



Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 2 of resolution [2345 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).



Annex

Letter dated 1 March 2018 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2345 (2017), the final report on its work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on 1 February 2018 and was considered by the Committee on 21 February 2018.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Hugh **Griffiths**
Coordinator

Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

(Signed) Benoit **Camguilhem**
Expert

(Signed) Dmitry **Kiku**
Expert

(Signed) Stephanie **Kleine-Ahlbrandt**
Expert

(Signed) Maiko **Takeuchi**
Expert

(Signed) Neil **Watts**
Expert

(Signed) Jong Kwon **Youn**
Expert

(Signed) Jiahu **Zong**
Expert

Enclosure**Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)**

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Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)

Summary

In 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea intensified its advanced nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities through the largest nuclear test to date, flight tests of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and an intermediate-range ballistic missile and a threat to conduct an atmospheric nuclear test over the Pacific Ocean. The Security Council adopted four resolutions, by which it strengthened existing sanctions and introduced new measures, including petroleum sanctions and a crude oil cap. In addition to ongoing violations and increasingly sophisticated evasion practices, the Panel's latest investigations show that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is already flouting the most recent resolutions by exploiting global oil supply chains, complicit foreign nationals, offshore company registries and the international banking system.

The Panel investigated illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum comprising a multi-million-dollar business that is driving an international network of brokers and ship charterers as well as unwitting global commodity trading companies and oil suppliers. In tandem, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to export almost all the commodities prohibited in the resolutions, generating nearly \$200 million in revenue between January and September 2017. In continuing its illicit coal exports, the country combined deceptive navigation patterns, signals manipulation, trans-shipment and fraudulent documentation to obscure the origin of the coal. While the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) has designated seven vessels for coal and petroleum transfers, a coordinated effort by Member States is crucial to curb these rampant illicit activities. At the same time, the heightened sanctions have created lucrative markets for Democratic People's Republic of Korea-backed traders seeking to procure petroleum while exporting the country's natural resources. The profit margins involved, coupled with the offshore nature of much of the affected oil, maritime and finance sectors, necessitate far greater private sector due diligence, information-sharing and self-policing.

The Panel investigated a wide array of prohibited military cooperation projects of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stretching from Africa to the Asia-Pacific region, including ongoing ballistic missile cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic and Myanmar, widespread conventional arms deals and cyberoperations to steal military secrets. The Panel's investigations show that diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continue to play a key role in the country's prohibited programmes, in particular trade representatives and missions which provide logistical support for arms transfers, military technicians and intelligence operations, acting as fronts for designated entities and individuals and engaging in commercial activities that violate the resolutions and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is accessing the global financial system through deceptive practices combined with critical deficiencies in the implementation of financial sanctions. Financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including designated banks, maintain more than 30 overseas representatives who live and move freely across borders in the Middle East and Asia, where they control bank accounts, facilitate transactions and deal in bulk cash. Corporate service providers present a key vulnerability in the implementation of financial sanctions, allowing the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea to easily create front companies offshore and in Asian financial centres, where they leverage the assistance of non-nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and use the firms to open and maintain accounts to move money worldwide. Joint ventures with foreign companies have further generated hard currency through overseas companies with no overt links to designated entities or interests of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Financial investigations highlight the activity of intelligence agents and other individuals acting on behalf of designated entities, operating bank accounts in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region and using diplomatic passports and diplomatic-plated cars to cross land and air borders with less scrutiny.

The international community has responded to the unprecedented nuclear and ballistic missile activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2017 by introducing an array of new measures that seek to change the country's behaviour and direction in 2018. However, this expansion of the regime is yet to be matched by the requisite political will, international coordination, prioritization and resource allocation necessary to drive effective implementation. The year 2018 could represent a critical window of opportunity before a potential miscalculation with disastrous implications for international peace and security.

The present report offers a series of recommendations for designation and other practical measures to assist Member States and the Security Council in addressing challenges and shortcomings.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea undertook its sixth nuclear test, on 3 September 2017, and conducted 20 ballistic missile launches, including 3 intercontinental ballistic missiles, in defiance of the resolutions and in line with its intent to accelerate the completion of its nuclear forces as stated in Kim Jong Un's 2017 New Year's address.¹ After the launch of the new intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-15 on 29 November 2017, Kim made a declaration on "completing the State nuclear force".² In his 2018 New Year's address, he further stated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had accomplished the "cause of perfecting the national nuclear forces" and attributed this to "simultaneously conducting economic construction and building up our nuclear forces (*Byongjin*), and its idea of prioritizing science".³

2. Domestically, Kim Jong Un further consolidated his power base by strengthening the party's control over the military and the executive. In 2017, the Workers' Party of Korea conducted its first political audit of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army in 20 years.⁴ Kim used the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea of 3 September 2017 to make an official decision to conduct the sixth nuclear test. During the second plenum of the seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, on 7 October 2017, Kim selected new members of the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party and reaffirmed his adherence to the *Byongjin* policy, while re-emphasizing the "independence and self-reliance" against sanctions.⁵

3. The continued violations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the resolutions further deepened its diplomatic and economic isolation. In 2017, several Member States expelled ambassadors of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and reduced the number of accredited diplomats, and some severed or reduced their commercial ties, often in protest of the country's continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction programmes and other illicit activities. However, even after the visit of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to the country in December 2017 and the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue to discuss participation in the 2018 Olympic Winter Games, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that the "nuclear force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not a bargaining chip for political purpose and business" and the country "should continue to bolster up the nuclear force".⁶

4. Through the nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic missile tests conducted in 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears to have achieved a number of important technical milestones in its weapons of mass destruction capability. There are no indications that such activities will cease, and the stated goals of achieving denuclearization and a peaceful solution to the situation seem increasingly remote. The country also continued to condemn actions by the United Nations on its human rights record, including the adoption of General Assembly resolution [72/188](#) of 19 December 2017, in which the Assembly encouraged the continuation of the

¹ "Kim Jong Un reviews achievements made last year", Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 1 January 2017.

² "DPRK Government statement on successful test-fire of new-type ICBM", KCNA, 29 November 2017.

³ "Kim Jong Un's New Year's address", Rodong Sinmun, 1 January 2018.

⁴ "North Korea carries out first political audit of army in 20 years", *Hankyoreh*, 21 November 2017.

⁵ "Second Plenum of Seventh WPK Central Committee", KCNA, 8 October 2017.

⁶ "DPRK's nuclear deterrent guarantees peace", Rodong Sinmun, 12 January 2018.

Security Council's consideration of and discussion on the human rights situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

5. The Panel continues to be targeted by a sophisticated hacking campaign, first noted in its 2017 midterm report.⁷ While this campaign has continued up through the time of writing, the Panel is investigating another attack. Microsoft confirmed that this attack was conducted by a “nation-State-associated” threat actor group⁸ (see annex 1), and the United Nations concluded that the attacks discovered in October 2017 “can be linked to an earlier incident in May 2017 and demonstrate the persistent nature of the attacks and the level of determination by the adversary” (see annex 2). The Panel is investigating these cases and is of the view that the strategic nature of the phishing, the emails selected for forwarding and the disruptive nature of the campaign amount to sanctions evasion.

Recommendation

6. In line with the requests in the most recent resolutions to provide the Panel with additional resources, the Panel recommends that the Security Council request the Secretary-General to take specific measures to reinforce both the physical and information security, administrative support and other relevant resources.

II. Ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programmes

Launches

7. Between August 2017 and January 2018, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched two Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (over Japan) and one Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (table 1). After the latter, Kim Jong Un declared that “the State nuclear force had been completed”.⁹ However, it is more likely that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is yet to validate the capacity of a nuclear payload to survive re-entry in the atmosphere for its intercontinental ballistic missile.

**Table 1
Launches of ballistic missiles, August 2017 to January 2018**

Date	Type	Number	Reported launch location	Reported flown distance (km)	Remark
26 August	Scud or Scud variant	3	Kittaeryong	250	1 or 2 reported failures
29 August	Hwasong-12	1	Sunan	2 700	Over Japan
15 September	Hwasong-12	1	Sunan	3 700	Over Japan
29 November	Hwasong-15	1	Pyongsong	950	4 475 km apogee

8. The designated Strategic Force of the Korean People's Army was responsible for the two intermediate-range ballistic missile launches (figure I), which were supervised by Kim Jong Un, who stated that they were aimed at confirming “the actual

⁷ This campaign has been ongoing for several years (see S/2017/742, footnote 1).

⁸ See annex 1 (Microsoft report, 20 November 2017).

⁹ “Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of Hwasong-15”, KCNA, 29 November 2017.

war capacity of the intermediate- and long-range strategic ballistic rocket".¹⁰ Following the second test, he asserted that "the combat efficiency and reliability of Hwasong-12 were thoroughly verified".¹¹

Figure I
Hwasong-12 launches on 29 August (left) and 15 September (right)



Source: Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

9. In a major milestone for its ballistic missile programme, on 29 November 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea successfully launched a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-15. Similar to that of the two Hwasong-14 launches in July, this launch was on a steeply lofted trajectory. The missile travelled approximately 53 minutes before falling into the exclusive economic zone of Japan.¹²

10. The Hwasong-15 is a two-stage liquid-fuel ballistic missile featuring a twin engine on its first stage. It was transported on a nine-axle truck never observed before. The Hwasong-15 appears to be the longest-range ballistic missile ever tested by the country (figure II).¹³ Despite the claim by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the Hwasong-15 "is capable of carrying super-heavy nuclear warhead and attacking the whole mainland of the United States",¹⁴ the Panel is still gathering information on its exact capabilities.¹⁵

¹⁰ "Kim Jong Un guides strategic ballistic rocket launching drill of KPA strategic force", KCNA, 30 August 2017.

¹¹ "Kim Jong Un guides Hwasong-12 launching drill again", KCNA, 16 September 2017.

¹² Ministry of Defence of Japan, "North Korea missile launch (2nd)", press release, 29 November 2017.

¹³ Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) analysis based on KCNA images assessed the diameter to be approximately 2.5 m and length around 20.5 m.

¹⁴ "Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of Hwasong-15", Korean Central News Agency, 29 November 2017.

¹⁵ According to the Republic of Korea Defence Ministry's 1 December 2017 statement "in the case it was fired at a normal angle, it would be capable of flying over 13,000 km". Regarding the range, it is not known whether the payload used for the test launch of 29 November 2017 had a mass similar to that of an operational payload.

Figure II
Hwasong-15 launch on 29 November 2017



Source: KCNA.

11. Regarding the capacity of intercontinental ballistic missile payloads to re-enter the atmosphere, according to a Member State, the success of the first intercontinental ballistic missile test (launch of the Hwasong-14 on 4 July 2017) is unclear, while it is believed that the re-entry vehicle of the second intercontinental ballistic missile test disintegrated (launch of the Hwasong-14 on 28 July 2017). The re-entry vehicle of the 29 November 2017 launch also reportedly failed. With regard to the re-entry technology, the Panel notes the statement by the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea regarding the 29 November 2017 test declaring that the launch “didn’t provide the capabilities of atmospheric re-entry, precise guidance or the operation of a nuclear warhead”.¹⁶

Test site activities


12. The Hwasong-12 and the first stage of the Hwasong-14 appear to be powered by the same liquid-fuel engine with four auxiliary engines tested on 18 March 2017 at the Sohae engine test pad (figure III). Kim Jong Un again supervised the test, which was described as that of a new “high-thrust engine”.¹⁷

13. Given the unreliability of the Hwasong-10 engine, this new engine was a step-change in allowing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to rapidly achieve a reliable intermediate-range ballistic missile and intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ “Kim Jong Un watches ground jet test of newly developed high-thrust engine”, Korean Central News Agency, 19 March 2017.

Figure III
Hwasong-14 engine (left), Hwasong-12 engine (right) and new engine tested on 18 March 2017 (bottom)




Source: KCNA.

14. According to a Member State, this engine could have been derived from the Soviet-era RD-250, a twin-combustion chamber engine (figure IV). The RD-250 was designed by the “Scientific and Production Association Energomash” (now in the Russian Federation), which in 1965 transferred the design documentation required for serial production to the Yuzhnoye State Design Office and the Yuzhmash Production Association (both now in Ukraine). Ukraine confirmed to the Panel that it was highly likely that the engine of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea contained separate components of this engine and used the same propellant components (nitrogen tetroxide or NTO and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine or UDMH). According to information provided to the Panel by the United States of America, “the U.S. Intelligence Community has publicly stated that ‘We have intelligence to suggest that North Korea is not reliant on imports of engines. Instead we judge they have the ability to produce the engines themselves.’”

15. Ukraine informed the Panel that all RD-250 engines suitable for flight use were delivered to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, later, the Russian Federation as part of missiles or launch vehicles. The production of RD-250 engines ceased in 1991 and the production line was dismantled in 1994. Ukraine stated that Yuzhnoye and Yuzhmash had “never undertaken attempts, signed contracts or entered into relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Ukraine also informed the Panel that “design, manufacturing and other documentation for production of missile technology and components is reliably stored in specially equipped premises”.

Figure IV
Comparison between the RD-250 engine (left) and the engine of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (right)



Source: The Panel.

16. According to Yuzhnoye and Yuzhmash experts, it is “impossible to modernize or create a new engine based on the existing one within two years without design and technological support”. Franz Klintzevich, first Deputy Chair of the Defence and Security Committee of the Federation Council, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, asserted that “the cooperation between the Ukrainian specialists and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been ongoing for years”.¹⁸ The Panel contacted the Russian Federation to request support for this claim along with the names and passport information of the individuals involved, but did not receive a reply. For its part, Ukraine informed the Panel that “it was continuously tracking employees of aerospace industry companies travelling abroad”.

Recent nuclear-related activities

3 September 2017 nuclear test

17. The Nuclear Weapons Institute of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stated on 3 September 2017 that the country had “successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM”.¹⁹ The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) detected “an unusual seismic event” near the previous location (at Punggye-ri) (figure V).²⁰ The 6.07 magnitude makes it the largest test yet.²¹ Two Member States estimated the yield at above 100 kilotons, although the type of device has yet to be confirmed.²² Consistent with this higher yield, several aftershocks occurred, suggesting additional damage to the test site. However, excavation work continued after the test, ostensibly to maintain the readiness of the site.

¹⁸ Federal News Agency article dated 16 August 2017.


¹⁹ “DPRK Nuclear Weapons Institute on Successful Test of H-bomb for ICBM”, KCNA, 3 September 2017.

²⁰ Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization(CTBTO), “CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo on the unusual seismic event detected in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, press release, 3 September 2017.

²¹ Magnitude of past tests (CTBTO): 5.10 (September 2016), 4.82 (January 2016), 4.92 (2013), 4.51 (2009) and 4.08 (2006).

²² Japan estimated a 160 kiloton yield (Defense Minister Onodera, 6 September 2017), while France reported to the Panel an estimated yield of above 100 kilotons. Japan also noted that the possibility of an H-bomb “could not be ruled out”.

Figure V
Test location estimates for 2006 (green), 2009 (yellow), 2013 (blue),
January 2016 (orange), September 2016 (pink) and 2017 (red)



Source: CTBTO.

Continuing activities and infrastructure expansion

18. According to KCNA, on 3 September 2017, Kim Jong Un provided “guidance to nuclear weaponization” showcasing a metal object and device (figure VI). A Member State assessed that the object appeared to be a nuclear device model with external characteristics associated with a thermonuclear device.

Figure VI
Object inspected by Kim Jong Un with the image of a missile warhead in the background



Source: KCNA.

19. In its report of August 2017, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that there were indicators of the operation of the 5 MW (e) reactor.²³ In addition, a Member State informed the Panel that the reactor operated constantly throughout 2017 except for two short periods in May and September. IAEA also observed mining and milling and concentration activities at the Pyongsan uranium mine and concentration plant.²⁴

20. Further construction and refurbishment activities also continued at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, including at the light water reactor.²⁵ A Member State detected a probable temperature rise in the water discharge area in May and September 2017 and assessed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might have conducted tests on each occasion.

Nuclear Weapons Institute

21. The primary role of the Nuclear Weapons Institute in nuclear development is evidenced through its announcement of the last two nuclear tests.²⁶ According to two Member States, it is subordinate to the designated Munitions Industry Department²⁷ and its head is Ri Hong-Sop, who has already been designated as the former director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre.

Recommendation

22. **The Panel recommends that the Committee update the existing list of designated individuals and entities as follows:**

- (a) **Ri Hong-Sop (KPi.004)**

Designation: Head of Nuclear Weapons Institute

- (b) **Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028)**

Other information:

The Munitions Industry Department oversees the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Nuclear Weapons Institute is subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department.

- (c) **Designate the following as being engaged in the nuclear-related programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:**

Name: Nuclear Weapons Institute

A.k.a.: na

Address: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Other information:

The Nuclear Weapons Institute is engaged in the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and is led by Ri Hong-Sop. It is subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department.

²³ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea”, document GOV/2017/36-GC(61)/21.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ See S/2017/150, para. 17.

²⁷ See S/2017/150, para. 50.

Other weapons of mass destruction programmes

23. The Kim Jong Nam²⁸ assassination trial began on 1 October 2017 at Shah Alam High Court in Malaysia and is ongoing at the time of writing. During the open court proceedings, one of the doctors who conducted the autopsy of Kim testified that the cause of death was “acute nerve agent VX poisoning”.²⁹ The court heard testimonies and examined evidence relating to two female suspects in custody who, according to the Malaysian police investigation, applied the VX precursors to the face of the victim, and the four male suspects from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who remain at large.³⁰

24. The lead case investigator from the Malaysian police testified that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Embassy official Hyon Kwang Song and Air Koryo representative Kim Uk Il met three of the four suspects from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at Kuala Lumpur International Airport within an hour of the attack. He further stated that the Air Koryo representative³¹ assisted the three suspects at the airport check-in counter in addition to arranging a flight on a different airline for the fourth suspect to exit Malaysia.³² Court testimony also revealed the involvement of a fifth suspect from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “Ri Ji U” (a.k.a. “James”, see annex 3).

25. The General Assembly, by its resolution [72/43](#) of 4 December 2017, reiterated the grave concern expressed by the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its decision EC-84/DEC.8 of 9 March 2017 that, according to statements by the Government of Malaysia, a chemical weapon — the Schedule 1 nerve agent VX — was used “in a fatal incident on 13 February 2017 at Kuala Lumpur International Airport 2”. The Panel has requested all relevant information from Malaysia, but has yet to receive a reply. The investigation continues.

Sodium cyanide patent application

26. The Panel launched an investigation following media reporting that the website of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) hosted a patent application by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entitled “Process for the production of sodium cyanide” (see annex 3-1). Sodium cyanide is a chemical weapons precursor (including of the nerve agent, tabun) that has been designated by the Security Council (see [S/2006/853](#), p. 4, No. 143-33-9). Additionally, in its resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#), the Council stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall abandon all chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related programmes and called upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

27. The Panel requested from WIPO detailed information about the patent application by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the listed inventors and the entities with which they are affiliated. While WIPO provided a description of the

²⁸ On 8 October 2017, Fuji TV reported that Kim Yu Song, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Embassy official in Malaysia, acknowledged that the murder victim was Kim Jong Nam (Putrajaya Hospital, 13 February 2017).

²⁹ “Doctor: Kim Jong Nam’s underwear soiled, pupils contracted”, Associated Press, 27 November 2017.

³⁰ Ri, Jae Nam; Hong, Song Hac; Ri, Ji Hyon; and O, Jong Gil ([S/2017/742](#), annex 6).

³¹ In its August 2016 national implementation report, Malaysia stated that the last flight of Air Koryo to Kuala Lumpur was on 8 June 2014 and has denied all flights’ overflight since then. The Panel has requested of Malaysia information on the Air Koryo representative’s activities in Kuala Lumpur.

³² “Airport video shows North Korean embassy official with Kim Jong Nam murder suspects”, Reuters, 6 November 2017.

patent application process, it could not provide information on the inventors' affiliations, given that that information is not required in the patent application form. The Panel notes that this makes it impossible to determine whether the inventors from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were affiliated with any designated entities.

28. The Panel informed WIPO that, although the organization had acted in accordance with the Patent Cooperation Treaty in receiving and processing the application, the Panel considered that pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution [2087 \(2013\)](#), WIPO should have contacted the Committee to ensure that processing a patent application by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea relating to the production of a substance banned by the Council was consistent with the provisions of the resolutions. The Panel recommended that WIPO inform the Committee of future patent applications by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea relating to any items, substances or technologies prohibited under the resolutions.

29. In addition to its standard procedure of checking the names appearing in patent application forms against United Nations sanctions lists, the Panel also recommended that WIPO introduce in the application form a mandatory field for the affiliation of the inventors from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the relevant addresses, telephone and fax numbers and government ministry or agency under which they fall.

30. WIPO informed the Panel that the Mansudae Art Studio, an entity designated in 2017, had applied for a patent in 2008 (see annex 3-2). Because entities designated by the Security Council could file patent applications directly with a national or regional patent office, the Panel recommends that Member States have their patent office check whether any of the listed applicants and inventors are designated to ensure that the fees received for the patent application process do not violate the relevant financial provisions of the resolutions.

III. Sectoral sanctions

31. To monitor exports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under paragraph 30 of resolution [2270 \(2106\)](#), paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#), paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#) and paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#), the Panel analysed Member State customs data as reported to the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) and the Trade Map of the International Trade Centre (ITC) or obtained through commercial global trade databases, according to the HS codes listed in annex 4.³³ According to those statistics, during the period from January to September 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to export prohibited commodities to generate at least \$177 million in revenue. That number does not, however, include imports of banned commodities from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that were undetected or unreported by Member States to UN Comtrade, global databases

³³ While the Security Council has adopted three new resolutions on sectoral sanctions since September 2016, it does not specify the HS codes corresponding to the listed minerals. Therefore, using the same methodology as for its two most recent reports, the Panel consulted with the World Customs Organization to update its working list of HS codes to include the newly sanctions items in resolutions [2371 \(2017\)](#) and [2375 \(2017\)](#). Because the Panel is reporting for the annual period from January to September 2017, some of the data presented in the tables below featured in the midterm report. The Panel's monitoring of these commodities was complicated by multiple reporting errors involving imports from the Republic of Korea being mislabelled as coming from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

or the Committee or wittingly or unwittingly falsely reported as imports from third countries other than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Those exports would add at least \$19 million dollars to the country's revenue from coal.

32. The Panel investigated more than 30 cases of exports of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to at least four Member States in South-East Asia, including several cases that involved the trans-shipment of coal via Russian Far Eastern ports. In so doing, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made use of a combination of multiple evasion techniques, routes and deceptive shipping tactics, including manipulation of the Automatic Identification System, loitering, voyage deviations and fraudulent documentation.

33. The Panel also investigated cases of ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products in violation of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#) and found that the network behind the vessels was primarily based in Taiwan Province of China while the affiliated companies were registered in the Marshall Islands and the British Virgin Islands, with ships flagged in Dominica, Hong Kong, China, Panama and Sierra Leone. The Panel is also investigating several multinational oil companies for their roles in the supply chain of petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Data from global trade databases

Iron and iron and steel products

Table 2

States importing iron and steel (HS 72) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

(United States dollars)

Importing State	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	Total
Barbados	317 365									317 365
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)			40 277							40 277
Chile				35 027						35 027
China	4 808 558	5 304 064	5 195 531	6 432 072	8 116 003	6 645 224	6 700 016	6 947 599	2 300 199	52 449 266
Costa Rica	36 762	106 468	89 264							232 494
El Salvador	249 493		30 453	21 975	2 560			11 411		315 892
India ^a	220 285		112 380	108 011	79 562	51 091	69 577	281 000	487 000	1 408 906
Ireland	17 280									17 280
Mexico		11 792			24 573	6 965				43 330
Pakistan	1 414 610	1 697 461	1 739 059							4 851 130
Philippines			1 062 947	994 948	248 000					2 305 895
Russian Federation ^b					167 953					167 953
Total	6 746 988	7 437 150	7 166 687	7 665 282	9 252 673	7 119 233	6 769 593	7 240 010	2 787 199	62 184 815

Source: UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map and Global Trade Atlas.

Note: Where the data for the same month differed between the two sources, the Panel used the lower of the two figures. The Panel has written to all relevant Member States requesting additional information.

^a Letter from India dated 14 July 2017 ([S/2017/742](#), annex 36).

^b The Russian Federation informed the Panel that the transaction was exempted under paragraph 26 (c) of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#).

34. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$62,184,815 in iron and steel (HS code 72) between January and September 2017 to the following countries: Barbados, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, India, Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Russian Federation. All exports after 4 September 2017 violated paragraph 8 of resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#), while those before 4 September 2017 violated paragraph 26 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) unless an exemption was made under paragraph 26 (c) of the same resolution.

**Table 3
States importing iron and steel products (HS 73) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017**

(United States dollars)

Importing State	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	Total
China	15 105		240		16	3 855		45 190	420	64 826
Colombia	17 173			29 232	18 827					65 232
Costa Rica					6 677		118 502	64 216		189 395
Ghana	363 654	966 318	5 810 890	189 159	59 868					7 389 889
India ^a	9 748	4 227	95 047	19 809	63 384	4 859	11 685	5 000	21 000	234 759
Mexico	10 942	11 890	9 585	6 646	17 924	21 320	13 042			91 349
Mozambique				2 000	17 000					19 000
Nicaragua							907 698	19 526	633 956	1 561 180
Philippines				6 381			145 795			152 176
Russian Federation ^b				16 297	176 257					192 554
Thailand				6 208	3 454	19 987		5 380	10 520	45 549
Total	384 344	1 014 713	5 915 762	275 732	363 407	50 021	1 196 722	139 312	665 896	10 005 909

Source: UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map and Global Trade Atlas.

^a Letter from India dated 14 July 2017 ([S/2017/742](#), annex 36).

^b The Russian Federation informed the Panel that the transactions were exempted under paragraph 26 (c) of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#).

35. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$10,005,909 in iron and steel products (HS code 73) to China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, India, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Philippines, the Russian Federation and Thailand between January and September 2017. All exports prior to 4 September 2017 constituted a violation of paragraph 26 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) unless an exemption was made under paragraph 26 (c). All exports thereafter constituted violations of paragraph 8 of resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#).

Iron ore

Table 4

Iron ore imports (HS 2601) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

<i>Month</i>	<i>Importing State</i>	<i>Value (United States dollars)</i>	<i>Quantity (kg)</i>
January	China	10 770 987	168 266 111
February	China	10 865 501	165 743 540
March	China	19 153 140	259 477 204
April	China	20 260 043	285 490 000
May	China	13 391 114	233 507 851
June	China	11 512 741	
July	China	9 194 639	
August	China	8 195 365	
September	China	54 638	
Total		103 398 168	1 112 484 706

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

36. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$103,398,168 and 1,112,484,706 kg of iron ore (HS code 2601) to China between January and September 2017. Exports before 4 September 2017 constituted a violation of paragraph 26 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) unless an exemption was made under paragraph 26 (c) of the same resolution. Any exports that took place after 4 September 2017 constituted violations of paragraph 8 of resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#).

Silver

Table 5

Imports of silver ores and concentrates (HS 261610) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

<i>Month</i>	<i>Importing State</i>	<i>Value (United States dollars)</i>	<i>Quantity (kg)</i>
January	China	43 560	109 627
February	China	57 136	128 730
March	China	24 488	61 149
April–September		0	0
Total		125 184	299 506

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

37. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$125,184 and 299,506 kg of silver ores and concentrates between January and March 2017 to China in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#). No imports were reported between April and September 2017.

Copper and copper ores and concentrates

Table 6

Copper imports (HS 74) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

Month	Importing State	Value (United States dollars)	Quantity (kg)
April	Mexico	6 592	
May	India	6 021	
June	Mexico	1 268	
	India	37 976	
July	Mexico	13 990	
August	India	47 000	
	Mexico	109 079	
September	India	152 000	
Total		373 926	—

Source: UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map and Global Trade Atlas.

38. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$373,926 in copper (HS code 74) to India and Mexico between January and September 2017 in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#).

Table 7

Imports of copper ores and concentrates (HS 2603) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

Month	Importing State	Value (United States dollars)	Quantity (kg)
January	China	97 826	500 882
February	China	2 371	44 860
March–September		0	0
Total		100 197	545 742

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

39. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported \$100,197 and 545,742 kg of copper, including copper ores and concentrates (2,603) in January and February 2017 to China in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#). No imports were reported between March and September 2017.

Table 8

Zinc and articles thereof imported (HS 79) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

Month	Importing State	Value (United States dollars)	Quantity (metric tons)
January	India ^a	526 018	
February–September		0	
Total		526 018	–

Source: UN Comtrade and Global Trade Atlas.

^a Letter from India dated 14 July 2017 ([S/2017/742](#), annex 36).

40. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$526,018 in zinc (HS 79) to India in January 2017 in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#). No imports were reported between February and September 2017.

Table 9

Zinc ore imports (HS 2608) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

Month	Importing State	Value (United States dollars)	Quantity (metric tons)
January	China	65 653	173
February	China	590 469	2 193
March	China	24 575	49
April–September		0	0
Total		680 697	2 415

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

41. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$680,697 and 2,415 metric tons of zinc ore to China between January and March 2017 in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#). No imports were reported between April and September 2017.

Table 10

Nickel imports (HS 75) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to September 2017

Month	Importing State	Value (United States dollars)	Quantity (metric tons)
January	China	42 000	4
February–September		0	0
Total		42 000	4

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

42. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$42,000 in nickel in January 2017 to China in violation of paragraph 28 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#). No imports were reported between February and September 2017.

Coal imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reported to the Committee

Coal

Table 11

Coal imports (HS 2701) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reported to the Committee by Member States, January to September 2017

Month	Value (United States dollars)	Quantity (kg)
January	126 390 037.84	1 441 985.60
February	104 590 640	1 232 000
March	575 219.40	6 342
August	138 000 000 ^a	1 637 000
September	44 000 000 ^b	511 000
Total	413 555 897.24^c	4 828 327.60

Source: Member State reporting to the Committee.

