, an increase of 4321 percent.

Several media reports alleged that DPRK nationals entered the Russian Federation in 2019 on student visas or as industrial trainees for the purpose of earning income.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Radio Free Asia, « North Korean Workers Skirt Sanctions to Return to Russia”

29 March 2019, [Daily NK](#), “[North Korean laborers reach Russian construction sites despite sanctions](#)” 24 July 2019

## Annex 40: The delivery route of Mercedes-Benz S-600 Long Guard sedans

- The two Mercedes-Benz class WDD222 S 600 Long Guard sedans with Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) WDD222 1761A355444 and WDD2221761A356398 were produced by Daimler AG in Sindelfingen in February 2018 upon a customer's request (discussions started in 2017), and were shipped to EUROPEAN CARS & MORE, S.R.L<sup>27</sup>. This company deals, inter alia, with car armoring at customer's request. On 28 February 2018 the vehicles were registered - and still were as of September 2019 - at Pubblico Registro Automobilistico Italiano (Certificato cronologico Targa: FN036CH and FN 046CH) (See Figure 1)

Figure 1 A certificate of registration of one of the Mercedes

**CERTIFICATO CRONOLOGICO**

**TARGA:** FN046CH

In base alle risultanze dell'archivio si certifica:

**( 01 ) PRIMA ISCRIZIONE DI VEICOLO NUOVO**

R.P.	A016114S
del	06/03/2018
Targa	FN046CH
Ufficio PRA di Competenza	CHIETI

Telaio	WDD2221761A355444
Fabbrica / Tipo	MERCEDES-BENZ 221 P P17BP0 NZSA0404
Data immatricolazione	15/02/2018
Data Rilascio Carta Circolazione	15/02/2018
KW	390,00
Classe / Uso	AUTOVEICOLO / PRIVATO LOCAZIONE SENZA CONDUCENTE PER USO SPECIALE
Carrozzeria	FURGONE
Specialità	VEICOLO BLINDATO
Cilindrata	5980
Alimentazione	BENZINA
Tara	4160
Portata	640
Peso complessivo	4800
Posti n.ro	4
Assi n.ro	2
Tipo atto	SCRITTURA PRIVATA
Data atto	26/02/2018
Proprietario	EUROPEAN CARS & MORE
Sesso / Tipo società	SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA
Comune di residenza	LANCIANO (CH)
Indirizzo	VIA DEL MARE 141 - 66034
Venditore	MERCEDES-BENZ ROMA
Sesso / Tipo società	SOCIETA' PER AZIONI
Comune di residenza	ROMA (RM)
Indirizzo	VIA ZOE FONTANA 220 - 00131
Prezzo del veicolo	***** 421.926,23 * Euro

**ANNOTAZIONI**  
Rilasciato certificato di proprietà

Certificazione del 08/10/2019 20:45:33

**DIRIGENTE RESPONSABILE**

**GIORGIO BRANDI**

Importo bollo 16,00 Euro Non Sogg. Art. 15 DPR 633/72  
Importo emolumenti 9,00 Euro Fuori campo IVA - D.M. del 21 marzo 2013

foglio n.ro 1 segue foglio aggiuntivo

Source: The Panel

<sup>27</sup> Address - Via Del Mare,141 -66034, Lanciano (CH), Italy

2. The Panel, however, obtained information and documentation confirming that in early June 2018 two cars with these VIN numbers were loaded into containers numbered ALLU4337574 and ALLU6320077 with seal numbers BS175555 and BS175553, respectively. The forwarder was Sleenburg and Huyser B.V.<sup>28</sup> The shipper was LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL.<sup>29</sup> This company and some of its top management are known to the Panel to have previous contacts with the DPRK.
  3. On 20 June, the containers were loaded onto the vessel of a major international shipping company, addressed to the consignee Dalian Shangen International Trade Co. Ltd (fig.2)<sup>30</sup>

Fig.2. The B/L with Dalian Shangen International Trade Co. Ltd as the consignee

ORIGINAL

PORT TO PORT OR CONSIGNEE TRANSPORT BILL OF LADING

1. Shipper LE LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL VIALE CIRCONLEVI LIGURIA 236 00119 ROMA	Porting No. Bill of Lading No. CO04513397630		
2. Consignee DALIAN SWANHENG INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LTD DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, GANGMAN STREET, UNIT 20A UNIT 8, 9TH FLOOR - DALIAN *	Booking Ref. Export Reference UE20183528.		
Forwarding Agent and Reference: N/A/C/Ref No.			
Port and Country of Origin: N/A			
3. Notify Party DALIAN SWANHENG INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LTD DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, GANGMAN STREET, UNIT 20A UNIT 8, 9TH FLOOR - DALIAN *	Above Notify Party -rossing & Initials: *F/N: 13132201617 / 0411-82718055 / 0411-82786077 / FAX 0411-82766799 CODE: 91210202MA0UOLGYCT0		
4. Combined Transport* DALIAN	Pre-Carriage by Rotterdam, ZUID-HOLLAND		
5. Ocean Vessel Vessel No. COSCO BRAIN 0216	7. Port of Loading ROTTERDAM		
6. Port of Discharge DALIAN	8. Combined Transport* Place of Delivery FCL / FCL CY-CY		
Marks & Nos. Container - See No. ALLU6220077 / BS175553	No. of Container in Packages 1 PIECE	Description of Goods or Description (Goods, See Clause 20) 1 PIECE / FCL / FCL / 40HQ/ 4800.00KGS	Gross Weight Net Weight/Unit
ALLU4337574 / BS175555	1 PIECE	1 PIECE / FCL / FCL / 40HQ/ 4800.00KGS MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD CAR SERIENNUMMER A001 817 80 32 A222 584 28 01 WDD2221761A355444 - WUD2221761A356398	
OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID ON CY-CY TERM SHIPPER'S LOAD STOW COUNT AND SEAL SHIPPER'S OWN CONTAINERS			
Desired Cargo Value USD 10 Total Number of Containers and/or Passages (in words) SAY TWO CONTAINERS TOTAL		Declaration or Comments for Shipper's use Only Well port of This Bill, Comment	
11 Freight & Charges Revenue Type	Rate	Per	Amount
			Freight & Charges Priced in / Inc.

*Source:* The Panel

<sup>28</sup> Address - Vasteland, 38J 3011BM, Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

<sup>29</sup> Address -Viale Charles Lenormant 236 00119, Roma 82718055, Italy.

<sup>30</sup> Address -People's Republic of China, Liaoning province, Dalian city, Zhongshan district, Gangwan St, 20A, unit 8. The representative of Dalian Shangen, managing this shipment, was Ms. Zhao Fuchao (趙福超), who was also Former CEO (nominal) of Dalian Oceanking Flying International Logistics Co., Ltd (大连海辰名扬国际物流有限公司 (Address: RM. 2902, Mingshi Fortune Center No. 20A, Gangwan Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China (in Chinese: 大连市中山区港湾街20号名仕财富A2902), and the customer for this delivery was her business partner, Mr.Yufeng E (鄂玉峰). CEO, (辽宁益森堂生物科技有限公司 (a.k.a. ECO-GINSENG)

4. The cars arrived in Dalian on 31 July 2018 with onward transportation, planned by the “receiving party” (see footnote 32) to what the receiving party called a “Russian customer”, aboard a bulk vessel. Accordingly the shipping company was requested to change the consignee on a new B/L to an entity stipulated as “Flot.DV-LLC, address 4-28 Zhigura St. Vladivostok,” (written with several mistakes: the right spelling would be Vladivostok and the name of the company (in Russian- “ООО Флот .ДВ) in English is not “Flot.DV-LLC”, but “Fleet.DV-LLC) and a new B/L was drafted by the transporting company (Fig 4).

Figure 3 Request for a change of the consignee

**From:** [REDACTED] @slavenburg-en-huyser.nl> **Sent:** vrijdag 10 augustus 2018 10:48 **To:** [REDACTED] @coscon.nl> Cc: [REDACTED] @coscon.nl>; [REDACTED] @coscon.nl> **Subject:** RE: COSCO SHIPPING LINES B/L Proforma No.: COSU4513397630 Vessel: COSCO SPAIN SVVD: AEU3-CCS-021 E SHIPPER REF: UE20183528. [From: xiaye ]  
Goedemorgen  
Originele bl's zijn in Dalian ingeleverd.  
De losse originele wordt binnen enkele ogenblikken bij jullie ingeleverd. Dan zijn alle drie de b.l.s ingeleverd.  
Mochten jullie willen weten van Cosco Dalian of ze daadwerkelijk ingeleverd zijn kunnen jullie: lilm@cosfrel.com contacten, die schijnt er over te gaan.  
Kun je regelen dat zodra de bl's er zijn een release wordt opgemaakt met onderstaande consignee / notify?  
FLOT.DV-LLC 4-28 ZHIGURA ST. VLADIVOSTOK, RUSSIA TEL +7 984-1540472 EMAIL: flot-dv@bk.ru  
Alvast bedankt  
Mvg [REDACTED]  
**Van:** cosco shipping [REDACTED] @coscon.com> **Verzonden:** dinsdag 12 juni 2018 8:36  
**Aan:** [REDACTED] @slavenburg-en-huyser.nl> **Onderwerp:** COSCO SHIPPING LINES B/L Proforma No.: COSU4513397630 Vessel: COSCO SPAIN SVVD: AEU3-CCS-021 E SHIPPER REF: UE20183528. [From: xiaye ]  
This is system auto email, please do not reply it directly. Please confirm the attached B/L or inform us about any amendment by mailto: [REDACTED] @coscon.com

*Source:* The Panel

Figure 4 A new B/L with “Flot.DV-LLC” as the consignee

SEA WAYBILL


NON-Negotiable SEA WAYBILL FOR COMBINED TRANSPORT OR PORT TO PORT

1. Shipper - Insert Name, Address and Phone/Fax		Booking No.	Sea Waybill No.	
RS LOGISTICS & EXPEDITION SRL VIALE CHARLES LENOIR DANT 215 00119 ROMA			C0004510097600	
2. Consignee - Insert Name, Address and Phone/Fax		Forwarding Agent and Reference Not applicable		
FLOT SV-LIC 4-18 SHIGURA ST. VLADIVOSTOK, RUSSIA TEL: + 884-1540472 EMAIL: FLOT-SV@RBT.RU		Port and Country of Origin		
3. Notify Party - Insert Name, Address and Phone/Fax		Area Notify Party-Contact & Instructions		
FLOT SV-LIC 4-18 SHIGURA ST. VLADIVOSTOK, RUSSIA TEL: + 884-1540472 EMAIL: FLOT-SV@RBT.RU		(It is agreed that no responsibility will attach to our company if no advice is given)		
4. Combined Transport - Referring to:		5. Combined Transport - Place of Despatch ROTTERDAM, ZUID-HOLLAND		
"S.S. Blue Wave" IMO No. COCO 2849N 0118		6. Mode of Loading ROTTERDAM		
7. Port of Discharge DALIAN		7. Combined Transport - Place of Delivery FCL / FCL		
Weight & Size Gross Tons / Net Tons		Description of Goods (If dangerous Goods, See Clause 20)		Gross Weight
ALLWE120077 / B01750552		1. PIECE / FCL / FCL / 40HQ/		4800.000000
ALLWE120077 / B01750553		1. PIECE / FCL / FCL / 40HQ/		4800.000000
		MERCEDES 5600 SEDAN LONG GUARD CAR SERIENNUMMER A001 817 80 11 CAR SERIENNUMMER A001 817 80 11 W001174 801 W001174 801 W001174 801 W001174 801		
		W001174 801 W001174 801 W001174 801 W001174 801		
OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID ON C.I.C. TERM SHIPPER'S LOAD STOW COUNT AND EX-IMPORT-100% C.I.F. CONTAINERS		SEAL		
Signed cargo vessel with Signature of Captain and Passages in order Subject to Clause 7 Limitation		Description of Contents for Shippers Use Only (not part of This Sea Waybill Contract)		
10. Total Number of Containers and/or Packages in order Subject to Clause 7 Limitation		ONE TWO CONTAINERS TOTAL		
11. Freight & Charges		Revenue Type	Rate	Fee
Reckoned in accordance with general terms and conditions agreed by shipper and carrier. The total number of the packages in units specified in the consignment. An description of the goods and the weight, when it is the case. The shipper is authorized by the receiver, and which the carrier has the responsibility of proving that is not a part of this Sea Waybill contract. The carrier has issued <u>      </u> Sea Waybill. The recipient agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions of the Sea Waybill or if such has previously signed this Sea Waybill.				
Represents only those documents used as a Combined Transport Sea Waybill.				
Despatches and Despatcher must be entered according to the form published at the main page of <a href="http://www.1000000000000000.com">www.100000000000000.com</a> . In any ambiguity or discrepancy between the Despatcher Form Report, this document and any other information, all non- <a href="http://www.100000000000000.com">www.100000000000000.com</a>				
9805 Date of Issue 20 JUN 2018 Place of Issue ROTTERDAM		Signed for the Car		
		Date Landed on Board 20 JUN 2018		
		Signed by		

*Source:* The Panel

5. The Dalian port authorities did not, however, approve the transshipment of the vehicles onboard the break bulk vessel.
6. On 16 August 2018, the shipper, Logistica & Spedizioni SRL, supposedly at the request of the “receiving party”, sent to the shipping company an official request for a change to a new consignee, Zuisyo Co., Ltd<sup>31</sup> (Fig. 6) also using apparently falsified documents, probably without the authorization of Zuisyo. A new B/L was again issued by transporting company (fig.7)

Figure 6. The request for change of consignee to Zuisyo



Source: The Panel

<sup>31</sup> Address: 1-8-1 Kamisakabe, Amagasaki City, Japan.