^a The Committee decided to use the price provided by China to calculate the values listed for August 2017. The Panel's calculation of the average (mean) was \$ 97.95 for August 2017, which would have amounted to a total value of \$ 160,344,150.

^b The Committee used the price provided by China to calculate the values listed for September 2017. The Panel's calculation of the average (mean) price was \$ 102.04 for September 2017, which would have amounted to a total value of \$ 52,142,440.

^c The total value for January and February transactions was calculated by the Panel using the average mean price, whereas the total value for August and September transactions was based on the price provided to the Committee by China.

43. According to Member State reports to the Committee, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of \$ 413,555,897.24 in coal (HS code 2701) between January and September 2017, which exceeded by \$12,685,879.24 the cap of \$400,870,018 specified in paragraph 26 (b) of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#). However, the section below includes at least 15 cases of deliveries of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prior to 5 August 2017 that were not reported to the Committee as required by the resolutions.

Exports of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prior to 5 August 2017 unreported to the Committee

44. In addition to the above, the Panel investigated more than 30 shipments of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea between January and November 2017 to ports, including in China, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Viet Nam. Detailed information on all of the shipments is contained in two tables (see annex 5-1). The tables are broken down into the coal shipments delivered between January and 4 August 2017 and those delivered after 5 August 2017, the date on which resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#), which introduced a full coal ban, was adopted (see annex 5-2).

45. With regard to the table of shipments to China, Malaysia, the Russian Federation and Viet Nam prior to 5 August 2017, the contents of only one shipment were reported to the Committee, by Malaysia.³⁴ All of the other shipments violated paragraph 26 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) requiring Member States to report them. In the majority of

³⁴ In a note verbale dated 1 May 2017 (ref. HA 59/17), Malaysia reported to the Committee on an import of 6,342 metric tons of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in March 2017. This amount corresponds to media reporting on the amount of coal discharged by the Kum Ya in Penang on 24 March 2017 (see table 11 above for more details).

cases, this was due to the fact that falsified paperwork accompanying the coal claimed its origin as countries other than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. For that reason, the above calculations of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has been exported in excess of the cap, do not present a complete picture.

Exports of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea following the full ban in resolution 2371 (2017)

46. All of the shipments listed in the table as having been delivered after the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017) to China, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Viet Nam would constitute a violation of the resolutions, if confirmed. While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also attempted to make a delivery to Thailand in March, the contract was cancelled and the vessel *Tai An* subsequently rerouted to Vung Tau, Viet Nam.³⁵ In multiple cases, accompanying paperwork indicated origins other than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the Russian Federation and China (see annexes 5-1 and 5-2). The following two sections explore the trading networks behind the prohibited transfers and the evasion patterns used to circumvent the sanctions.

Networks

47. The network of foreign traders responsible for violations of the coal ban operates through numerous front companies registered in multiple jurisdictions, some of which the Panel has previously investigated. Front companies are registered in Australia, the British Virgin Islands, the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Seychelles and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, while they are physically based in different countries and areas, including Australia, the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan Province of China and Singapore.

48. Maison Trading Ltd, which shipped at least four consignments using vessels listed in annex 5, is a front company for Dandong Chengtai Trading Co., Ltd (a.k.a. Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., Ltd), prosecuted by a Member State for money-laundering (see annex 6-1).³⁶ Brigt Australia, an Australian-registered property developer, was contracted to ship coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Viet Nam. While the shipping documents claimed Nakhodka as the origin, the vessel never docked there (confirmed by the Russian Federation) (see annex 6-2). According to Australia, it is investigating the company and its director, Livia Wang. Another shipper of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Viet Nam, a Swedish company, falsely listed the Russian Federation as the origin. The origin was also falsely certified by a company based in Taiwan Province of China (see annex 6-3).

³⁵ The ship's documents stated the coal's origin as Tianjin, when it had been loaded in Nampo between 5 and 7 March 2017. A Thai company had contracted with a Thai importer for 8,000 metric tons of anthracite but another importer, Star Bravo, represented by a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, intended to import 26,265 metric tons for delivery to Koh Si Chang between 20 and 30 March 2017.

³⁶ *United States of America v. \$4,083,935.00 of funds associated with Dandong Chengtai Trading Limited et al.* of 22 August 2017. The Marshall Islands informed the Panel that the registration of Maison Trading Ltd was revoked on 30 October 2017 (registered on 20 September 2016) and used a Chinese bank account. China informed the Panel that Maison Trading is not registered in China.

Evasion patterns by coal vessels

49. In investigating the above-mentioned coal shipments, the Panel found extensive use of a combination of multiple evasion tactics, including indirect routes, detours, loitering, false documentation, trans-shipment through third countries and manipulation of Automatic Identification System signals and destinations/estimated times of arrival, as well as changes to the class, length and draft of the vessels. These are used to obfuscate actual routes, conceal port calls and give the impression that the coal was loaded in ports other than in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The consistency and similarity of the tactics suggest that they are part of a centralized strategy on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to evade the commodities ban, especially given that they were also employed in the case of the designated *Jie Shun*.³⁷

Voyage irregularities

50. Route detours almost always involved manipulating Automatic Identification System transmissions³⁸ while loading coal in ports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea before rejoining the original route and reactivating the Automatic Identification System in time for delivery.³⁹ For example, the Fijian-flagged *Zhi Kun 7* deviated from its stated destination, Posyet, Russian Federation, on 9 April 2017, turning off its Automatic Identification System to load coal in Wonsan, then rejoining its original voyage, reactivating the Automatic Identification System and entering Nakhodka port on 14 April (figure VII). While in Nakhodka until 17 May, the vessel changed its identity on 11 May 2017 before discharging its coal on 19 May.⁴⁰ On its return voyage, the vessel loaded again in Chongjin on 28 May, using the same route deviation tactic, delivering the coal to Nanjing on 7 June 2017.


³⁷ The *Jie Shun*, which carried illicit iron ore and weapons to Egypt on 11 August 2016, used similar tactics such as feigning port calls, using manipulation of the Automatic Identification System and making use of draft and class changes. *Jie Shun* was designated on 3 October 2017. See www.un.org/sc/subborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials/list-of-designated-vessels.

³⁸ A violation of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended: The Automatic Identification System to be fitted and maintained in operation at all times for vessels of 300 gross tonnage and upwards.

³⁹ Such incidents involve lengthy time periods used to cover the distance between transmissions, often accompanied by draft changes with the first transmission, reflecting that the vessel has been loaded, a fact that must be reported prior to port entry.

⁴⁰ The *Zhi Kun 7* was renamed the *Orient Lidu* and registered to Mongolia on 11 May 2017, moving to Panama on 17 July 2017.

Figure VII
Zhi Kun 7: deviation and loading of coal in Wonsan




Source: Windward (left) and Member State (right).

51. An example of an almost two-week voyage deviation was the delivery of coal by the *Petrel 8* to Bayuquan, with a Nakhodka decoy port visit.⁴¹ On 19 July 2017, as it was sailing east out of Bayuquan, it indicated a Nakhodka destination. En route, it switched off its Automatic Identification System and made a deviation to load coal in Taean (near Nampo)⁴² on 26 July. Then it rejoined its voyage on 27 July, switched on its Automatic Identification System, sailing on to Nakhodka, docking for a day without discharging its coal, ostensibly to create the impression that the coal's origin was the Russian Federation. It then sailed back to Bayuquan to unload the coal (figure VIII).

⁴¹ The *Petrel 8* was designated on 3 October 2017. See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials/list-of-designated-vessels.

⁴² Changing its draft to indicate a loaded condition (leaving Bayuquan empty).


Figure VIII
Voyage of the *Petrel 8* showing deviation decoy voyage



Source: Windward.

52. While deviating to Songnim (near Nampo) to load coal on 7 August 2017, the *Orient Shenyu* switched off its Automatic Identification System for eight days before sailing to Lianyungang, where it loitered near the port to claim Chinese origin (see figure IX and annex 7) prior to heading to Cam Pha, Viet Nam, to unload on 26 August.

Figure IX
Orient Shenyu: deviation and imagery of loading in Songnim



Source: Member State.

Loitering

53. The *Cheng Hong* falsely declared a port call in Penglai, from which it claimed the coal originated, whereas it was actually loaded in Nampo on 16 June 2017 (figure X). The vessel then loitered off Penglai and used a false draft change to feign having loaded coal before unloading it in Cam Pha.

54. The *Hua Fu* loitered off Penglai and Shidao, before delivering coal to Cam Pha on 14 September. It then again loaded coal on 23 September in Najin, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and attempted to deliver it to Cam Pha, claiming its origin as Nakhodka, despite not having visited any Russian ports for over a year (see annex 8). After Viet Nam refused the coal, the *Hua Fu* attempted to deliver it to Fang Cheng, China.

Figure X
Cheng Hong loading in Nampo, then loitering for a false port call in Penglai



Source: Member State (left) and Windward (centre, right).

55. Vessels also changed their identities mid-route by adopting new names, flags and call signs. The *Xin Guang Hai* transmitted a false International Maritime Organization (IMO) number and altered name while carrying coal from Songnim on 31 August 2017 for delivery in Hai Phong, Viet Nam, on 19 September 2017. The vessel also transmitted a false draft change to feign loading in Hong Kong and

changed its IMO number and name en route.⁴³ The *Hua Fu* shipped coal from Nampo to Cam Pha and also often changed call signs, and the *Xin Sheng Hai* and the *Glory Hope 6* frequently changed length and class. The *East Glory 7* changed its class from “cargo” to “fishing” prior to discharging coal from Nampo in Guangzhou on 16 August 2017.

Document falsification

56. The Panel’s investigations showed extensive evidence of false cargo documentation. Although authentic verification documents and stamps accompanied numerous contracts, bills of lading, certificates and warranties of origin, many vessels never visited the ports in question. For example, while the *Kai Xiang* documents indicated loading in Vladivostok on 28 July and Nakhodka on 31 August 2017, the vessel never visited that port. Furthermore, satellite imagery shows it loading in Nampo on 31 August 2017.⁴⁴

57. Similarly, the *Hua Fu* documents claimed the origin as Lianyungang, China; however, the vessel never visited that port on 6 September 2017, having loaded the coal in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea while its Automatic Identification system was off from 2 to 7 September. The *Bai Mei 8* crew list shows the crew joining in Nampo where the coal was loaded and not Nakhodka as claimed (see annex 9).

58. Details of the Panel’s investigations of coal shipments delivered between January and 4 August 2017 are contained in two tables (see annex 5-1). These include weights and values, evasion tactics and suppliers/exporters, where documented.

Trans-shipment

59. In addition to the *Great Spring* trans-shipment of coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea discharged by the *Sun Union* on 28 June 2017 in Nakhodka, the Panel noted the adoption by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of a new route to a port rarely visited previously, Kholmsk, Russian Federation, following the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017). Tracking data show at least four vessels, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged *Ul Ji Bong 6*, *Rung Ra 2* and *Un Bong 2* and the Togo-flagged *Yu Yuan*, calling at Kholmsk (table 12). According to a Member State, they were transporting coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel noted several vessels arriving at the same berth at the coal terminal within a few days based on data available on maritime databases, often indicating an increase in draft upon departure.⁴⁵

60. Shortly after this coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was discharged, some vessels berthed at the same terminal, suggesting that, as was the case with the *Great Spring* and the *Hua Fu*, the coal might have been trans-shipped using false origin documents. According to open sources, authorities at Rizhao port and Qingdao port in China announced bans in early August 2017 on all imports of Russian coal based on concerns that coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of

⁴³ From 28 July to 2 August 2017 and on 8 August 2017, the vessel used the IMO10053276 (instead of 9004700) and the name *Xin Guang Hah* (instead of *Xin Guang Hai*). When the ship reactivated its Automatic Identification System on 5 September, its draft of 0.0 showed that it was not loaded with cargo. After loitering off Hong Kong on 18 September 2017, it transmitted a false draft increase to feign that it had loaded coal in Hong Kong, before unloading in Hai Phong, Viet Nam, on 19 September.

⁴⁴ The bills of lading for the *Kai Xiang* show a Swedish company claiming the coal to be of Russian origin (see annex 6-3), along with a warranty, a Taiwan Province of China company, registered in Hong Kong.

⁴⁵ Two other vessels loaded scrap-iron at the terminal.

Korea was being mixed with Russian cargoes.⁴⁶ The Panel is awaiting replies to its enquiries in that regard (table 13).

Table 12

Vessels discharging coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Kholmsk, Russian Federation, 2017

<i>Vessel name</i>	<i>IMO No.</i>	<i>Flag</i>	<i>Port in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at which coal was loaded</i>	<i>Date of discharge in Kholmsk</i>
Rung Ra 2	9020534	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Nampo, 24 July	3–7 August
			Wonsan, 22 August	29 August–2 September
			Wonsan, 7 September	12–14 September (annex 10)
Ul Ji Bong 6	9114555	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Wonsan, 26 August 7	9 August (annexes 10–12)
Un Bong 2	8913186	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Chongjin	22–25 August/16 October (annex 10)
Yu Yuan	9358694	Togo	Wonsan, 12 August	5 September (annexes 11–12)

Source: Member States and Windward.

Table 13

Vessels at the same berth in Kholmsk, Russian Federation

<i>Vessel name</i>	<i>IMO No.</i>	<i>Flag</i>	<i>Date of loading, 2017</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Sky Lady ^a	9168441	Panama	9–10 August (3 hours) ^b 10 August	Origin on bill of lading: Shaktersk, Russian Federation 3 280 metric tons Exporter: Solntsevsky Coal Mine LLC(annex 13)
Sky Angel ^a	9168441	Panama	21 September ^b	Origin on bill of lading: Kholmsk Exporter: Amet Venture Ltd, United Kingdom 4 156 metric tons (annex 14)

⁴⁶ Argus, “China port bans Russian anthracite on N Korea concerns”, 7 August 2017, available from argusmedia.com; and Meitanwang, “Analysis of Shandong port restrictions on relief of Russia coal carrier” (in Chinese), 3 August 2017, available from www.meitanwang.com.

Vessel name	IMO No.	Flag	Date of loading, 2017	Remarks
Rich Glory	8649905	Sierra Leone	5–6 October ^b	Origin on bill of lading: Kholmsk Shipper: Hong Kong Coal Energy Ltd 5 000 metric tons (annex 15)

Source: Member States.

^a Operated by the same company.

^b Outstanding replies to Panel enquiries.

Ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products

61. The Panel investigated four ships involved in the violation of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 2375 (2017). While their network is primarily based in Taiwan Province of China, their companies have been registered in multiple jurisdictions, including the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, the Marshall Islands, Samoa and Seychelles, with ships flagged in Dominica, Hong Kong, Panama and Sierra Leone.

62. According to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been using at least three areas for ship-to-ship transfers: waters off the port of Wonsan; Nampo; and international waters between the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea.

63. The first two tankers that the Panel investigated, the Hong Kong-flagged *Lighthouse Winmore* and the Panama-flagged *Billions No. 18*, transferred marine diesel⁴⁷ to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged tankers, the *Sam Jong 2* and the *Rye Song Gang 1*, respectively, on 19 October 2017.⁴⁸ Both tankers sailed from Yeosu, Republic of Korea, and switched off their Automatic Identification System a few days before and after the transfers, in a pattern described above with regard to vessels picking up coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both vessels sailed southwards for transfers, but not to the port of Taichung, Taiwan Province of China, the stated port of destination, instead returning to Yeosu. The Republic of Korea detained the *Lighthouse Winmore* for investigation on 24 November 2017.

Figure XI

Ship-to-ship transfer between the *Lighthouse Winmore* and the *Sam Jong 2*



Source: Member State.

64. A third case involved the ship-to-ship transfer by the Sierra Leone-flagged tanker *Jin Hye* (IMO No. 8518572) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-

⁴⁷ 500ppm sulphur content marine gas oil (Gasoil).

⁴⁸ *Billions No. 18*, designated together with *Rye Song Gang 1*, on 28 December 2017, was renamed *Kingsway* under the Palau flag in December 2017.

flagged tanker *Chon Ma San* (IMO No. 8660313) in the East China Sea on or about 5 December 2017. The *Chon Ma San* disguised its identity by painting the names “Whale” and “Freetown (Sierra Leone)” over the original name and port of registration and changing the “3”s to “8”s in the IMO number on the superstructure (8660313 to 8660818). The flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the funnel was also painted over with white paint.

Figure XII
Ship-to-ship transfer between the *Jin Hye* and the *Chon Ma San*



Source: Member State.

65. A fourth vessel involved in a ship-to-ship transfer with a tanker from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was the Panama-flagged tanker *Koti* (IMO No. 9417115), also currently detained by the Republic of Korea for investigation. In a pattern very similar to the transfers by the *Lighthouse Winmore* and the *Billions No. 18* on 19 October 2017, the *Koti* departed Yeosu and selectively used its Automatic Identification System for four days and again for five days from 30 November 2017.

66. On 20 January 2018, another ship-to-ship transfer took place between the designated tanker of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea *Rye Song Gang 1* and the Dominica-flagged *Yuk Tung* (IMO No. 9030591) in the high seas of the East China Sea. The vessel’s Automatic Identification System had been switched off since its departure from Keelung, Taiwan Province of China, on 2 January. Its owner is Yuk Tung Energy Inc., registered in the Cook Islands, its operator Yuk Tung Energy Pte Ltd, based in Singapore, and its primary business crude oil wholesale.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Address: 80 Raffles place, #17-22, UOB Plaza, Singapore 048624 (Unique Entity No. 201710754R).


Figure XIII
Transfer at night



Source: Member State.

67. The fact that this transfer took place in the dark shows that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is adapting its evasion tactics (figure XIII). Subsequent to its designation, the tanker disguised its identity, repainting its funnel and mast and changing its name to "Song Hae" (figure XIV).

Figure XIV
Comparison of *Rye Song Gang 1* before and after its designation (both during ship-to-ship transfers)



Source: Member States.

Networks

68. The *Lighthouse Winmore* was chartered the month before the ship-to-ship transfers by the Marshall Islands company Oceanic Enterprise Ltd via a Singapore-based broker.⁵⁰ Its sole director and shareholder is Shih-Hsien Chen (also known as “Sunny Chen”), a national of Taiwan Province of China (annex 16).⁵¹ The Yingjen Fishery Company⁵² communicated administrative and logistical arrangements to the owner via the broker, while the Billions Bunker Group Corporation issued operational instructions to the captain (see annex 17).⁵³ The intention to use the vessel for ship-to-ship transfers was evidenced in the charterer’s procurement of three large fenders for the duration of the charter. Chen also embedded a company representative with the vessel’s crew.⁵⁴

69. Shih-Hsien Chen is the sole shareholder, owner and operator of two ships and the companies that own them, the tanker *Billions No. 18* and Bunker’s Taiwan Group Corporation (British Virgin Islands), as well as the tanker *Billions No. 88* and the Billions Bunker Group Corporation (Marshall Islands), which has also engaged in ship-to-ship transfer to an as yet unidentified tanker.⁵⁵ The Panel notes that the owner/operator of the *Lighthouse Winmore*, Lighthouse Ship Management (also involved in ship-to-ship transfers), was previously known as the similar-sounding

⁵⁰ Registered owner: Win More Shipping Ltd. (永嘉船務有限公司), Hong Kong; registered operator: Lighthouse Ship Management Ltd. (方向海運管理有限公司), Hong Kong but based in Guangzhou. Owner of both companies resides in Guangzhou.

⁵¹ Taiwan Province of China identity No. 308222135, Date of birth (DOB): 11 December 1965.

⁵² Chin Tse Chien, a.k.a. “Money Chien”, cchien.yjfishery@gmail.com, cchien.yjfishery@hotmail.com. Shih-Hsien Chen used yingjen.fishery@gmail.com.


⁵³ Miguel Shiao (蕭錫理) via billions.miguel@gmail.com.

⁵⁴ Jiang Bing.

⁵⁵ The *Billions No. 88* was renamed *Twins Bull* and the flag changed from Panama to Palau, and ownership was switched in December to another of Chen’s companies, Pacific Bunker Co. Ltd. The Marshall Islands informed the Panel that it had deleted Chen’s companies from its register on 23 January 2018.

Billion Great International Group Ltd (see annex 18), suggesting a link to Chen's companies. In addition, two of Chen's tankers, the *Lighthouse Winmore* and the *Golden Rich*, utilize the same document of compliance holder and International Safety Management manager, Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co. Ltd, which is the owner and operator of the other tanker engaging in ship-to-ship transfers, the *Jin Hye* (figure XV). The Panel continues to investigate Shih-Hsien Chen's central role in transfers of petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which shows the continuation of its reliance on trusted foreign nationals in its illicit activities.

Figure XV
Tankers engaged in illicit transfers linked to Shih-Hsien Chen



70. The ownership and leasing of the fourth tanker, *Koti*, follows the pattern described above, with both the owner and the companies in Taiwan Province of China but registered elsewhere:⁵⁶

- (a) The tanker's owner, M.T. Koti Corporation (registered in Panama), leased the vessel to Auria Resource Co., Ltd⁵⁷ (registered in Samoa);
- (b) Auria Resource claimed that it had leased the vessel to Sailing Petrochemical Incorp., Taiwan Province of China, on a time-charter just prior to the ship-to-ship transfer;⁵⁸
- (c) Harmonized Resources Shipping Management Co., Ltd, registered in Hong Kong and based in Dalian, was the vessel's operator. While M.T. Koti Corporation claimed that the registration of Harmonized Resources as operator was an error (which it subsequently "corrected" by registering itself as the operator), correspondence shows that Harmonized Resources had registered the IMO company

⁵⁶ 7F, No. 85, Sec. 2, Chenggong Rd., Taoyon District, Taoyuan City. The company's three directors are: Chien-Ting Chang, Chien-Huan Chang (also known as "Norris Chang") and Shih-Chuan Kao.

⁵⁷ 6F-2, No. 51 Hengyang Rd., Taipei.

⁵⁸ Sailing's payments came from Firstec Maritime Ltd. and Xin Miao Co. Ltd. accounts.

numbers for both the owner and the International Safety Management manager of the *Koti*. The company's point of contact, Lu Tiehe (吕铁和), was previously involved with the *Light* incident and an associate of Fan Mintian linked to both the *Light* and the *Jie Shun* interdiction.⁵⁹

Petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea


71. The bills of lading for the petroleum products embarked by both the *Lighthouse Winmore* (14,094 metric tons of marine gasoil (gasoil)) and the *Billions No. 18* (7,954 metric tons of gasoil (diesel)) prior to the transfer on 19 October 2017 show the multinational company, Trafigura Pte. Ltd.,⁶⁰ as the shipper (see annex 19), Global Commodities Consultants Ltd as the consignee and the port of Taichung as the destination (which was fabricated; see annex 20). Global Commodities is registered in Hong Kong, but the registered address (12B Wilkinson Road, Singapore, 436759) matches that of the Singaporean company, Global SGP Pte Ltd. (Unique Entity No. 201222231W), both of which share the same director and sole shareholder. Further, all email communications for shipments onboard Shih-Hsien Chen's vessels came from Global SGP and not Global Commodities Consultants (see annexes 21–22). The Panel continues to investigate other multinational oil companies for their possible roles in the supply chain of petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

72. Oceanic Enterprise prepaid Global SGP for the two shipments delivered free onboard (FOB) to the vessels (\$4,564,942.80 and \$8,510,097.75) through bank transfers to the supplier, with which it had a contract. In addition to these two transfers by the *Billions No. 18* and the *Lighthouse Winmore*, Oceanic had planned another nine shipments with the same two vessels plus another of Shih-Hsien Chen's vessels, the *Sky Ace 1* (as part of the contract) (figure XVI), which according to the plan for the shipments (see annexes 22–25) totalled 95,000 metric tons (with an estimated value of about \$65 million according to the rate used for the first two transfers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). In addition, Chen requested green dye supplement for the fuel, a common practice for supplies for fishing vessels. Singapore informed the Panel that its authorities were checking the companies related to the transactions.

⁵⁹ Directors of Sea Star Ship Co. Ltd., see [S/2017/150](#), para. 66; and [S/2014/147](#), paras. 135–137. Lu Tiehe (who still uses the Sea Star Ship email address) denied having any contact with Fan Mintian.

⁶⁰ Trafigura is legally registered in the Netherlands and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland with its oil and petroleum operations based in Singapore.

Figure XVI
Oil transfers using the tankers of Shih-Hsien Chen



73. According to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has thus far relied on two oil companies for the import of petroleum: First Oil Center (a.k.a. First Oil JV Co. Ltd) and Korea Kumgang Petroleum. The First Oil Center is affiliated with the First Credit Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Cheil Credit Bank, 제일신용은행), which is also under Panel investigation for violations of financial sanctions. Korea Kumgang Petroleum was established in January 2015 under the Korea Kumgang Group,⁶¹ which is affiliated with the designated Ministry of People's Armed Forces. A list of tankers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is contained in annex 26.

Recommendations

74. The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future sectoral sanctions measures, include the relevant HS codes, as it did in resolution 2397 (2017).

75. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise heightened vigilance over their companies to ensure the prohibition of the transfer of the items listed in resolutions 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), including all industrial machinery and transportation vehicles.

76. Given that the same key individuals continue to feature in Panel reports for a growing number of different types of violations, the Panel calls upon Member States to take the appropriate action to ensure that those individuals cease their prohibited activities.

77. The Panel recommends that any Member State receiving coal shipments for delivery or trans-shipment take enhanced measures to validate the documentation accompanying those shipments. To assist the efforts by Member State, the Panel recommends the establishment of a regional cooperative mechanism to share information on whether the relevant vessels actually docked and loaded coal from the ports claimed in their documents of origin. At a minimum, Member States should establish a point of contact for that purpose.

⁶¹ Korean: 조선금강그룹 or 금강경제개발총회사.

The Panel will continue to serve as a resource for Member States seeking information.

78. Member States must be vigilant regarding vessel movements in the typical areas for ship-to-ship transfers and report such transfers to the Committee.

79. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate (deny port entry for) all vessels and their captains involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

80. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following individuals for violations of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#): Shih-Hsien Chen, Boby Julian Akbari⁶² and Wang Songchang.⁶³

81. The Panel recommends that Member States strictly implement resolutions pertaining to prohibited ship-to-ship transfers, including by enacting enabling legislation mandating appropriate action against all vessels and their captains found to be conducting them, as well as actions against vessels such as port entry denial (in force for at least six months, with all costs borne by the owners or charterers). In addition, flag States should deregister all vessels reported as involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers. Member States should ensure that all contracts by petroleum industry companies registered or based in their jurisdictions include a clause stipulating that all transfers involving violations of the resolutions, in particular including prohibited ship-to-ship transfers and petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, be voided.

82. Member States hosting petroleum suppliers, brokers, importers and tanker companies dealing in oil and petroleum products must heighten their vigilance of the relevant entities to ensure that these are not redirected to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of the resolutions. Countries serving as trans-shipment hubs for petroleum products must undertake similar enhanced due diligence to validate the origin and intended destination.

83. The Panel further recommends that maritime protection and indemnity insurers include a clause in all contracts, stipulating that all transfers involving violations of the resolutions, in particular prohibited ship-to-ship transfers and petroleum products transferred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, be voided.

IV. Embargoes, designated entities and individuals

Angola

84. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies (Mansudae) in Angola.⁶⁴ Angola reported that, pursuant to resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#) and a presidential order dated 13 November, all of the activities, contracts and work visas of Mansudae had been terminated and its management, staff and employees instructed to leave the country. The presidential order was in response to the Panel's letter of 10 August 2017, and subsequently, 152 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea departed Angola on 18 October 2017, including Yon Jong Gi, Managing Director of the Mansudae Angola Group. Angola assisted by providing detailed information on the activities of

⁶² Captain of the *Billions No. 18*: Seaman's Book No. B2380031, DOB 30 July 1985.

⁶³ Captain of the *Lighthouse Winmore*: Seaman's Book No. G50001538, DOB 7 August 1973.

⁶⁴ See [S/2017/150](#), para. 116.

Mansudae as well as supporting documents relating to the expulsion of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Angola.⁶⁵

85. The Panel also investigated diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accredited in Angola working on behalf of a designated entity, Green Pine Corporation, including Kim Hyok Chan and Jon Chol Young, who had previously engaged in prohibited arms-related activities.⁶⁶ Angola reported to the Panel that Kim Hyok Chan and his family members had been expelled from Angola on the instructions of President João Lourenço on 29 November 2017, providing immigration documentation. Jon Chol Young's visa expires on 17 March 2018, and he remains at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Luanda. Angola also considers the presence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Luanda "to be in excessive numbers, taking into account the state of cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and will work with that country to gradually reduce it".

86. The Panel also investigated advisers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea training the Angolan presidential guard and other units.⁶⁷ According to a Member State, an 80-member military advisory mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was based in Angola until the departure of the advisers in January 2017. The Panel requested the names, ranks and Korean People's Army unit affiliations of the military advisory mission, together with details on its activities in Angola and third countries but has yet to receive a reply.

Australia

87. On 16 December 2017, the Australian Federal Police arrested and charged its citizen, Chan Han Choi.⁶⁸ It is believed that Choi is an established economic agent of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. His role was to conduct brokering activities to facilitate the trade of various commodities to or from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including coal, graphite, copper ore, gold and crude oil, as well as missiles and missile-related technology.

88. Choi used the alias "Solomon Choi" and conducted his activities from his residence while using his Australian companies as intermediaries, including Auskor Engineering Pty Ltd, Above Engineering Pty Ltd, Above Energy Pty Ltd, LWM Engineering Pty Ltd and Morning World Pty Ltd. Choi has also used offshore bank accounts.

China

Overseas showrooms of the Mansudae Art Studio in Beijing

89. The Mansudae Art Studio utilizes a gallery in China located in the 798 Art District, a renowned art exhibition area in Beijing. The gallery was selling Mansudae works of art in 2017 after the designation of that entity. The Panel notes that the name of the gallery includes the identical Chinese transcription of the Korean name for the Mansudae Art Studio, and a billboard on the building advertises an exhibition jointly hosted by "Mansudae Art Studio Museum of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and Beijingyuan Mansudae Cultural Company Ltd (北京元万寿台文化有限公司) entitled "Art exhibition of artists of the Mansudae Art Studio of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (figure XVII). Furthermore, the Panel considers that this collaborative activity with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is prohibited

⁶⁵ Including information on the expulsion of the 152 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, their names, passport numbers and visa details.

⁶⁶ See S/2017/150, paras. 103, 207 and 208.

⁶⁷ See S/2017/742, para. 23; and S/2017/150, para. 120.

⁶⁸ Choi acquired Australian citizenship in 2001.

according to paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#). However, Ji Zhengtai, the director of Beijingyuan Mansudae, has publicly stated that sanctions do not apply and have not affected his business. China informed the Panel that it could not confirm that this was a branch of the designated entity. However, given that Beijingyuan Mansudae is a joint venture with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it was closed by 9 January 2018 in accordance with Ministry of Commerce announcement No. 55.

Figure XVII
Gallery utilized by the Mansudae Art Studio in Beijing



Egypt

90. The Panel continued its investigation into the shipment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades and components seized by Egyptian authorities from the *Jie Shun* in August 2016.⁶⁹ The Panel's onsite inspection of the vessel and port revealed that the large crates containing the rocket-propelled grenades were prominently marked "Al-Sakr Cairo" followed by an address identical to that on the shipping documentation, which listed the consignee as Al-Sakr Factory for Developed Industries, which manufactures rocket-propelled grenades.⁷⁰ The Panel also notes that the Al-Sakr factory and its parent company have reportedly had a long-standing relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including in the field of ballistic missiles. The replies of the company and of Egypt to the Panel did not answer the Panel's requests for the identity of the exporters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, any financial information or any correspondence with entities violating the arms embargo provisions.

⁶⁹ See [S/2017/150](#), paras. 61–71.

⁷⁰ The Panel was prohibited from taking its own photographs during the inspection and Egypt declined to provide permission for the Panel to reproduce images and documents submitted.

Eritrea

91. The Panel continued its investigation into “Eritech”, the Eritrean recipient of an interdicted shipment of arms and related materiel from the company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Glocor.⁷¹ The Panel notes that “Eritech” was identified by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as based at the “Asha Golgol Military Technical Centre” and that this facility is “operated by the Eritrean Defence Forces that serves as a central workshop for the production, modification and repair of civilian and military and paramilitary equipment”.⁷² The Panel requested from Eritrea information on the current status of “Eritech”, also known as “E-tech”, and on whether it is an entity operating under the authority or at the direction of the Eritrean Defence Forces. Eritrea continues to fail to provide substantive information to the Panel’s enquiries on this case, which forms part of established arms-related cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Eritrea.⁷³

Italy

Western Representative of the Mansudae Art Studio

92. The Panel investigated an individual claiming to be “the Western Representative of Mansudae Art Studio”,⁷⁴ Pier Luigi Cecioni, after the Mansudae Art Studio was designated on 5 August 2017. On 26 September, the Panel visited the office address named “Mansudae Art Studio” in Florence, Italy (figure XVIII). The Panel interviewed Cecioni, who acknowledged his past cooperation with Mansudae Art Studio personnel in Pyongyang, including an attempt to organize a Mansudae Art Studio exhibition after the designation of that entity. In his reply of 27 November, Cecioni stated that his website description of his role as “Western Representative of Mansudae Art Studio” was “misleading”. The Panel views Pier Luigi Cecioni’s entity and that of the Mansudae Art Studio in Pyongyang as a cooperative entity prohibited under paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). In December 2017, the Mansudae Art Studio website was renamed “North Korea Art Gallery” and mention of Cecioni’s position as “Western Representative of Mansudae Art Studio” was removed. As at 28 January 2018, the website address remained www.mansudeartstudio.com. As a result of the investigation, the Panel obtained additional information on the Mansudae Art Studio in Pyongyang, including the name of the Vice-Director, Kim Song Min. The Italian authorities informed the Panel that “no evidence has been found, subsequent to July 2016, of imports from North Korea on the part of Mr. Cecioni” and “currently there does not appear to be any basis on which to determine that Mr. Cecioni violated the sanctions regime nor is there evidence of activity by Mr. Cecioni on behalf of the listed entity, Mansudae Art Studio. Instead, Mr. Cecioni seems to have used the name of this entity on his website of his own initiative and for own, exclusive benefit ... The authorities are trying to determine whether this website may constitute a violation of the sanctions regime, particularly with reference to the prohibition on joint ventures and cooperative entities, in paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017) and 15 of resolution 2270 (2016).”.

⁷¹ See S/2017/150, paras. 72–87.

⁷² See S/2017/925, para. 21.

⁷³ See S/2017/150, paras. 72–87; S/2016/157, paras. 94–95; S/2015/131, para. 89; and S/2014/147, paras. 94–97.

⁷⁴ The website named “Mansudae Art Studio” (www.mansudeartstudio.com) was accessed by the Panel in August and September 2017, at which time the website and associated Internet registration and advertising portrayed Cecioni as the Western Representative of the Mansudae Art Studio (see annex 27).

Figure XVIII
Mansudae Art Studio address and interior, Florence, Italy, 26 September 2017



Source: The Panel.

Japan

Crane loading Hwasong-12 missile

93. The Panel investigated a foreign-manufactured crane seen in the Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcast of 14 May 2017 loading the Hwasong-12 missile, which highlights the use of commercial cranes in ballistic missile-related activities (figure XIX). The crane was likely produced by a Japanese company, which acknowledged to the Panel that two units had been exported in 1992 to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while it was also possible that the crane had been procured on the second-hand market.⁷⁵ The crane is now prohibited under paragraph 7 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#) banning the sale of items under HS code 84 and paragraph 27 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#).

⁷⁵ This model was produced between 1990 and 2002.

Figure XIX
Crane loading Hwasong-12



Source: KCTV.

Mozambique

Military cooperation

94. The Panel investigated military cooperation between the Korea Haegumgang Trading Corporation and the Mozambique company “Monte Binga” in respect of a \$6 million contract that included surface-to-air missiles, P-12 air defence radar, tank refurbishment and man-portable air defence systems. The Panel obtained documents, including letters of invitation for visits to Mozambique in October 2015 of radar technicians organized by the Economic and Trade Representative Mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Mozambique (see annex 28). According to a Member State, this trade mission is staffed by representatives of Haegumgang, which falls under the Military Cooperation General Bureau of the designated Ministry of People’s Armed Forces. Ri Chang Su (Passport No. 927310139, Date of birth: 29 April 1967), Third Economic and Commercial Secretary accredited to the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in South Africa (see annex 28), has been responsible for the military cooperation projects between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Mozambique since at least 2017.

95. While the Panel requested all information, including contracts, bills of lading and financial transfers between Monte Binga and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the one undated invoice for a list of goods provided (see annex 28) was inconsistent with information provided by a Member State. The Member State reported at least 13 separate shipments from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Mozambique, including six tons of air cargo in 2015 and seven shipments following the adoption of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#). In response to the Panel’s request for financial information relating to the \$6 million contract, the Chief Executive Officer stated that “Monte Binga SA does not keep any funding for military cooperation.”. However, the Panel notes that Monte Binga has accessed funding and paid for arms-related cooperation projects, including at least in one case involving more than \$24.9 million as payment for a loan on behalf of a related company,

ProIndicus,⁷⁶ for the procurement of maritime patrol vessels in 2015. The Panel notes that since October 2017, the new Government has cooperated with the Panel.

Designated entity representatives in Mozambique

96. The new Government provided the Panel information on travel between 2012 and 2017 to and within Mozambique by five nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea working on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and the Green Pine Associated Corporation, as well as other designated entities, including those reported as involved in conventional arms trade in other African countries. These included Kim Hyok Chan, Kim Song Chol, Ri Won Ho, Kim Sok Chol and Kim Jung Jong. The investigation continues.

Prohibited fishing activities

97. A Member State informed the Panel in late 2017 that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was violating paragraph 9 of resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#) through a commercial fishing joint venture, EMKIP, which employed approximately 40 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as fishermen and three vessels, including the *Susan 1* and the *Susan 2* (IMO No. 8672299). The vessels were photographed in a Mozambique port with flags of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and displaying political slogans (see annex 28).

98. The vessels, which were crewed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, caught shrimp, which was then sold to a South African company, Supa Packers Fish Processors Pty. Ltd, for processing before onward transfer to a company in Shenyang, China. Supa Packers has not replied to the Panel's enquiries. Mozambique informed the Panel that "practical steps taken so far include the dissolution of the EMKIP company and preparations for subsequent steps" and provided supporting documentation. The Panel continues to monitor the vessels and their attempts to re-establish operations in other countries.

Mansudae

99. According to detailed information provided by Mozambique to the Panel, Mansudae "is not registered in Mozambique, thus it does not have any branches or subsidiaries in the country and there are no entities or individuals associated with this company". It further stated that the statue of a former President of Mozambique was undertaken by Mansudae's Namibian company. In the contract for the statue signed in Pyongyang in June 2011 with Mansudae Overseas Project Vice-President Sin Kyu Sop, the quote was \$170,000, not including an additional planned seven statues for an estimated \$1,360,000.

Cooperation with the Panel

100. Mozambique started working closely with the Panel in October 2017, after which it "established a Ministerial Task Force to oversee the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council pertaining to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". Regarding the Monte Binga case, Mozambique noted that the three technicians of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who arrived in 2015 "provided support to Mozambican technicians in the repair and renovation of the one P-18 early warning radar and of fifteen T-55 tanks". The Panel also notes a letter of September 2016 from the Ministry of Defence to the

⁷⁶ Independent audit related to loans contracted by ProIndicus S.A., EMATUM S.A. and Mozambique Asset Management S.A. Report prepared for the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Mozambique, Kroll Associates, 22 June 2017, p. 20.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which stated that, owing to an impending Panel visit to Mozambique, the Ministry had decided to "temporarily suspend with immediate effect, all the activities under the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement reached upon between our two Ministries" (see annex 28). On 4 January 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mozambique further signalled its willingness to pursue further cooperation with the Panel.

Myanmar

101. The Panel requested information from Myanmar after receiving Member State notification that the country had an ongoing arms relationship with KOMID run principally through its Directorate for Defence Industries and was expecting future shipments from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Member State further notified the Panel of evidence of the receipt by Myanmar of ballistic missile systems from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in addition to a range of conventional weapons, including multiple rocket launchers and surface-to-air missiles; and that KOMID had hosted military technicians from Myanmar in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and personnel of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been dispatched to Directorate for Defence Industries-operated facilities in Myanmar.

102. The Member State informed the Panel that the Myanmar Directorate for Defence Industries maintains a sophisticated global procurement network and that its Director, Tun Hlaing, had reportedly been involved in overseas procurements and was associated with at least two Singapore-based firms, Excellence Metal Casting and STE Global Trading Pte Ltd. It further indicated that Tun Hlaing may have previously been associated with Myanmar's Excellence Mineral Manufacturing Co. Ltd, previously designated by a Member State for working with officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to import materiel for military weapons programmes. The Member State added that the Directorate for Defence Industries was seeking equipment from overseas suppliers for its Democratic People's Republic of Korea-linked missile programme and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-contracted Directorate for Defence Industries procurement activities included seeking items subject to controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Member State also informed the Panel that the Myanmar-based Ye Min Hein Co. Ltd was likely involved in the procurement of sensitive equipment and also likely a front for the Directorate for Defence Industries. The company had previously operated under the name Soe Min Htike Co. Ltd, also designated by a Member State from 2013 to 2016 for working with officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to import materiel for military weapon programmes.

103. The Panel previously concluded that Soe Min Htike was the consignee in the attempted transfer of prohibited nuclear-related items in 2012. In its reply of 15 June 2015 to the Panel on Myanmar's involvement with the prohibited ballistic missile and conventional arms programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its relationships with KOMID, Myanmar stated that "the government of Myanmar has no substantive bilateral relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea other than those related to normal diplomatic ties". Nevertheless, on 26 July 2017, Myanmar informed the Panel of the expulsion on 9 June 2017 of Kim Chol Nam, an accredited diplomat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for acting on behalf or at the direction of KOMID. On 24 January 2018, Myanmar added that it was investigating the Panel's latest request for information.

Namibia

104. On 17 November 2017, Namibia cooperated with the Panel by providing a 350-page response to multiple Panel enquiries since 2016. Regarding the designation of Mansudae, the country provided an interministerial committee technical evaluation on the repatriation of 242 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Namibia in response to the Panel's communication of 10 August 2017. Namibia stated that "all workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have left the country"⁷⁷ and supplied supporting documentation.

105. Namibia also provided company registration details on the entity "Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural and Technical Services (Proprietary) Ltd", active in Namibia in 2017. Namibia also supplied project cancellation orders, including the letter of 9 August 2017 from the Ministry of Defence-controlled August 26 Holding Company (PTY) Ltd to Mansudae, annulling their subcontract on the extension of the Leopard Valley military base.⁷⁸ The second Mansudae project, the "Keetmanshoop Farm project" involving the August 26 Company was cancelled on 9 August 2017.

106. Namibia also supplied documentation on a third Mansudae project, "Office Space Creation Project", for the Office of the President of Namibia. This project appears to have been terminated on 9 December 2016. According to Namibia, Qingdao Construction (Namibia) replaced Mansudae as the main contractor on 6 February 2017 in a contract worth approximately \$4.4 million.⁷⁹ On 1 September 2017, the First National Bank of Namibia wrote to the Financial Intelligence Centre at the Bank of Namibia stating that it had terminated business relations with Qingdao Construction and Kim Tong Chol and related parties "due to internal group policies and assessed risk of possible international sanctions violations" involving Mansudae.⁸⁰ On 6 November 2017, the Namibian Business and Intellectual Property Authority noted that the Mansudae Overseas Project Architectural and Technical Services Company was on their integrated companies registration system under a new name "TRITONIA HOLDINGSG NAMIBIA (PROPRIETARY LIMITED)"(sic).⁸¹

107. Namibia did not provide any information relating to payments to Mansudae for the above-mentioned cancelled projects despite its relationship with the designated KOMID.⁸² Nor did Namibia provide any information on the freezing of specific bank accounts after the designation of Mansudae.

108. Namibia further provided a list dated 27 October 2017 of 24 vehicles registered and licensed to Mansudae and stated that it had placed "high-level administrative marks on the company", noting that the administrative mark "prevents the company from conducting any business on the system". In a letter to Namibia, the Panel

⁷⁷ Namibia letter to the Panel dated 17 November 2017.

⁷⁸ See S/2017/150, para. 113.

⁷⁹ A contract dated 31 March 2017 between the Office of the President of Namibia and Qingdao Construction stated that the total value of the project was 62,506,125 Namibian dollars. According to a signed addendum "the amount certified under MOP Architectural and Technical Services amounts to N\$ 25,501, 626.97". The amount "to be certified under Qindao Construction cc would amount to N\$ 37,004,498.08".

⁸⁰ Qingdao and Kim Tong Chol were designated 10 days earlier by the United States of America. See United States Department of the Treasury, "Treasury targets Chinese and Russian entities and individuals supporting the North Korean regime: OFAC Designates 16 for Activities Related to Support of North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, Energy Trade, Labor Exports, and Sanctions Evasion", press release, 22 August 2017. Available from www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0148.aspx.

⁸¹ BIPA, email to National Bank, 6 November 2017.

⁸² See S/2017/150, paras. 110–112.

indicated that these vehicles should be frozen together with related assets and bank accounts. The investigation continues.

Poland

109. The Panel investigated the reported involvement of overseas workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the construction of a Danish warship at Polish shipyards, which would violate the arms embargo in paragraph 9 of resolution 1874 (2009).

110. Denmark informed the Panel that its Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization had signed a contract in March 2014 with a Danish shipyard for the construction of an Arctic patrol vessel, the *Laage Koch*. This shipyard, in turn, contracted with the Polish shipyard Crist S.A. to produce the hull, which was subsequently constructed in Poland between May 2014 and April 2015 under project number “NB 428” (figure XX).

**Figure XX
Danish warship hull at Polish shipyard (Crist)**



Source: The Panel.

111. According to a document obtained by the Panel, Crist contracted with another Polish company, Armex Sp. z o. o., to employ a “Group of Koreans” from 1 July 2014 to 31 December 2014 on several projects, including NB 428 (see annex 29). The Panel had already established that since at least 2012, Armex had employed workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea contracted under an agreement with an entity of that country, Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation (see annex 30). The Panel documented the involvement of Rungrado in a high-profile sanctions violation through the sale of Scud ballistic missile spare parts to an Egyptian entity in 2013.

112. Crist provided a statement denying any involvement of workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in project NB 428. The statement also asserted that NB 428 was built “as a universal multipurpose vessel based on standard shipbuilding solutions without any linkage to services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of prohibited arms or related material”. No supporting documentation was provided, while the Panel obtained evidence showing that Crist was fully aware that the hull (project NB 428) was constructed as part of a warship given the specifications accompanying the contract, according to which foundations had to be “arranged for weapon systems” including “ammunition store”, “torpedo”, “salute canon”, “light machine gun” and “heavy machine gun” with a drawing clearly showing a naval gun (see annex 31).⁸³

113. Additionally, according to the Polish National Labour Inspectorate, 19 workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were employed at the shipyard

⁸³ Crist replied to the Panel’s opportunity of reply letter (see annex 32).

Nauta S.A. which, *inter alia*, provides “services in the area of repair, modifications and building of the naval vessels for the Polish and foreign navies” (see annex 33). The workers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were hired through the company Alson Sp. Z o.o., which appears to be run by the same individuals as Armex. Poland informed the Panel that Armex was currently under liquidation.

114. In paragraph 8 of its resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council obligated Member States to repatriate all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea earning income in their jurisdiction immediately but no later than 24 months from 22 December 2017. In the meantime, this case also shows the importance for Member States still hosting overseas labour from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of scrutinizing both the workers’ affiliations and activities to avoid sanctions violations.

Pyongyang International Trade Fair

Participation of designated entities

115. The Korea International Exhibition Corporation, affiliated with the Ministry of External Economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, continued to organize the Pyongyang International Trade Fair in May and September 2017.⁸⁴ The Panel previously recommended the Korea International Exhibition Corporation for designation, given its role in assisting designated entities by providing a platform to transfer, sell or supply prohibited items to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

116. The Panel notes that the two Pyongyang International Trade Fairs in 2017 included designated entities and aliases thereof, including the Natural Resources Development and Investment Corporation (alias of the Green Pine Associated Corporation) and the Kangbong Trading Corporation. Furthermore, the Kuryonggang Trading Company appears to be an alias of the Korea Kuryonggang Trading Company, itself an alias of the Korean Tangun Trading Corporation.

117. In addition, the list of exhibitors (see annex 34) included entities designated by Member States for trading prohibited commodities including coal, the Songi Trading Corporation and the Wonbong Trading Corporation. The Royal Team Corporation from Taiwan Province of China, which had been previously investigated by the Panel, also continued its participation.⁸⁵

Six-axle vehicle brochures

118. A Chinese company exhibited brochures that included six- and seven-axle vehicles, which are prohibited for transfer to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 35). China investigated and informed the Panel that the company had not signed any agreements or contracts with any entity or individual of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Republic of Korea

Unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage retrieved in 2017

119. According to information provided by a Member State, flight data analysis from the 2017 unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage indicated that it took off from Kumgang County, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, on 2 May 2017 before heading towards a military facility in Seongju, Republic of Korea. On its return to the

⁸⁴ The 20th Pyongyang International Trade Fairs (Spring), 22–25 May 2017, and the 13th Pyongyang International Trade Fairs (Autumn), 25–28 September 2017.

⁸⁵ See [S/2016/157](#), paras. 182–186.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it crashed in Inje County, Republic of Korea, owing to engine malfunction. Its camera had taken 555 photographs, including 19 of the Seongju facility, showing that the unmanned aerial vehicle was engaged in reconnaissance. The unmanned aerial vehicle was similar to the one that crashed on Baengnyeong-do Island, Republic of Korea, in 2014 but had been improved to undertake reconnaissance missions deeper into the territory of the Republic of Korea.

120. The unmanned aerial vehicle also contained foreign-made items similar to those retrieved in the 2014 Baengnyeong-do Island crash. In particular, the engine and autopilot were manufactured by the same companies. However, this time, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had erased the serial number in an attempt to obfuscate the origin and therefore the procurement route. The Panel used the opportunity presented by this new unmanned aerial vehicle wreckage to send a follow-up letter to China requesting information about the individuals who had served as intermediaries in the procurement of the 2014 Baengnyeong-do Island unmanned aerial vehicle and has yet to receive a reply.

Cybertheft of military technology

121. According to the public records of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hacked one of its major shipbuilding companies in April 2016.⁸⁶ This incident involved the theft of confidential information on warships and submarines, including “cold launch” technology, which could be used for the submarine-launched ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Panel views such activity as constituting evasion of the arms embargo, given that such technological information could directly contribute to the development of the operational capabilities of the armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Sudan

122. The Panel investigated military cooperation projects between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Sudan and the presence and activities of KOMID representatives in the Sudan. In multiple letters sent between 2016 and 2018, the Panel requested clarification and documentation to substantiate reported statements made in November 2016 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan: “Sudan has completely cut off its military cooperation with North Korea.” and “Sudan is thoroughly implementing United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions on North Korea.”⁸⁷ While the Sudan has yet to respond to the Panel, a Member State indicated that since February 2017, cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has continued, noting that “NPN Electronics Company (미래전자회사)” sent technicians to the Sudan in September 2016 and that two KOMID operatives deported from Egypt in April 2016, Kim Song Chol and Son Jong Hyok, are the centre of the new connection between the Sudan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Another Member State informed the Panel in November 2017 that “KOMID continues to engage with the Sudanese State-controlled Military Industrial Corporation (MIC)”. The Panel is also investigating a number of air and sea shipments from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Sudan related to KOMID.

⁸⁶ During its report to the National Assembly in October 2017, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea acknowledged that the hacking involved the theft of 40,000 documents, including 60 classified military files from Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. Ltd.

⁸⁷ Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release, 1 November 2016.

Syrian Arab Republic

123. The Panel continued multiple investigations into the prohibited ballistic missile, conventional arms-related and dual-use goods transfers to and projects within the Syrian Arab Republic, including:

- Activities of multiple groups of ballistic missile technicians and designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Syrian Arab Republic
- More than 40 previously unreported shipments from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Syrian Arab Republic between 2012 and 2017 by entities designated by Member States as front companies for the Scientific Studies Research Centre of the Syrian Arab Republic⁸⁸

124. Seizure by Member States of goods believed to be part of a KOMID⁸⁹ contract in the Syrian Arab Republic, which were destined for Scientific Studies Research Centre front companies. The investigations revealed substantial new evidence regarding long-standing and ongoing prohibited programmes and designated entity activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as innovative evasion techniques, including the use of a parallel system to send maritime shipment documentation with authentic documents containing actual consignee information sent via air.⁹⁰

Ballistic missile cooperation and technician exchanges

125. A Member State informed the Panel that the Ryonhap-2 Corporation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was involved in the Syrian manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle Scud D project in 2008, in addition to the transit of a Syrian Arab Republic-bound delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through Beijing in February 2011 and its return on 14 March 2017.

126. Another Member State informed the Panel of a visit to the Syrian Arab Republic in November 2016 by a group of ballistic missile technicians affiliated with the designated Academy of National Defence Science. The group transited through Beijing and Dubai airports on the way to Damascus aboard a Syrian Arab Airlines passenger flight. The trip was preceded by the visit of a technical delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Syrian Arab Republic in August 2016, which involved the transfer to the Syrian Arab Republic of special resistance valves and thermometers known for use in chemical weapons programmes (in addition, 60 types of items were reportedly also discussed for procurement). A third group of missile technicians of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that had travelled to Damascus in April 2016 reportedly resided at Syrian military facilities.⁹¹ The Member State reported that technicians of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

⁸⁸ The United States designated the Scientific Studies Research Centre (Executive Order 13382) for suspected implication in Syrian weapons of mass destruction programmes, by European Council Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 and identified by Japan as an entity of proliferation concern in its “foreign end-user list”. See United States, Department of Treasury, “Three entities targeted by Treasury for supporting Syria WMD proliferation”, press release HP-216, 4 January 2007.

⁸⁹ No supporting documentation was provided.

⁹⁰ Panel reports on prohibited shipments to the Syrian Arab Republic, including Scientific Studies Research Centre front companies: [S/2010/571](#), paras. 50, 62, and recommendation 9; [S/2012/422](#), paras. 57, 60–61 and 65–67; [S/2013/337](#), paras. 44–46 and 86–89; [S/2014/147](#), paras. 51–54; [S/2016/157](#), paras. 62–70, 169–170 and 174; [S/2017/150](#), para. 99 and table 8; [S/2017/742](#), para. 28.

⁹¹ The April 2016 delegation's luggage was sent to the Mazzah air force base (near Damascus), a major logistics and intelligence centre, which, according to Syrian media, has been subject to repeated foreign air attacks. The Member State believes that this delegation resided at the base.

continued to operate at chemical weapons and missile facilities at Barzah, Adra and Hama. The Syrian Arab Republic replied to the Panel that “there are no technical companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Syria and the only presence of some individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are confined in the field of sports under private individual contracts for training athletics and gymnastics” (see annex 36). The Panel has yet to receive a reply to its request for supporting documentation for these claims and a list of all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who have travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic and is continuing its investigation.

Activities of Syrian representatives of designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

127. The Panel continued its investigations into the activities of designated Ryu Jin, senior KOMID official in the Syrian Arab Republic, and of other KOMID officials in the Syrian Arab Republic and their successors. In an official proposal to Major General Ali Salim of the Army Supply Bureau of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces for an air defence command and control system, Ryu Jin listed his rank as Major General and used letterhead of the Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, designated on 22 January 2013 as a KOMID subsidiary.⁹² According to the Member State, KOMID representatives in the Syrian Arab Republic have also been importing military goods via commercial air cargo services and, in that regard, attempted in July 2016 to import military communications antennas of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from Glocom.⁹³ In addition to those activities, between July 2015 and June 2016, Ryu Jin shipped ball bearings and fibre optic cables to the Syrian Arab Republic and invited three technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the country. Ryu Jin earned at least 56,000 euros and 48,000 euros transferred through the Tanchon Commercial Bank.

128. According to multiple Member States and airline companies, Ryu Jin engaged in extensive international travel between 2014 and 2016.⁹⁴ This included travel on Syrian Arab Airlines between Damascus and the port city of Latakia, to which previous KOMID-related shipments were destined. It is believed that Ryu Jin now travels outside the Syrian Arab Republic using an alias, as did the second KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab Republic, Kang Ryong.⁹⁵ Pak Gwang II⁹⁶ has since replaced Kang Ryong as the second KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab Republic. Between August 2015 and January 2017, Pak Gwang II entered the Syrian Arab Republic 15 times through the Masna‘ border between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon.⁹⁷ The Panel sent its fifth letter, in July 2017, to the Syrian authorities requesting information on the activities of the above-mentioned individuals and two

⁹² Tosong was listed on 22 January 2013 “as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programs.” [KOMID] is the parent company of the Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, according to Tosong’s list entry on the 1718 sanctions list. See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials.

⁹³ See S/2017/150, interdicted Glocom shipment to Eritrea and Glocom’s other activities.

⁹⁴ Including to or through China, Lebanon, the Russian Federation, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates.

⁹⁵ On 12 October 2016, Kang Ryong and his family were denied entry attempting to transit Dubai airport coming from Damascus aboard a Syrian International Airlines flight and before boarding an Aeroflot flight to Moscow (under the alias of Ri Chun Sik) He later travelled to Pyongyang via Moscow under the alias Ri Chun Sik with an emergency passport numbered 7640001.

⁹⁶ 박광일, DOB: 26 February 1973, passport number PD836310028.

⁹⁷ Pak Gwang II’s movements resemble those of Kang Ryong, who entered and exited the Syrian Arab Republic 25 times between February and December of 2015. Information contained within a letter from a Member State to the Panel.

Syrian representatives of the Tanchon Commercial Bank.⁹⁸ The Syrian Arab Republic replied that it “had no interaction with the two entities or individuals whose names are mentioned in the letter”. It has not replied to another request for information regarding Pak Gwang Il, the Tanchon Commercial Bank representatives and Ryu Jin, in particular, as to whether they have been expelled. The investigation continues.

Arms shipments and cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and designated entity front companies (2010–2017)

129. The Panel’s investigations into several cases of hitherto unreported arms shipments and cooperation with front companies of designated entities between 2010 and 2017 showed further evidence of arms embargo and other violations, including through the transfer of items with utility in ballistic missile and chemical weapons programmes. According to a Member State, for many years, the Corst Company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea acted on behalf of the designated Second Economic Committee⁹⁹ to ship items relating to prohibited programmes to entities acting on behalf of the Scientific Studies Research Centre. The Panel obtained documentation showing an attempt by the Corst Company in June 2010 to send 16 boxes of weapons production equipment (total 359 kg) to Damascus (figure XXI).