Fig.7 B/L with Zuisyo as consignee

Shipper: Insert Name Address and Phone LS LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL VIALE CHARLES LENORMANT 236 00119 ROMA 82718055		B/L NO.: DBRDL05180839095  [REDACTED]		
Consignee: Insert Name Address and Phone ZUISYO CO.,LTD RM NO.140 1-8-1 KAMISAKABE, AMAGASAKI CITY, JAPAN TEL. 06-6567-9845 FAX 06-6567-9846		Port-to-Port or Combined Transport  BILL OF LADING		
Notify Party: Insert Name Address and Phone (It is agreed that no responsibility shall attach to the Carrier or his agents for failure to notify) ZUISYO CO.,LTD RM NO.140 1-8-1 KAMISAKABE, AMAGASAKI CITY, JAPAN TEL. 06-6567-9845 FAX 06-6567-9846		<p>RECEIVED in arrival apparent good order and condition except as otherwise noted, the total weight of packages or parts stated in the consignment, the descriptions of the goods and the weight shown in this Bill of Lading are furnished by the Merchant, and which the carrier has an irrevocable cause of declining and is not a part of this Bill of Lading contract. The carrier has issued the number of Bills of Lading stated below, all of this same and in case of the original Bills of Lading must be surrendered and endorsed or signed against the delivery of the shipper and whereupon any other original Bills of Lading shall be void. The Merchant agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Bill of Lading as if each had personally signed this Bill of Lading.</p> <p>MEC clause 4 on the back of this Bill of Lading (Terms contained on the back have precedence over those on the face)</p> <p>*Applicable Only When Document Used as a Combined Transport Bill of Lading</p>		
Pre-carriage by:	Place of Receipt DALIAN			
Ocean Vessel: Voy. No. LANTAU BAY 1835E	Port of Loading DALIAN			
Port of Discharge: OSAKA	Place of Delivery:			
Marks & Nos. N.M. ALLU6320977 BS175553 40 HC ALLU4337574 BS175555 40 HC	No of Containers or Pkgs 2PIECES	Description of Goods (If Dangerous Goods, See Clause 20) SHIPPER'S LOAD & COUNT & SEAL MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD NR 9 CAR SERIENUMMER A601 817 80 22 CAR SERIENUMMBER A222 584 28 01 WDD2221761A355444 - WDD2221761A356398 CY-CY FREIGHT PREPAID SHIPPED ON BOARD  E-MAIL: bfr-docs@bendlinc.co.jp TEL: +81367180730 CONTRACT Ben Line Agencies(Japan) Ltd. Customer Service Team SERVICE Japan Service Contract List	Gross Weight kgs 6000KGS	Measurement 40CBM
<b>SURRENDERED</b>				
Total Number of containers and/or packages (in words) Subject to Clause 7 Limitation		TWO (2) Containers Only		
Freight & Charges	Revenue Tons	Rate	Per	Prepaid
Ex. Rate:	Prepaid at	Payable at	Place and date of Issue DALIAN 2018-08-26	
	Total Prepaid	No. of Original B/L	Signed for the Carrier [REDACTED]	

Source: The Panel

7. The drafted documents included a sales contract between Logistica & Spedizioni SRL and Zuisyo but authorized with a seal that was not identical with Zuisyo's official seal. (Fig.8)

Fig 8 Sales Contract

## SALES CONTRACT

**BUYER:** ZUISYO CO.,LTD  
RMNO.140 1-8-1 KAMISAKABE, AMAGASAKI CITY, JAPAN  
TEL 06-6567-9845  
FAX 06-6567-9846

**SELLER:** LS LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL  
VIALE CHARLES LENORMANT

NO.: 20180001  
DATE: JUL. 01, 2018

This contract is made by and agreed between the BUYER and SELLER, in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated below.

Commodity & Specification	Quantity	Unit Price & Trade Terms	Amount
<b>CIF OSAKA PORT JAPAN</b>			
MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD VR 9			
CAR	2pieces	450000	900,000.00
Total:	2pieces		EUR900,000.00

With More or less of shipment allowed at the sellers' option

5. Total Value EUR900,000.00

6. Packing

7. Time of Shipment & means of Transportation BEFORE 2018.12.31

8. Port of Loading & Destination From : ROTTERDAM,ZUID-HOLLAND  
To : OSAKA PORT,JAPAN

9. Insurance To be covered by the buyer.

10. Terms of BY T/T  
Payment

11. Quality/Quantity discrepancy :

In case of quality discrepancy, claim should be filed by the Buyer within 30 days after the arrival of the goods at port of destination, while for quantity discrepancy, claim should be filed by the Buyer within 15 days after the arrival of the goods at port of destination. It is understood that the Seller shall not be liable for any discrepancy of the goods shipped due to causes for which the Insurance Company, Shipping Company, other Transportation Organization /or Post Office are liable.

12. The Seller shall not be held responsible for failure or delay in delivery of the entire lot or a portion of the goods under this Sales Contract in consequence of any Force Majeure incidents, which might occur. Force Majeure as referred to in this contract means unforeseeable, unavoidable and insurmountable objective conditions.

13. All disputes in connection with the execution of this Contract shall be settled friendly through negotiation. In case no settlement can be reached, the case then may be submitted for arbitration to the Arbitration Commission of the Council for the Promotion of International Trade in accordance with the Provisional Rules of Procedure promulgated by the said Arbitration Commission. The Arbitration committee shall be final and binding upon both parties. And the Arbitration fee shall be borne by the losing parties.

14. This Contract is in two copies effective since being signed sealed by both parties.



The Seller  
LS LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL  
(signature)

Source: The Panel

8. On 29 August 2018, the containers were shipped by LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL from Dalian on board the vessel “Lantau Bay 183E” to Osaka (Japan) in the name of Zuisyo Co., Ltd. The cargo arrived on 31 August.
9. After a delay, caused by typhoon in Osaka and constant change of routing plans (including, at one stage, Shanghai port) by the customers, on 27 September the cargo departed Osaka for Busan; shipping documentation listed Do Young Shipping <sup>32</sup> as consignee. Busan-based company, Hantrade Co., Ltd.<sup>33</sup> was listed as the notify party with a plan of transhipment to Vladivostok. (Fig.9).

Fig 9.B/L with Do Young as consignee and Hantrade as “Notify party”

Shipper <b>ZUISYO CO.,LTD</b> RM NO.140 1-B-1 KAMISAKABE, AMAGASAKI CITY, JAPAN		B/L No. <b>MNEX180893801</b>	
<b>Consignee</b> C/O Captain of M/V DNS505. Do Young Shipping Company, LTD Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Island MH 96960			
<b>Notify Party</b> HAN TRADE CO.,LTD HARBOUR TOWER,RM 1001,KUDEOK-RO 87- 1,NAMPODONG,JUNG-GU,BUSAN,KOREA TEL:82-51-463- 8686 FAX:82-51-463-8775			
<b>Pre-carriage by</b> Vessel: [REDACTED] Vessel No.: [REDACTED]		<b>Place of Receipt</b> OSAKA CY	
<b>Vessel</b> [REDACTED]		<b>Port of Loading</b> OSAKA,JAPAN	
<b>Port of Discharge</b> 0030W BUSAN,KOREA		<b>Place of Delivery</b> BUSAN,CY	
<b>Container No.</b> Seal No. Marks and Numbers  N/M		<b>No. Of Containers or Pkgs</b>  2 CONTAINERS 2 PIECES	
<b>Kind of Packages; Description of Goods</b>  "SHIPPER'S LOAD & COUNT" "SAID TO CONTAIN"		<b>Gross Weight</b>  9,600.000 KGS	
 MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD VR 9 CAR SERIENUMMER A0018178022 CAR SERIENUMMBER A2225842801 WDD2221761A355444+ WDD2221761A356398		<b>Measurement</b>  40.000 M3	
 TRANSIT VIA BUSAN TO VLADIVOSTOK BY BULK VESSEL.			
ALLU6320077/40'GP ALLU4337574/40'GP			
Total number of Containers or other Packages or Units (In words): [REDACTED]		<small>Note: The Merchant's attention is called to the fact that according to Clauses 18 &amp; 23 of this Bill of Lading the liability of the Carrier is, in most cases, limited in respect of loss of or damage to the Goods.</small>	
Merchant's Declared Value(See Clauses 18 & 23):			
Freight and Charges  <b>FREIGHT PREPAID AS ARRANGED</b>		Revenue Tons  <b>SEA WAY BILL</b>	
Prepaid at <b>OSAKA,JAPAN</b>		Payable at  Place and Date of Issue <b>OSAKA,JAPAN 20180927</b>	
Total Prepaid In Local Currency <b>ONE(1)</b>		<small>In witness whereof, the undersigned has signed in behalf of [REDACTED] of Lading stated herein, all of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished As Carrier</small>	
Laden on Board the Vessel Vessel: [REDACTED] Date: 20180927 Port of Loading: OSAKA,JAPAN By: [REDACTED]		<small>An unaged copy of back clauses is available from the Carrier upon request.</small>	
MINO LOGISTICS JAPAN CO.,LTD			


Source: The Panel

<sup>32</sup> Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Island MH 96960

<sup>33</sup> Address: Room 1001, Harbour Tower, Nampo-dong 6-ga, Jung-gu, Busan, 600-046.

10. According to a specialized maritime platform, Do Young Shipping, a Marshall Island registered company, is listed as a subsidiary of Jiho Shipping Co Ltd,<sup>34</sup> and the registered owner of the vessel *DN5505* (IMO number: 8630708). (Fig 10)

Fig.10. *DN5505* Certificate of Registration



Source: The Panel

<sup>34</sup> Address: Daesung Building, 326, Dongdaesin-dong 1-ga, Seo-gu, Busan, ROK.

11. The containers arrived at Busan on September 30 and were listed as transiting via Busan to Vladivostok with Mino Logistics Co., Ltd based in Seoul,<sup>35</sup> ROK (business partner of Mino Logistics, Japan, as well as Zuisyo) as the party to contact for the cargo release, and the consignee given as under the care of Do Young Shipping Company. (fig11)

Fig 11. Arrival notice to Busan


<b><u>ARRIVAL NOTICE</u></b>																					
To : Import Dept																					
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">입항번호 : [REDACTED]</td> <td style="width: 50%;">호출부호 : 3ERC6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>B/L NO. : HASLBB0298002P00 Seawaybill</td> <td>MRN : 18SNK04629I</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">수하인 (CONSIGNEE)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MINO LOGISTICS CO., LTD. RM 322, DONGYANG TRESBELLE BLDG, 394-25, SEOKYO-DONG, MAPO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA **</td> <td>통지처 (NOTIFY PARTY) SAME AS CONSIGNEE</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">                     =&gt; 입항일시 (入港時) : 2018년09월29일 04시00분                      Place of Receipt : OSAKA, JAPAN CY                      Port of Loading : OSAKA, JAPAN                      Port of Discharge : BUSAN                      Place of Delivery : BUSAN                 </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"> <b>DESCRIPTION OF GOODS</b>                      포장 개수 : 2 GT                      총 중량 : 9,600.000 KGS 40.000 CBM                      품 명 : MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD                 </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">                     Container # TP SEAL #                      ALLU4337574 D4 BS175555                      ALLU6320077 D4 BS175553                 </td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: right;">FREIGHT AMOUNT COLLECT</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: right;">CNG RATED AS RATE PER COLLECT</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"> <b>REMARK</b>                      **후석언어로 인한 누적 일레이발생 : ETA-&gt;29일 예정 **                      後方言語로 인한 누적 일레이발생 : ETA -&gt; 29일 예정                      인바운드 세관신고/해정 담당자 : EBIZ / WEBPDF TEL : FAX : EMAIL :                 </td> </tr> </table>		입항번호 : [REDACTED]	호출부호 : 3ERC6	B/L NO. : HASLBB0298002P00 Seawaybill	MRN : 18SNK04629I	수하인 (CONSIGNEE)		MINO LOGISTICS CO., LTD. RM 322, DONGYANG TRESBELLE BLDG, 394-25, SEOKYO-DONG, MAPO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA **	통지처 (NOTIFY PARTY) SAME AS CONSIGNEE	=> 입항일시 (入港時) : 2018년09월29일 04시00분 Place of Receipt : OSAKA, JAPAN CY Port of Loading : OSAKA, JAPAN Port of Discharge : BUSAN Place of Delivery : BUSAN		<b>DESCRIPTION OF GOODS</b> 포장 개수 : 2 GT 총 중량 : 9,600.000 KGS 40.000 CBM 품 명 : MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD		Container # TP SEAL # ALLU4337574 D4 BS175555 ALLU6320077 D4 BS175553		FREIGHT AMOUNT COLLECT		CNG RATED AS RATE PER COLLECT		<b>REMARK</b> **후석언어로 인한 누적 일레이발생 : ETA->29일 예정 ** 後方言語로 인한 누적 일레이발생 : ETA -> 29일 예정 인바운드 세관신고/해정 담당자 : EBIZ / WEBPDF TEL : FAX : EMAIL :	
입항번호 : [REDACTED]	호출부호 : 3ERC6																				
B/L NO. : HASLBB0298002P00 Seawaybill	MRN : 18SNK04629I																				
수하인 (CONSIGNEE)																					
MINO LOGISTICS CO., LTD. RM 322, DONGYANG TRESBELLE BLDG, 394-25, SEOKYO-DONG, MAPO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA **	통지처 (NOTIFY PARTY) SAME AS CONSIGNEE																				
=> 입항일시 (入港時) : 2018년09월29일 04시00분 Place of Receipt : OSAKA, JAPAN CY Port of Loading : OSAKA, JAPAN Port of Discharge : BUSAN Place of Delivery : BUSAN																					
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FREIGHT AMOUNT COLLECT																					
CNG RATED AS RATE PER COLLECT																					
<b>REMARK</b> **후석언어로 인한 누적 일레이발생 : ETA->29일 예정 ** 後方言語로 인한 누적 일레이발생 : ETA -> 29일 예정 인바운드 세관신고/해정 담당자 : EBIZ / WEBPDF TEL : FAX : EMAIL :																					

Source: The Panel

<sup>35</sup> Address: Room 701, Dongyang Han river Travel Officetel, 56 Yanghwa-ro, Mapo-gu. Seoul. 04045. ROK

12. The last documented mention, available to the Panel, of the cargo is dated 2 October 2018, when shipping documents were drawn up reflecting the plan to ship the two containers from Busan to Nakhodka by the *DN5505*. These documents, dated 00:00 2 Oct. 2019 list *DN5505* as the vessel and Nakhodka as destination.
13. AIS data indicate that as the *DN5505* sailed north on 1 October, with vessel's AIS signal stopped transmitting while in ROK waters. Prior to that, the vessel had reported by AIS an intended destination of Nakhodka, Russia with an estimated date of arrival on 5 October (fig.12)


Fig 12 Information of the intended route of *DN5505*



Source: Windward

14. Russia replied to the Panel that no Russian port in the Far East recorded an arrival or departure of the *DN5505* at any time between 1 and 19 October.
15. The *DN5505* resumed transmitting AIS only on 19 October from a location approximately 24 miles south of the location of its last transmission, heading back to Busan Port. (Fig.13).