Figure XXI

Attempted weapons production shipment by the Corst Company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Damascus in 2010

Corst Company Ltd 123, CENTRAL DISTRICT PYONGYANG, D.P.R. OF KOREA TELFAX:00850 2 381 5770	Air Waybill No. 123456789
Designated Front and Address MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION FACTORY DAMASCUS AL-QADAM INDUSTRIAL ZONE, P.O.BOX 35202, DAMASCUS, SYRIA TEL/FAX +963 11 6142565	Caution! 1,2 and 8 entries Air Waybill are identical and have the same variety. It is agreed that the goods mentioned herein are consigned by express road, air and rail services between the port of departure up to the port of destination, without contract on the reverse. Hence all goods may be carried by any other means of transport, such as air or other carriers unless specific contrary instructions are given below. The carrier shall not be liable for damage to the goods if they are carried via intermediate stopping places which the carrier does not control, unless the consignee attention is drawn to this notice concerning carriage under contract and paying a reasonable charge if specified.
Agents USA-EUROPE	Amount No.
Shipped Under [Air or Land Contract] and voyage/Routing	Reference Number
Ex-Port [] DAM	To [] PP
Delivery Method [] DAMASCUS	Delivery Method [] PP
Subport/Location SUBPORT 12 JUN 2010	Amount of Insurance IN INSURANCE = 0.00 Euro/Unit, Total amount is 0.00 Required in accordance with the relevant Statute, Rule of Law or Contract of carriage.

Source: The Panel.

130. Corst sent goods to the Syrian Arab Republic in July 2017 for use in prohibited programmes, which were received by a Scientific Studies Research Centre research staff member. The Panel also received documents showing Corst as the shipper. The Syrian consignee contact number on the invoice¹⁰⁰ matches the one listed by Member States and the European Union for the Scientific Studies Research Centre front

⁹⁸ They are Jang Bom Su (DOB: 15 April 1957), a.k.a. Jang Hyon U (DOB: 22 February 1958; passport No.: 654210151) and Jon Myung Guk, a.k.a. Jon Yong Sang (DOB: 1 January 1976; passport No. 654210108).

⁹⁹ According to the sanctions list, it is involved in key aspects of the missile programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, oversees the country’s production of the ballistic missiles and directs the activities of KOMID.

¹⁰⁰ Telephone No. 00963 114471081.

company, Megatrade.¹⁰¹ In addition, the same telephone/fax number and address were being utilized by the Scientific Studies Research Centre for another of its front companies, Electric Parts Ltd, for a missile-related shipment from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea seized by the Republic of Korea in 2012.¹⁰²

131. According to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also delivered prohibited materials to the Syrian Arab Republic through Choe Ki Yong (최기용) of Pusong Trading (부성무역) (a.k.a. Korea Pusong Corporation), which also falls under the Second Economic Committee. The materials were delivered to the Scientific Studies Research Centre through companies acting on its behalf, Elite Surveying Instruments Co. and Megatrade.¹⁰³ Using the airway bill number provided by the Panel, the transport company corroborated information provided by the Member State, including that the shipper of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was "Elite Surveying Instruments Co." and the consignee, "Mr. Adeeb Kabekli, Aleppo Street, Building 54, Damascus, Syria, Tel: 00963-11-447-1081", whose name, address and number match the July 2017 Corst shipment to Megatrade (see annex 36).

132. KOMID has used innovative evasion techniques in the Syrian Arab Republic. In contrast with the usual practice of including information on consignee, shipper and consignor in documentation accompanying the container shipment, in these cases, documents providing the actual consignee information were sent separately by air. For example, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent by air to Kim Kwang Chol, a KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab Republic, the actual bill of lading and cargo list for Mechanical Systems, a Scientific Studies Research Centre front company, which listed the shipper as a foreign company operating in Pyongyang, the "China Delixi Group Pyongyang office", although the contact was a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pak Song Il. The consignee listed was the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex 36). The Panel notes that while a number of international logistics companies have instituted enhanced screening to inspect all Democratic People's Republic of Korea-related shipments, one exception is "sealed diplomatic shipments", which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea often uses to undertake prohibited activities that involve designated entities. Combined with the use of a so-called foreign company, these practices are evidence of an attempt to further obfuscate the timing, routes and content of prohibited shipments. The Panel has identified 39 shipments from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Syrian Arab Republic involving the above-mentioned companies between December 2012 and December 2017. The investigation continues.

133. The Member State also informed the Panel that the national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Choe Jin Myong,¹⁰⁴ a long-time representative of the Chilsong Trading Company, which deals in military communications equipment, has been working with Han Il, the Beijing representative of the designated Daeryonggang

¹⁰¹ "52. Megatrade, address: Aleppo Street, P.O. Box 5966, Damascus, Syria; fax: 963114471081; 'Acts as a proxy for the [SSRC], which is listed. Involved in trade in dual use goods prohibited by EU sanctions for the Syrian government'; 16.10.2012" (see *Official Journal of the European Union*, L330/9, 30 November 2012).

¹⁰² See [S/2013/337](#), para. 46, annex IX which lists the address as "Aleppo Street Damascus" and Tel. No. 00963 114471081.

¹⁰³ In its 2017 final report, the Panel noted that "Elite Surveying Instruments", an alias of Korea Pusong Corporation, had been designated by a Member State and manufactured vehicle-related machinery parts such as grinders and bearings, further stating that "Elite Surveying Instruments" had been involved in illicit shipments of dual-use items to an entity in the Syrian Arab Republic "Megatrade". See [S/2017/150](#), para. 99.

¹⁰⁴ 최진명 DOB: 14 October 1962, passport number 472220689.

Trading Corporation,¹⁰⁵ to broker arms-related equipment to a Syrian munitions company, Yona Star International.¹⁰⁶ The deal was to include broadband communications equipment and ultra-long distance detection radar, as well as an explosive ordinance disposal vehicle. Another Member State informed the Panel of its suspicion that “several tons of conventional armaments were acquired by [Syria] through the North Korean entity Chonryong Technology Corp.” The negotiations between the two sides took place in September 2016 and were related to the procurement of 30 mm grenade launchers, six-barrelled 7.62 mm machine guns and six-barrelled 30 mm autocannons.

Interdicted shipments

134. Two Member States interdicted consignments en route to the Syrian Arab Republic containing identical items and another Member State informed the Panel that it had reasons to believe the consignments were related to a KOMID contract¹⁰⁷ with Syrian entities known to engage in prohibited activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the fields of chemical, ballistic missile or conventional arms development.

1. *Shipper*

135. The bills of lading of the shipments showed a Chinese company, Cheng Tong Trading Co. Ltd, as shipper in January 2017 (see annex 37). The shipments were part of a batch of five sent by the same company, with the three others sent between 3 November 2016 and 12 December 2016.

136. The contracts provided by Cheng Tong Trading Co. Ltd showed that the goods in all five shipments were acquired by the Syrian companies for a total of approximately \$320,000 (see annex 38). The contracts stipulated a 30 per cent pre-shipping payment, but Cheng Tong failed to provide any payment remittances. The Panel has requested these documents from China. China responded to the Panel’s enquiries on the Cheng Tong Trading Company, noting that “China does not have any clue or evidence demonstrating that Cheng Tong Trading Co. has business with Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) or other designated entities or individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or takes part in activities violating the Security Council resolutions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. If the Panel of Experts has any concrete evidence on the relationship between Cheng Tong Trading Co. and KOMID, please provide to China to facilitate China’s further investigation.”

2. *Consignee*

137. The interdicted shipments were destined for a Damascus-based company, Metallic Manufacturing Factory (see annex 37) which, according to a Member State, is acting for or on behalf of the Mechanical Construction Factory,¹⁰⁸ which is itself a

¹⁰⁵ According to the Member State, this alias has been used by the designated Namchongang Trading Corporation”.

¹⁰⁶ Yona Star International has been designated by another Member State, see United States, Department of Treasury, “Treasury sanctions networks providing support to the Government of Syria”, press release, 21 July 2016.

¹⁰⁷ The Panel does not possess a copy of this contract.

¹⁰⁸ United States, Department of Treasury, “Treasury sanctions senior Al-Nusrah Front leaders concurrently with UN designations”, press release, 23 February 2017. Available from www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0011.aspx.

front company for the Scientific Studies Research Centre.¹⁰⁹ The Mechanical Construction Factory was previously investigated by the Panel for acting as consignee in an interdiction of military-specific items and other items with possible military uses.¹¹⁰

138. Another of the shipments sent by the Cheng Tong Trading Company included one destined to a Damascus-based company named General Company for Cables, a reported subsidiary of the General Organization for Engineering Industries (see annex 39), another front company for the Scientific Studies Research Centre.¹¹¹

3. *Cargo content*

139. During its inspection of the interdicted cargo at the invitation of the Member States, the Panel found its content to be consistent with the bills of lading. The first shipment consisted of six shipping containers of acid-resistant tiles (bricks). The second was seven shipping containers of the same acid-resistant tiles along with adhesive paste and accessories (see figure XXII). The number of tiles would cover 5000 m², an area commensurate to a large-scale industrial project. A technical analysis of the tiles by a Member State concluded that they were to be used for activities conducted at high temperatures. Although the Panel determined that the seized items did not appear on any control lists, another Member State informed the Panel that they included “materials that can be used to build bricks for the interior walls of [a] chemical factory.”

Figure XXII
Acid-resistant tiles (bricks) inspected by the Panel



Source: The Panel.

140. The November and December 2016 shipments contained items consistent with another large-scale industrial project including valves, welded pipes (23 tons), stainless steel seamless pipes (27 tons) and cables. The investigation continues.

¹⁰⁹ United States, Department of Treasury, “Treasury increases sanctions against Syria”, press release, 18 July 2012. Available from www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1642.aspx. The Scientific Studies Research Centre was described by a Member State as being responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons and missiles to deliver them (United States, Department of Treasury, “Fact sheet: increasing sanctions against Syria”, 18 July 2012).

¹¹⁰ See S/2013/337, paras 86–89.

¹¹¹ United States, Department of Treasury, “Treasury increases sanctions against Syria”.

Switzerland

Robotic arm used at military-related machinery plant

141. The Panel investigated a robotic arm produced by a Swiss manufacturer, which was observed in the KCTV broadcast of 20 December 2015 on the “January 18 General Machinery Plant”, which is known for manufacturing military products (see figure XXIII).¹¹² The Panel found that the robotic arm had been indirectly procured by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea between 2006 and 2015 without the manufacturer’s knowledge. The Panel notes that robotic arms are now prohibited under paragraph 7 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), in which the Security Council prohibited the sale of items under HS code 84, and under paragraphs 8 and 27 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#).

Figure XXIII

Robotic arm used at the January 18 General Machinery Plant



Source: KCTV.

Uganda

142. The Panel continued its investigation into prohibited military activities in Uganda and travel to the country by individuals working on behalf of designated entities. On 6 September 2017, Uganda informed the Panel that all remaining military cooperation projects with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea prohibited under resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) had expired or been terminated.¹¹³ The first contract with the military training team of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expired on 27 April 2017 and was not renewed. It noted that the other contract involving air force pilots and technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which was due to expire on 20 March 2018, was terminated on an unspecified date in 2017.¹¹⁴ Uganda cooperated with the Panel by supplying the requested contracts and list of 19 officers ranging in rank from brigadier to major who comprised the air force contract and three colonels and a major who comprised the military training team and have now left the country.¹¹⁵ Uganda, however, is yet to respond to the Panel’s enquiries

¹¹² See [S/2017/150](#), para. 194.

¹¹³ While the Panel recommended that Uganda cease all military cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in June 2015, more than two years passed until the contract expired and was not renewed.

¹¹⁴ The Panel first identified Democratic People’s Republic of Korea air force trainers at a Ugandan air force base in its letter of 24 July 2015 to Uganda. See [S/2016/157](#), para. 114 and figure XXV.

¹¹⁵ The Panel notes that the salaries of the military training team of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were to be paid in United States dollars to the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Kampala.

into the activities of four senior KOMID officials also active in Libya, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic and documented as travelling to Uganda.¹¹⁶ In December 2017, Uganda did report that two diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "Mr. Yu Kyong Jin and Mr. Jong Kuk Chol, who were allegedly employees of an entity sanctioned by the United Nations, the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation, were asked to leave the country in October 2017."¹¹⁷ Uganda has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries into attempts by the military attaché's office at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Kampala to provide military services prohibited under the resolutions to third countries.¹¹⁸

United Republic of Tanzania

143. The Panel continued its investigation into the Haegeumgang Trading Corporation's (a.k.a. Haegumgang) €10.49 million contract to repair and upgrade surface-to-air missile Pechora (S-125) systems and P-12 air defence radar in the United Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania informed the Panel that "in 2014 Tanzania took a decision to terminate, with immediate effect, the working business relationship between the Government of Tanzania and the Naegeumgang (sic) Trading Company of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as mentioned in the Panel's report".¹¹⁹ However, according to a Member State, the military contracts were only "temporarily suspended" in April 2014 and "in July 2016 military cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea resumed based on the receipt by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of a 40 per cent down payment for the contracts". The head of the Haegeumgang Trading Corporation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kim Kwang Nam,¹²⁰ entered the United Republic of Tanzania with electronic warfare equipment technicians of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in December 2016. The military technicians are residing at a Tanzanian military facility at Nyumbu, near the town of Kibaha, and have been engaged in the upgrade of the P-12 radars since February 2017, according to a Member State. The Panel wrote to the United Republic of Tanzania requesting evidence of the contract cancellation and period of stay of all technicians and Haegeumgang personnel in the country. The Panel is awaiting a response. The Panel notes that Haegeumgang has been active in neighbouring Mozambique, upgrading the same type of air defence systems.¹²¹

Zimbabwe

144. The Panel is investigating the reported presence of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies¹²² and individuals working on behalf of the Green Pine Associated Corporation and the Reconnaissance General Bureau in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe provided information on two Mansudae companies, "Mansudae Ordnance Supplies" and "Mansudae Boka Design Company", stating that the latter is "not a subsidiary of Mansudae Overseas Project or Mansudae Art Studio". It further stated that Mansudae Ordnance Supplies "is dormant" and that the Mansudae Boka Design Company "focused on gold and precious metals", initially as a "jewelry design company" and is now a "manufacturer for jewelry".¹²³ However, the Panel notes that two of the three directors of the Mansudae Boka Design Company, Yun Kyong Chol

¹¹⁶ See [S/2017/150](#), table 8.

¹¹⁷ See [S/AC.49/2018/11](#), annex. Report of Uganda on the implementation of Security Council resolutions [2321 \(2016\)](#) and [2371 \(2017\)](#), 18 January 2018.

¹¹⁸ [S/2017/150](#), para. 122.

¹¹⁹ See [S/2017/742](#), para. 30.

¹²⁰ DOB: 27 November 1958, passport No. 836420376.

¹²¹ See [S/2017/742](#), para. 26.

¹²² Security Council resolution [2371 \(2017\)](#), annex II, states that the Mansudae Overseas Project "has been reported to conduct business" in Zimbabwe.

¹²³ Letter to Panel received 26 October 2017.

and Kim Kyong Ryop, are nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Zimbabwe informed the Panel that the company was being dissolved. In response to the Panel's letter requesting immigration information on 83 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and their activities on behalf of designated entities,¹²⁴ Zimbabwe informed the Panel that Ri Hak Chol had travelled to Zimbabwe via air on 18 August 2017 and departed on 23 August 2017. Kim Yong Nam travelled to Zimbabwe at least two times in 2017 (15 to 23 February and 21 June to 23 August).¹²⁵ Ri Hak Chol is the president of Saeing P'il Corporation and has travelled to Angola, Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran,¹²⁶ where arms-related activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been reported.¹²⁷ Kim Yong Nam is reportedly an officer of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, a designated entity that oversees the activities of the Green Pine Associated Corporation. The Panel is continuing its investigation into the activities of these individuals in Zimbabwe.

Implementation of the luxury goods ban

Wonsan Air Show

145. The Panel investigated the operation of two previously reported aircraft observed during the Wonsan Air Festival in September 2016.¹²⁸ Regarding the P-750 XSTOL aircraft manufactured by Pacific Aerospace Ltd, the Government of New Zealand informed the Panel that the national Customs Service had investigated the case further and had prosecuted Pacific Aerospace Ltd for the indirect export of aircraft parts to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Furthermore, Pacific Aerospace Ltd informed the Panel about the adoption of new policies and procedures to improve its internal export control system.

Bugsae Shop (alternative spelling of Buksae)

146. The Panel investigated the operation in Pyongyang of the Bugsae Shop, linked to the Singapore-based OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd (figure XXIV) (see paras. 178–188). Media reports reveal imported luxury goods produced in the European Union and Japan and distributed by another Singapore-based company, T Specialist International (Singapore) Pte Ltd. The Panel notes that in accordance with the export and import regulations of Singapore, a wide range of luxury goods, including wines and spirits, are prohibited to be exported to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Panel letter to Zimbabwe, 12 October 2017.

¹²⁵ According to the Department of Immigration of Zimbabwe, Ri Hak Chol used Democratic People's Republic of Korea passport No. 836220494. Kim Yong Nam used Democratic People's Republic of Korea passport No. 836120079.

¹²⁶ See [S/2017/150](#), table 9.

¹²⁷ See [S/2017/150](#), paras. 103, 207–209 (Angola); paras. 181–182 (Egypt); press release SC/10633, 2 May 2012 (Islamic Republic of Iran).

¹²⁸ See [S/2017/150](#), paras. 126–128.

¹²⁹ See [S/2015/131](#), annex 11.

Figure XXIV

Images showing the Bugsae Shop as a member of the OCN Group in Pyongyang in July 2017



Source: NK Pro.

Pyongyang branch linked to the MINISO retail chain claimed to be based in Japan

147. The Panel investigated the opening in April 2017 of a new brand chain outlet of MINISO in Pyongyang, advertising itself as a “Japan-based designer brand” (see annex 40). The MINISO website shows images of items in its stores, such as cosmetics and earphones, that could be considered luxury goods in accordance with resolution 1718 (2006) given that they are covered by Japan’s luxury goods ban. On 18 January 2017, prior to the opening of the Pyongyang branch, MINISO signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The attendees of the signing ceremony included Nan Chengyi, the chief delegate of the North Korea Economic Cooperation Council, China Dandong Office, and the global cofounders of MINISO, Miyake Junya (chief designer) and Ye Guofu (Chief Executive Officer) (see annex 41). MINISO claimed that its items retailed in Pyongyang were not produced in Japan and that the MINISO China office was handling the brand’s overseas franchise, including the Pyongyang branch. After being contacted by the Panel, the brand deleted its headquarters address in Japan on its website (see annex 42). Furthermore, the Pyongyang store has changed its retail brand name in its packaging (see figure XXV). The Panel also addressed its concern about possible violations of the prohibition on joint ventures in a letter to the company, to which it has not received a reply.

Figure XXV

Example of retail brand name change in packaging



Source: NK News.

Other cases under the luxury goods ban

148. The Panel investigated exports of luxury goods to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from at least five Member States, sending enquiries and compiling corroborating information.

Jewellery, gems and precious and semi-precious stones (HS code 71)

149. According to UN Comtrade, from January to June 2017, India exported precious metals and stones worth \$578,994 to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The largest commodity exported from January to June 2017 was diamonds (HS code 710239) worth \$514,823.

150. The Panel reiterates that the jewellery items listed in paragraph 1 of annex IV to resolution [2094 \(2013\)](#) correspond to HS codes beginning with 71 and calls upon Member States to exercise vigilance with regard to any exports of goods classified under that code.¹³⁰

151. Annex IV to Council Regulation (EU) No. 2016/682 of 29 April 2016 amending Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007, which implements resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#), contains tables of HS codes corresponding to the list of prohibited "luxury goods" for transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Wines (including sparkling wines), spirits and spirituous beverages (HS codes 220410, 220421, 220429, 2205 and 2208)

152. Following the adoption of the Council Regulation, Germany exported wines, including sparkling wines, and spirits in the amount of \$151,840 (between June 2016 and June 2017) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Italy exported \$46,992 worth of wine and vermouth between July 2016 and February 2017, and Bulgaria exported \$11,959 worth of wine in April 2017. In their replies to the Panel, all three countries claimed their transactions to be exempt under the 2016 Council Regulation. While "wine, vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes" as well as ethyl alcohol were indeed exempted, if the commodities exported by Germany were of HS code 22041011 (Champagne) and HS code 22041091 (Asti spumante), they would not have been exempt.

153. In addition, Chile exported wine worth \$290,880 between June 2016 and August 2017. The Panel did not receive a reply from Chile as to whether wine was covered by its domestic luxury goods ban.

Perfumes and cosmetics (HS codes 3303, 3304, 3305 and 3307)

154. Between September 2016 and June 2017, Bulgaria exported perfumes and cosmetics in the amount of \$198,074 to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Germany's exports of the same articles between September 2016 and April 2017 amounted to \$62,179. Both countries informed the Panel that their transactions were exempt under the same Council Regulation.

155. The Panel notes that annex VIII to a new European Union regulation, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2062 of 13 November 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, eliminated the above-mentioned exemptions by introducing a total ban on those items.

¹³⁰ See [S/2016/157](#), para. 129.

V. Finance

156. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to access the international financial system because of critical implementation deficiencies, which resulted in the country's evasive activities not being duly identified and prevented. The deceptive practices of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the lack of appropriate action by many Member States are systematically undermining the effectiveness of financial sanctions.

157. Multiple Member States were found to be exerting insufficient scrutiny of the activities of bank representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea residing in, or moving through, their territory. Many financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including designated banks, maintain a network of overseas representatives who continue to move freely across borders to undertake transactions in multiple countries and to establish residences abroad. Their ability to do so points to insufficient monitoring of the activities of these representatives and the lack of enforcement of the obligation to expel individuals working on behalf of or at the direction of banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, close their branches, subsidiaries and representative offices and freeze all assets controlled by designated entities or members of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are engaged in violating or evading the provisions of the resolutions.

158. The Panel also investigated the account-opening and transaction patterns of banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and their representatives, which revealed that several foreign financial institutions had deficient vigilance measures and due diligence processes. While in some cases, the establishment of the accounts predated designation or the relevant sanctions measure, the Panel found that the financial institutions had performed inadequate due diligence at the onboarding stage, had deficient transaction monitoring procedures and largely failed to conduct reviews of these high-risk accounts. Evasive practices in opening accounts included listing the accounts in the names of foreign nationals, front companies and family members, together with provisions for a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea authorized to have signing rights and control of accounts. Frequent cash withdrawals from the accounts investigated by the Panel indicate the importance of bulk cash in business transactions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

159. The Panel's financial investigations also highlighted how corporate service providers act as a key vulnerability. Instead of serving as a line of defence against sanctions evasion, they have often facilitated such evasion, albeit unwittingly. Once the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can register a front company without overt links to the country through the assistance of foreign nationals, it becomes significantly easier for its firms to pass rudimentary due diligence checks by financial institutions and open and maintain accounts. An investigation into a Singaporean company with ownership ties to financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea revealed the use of overseas representatives and front companies, especially those established in Hong Kong, to ensure that transactions were conducted in a manner that would not reveal any overt connection to a designated entity or interest of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

160. The Panel's investigation into Glocor highlighted similar patterns of evasion, showing that multiple overseas accounts, especially those established in the name of front companies with the assistance of trusted local partners, allowed it to continuously move funds between and in different banks and jurisdictions. The network's transactions, whether for purposes of moving money between accounts it controlled in its own network or for paying suppliers, often involved an array of

evasion tactics, including large-scale use of bulk cash, front companies in Hong Kong and elsewhere, middlemen and a ledger system.

161. The Panel also investigated the Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies(MKP), a network of overseas branches of a major joint venture of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea linked to the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Mansudae Overseas Group and having ties to financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The network benefits heavily from a decentralized corporate model that helps to distance the Group's activities from its beneficiaries of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on paper and from the cooperation of non-nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including prominent political and business figures in the countries in which they operate. Furthermore, the Panel found that several firms and, in some cases, foreign governments, have been supporting the efforts of the network to find financing for its activities, in contravention of provisions in the resolutions prohibiting such activities.

Bank representatives and bank accounts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abroad

162. The Panel investigated more than 30 representatives of financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea operating abroad, including from the Tanchon Commercial Bank, Korea Kumgang Group Bank, Foreign Trade Bank, Cheil Credit Bank, Daesong Bank, Ilsim International Bank, Bank of East Land, Daedong Credit Bank and Ryugyong Commercial Bank, who operated in China, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates in 2017 (see annexes 43–44). The Panel has previously reported on the use of embassies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the country's bank operations in some of the listed cases.¹³¹ The Panel also notes that many of these representatives continue to travel internationally. The Foreign Trade Bank representative in Libya, Ku Ja Hyong, has undertaken multiple trips since the adoption of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#), including to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Panel recalls that Member States must expel any individual determined to be working on behalf of or at the direction of a bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which violates both paragraph 33 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#) and paragraph 33 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#).

Overseas bank accounts of individuals and entities acting on behalf of financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

163. The Panel wrote letters to more than 10 Member States in whose jurisdictions bank accounts had been established by financial institutions and designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, requesting account documentation and transaction information. One Member State replied that of the 125 accounts mentioned in the Panel's letter, 99 had been identified and closed, with the exception of one under a name that is not designated.

164. Other Member State replies enabled the Panel to analyse how overseas bank accounts were established by financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and their representatives.¹³² This information showed various evasion techniques employed by bank representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea operating abroad, including the use of foreign nationals, front companies and local embassies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to set up and make use of accounts where nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had signing

¹³¹ See [S/2017/150](#), paras. 236, 241, 185 and annex 14–27.

¹³² The Panel received replies from Austria, Belarus, Belgium, France, Italy, Latvia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland and Tunisia.

authority. For example, a euro account was opened at the International Arab Bank of Tunisia on 23 November 2013 by a Chinese passport holder, Jin Huixing (金辉星) (see annex 45), but with a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Nam Sok Chan, managing the account. It was frozen by the International Arab Bank of Tunisia on 7 August 2016, with a balance of \$181,730.00. On 27 November 2013, a dollar account at the International Arab Bank of Tunisia was opened by another Chinese passport holder, Ji Hong Hua (吉红花), but with signing authority given to the same national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The International Arab Bank of Tunisia froze that account on 24 July 2015, with a balance of \$25,869.70. Documentation relating to the opening of the accounts shows that both Jin Huixing and Ji Hong Hua listed their addresses for the above-mentioned accounts as "Embassy of Democratic Korea Tripoli Libya" (see annex 45). Yet another euro account was opened at the International Arab Bank of Tunisia on 18 July 2012 by Ri Chun Song in his capacity as "Secretary's Delegate of the Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Tripoli", before being closed on 22 August 2013. Ri Chun Song serves as the representative of the Foreign Trade Bank in Beijing.¹³³ He was also listed, along with Nam Sok Chan, as having signing authority for a United States dollar account at the Arab Tunisian Bank in the name of the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, opened on 2 July 2012 and closed on 11 November 2012. Lastly, the Foreign Trade Bank used the name of a front company, "Kartos", to establish another account at the Arab Tunisian Bank on 12 May 1999, periodically designating multiple nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as new signatories. The account was closed on 3 March 2012. These cases demonstrate the need for financial institutions to factor in the involvement of individuals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in account control for client risk assessments. Listing multiple individuals with signing authority allowed the Foreign Trade Bank to continue to undertake transactions from the same accounts while its representatives travelled between global Foreign Trade Bank offices. The Panel obtained a 2011 order by the Foreign Trade Bank Libya representative faxed to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Vienna for the Foreign Trade Bank Austria representative for transfers to its euro and United States dollar accounts at the Arab Tunisian Bank in Tunisia, showing global Foreign Trade Bank cooperation.

165. With regard to accounts in Austria, its former local Foreign Trade Bank representative, Kim Yu Jin, was instrumental in establishing a complex web of financial relationships, opening accounts in the name of the Foreign Trade Bank in at least three different financial institutions (including three accounts in one bank) and opening other accounts in his own name, in the name of the company Korea Ungum Co. and in the name of the wife of a staff member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. According to Austria, Kim Yu Jin was himself a member of the administrative and technical staff of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Austria who departed when his accreditation expired.¹³⁴ As at 26 October 2017, Austrian authorities had closed 12 bank accounts held by persons affiliated with the Embassy. Austria noted that this action went beyond the requirements of paragraph 16 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#), which refers to diplomats and consular officers only. This interpretation suggests that some Member States may not consider administrative and technical staff to be included under that provision. The Panel nevertheless considers paragraph 16 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) to be applicable to all personnel of embassies of the Democratic People's Republic of

¹³³ China replied to the Panel that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets.

¹³⁴ Another member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pak Kang Son, also established accounts in four different banks.

Korea, including trade, administrative, support and technical staff, particularly in the light of the history of these embassies using such staff to open bank accounts and perform transactions on behalf of the country's financial institutions. The Panel also recalls its previous recommendation that Member States ensure that additional accounts are not established in the names of family members of diplomats.¹³⁵

Documentation relating to the opening of bank accounts

166. An analysis of documents submitted by financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and their representatives to open bank accounts showed insufficient due diligence performed by financial institutions during the onboarding process. For example, the due diligence conducted by a major European bank for an application for a euro-denominated account by a representative of the Korea Daesong Bank showed no independent review or verification of the answers given on the anti-money-laundering questionnaire. A due diligence checklist indicated that despite negative public information about applicants (including an entry in the Thomson Reuters World-Check database), the fact that the bank's regulator was the Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that no audited documentation was available,¹³⁶ the bank's compliance department recommended that the application be accepted.

167. Singapore provided the Panel with copies of application forms and account statements from a front company for the Northeast Asia Bank, Great Best Trading Pte, Ltd. Great Best Trading was co-located with Chinpo Shipping and the Tonghae Shipping Agency, and the two also shared key management personnel and shareholders, suggesting links to the Ocean Maritime Management Company. Although the account was originally established in 1995, there was no evidence that the bank conducted any account reviews, including when the company first applied for a "business privilege account", when a euro account was added through a simple request by fax or, in 2013, when the account ran an average balance of \$995,000 and showed withdrawals and deposits of large amounts in round numbers. The Panel notes that Member States are obliged under paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) to apply enhanced monitoring to prevent transactions that could contribute to violations of the resolutions or to sanctions evasion.