Figure 13. Activity timeline of *DN5055*



Source: Windward

16. On arrival at Busan, the *DN5055* no longer carried containers but was laden with suspected DPRK-origin coal. The vessel was later detained by the ROK authorities.

**Annex 41: Reply from the Permanent Mission of Belarus (excerpt)**  
*(Translated from Russian)*

**Response to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the DPRK**

Belarus has considered your letter No. S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.112 of 21 October 2019. On the substance of the issues raised, we wish to communicate the following.

1. Correspondence between CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory and Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. on conditions for the shipment and payment of consignments under contract No. 29/03/18 of 29 March 2018 was conducted by e-mail (a copy of the correspondence is attached).

In a letter dated 14 September 2018, the representative of Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. stated that payment for the goods would be made from the current account of another company, as the procedure for payment in United States dollars was very difficult for Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co.

The representative of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory said that if the other company was acting as the payer then the purchaser would need to provide the payer's details and sign a supplementary agreement to the contract.

Following negotiations, the parties signed supplementary agreement No. 1 of 28 September 2018 to contract No. 29/03/18 of 29 March 2018, whereby the company Aspen Resources Pte Ltd (Singapore) acted as the payer. That company made the payment for the goods to the current account of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory.

According to section 1.3 of contract No. 29/03/18, the purpose of the purchaser acquiring the goods was for wholesale and/or retail trade outside of Belarus and not for subsequent export to other countries.

2. Under contract No. 29/03/18 of 29 March 2018 between CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory (the seller) and Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. (the buyer), the seller undertakes to transfer its own produced alcoholic beverages to the buyer, while the buyer undertakes to take ownership thereof and provide payment. The variety, quantity and price of the goods

are agreed in the specification documents signed by the parties for each consignment and are an integral part of the contract.

Under the terms of the contract concluded, the parties signed specification document No. 1 of 29 March 2018 on the supply of goods totalling USD \$12,438.40 under FCA terms to the supplier's warehouse in Brest, ul. Katin Bor, 93B (Brest branch of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory) and specification document No. 2 of 29 March 2018 on the supply of goods totalling USD \$12,840.00 under FCA terms to the supplier's warehouse in Minsk, ul. Kazintsa, 52A.

The goods in specification document No. 1 were transferred to the carrier of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory for delivery to the buyer, as shown in CMR consignment note No. 163 of 25 May 2018, and the goods in specification document No. 2 were handed over to the carrier on 24 May 2018, as shown in CMR consignment note No. 3 of 24 May 2018. Subsequently, the goods were loaded into shipping containers No. MRKU9286516 and No. MSKU7286890 and, according to CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory, they were received by the buyer (a copy of an e-mail dated 5 September 2018 from the carrier, dina.kolibaba@quehenberger.by, and a copy of the e-mail from the purchaser, dated 5 September 2018, are attached).

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the readiness of Belarus to continue its cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Annexes:

1. Correspondence with the buyer (three pages);
2. Copy of specification document No. 1 of 14 September 2018 (two pages);
3. Copy of specification document No. 2 of 14 September 2018 (two pages);
4. Copy of CMR consignment notes No. 163 and No. 3 (two pages);
5. Copy of letters from the carrier and the buyer (two pages).

*Source:* Member State

## Annex 42: Niva invoice

NIVA Distillery Company Limited  
ООО "Оптический завод "НИВА"  
192102, Russia, Saint-Petersburg, Progromnya str. 6, lit. A.  
tel. 766-12-88, fax 766-15-10, e-mail: office@nivaspb.ru  
ИИН 7825671212 КПП 781601001 р/с 407028103273600003745  
в ФИЛИАЛЕ № 7806 ВТБ (ПАО) г. САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГ п/с 30101810240300000707  
БИК 044030707

27.12.2018 Saint-Petersburg, Russia

**INVOICE # 2 (amended 21.01.19)/ Инвойс № 2 (в редакции 21.01.19)**  
Contract № 15/2018 dated 15/10/2018 / Контракт № 15/2018 от 15.10.2018

Prayer / Пакетърскиц: MANZHOU LI KESHENG TRADE CO., LTD  
Address : ROOM1704, NO.17 BUILDING, THE NORTH PORT GEMINI WEST TOWER, MANZHOU LI CITY, CHINA

**Consignor of goods / Грузоотправитель:** NIVA Distillery Company Ltd., 192102, Russia, Saint-Petersburg.  
адреса: Progromnaya str., 6, lit. A.

**Consignee / Грузополучатель:** MANZHOU LI KESHENG TRADE CO., LTD

Address: ROOM#104, NO.17 BUILDING,THE NORTH PORT GEMINI WEST TOWER ,MANZHOULI CITY, CHINA										
	Description of product, etc., vol./code / Наименование товара, пропуск/№, еденица изм.	Q'ty Item / Кол-во единиц	Q'ty Items 100% Kon- trol 100% контроли- руемых	Net weight/ kg/lbs. взвешено	Gross weight, kg взвешано	Quantity bottles Кол-во упаковок	Q'ty losses/ Kols-vo упаковок изъятых	Price for bottle, руб./Цена за бутылку руб./руб.	Total Amount/ Цена руб./руб.	Country of origin/ Страна производи- теля
1	VODKA «STOLBOVAYA EXPORT» 40%, 0,1 л.	9000,00	3600,00	21960,00	23175,00	90 000	3 000	19,00	1 710 000,00	Россия/Russia
	ИТОГО	9 000,00	3 600,00	21 960,00	23 175,00	90 000	3 050		1 710 000,00	

ПРИМЕРЫ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЯ

Kinds of packages/ Вид упаковки: cartons/ картонные коробки  
Basis of delivery / Базис поставки: CIF Port Dalian (Incoterms 2010).  
Payment / Оплата: предоплата 100% / Предоплата 100%

Генеральный директор/СВО



*Source:* The Panel

## Annex 43: Reply from the Russian Federation

Постоянное представительство  
Российской Федерации  
при Организации  
Объединенных Наций

Phone: (212) 861 4900  
Fax: (212) 628 0252



Permanent Mission  
of the Russian Federation  
to the United Nations

136 East 67<sup>th</sup> Street  
New York, NY 10065

No. 2927/n

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and referring to the inquiry by the Panel dated 28 June 2019 (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.73) has the honour to transmit the following.

LLC “Niva Pilot Plant” (NIVA Distillery Company Limited) and Manzhouli Kesheng Trade Co., Ltd (China) have concluded an international sales contract #15/2018 on 15 October 2018 for the delivery of alcohol products. In accordance with the contract, the shipment was made under FCA (Free Carrier) conditions to the port of Saint-Petersburg. Therefore the ownership of the goods was transferred to the buyer upon their receipt in the port of Saint-Petersburg by the designated carrier. LLC “Niva Pilot Plant”, being the producer of the goods, did not conclude any contracts on their shipment or delivery.

Panel of Experts established pursuant  
to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)  
United Nations

New York

On 30 January 2019 LLC "Niva Pilot Plant" shipped and transferred the goods to the designated carrier at the port of Saint-Petersburg for further delivery to "Room 1704, No. 17 Building, the North Port Gemini West Tower, Manzhouli City, China". Thus, the alcohol products were intended for delivery to a Chinese company. LLC "Niva Pilot Plant" has no information on their delivery to the DPRK and does not maintain any contacts with representatives of this country.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation takes this opportunity to convey to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, "29" July 2019



*Source:* Member State

## Annex 44: Beer shipping documents

<b>BILL OF LADING</b>					
<p>(1) Consigner's complete name and address:  <b>BALTIKA BREWERIES</b>              3, 6-TH VERKHNY PEREULOK, ST.              PETERSBURG, 194192, RUSSIA              +7 (812) 3266267              EXPORT@BALTIKA.RU</p>			<p>(2) Document No.  <b>507900014091</b>              (3) Export References</p>		
<p>(3) Consignee's complete name and address:  <b>DALIAN MYUNGHAE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LTD.</b>              SUITE 202, WENYUAN HOTEL, 2102              ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN,              LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA              +8613889450626</p>			<p>(4) Forwarding Agent References</p>		
<p>(4) Notify Party (complete name and address):  <b>DALIAN MYUNGHAE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO., LTD.</b>              SUITE 202, WENYUAN HOTEL, 2102              ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN,              LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA              +8613889450626</p>			<p>(5) Port and Country of Origin (for the Merchant's reference only)</p>		
			<p>(6) Also Notify Party (complete name and address)</p>		
<p>(11) Vessel Name  <b>NAVI BALTIC 225S</b></p>		<p>(12) Port of Loading  <b>ST. PETERSBURG, FCT</b></p>		<p>(13) Forwarder/Int'l Routing/Export Instructions (Parties are contracted separately by Merchant entirely for their own account and risk)</p>	
<p>(14) Vessel No.  <b>COSCO SHIPPING NEBULA 003E</b></p>		<p>(15) Port of Discharge  <b>ST. PETERSBURG, FCT</b></p>			
<p>(16) Place of Loading  <b>DALIAN, CHINA</b></p>		<p>(17) Port of Discharge  <b>DALIAN, CHINA</b></p>			
Particulars furnished by the Merchant					
(18) Container No. and Seal No. Marks & Nos.	(19) Quantity And Kind of Packages	(20) Description of Goods		(21) Measurements (M) Gross Weight (KGS)	
<b>CONTAINER NO: 507900014091</b>	957 CASES	<b>BALTIKA NV EXPORT, 5,1 ALC., % BOTTLE VOL 0.47L</b>		<b>15,273.720 KGS</b>	
EMCU3077367/20*/B1050636 / /07818131 / /22274601 / 1 X 20'	18 DAYS FREE AT POD				
<b>"OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID" SHIPPER'S LOAD &amp; COUNT</b>					
<p>(22) TOTAL NUMBER OF CONTAINERS OR PACKAGES (IN WORDS)</p> <p><b>ONE (1) CONTAINER ONLY</b></p>					
<p>(23) FREIGHT &amp; CHARGES</p>		Freight Tons	Rate	Per	Prepaid
					Collect
<p>(24) INVOICE NO.  <b>EGLV 507900014091</b></p>		<p>(25) Number of Original Bills  <b>ONE (1)</b></p>		(26) Freight at <b>ST. PETERSBURG, FCT</b>	(27) Collect at
<p>(28) Revision Type/Made  <b>FCL/FCL O/O</b></p>		<p>(29) Place of Billing, Invoicing  <b>ST. PETERSBURG, FLP APR.12.2019</b></p>		(30) Exchange Rate	(31) Exchange Rate
<p>(32) Loaded on Board  <b>APR.12, 2019</b>  <b>NAVI BALTIC 225S</b>  <b>ST. PETERSBURG, FCT</b></p>					

FORM NO. DOC-L886-02

Source: The Panel

## Annex 45: Bill of Landing for beer to Liaoning

		BILL OF LADING (Non Negotiable Unless Consigned to Order)	
SHIPPER/EXPORTER (COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS)  BALTIKA BREWERY 6-TH VERHNIY PER. 3 SANKT PETERBURG, SANKT PETERBURG - 194292 RUSSIA		ORIGINAL BOOKING NO. 2620594640 BILL OF LADING NO. OOLU2620594640 EXPORT REFERENCES	
CONSIGNEE (COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS)  LIAONING PILOT FREE TRADE ZONE YURONG WAREHOUSING CO., LTD H UNIT W2, NO.13-2 PORT THREE, BONDED PORT AREA, DALIAN FREE TRADE ZONE *		FORWARDING AGENT-REFERENCED FMC NO.: MAK SHIPPING LLC INN 7814430213 9, BAYKONURSKAYA STR. 197227 SANKT PETERBURG RUSSIA POINT AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF GOODS	
NOTIFY PARTY (COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS) <small>(It is agreed that no responsibility shall be attached to the Carrier or its Agents for failure to notify this clause 1 on reverse)</small>  LIAONING PILOT FREE TRADE ZONE YURONG WAREHOUSING CO., LTD H UNIT W2, NO.13-2 PORT THREE, BONDED PORT AREA, DALIAN FREE TRADE ZONE *		ALSO NOTIFY PARTY-ROUTING & INSTRUCTIONS *TEL : [REDACTED] FAX: 8 [REDACTED] PERSON IN CHARGE: MR. PAK [REDACTED]	
PRE-CARRIAGE BY	PLACE OF RECEIPT ST. PETERSBURG	LOADING PORT/TERMINAL	ORIGINALS TO BE RELEASED AT ST PETERSBURG
INTENDED VESSEL/Voyage/FLAG DELPHIS FINLAND 006 S	HONG KONG PORT OF LOADING ST. PETERSBURG	TYPE OF MOVEMENT (IF MIXED, USE DESCRIPTION OF PACKAGES AND GOODS FIELD) FCL / FCL CY/CY	
PORT OF DISCHARGE DALIAN		PLACE OF DELIVERY DALIAN	
(CHECK "M" COLUMN IF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL) PARTICULARS DECLARED BY SHIPPER BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE CARRIER			
CNTL NOS. INSEAL NOS. MARK & NUMBERS	QUANTITY (FOR CUSTOMS DECLARATION ONLY)	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	GROSS WEIGHT
	3100 CASES	2X40'GP CONTAINERS S.T.C.: BEER	49476.002KGS
OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID TOTAL NO. OF CONTAINERS/PACKAGES RECEIVED & ACKNOWLEDGED BY CARRIER FOR THE PURPOSE OF CALCULATION OF PACKAGE LIMITATION (IF APPLICABLE): 2 CONTAINER(S)/PACKAGE(S) DESTINATION CHARGES COLLECT PER LINE TARIFF, AND TO BE COLLECTED FROM THE PARTY WHO LAWFULLY DEMANDS DELIVERY OF THE CARGO. SHIPPER LOAD AND COUNT, CONTAINER(S) SEALED BY SHIPPER THE SECOND SEAL NO.: DOCU7758659 2ND SEAL: 22274352 DOCU4960762 2ND SEAL: 22274451			
DOCU7758659 / 0781932 DOCU4960762 / 0781941	/ 1550 CASES 1550 CASES	/ FCL/FCL /40GP/24738.001KGS / FCL/FCL /40GP/24738.001KGS	
<small>NOTICE 1: For carriage in or from the United States of America (or Clauses 1 and 23 on the reverse side hereof) limit the Carrier's liability to a maximum of US \$500 per package or customary freight or by value or proportionate of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA") unless the Merchant declares "High Value" below and the Carrier accepts written notice; and (ii) if carried on deck of Merchant's risk as per parts inherent in such carriage but in all other cases subject to the provisions of COGSA</small> <small>NOTICE 2: If carrier consigns to an agent or receiver, notice of delivery will be given to the agent or receiver.</small> <small>NOTICE 3: If carrier carries on deck at Merchant's risk without responsibility for loss or damage howsoever caused.</small>			
Declared Cargo Value US\$ <input type="checkbox"/> If Merchant enters a value, Carrier's limitation of liability shall not apply and the ad valorem rate will be charged. FREIGHT & CHARGES PAYABLE AT/BY:		<small>Received the Container/Package or other units indicated in the box described as "Total No. of Container(s)/Package(s)" and acknowledged by Carrier in apparent good order and condition, unless otherwise noted, signed, sealed, stamped and delivered as herein provided.</small> <small>The receipt, custody, carriage and delivery of the goods are subject to the terms appearing on the back of this bill and to the Carrier's applicable tariff.</small> <small>It witness whereof, 3 signatures of loading have been signed, one of which being representative of the consignee, is set forth.</small> <small>DATE CARGO RECEIVED 28 APR 2019</small>	
<small>The printed terms and conditions appearing on the face and reverse side of this Bill of Lading are available at <a href="http://www.oocl.com">www.oocl.com</a>, in OCL's published US tariffs, and in pamphlet form.</small> <small>* STRIKE OUT FOR ON BOARD VESSEL BILL OF LADING * SEE CLAUSE 1 ON REVERSE SIDE * SEE CLAUSE 2 ON REVERSE SIDE QF01 HQD 0101</small>			

Source: The Panel

**Annex 46: Letter from Singapore on T Specialist**

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE  
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

11 December 2019

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator

Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874  
(2009)

[REDACTED]

I refer to your letter (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.79) dated 1 July 2019, requesting information on OCN, T Specialist, SCN and related entities and individuals, and to Singapore's letter to the Panel dated 17 July 2019 wherein we stated that the proceedings against T Specialist Director Ng Kheng Wah ("Ng") and T Specialist were *sub judice*.

We wish to inform the Panel that Ng, T Specialist, and Wang Zhiguo pleaded guilty to the charges below on 22 November 2019. They were sentenced as follows:

- a) Ng: 34 months' imprisonment (for 10 x UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations charges and 10 x cheating charges);
- b) T Specialist: Fine of S\$880,000 (for 10 x UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations charges and 2 x money laundering charges); and
- c) Wang Zhiguo: 12 months' imprisonment (for 10 x cheating charges).

During court proceedings, the presiding Senior District Judge noted that the UNSC sanctions regime to combat the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme would only be effective if every UN member state, including Singapore, used their best efforts to ensure full compliance. His oral remarks as well as the Grounds of Decision on sentencing are enclosed for the Panel's reference. Comments in paragraphs 55, 75, and 77 of the Grounds of Decision that reference the work of the Panel may be of particular interest.

A second series of related prosecutions will now be pursued concerning Chong Hock Yen, SCN Singapore Pte Ltd, Laurich International Pte Ltd, Sindok Trading Pte Ltd, and Li Hyon. These five accused individuals/entities were charged on 18 October 2018, as conveyed to the Panel earlier in our letter of 17 July 2019. We will keep the Panel updated on the outcome of the remaining prosecutions in due course.

This outcome is testament to our shared commitment in ensuring the full implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. We look forward to continuing our cooperation and partnership with the Panel.

Yours sincerely,



**BURHAN GAFOOR**  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Enc.

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 47: Letter from Singapore on SINSMS**

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE  
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

20 September 2019

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator  
Panel of Experts established pursuant to  
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

[REDACTED]

I refer to your letter (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.102) dated 30 August 2019, requesting information on SINSMS Pte Ltd (“SINSMS”) and related entities and individuals.

In its letter, the Panel referred to a media report that SINSMS, an affiliate of Dalian Sun Moon Star International Logistics Trading Co., had been charged in August 2019 for facilitating shipments of wines and spirits to the DPRK between October 2016 and January 2017. The Panel requested for any information that the Singapore Government could provide, to the extent that we were able to do so without prejudicing court proceedings.

This letter informs the Panel that our authorities uncovered evidence that between 2016 and 2017, Lim Cheng Hwee (“Lim”), a director of SINSMS, engaged in a conspiracy with Liang Ye (another director of SINSMS) to export wines and spirits worth approximately SGD 665,000 to Nampo, the DPRK via transhipment through Dalian, China at the alleged behest of DPRK national Mun Chol Myong (“Mun”). Mun remains at large. Our authorities have charged SINSMS and Lim on four charges of supplying designated luxury items to the DPRK. Our authorities also filed four charges against Lim’s wife, Hong Leng Ooi (“Hong”), for her failure to inform the Police about SINSMS’ supply of these designated items. Our authorities expect to bring additional charges against Lim and SINSMS.

Given that judicial proceedings against SINSMS, Lim, and Hong are ongoing, we seek the Panel's understanding that we are unable to share the full extent of information requested. In the interim, we enclose the charge sheets against SINSMS (4 charges), Lim (4 charges), and Hong (4 charges) at Annex for your reference.

We hope that the information provided will be helpful to the work of the Panel.



**BURHAN GAFOOR**  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Enc.

**THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE  
(CHAPTER 68, REVISED EDITION 2012)  
SECTIONS 123-125**

**2<sup>nd</sup> CHARGE**

You,

**HONG LENG OOI (FEMALE) [REDACTED]  
NRIC No: [REDACTED]  
DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]  
NATIONALITY: SINGAPORE CITIZEN**

are charged that you, on or around 30 October 2016, having information about a transaction prohibited by Regulation 5(a) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK")) Regulations 2010, to wit, information regarding the supply of wines and spirits with a total value of SGD 133,632.39 by Sinsms Pte Ltd to a person in the DPRK via Dalian, did fail to immediately inform the Commissioner of Police or any authorised person of this information and you have thereby committed an offence under Regulation 14(1)(c)(i) read with Regulation 16(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010, punishable under Section 5(1)(a) of the United Nations Act (Cap. 339, 2002 Rev. Ed.).

**COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT  
SINGAPORE POLICE FORCE**

Date: 14 August 2019

*Regulation 5(a) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 states:*

5. No person in Singapore or any citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall –  
(a) supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the DPRK, whether or not the item originated in Singapore.

*Regulation 14(1)(c) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 states:*

14. – (1) Every person in Singapore and any citizen of Singapore outside Singapore who –  
(c) has information about any transaction prohibited by Regulation 5, 6, 7 or 8,  
shall –  
(i) immediately inform the Commissioner of Police or any authorised person of that fact or information; and  
(ii) provide such further information relating to the property, transaction or proposed transaction as the Commissioner of Police or authorised person may require.

*Section 5(1)(a) of the United Nations Act (Chapter 339, 2002 Rev. Ed.) states:*

5. – Every person who commits, or attempts to commit, or does any act with intent to commit, or counsels, procures, aids, abets, or incites any other person to commit, or conspires with any other person (whether in Singapore or elsewhere) to commit any offence against any regulations made under this Act shall be liable on conviction —  
(a) in the case of an individual, to a fine not exceeding \$500,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to both; or  
(b) in any other case, to a fine not exceeding \$1 million.

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 48: Corporate registry information for Fullberg Trading Develop Limited and HK Xiang Long Trading Group Limited**

CR No.:	2395119
Company Name:	FULLBERG TRADING DEVELOP LIMITED 丰百貿易拓展有限公司
Company Type:	Private company limited by shares
Date of Incorporation:	24-JUN-2016
Active Status:	Live
Remarks:	-
Winding Up Mode:	-
Date of Dissolution / Ceasing to Exist:	-
Register of Charges:	Unavailable
Important Note:	-
<b>Name History</b>	
Effective Date	Name Used
24-JUN-2016	FULLBERG TRADING DEVELOP LIMITED 丰百貿易拓展有限公司

CR No.:	2619552
Company Name:	HK Xiang Long Trading Group Limited 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司
Company Type:	Private company limited by shares
Date of Incorporation:	06-DEC-2017
Active Status:	Live
Remarks:	-
Winding Up Mode:	-
Date of Dissolution / Ceasing to Exist:	-
Register of Charges:	Unavailable
Important Note:	-
<b>Name History</b>	
Effective Date	Name Used
06-DEC-2017	HK Xiang Long Trading Group Limited 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司

Source: Hong Kong Corporate Registry, <https://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/>. Accessed 9 January 2020.

**Annex 49: Payments for the New Regent****付款資料**

付款日期 2018/04/11

付款用戶ID/戶名 HK000411 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司

"HK Xiang Long Trading  
Group Limited"

付款帳號 1100001642

付款金額 USD 600,000.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

**受款資料**

受款帳號 帳號 : [REDACTED]

受款金額 USD 600,000.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

受款人姓名/地址 [REDACTED]

受款人電話

**受款行資料**

SWIFT CODE [REDACTED]

銀行名稱/地址 [REDACTED]

其他銀行代號

匯款目的

付款資料

付款日期 2018/03/29

付款用戶ID/戶名 HK000411 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司

"HK Xiang Long Trading  
Group Limited"

付款帳號 1100001642

付款金額 USD 156,740.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

受款資料

受款帳號 帳號 : [REDACTED]

受款金額 USD 156,740.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

受款人姓名/地址 Oswald Maritime Services Limited

受款人電話

受款行資料

SWIFT CODE [REDACTED]

銀行名稱/地址 [REDACTED]

其他銀行代號

Source: The Panel

## Annex 50: Corporate registry information for “TH CO OOD”

Main circumstances				
1. UIC/PIC	202762396	20131004122334	History	Documents
2. Firma/ Наименование	ТИ ЕЙЧ КО	20131004122334	History	Documents
3. Legal form	Дружество с ограничена отговорност	20131004122334	History	Documents
4. Transcription in a foreign language	TH CO	20131004122334	History	Documents
5. Head office and registered office	БЪЛГАРИЯ област София (столица), община Столична гр. София 1444 район р-н Витоша ж.к. Симеоново, 83-та № 19, бл. 1, вх. 1, ет. 1, ап. 1 тел.: 0888647226 Електронна поща: [REDACTED]	20131209120928	History	Documents
5a. In-country address that will be used for correspondence with the National revenue agency	БЪЛГАРИЯ област София (столица), община Столична гр. София 1444 район р-н Витоша ж.к. СИМЕОНОВО, 83 № 19, бл. 1, вх. 1, ет. 1, ап. 1	20131209120928	History	Documents
6. Scope of business activity	РАЗРАБОТКА НА РАЗЛИЧНИ ВИДОВЕ СОФТУЕР; ПОДАРЪЖКА И АДМИНИСТРИРАНЕ НА РАЗРАБОТЕНИЯ СОФТУЕР.	20131004122334	History	Documents
7. Manager	[REDACTED] А	20170427112054	History	Documents
11. Manner of representation	Друг начин: [REDACTED]	20190422145027	History	Documents
16. Term of the company	04.10.2018, начинът, по който се определя срокът: 5 /пет/ години, считано от датата на влизането в Търговския регистър.	20131004122334	History	Documents
19. Venturers	ДАНДОНГ ХАТОНГ КЪМЪРШЪЛ - ТРЕЙД КО ОД, Чуждестранно юридическо лице, държава: КИТАЙ, 16000 лв. ТАНЯ ИМПОРТ ЕКСПОРТ, ЕИК/ПИК 201331021, държава: БЪЛГАРИЯ, 4000 лв.	20170323154042	History	Documents
24. Transfer of a share		20170323154042	History	Documents
26. Termination of commercial activity	Прекратена търговска дейност	20190422145027	History	Documents
<b>Capital</b>				
31. Amount	20000 лв.	20131004122334	History	Documents
32. Paid-in capital	20000 лв.	20131004122334	History	Documents

“Box 19. Venturers DANDONG HAOTONG COMMERCIAL - TRADE CO. OOD, Foreign Legal Entity, Country: CHINA, 16000 BGN.”

Source: Bulgarian Company Registry, available at <http://www.brra.bg/Default.ra>, accessed 27 November 2019.

## Annex 51: DPRK bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)

Names	Title and activities **	Location **	Passport number / expiry UN Security Council designations where applicable
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang Pom Su, Jang Hyon U) 장범수	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative. Also operates in and travels to Lebanon under various aliases	Syria	22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020 UN res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria” on 2 March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KP.i.016
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a. Cho'n Myo'ng-kuk, Jon Yong Sang) 전명국 (전영상)	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative in Syria. Also travels to and operates in Lebanon under various aliases.	Syria	25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number 836110035, expires 1 January 2020
Ryom Huibong (aka Ryo'M Hu'I-Pong) 령희봉	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank (aka KKG bank, 금강은행 Kumgang Export and Import Bank, 金刚银行)		18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20 January 2020); Outside UAE since 28 May 2018.
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song Chol) 리선철 (리성철)	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank  Transported money of DPRK laborers in the Middle East to the DPRK		28 March 1964 PP No.: 836132137  Outside UAE since 15 March 2017.
Kwak Chongchol (Aka Kwak Jong-Chol) 곽정철	Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank		1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533;  Outside UAE since 28 December 2016
Ro Il Gwang 노일광	Korea Kumgang Group Bank		26 May 1983 PP No.: 836434467;  Outside UAE since 15 March 2017
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-il) 김경일	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office opened at least 5 accounts at Banque International Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia. Two of them are in the name of a front company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been involved in transactions undertaken by Daedong Credit Bank in China.	Libya	1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029  Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB deputy chief representative in Libya” on 22 December (KP.i.067)
Choe, Un Hyok 최은혁	Unification Development Bank (or Korea Unification Development Bank, UDB or KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un'So'ng. Choe Un Hyok's KUDB business card with his title of “Representative of KUDB, Moscow		19 October 1985 PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)