Banks of a European Member State used for sanctions violations

168. From 2009 to 2016, banks in a European Member State were used by foreign organized crime syndicates to circumvent the sanctions regime, including for the export of goods and equipment related to the prohibited programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Customers at several banks transferred funds in a series of complicated transactions involving accounts held by offshore companies for the benefit of entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The bank's offshore clients did not transact directly with sanctioned entities but used a network of intermediaries. The Member State whose banks were fined for this behaviour shared the typologies with the Panel. The typologies show that the banks did not conduct adequate due diligence and transaction monitoring and did not sufficiently scrutinize the beneficiaries of transactions. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was geographically far from the Member State in question, its financial institutions were used to circumvent sanctions, specifically through the use of offshore front companies. This violation was discovered through the sharing of information between Member States. It shows how the evasive practices of the

¹³⁵ See S/2017/742, para. 65.

¹³⁶ Nor was any research carried out on the parent company of the bank, Korea Daesong Economic Group.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea significantly increase the challenges associated with implementing financial sanctions and highlights the importance of establishing feasible mechanisms for sharing information between Member States and banks, whose ability to freely share proprietary information is almost always severely restricted.¹³⁷

Financial operations of the Reconnaissance General Bureau

169. The Panel analysed transaction records supplied by Italy for more than six accounts at two major financial institutions in the country established by Kim Su-Gwang, an official of the Reconnaissance General Bureau whose assets were frozen by France in January 2014 along with those of his father and sister, the latter of whom, Kim Su Gyong, is an official of the Korean United Development Bank.¹³⁸ While Kim Su-Gwang's employment at the international organization that had been supplying him cover was terminated on 23 January 2015, he nevertheless continues to own property and at least one bank account in Italy and signed two four-year apartment leases starting in February 2015 and November 2016, respectively, which transaction records suggest may be sublet to other nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹³⁹ Meanwhile, he served as the deputy trade representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Belarus from 24 September to 16 December 2017, during which time he and his wife travelled to and made purchases in neighbouring countries using a car with a diplomatic plate.

170. Kim Su-Gwang opened at least six accounts in Italy in various combinations of names of his father, sister, wife and mother (Djang Tcheul Hy), the latter of whom was listed on three accounts despite having never been to the country according to Italian records. One of his United States dollar accounts (also in the names of his mother and father) showed regular salary payments from his employer, as well as pension payments from the other international organization for which his father worked. These payments continued beyond the January 2014 assets freeze by France.

171. The accounts showed numerous cash withdrawals in Rome as well as Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, Moscow and Shanghai, often for the maximum amount allowed and using multiple bank cards within minutes of one another at the same automatic teller machine (ATM). One card was used to withdraw cash in Shanghai and Kuala Lumpur in February and March 2014, a period that coincided with the retention of three Reconnaissance General Bureau operatives in Malaysia (February 2014) on suspicion of smuggling \$450,000 cash out of the country. Cash was also widely used to make purchases of air tickets and foreign currency. The reliance on cash withdrawals is a pattern also seen in the banking practices of the Glocom network, discussed further in the following section. It highlights the need for relevant financial institutions, as part of a risk-based approach, to conduct thorough due diligence and reviews of

¹³⁷ The sharing of information is restricted for several reasons. In some States, information-sharing is possible only when there is suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed. Some countries have a legal framework for targeted financial sanctions and are legally able to share information related to sanctions evasion, but do not include this provision in their implementing legislation. Most importantly, many States have not considered or prioritized the issue of mechanisms/channels/points of contact for such international cooperation.

¹³⁸ The Panel previously reported on Kim Su-Gwang's cooperation with his father, another Reconnaissance General Bureau agent, Kim Yong Nam, and his sister, Kim Su-Gyong, official of the Korean United Development Bank, in financial activities in Europe. See [S/2017/742](#), paras. 52–53; and [S/2017/150](#), paras. 72–87 and 232–241. See also annexes 46–48.

¹³⁹ These contracts are in the name of his alias, "Kim Souk Wang". Monthly rent payments into his account suggest that he is subletting these apartments to other nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.


accounts where nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are signatories or may have indirect account control.

172. All of the accounts have been closed with the exception of at least one account in the name of the wife of Kim Su-Gwang, Kim Kyong Hui, opened in March 2014 (two months after the French assets freeze) at the address of his employer, which remains on the account despite the termination of his employment on 23 January 2015.

Financial operations of Glocom

173. The Panel continued its investigation into the financing of Glocom, a Reconnaissance General Bureau-directed network selling prohibited military communications technology.¹⁴⁰ In addition to its four bank accounts with the Daedong Credit Bank in Pyongyang, the Glocom network controlled at least 10 accounts in four other countries between 2012 and 2017, including through Malaysia-based front companies. Records show that these multiple overseas accounts allowed Glocom to continuously move funds between accounts it controlled in different banks and countries in the course of its illicit trade.

Figure XXVI
Accounts controlled by Glocom



174. Kim Chang Hyok, the representative of Glocom in Malaysia, held the sole signing authority for the accounts of the front companies he directed, International Golden Services and International Global System. In contrast to other cases reviewed by the Panel in which nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sought to conceal their links to the country on official documentation, the onboarding paperwork shows that the Malaysian bank was fully aware that these accounts were controlled by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Kim Chang Hyok declared himself to be a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, indicated that the country was also the source of the funds and that he intended to open a factory in Malaysia. These red flags were ignored in a manner similar to during the onboarding and customer due diligence process by the above-mentioned European financial institution for entering into a counterparty relationship with Korea Daesong Bank.

¹⁴⁰ Directed by the Pyongyang branch of Pan Systems Pte. Ltd. See [S/2017/742](#), paras. 52–53; and [S/2017/150](#), paras. 72–87 and 232–241.

175. Alongside the front company accounts he controlled, Kim Chang Hyok also maintained four personal accounts in a Malaysian bank. His day-to-day expenditure was conducted almost exclusively using his credit card, including frequent maximum daily cash withdrawals from ATMs. The cash withdrawals were split between his accounts, further limiting the bank's view of the nature of his activity.¹⁴¹ Periodic bulk cash injections or large in-house cheque deposits replenished the accounts.

176. Glocom's payments to suppliers and transfers around the network often made use of a particular pattern combining a variety of tactics commonly used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to evade financial sanctions.¹⁴² First, a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would make a bulk cash deposit into one of the Glocom accounts in Pyongyang.¹⁴³ This deposit would be reconciled by ledger with accounts controlled by Kim Chol Sam, the then-representative of the Daedong Credit Bank in China.¹⁴⁴ On the same or the next day, Kim Chol Sam would initiate a transfer to the intended recipient in Malaysia or Singapore for the same amount. To do so, actual funds would flow from the account where the deposit had been recorded to a Democratic People's Republic of Korea-controlled front company in Hong Kong, less transfer fees and a commission for middlemen. The front company would then in turn remit funds to the intended recipient. As a result, the receiving financial institution in Malaysia or Singapore would see only an incoming payment from the Hong Kong front company, rather than one from International Global System or Pan Systems — the actual holders of the accounts with the Daedong Credit Bank. The same is true of correspondent banks processing the transactions, including those in New York, which would have little insight into the origin or beneficiaries of the transaction. In addition to paying suppliers in this fashion, Glocom used the same method to move money within its own network, specifically between its front company accounts in Pyongyang and those in Malaysia. An example of such a transaction in which funds were moved internally within the Glocom network is shown in figure XXVII.

¹⁴¹ In a period of less than two years between 2013 and 2015, Kim Chang Hyok conducted 63 cash withdrawals from ATMs, totalling RM 88,000 (approximately \$21,000). The vast majority of these were of the maximum limit allowed. Withdrawals were often done in batches on the same day or on consecutive days. For example, over a two-day period in August 2014, he made eight withdrawals totalling RM 9,000 (approximately \$2,200).

¹⁴² As revealed in the Panel's 2017 midterm report, two Glocom front companies — International Global System and Pan Systems — held accounts with the Daedong Credit Bank. These accounts were serviced by the bank's then-representative in China, Kim Chol Sam, who used his own personal and front company accounts to perform transactions on behalf of the bank's Glocom-linked clients.

¹⁴³ Several of these deposits were made by Ryang Su Nyo, a member of the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a shareholder of International Global System, and a key agent in the Glocom network. Ryang was the signatory for Glocom's Daedong Credit Bank accounts and is known to have been instrumental in moving bulk cash related to Glocom's activities. She was caught exiting Malaysia with \$400,000 in mint United States dollar notes in 2014.

¹⁴⁴ China replied to the Panel that he returned to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 14 October 2016 and, as with other designated individuals, is blocked from entry to the country.

Figure XXVII
Payment from International Global System to a Singapore supplier





Figure XXVIII
Payment between Glocom front companies



177. The Panel recommends that the relevant Member States expel all bank representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from their territories and freeze all bank accounts and other assets owned by them, as well as any individuals and entities acting on behalf of Pan Systems or Glocom.

Foreign ties to the Ryugyong Commercial Bank and the Daedong Credit Bank

178. The Panel investigated three Singaporean companies, a Chinese individual and two Chinese entities for business ties to financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of paragraph 33 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#), paragraph 33 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) and paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#) regarding joint ventures, in addition to the sale of luxury goods. In the case of two of the Singaporean and Chinese companies and a national, the relationships also involved ownership interests in financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, part of a pattern identified by the Panel in its 2017 final and midterm reports.¹⁴⁵

Foreign company activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

179. The two main companies under investigation, OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd and T Specialist International (Singapore) Pte Ltd, share the same Singapore address and director, “Leo” Ng Kheng Wah (see annexes 49 and 55). OCN has been active in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 1995 and has exported goods to the country since at least 2006, in particular by supplying the Pyongyang Bugsae department stores with items for sale, including luxury goods (see para. 146 above). OCN has employed a Pyongyang office manager, Ri Ik (a.k.a. Li Ik), since 2004 (see annexes 56–57). He remains under contract with OCN at the time of writing, but has spent a significant amount of time in Singapore in recent years according to Singaporean travel records. In response to the Panel's enquiries, OCN's lawyers claimed that it “does not own any office space” in Pyongyang and that in late 2012, it “stopped the sale of goods into the DPRK”. According to their response, OCN's sister company, T Specialist, entered into a “contract for consulting and logistics services” on 1 January 2013 with Wang Zhi Guo (王志国, see annexes 50–54),¹⁴⁶ the director of the Hong Kong-registered Pinnacle International Distribution (HK) Company Ltd, according to which “goods would be shipped by us [T Specialist] to Dalian as the destination port for distribution in China”.

180. However, OCN-branded plastic shopping bags continued to be given to shoppers at the Pyongyang Bugsae stores until July of 2017 (see annexes 60–61). The addresses on the OCN bags also match the “OCN Pyongyang” address on a Ukrainian company's 2017 export documents (see annex 62).¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, T Specialist- and OCN-branded goods (solely owned and distributed by those companies) continued to be offered for sale in the Bugsae department stores in Pyongyang until as recently as July 2017 (see annexes 63–64). OCN's lawyers wrote to the Panel, “Our clients have no knowledge of the authenticity of the sale of goods in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as included in your letter and no knowledge of how any such goods ended up in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea”. However, the Panel has a

¹⁴⁵ See [S/2017/742](#), para. 54; and [S/2017/150](#), para. 228.

¹⁴⁶ A Singaporean namesake of the company, “Pinnacle International Pte. Ltd”, which existed from 1993 until 2009, was co-directed by both Wang Zhi Guo and Ng Kheng Wah (“Leo”), showing their close connection. Wang is also listed as a shareholder in Lagun Sari, along with Leo's two daughters, and is also listed as a director for OCN Shipping Hong Kong, with known links to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He used a Chinese address in the registration documents: No. 17 Jiangjia Hutong Li Gong Lou, Hedong District, Tianjin, China with the passport number 140254055. (see annexes 53–55). Wang Zhi Guo is a Singaporean permanent resident.

¹⁴⁷ OCN Pyongyang Office #01-05, Changgwang House, Ryenhwa-Dong, Central district, Pyongyang, D.P.R.Korea. Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM also lists an address in the Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24 (see annex 58). In a letter to the Panel, OCN's lawyers claimed that the OCN plastic bags ceased to be printed in or about 2012 but that they were “sold to Mr. Ri Ik, pursuant to his request” and that “after 2012, Mr. Ri Ik printed the OCN Plastic Bags without our Client's knowledge, elsewhere.”

2017 reply from an OCN/T Specialist employee to the request from a prospective client from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for a quote for the purchase of electronic items to be shipped to Rason, in which OCN agreed to provide a quotation for shipment of the items to China, showing clear knowledge of the end use of the items.

181. Further, regarding the continued employment of Ri Ik after the supposed termination of all OCN sales to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the company explained that “his assistance was required to ensure collectability of the accounts receivables from the arrears outstanding as of 2012 for goods sold”. No evidence for these claims was provided to the Panel despite its request.

Daedong Credit Bank

182. OCN’s lawyers claimed to the Panel that OCN “did not at all material times, and do not have any relationships with FTB, Jae-il Shinyong Unhaeng, First Credit Bank and Daedong Credit Bank (DCB)”. However, OCN was one of the first customers of the Daedong Credit Bank, opening an account in March 1997 and later changing the name to T Specialist. The account was managed primarily by OCN Pyongyang Office Manager Ri Ik. This account was used by both OCN and T Specialist starting in 2006 to transfer proceeds from items sold in the Bugsae Shop to T Specialist’s accounts at the Development Bank of Singapore in both euros and dollars, almost always in even amounts.

183. Between November 2011 and May 2014, transactions valued at more than \$5 million were made through that account to T Specialist as well as to another Singaporean company, SCN Singapore Pte Ltd for payment for goods sold at the OCN Pyongyang Bugsae Shop, as well as other expenditures. Of this, more than 25 transactions in even amounts ranging from \$100,000 to \$350,000 were made to a T Specialist account at the Development Bank of Singapore. T Specialist claimed to the Panel that these transfers were “remitted from Hongdae International Ltd (HK) and not any financial institution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” but the Panel has previously reported that Hongdae was established by the Daedong Credit Bank’s representative in Dalian, China, Kim Chol Sam (aka Jin Tiesan, 金铁三), in order to undertake financial transactions on behalf of the Daedong Credit Bank.¹⁴⁸ T Specialist claimed that the transfers were “for arrears in relation to amounts due and owing for goods sold” before October 2012, but declined to provide supporting documentation. The Panel also notes a transfer from Pan Systems, a company that the Panel has recommended for designation,¹⁴⁹ to T Specialist in July 2011 for 1,157.69 euros. This shows a link between these two Singaporean and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entities and networks.

184. With regard to more than 10 transactions ranging from \$70,000 to \$150,000 made through this account to the other Singaporean company, SCN Singapore Pte Ltd, at Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited Singapore, OCN’s lawyers stated, “SCN Singapore is not an entity related to our clients”. SCN has yet to reply to the Panel’s enquiries.

185. Further information obtained by the Panel indicates that repeated transfers in both euros and United States dollars were made to T Specialist from the account at the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation of the “Party Financial Management Department” for goods supplied to Changgwang Foreigners’ Dormitory as well as payments to Chinese companies for various consumer goods, payments for foreign

¹⁴⁸ See S/2017/150, paras. 228–230.

¹⁴⁹ See S/2017/742, paras. 52 and 62; S/2017/150, paras. 232–241.

vessel port fees, hotel bills and payments for “OCN construction investment” and cement. OCN/T Specialist claimed to have no knowledge of these transfers.

Ryugyong Commercial Bank and Koryo Commercial Bank

186. The Panel’s investigations also highlighted long-standing close ties between OCN/T Specialist and the Ryugyong Commercial Bank, including ownership ties. In 2012 and 2013, three transfers of \$499,970 each were made into a T Specialist account in Singapore by Wang Zhi Guo’s Pinnacle International in addition to a transfer from Mars Rock International for \$499,935 (totalling \$1,999,845). In addition to the provision of an ATM, these transactions were for the purchase of shares in the Ryugyong Commercial Bank, facilitated by Ri Ik. Not only were the transactions sent to T Specialist’s bank account but a Member State separately informed the Panel that OCN and the Koryo Commercial Bank formed a joint venture with the Ryugyong Commercial Bank. The Panel subsequently received information according to which T Specialist and the Koryo Commercial Bank formed a joint venture with the name Ryugyong Commercial Bank. OCN nevertheless denied to the Panel its interests in the Ryugyong Commercial Bank, stating, “it was never our [...] intent to be the beneficial owner or interested party in the purchase”. OCN further claimed that its role was limited to “assist[ing] in the translation between Ri lk and Wang” and that the shares in the Ryugyong Commercial Bank were being purchased from a Chinese company named TungHye.¹⁵⁰ OCN has not provided the Panel with the requested documentation supporting these claims and it is implausible that Ri Ik and Wang Zhi Guo would require translation assistance generally, and from OCN specifically, given their combined extensive international work, travel and residence experiences. Indeed, over the past four years, Wang Zhi Guo made 25 trips in and out of Singapore, spending 1,256 days in the country, and Ri Ik made more than 37 trips, with 518 days in Singapore (see annexes 51 and 57). T Specialist also admitted that it had undertaken correspondence between 2012 and 2014 with Ri Ho Nam,¹⁵¹ Ryugyong Commercial Bank’s general manager and representative in Beijing since at least 2014, and Ri Jong Ui, Koryo Commercial Bank’s representative, for the Ryugyong Commercial Bank purchase deal. None of this correspondence was provided when requested.

187. The ties between the Ryugyong Commercial Bank and OCN in Pyongyang are further demonstrated by the installation of an ATM in a Ryugyong Commercial Bank in Spring 2017 at the Bugsae Shop, followed by a promotion in 2017 in which Ryugyong Commercial Bank customers who deposited more than \$10,000 dollars for at least a year received a “VIP” Gold or Silver Card and a 5 per cent discount at the Bugsae Shop and the Pothonggang Ryugyong Store (see annex 59).

188. These cases show a continued pattern of joint ownership of financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by foreign entities and individuals, directly supporting illicit activity by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through access to the international financial and trade systems. They demonstrate how financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea evade sanctions through overseas representatives and front companies to ensure that transactions are conducted in such a manner as to not reveal an overt connection to a designated entity or interest of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Hong Kong-registered front companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducting transactions through Chinese and Singaporean banks may not trigger alerts, showing that banks that cater more to offshore financial centre customers should ensure adequate know-your-customer and customer due diligence monitoring, as well as proper transaction

¹⁵⁰ In Mandarin, the name could be rendered as Tungha, Tunghai or Donghai.

¹⁵¹ Ri Ho Nam (DOB: 3 January 1967) has been serving as the Beijing representative of Ryugyong Commercial Bank since November 2014. For more information, see annex 43.

monitoring and screening. These checks should have raised red flags over the frequent transfers of large and even amounts over time from a company whose jurisdiction has shown a pattern registering front companies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Regarding business registry practices, this case also shows the well-known evasion technique used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of having individuals of the country represent themselves as nationals of the Republic of Korea in corporate registry paperwork (seen also in the MKP case referred to in para. 199 below). In compliance with the financial provisions of the resolutions, the Panel recommends that relevant Member States take all necessary measures to implement paragraph 33 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#), paragraph 33 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) and paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#), including by ensuring that all assets of entities acting on behalf of designated entities are frozen, that all representatives of banks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are expelled and the assets of those designated are frozen and that joint ventures with entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are terminated.

Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies

189. The Panel continued its investigation into the MKP headquarters in Malaysia as well as the network of its affiliated firms both in Malaysia and around the world. These investigations have so far revealed evasion and breaches of a wide array of sanctions provisions as follows:

- (a) The involvement of a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (and Reconnaissance General Bureau operative), Han Hun Il, in the establishment and operation of numerous companies within the MKP Group of Companies¹⁵² constitutes a violation of the prohibition on joint ventures;
- (b) The company's links to designated entities, including Mansudae Overseas Projects, the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Ocean Maritime Management Company;¹⁵³
- (c) Links between MKP and financial institutions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the designated Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation¹⁵⁴ and possibly the International Consortium Bank in Pyongyang;
- (d) Use of diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in business facilitation;
- (e) Potential violations of the prohibition on the provision of public or private support for trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (f) Involvement in the provision of security services;
- (g) Use by MKP of aliases and trading names that obscure the company's identity; its reliance on a semi-devolved corporate model when operating outside of Malaysia; and its use of foreign facilitators as country directors to create plausible deniability of the control relationship between Han Hun Il and the Reconnaissance General Bureau and MKP-linked companies.

¹⁵² Han established a Mansudae branch in Singapore, M.O.P. (S) Pte. Ltd., on 20 May 1994, which was struck on 30 September 2009 (see annex 68).

¹⁵³ See [S/2017/150](#), annexes 14–9 and 15–3; and [S/2017/742](#), para. 57.

¹⁵⁴ See [S/2017/742](#), para. 57.

*Background and role of the national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Han Hun Il*


190. According to a Member State, Han Hun Il, a.k.a. Edward Han (see annex 65), was dispatched to Malaysia in 1995 as a representative of the Mansudae Overseas Project before establishing the MKP Group of Companies jointly with the Malaysian national, Yong Kok Yeap, in 1996. According to a Member State, when Han's tenure abroad was set to expire in 2006, the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed to extend permission for him to remain abroad as a Reconnaissance General Bureau "operative".¹⁵⁵ MKP has, at one time or another, operated at least 13 companies in Malaysia, of which 10 were still listed as "existing" in corporate registries as at 15 December 2017 (see annexes 66–67). Han Hun Il remains a director of seven of these companies, although MKP indicated to the Panel that it intends to remove him. Regarding his geographic location, MKP informed the Panel on 4 October 2017 that "Edward Han is now not in Malaysia", yet declined to provide information on his travel, work visas or copies of passports. A Member State informed the Panel that Han Hun Il had travelled to other South-East Asian countries in 2016, including the Lao People's Democratic Republic in October. At the time of writing, the Lao People's Democratic Republic had not responded to the Panel's enquiry.

MKP global operations

191. MKP has developed an extensive and sophisticated network spanning several continents and multiple industry sectors, including information technology, construction, mining, coal trading, security, transport and construction, with at least 15 affiliated companies in four countries. The Panel was able to document many of the company's activities in Africa and Hong Kong, but not those publicly claimed by MKP on its various websites, which include 18 African countries, 6 Middle Eastern States and a range of countries representing all regions of the world (see annex 69). Details of linkages investigated by the Panel between MKP-affiliated entities and individuals is available in figure XXIX.

¹⁵⁵ According to a Member State, when his tenure abroad was set to expire in 2006, Han Hun Il bribed officials at the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to extend permission for him to remain abroad, after which he was given the status of "operative" in the RGB. His son, Han Kum-Ryong, a.k.a. "Han Song" or "Harvard Han", joined the National Defense Commission in 2010 and worked for MKP in Myanmar until 2013.

Figure XXIX
MKP global operations



192. Corporate registry documents for MKP overseas affiliates indicate that the firm and its directors have devolved some control over those entities, while preserving the use of the MKP brand.¹⁵⁶ These ownership and control patterns indicate that MKP foreign national partners are given discretion to determine where, how and with whom MKP deals.¹⁵⁷ In Zambia, where MKP has at least 12 affiliate firms, an Algerian national, Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, has played the central organizational role, while a small number of Zambian nationals have served as directors (see annexes 80–85). While Zambia has not yet replied to the Panel’s letters, in the reply by MKP of 4 October 2017, Yong Kok Yeap claimed that “MKP (Zambia) and the Zambian operations were/are run by Yazid Merzouk independently of MKP in Malaysia”. Yet, Yazid Merzouk appears extensively in MKP marketing materials as well as in Zambian corporate paperwork alongside several directors of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including for MKP Holdings and MKP TMS Hospital (see annexes 74–78 and 80–81). He is also a majority owner of MKP Irehab in Zambia, which Yong Kok Yeap acknowledges “is affiliated” with MKP Malaysia (see annex 84).

¹⁵⁶ Outside of Malaysia, Yong Kok Yeap and Han Hun Il appear on corporate paperwork with decreasing frequency.

¹⁵⁷ The brand reliance of MKP in its affiliated companies is noteworthy when contrasted with other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea networks, which tend to use an array of different names for front companies. This brand dependency is apparent even in the case of MKP South Africa, which ruptured its relationship with MKP Malaysia, but nevertheless decided to continue to use the MKP name. It does not appear to have incurred any negative reputational repercussions for this branding choice.

MKP links to financial institutions

193. In 2011, MKP purchased a stake in Commercial Capital Corporation Limited, a bank in Zambia.¹⁵⁸ According to Yong Kok Yeap, “MKP (Zambia) had a minority shareholding (about 10-20 per cent) in Commercial Capital Corporation Limited. While Yong claims that Commercial Capital Corporation Limited has since shut down, corporate registry documentation suggests that the company remains active (see annex 85).¹⁵⁹ The MKP website also advertises its involvement with the Pyongyang-based International Consortium Bank. MKP now denies any involvement with that institution and claims that any evidence suggesting it, including its own advertisements for the institution on its official website, is fabricated. These claims contradict available open-source evidence (see annex 86). Information for Hi-Fund International Bank, which MKP acknowledges is an alias for the International Consortium Bank, has been present on the MKP website since at least 2009 under “services”. The Panel also notes an indirect link between MKP and the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation through the purchase of coal from the Democratic People’s Republic in Korea in Malaysia.¹⁶⁰

194. By his own admission, Yong Kok Yeap directs EKB Building Limitada in Angola alongside Angola’s former Deputy Attorney General. Lloyd Chingambo, a shareholder and financier of MKP-Lloyd’s in Zambia, is the Chairman of Zambia’s National Economic Advisory Council and sits on the board of major national banks (see annex 83). An MKP Security Systems Zambia shareholder is the former Minister of Defence of the country. Such relationships help to create new business opportunities, generate sources of financing and facilitate wider access to local decision-makers while also potentially deterring host governments from taking enforcement action.¹⁶¹

Case study of an MKP overseas operation

195. The way in which MKP established an office in South Africa demonstrates some of the methods it uses to set up overseas operations, including reliance on embassy officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to make introductions and facilitate relationships and the use of falsified documents to fulfil partners’ due diligence requirements. In this case, the latter of these practices led the South African partner of MKP, Mr. X, to break off all relations with MKP Malaysia.

196. Han Hun II and Yong Kok Yeap were introduced to the local partner, Mr. X, in Johannesburg in 2008 by the Ambassador of the Democratic People’s Republic of

¹⁵⁸ Contrary to this assertion, Yazid Merzouk has claimed that MKP has been involved in “financing” in Zambia since 2008. See Lam Seng Fatt, “Healing touch of Malaysian firm”, Star Online, 31 July 2008. Available from www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2008/07/31/healing-touch-of-malaysian-firm/#zD4XqZ7kt2CKIEMw.99.

¹⁵⁹ Yazid Merzouk is not a current director or shareholder. This may be a product of the recent lawsuit between Merzouk and Commercial Capital Corporation Limited, which reached the Supreme Court in 2014 (see annex 79). Samson Sakala, a director of MKP Security Systems Zambia (see annex 84), however, does control a sizable portion of Commercial Capital Corporation Limited shares. The MKP website, specifically its finance section, also advertises a money remittance service called “Cash4Africa”. In response to enquiries about the service, Yong Kok Yeap stated, “this is not a bank or a finance entity, but a product of CCCL. It is a product providing services similar to, say, Western Union”. The Panel’s investigations concluded that Cash4Africa is currently defunct.

¹⁶⁰ See S/2017/742, para. 57.

¹⁶¹ At the same time, MKP has also created individual companies that tend to be ‘single-use’ — created specifically in order to facilitate a particular large contract or to roll out a new product/service line in partnership with a local firm. “Heritage MKP Builders” in Nigeria, which was created mainly to build the Heritage City Park, is an example. This model could also help to contain the impact of any enforcement action to a small corner of a very dispersed network.

Korea to South Africa and the commercial trade attaché, Han Hun Il and Yong Kok Yeap presented themselves as businessmen in the construction industry and invited Mr. X to MKP offices in Kuala Lumpur that year, where he was made Chief Executive Officer of MKP Builders and offered 50 per cent of all future profits. The “partnership” signed on 17 September 2009 gave him the mandate to execute business and “forward” project contracts to MKP Malaysia, which would serve as the construction and financing company.

197. When Mr. X requested full audited company financial statements and an advance payment guarantee from Han Hun Il and Yong Kok Yeap, MKP sent him the financial statement of a Hong Kong-based company with which MKP had close relations, WLS Holdings Limited (HK), and a scanned bank guarantee from a major Malaysian bank of \$5 million dated 28 July 2010. Unable to confirm the guarantee, Mr. X travelled to Malaysia along with a client from Rwanda to verify the authenticity of the guarantee at the bank’s headquarters. Interactions with the bank indicated that the documents had been falsified. As a result, Mr. X severed all ties with MKP Malaysia but continued to use the company name (with no apparent reputational costs).

198. The Ugandan and Zambian branches of MKP have undertaken numerous construction projects, many of which are linked to government financing (see annexes 91–92). MKP’s letter to the Panel directly referenced construction or artist contracts in Angola, Malaysia, Uganda and Zambia. Uganda awarded several contracts to MKP and, as recently as in September 2017, was soliciting \$200 million in investment for a “MKP Holdings Ltd”¹⁶² project at the Moroto Marble Mine in Kasimeri-Moroto municipality (see annex 93). Uganda has not responded to the Panel’s enquiries. The Panel reiterates that Member States are prohibited from providing public or private financing for trade activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

199. In addition to its mining activities, MKP also owns and operates at least three companies in Uganda: “MKP Capital Bernard Co. Limited”, “MKP Builders San Bhd” and “NH-MKP Builders Ltd” (see annexes 88–89). Corporate records show that MKP Capital’s ownership is split between two Ugandan individuals; and “Edward Han” and “Young Kyong Kin” are listed on the paperwork only as “Korean”. MKP Builders San Bhd is likely a branch of one of MKP’s Malaysian companies by the same name, owned by Han Hun Il and Yong Kok Yeap. Furthermore, both MKP Capital and MKP Builders trade in Uganda under the name of “Vidas Engineering Services Company Limited”, registered as a separate entity in Uganda. Vidas has received at least four contracts (one complete, three in progress) from the Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment to develop the water and sanitation systems in Ugandan cities (see annexes 91–92), projects that have received funding from international development agencies, which might constitute a violation of the prohibition on the provision of public or private support for trade with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Furthermore, regarding a 2011 project that the Government of Uganda awarded MKP to build housing units, local media reported that MKP took approximately \$5.2 million in advance payment and then abandoned the project.¹⁶³

200. The Panel investigated the activities of Omega MKP Security Systems Zambia, which provides private security services in the country. Omega stated to the Panel that the relationship was established after the director of MKP Security Systems Zambia approached it with a proposal to set up a joint venture. This director stated

¹⁶² A company named “MKP Holdings Ltd” is part of the MKP Group of Companies in Malaysia. No entity by this name is registered in Uganda. Ugandan official advertisements for the mining project also note that the prospecting work at the mine was done by a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea entity in the 1990s.

¹⁶³ Edris Kiggundu, “Police clears Migereko over Naalya project,” *The Observer*, 27 October 2014.

that the company was seeking a strategic partner who could “fund and equip” it for security-related activities, particularly in relation to a project in which MKP Security Systems had been involved with the Government of Zambia to remotely monitor and secure the borders.

201. According to Omega, it agreed to establish a new company with the directors of MKP Security Systems serving in their personal capacities. Omega also stated that it met Yazid Merzouk only once in 2013. The Panel notes that a photo appearing to show senior Omega staff with Yazid Merzouk has been on the MKP website since at least 3 January 2012 (see annexes 94–97).

202. In its response to the Panel, MKP Malaysia characterized the relationship differently, noting that Omega MKP is a “joint venture with Omega” and asserting that Yazid Merzouk manages these activities in Zambia. Discrepancies between the accounts of these parties point to the utility of the semi-devolved and personality-driven corporate structure of MKP in reducing transparency and creating plausible deniability regarding the involvement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in, and/or benefit from, any part of the business.

Diplomatic property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used for commercial purposes

203. The Panel investigated the leasing of embassy property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for uses other than diplomatic or consular activities in Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Romania and Pakistan as violations of paragraph 18 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#). The Panel notes that continued use of property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for purposes prohibited by the resolution constitutes a violation, whether or not the relevant embassies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are compensated for use of the leased space.

Bulgaria

204. Two Bulgarian entities, “Terra” and “Technologica”, rent property belonging to the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Sofia. In February 2017, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and these companies about the restrictions under resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) and called upon them to cease any relevant activities and vacate the premises (see annex 98). The Bulgarian authorities confirmed to the Panel that no payments had been made by the companies to the Embassy’s only bank account in Bulgaria since the beginning of 2017. At the time of writing, the Terra Group’s “Terra Residence” was still publicly advertising the rental of the former residence of the Ambassador of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 99).

205. Technologica indicated to the Panel that in exchange for renovation, it would be given the free use of the building for 40 months, of which 6 months still remained. The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Panel that the situation was further complicated because of a bilateral agreement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea involving reciprocal use by Bulgaria of property belonging to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Pyongyang. The Panel notes that the continued use of property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for commercial activities constitutes a violation by Bulgaria of paragraph 18 of resolution [2321 \(2016\)](#) regardless of whether it is done for any specific companies as business compensation for existing contracts or economic losses.

Germany

206. With regard to the rental of Embassy premises of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Berlin by EGI GmbH (for City Hostel Berlin) for 38,000 euros per month¹⁶⁴ and ForX Festival for the banquet hall, following the adoption of European Union Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 of 27 February 2017 incorporating paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016),¹⁶⁵ the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 16 March 2017 urging it to abide by paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution 2321 (2016). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea responded on 21 March 2017 by denying the validity and legitimacy of resolution 2321 (2016) and all acts based upon it. On 7 April 2017, the Government of Germany informed the individuals leasing the premises of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of their obligations under resolution 2321 (2106) and the European Union implementing regulations. Germany also amended its Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance on 4 May 2017 to make the leasing of property from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea an administrative offence in the country. Simultaneously, it increased its diplomatic pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, continuing to stress the Embassy's obligation to cease using its property for non-diplomatic purposes and urged it on numerous occasions at all levels to abide by the applicable resolution. As a result, on 10 August 2017, the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea terminated the leases with the two companies, requesting them to vacate the premises by 30 September 2017. However, both companies rejected the termination of their leases and have threatened legal action. On 6 November 2017, the Central Customs Authority formally opened legal proceedings against the companies engaging in illicit activities under the above-mentioned legislation.

Poland

207. The Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Warsaw is currently occupied by at least nine companies, most of which are involved in media, advertising, real estate and medicine (see annex 100). Others also occupy the space and act as brokers between the companies and the Embassy in renting it out. Poland informed the Panel that it first sent a diplomatic note regarding unlawful use of the property to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in February 2017, to which the latter responded that the space was not used for commercial purposes but to maintain the premises. Poland sent another note in November 2017 requesting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return any premises used for non-diplomatic purposes in accordance with the 1966 bilateral agreement between the two countries, but has not yet heard back (see annex 101). Only in October 2017 did Poland instruct the companies to relocate. On 15 January 2018, Poland informed the Panel that eight companies had terminated their leases, with another soon to do so. Poland also informed the Panel that it had instructed its corporate registry not to register any more entities at the Embassy's address. Dreamsound Sp. z o. o. indicated to the Panel that it was subletting Embassy space from Digital Beast Estate Sp. z o. o.

¹⁶⁴ See S/2017/742, para. 58.

¹⁶⁵ According to para. 18 of resolution 2321 (2016), Member States shall prohibit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from using real property for any purpose other than diplomatic activities. The European Union went beyond this in article 31 b (2) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849, in which it is stipulated: "It shall also be prohibited to lease from the DPRK real property which is situated outside the territory of the DPRK". To implement this decision, Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 was amended to include article 4e, para. 1 (b), in which it is stipulated: "It shall be prohibited to: (...) (b) lease real property, directly or indirectly, from persons, entities or bodies of the Government of North Korea". This provision is directly applicable to all European Union member States.

The Panel notes that at the time of writing, Digital Beast Estate Sp. z o. o. was still advertising the rental of Embassy space (see annex 102).

Romania

208. Romania informed the Panel that Embassy property of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Bucharest had been leased by two companies since 2001 and 2011, respectively, which further sublet the property to at least 27 other persons and entities. One company, which had been paying \$46,000 in monthly rent (not including expenses), informed the Panel that it had ceased payments to the Embassy on 10 April and, by December 2017, had moved out of the premises along with three other companies that had sublet the space from it.

209. Romania informed the Panel that IMA Partners SRL had also ceased all payments to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from 21 March 2017 but that the lease and the sublet agreements had not been terminated.¹⁶⁶

Pakistan

210. The Panel was informed by a Member State that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had used property in Pakistan that it owned or leased for purposes other than diplomatic or consular activities. In that regard, the Panel wrote several letters to Pakistan but has yet to receive a reply. In addition, the Panel is investigating the use of diplomatic premises of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the smuggling of alcohol.¹⁶⁷

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The Panel reiterates its recommendations in previous reports for the designation of Pan Systems.¹⁶⁸ The Panel further recommends the designation of the following individuals and entities: Han Hun Il (Edward Han), Ri Ho Nam, Ri Ik (Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo, Pak In Su, Kim Chang-Hyok and Kim Su-Gwang, as well as International Global System and International Golden Services.

Recommendation 2

The Panel recommends that Member States, as part of their implementation of the financial provisions of the resolutions, ensure that their financial institutions implement a risk-based approach to identifying sanctions violations in their “know-your-customer” and compliance programmes, including by ensuring more robust scrutiny at the onboarding, transaction monitoring and account review phases. To that end, Member States should provide their financial institutions with more detailed and regular information on sanctions evasion risks.

Recommendation 3

The Panel recommends that Member States include all Embassy personnel within the scope of paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016) and ensure that

¹⁶⁶ The Panel also notes that the lease extension between IMA Partners SRL and the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was signed on 13 February 2017, i.e. following the adoption of resolution 2321 (2016) (see annex 103).

¹⁶⁷ Drazen Jorgic, “In Pakistan, North Korean diplomat’s alcohol stash raises bootlegging suspicions”, Reuters, 8 November 2017.

¹⁶⁸ See S/2017/742, para. 62.

diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in the names of family members or front companies, and that they verify that bank accounts are closed when a diplomat ends his or her tour in the country.

Recommendation 4

Given the pervasive use of front companies to evade financial sanctions, Member States should ensure that their domestic corporate service providers implement effective due diligence measures to capture detailed and accurate information on clients and beneficial owners and file suspicious action reports in the case of arrangements suspected of being used for illicit purposes.

Recommendation 5

Member States should take measures to ensure that financial sector supervisors subject to their jurisdiction prioritize guidance, supervision and enforcement of controls that support the implementation of the resolutions.

Recommendation 6

Member States with appropriate knowledge and experience should offer technical assistance to other Member States seeking assistance with their legal frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the resolutions.

Recommendation 7

The Panel recommends that Member States, in addition to ensuring an appropriate legislative framework for combating proliferation financing, require the establishment of robust information-sharing mechanisms among financial supervisors, financial intelligence units, customs and strategic trade control authorities, border control and security and intelligence agencies, and with the private sector.

Recommendation 8

The Panel recommends that the relevant countries take the necessary measures to ensure that all non-diplomatic activities taking place on Embassy property of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as prohibited by paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) are terminated and all related leases are cancelled.

VI. Unintended impact of sanctions

211. The Panel noted that in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 3 August 2017, it was stated that the adoption of Security Council resolution 2270 (2016) and sanctions towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had had an unintended negative impact on the humanitarian operations of the United Nations and other actors, including notably on the transfer of funds through financial institutions into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, leading to delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the suspension of some programmatic activities (A/72/279, para. 70).

212. The Committee issued a press release on 8 December 2017 (SC/13113)¹⁶⁹ in order to dispel any potential misunderstandings regarding the Security Council sanctions regime on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to better facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the country. The Committee called upon Member States to clarify to public and private sector entities within their jurisdictions in order to raise awareness regarding the humanitarian exemptions contained in the resolutions, as well as the need to avoid unduly restricting the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

213. The Panel therefore recommends that Member States report, as part of their national reporting to the Committee, on the incorporation of the humanitarian exemptions contained in the resolutions into their domestic legislation.

¹⁶⁹ United Nations, “Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Underlines Humanitarian Exemptions Pursuant to Paragraph 26 of Security Council Resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#)”, press release SC/13113, 8 December 2017. Available from www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13113.doc.htm.

Annex 1: Letter of notification from Microsoft identifying compromised accounts



November 20, 2017

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
UN Headquarters
New York, New York 10017

Re: Letter dated 7 November 2017

Dear Mr. Griffiths:

We are in receipt of your letter dated 7 November, 2017 requesting information in support of your efforts to better understand the attacks against [REDACTED] members of the Panel of Experts (Panel).

[REDACTED] Microsoft notified [REDACTED] compromised accounts we had identified within the UN's Office 365 service.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Microsoft's response is set forth below.

[REDACTED]
attack,
[REDACTED] your views on a possible source of the

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
the threat actor group we associate the attack
with is nation-state associated. That information remains consistent as of this writing.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Microsoft appreciates this opportunity to assist in your investigation. If you have additional questions,
please do not hesitate to contact me.



Microsoft

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink that appears to read "Tom Burt".

Tom Burt
Vice President, Deputy General Counsel, Digital Trust
Microsoft Corporation

Annex 2: UN Incident report: Compromise of email accounts

Incident report: Compromise of email accounts

This report documents the findings and analysis related to the incident affecting email accounts of members of the DPRK panel.

Executive summary

The analysis of the incident revealed that [REDACTED] email accounts of current and former members of the panel of experts had been compromised since July 2016. An unauthorised third party had accessed these email accounts remotely over extended periods of time.

It was further established that [REDACTED] email messages had been forwarded to external email addresses.

The method by which the accounts had been compromised, i.e. how the passwords have become known to the adversary, remains unknown.

[REDACTED] The subsequent attacks can be linked to an earlier incident in May 2017 and demonstrate the persistent nature of the attacks, and the level of determination by the adversary.

[REDACTED] revealed that a third party had been accessing [REDACTED] mailboxes remotely, and that a considerable number of email messages had been forwarded to external accounts that were presumably created for this specific purpose.

[REDACTED] briefed DPA on 25 October, and the panel on 26 October.

[REDACTED]

■ Since the forwarded messages are believed to include communications from the security council committee, DPA requested to brief the committee; the briefing was provided on 30 October.


[REDACTED]

The incident resulted in the compromise of four email accounts of current or former members of the DPRK panel.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



As can be seen there are significant communalities between the different incidents over an extended period, which demonstrate that they form a persistent and sophisticated attack by a professionally operating adversary. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] observed, and members of the panel as well as staff members from DPA reported a significant increase in targeted "spear phishing attacks".

The attacks use forged email messages that contain [REDACTED] files as attachments that are based on legitimate documents that were either accessed by or forwarded to the adversary. Some of these messages were sent through the same infrastructure used in an earlier attack against the panel in May

2017, clearly linking the individual incidents to a common source. One example of such an attack is depicted in figure 3 below.




Figure 2: Remote access and forwarding






Figure 3: Subsequent attacks and link to prior incident



8/8

Source: United Nations

Annex 3: Image of Ri Ji U (aka “James”)



Source: YouTube

Annex 3-1: Report on the DPRK patent application on the production of Sodium Cyanide

(12) International Application Status Report

Received at International Bureau: 14 February 2016 (14.02.2016)

Information valid as of: 18 November 2016 (18.11.2016)

Report generated on: 11 May 2017 (11.05.2017)

(10) Publication number:
WO2016/199944

(43) Publication date:
15 December 2016 (15.12.2016)

(26) Publication language:
English (EN)

(21) Application Number:
PCT/KP2015/000039

(22) Filing Date:
01 November 2015 (01.11.2015)

(25) Filing language:
English (EN)

(31) Priority number(s):
2015 10002015 (KP)

(31) Priority date(s):
09 June 2015 (09.06.2015)

(31) Priority status:
Priority document received (in compliance with PCT Rule 17.1)

(51) International Patent Classification:
C01C 3/10 (2006.01)

(71) Applicant(s):

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(72) Inventor(s):

RI, Chol Min; 66, Mirim-dong Sadong District Pyongyang (KP)
YUN, Jae Ho; 78 Ryungyong-dong No 2 Potongyang District Pyongyang (KP)
KIM, Yong Hae; 64, Ryonghung-dong No 1 Daesong District Pyongyang (KP)
HWANG Suk Yong; 54, Sinwon-dong Potonggang District Pyongyang (KP)

(74) Agent(s):

JO Song Chol; Taedonggang Patent & Trademark Law Office P.O Box 777 Kaeson-dong, Moranbong District Pyongyang (KP)

(54) Title (EN): PROCESS FOR PRODUCTION OF SODIUM CYANIDE

(54) Title (FR): PROCÉDÉ POUR LA PRODUCTION DE CYANURE DE SODIUM

(57) Abstract:

(EN): A process for the production of sodium cyanide with urea and sodium carbonate as main raw materials comprises: a) step for blending raw materials; b) step for first-order reaction; c) step for second-order reaction; d) step for centrifugal atomization; e) step for agitating and dissolving; f) step for precipitating and filtering; g) step for vacuum distillation; and h) step for centrifugal separating and drying. High purity (above 98%) of sodium cyanide finished product may be obtained.

(FR): L'invention concerne un procédé pour la production de cyanure de sodium avec de l'urée et du carbonate de sodium en tant que matières premières principales, comprenant : a) une étape de mélange de matières premières ; b) un étage de réaction de premier ordre ; c) une étape de réaction de deuxième ordre ; d) une étape d'atomisation par centrifugation ; e) une étape d'agitation et de dissolution ; f) une étape de précipitation et de filtration ; g) une étape de distillation sous vide ; et h) une étape de séparation et de séchage par centrifugation. Une pureté élevée (supérieure à 98 %) du cyanure de sodium en tant que produit fini peut être obtenue.

Source: The Panel

Annex 3-2: Mansudae Art Studio patent application

LIST OF ALL PATENT APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY WIPO FROM THE DPRK SINCE OCTOBER 2006

(A) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS FILED AT THE INVENTION OFFICE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (35)

PCT/KP2007/000010 – International filing date: 15 Jul 2007; Published: 24 Jan 2008
 A DIE ASSEMBLY AND A METHOD OF MAKING IT
 ISA: AT; link: <https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/detail.jsf?docId=08/010614>
 Agent: RI, Myong Hwa, Nansanjae Patent & Trademark Agents, Grand People's Study House, P.O.
 Box 200, Pyongyang, KP
 Applicant and Inventor: CHOE, Sung Gi (KP/KP), 8, Sonkyo-Dong No.1, Sonkyo District, Pyongyang,
 KP

PCT/KP2007/000011 – International filing date: 23 Nov 2007; Published: 29 May 2008
 A METHOD FOR CREATING POSOKHWA PAINTING WITH FAST COLOR MATERIAL AND ITS
 DRAWING MEANS
 ISA: AT; link: <https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/detail.jsf?docId=08/062912>
 Agent: CHOE Yong Suk, Chonggyechon Patent & Trademark Agency, Chonggye-dong, Ryongsong
 District, P.O Box 303, Pyongyang, KP
 Applicant: MANSUDEA ART STUDIO (KP/KP), 38 Jongpyong-dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang,
 KP
 Applicant and Inventor: SIN Bong Hwa (KP/KP), 77 Saemaul-dong No.1, Pyongchon District,
 Pyongyang, KP

PCT/KP2008/000012 – International filing date: 21 Jan 2008; Published: 27 Nov 2008
 COMPOSITION CONTAINING CHLORELLA AND HERBAL EXTRACTS
 ISA: AT; link: <https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/detail.jsf?docId=08/143365>
 Agent: YO, Chung Il, Moronbong Patent & Trademark Agency, P.O. Box 43, Wasan-Dong,
 Podunamu St., Sosong District, Pyongyang, KP
 Applicant and Inventor: RIM, Sin Yong (KP/KP), 85 Uiam-Dong, Daedonggang District, Pyongyang,
 KP

PCT/KP2008/000013 – International filing date: 28 Mar 2008; Withdrawn before publication: 20
 May 2008
 METHOD OF MANUFACTURING HEATHCARE WATER BY THE COMBINATION OF OZONE AND
 KUMGANG MEDICAL STONE
 ISA: AT
 Agent: CHOE, Un Hui, OUN PATENT OFFICE, Ryonghung-Dong No.1, Taesong District, P.O. Box
 33, Pyongyang, KP
 Applicant and Inventor: OM, Chol Jin (KP/KP), Tongmun-Dong No.1, Taedonggang District,
 Pyongyang, KP
 Applicant and Inventor: CHOE, Mee Hyang (KP/KP), Tongmun-Dong No.1, Taedonggang District,
 Pyongyang, KP
 Applicant and Inventor: CHOE, Hye Yong (KP/KP), Tongmun-Dong No.1, Taedonggang District,
 Pyongyang, KP

PCT/KP2008/000014 – International filing date: 23 Apr 2008; Published: 30 Oct 2008
 OVERLOAD ADAPTIVE AND NON-STEP CONTROLLABLE WINCH
 ISA: AT; link: <https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/detail.jsf?docId=08/130062>
 Agent: KIM, Myong Nam, Cholsan Patent & Trademark Agency, P.O. Box 62, Central District,
 Pyongyang, KP
 Applicant and Inventor: TAE, Nung Jun (KP/KP), 2, Chongsong-Dong No.3, Pohang District, Chongjin
 City, North Hamgyong Province, KP
 Inventor: TAE, Yong Il, 2, Chongsong-Dong No.3, Pohang District, Chongjin City, North Hamgyong
 Province, KP
 Inventor: KIM, Yong Chol, 19, Sunam-Dong No.1, Sunam District, Chongjin City, North Hamgyong
 Province, KP

Annex 4: HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371(2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017)

Table 1: HS codes for Sectoral Bans on imports from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Coal	2701	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of res 2371 (2017)
Iron Ore	2601	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
Iron	Chapter 72	Iron and steel products (7201-7229)	
Iron and Steel products	Chapter 73	Iron and steel products (7301-7326)	
Gold	261690	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of res 2270 (2016)
	7108	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	710811	Gold Powder, Unwrought	
	710812	Gold in Other Unwrought Forms	
	710813	Gold in Other Semi-manufactured Forms	
	710820	Monetary Gold	
Titanium	2614	Titanium ores and concentrates	
Vanadium	2615	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	2612	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [261210 and 261220]	
	2617	ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code 261790 - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	2844	radioactive chemical elements & isotopes etc.	
Copper	Chapter 74	Copper and articles thereof (7401-7419)	Para. 28 of res 2321 (2016)
	2603	Copper ores and concentrates	
Zinc	Chapter 79	Zinc and articles thereof (7901-7907)	
	2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	Chapter 75	Nickel and articles thereof (7501-7508)	
	2604	Nickel ores and concentrates	
Silver	2616100	Silver ores and concentrates	
	7106, 7107	Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	7114	articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
Seafood (incl fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	Chapter 3	Fish and Crustaceans, Molluscs and other Aquatic Invertebrates (0301-0308)	Para. 9 of res 2371 (2017)
	1603	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	1604	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	1605	Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
Lead	Chapter 78	Lead and articles thereof (7801-7806)	

Lead ore	2607	Lead ores and concentrates	Para. 10 of res 2371 (2017)
Condensates and natural gas liquids	2709	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of res 2375 (2017)
	2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
Refined petroleum products	2710	Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not crude ; preparations n.e.c, containing by weight 70% or more of petroleum oils or oils from bituminous minerals; these being the basic constituents of the preparations; waste oils	Para. 14 of res 2375 (2017)
	2712	Petroleum jelly; paraffin wax, micro-crystalline petroleum wax, slack wax, ozokerite, lignite wax, peat wax, other mineral waxes, similar products obtained by synthesis, other processes; coloured or not.	
	2713	Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen; other residues of petroleum oils or oils obtained from bituminous minerals.	
Crude Oil	2709	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude	Para. 15 of res 2375 (2017)
Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	Chapters 50-63		Para. 16 of res 2375 (2017)
	50	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	51	Wool And Fine Or Coarse Animal Hair, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof; Horsehair Yarn And Woven Fabric	
	52	Cotton, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof	
	53	Vegetable Textile Fibers Nesoi; Yarns And Woven Fabrics Of Vegetable Textile Fibers Nesoi And Paper	
	54	Manmade Filaments, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof	
	55	Manmade Staple Fibers, Including Yarns And Woven Fabrics Thereof	
	56	Wadding, Felt And Nonwovens; Special Yarns; Twine, Cordage, Ropes And Cables And Articles Thereof	
	57	Carpets And Other Textile Floor Covering	
	58	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	59	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	61	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	62	Apparel and clothing accessories; <i>not</i> knitted or crocheted;	
	63	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
Agricultural products	07	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of res. 2397 (2017)
	08	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	

	12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
Machinery	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of res. 2397 (2017)
Electrical equipment	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia	25	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
Wood	44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
Vessels	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	

Table 2: HS Codes for Sectoral Bans on exports to the DPRK according to paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017)

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Industrial Machinery	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Transportation vehicles	86	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	
Iron, steel and other metals	Chapters 72-83		Para. 7 of res. 2397 (2017)
	72	Iron and steel	
	73	Articles of iron or steel	
	74	Copper and articles thereof	
	75	Nickel and articles thereof	
	76	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	77	Reserved for possible future use	
	78	Lead and articles thereof	
	79	Zinc and articles thereof	
	80	Tin and articles thereof	
	81	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

Table 3: Harmonized System codes assigned by WCO and Member States for commodities listed only in resolutions 2371 (2017) and 2375 (2017)

Commodity	WCO	Member State and regional organization interpretations
Seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	<p>Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms (all codes of chapter 03);</p> <p>Animal products; of fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; dead animals of chapter 03, unfit for human consumption (chapter 05, heading 0511, subheading 0511.91);</p> <p>Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs;</p> <p>Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved (1603-1605);</p> <p>Meat and edible meat offal of aquatic mammals, fresh, chilled or frozen (chapter 02, heading 0208);</p> <p>Meat and edible meat offal; salted, in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours, meals of meat or meat offal of aquatic mammals (chapter 02, heading 0210, subheading 0210.92);</p> <p>Flours, meal and pellets, of meat or meat offal, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates (chapter 23, heading 2301)</p>	<p>China¹ Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms (all codes of chapter 03);</p> <p>Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs; Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved (1603-1605)</p> <p>European Union²: Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms (all codes of chapter 03);</p> <p>Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs; Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved (1603-1605);</p> <p>Stuffed pasta, whether or not cooked or otherwise prepared containing more than 20 % by weight of fish, crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrate (1902.20.10);</p> <p>Soups and broths and preparations therefor; homogenised composite food preparations, containing fish, crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates (2104)</p> <p>United States of America³: Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms (all codes of chapter 03);</p> <p>Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs; Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved (1604-1605)</p>

¹ Official announcements by China No. 52 of 22 September 2017 and No. 40 of 14 August 2017 regarding the implementation of resolutions 2375 (2017) and 2371 (2017).

² Council Regulations (EC) No. 2017/1836 of 10 October 2017, No. 2017/1548 of 14 September 2017 and No. 2017/1509 of 30 August 2017.

³ Communication to the Panel from U.S. Department of State of 19 October 2017.