	Russia” with the same address as the Embassy in Moscow is available in the Panel’s 2017 Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251.  <i>Russia replied to the Panel that the “Bank of Russia has not received any requests regarding the accreditation in Moscow of a representative of the Korea United Development Bank or the appointment of Choe Un Hyok as its representative. We do not have any information about the bank accounts in the name of Choe Un Hyok”</i>		
Chu Hyo’k (Aka Ju Hyok) 주혁	Foreign Trade Bank Representative  <i>Russia replied Chu Hyo’k is not currently residing in Russia. (see below)</i>		23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct. 2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an “overseas FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.065)
Ri U’n-so’ng (aka Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song) 리은성	Korea Unification Development Bank representative  <i>Russia replied that Ri U’n-so’ng is not currently residing in Russia.</i>		23 July 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Korean Unification Development Bank representative” on 22 December (KPi.078)
Han Jang Su (aka Chang-Su Han) 한장수	Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank  <i>Russia replied that Han Jang Su left Russia in 2019</i>		8 Nov. 1969; PP No.: 745420176 (expires 19 Oct 2020) Designated by Resolution 2371 (2017) as “Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank”
Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku Cha-hyo’ng) 구자형	Foreign Trade Bank Representative	Libya (also travelled to Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia 2015-2017)	8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 - used in July 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB chief representative in Libya” on 22 December 2017 (Kpi.070)
Ch’oe So’k-min 최석민	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016, Ch’oe So’k-min was the deputy representative at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has been associated with cash transfers from that FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK special organizations and RGB located overseas.  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Shenyang China	25 July 1978  Res 2397(2017) designated him as “overseas FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.064)

Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim Tong-ch'o'l) 김동철	Foreign Trade Bank Representative  <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	28 Jan 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires 26 Sept 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 - (KPi.068)
Ko Chol Man (aka Ko Ch'o'l-man) 고철만	Foreign Trade Bank Representative  <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.069)
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka Mun Kyo'ng-hwan) 문경환	Bank of East Land Representative  <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Dandong, China	22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March 2016 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Bank of East Land representative" on 22 December (KPi.071)
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae Wo'n-uk) 배원욱	Korea Daesong Bank Representative  <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb 2017 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Daesong Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.072)
Pak Bong Nam (aka Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam) 박봉남	Ilsim International Bank representative  <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018	Shenyang, China	06 May 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Ilsim International Bank representative" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.073)
Pak Mun Il 박문일	Korea Daesong Bank Representative  <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Yanji, China	DPRK / 1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509 (expires 27/8/2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.079)
Ri Chun Hwan (Aka Ri Ch'un-hwan) 리춘환	Foreign Trade Bank Representative  <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Zhuhai, China	21 August 1957 <sup>*</sup> PP No: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.074)

Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri Ch'un-so'ng) 리춘성	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a Euro account at International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of “Secretary’s Delegate of the DPRK’s Mission to Tripoli” (closed on 22 August 2013).  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Beijing, China	30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (expires 11 March 2019)  Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.075)
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li Cheng He) 리성혁	Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Beijing, China	19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (expires 19 May 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank” on 22 December (KPi.077)
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang So-Nam, Pang Sunam) 방수남	Ilsim (ILSIM) International Bank Representative  <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Zhuhai, China	1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch'a Su'ng-chun) 차승준	Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative. Has held several accounts in his name at Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a cover company.  <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Beijing, China	4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355
Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-hyo'k) 김경혁	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Bank  <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Shanghai, China	5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14 September 2016)
Pak Ch’O'l-Nam 박철남	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the name “Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)”in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China”	Beijing, China	16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)

	<i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>		
Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho Ch'o'l-So'ng) 조철성	Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as “Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限公司)” and “Golden Tiger Investment Group (金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司)”, both registered in Hong Kong.  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Dandong, China	25 September 1984 PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019)  Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Korea United Development Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.058)
Ho Young Il (Aka Ho Yo'ng-il) 허영일	Hana Bank Representative In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a high volume of USD transactions for the FTB.  <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Dandong, China	DPRK/ DOB: 9 September 1968
Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim Mun-ch'o'l) 김문철	Representative for Korea United Development Bank. Uses false entity names including “Chongryu Technical Company” or “Kyong Un Trading Company”  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018.  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Dandong, China	DOB 25 March 1957  Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Korea United Development Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.060)
Choe Chun Yong (Aka Ch'oe Ch'un-yo'ng) 최천영	Ilsim International Bank Representative		PP no: 654410078 Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Ilsim International Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim Myong Gi)	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative	Transited China, Ethiopia,	25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March 2018)

고태훈 (or 고대훈) (aka 김명기)		UAE, visited Sudan <sup>36</sup>	UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 2 March (KPi.025)
Kang Min 강민	Daesong Bank representative who, in late 2016, held Chinese bank accounts. <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Beijing, China	07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February 2018)
Kim Sang Ho 김상호	Representative, Korea Daesong Bank As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39 official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading Company representative in Yanji, China.  <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Yanji, China	16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26 September 2018)
Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim Cho’ng Man) 김정만	Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office 39 official posted to Hong Kong.  <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Zhuhai, China	16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780
Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim Hyo’k-Cho’l, Hyok Chol Kim) 김혁철	Deputy Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank  <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Zhuhai, China	9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June 2017)
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-nam) 리호남	Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch representative (2014 to present)	Beijing, China	DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires 21 February 2019)

<sup>36</sup> See S/2017/150, p. 64

	<i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>		
Ms. Kim Su Gyong 김수경	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips around Europe, especially in France and Italy, with the assistance of her father, Kim Yong Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB agents who used their status as staff members of international organizations to help her obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See: S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187.	Europe, also transited UAE and the Russian Federation <sup>37</sup>	DOB: 16 Jan 1973; PP 745120374
Jang Myong Chol	Koryo Commercial Bank  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Shenyang, China	
Choe Chil Song	Korea Great China People’s Bank  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Dalian, China	
Han Yong Chol	Foreign Trade Bank  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Beijing, China	
Kim Myong Jin	Korea Daesong Bank  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018	Dandong, China	

<sup>37</sup> The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were “not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory”.

	<i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>		
Ri Jin Hyok	Foreign Trade Bank  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Zhuhai, China	
Mun Cho'ng-Ch'o'l 문정철	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative. Has facilitated transactions for TCB.		Res 2094 (2013) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 7 March (KPi.012)
Choe Song Nam CHOE, Song Nam (aka CH'OE, So'ng-nam) 최성남	Representative of Daesong Bank  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Shenyang, China	DOB: 07 Jan 1979; Passport 563320192 expires 09 Aug 2018;
Kim Chol KIM, Chol (a.k.a. KIM, Ch'o'l) 김철	Representative of Korea United Development Bank		DOB 27 Sep 1964
Paek Jong Sam PAEK, Jong Sam (a.k.a. PAEK, Chong-sam) 백종삼	Representative of Kumgang Bank  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018  <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Shenyang, China	DOB 17 Jan 1964; nationality Korea, North
Ko Il Hwan KO, Il Hwan (a.k.a. KO, Il-hwan) 고일환	Representative of Korea Daesong Bank. According to a Member State, he engaged in transactions for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018 while acting as representative of Daesong Bank in Shenyang.  According to a Member State, active as of late 2018	Shenyang, China	DOB 28 August 1967 Passport 927220424 expires 12 Jun 2022

	<i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>		
Ri Myong Hun RI, Myong Hun (a.k.a. RI, Myo'ng-hun) 리명훈	Representative of Foreign Trade Bank		DOB 14 Mar 1969; Gender Male; Passport <u>381420089</u> expires 11 Oct 2016
Kim Nam Ung 김남웅	Representative for Iksim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Iksim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.		Passport no.: 654110043 Res 2371(2017) designated him as Representative for Iksim International Bank
RI, Jong Won (a.k.a. RI, Cho'ng-Wo'n; a.k.a. RI, Jung Won)	The Russian Federation replied, <i>Mr. Ri Jong Won arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an officially accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation. It is not known what information was used to determine that he is the Moscow-based deputy representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. Moreover, according to the available information, he returned to the DPRK on 8 October 2018.</i>		DOB: 22 Apr 1971; Passport no 654320421 expires 11 Mar 2019

## Annex 52: Pyongyang Cryptocurrency Conference 2019, website screenshot



**Price:**  
3,300 euro per person

**Price Includes:**

- Flight Beijing-Pyongyang-Beijing,
- 7 nights 3\*\*\* hotel in individual room
- 3 meals a day (Vegetarian/Vegan meals available),
- Attendance to the conference
- Translators Korean-English
- Transportation with driver
- All entrances included in the program

Does not include: Payment of DPRK visa (Around 80 euro, depending on nationality and to be made directly in the DPRK Embassy in Beijing), flight from your country of origin to Beijing, laundry, extra drinks, rental of sports' equipment.

\*\*\*\*\* FAQ: \*\*\*\*\*

- \* Are USA passports allowed to apply?  
- Yes, you are welcome to apply.
- \* Can I bring my laptop, smartphone or tablet?  
- Yes, but please note that any mass printed propaganda or digital/printed material against the dignity of the Republic is not allowed.
- \* Is it safe?  
- The DPRK can be considered the safest country in the world. As long as you have a basic common-sense and respect for the culture and belief of other nations, you'll be always welcome and enjoy like thousands of friends we've been hosting for the past 28 years and engaged in cultural, sports, science or business relations.
- \* Who is organizing this?  
- The organizers of the conference are, in the DPRK side, Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos, Special Delegate for the Committee for Cultural Relations and President of the Korean Friendship Association (KFA), and in the technical side Mr. Chris Emms, Blockchain and Crypto expert.
- \* Do you have Internet?  
- Internet is available in the hotel at the price of 5 USD per hour.
- \* What about phone calls?  
- There is no roaming service. It's possible to buy a SIM card to be used to receive/make international phone calls, but we do not recommend it for such short time stay. You can make use of the communications' room in the hotel to make international calls.
- \* Other questions?  
- Please contact: [korea@korea-dpr.info](mailto:korea@korea-dpr.info)

20-02046

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**Who can join?**  
Any interested person except passports from: South Korea, Japan and Israel. Journalists are not allowed to attend.

**How to apply?**  
**For participants:**  
Send picture/scan of the main page of your passport, together with your full address, telephone and short CV-Resume (Stating studies, position and work/company) to: korea@korea-dpr.info

**For lecturers:**  
Send picture/scan of the main page of your passport, together with your full address, telephone and short CV (Stating position and work/company) to:  
korea@korea-dpr.info  
We'll get you back with further details.

**Application deadline:** February 10th, 2019

*Source:* <https://korea-dpr.info/dprk-blockchain-conference-2019.html>, accessed 30 January 2020

## Annex 53: DPRK-linked cryptocurrency trading platforms

According to the cyber security research team, it identified another cryptocurrency trading application infected with malware linked to the Lazarus group in October 2019. Attackers used a fake company and professionally designed website to distribute a free cryptocurrency trading platform, named JMT Trader. Like Celas Trade Pro (below), JMT Trader is a modified version of legitimate trading software, QT Bitcoin Trader. Of particular note is the use of multi-platform infected software (i.e., Windows and Mac), as well as a social media account to promote the software.

The screenshot shows the homepage of JMT TRADING. At the top left is the logo 'jmt JMTTRADING WWW.JMTTRADING.ORG'. At the top right are links: WHY CHOOSE JMT?, DOWNLOAD, JMT AI, HELP & SUPPORT, and FAQS. The main background image features several physical cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum coins. The title 'JMT' is prominently displayed in the center, followed by 'Digital Currency Trading'. Below this, a subtitle reads: 'Bringing World-Class, Institutional Grade Trading Technology to Digital Currency Investors. Buy, sell, trade and securely store Bitcoin, Ripple, Ethereum and more.' At the bottom, there are five trading pair cards: LTCBTC -0.75%, BTCUSD -1.86%, ETHUSD -1.68%, DASHUSD 0.18%, LTCUSD -2.64%, and DASHBTC 1.89%.

The screenshot shows the homepage of the JMT Trading Platform. At the top left is the logo 'jmt JMTTRADING WWW.JMTTRADING.ORG'. At the top right are links: WHY CHOOSE JMT?, DOWNLOAD, JMT AI, HELP & SUPPORT, and FAQS. The background features a blurred stock market chart with various numbers and trends. A green button in the center says 'DOWNLOAD FROM GITHUB'. The title 'Trading Platform' is at the top, followed by 'Innovative Software and Reliable Hardware'. Below this is a detailed description: 'Advanced trading functions for cryptocurrency traders that includes: technical and fundamental analysis, automated trading, and many other innovative features to help traders to be successful. The trading Application is available Windows, desktop and Mac versions.' At the bottom, there are five trading pair cards: LTCBTC -0.75%, BTCUSD -1.72%, ETHUSD -1.57%, DASHUSD 0.70%, LTCUSD -2.56%, and DASHBTC 2.27%.



The screenshot shows the homepage of CELAS LLC. At the top left is the logo 'CELAS LIMITED' with a blue circular icon containing a white Bitcoin symbol. At the top right are links for 'MAIN', 'DOWNLOADS', 'FAQ', 'CONTACT US', and a language selector set to 'English'. The main title 'CELAS LLC' is centered above the subtitle 'Bitcoin | Trading | Cryptocurrency'. Below this is a paragraph about blockchain technology and security, followed by a bold announcement: '29/04/2018 Celas Trade Pro Launches!'. A subtext below it says: 'The first layer of Celas Trade Pro has been released, you can download the Celas Trade Pro to trade several cryptocurrencies from various exchanges.' A 'DOWNLOAD HERE' button is located in a white box at the bottom of this section. The background features a dark, blurred image of mechanical gears.



#### Secure Trading

Celas Trade Pro is secure client uses latest OpenSSL and best encryption.



#### Ease of Use

Celas Trade Pro is an easy to use application.



#### Cross-Platform

Celas Trade Pro is written to be used on any system.




#### Performance

Celas Trade Pro is very fast and uses very little resources.



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The above screenshots show the landing page for JMT Trading and Ceras, respectively. The highly stylized website featured robust content, which helped facilitate the facade of legitimacy.




The above image is a screenshot of Celas Limited's trading platform, which is infected with malware designed to exfiltrate the user's wallet keys.

*Source: The Panel*

**Annex 54: Yongbyon 5 MW (e) Reactor and Light Water Reactor  
(39°47'44.53"N 125°45'19.05"E / LWR)**



Source: Planet

**Annex 55: Abandoned 50 MW (e) Reactor (39°47'20.04"N 125°45'43.87"E)**

Source: Planet

**Annex 56: Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in November 2019**

(41°16'46.14"N 129° 5'9.74"E / west Portal)



*Source:* Planet

## **Annex 57: Nuclear program of the DPRK**

### **1. Lithium-6 production capability**

The Panel previously reported<sup>38</sup> a 2016 advertisement for sale of Lithium-6 by a DPRK entity.<sup>39</sup> A Member State recently shared its assessment, made on the basis of relevant academic publications in a science journal of Kim Il Song University since the late 1990s, that the DPRK had developed capability to produce the Lithium-6, enriched to the degree of  $10.8 \pm 3\%$ , which was advertised in 2016. Based on an open source report published in 2017, the Member State informed the Panel of the possible location of the facility in a chemical complex.

This suggest the scientific research conducted by the DPRK, which started before the UN sanctions, could have provided the DPRK with knowledge and materials for production of Lithium 6, a vital material for development of a thermonuclear device. Furthermore, a chemical complex which is not specifically identified as a military or nuclear facility, may nevertheless be used directly for the DPRK's nuclear weapons program.

### **2. Choke point items concerning DPRK's nuclear program**

The Panel continues to assess the items for its nuclear program which DPRK could seek to procure overseas, either for economic reasons (lower cost) or technological reasons (inability of domestic production, or to obtain technology and know-how for domestic production): "choke point" items.

Possible items include: autoclaves, basalt fiber, bellows sealed valves, beryllium, boron powder, boron-10, capacitors, carbon fiber, controlled atmosphere furnaces, CNC machine-tools, deuterium, filament winding machines, flash X-ray equipment, flow forming machines, glass fiber, graphite, heavy water, high-speed cameras, high strength materials, inverters, isostatic presses, manipulators, maraging steel, mass spectrometers, neutron detectors, para-aramid fiber, pressure gauges, pressure transducers, pressure vessels, radiation shielding windows, trigger spark gaps, vaccum pumps, zirconium.

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<sup>38</sup> S/2017/150, paras 24-25.

<sup>39</sup> General Precious Metal.

**Annex 58.1: Test No.1, 4 May SRBM launched from Hodo peninsula 39°24'32.25"N 127°31'53.63"E (see S/2019/691)**

Figure 58.1.1: Two new SRBM (KN-23) were launched on 4 May 08h30 & 10h50 from Hodo peninsula (39°24'32.25"N 127°31'53.63"E) with a 4-axle wheeled-TEL chassis WS200 inspired by Iskander TEL and similar systems. One of the launches was not fully successful according to a Member State.



Source: Panel S/2019/691 from KCNA picture and Planet (May 4, 2019 01:54:39 UTC) - Member State from KCNA picture (Right)

According to another Member State, the positioning of the cable duct reaching far into the warhead compartment suggested a light warhead, in order to reach the maximum distance of around 600 km. The same SRBM which was launched on the 9 May from the Kusong area has a potential range greater than 400 km.

A third Member State added that the cable ducts positioning in the airframe could point to a different organization of the missile's interior in comparison with the Iskander. (see Annex 59.)

**Annex 58.2: Test No.6, 5 Aug, SRBM launched from Kwail airfield 38°24'54.98"N 125°1'43.00"E**

**Figure 58.2.1: Picture analysis of the launch site in Kwail Airfield**, after the 5 August launch burnt vegetation is visible which does not reflect Near Infrared (NIR), therefore does not appear red on the processed image.



Source: Picture KCNA & Rodong Sinmun; Planet Aug 5, 2019 02:25:53 UTC (left), Planet Aug 6, 2019 02:04:19 UTC (right) with NIR analyses with QGIS application.

**Annex 58.3: Test No.7, 10 Aug, New Tactical Missile launched from Hamhung South East  
39°48'44.32"N 127°39'49.68"E:**

**Figure 58.3.1: the test from an inhabited environment indicates DPRK confidence in the weapon System**



Source: Planet Aug 5, 2019 04:56:17 UTC – Picture KCNA


**Figure 58.3.2: The SRBM launched on 10 and 16 August 2019** resembles the US MGM-140 ATACMS. The TEL chassis is based on the DPRK Pokpung-ho battle tank chassis (derived from T62 and T72), possibly painted in unusual sand color (DPRK traditionally uses forest green camouflage paint schemes for its own missile systems and TELs). (see Figure 58.4.2)



*Source:* KCNA

**Annex 58.4: Test No.8, 16 Aug, ATCM launched from Tongchan area 39°03'33"N  
127°46'44"E**

**Figure 58.4.1: Picture analysis of the launch site in Tongchan area**



*Source:* Picture: KCNA - Planet Aug 4, 2019 02:16:50 UTC (left before the launch of Aug 16) Planet Aug 23, 2019 04:41:34 UTC (right after the launch of Aug 16) (top right with NIR)

**Figure 58.4.2: The two SRBMs launched on 16 August 2019 resemble the US MGM-140 ATACMS and the TEL chassis built on the DPRK Pokpung-ho battle tank chassis derived from T62 and T72 (see Figure 53.3.2)**




*Source:* KCNA


**Annex 58.5: Test No.9, 24 Aug, New Heavy Rocket “super large” (600mm) launched from Sondok Airfield 39°44'37.05"N 127°28'23.79"E**

The test from an airfield reveals the need for a precise launch location with stable and firm soil and security in case of sudden missile explosion. Near infrared analysis shows the exact location of the launch if the KCNA picture and the official statement are true.

**Figure 58.5.1: Picture analyse of the launch site**



Source: KCNA (above) - Google Earth 25 March 2019 above (right) - Planet Aug 23, 2019 01:51:37 UTC; Aug 24, 2019 01:58:37 UTC; Aug 25, 2019 02:16:10 UTC



Source: Planet Aug 26, 2019 (left) Aug 23, 2019 (right)

**Annex 58.6: Test No.10, 10 Sept, New MLRS “super large” (600mm) launched from Kaechon Airfield 39°45'8.46"N 125°53'59.06"E**

Figure VB-1.6.1: Imagery analysis of the launch site in Kaechon Airfield, after the 10 September launch the burnt vegetation is visible (burnt vegetation does not reflect NIR and so does not appear red on the processed image)



Source: Planet Sept 16, 2019 02:22:48 UTC




Source: Planet Sept 11, 2019 00:43:07 UTC (top left) Planet Sept 02, 2019 02:04:15 UTC (bottom left) For NIR analysis with QGIS Planet Sep 16, 2019 02:22:48 UTC (top right) and Sept 9, 2019 02:22:48 UTC (bottom right) and NIR analysis with QGIS

## Annex 58.7: Test No.11, 02 Oct, New SLBM-MRBM launched from a Submersible test barge in the Wonsan area

According to several Member States, the SLBM launched from a submersible test platform on 2 October was the Pukkuksong-3 a naval adaptation of the Pukkuksong-2 (KN-15): same diameter, stage 1 and 2 similar in length but different re-entry vehicle (RV) (see figures below). The Pukkuksong-3 has a hydrodynamic shroud to protect the RV during undersea travel. Before launch, the SLBM is fitted into a transport launch tube with a diameter of around 1.8m. The maximum range was estimated by one Member State at 1,700km and by another Member State as less than 2,500 km.

**Figure 58.7.1: Evaluated Pukkuksong-3 dimensions**



Source: Member State from KCNA & Rodong Sinmun pictures

**Figure 58.7.2: launch of the Pukkuksong-3 on 2 October 2019 (left, middle) and Sinpo ship-yard (right)**




Source: Member State (raw material: KCNA & Rodong Sinmun pictures)

According to a Member State, two of the submersible test platforms have similar design (one in Sinpo and the second in Nampo - (see Figure below:4.5), and a third one in Sinpo has a new design (see below -.7). This last was used for the test launch of the Pukkuksong-3. This new launch test platform contains a hollow cylinder with an external diameter of about 5m, an interior diameter of about 2m and 6~6.5m height. (see below:.3.7)

**Figure 58.7.3: Activity in the Sinpo Naval South shipyard at the secure boat basin from November 2018 to December 2019 related to the SLBM test of 2 October 2019 and in parallel with the activity at the Nampo Naval Shipyard. Up to 3 submersible test barges were observed.**



Source: Planet Dec 5, 2019 04:51:13 UTC



Source: Planet Nov 28, 2018 04:47:36 UTC



3. Simpo secure boat basin: two submersible test barges



4. Nampo Naval Shipyard at the secure boat basin: one other submersible test stand barge (38°43'6.44"N 125°23'39.45"E)

Source: Planet Jun 22, 2019 02:50:20 UTC



**5. Nampo Naval Shipyard** at the secure boat basin: the submersible test stand barge always at the berth on 1st October  
( $38^{\circ}43'6.44''N$   
 $125^{\circ}23'39.45''E$ )

Source: Planet Oct 1, 2019 05:20:54 UTC



**6. Simpo** secure boat basin: Beside the canopy (around 100m length) over the berth a container (trailer) around 15m length ( $40^{\circ}1'34.29''N$   $128^{\circ}9'57.65''E$ ) and crate/canister less than 15m length

Source: Planet Sept 23, 2019 04:50:25 UTC



Source: Planet Sept 29, 2019 01:56:15 UTC (L) Oct 1, 2019 02:12:35 UTC (cent) Oct 8, 2019 02:11:46 UTC (R)



Source: Planet Dec 5, 2019 04:51:13 UTC

## Annex 59: Technical specifications and trajectography of missile tests conducted in 2019

All missiles and heavy rockets launched from 4 May to 28 November 2019 used ballistic missile technology augmented by guidance technology and demonstrated a ballistic trajectory during the course of flight. Some experts have referred to this as quasi-ballistic trajectory.

According to several Member States, however, all of these launches conducted by the DPRK are considered to be ballistic missiles regardless of their specific flight profiles as each of the launches used a propulsion system in boost phase only, with a majority of their flight being unpowered. The analysis below is based on assessments and data provided by four Member States (see Tables 59.1, 59.2, 59.3, Figures 59.1, 59.2, 59.3, 59.4 below) and supplemented by others.

After observing foreign missile systems utilizing solid propellant, which offered advantages in the field, the DPRK had the expertise to design, develop, test and deploy its own systems. Although the new missile systems launched on 4 May, 9 May, 25 July and 6 August (US-dubbed KN-23) resembled the Iskander and similar systems in appearance, this does not suggest that the DPRK was supplied with or stole the design.

According to a Member State, the KN-23 is designed to counter air defense systems. It was first demonstrated in February 2018 military parade (see S/2019/171) using a mock-up mounted on a truck.

**Table 59.1: Main characteristics of the SRBMs (approximate measurements) (see figure 59.1)**

	<i>KN-23</i>	<i>KN-24</i>	<i>KN-25</i>
<i>Length</i>	7.4 m	5.7 m	8.1m
<i>Diameter</i>	0.92 m	0.97 m	0.60 m
<i>Take-off mass</i>	3 800 kg	2 900 kg	3 500 kg
<i>War-head mass</i>	400 kg	400 kg	300 kg
	2	600	
<i>Solid fuel mass</i>	kg	2 000 kg	2 400 kg
<i>Stage number</i>	1	1	1
<i>Separated RV</i>	No	No	No
<i>Trajectory type</i>	Depressed with pull-up	Depressed with pull-up	Ballistic trajectory
<i>Max range without pull-up</i>	450 km	300 km	380 km


Source: Member State

**Figure 59.1: Ballistic missiles identified by a Member State**




*Source:* Member State; *Images:* KCNA

Figure 59.2: Trajectography of Ballistic Missile Launches from May to September 2019




Source: Member State

Figure 59.3: Launches by the DPRK in 2019 (May to October 2019)



Source: Member State

Figure 59.4: DPRK's Ballistic Missile Launches in 2019 (04 May to 28 November 2019)



Source: Member State

**Table 59.2: Analysis of Missile launches from 05 May to 28 November 2019 (excerpt from Figure VB-2.4)**

	(1)19.5.4.	(2)19.5.9.	(3)19.7.25.	(4)19.7.31.	(5)19.8.2.	(6)19.8.6.	(7)19.8.10.	(8)19.8.16.	(9)19.8.24.	(10)19.9.10.	(11)19.10.2.	(12)19.10.31.	(13)19.11.28.
location	Hodo Peninsula	North Pyongan Province, Kusong	Hodo Peninsula	Wonsan Kalma	South Hamgyong Province, Yeongheung	South Hamgyong Province, Kwalli	South Hamgyong Province, Hamheung	Kangwon Province, Tongchon	South Hamgyong Province, Kaechon	South Pyongan Province, Wonsan	Northeastern waters off Wonsan	South Ryongan Province, Sunchon	South Hamgyong Province, Yonpo
Launcher	Wheeled-Track Vehicle	Continuous Wheeled-Vehicle	Continuous Track Vehicle	Continuous Track Vehicle	Wheeled-Vehicle	Track Vehicle	Track Vehicle	Continuous (Canister)	Wheeled-Vehicle	Submerged Test-Launcher	Wheeled-Vehicle	Wheeled-Vehicle	
Projectile (DPRK Announcement)	New SRBM (New tactical guided weapon)	New SRBM (Launch drill of large caliber long-range and tactical guided weapon)	New SRBM (New tactical guided weapon)	New SRBM (New large-caliber multiple-launch guided rocket system)	New SRBM (New large-caliber, multiple-launch guided rocket system)	New SRBM (New tactical guided missile system)	New SRBM (New (New Weapon))	New SRBM (New (New Weapon))	New SRBM (Super-large multiple rocket)	New SRBM (Super-large multiple (Bukkalsong-3) rocket)	New SRBM (Super-large multiple rocket)	New SRBM (Super-large multiple rocket)	
Rak.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	
Max Altitude	40km	50km	30km	25km	37km	40km	30km	97km	60km	910km	90km	97km	
Flight Distance	240km	420km	600km	250km	220km	450km	430km	380km	330km	450km	370km	380km	

Source: Member State

Table 59.3: Analysis of recent missile launches (May to October 2019)

Date	Missile Name	Missile Type	Facility Name	Facility Latitude	Facility Longitude	Apogee	Distance Travelled	TEL type / launch type
04/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°31'56"E		200 km	Wheeled TEL type 1
04/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°31'56"E			Wheeled TEL type 1
09/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Baegun	40°01'47"N	125°13'38"E	50 km	420 km	Caterpillar TEL
09/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Baegun	40°01'47"N	125°13'38"E	?	270 km	Caterpillar TEL
24/07/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°32'03"E	50 km	430 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
24/07/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°32'03"E	50 km	690 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
06/08/19	KN-23	SRBM	Kwall Airbase	38°24'55"N	125°01'43"E	37 km	450 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
06/08/19	KN-23	SRBM	Kwall Airbase	38°24'55"N	125°01'43"E	37 km	450 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
09/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Hungnam	39°48'43"N	127°39'49"E	48 km	400 km	Caterpillar TEL
09/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Hungnam	39°48'43"N	127°39'49"E	48 km	400 km	Caterpillar TEL
15/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Tongchan	39°03'33"N	127°46'44"E	30 km	230 km	Caterpillar TEL
15/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Tongchan	39°03'33"N	127°46'44"E	30 km	230 km	Caterpillar TEL
23/08/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sondok Airbase	39°44'37"N	127°28'24"E	97 km	380 km	Wheeled TEL
23/08/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sondok Airbase	39°44'37"N	127°28'24"E	97 km	380 km	Wheeled TEL
09/09/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Kaechon Air Base	39°45'01"N	125°53'54"E	50 km	330 km	Wheeled TEL
09/09/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Kaechon Air Base	39°45'01"N	125°53'54"E	50 km	330 km	Wheeled TEL
01/10/19	Pukguksong-3	SLBM	Yonghung Bay			910 km	450 km	Imerged Barge
31/10/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sunchon Airbase	39°24'48"N	125°53'18"E	90 km	370 km	Wheeled TEL ?
31/10/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sunchon Airbase	39°24'48"N	125°53'18"E	90 km	370 km	Wheeled TEL ?