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>WCO</i>	<i>Member State and regional organization interpretations</i>
Lead and lead ore	Lead ores and concentrates (2607); Lead oxides; red lead and orange lead (chapter 28, heading 2824); Tetramethyl lead and tetraethyl lead (chapter 29, heading 2931, subheading 2931.10); Lead and articles thereof (codes of chapter 78)	China: Lead ores and concentrates (2607); Lead and articles thereof (all codes of chapter 78) European Union: Lead ores and concentrates (2607); Lead and articles thereof (all codes of chapter 78) United States of America: Lead ores and concentrates (2607); Lead and articles thereof (all codes of chapter 78)
All condensates and natural gas liquids; Crude oil	Condensates and natural gas liquids; refined petroleum products and crude oil (2709-2713); Biodiesel and mixtures thereof; not containing or containing less than 70% by weight of petroleum oils or oils obtained from bituminous minerals (2826)	China: Condensate oil, excluding crude oil (2709.00.00.00); Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not crude; preparations n.e.c, containing by weight 70% or more of petroleum oils or oils from bituminous minerals; these being the basic constituents of the preparations; waste oils (2710); Liquefied natural gas (2711.11.00.00); Petroleum jelly; paraffin wax, micro-crystalline petroleum wax, slack wax, ozokerite, lignite wax, peat wax, other mineral waxes, similar products obtained by synthesis, other processes; coloured or not (2712); Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen; other residues of petroleum oils or oils obtained from bituminous minerals (2713) European Union: Oils and other products of the distillation of high temperature coal tar; similar products in which the weight of the aromatic constituents exceeds that of the non-aromatic constituents (2707); Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude; Other than crude; Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons (2709-2711); Petroleum jelly (2712.10); Paraffin wax containing by weight less than 0,75 % of oil (2712.20); Other (2712.90); Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen and other residues of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from bituminous minerals; Bitumen and asphalt, natural; bituminous or oil-shale and tar sands; asphaltites

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>WCO</i>	<i>Member State and regional organization interpretations</i>
Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	Woven, knitted or crocheted fabrics, felt and nonwovens, impregnated, coated, covered or laminated with plastics, and articles thereof, belong to chapter 39 Section XI (chapters 50-63)	and asphaltic rocks; Bituminous mixtures based on natural asphalt, on natural bitumen, on petroleum bitumen, on mineral tar or on mineral tar pitch (for example, bituminous mastics, cut-backs) (2713-2715); Preparations for the treatment of textile materials, leather, furskins or other materials (3403.11, 3403.91); Other (3403.19, 3403.99); In the form of a liquid at 20 °C; Other (3824.99.92, 3824.99.93, 3824.99.96); Fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters, containing by volume 96,5 % or more of esters (FAMAE); Other (3826.00.10, 3826.00.90) United States of America: Condensates and natural gas liquids; refined petroleum products and crude oil (2709-2713); China: Plastics; articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts) (3926.20.11, 3926.20.19 and 3926.20.90); Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts), for all purposes, of vulcanised rubber other than hard rubber (4015); Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, of leather or of composition leather (4203); Fur skin articles; apparel and clothing accessories (4303.10); Section XI “Textile and textile articles” (select codes of chapters 50-53 and 55: 5004-5007; 5106-5113; 5204-5212; 5306-5311; 5508-5516; codes 54 and 56-63) Select codes of chapter 65 “Headgear and parts thereof” (6501-6502; 6504-6507). Select codes of subchapter 7019 “Glass fibres (including glass wool) and articles thereof (e.g. yarn, woven fabrics)” (7019.11-7019.12; 7019.4; 7019.51.00-7019.52.00; 7019.59.00) European Union: Section XI “Textile and textile articles” (all codes of chapters 50-63) United States of America: Section XI “Textile and textile articles” (all codes of chapters 50-63)

Source: The Panel

Annex 5-1: Panel investigations of coal shipments delivered between January and 4 August 2017 (shading indicates transshipment)

Table 1

	Port of discharge and date	Vessel / IMO / Flag at time of shipment (current)	Volume and Value (\$)	Date / Port of Loading	Remarks
1	Penang, Malaysia 18 March	<i>Cheng Hong</i> (<i>Jia Feng</i>) 9136541 Palau (Togo)		Nampo, DPRK circa 25 January <u>*claimed port:</u> Penang, Malaysia, 18 March	AIS off from 11-25 January and 2 -9 March 2017.
2	Port Klang, Malaysia, 15-25 March	<i>New Global</i> 8660521 Kiribati Jamaica		Nampo, DPRK 13 February	AIS off from 30 January to 17 March and 7-14 March 2017 Vessel de-registered by Jamaica
3	Nghi Son, Thanh Hoa, Vietnam, 15 March	<i>Kai Xiang</i> 9634359 Panama (Sierra Leone)	20,048 MT	Nampo, DPRK <u>*claimed:</u> Qingdao, China 6 March	Posted ETA for Nampo, DPRK for 19 February 2017 but AIS off from 18 February 2017 to 9 March 2017. No port call at Qingdao, China 6 March 2017
4	Penang, Malaysia, 18 March	<i>Jian Fu</i> 8306890 Fiji (Palau)		Nampo, DPRK 26 February	AIS off from 23 February to 4 March and 6-14 March 2017.
5	Penang, Malaysia, 24 March	<i>Kum Ya</i> 9004073 DPRK	6,342 MT	DPRK 2 March	Only cargo of this list reported to the 1718 Committee by Malaysia
6	Vung Tao, Vietnam, 26 March-14 April	<i>Tai An</i> 8400529 Panama (Togo)	26,265 MT	Nampo, DPRK, 5-7 March <u>*claimed:</u> Tianjin and Penglai, China	AIS off from 4-11 March. Draft change 6 to 9.7 on 19 March. Thailand cancelled the import planned for Koh Si Chang 20- 30 March, and the vessel re-routed to Vung Tao. Vessel broken-up 6 May 2017.
7	Cam Pha, Vietnam 16 March	<i>Zhang Hong</i> No 1 8307894 Taiwan Province of China	9,934.06 MT / \$665,582,02 (@ \$67/ton)	Nampo, DPRK circa 17 Feb <u>*claimed:</u> Tianjin, China, 3 March	Supplier: Maison Trading Ltd.**, a front company for Dandong Chengtai Trading Co., Ltd., also known as Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., Ltd. (Annex 6-1)
8	Cam Pha, Vietnam 21 March	<i>Zhang Hong</i> No 1 8307894 Taiwan Province of China	22,000 MT /\$1,474,000 (@ \$67/ton)	Nampo, DPRK circa 17 Feb <u>*claimed:</u> Tianjin, China, 15 March	Supplier: Maison Trading Ltd.**, a front company for Dandong Chengtai Trading Co., Ltd., also known as Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., Ltd. (Annex 6-1)
9	Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam 21 April	<i>Bai Mei 8</i> 9584578 St. Kitts &Nevis	31,903 MT	Nampo, DPRK 17 March	AIS off from 12 February to 31 March 2017 Exporter: Maison Trading Ltd. ** (Annexes 6-1 and 9)

		(China)			
10	Nakhodka, Russia 25 April	<i>Zhi Kun 7</i> (<i>Orient Lidu</i>) 9614610 Mongolia (Panama)		Wonsan, DPRK 12 April	AIS off from 9 to 14 April 2017. Draft changed from 4.4 to 6.5 on 14 April.
11	Cam Pha, Vietnam, 27 May	<i>Jian Fu</i> 8306890 Fiji (Palau)	20,089MT	Nampo, DPRK <u>*claimed:</u> Qingdao, China, 10-19 May	AIS off from 8 -16 May 2017. At anchor only 17 to18 May 2017 – no port call at Qingdao. Exporter: Maison Trading Ltd. ** (Annex 6-1)
12	Nanjing, China, 7 June	<i>Zhi Kun 7</i> (<i>Orient Lidu</i>) 9614610 Mongolia (Panama)		Chongjin, DPRK 28 May	
13	Cam Pha, Vietnam, 24 June	<i>Cheng Hong</i> (<i>Jia Feng</i>) 9136541 Panama (Togo)	24,140MT	Nampo, DPRK 15 June <u>*claimed:</u> Penglai, China 14-18 June	AIS off from 13-17 June 2017 Loitered 17-18 June 2017 off Penglai – no port call
14	Ningbo, China 30 June	<i>Bai Mei 8</i> 9584578 St. Kitts &Nevis (China)		Nampo, DPRK 16 June <u>*claimed:</u> Vladivostok, Russia, 23 June	AIS switched off 7 June and back on after rejoining its voyage on 19 June 2017 Satellite image of 16 June 2017 shows the vessel laoding coal in Nampo, DPRK.df
15	Nakhodka, Russia 28 June (For transshipment)	<i>Sun Union</i> (<i>Gold River</i>) (9098517) Palau		Wonsan, DPRK 14 June	AIS off from from 6 to 15 July 2017. DPRK coal discharged loaded and transshipped by the <i>Great Spring</i> on 11 July 2017. Vessel de-registered by Jamaica
16	Tianjin, China 18 July	<i>Great Spring</i> (9560326) Panama		Nakhodka, Russia 11 July	Loaded DPRK coal discharged by the <i>Sun Union</i> on 28 June 2017.

Sources: Member States, maritime databases

Annex 5-2: Panel investigations of shipments delivered after the comprehensive coal ban on 5 August 2017 (shading indicates transshipment)

	Port of discharge and date	Vessel Name (IMO #) and Flag at time of shipment (current)	Amount and Value of Coal Discharged	Actual Port of Loading and Date	Remarks
1	Kholmsk, Russia 3-7 August (For transshipment)	<i>Rung Ra 2</i> (9020534) DPRK		Wonsan, DPRK	First of three calls to the Kholmsk coal terminal Designated 28 December 2017 (annexes 10-12)
2	Can Tho, Vietnam 8 August	<i>Toyo Maru</i> (9009097) Palau	6680 MT \$ 268,536.00	Nampo, DPRK <i>*claimed port:</i> Lianyungang, China 18 July	AIS off from 4 to 17 July. No port call, only loitering off Lianyungang 18 to 19 July
3	Bayuquan, China 8 August	<i>Petrel 8</i> (9562233) Comoros		Taean, DPRK 26 July	AIS off from 20 to 27 July. Draft changed from 4 to 6.9 on 27 July. Designated 3 October 2017 China reply stated "from 8 to 24 August 2017 coal originated Russian Federation".
4	Kholmsk, Russia 9-11 August 2017 (For transshipment)	<i>Ul Ji Bong 6</i> (9114555) DPRK		Wonsan, DPRK 26 August 2017	AIS off from 26 July to 2 August. Unloaded at same terminal where coal had been discharged by <i>Rung Ra 2</i> for transshipment. Designated 28 December 2017. (annexes 10-12)
5	Bayuquan, China 13 August	<i>Xin Sheng Hai</i> (9485617) Belize		Nampo, DPRK 26 July	AIS off from 20 to 29 July. Draft changed from 5 to 8.6 on 29 July. China reply stated "from 8 to 24 August 2017 coal originated Russian Federation".
6	Nantong, China 14 August	<i>Hao Fan 6</i> (8628597) St Kitts & Nevis		Nampo, DPRK 29 July	AIS off from 19 July to 3 August. Draft changed: from 3.7 to 8 on 3 August. Designated 3 October 2017 China reply stated "from 8 to 24 August 2017 coal originated Russian Federation".
7	Guangzhou, China 16 August	<i>East Glory</i> (<i>Fast Glory</i>) (8673114) Palau (Togo)		Nampo, DPRK 25 July	AIS off from 22 to 27 July. Loitered off Shidao, fake call to Yantai, China. China reply stated "from 8 to 24 August 2017 coal originated Russian Federation".
8	Cam Pha, Vietnam 16 August	<i>Kai Xiang</i> (9634359) Panama (Sierra Leone)	20,090 MT	Nampo on 26 July <i>*claimed port:</i> Vladivostok, Russia 28 July	AIS off from 21 August to 3 September 2017. Draft changed from 6.6 to 9.5 on 3 September. Russia confirmed no port call

9	Kholmsk, Russia 22-25 August (For transshipment)	<i>Un Bong 2</i> (8913186) DPRK		Chongjin, DPRK	Unloaded at same terminal where coal had been discharged <i>Rung Ra 2</i> and <i>Ul Ji Bong</i> for transshipment.
10	Bayuquan, China 24 August	<i>Tong San 2</i> (8937675) DPRK		Nampo, DPRK 15 June	AIS off from 22 April to 15 July; 20 July to 13 August (en route Najin); and 14 to 17 August (en route to Bayuquan). Designated 3 October 2017 China reply stated cargo caustic calcite magnesite
11	Cam Pha, Vietnam 26 August	<i>Orient Shenyu</i> (8671611) Panama (China)		Songnim, DPRK 7 August	AIS off from 3 to 12 August. Loitered off Lianyungang, China 13 to 15 August. Draft changed from 5.8 to 10.2 on 13 August. (Annex 7)
12	Kholmsk, Russia 29 August - 1 September (For transshipment)	<i>Rung Ra 2</i> (9020534) DPRK		Wonsan, DPRK 26 August	Second of three port visits to the Kholmsk coal terminal for transshipment. Designated 28 December 2017 (Annex 10)
13	Cam Pha, Vietnam 1 September	<i>Glory Hope 6</i> (8684527) Panama (China)		Nampo, DPRK 6-13 August	AIS off from 5 to 14 August. Loitered off Qingdao, China on 16 August
14	Kholmsk, Russia 4 -5 September (For transshipment)	<i>Ul Ji Bong 6</i> (9114555) DPRK		Wonsan, DPRK 26 August	AIS off from 12 August to 4 September. Unloaded at same terminal where coal had been discharged by <i>Rung Ra 2</i> and <i>Un Bong 2</i> for transshipment. Designated 28 December 2017 (Annexes 10-12)
15	Kholmsk, Russia 1-5 September (For transshipment)	<i>Yu Yuan</i> (9358694) Togo		Wonsan, DPRK 12 August	Unloaded at same terminal at which coal had been discharged by <i>Rung Ra 2</i> , <i>Un Bong 2</i> , <i>Ul Ji Bong 6</i> . (Annex 11)
16	Kholmsk, Russia 12-17 September (For transshipment)	<i>Rung Ra 2</i> (9020534) DPRK		Wonsan, DPRK 7 September	Third of three drop-offs at same berth at Kholmsk for transshipment. Designated 28 December 2017 (Annex 10)
17	Cam Pha, Vietnam 14 September	<i>Hua Fu</i> (9020003) Panama	12,652.52 MT @\$ 65.40/MT \$ 827,474.81	Nampo, DPRK *claimed port: Lianyungang, China 6 September	Loitered off Shidao 17 August to 2 September. Draft changed from 4.3 to 10.4 on 17 August. AIS off from 2 to 7 September. Loitered off Hong Kong 7 September. (Annexes 6-2 and 7)
18	Cam Pha, Vietnam 18 September	<i>Kai Xiang</i> (9634359) Panama (Sierra Leone)	20,180 MT	Nampo, DPRK 31 August *claimed: Nahodka, Russia 31 Aug	AIS off from 21 August to 3 September 2017. Draft changed from 6.6 to 9.5 on 3 September. Russia confirmed no port call
19	Hai Phong, Vietnam 19 September	<i>Xin Guang Hai</i> (9004700) Panama (Togo)		Songnim, DPRK 31 August	AIS off from 31 August to 5 September. Draft changed from 4.3 to 0 on 4 September. Loitered off Shidao 5 to 8 September. Loitered off Hong Kong 18 September and draught change 0 to 7.

20	Cam Pha, Vietnam 27 September	<i>Xin Sheng Hai</i> (9485617) Belize		Nampo, DPRK 31 August	AIS off from 24 August to 2 September. Draft changed from 4.6 to 8.8 on 2 September.
21	Incheon, Republic of Korea 2 October	<i>Sky Angel</i> (9168441) Panama (China)		Kholmsk, Russia 21 September (coal terminal)	Loaded at same terminal at which coal had been discharged by <i>Rung Ra 2</i> , <i>Un Bong 2</i> , <i>Ul Ji Bong 6</i> , and <i>Yu Yuan</i> . Same operator as <i>Sky Lady</i> which used the same berth on 9 August. China reply stated "coal originated Russian Federation".
22	Cam Pha, Vietnam 7 October	<i>Hua Fu</i> (9020003) Panama	11,850 MT @\$ 66/MT \$ 770,250	Wonsan / Chongjin, DPRK *claimed port: Nakhodka, Russia	AIS off from 21 to 27 September. No port call to Nakhodka. Russia confirmed no port call (Annex 8)
23	Pohang, Republic of Korea 11 October	<i>Rich Glory</i> (8649905) Sierra Leone	5,000 MT @\$ 65/MT \$ 325,000	Kholmsk, Russia 5-6 October (coal terminal)	Loaded at same terminal at which coal had been discharged by <i>Rung Ra 2</i> , <i>Un Bong 2</i> , <i>Ul Ji Bong 6</i> , and <i>Yu Yuan</i> . (Annexes 10-12, 15)

Source: Member States, maritime databases

Annex 6-1: Documents showing Maison Trading Ltd. as the exporter of at least 4 shipments of DPRK coal

Jian Fu

CODE NAME "CONGENBILL", EDITION 1994 Shipper MAISON TRADING LIMITED TRUST COMPANY COMPLEX, AJELTAKE ISLAND, MAJURO		BILL OF LADING DA. No. 01 TO BE USED WITH CHARTER-PARTIES	
Consignee 		ORIGINAL	
Notify address: 		<i>CHINESE</i>	
Vessel MV JIAN FU	Port of loading QINGDAO PORT OF CHINA		
Port of discharge CAM PHA PORT, VIETNAM			
Shipper's description of goods	Quantity and Description of Goods	Gross weight	Measurement
N/M	ANTHRACITE COAL IN BULK QUANTITY: 20,089 MTS	20,089MTS	
CLEAN SHIPPED ON BOARD FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY			
SAY: TWENTY THOUSAND AND EIGHTY NINE METRIC TONS ONLY.			
(of which _____ on deck at shipper's risk; the carrier not being responsible for loss or damage howsoever arising)			
Freight payable as per CHARTER-PARTY dated	SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above. Weight, measure; quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown. IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of bills of lading indicated below all of this tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.		
FREIGHT ADVANCE. Received on account of freight:	FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF		
Time used for loading..... days..... hours.			
Freight payable at		Place and date of issue QINGDAO, CHINA MAY 18, 2017	
Number of original B/L THREE		Signature <i>[Signature]</i> AS MASTER OF MV. JIAN FU	


Source: Member State

Extracts of Maison Trading contracts: Zhang Hong 1

SALES AND PURCHASE CONTRACT Contract No: ANAS.007.17 MST-DKM Date: 3 rd Mar 2017	
Between: The Seller: MAISON TRADING LIMITED Address: Trust Company Complex , Aejatake Island, Majuro	
The Buyer: [REDACTED]	
4. Price: USD 67.00 /MT CFR FO Cam Pha port, Vietnam basis GCV 6,500Kcal/kg DB (INCOTERMS 2010). Total contract value: USD 670,000.00 (+/- 10%)	
USD 67.00/MT CFR FO Cam Pha port, Vietnam basis GCV 6,500Kcal/kg DB (INCOTERMS 2010). Total contract value: USD 1,474,000.00 (+/- 10%)	
5. Payment: 9.1 Upon receipt of hard documents as stipulated in Article 9.3 sent by the Seller to the Buyer, within 3 working days, the Buyer shall pay 100% of shipment value to Seller's bank account by T/T. Seller's bank: Bank name: [REDACTED] (China) Ltd. SWIFT BIC: [REDACTED] Advise Through: [REDACTED] (China) Ltd. QINGDAO STDZ Sub-Branch Account No. NRA729100109822001 Beneficiary Name: MAISON TRADING LIMITED	
For and on behalf of: MAISON TRADING LIMITED Signed: [REDACTED] TRADING LIMITED Date: [REDACTED] SEL [REDACTED] Authorized Signature(s) Sler [REDACTED] Date: 3 rd March 2017	

Source: Member State

Identification document of the Director of Maison Trading Limited: Sheng Wang
Date of Birth: 20 March 1973



Source: Member State

Note : Marshall Islands informed the Panel that Maison Trading Ltd.'s registration was revoked on 30 October 2017. The company had been registered on 20 September 2016.

Annex 6-2: Documents showing Brigt Australia as the shipper of DPRK coal claiming Russian origin.

Hua Fu

PROFORMA INVOICE	
Date	: Sep. 25, 2017
Attention	: KTD Strong Development Joint Stock Company ADD: Bai Mac, Thuong Quan Ward, Kinh Mon District, Hai Duong Province, Vietnam
Invoice no.	: 2017018
COMMODITY:	ANTHRACITE COAL IN BULK
UNIT PRICE:	USD 65.00 /METRIC TON
B/L QUANTITY:	11,850.00 MT
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN:	RUSSIA
PRICE TERMS:	CFR FO HON NET ANCHORAGE, CAM PHA PORT, VIETNAM
VESSEL NAME:	M/V HUA FU
PORT OF LOADING:	NAKHODKA, RUSSIA
PORT OF DISCHARGE:	HON NET ANCHORAGE, CAM PHA PORT, VIETNAM
Total amount:	USD770,250.00
IN WORDS: SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS ONLY.	
For and on behalf of	
<i>For and on behalf of Brigt Australia Pty Ltd</i>	
..... <i>Authorized Signature(s)</i>	
Brigt Australia Pty Ltd	

**Russia confirmed
no port call made**

SAO NGUYỄN VĂN BẢN CHÍNH

Source: Member State

Extracts of a Brigt Australia contract for DPRK coal shipped to Vietnam

SALES AND PURCHASE CONTRACT [REDACTED]

HỢP ĐỒNG MUA BÁN

Contract No: HL-VAD/004-17

Số HL-VAD/004-17

On 15th September 2017

Ngày 15/09/2017

Between / Giữa:

The Seller: Brigt Australia Pty Ltd

Bên Bán: Brigt Australia Pty Ltd

Address: SUITE 03, LEVEL 14, 100 WALKER ST, NORTH SYDNEY, NSW 2060,
AUSTRALIA

Represented by: Ms Livia Wang

Position: Director

Địa chỉ: SUITE 03, LEVEL 14, 100 WALKER ST, NORTH SYDNEY, NSW 2060,
AUSTRALIA

The Buyer [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED]

Considering that:/Xét rằng:

- Seller's company is established and registered under Australia law and Seller's certificate/license of business registration allowed for selling coal cargo as specified in this contract.
(Bên bán là doanh nghiệp được thành lập và kinh doanh hợp pháp theo pháp luật Australia theo giấy phép/ đăng ký kinh doanh, có khả năng bán hàng hóa như qui định tại Hợp đồng này) and (va)
- Buyer's company is established and registered under Vietnamese law allowed for buying coal cargo as specified in this contract.
(Bên mua là doanh nghiệp được thành lập và kinh doanh hợp pháp theo pháp luật Việt Nam, có nhu cầu mua hàng hóa như qui định tại Hợp đồng này)

The Buyer and the Seller hereinafter shall be jointly referred to as the "Parties" and respectively as the "Party".

Người bán và người mua sau đây sẽ được gọi là các bên trong hợp đồng

- The seller agrees to sell and the buyer agrees to buy the cargo in the Contract with the terms and conditions as follows:

Người bán đồng ý bán và người mua đồng ý mua hàng hóa trong hợp đồng với các điều khoản, điều kiện như dưới đây.

1. Contract cargo

Anthracite Coal in Bulk, hereinafter referred to as 'Coal'

Origin: Russia

Hàng hóa:

Signed by Brigt Australia PTY Ltd



Source: Member State

Annex 6-3: Documents for DPRK coal onboard the *Kai Xiang* falsely claiming Russian origin

Company based in Sweden

1. Exporter (name, address, country) [REDACTED]	ORIGINAL NO: 7020006385 6215973 CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN Issued in the Russian Federation		
2. Consignee (name, address, country) TO THE ORDER			
3. Means of transport and route MV KAI XIANG Port of loading: PORT VLADIVOSTOK, RUSSIA Port of discharge: CAM PHA, ANCHORAGE AREA, VIETNAM	4. For official use Russia confirmed no port call made		
5. Country of origin ORIGIN OF COUNTRY: RUSSIA	6. Supplementary details BILL OF LADING No. 01 dd. 28.07.2017		
7. Item number	8. Description of goods	9. Number and kind of packages	10. Gross weight or other quantity
1.	COMMODITY: ANTHRACITE ULG GRADE QUANTITY:	in bulk	20 090,000 METRIC TONS
			
11. Certification It is hereby certified, that the declaration by the exporter is correct UNION THE PRIMORSK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 1a-316, Shkolnaya str. Nakhodka  Place, date, signature, name and stamp of certifying authority		12. Declaration by the exporter The undersigned hereby declares that the above details and statements are correct; that the goods are of origin of the country shown in box No 5; that the goods are exported  Place, date, stamp and signature of authorized signatory	

Source: Member State

Warranty of origin for DPRK coal onboard the *Kai Xiang* falsely claiming Russian origin

[REDACTED]

HONG KONG
TAIPEI TAIWAN

LETTER OF WARRANTY
CONTRACT NUMBER: C07010

WE, [REDACTED] HEREBY CONFIRM THE COMMODITY WE SOLD TO YOUR ESTEEMED COMPANY IS RUSSIAN ANTHRACITE (RUSSIAN ORIGIN). RELATED DOCUMENTS FROM OUR SUPPLIER HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDED TO YOUR ESTEEMED COMPANY ALREADY.


[REDACTED] LTD.

SIGNATURE

NAME [REDACTED]
TITLE [REDACTED]


Source: Member State

Annex 7: The *Orient Shenyu*'s deviation of the vessel loading in Songnim on 7 August 2017



Source: Windward

Annex 8 *Hua Fu*'s voyage showing a second attempt to deliver its DPRK coal



Source: Windward

Annex 9: Crew list of the *Bai Mei* 8 showing the crew joining in Nampo, DPRK confirming the vessel's call there

IMO CREW LIST

		Arrival	Departure	Page No 1 Of 1		
1. Name of ship BAL NEIB		2. Port of arrived Ho Chi Minh (Go Gia)	3. Date of arrived 2017-APR-			
4. Nationality of ship ST. KITTS&NEVIS		5. Port of departure HONGKONG	6. Maturity and No. of identity document (Passport) and Valid Date	7. Maturity and No. of identity document (Seaman's Passport) and Valid Date		
8. No	9. Family name, given names	10. Sex	11. Rank or rate	12. Notarized	13. Date and place of birth	14. Joining date & Place
1			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
2			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
3			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
4			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
5			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
6			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
7			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
8			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
9			CHINESE			DALIAN CHINA 02-Apr-2017
10			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
11			MYANMAR			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
12			MYANMAR			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
13			MYANMAR			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
14			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
15			MYANMAR			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
16			MYANMAR			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017
17			CHINESE			NAMPO DPRK 27-Mar-2017


Date and signature by Master, authorized agent or officer:

MASTER:
DATE :


2017-APR-24
3.武松

Source: Member State

Annex 10: Rung Ra 2, Ul Ji Bong 6 and Un Bong 2 at the same coal terminal in Kholmsk




Annex 11: Images of the *Yu Yuan* and *Ul Ji Bong 6* loading coal in Wonsan



Source: Member State

Annex 12: Images of the *Yu Yuan* and *Ul Ji Bong 6* discharging DPRK coal in Kholmsk



Source: Member State

Annex 13: Certificate of origin for *Sky Lady* showing coal origin as Shaktersk

Certificate No. 181202-150771-C/M-NA-2017

Vessel	: MV SKY LADY
Commodity	: Solntsevsky Steaming coal 3B in bulk
Vessel commenced loading	: at 17:40 hrs on 11.06.2017
Vessel completed loading	: at 19:30 hrs on 11.06.2017
Quantity	: 3,280,000 MT
Port of Loading	: Shaktersk, Russia
Port of Discharge	: [Redacted]
B/L Date	: August 11, 2017

THIS IS TO REPORT:

That, in accordance with the instructions received from our Principal, SOLNTSEVSKY COAL MINE LLC, we hereby report that according to the RWBs provided for checking the coal loaded on board MV SKY LADY is really of origin of the Russian Federation.

This document is a witness of survey services rendering.
SGS Group employees, directors, and representatives take no responsibility; will not be held liable for, and shall be fully indemnified for any loss related to this document.

Signed and dated at
NAKHODKA, RUSSIA
August 18, 2017

FOR AND ON BEHALF OF
SGS VOSTOK LIMITED

SGS Vostok Limited | 30, Nakhimovskaya Street, 692801, Nakhodka, Russia | +7 (4238) 62-18-14, +7 (4238) 62-11-87 | www.sgs.com | Member of the SGS Group

This document is issued on behalf of, by the Surveyor under the Surveyor's Conditions of Surveying printed on page 1.
The Surveyor's signature is drawn on the Declaration of Qualification, Issued by the Surveyor and placed on the reverse side of this document.

SGSPAPER
18055757

Source: Sky Ocean

Annex 14: Certificate of origin for *Sky Angel* showing coal origin as Kholmsk

1. Exporter (name, address, country) "AMET VENTURE LIMITED" 4TH FLOOR 1 KINGHTFRIER COURT ST. PAULS LONDON EC4V 5BS, GREAT BRITAIN.	ORIGINAL, № 702800022 6690624 CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN Issued in the Russian Federation		
2. Consignee (name, address, country) [REDACTED]			
3. Means of transport and route RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION ST. KEMEROVO OF THE KEMEROVO, RAILWAY PORT KHOLOMSK. SEA TRANSPORTATION PORT KHOLOMSK TO INCHON PORT, SOUTH KOREA.	4. For official use TO CUSTOMS		
5. Country of origin RUSSIAN FEDERATION	6. Supplementary details BILL OF LADING № SA170923		
7. Item number	8. Description of goods SEMI COKE	9. Number and kind of packages	10. Gross weight or other quantity
		TONBAG	4156.00 MT
11. Certification It is hereby certified, that the declaration by the exporter is correct		12. Declaration by the exporter The undersigned hereby declares that the above details and statements are correct; that the goods are of origin of the country shown in box No 5; that the goods are exported to	
 16.10.2017 Place, date, signature and stamp of certifying authority		 16.10.2017 Place, date, signature of authorized signatory	

Source: Sky Ocean

Annex 15: Shipping document of *Rich Glory* showing coal origin as Kholmsk

PACKING LIST					
1. Shipper / Exporter HONG KONG CCAL ENERGY LIMITED 11/F AXA CENTRE, 151 GLOUCESTER ROAD WANCHAI HONG KONG	8. NO. & Date of Packing List HKC20171006-B OCT 06, 2017				
2. For Account & Risk of Meters. [REDACTED]	9. No. & Date of L/C				
3. Notify Party [REDACTED]					
4. Port of Loading KHOLMSK PORT, RUSSIA	5. Final Destination POHANG PORT, KOREA				
6. Carrier MV. RICH GLORY	7. Sailing and or about 06TH OCT, 2017				
11. Shipping Marks	12. Description of Goods	13. Quantity	14. Net-Weight	15. Gross-Weight	16. Measurement
N/M	ANTHRACITE COAL	5,000.00MT	(MT)	(MT)	mt
<p>ANTHRACITE COAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - TOTAL MOISTURE (ARB) : 8% MAX - ASH (ADB) : 12% MAX - CALORIFIC VALUE(DB) : 6,600kcal MIN - FIXED CARBON (DB) : 82% MIN - VOLATILE MATTER (ADB) : 5% MAX - SIZE : 0-50mm 90% MIN - COUNTRY OF ORIGIN : RUSSIA - PACKING IN BULK 			 <p>17. Signed by HONG KONG COAL ENERGY LIMITED</p>		
<p>[REDACTED]</p>					

Source: Member State

**Annex 16: Business card of Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen as the representative of
Ocean Enterprises Ltd. to charter the *Lighthouse Winmore***

YingJen Fishery Company

Vice president

Sunny S. Chen



TEL/886-7.533.1200 [500] FAX/886-7.561.5852
3F No.218 Wufu 4th Road, Kaohsiung, Taiwan 803

盈仁漁業公司

YingJen Fishery Company

副董事長


陳世憲



高雄市鹽埕區五福四路218號3F
TEL/07.533.1200 [500] FAX/07.561.5852

Source: The Panel

Identity document of Mr. Shih-Hsien Chen, owner of Oceanic Enterprises, Billions Bunker Group Corp. and Bunkers Taiwan Group Corp.



Source: The Panel

Annex 17: Emails from Oceanic Enterprises to the *Lighthouse Winmore* emanating from Billions Bunker Group

Tue 19/09/2017 1:49 AM

CHIEN MONEY <cchien.yjfishery@hotmail.com>
Lighthouse交船殘油匯款電文

To: VRNC3; [REDACTED] **Lighthouse Winmore**

Cc: cchien.yjfishery; Miguel S; SUNNY CHENsunny Chen; management

PDF 20170919132333.pdf 47 KB

曾董好
付上電文!請查收!!