Source: Member State, The Panel

## Annex 60: Construction of the new submarine at Sinpo south shipyard

According to several Member States, two submarines could be built concurrently at the new hall ( $40^{\circ} 1'22.88''N$   $128^{\circ} 9'42.43''E$ ). The Panel assess that given the size of the submarine presented on the 23 July in DPRK images and the estimated space utilisation (see figure below) three submarines could be built concurrently. This assumption is shared by other Member States.

**Figure 60.1: Sinpo South shipyards – new hall new berth ( $40^{\circ} 1'20.76''N$   $128^{\circ} 9'46.55''E$ ) and location of the possible ballistic missile submarine (SSB) presented on the 23 July 2019 by KCNA**



Source: Planet Sep 23, 2019 04:50:25 UTC; Picture: KCNA

## Annex 61: General development of the Sinpo south shipyard

In the Sinpo south shipyard, DPRK continued infrastructure development from May to Dec 2019, in the Sinpo peninsula (see Figure, red circle  $40^{\circ} 0'38.02"N$   $128^{\circ} 9'21.50"E$ ) and a possible new submarine training center (see Figure, orange rectangle -  $40^{\circ} 1'37.35"N$   $128^{\circ} 9'14.79"E$ ), whereas the construction of the future underground submarine shelter (see Figure, blue ellipse -  $40^{\circ} 0'42.23"N$   $128^{\circ} 8'51.60"E$ ) slowed. Ground activities were observed in Mayang-do base (see Figure, green circle -  $39^{\circ}59'36.47"N$   $128^{\circ}12'45.51"E$ )


**Figure 61.1: General view of Sinpo shipyard and Mayang-do base. This area could be used as a naval support base for the future SSB according to several Member States.**



Source: Planet Dec 3, 2019 01:54:10 UTC

At the Mayang-do Submarine Base, in parallel with submarine activity, an object resembling a container or cylinder (whose length around 10 m and width 2 m) was observed on 31 May 2018 near the submarine dock in the middle of an open area (see Figure circle green-  $39^{\circ}59'36.47"N$   $128^{\circ}12'45.51"E$ ). This may have been an SLBM or SLBM-canister.

**Figure 61.2: Activity at the Mayang-do submarine base. The object looked like an SLBM cylinder or container on the 31 May – 1 June 2018**



Source: Google Earth May 31, 2018 (left, center); Planet Jun 2, 2018 04 :45 :01 UTC (right)

**Figure 61.3: New infrastructure developments from May to Dec 2019 on the Sinpo peninsula (Figure red circle  $40^{\circ} 0'38.02''N\ 128^{\circ} 9'21.50''E$ ). Construction of the future underground submarine shelter ( $40^{\circ} 0'42.23''N\ 128^{\circ} 8'51.60''E$ ) has slowed.**



**Figure 61.4:** The construction of the future underground submarine shelter (Figure blue ellipse 40° 0'42.23"N 128° 8'51.60"E) has slowed. According to a Member State this building could become a maintenance shelter for the new SSB.



Source: Planet Jan 18, 2018 02:45:06 UTC



Source: Planet Mar 18, 2018 04:55:15 UTC



**Figure 61.5: A possible new submarine training centre (according to the assessment of several Member States) started in 2017 and almost finished in December 2019 (red rectangle - 40° 1'37.35"N 128° 9'14.79"E)**



## Annex 62: Developments at the Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite launching ground

**Figure VB-5.1: Activity on Sohae (Tongchang-ri) Vertical engine test stand (39°39'11.32"N 124°42'51.30"E) from 2 to 8 December 2019 with the arrival of a distinctive container (length > 10m) before the 7 December engine test**



Source: Planet Dec 4, 2019, 05:10:51 UTC



Source: Planet Dec 8, 2019, 02:25:58 UTC

Dec 8, 2019 SOHAE (Tongchang-ri)  
Vertical engine test stand activity  
( $39^{\circ}39'11.32''N$   $124^{\circ}42'51.30''E$ ):  
container (length > 10m) after the engine  
test on Saturday 7 (PM)



Source: Planet Dec 5, 2019, 05:27:04 UTC

Dec 5, 2019 SOHAE (Tongchang-ri)  
Vertical engine test stand activity: new  
container (length > 10m) before the engine  
test on Saturday 7 (PM)



Source: Planet Dec 2, 2019, 05:29:10 UTC

Dec 2, 2019 SOHAE (Tongchang-ri)  
Vertical engine test stand activity: cars  
moving

**Annex 63: Developments at the vertical engine test stand in Chamjin Taesong machine factory since February 2019 (38°57'4.75"N 125°34'12.05"E)**

**Figure 63.1:** The engine vertical test stand of the Taesong Machine factory on 20 February 2019 (38°57'4.75"N 125°34'12.05"E)



Source: Google Earth 20 February 2019 (Left) & Planet Dec 2, 2019 02:07:10 UTC (right)

**Figure 63.2:** Developments at the vertical engine test stand infrastructures between 15 April (left) and 2 December 2019 (right): destruction of two buildings, construction of three buildings (see series of pictures below). The test stand is in the centre of the red circle.



Source: Planet Apr 15, 2019 02:49:57 UTC - Dec 2, 2019 05 :06:32 UTC

				
<i>Source: Planet May 2 2019 - 02:22:10 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet May 29 2019 - 02:22:03 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet June 8 2019 - 03:02:31 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet Jul 5 2019 - 02:57:56 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet Oct 11 2019 - 05:12:08 UTC</i>
Situation of the engine vertical test stand on 02 May 2019: building (north), building (south)	29 May 2019: ongoing dismantlement of buildings (north and south)	08 June 2019: ongoing dismantlement of buildings (north and south) and ongoing construction of 3 new buildings	05 July 2019: dismantlement of buildings (north and south) completed and the 3 new buildings almost completed	11 October 2019: renovation of the site seems completed:

## Annex 64: Signs of regular activity inside the Hungnam 17 Explosives Factory


Regular logistic activity was observed 100 m south-eastern of the solid fuel propellant production facility in the Hungnam 17 Explosives Factory ( $39^{\circ}49'27.00"N$   $127^{\circ}35'13.55"E$ ). Railcars with a 12-13m container regularly moved from the same location ( $39^{\circ}49'22.13"N$   $127^{\circ}35'17.45"E$ ) (see Figure 64.2).

**Figure 64.1: Overview of the Hungnam 17 Explosives Factory**



Source: Planet Oct 15, 2019 04:56:06 UTC

**Figure 64.2: Railcar with a 12-13m container (often white in colour) moved monthly from the same location (39°49'22.13"N 127°35'17.45"E)**



Source: Planet Apr 17, 2019 02:27:51 UTC Source: Planet May 18, 2019 02:23:38 UTC Source: Planet Jun 22, 2019 02:27:14 UTC Source: Planet Jul 9, 2019 04:50:13 UTC Source: Planet Aug 24, 2019 05:15:00 UTC Source: Planet Oct 26, 2019 04:59:41 UTC

In its report S/2019/691 the Panel reported on the regular movement of trucks and trailers from 400 m southeast of production facility (39°49'12.60"N 127°35'19.36"E) (see Figure 64.3). This regular flow of trucks and trailers continues.


**Figure 64.3: Trucks and trailers regularly moved from a storage area (39°49'12.60"N 127°35'19.36"E) located 400 m southeast of production facility**



Source: Planet Sept 25, 2019 05:12:54 UTC

## Annex 65: Developments at the Pyongsong March 16 Factory Automotive Plant

**Figure 65.1:** In September 2019, new construction started along the main building of Pyongsong March 16th Factory Automotive Plant ( $39^{\circ}16'52.37''N$   $125^{\circ}52'15.01''E$ ) where the ICBM Hwasong-15 was assembled before the 29 November 2017 test. Construction appeared almost finished on 19 December 2019.



Source: (From above right to bottom right) Planet Aug 30, 2019 00:44:06 UTC; Sept 16, 2019, 02:22:39 UTC; Nov 11, 2019 02:19:31 UTC; Dec 8, 2019 02:05:15 UTC; (Left) Planet Dec 19, 2019 02:09:00 UTC

## Annex 66: DPRK procurement related to specific technologies

**According to a Member State, obtaining extra-large TELs remained a constraint for the DPRK. The DPRK had not established a production facility for such vehicles for reasons of cost and technology.** The 8-axle TELs (obtained as ‘forestry vehicles’ from China in 2011, S/2016/157 para. 100 and S/2013/337, paras. 52-58) had undergone some modification. A ninth axle had been added for the Hwasong15 launch in November 2017 to produce a vehicle over 20 meters long and two meters wide. It was not known how many of the extra-large TELs which the DPRK possessed had eight and how many had nine axles.

The Panel’s analysis of satellite imagery (Planet) from September to December 2019 (see Annex 65, March 16 Factory of Pyongsang) showed, however, that a new building has been constructed alongside the one where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in November 2017 (see S/2019/171).

**According to the Member State, the DPRK also had difficulty producing the quantity and quality of speciality steels and aluminium required for the BM programme** – including speciality materials containing titanium. Moreover, around 10 years after the construction a solid fuel engine, materials would begin to deteriorate with the appearance of cracks.

**The DPRK probably needed to import the components for guidance systems, but components that could be used in ballistic missile guidance systems were now widely available.**

**The need for filament winders and winding equipment was a constraint as well as the requirement for carbon-carbon to manufacture the nozzles for solid propellant rocket motors.** From state media images (see S/2019/171 Annex 84 Figure VI) it was apparent that the DPRK were working on carbon fibre for composite motor cases – for which Kevlar and aramid fibre were alternatives.

**Other procurement of choke-points items included solid propellant. A typical composite formula involved aluminium powder and ammonium perchlorate.** Although the DPRK had manufacturing capacity, DPRK plant might not be operating well according to a Member State. It was assessed that the DPRK had difficulty in producing such materials at the right degree of purity and particulate size. To support its flight test programme and production for deployment, the Member State estimated that the DPRK needed 100 tonnes of the aforementioned materials over ten years.

A Member State identified specific DPRK procurement related to high tech devices, from which machinery and certain components could be used in the WMD programme. In particular the DPRK is seeking Specific electronic equipment (like batteries, receiver and recorder), industrial equipment (like bearing crusher, generators, milling and other machinery) and certain elements of vehicles (cars and spare parts).

## **Annex 67: Specific scientific collaboration identified as possible means of Intangible Transfer of Technology (ITT)**

The Panel requested information from a Member State on international joint studies, in particular, concerning the role of the DPRK partners in the studies and networks established through the joint studies.<sup>40</sup> The Member State informed the Panel in respect of one professor who conducted a joint study, that the DPRK researcher in the professor's team had merely participated in "a basic calculation." The Panel views that even a supporting role in research could be used to acquire relevant advanced knowledge and establish networks.

From the studies presented in the CNS Occasional paper #43 December 2018 report<sup>41</sup> and in the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information report<sup>42</sup> and from its own investigation, the Panel identified nine particular scientific partnerships (among many others) with DPRK institutions which involve DPRK scientists and which could be a means for the DPRK to supplement its technical knowledge gaps in specific fields mentioned below<sup>43</sup>.

One Member State queried by the Panel replied that seven of the studies were published in public journals before 2017 and the drafting, submission, revision and finalization of the papers were completed before the adoption of Security Council resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016). All contents in the studies are basic scientific research work and have been publicly published with unclassified bibliographies.

Regarding two papers published in 2018, according to the Member State, they were submitted before the adoption of resolution 2321 (2016). They are basic scientific research work without sensitive contents, and large number of similar research works can be found.

Below are the areas that DPRK students and researchers participated in joint studies which can possibly be applied to the DPRK's prohibited WMD programmes in the future. The following technological expertise has been identified:

### **Damping technology applicable to space and missile development**

**Study:** A Novel Shear Mode MR Damper and Its Mechanical Performance.

**Study:** Design and experiments of a novel magneto-rheological damper featuring bifold flow mode

### **Manufacturing technology for aircraft engines and airframes**

**Study:** Enhanced Ductility of a Bimodal Grain Structure Ti-22Al-25Nb Alloy Fabricated by Spark Plasma Sintering

**Study:** Microstructure and mechanical properties of a Ti22A125Nb alloy fabricated from elemental powders by mechanical alloying and spark plasma sintering

**Study:** Influence of mechanical alloying on the microstructure and mechanical properties of powder metallurgy Ti2AlNb-based alloy

**Study:** Experimental comparison of ground surface characteristics for P/M Ti2AlNb-based alloy using CBN and diamond grinding wheels

<sup>40</sup> specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering.

<sup>41</sup> By the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

<sup>42</sup> [www.kisti.re.kr](http://www.kisti.re.kr) (covering the publications between 2007-2016)

<sup>43</sup> Paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), which reinforces paragraph 28 of resolution 1874 (2009) and which called for Member State vigilance, states that "all Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines".

**Technology used in specialized heavy vehicles**

**Study:** Active steering control strategy for articulated vehicles

**The design and implementation of Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS)** (such as applied in the new DPRK January 18 General Machinery Factory (possibly located 39°33'19.88"N 125°51'20.23"E) which manufactures engines for heavy ground vehicle including tanks and tracked Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) and could be involved in the development of missile weapon systems)

**Study:** Design and Implementation of Automatic Flexible Manufacture System in Multistage Machining Process Oriented to Information Integrated Control

**Technology related to vibration test equipment**


**Study:** Vibration analysis of coupled doubly-curved revolution shell structures using Jacobi-Ritz method

## Annex 68: DPRK Sectoral Statistics, Bank of Korea (ROK)

Based on the data provided by Bank of Korea, and subsequent analysis by Panel Members, the estimated effect of UN sectoral sanctions on affected sectors could range between 4.6 and 8.2 billion USD. This estimate assumes DPRK GDP is between 18 and 32 billion USD. This would translate into a rough estimate of a loss of hundreds of millions in revenues which can affect workers and their families' livelihoods.<sup>44</sup> It is important to note, however, that declines in affected sectors are an intended consequence of UN sanctions and that the panel has no specific information about how income loss may affect humanitarian aid and the civilian population in the DPRK.

### North Korea's Population, Nominal GNI, GNI per Capita, Economic Growth Rate

	unit	'18	'17	'16	'15
population	clarification	25,132	25,014	24,897	24,779
Nominal GNI	1 billion won	35,895	36,631	36,373	34,512
	(\$ Billion)	326	324	313	305
GNI per capita	Ten thousand won	142.8	146.4	146	139
	(dollar)	1,298	1,295	1,259	1,231
Economic growth	%	-4.1	-3.5	3.9	-1.1



<sup>44</sup> This analysis does not include lost wages for overseas laborers. According to diplomats accredited to Pyongyang, overseas workers usually support between 3 and 10 family members (Source: [https://1prime.ru/News/20191214/830688796.html?fbclid=IwAR2PUx1EcG9RZekkMXtYPEbmPrjim0rUG903kmbmCl45U05LZhL3qGgN7\\_A](https://1prime.ru/News/20191214/830688796.html?fbclid=IwAR2PUx1EcG9RZekkMXtYPEbmPrjim0rUG903kmbmCl45U05LZhL3qGgN7_A)). It is important to note, however, that some have estimated between 60 and 75 percent of overseas labourer's wages are deducted by the state.

## North Korea's Growth Rate by Industry (Unit:%)

and research

International	'18	'17	'16	
<b>Agriculture, forestry and fishery</b>	-1.8	-1.3	2.5	.
<b>Mining industry</b>	-12.3	-8.5	6.2	.
Mining	-17.8	-11.0	8.4	.
- manufacturing	-9.1	-6.9	4.8	.
-(Light industry)	-2.6	0.1	1.1	.
-(Heavy chemical industry)	-12.4	-10.4	6.7	.
<b>Electric Gas Water Business</b>	5.7	-2.9	22.3	-
<b>Construction</b>	-4.4	-4.4	1.2	.
<b>Service</b>	0.9	0.5	0.6	.
- (government)	0.8	0.8	0.6	.
- (Other)	1.2	-0.3	0.5	.
<b>Gross domestic product</b>	-4.1	-3.5	3.9	.



**North Korea's Industrial Structure (Unit: nominal,%)**

	'18	'17	'16	'15
<b>Agriculture, forestry and fishery</b>	23.3	22.8	21.7	21.6
<b>Mining industry</b>	29.4	31.8	33.2	32.7
Mining	10.6	11.7	12.6	12.2
- manufacturing	18.8	20.1	20.6	20.4
-(Light industry)	6.8	6.8	6.9	7.0
-(Heavy chemical industry)	12.0	13.3	13.7	13.4
<b>Electric Gas Water Business</b>	5.4	5.0	5.2	4.5
<b>Construction</b>	8.9	8.6	8.8	9.0
<b>Service</b>	33.0	31.7	31.1	32.2
- (government)	24.6	23.2	22.4	23.3
- (Other)	8.5	8.4	8.7	8.9
<b>Gross domestic product</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bank of Korea website. Available at: <https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/main/contents.do?menuNo=200091>, accessed 31 January 2020.

### Annex 69: DPRK Fuel Supply (2017, 2018 and 5 year average), FAO

The sectoral sanctions limit the amount of fuel, production of fertilizers, and the availability of machinery for agriculture and food production. Spare parts are increasingly in short supply as existing machinery ages. Moreover, according to FAO, “shortages of fuel, electricity and pumping equipment limit the ability to irrigate, reducing yields and making crops susceptible to extreme weather shocks, such as drought and heatwaves.”

Fuel Type	2018	2017	5 yr average	2017-2018 change	2018 change from 5 yr average
	Metric Tones			%	
Diesel	40,502	54,350	57,727	-25	-30
Petrol	4,000	6,000	6,500	-33	-38
TOTAL	44,502	60,350	64,227	-26	-31

Source: FAO website. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/ca4447en/ca4447en.pdf>, accessed 31 January 2020

## Annex 70: An analysis of exemption request times

The Panel compared exemption request approval times in 2018 and 2019. The table below highlights the average approval time, defined as the number of working days (i.e., Monday to Friday) from the date of the request to the date of the approval.<sup>45</sup> The data show that the average number of working days for an exemption request approval fell from 59 in 2018 to 17 in 2019—a decrease of approximately 71%.

Table 1: Average time for exemption request approvals


Year	No. of Request Approvals	Average approval time (in workdays)	Std. Dev. (in workdays)
2018	16	59	48
2019	32	17	31

The Panel found no statistically significant difference between the type of organization making the request (i.e., a UN organization or a non-UN organization).<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> This analysis excludes requests that were denied, placed on hold, or withdrawn from the committee. In total, these included 4 cases (2018 and 2019 combined). The cases were excluded to ensure consistency in the analysis and because contextual circumstances varied significantly between cases. An alternative analysis of “time-to-decision”, which includes the 4 cases, shows no significant difference from the decrease in exemption request approval times.

<sup>46</sup> The Panel conducted an independent-sample t-test to compare UN and non-UN exemption request time approvals (2-tailed, p = 0.118). This result is for 2018 and 2019 combined, as there were not enough samples to test each year individually.

## Annex 71: DPRK Needs and Priorities Report by UN OCHA, 2019 (excerpt)



Source: OCHA

## Annex 72: Potential Social Impacts

Theoretical and empirical analyses of sanctions' effects on civilian populations in various countries show that sanctions tend to take a disproportionate toll on the most vulnerable segments of society—e.g., women, children, the elderly, and the disabled. This is especially true in less developed states that lack legal protections for marginalized or underrepresented populations, as well as those states that do not afford women access to education, exclude certain groups from participation in political processes, and limit women's economic rights. Economic shocks—caused by sanctions—can lead to increased violations of women's economic rights, which in turn leads to more violations of women's basic rights.<sup>47</sup> Although there are no systematic studies that examine the direct consequences of UN sanctions on women's rights or status in the DPRK, it is worth noting that the textile, clothing, seafood and other food processing industries within the DPRK's economy, which are all affected by UN sectoral sanctions, have large proportions of female laborers.

It would be reasonable to assume that UN sanctions' effects on the country's economy may have disproportionate effects on the most vulnerable segments of society. In the DPRK, as in other countries, children of a particular age are often the first to be affected by the absence of adequate nutrition and healthcare. Sanctions may also complicate the ability to provide support for the disabled.<sup>48</sup> Of course, these effects are compounded by domestic policies that favor elites, who sometimes, paradoxically, benefit from their increased ability to manage shrinking resources, resulting from limiting of external supplies due to sanctions, and capitalize on the “new economy.”

*Source:* The Panel

<sup>47</sup> See, for example, Drury, A. Cooper, and Dursun Peksen. 2014. “Women and Economic Statecraft: The Negative Impact International Economic Sanctions Visit on Women.” European Journal of International Relations 20 (2): 463–90.

<sup>48</sup> See <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/north-koreans-disabilities-threatened-international-sanctions-aid-groups-say>.

## Annex 73: Consolidated List of Recommendations

### (Maritime and Sectoral)

1. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee agree upon a single conversion rate between tons and barrels for refined petroleum products and specify the ton measurement referred to in the resolution.
2. The Panel recommends that the Committee publish the amounts of refined petroleum deliveries converted into barrels on receipt of any notification.
3. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States should report in a timely manner any known transfers of refined petroleum products to the Committee, as required by the resolution.
4. The Panel recommends to the Committee to designate the following vessels for violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):
  - *Bonvoy 3* (IMO: 8978784), unknown-flagged
  - *Diamond 8* (IMO: 9132612), Sierra Leone-flagged
  - *Hokong* (IMO: 9006758), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
  - *Sen Lin 01* (IMO: 8910378), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
  - *Subblie* (IMO: 8126082), formerly Togo-flagged
  - *Tianyou* (IMO: 8817007), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
  - *Unica* (IMO: 8514306), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
  - *Viet Tin 01* (IMO: 8508838), Viet Nam-flagged
  - *Vifine* also known as *Tealway FV* (IMO: 9045962), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
  - *Yun Hong 8* (MMSI: 413459380), Chinese-flagged
5. The Panel recommends to the Committee to designate the following vessels for conducting ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels for violation of paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):
  - *Rui Hong 916* (IMO: 9058866), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
  - *Sea Prima* (IMO: 8617524), formerly Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged
6. The Panel reiterates its recommendations to designate the following DPRK vessels for violation of paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):
  - *Bok Un 1 / Myong Ryu 1* (IMO: 8532413), DPRK-flagged
  - *Mu Bong 1* (IMO: 8610461), DPRK-flagged

**To Member States on best practices with regards to the DPRK activities:**

#### *On information sharing:*

7. Member States with evidence should share a list of vessels suspected of delivering petroleum products to the DPRK with the relevant Member State authorities in order to conduct their own due diligence and deter vessels that facilitate imports of refined petroleum into the DPRK.
8. Member States should encourage ship owners, operators and charterers to incorporate into due diligence practices available data from organizations that provide data such as ship location, ship registry information, and ship flagging information, along with available information from the 1718 Committee.

*On promoting transparency:*

9. Member States should require their relevant competent authorities to disclose beneficial ownership information of all legal entities seeking to register vessels under their ship registry. Member States with open registries should endeavor to collect identifying and contact information for each individual that owns or exerts control over the foreign entity to which each vessel belongs, whether as a controlling shareholder, a financier of the enterprise, or as a senior manager or decisionmaker.

10. Member States with open registries should endeavor to collect identifying and contact information on vessel owners represented by a resident agent national, should there be no legal entity within the Member State's jurisdiction.

*On leveraging technology in support of effective implementation of maritime sanctions measures:*

11. Flag states and the maritime industry should consider technical solutions to avoid abuse of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) such as a "soft-lock" system to ensure transmission of valid vessel identification data, using a strictly controlled access code.

12. Flag States and the maritime industry to consider developing and adopting electronic document management systems to enable rapid, on-site checks for authenticity, validity or cancellation (for sanctions reasons), using a mobile phone application or by accessing the Flag State website online.

*On promoting best practices on end-user certification*

13. Member States should consider adopting guidance measures for commodity traders, suppliers and brokering companies that require certificates of ultimate origin and destination for commodities being sold to apply a 'Know your Customer's Customer (KYCC)' due diligence measures.

**To the Committee:**

14. The Panel recommends to the Committee to designate the *Rui Jin* (IMO: 8919104) for violation of paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017).

15. To assist the efforts of Member State, the Panel reiterates its previous recommendation to establish a regional cooperative mechanism to share information on whether vessels actually docked and loaded coal from the ports claimed in their documents of cargo origin. Member States should establish a point of contact for that purpose.

16. The Panel recommends that Member States take all necessary measures including enacting legislation mandating appropriate action against all vessels found to have violated sanctions.

17. The Panel recommends that Member States share with other Member States, Committee and the Panel the list of vessels confirmed as involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by relevant resolutions.

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**(Embargoes, designated entities/individuals and workers)**

18. Member States should exercise vigilance in screening all categories of visa application by DPRK nationals to prevent the entry of DPRK nationals intending to earn income overseas.
19. Member States, pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), should submit in a timely manner reports containing complete information on repatriation to the DPRK of all DPRK nationals earning income.
20. To enhance the efficiency of Member States implementation of reporting requirements, the Committee should consider issuing Implementation Assistance Notices (IANs).

**(Luxury Goods)**

21. Member States should encourage their nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent re-sale to sanctioned jurisdictions.
22. The Committee should prepare a more detailed list of prohibited luxury goods (where possible, with specific HS commodity codes) for consideration by the Council.
23. Member States should harmonize their export control lists to reflect the list of prohibited luxury goods.
24. Member States and relevant international organizations should encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide a thorough systems for checking consignees, bearing in mind the risk of transhipment.

**(Finance)**

25. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities, contained in paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).
26. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Security Council consider explicitly addressing the DPRK's evasion of sanctions through cyber means if drafting additional sanctions measures in the future.
27. The Panel recommends that all Member States exercise vigilance over their nationals who may be traveling to the DPRK to provide training and/or advice on using virtual currencies and related technologies to evade UN sanctions.
28. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation that Member States ensure their legal and regulatory frameworks cover virtual assets (e.g., cryptocurrency) and virtual asset service providers (e.g. cryptocurrency exchanges).
29. The Panel specifically highlights a recurring trend whereby DPRK diplomats and their family members establish bank accounts for the purpose of UN sanctions evasion, and recommends Member States exercise enhanced vigilance.
30. The Panel encourages Member States to implement the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, with special attention given to measures associated with *targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation and transparency and*

*beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements (FATF Recommendations 7, 24, and 25).*

**(Nuclear and ballistic missiles)**

31. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise vigilance over the risk of sanctions violation through exchanges, including joint research with DPRK researchers and institutions in sensitive areas.

32. The Panel recommends that Member States be vigilant in monitoring intangible technology transfer, including the transfer of “know-how”.

33. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise higher vigilance to the supply of items prohibited under relevant resolutions, and further emphasizes the importance of stringent export control by all relevant parties such as the producers, brokers, and the end-users.

**(Unintended consequences)**

34. The Committee should continue efforts for the prompt resumption of a stable banking channel for humanitarian activities, including the identification of financial channels and institutions as possible alternatives for fund transfers.

35. The Committee should continue the practice of bi-annual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions on the civilian population and on their operations within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

36. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that are consequential to mitigating the unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on DPRK’s civilian population and on humanitarian aid operations.

37. The Committee should continue discuss simplifying the exemption application and no objection procedures for UN humanitarian organizations in the DPRK.

38. The Committee should work toward streamlining the procedure for applying for exemptions under the terms of the Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 and work to simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved and the frequency of requests and submissions.

39. In order to help humanitarian organizations’ planning and budgeting processes, the Committee should publish detailed quarterly statistics on the exemption approvals and the approval process.

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