 **Billions Bunker Group Corp.**
比利恩油品集團

錢欽擇 協理
Money Chien

Cel: +886-909-808-807
Tel: +886-7-533-1200 # 321
Fax: +886-7-533-1211
Email:cchien.yjfishery@hotmail.com

高雄市鹽埕區五福四路218號3樓
3F, No. 218, Wu-Fu 4th Road, Kaohsikung

比利恩油品集團
Billions Bunker Group Corp.
Manager
蕭錫理 Miguel Shiao.
Tel : +886-7533-1200 # 301
Fax: +886-7533-1211
Cell: +886-981-696-924
Email: billions.miguel@gmail.com

Source: The Panel

Email to the Lighthouse Winmore from Mr Chen's Billions Bunker Group Corporation showing his company's operations management of the tanker prior to the ship-to-ship transfer on 19 October 2017

From: Miguel S <billions.miguel@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, 29 September, 2017 9:30 PM
To: VRNC3: Chien Money: [REDACTED]
Subject: 碼頭協議

王船長您好：

以下重點：

這次進碼頭，okyc 的人員會再上船檢查一次，請確實做好

- 1.纜繩和煞車系統的更換及保養
- 2.高低位顯示，請配合韓國人的指示
- 3.應對態度和船員積極性改善，盡量配合他們的需求

如果表現不錯的話，他們願意給我們一次機會靠碼頭，注意是"表現好的話他們願意再給我們一次機會" 所以麻煩船長 做好一切應變的措施，拜託！

感謝船長的配合

比利恩油品集團

Billions Bunker Group Corp.

Manager

蕭錫理 Miguel Shiao.

Tel : +886-7533-1200 # 301

Fax: +886-7533-1211

Cell: +886-981-696-924

Email: billions.miguel@gmail.com

Source: The Panel

Annex 18: Corporate records showing Lighthouse Ship Management Ltd. was formerly known as Billion Great International Group Ltd.

LIGHTHOUSE SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED	
Hong Kong	HK-1653732
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Live	
LIGHTHOUSE SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED was incorporated on 2011-08-03. This company is now live, their business is recorded as private. As so far this company has running for 6 Years 3 Months 1 Day.	
Registration Information	
CR No:	1653732
Company Name:	LIGHTHOUSE SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED
Company Name(CN):	方向海運管理有限公司
Company Type:	private
Active Status:	Live
Date of Incorporation:	03-08-2011
Remarks:	-
Winding Up Mode:	-
Date of Dissolution:	-
Register of Charges:	unavailable
Important Note:	-
Name History:	27-09-2013 LIGHTHOUSE SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED 方向海運管理有限公司
	03-08-2011 BILLION GREAT INTERNATIONAL GROUP LIMITED 兆佳國際集團有限公司
Added:	15-Sep-2015 6:20 AM
Source:	Hong Kong Companies Registry, http://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/

Source: hongkongcompanylist.com

Annex 19: Bills of lading for the petroleum products embarked on the two vessels transferred to the DPRK

Lighthouse Winmore

1. Shipper	BILL OF LADING	
TRAFIGURA PTE LTD	FIRST ORIGINAL	
2. Consignee		
TO THE ORDER OF GLOBAL COMMODITIES CONSULTANTS LIMITED		
3. Notify Party	4. B/L Number	
	SACL17LW101501	
5. Vessel	6. Charterparty between _____ and _____ dated _____	
LIGHTHOUSE WINMORE		
7. Port(s) of loading	8. Port(s) of discharge	
YOSU, KOREA	TAICHUNG, TAIWAN	
9. Shipper's description of goods	10. Gross weight / volume	
MARINE GAS OIL 500PPM SULPHUR	14,094.065 MT	
	16,804.656 KLITRES AT 15 DEG C	
	105,751.70 US BBLS AT 60 DEG F	

11. Remarks:

12. Freight: ("Payable as Per Charter party")

SHIPPED at the Port(s) of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port(s) of Discharge specified above.

Weight, measure, quality, condition, contents and value unknown.

IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed THREE (3/3) original Bills of Lading, all of this tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.

FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF

13. Place and date of issue at YOSU, KOREA ON 15TH OCTOBER 2017	14. Signature  MASTER WANG SONGCHANG
--	--

Source: The Panel

Billions No. 18

1. Shipper

TRAFIGURA PTE LTD

2. Consignee

TO THE ORDER OF
GLOBAL COMMODITIES CONSULTANTS LIMITED

3. Notify Party

BILL OF LADING

FIRST ORIGINAL

4. B/L Number

SACL17BN101101

5. Vessel

BILLIONS NO. 18

6. Charterparty between _____
and _____ dated _____

7. Port(s) of loading

YOSU, KOREA

8. Port(s) of discharge

TAICHUNG, TAIWAN

9. Shipper's description of goods

MARINE GAS OIL 500PPM SULPHUR

10. Gross weight / volume

7,940.714 MT

9,458.862 KLITRES AT 15 DEG C

59,524.62 US BBLS AT 60 DEG F

11. Remarks:

12. Freight: ("Payable as Per Charter party")

SHIPPED at the Port(s) of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port(s) of Discharge specified above.

Weight, measure, quality, condition, contents and value unknown.

IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed THREE (3/3) original Bills of Lading, all of this tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.

FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF

13. Place and date of issue

at YOSU, KOREA ON 11TH OCTOBER 2017

14. Signature

MASTEIR [BOBY JULIAN AKBARI]



Source: The Panel

Annex 20: Communications showing Oceanic's false destination for the fuel

From: [REDACTED] @globalsgp.com>
Sent: 10 October 2017 10:32
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Documentary Instructions Lighthouse Winmore loading MGO FOB OKYC Yosu during 12-13 Oct 2017

Hi [REDACTED]

Our documentary instructions as follows:

B/L MAKE-UP

VESSEL : LIGHHOUSE WINMORE
CONSIGNOR : ORIGINAL SUPPLIER
CONSIGNEE : TO THE ORDER OF GLOBAL COMMODITIES CONSULTANTS LIMITED
PRODUCT : MARINE GAS OIL 500PPM SULPHUR
QUANTITY : LOAD CLOSE TO 15,000 MT
MARKINGS: FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY
MEASUREMENT : MT, KLITRES AT 15 DEG C, US BBLS AT 60 DEG F
DESTINATION : TAICHUNG, TAIWAN

**Global SGP
Pte. Ltd.**

**False destination –
tanker never
called in Taichung**

GLOBAL COMMODITIES CONSULTANTS LTD	MASTER
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED	ORIGINAL COPY COPY
1. BILL OF LADING	3/3 1 1
2. CERT OF QUANTITY	1 1 1
3. CERT OF QUALITY	1 1 1
DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENTS	
1. ONE COPY SET OF ALL SHIPPING DOCUMENTS TO CONSIGNEE VIA MASTER. 2. ONE COPY SET OF ALL SHIPPING DOCUMENTS FOR MASTER OWN USE. 3. UPON COMPLETION OF LOADING PLEASE EMAIL COPY OF ALL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS TO GLOBAL COMMODITIES CONSULTANTS LTD, ATTN : JOHN LIM EMAIL: [REDACTED]@globalsgp.com PLEASE PROVIDE 1 SAMPLE OF SHORETANK CARGO FOR VESSEL'S RETENTION	

Thank you
[REDACTED]

Source: The Panel

Annex 21: Communications of Global SGP showing the prepayment arrangements for the *Billions No. 18* and *Lighthouse Winmore* shipments

From: [REDACTED]@globalsgp.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2017 8:10 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] September Final invoices

Dear [REDACTED]

Can we confirm the final invoice values for our last 2 cargos BL dated 3rd and 7th Oct?

3rd Oct Billions 18

BL: 7,969.332 MT / 59,717.79 bbls

Prepayment invoice: \$4,564,942.80

Final invoice value: \$4,196,070.51

Credit balance: \$368,872.29

7th Oct Lighthouse Winmore

BL: 14,091.782 MT / 105,633.82 bbls

Prepayment invoice: \$8,510,097.75

Final invoice value: \$7,422,360.36

Credit balance: \$1,087,737.39

Kindly confirm if the above figures are correct, i.e a total credit balance of \$1,456,609.67

In addition, can you email us the final invoices for these cargos BL-ed 7th Sep, 10th Sep, 22nd Sep, 26th Sep, 3rd Oct and 7th Oct?

Thank you

[REDACTED]
Source: The Panel

Annex 22: Communications showing the planned shipments using Mr. Chen's tankers

From: [REDACTED] @globalsgp.com

Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2017 4:05 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Oct program

Dear [REDACTED]

Please see our forecast schedule for Oct

8th Oct	Billions 18	8 kt under Sep program
13th Oct	Lighthouse	16kt under Oct (depending on terminal they might limit us to 15kt)
14th Oct	Billions 18	8kt to complete Sep program
19th Oct	Lighthouse	16kt
20th Oct	Billions 18	8kt
22nd Oct	Sky Ace1	7.5kt
25th Oct	Lighthouse	16kt
26th Oct	Billions 18	8kt
29th Oct	Sky Ace1	7.5kt
30th Oct	Lighthouse	16kt
31st Oct	Billions 18	8kt

kt = 1000 (tonnes)

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: 10/5/2017 3:35 PM

To: "[REDACTED]@globalsgp.com" <[REDACTED]@globalsgp.com>

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Oct program

Dear [REDACTED] will give you a ring, can you please provide this schedule?

Thank you

Source: The Panel

**Annex 23: Invoice for Ocenic Entreprise Ltd. for pre-payment for the
Lighthouse Winmore shipment**

Global SGP Pte Ltd [REDACTED]	Mr. Shih-Hsien Chen											
INVOICE												
INVOICE TO	INVOICE NO. GSGP20170075											
Sunny Chen Oceanic Enterprise Ltd Oceanic Enterprise Ltd 3F No.218 Wu-fu 4th Road Kaohsiung Taiwan MH96960	DATE 10/10/2017 DUE DATE 11/10/2017 TERMS COD											
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>ACTIVITY</th> <th>QTY</th> <th>UNIT PRICE</th> <th>AMOUNT</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Sale - GCC:GCC Lighthouse Winmore - First Loading in Oct 2017 - (67.81 + .25) * 15,000 MT * 7.5 * 110%</td> <td>112,500</td> <td>75.966</td> <td>8,546,175.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Payment and Remittance Advice to GLOBAL SGP PTE LTD [REDACTED]</td> <td>PAYMENT BALANCE DUE</td> <td>8,546,175.00 USD 0.00 SGD 0.00</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		ACTIVITY	QTY	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT	Sale - GCC:GCC Lighthouse Winmore - First Loading in Oct 2017 - (67.81 + .25) * 15,000 MT * 7.5 * 110%	112,500	75.966	8,546,175.00	Payment and Remittance Advice to GLOBAL SGP PTE LTD [REDACTED]	PAYMENT BALANCE DUE	8,546,175.00 USD 0.00 SGD 0.00
ACTIVITY	QTY	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT									
Sale - GCC:GCC Lighthouse Winmore - First Loading in Oct 2017 - (67.81 + .25) * 15,000 MT * 7.5 * 110%	112,500	75.966	8,546,175.00									
Payment and Remittance Advice to GLOBAL SGP PTE LTD [REDACTED]	PAYMENT BALANCE DUE	8,546,175.00 USD 0.00 SGD 0.00										

PAID

Source: The Panel

Annex 24: Bank account used by Oceanic Enterprise Ltd. for payments relating to the *Lighthouse Winmore* showing a Kaohsiung City address

----- **Instance Type and Transmission** -----

Notification (Transmission) of Original sent to SWIFT (ACK)
 Network Delivery Status : Network Ack
 Priority/Delivery : Normal
 Message Input Reference : 1530 170904TCBBTWTHA1037003793162

----- **Message Header** -----

Swift Input : FIN 103 Single Customer Credit Transfer
 Sender : TCBBTWTH103
 TAICHUNG COMMERCIAL BANK
 (KAOHSIUNG BRANCH)
 KAOHSIUNG TW

Receiver :



MUR : 2017090410901030

----- **Message Text** -----

20: Sender's Reference

NOBUTT706661-103

23B: Bank Operation Code

CNRP

32A: Val Dte/Curr/Interbnk SettId Amt

Date : 04 September 2017

Currency : USD (US DOLLAR)

Amount : #375000,00#

50K: Ordering Customer-Name & Address

/109270010061

OCEANIC ENTERPRISE LTD.

3F., NO.218, WUFU 4TH RD., YANCHENG

DIST., KAOHSIUNG CITY 80344, TAIWAN

57A: Account With Institution - FI BIC

DHBKHKHH

DBS BANK (HONG KONG) LIMITED

HONG KONG HK

59: Beneficiary Customer-Name & Addr



70: Remittance Information

INV.LHWM-17/18(1)

71A: Details of Charges

SHA

Source: The Panel

Annex 25: Bank account used by Oceanic Enterprise Ltd. for payments relating to the *Lighthouse Winmore* showing a Marshall Islands address

CHECKLIST FOR SWIFT MESSAGE

REF. NO : 7NFAH1T805570

VER. NO : 002 TX

SWIFT MESSAGE COV202

RECEIVER CITIUS33

PRIORITY N1 OBS PERIOD 20 BANK PRIORITY

USER REF

TAG CONTENT

20 TRANSACTION REFERENCE NUMBER

7NFAH1T805570

21 REFERENCE TO RELATED MESSAGE/TRANSACTION

7NFAH1T805570

32A VALUE DATE, CURRENCY CODE, AMOUNT

170919USD115680,30

58A BENEFICIARY BANK (ISO ID)

DHBKHKHH

50K ORDERING CUSTOMER

/01800700010736

OCEANIC ENTERPRISE LTD.

TURST COMPANY COMPLEX, AJELTAKE ROAD

AJELTAKE ISLAND, MAJURO, MARSHALL

ISLAND MH96960

59 BENEFICIARY

*** END OF CHECKLIST ***

Source: The Panel

Annex 26: List of DPRK tankers

	Name (Alphabetic)	Name (Korean)	IMO Number	Gross Tonnage (GT)
1	An San 1	안산 1	7303803	1,757
2	Po Chon (a.k.a. Bochon)	보천	8848276	1,996
3	Chong Rim 1	청림 1	n/a	n/a
4	Chong Rim 2 (a.k.a Saabyol)	새별	8916293	1,595
5	Chong Rim 3	청림 3	8665131	1,377
6	Chon Ma San	천마산	8660313	2,808
7	Chon Myong 1	천명 1	8712362	1,220
8	Ji Song 6	지성 6	8898740	841
9	Ko Song 1	고성 1	8977900	498
10	Kum Gang 3	금강 3	8966535	815
11	Kum Un San	금은산	8720436	1,023
12	Kum Un San 2 [Callsign HMYZ9]	금은산 2	n/a	n/a
13	Kum Un San 3	금은산 3	8705539	1,995
14	Ma Du San (a.k.a. Maducan or Samma)	마두산	8021579	418
15	Nam San 8	남산 8	8122347	1,914
16	Paek Ma	백마	9066978	1,181
17	Rye Son Gang 1 (a.k.a. Ryesonggang)	례성강 1	7389704	1,757
18	Ryong Bong 1 (a.k.a. Ryongbong1)	령봉 1	8610461	999
19	Sam Jong 1	삼정 1	8405311	1,038
20	Sam Jong 2	삼정 2	7408873	1,676
21	Sam Ma 2 (a.k.a. Samma2)	삼마 2	8106496	962
22	Song Won (a.k.a. Songwon)	송원	8613360	996
23	Tong Hung 5 (a.k.a. Tonghung5 or Kang Nam 3)	동흥 5	8151415	283
24	Yu Jong 2 (a.k.a. Yujong-2)	유정 2	8604917	748
25	Yu Phyong 5 (a.k.a. Yupyong5)	유평 5	8605026	795
26	Yu Son (a.k.a. Yuson)	유선	8691702	2,228

Source: Member State

Annex 27: Italy: Western Representative of Mansudae Art Studio

Version of website accessed on 26 September 2017



The Official Web-Site Abroad of the Mansudae Art Studio

With a labor force of approximately 4000 people, 1000 of which artists, and an area of over 120,000 square meters, 80,000 of which indoor, the Mansudae Art Studio is probably the largest art production center in the world and by far the largest and most important of the country.

It was founded on November 17, 1959 in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Only six years had elapsed since the terrible Korean War (1950-1953) in which about 20% of the population of the country had died and most cities were completely destroyed.

The Studio is divided in 13 creative groups, several manufacturing plants and more than 50 exhibition departments. The artists works realized at the Mansudae Art Studio range from oil paintings to bronze sculptures, from Korean Paintings (ink on paper) to ceramics, from woodcuts to embroidery, from jewel paintings (made with precious or semiprecious stones reduced to powder) to charcoal drawings and much more.

The Mansudae Art Studio is not a sort of chain factory, like some Chinese and other Oriental centers, nor a school, but a very high quality art production center. The vast majority of the major art works of the country have been realized by Mansudae Art Studio artists. Their ages go from mid 20's to mid 80's and almost all are graduates of the very demanding Pyongyang University. Over half of the Merit Artists and of the People's Artists, the two highest awards an artist can receive in DPRK, are or have been members of the Mansudae Art Studio. This web-site presents officially the Mansudae Art Studio and its works to the West, and in general abroad, also to contrast the unauthorized use of the name by several Western and Asian web-sites and galleries. This web-site is managed from Italy following an agreement of exclusivity between the Mansudae Art Studio and the Italian Pier Luigi Cecioni. Works bought through this site are sold and shipped from Italy by an Italian company and they are accompanied by a certificate that guarantees they are made by Mansudae Art Studio artists.


The Mansudae Art Studio at the 798 Art District in Beijing



Many of the most important Chinese galleries, several foreign ones and a few academies, museums and foundations have an exhibition space in the 798 Art District. The exhibitions and the numerous events held in those spaces are usually of the highest quality, in line with the leading role in contemporary art that China is now playing, especially in terms of auction sales.

Since 2009 the Mansudae Art Studio is present in the 798 with its own vast, elegant, almost museum-like space called in fact Mansudae Art Museum, though most exhibited works are for sale. This presence, besides promoting sales of Mansudae artists' works, is a testimony of the position that the Mansudae Art Studio is occupying on the contemporary art scene. The works exhibited in the Mansudae Art Museum in Beijing are comparable to some of those that can be found in this web-site. Their price is usually higher since they are offered mainly to Chinese collectors that have more familiarity with Mansudae artists.

North Korea: a Unique Country Contemporary Artists from North Korea



A prominent feature is the works' unusual size: they are all 10 x 12 cm. The reason for this choice is that Luciano Benetton—co-founder, co-owner and iconic figure of the Benetton Group—is aiming to realize, in effect, a world atlas of contemporary art by collecting a large number of works from as many countries as possible. The small size, the same for all countries (as is the approximate number of works for each country), reflects, first of all, a practical need: it would be almost impossible to collect thousands of art works of "normal" size. Moreover, this homogeneity allows a comparison, a more intense dialogue, among the different countries, especially when all the works of one country are inserted in the displays realized by the architect Tobia Scarpa, and then placed one next to the other.

The works for North Korea: a Unique Country have been realized at the Mansudae Art Studio, the Pyongyang art center where the vast majority of the most accomplished North Korean artists work. The techniques represented are virtually all those employed in the country: ink, oil, acrylic, woodcut, embroidery, drawing, tempera, calligraphy, watercolor and jewel painting. This last consists in using precious or semiprecious stones that are crushed

How to buy a work

Almost all works shown in this web-site are on sale. To buy, first use the form you can open below to ask about the work you are interested in (availability and price). Please provide your identification data (name, e-mail, address, phone number). Unidentified inquiries will not be answered.

Once you know if the work is available, you are satisfied with its price and you decide to buy, communicate your intention to reserve the work. Make the payment by PayPal or bank transfer to the account you will give. Once the payment is received the work will be shipped to you within three working days.

All transactions are made with an Italian company, not directly with the Mansudae Art Studio nor with any North Korean company. The transactions are regulated by Italian (European) law and shipping are made from Italy.

How to purchase

Do you want to hold an exhibition of Mansudae Art Studio works?

Museums, galleries, public institutions interested in holding exhibitions can contact us to evaluate the possibilities and, in case, to define the projects. The requesting parties must have very good artistic and cultural reputation.

All agreements are managed by an Italian company and all direct contacts are with it. The works are shipped from Italy.

Korean Posters



DPRK (North Korea) is the only country which still utilizes posters to convey social and political messages to its people.

A form of art in itself—once popular in China and in Soviet Union—these posters are hand-painted, typically using tempera, by artists most of which realize also other kinds of paintings. Besides their artistic value, these posters, with their writings and their messages, offer a view on the unique North Korean society and have a strong political interest.


The web-site www.koreanposters.com presents a large selection, periodically updated, of original North Korean posters for sale.

Whois mansudeartstudio.org

Domain Name: MANSUDEARTSTUDIO.ORG
 Registry Domain ID: D127541223-LROR
 Registrar WHOIS Server:
 Registrar URL: http://www.tucows.com
 Updated Date: 2016-12-17T10:32:29Z
 Creation Date: 2006-08-20T19:04:14Z
 Registry Expiry Date: 2017-08-20T19:04:14Z
 Registrar: Tucows Inc.
 Registrar IANA ID: 69
 Registrar Abuse Contact Email:
 Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:
 Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
 Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
 Registry Registrant ID: tu4OnAf5d5zchLk
 Registrant Name: Petra srl Petra srl
 Registrant Organization: Pier Luigi Cecioni
 Registrant Street: via Aretina 151 L
 Registrant City: Pontassieve
 Registrant State/Province: FI
 Registrant Postal Code: 50065
 Registrant Country: IT
 Registrant Phone: +39.3939154488
 Registrant Phone Ext:
 Registrant Fax: +39.02700414102
 Registrant Fax Ext:
 Registrant Email: info@edizioniipetra.com
 Registry Admin ID: tuy50exDPhAoPww
 Admin Name: Petra srl Petra srl
 Admin Organization: Pier Luigi Cecioni
 Admin Street: via Aretina 151 L
 Admin City: Pontassieve
 Admin State/Province: FI
 Admin Postal Code: 50065
 Admin Country: IT
 Admin Phone: +39.3939154488
 Admin Phone Ext:
 Admin Fax: +39.02700414102
 Admin Fax Ext:
 Admin Email: info@edizioniipetra.com
 Registry Tech ID: tugFVb71do02MOPD
 Tech Name: Petra srl Petra srl
 Tech Organization: Pier Luigi Cecioni
 Tech Street: via Aretina 151 L
 Tech City: Pontassieve
 Tech State/Province: FI
 Tech Postal Code: 50065
 Tech Country: IT

Source: The Panel

Advertising as Western Representative Office of Mansude Art Studio



Whois mansudeartstudio.org

Domain Name: MANSUDEARTSTUDIO.ORG
 Registry Domain ID: D127541223-LROR
 Registrar WHOIS Server:
 Registrar URL: <http://www.tucows.com>
 Updated Date: 2016-12-17T10:32:29Z
 Creation Date: 2006-08-20T19:04:14Z
 Registry Expiry Date: 2017-08-20T19:04:14Z
 Registrar: Tucows Inc.
 Registrar IANA ID: 69
 Registrar Abuse Contact Email:
 Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:
 Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited <https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited>
 Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited <https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited>
 Registry Registrant ID: tul40nAfSd9zzhLk
 Registrant Name: Petra srl Petra srl
 Registrant Organization: Pier Luigi Cecioni
 Registrant Street: via Aretina 151 L
 Registrant City: Pontassieve
 Registrant State/Province: FI
 Registrant Postal Code: 50065
 Registrant Country: IT
 Registrant Phone: +39.3939154488
 Registrant Phone Ext:
 Registrant Fax: +39.02700414102
 Registrant Fax Ext:
 Registrant Email: info@edizionipetra.com
 Registry Admin ID: tuy50exxDPhAoPww
 Admin Name: Petra srl Petra srl
 Admin Organization: Pier Luigi Cecioni
 Admin Street: via Aretina 151 L
 Admin City: Pontassieve
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 Admin Postal Code: 50065
 Admin Country: IT
 Admin Phone: +39.3939154488
 Admin Phone Ext:
 Admin Fax: +39.02700414102
 Admin Fax Ext:
 Admin Email: info@edizionipetra.com
 Registry Tech ID: tugFWb71do02MOPD
 Tech Name: Petra srl Petra srl
 Tech Organization: Pier Luigi Cecioni
 Tech Street: via Aretina 151 L
 Tech City: Pontassieve
 Tech State/Province: FI
 Tech Postal Code: 50065
 Tech Country: IT

Source: The Panel

Annex 28: DPRK prohibited activities in Mozambique

Examples of documentary evidence of military cooperation between the DPRK and Mozambique



Ref № KMN-

Re: Visit by a Korean Delegation

The Economic and Trade Representative Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Maputo presents its compliments to the National Directorate for Defense Policy of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Mozambique and has the honor to request the latter to kindly arrange to send a visa issue instruction to the Consulate, Republic of Mozambique in Beijing, China for the following Passport holders who are going to visit the Economic and Trade Representative Mission of DPR Korea in Maputo and other Korean Delegations in Mozambique for the understanding of our work from 30 Oct. 2015. The passport data for the members are as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Name: Kim Kang Chol | Date of Birth: 23/09/1969 |
| | Passport №: PS 745220482 |
| 2. Name: Pak Ho Hyon | Date of Birth: 09/04/1968 |
| | Passport №: PS 745320662 |
| 3. Name: Pak Choi Ung | Date of Birth: 19/02/1981 |

The Economic and Trade Representative Mission of DPR Korea in the Republic of Mozambique avails itself of this opportunity to renew to your Directorate the assurances of its highest considerations.

The National Directorate of Defense Policy
Ministry of National Defense,
Republic of Mozambique
Maputo

Maputo, Oct. 13, 2015

PAEK SONG SAN
Representative

Bairro Malhangalene, R/C No. 1224, Av. Mao Tse Tung, Maputo, Mozambique
Tel: +258 84 9573001, +258 21 400173, E-Mail: madesan@idm.co.mz

Source: The Panel



CONFIDENCIAL

REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE FOR DEFENCE POLICY

To:
Economic & Trade Representative Mission of
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
MAPUTO

Ref: Maputo 16/2015 /DNPD/MDN/2015 Maputo 16 October 2015

Subject: Letter of Invitation

The National Directorate for Defence Policy presents its compliments to the Economic & Trade Representative Mission of Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has the honour to invite the following members to visit Maputo in October 2015 in order to conduct an inspection on the joint project between the two Ministries of Defence of Mozambique and Korea:

1. Mr. Kim Kang Chol -----PS 745220482
2. Mr. Pak Ho Hyon-----PS 745320662
3. Mr. Pak Chel Ung-----PS 775420128

The National Directorate for Defence Policy avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate to the Economic & Trade Representative Mission of Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Maputo the assurances of its highest consideration.



Cc: Embassy of Mozambique in Beijing

SIC / DNPD / MDN	
Enviado	Entregado
Nº	5A84
Data	06/10/15
Ass.	A. T. M.

Source: The Panel

**Mr. Ri Chang Su, (Passport No. 927310139, DOB: 29 April 1967),
Third Economic and Commercial Secretary at the DPRK embassy
in South Africa, Haegumgang Trading Corporation representative
responsible for military cooperation with Mozambique**




Source: The Panel

Single undated invoice for \$6 million contract provided by Monte Binga

INVOICE					
First Box		001111			
No.		Model	Qty	unit	Amount (USD)
1	cabinet	130x50x10cm	2	set	600
2	computer	acer DC	3	set	3000
3	electric wire	RVVP10x0.5	50	m	100
4	electric wire	RVVP12x0.5	50	m	125
Second Box		001111			
No.	Item	Model	Qty	unit	Amount (USD)
1	Three phase engine generator	7.5kW, SAW7000E	2	set	14000
2	UPS	SUNTEK K1000	5	set	500
3	空调	Hissense 1P	2	set	20
Third Box		001111			
No.	Item	Model	Qty	unit	Amount (USD)
1	power electric wire	PK-50 35mm ²	50	m	50
2	MODEM>Select	WAVESHOW VAG 19.2Kbps	1000	m	200
3	enamel copper wire	2.5mm	1	kg	100
4	"	1.2mm	4	"	150
5	"	1mm	7	"	580
6	"	0.6mm	1	"	240
7	"	0.25mm	1	"	150
8	electric wire	RVV 3x25	100	m	100
9	electric wire	RVVP 4x3	10	m	10
10	electric wire	RVVP 2x3	20	m	20
11	automatic stabilizer	JONCHEN 2kVA	5	set	500
12	oscilloscope	UNIT UT2050CE, 50MHz 2 channels	2	set	2000
13	telephone	DEX 869	3	set	90
14	display	Acer 23"	5	set	500
15	keyboard, mouse	"	5	set	50
16	3D speaker	"	5	set	180
Fourth Box		001111			
No.	Item	Model	Qty	unit	Amount (USD)
1	Diode	ACR300SG11	4	pc	4
2	Resistor	BPR300, 600R, K11006	4	pc	2
3	"	BPR600, 3R3, K11006	2	pc	1
4	power supply	AC/DC = 24V, 12A	2	pc	30
5	Teflon wire	Φ 0.1mm	10	m	10
6	electric wire	2273EC01(BV) 450V, insulated 15mm	10	m	10
7	tape	15mm	40	pc	20
8	soldering paste	M-150	3	tray	3
9	soldering iron	Φ2mm	2	reel	2
10	"	Φ1mm	2	"	2
11	"	Φ0.5mm	2	"	2
12	oil magic	red, blue, black	3	set	5
13	socket	25A/4 ports	6	pc	30
14	parts for hydraulic device	high pressure tube, tools, engine starter	15	set	300
Fifth Box		001111			
No.	Item	Model	Qty	unit	Amount (USD)
1	copper plate	thickness 0.35mm, 30x50cm	2	pc	30
2	tool box	Ak52	3	set	200
3	electric wire	Φ1mm	2	reel	100
4	"	Φ2mm	2	"	200
5	"	Φ0.75mm	3	"	300
6	"	Φ0.5mm	3	"	300
7	"	Φ0.35mm	3	"	340
8	heat shrink tube	Φ40mm red, blue, black	100	m	100
Sixth Box		001111			
No.	Item	Model	Qty	unit	Amount (USD)
44	bolt, nut	M3,	100	set	100
45	"	M4,	100	set	100
46	"	M5,	100	set	50
47	"	M6,	50	set	800
48	terminal	Φ3	100	pc	300
49	"	Φ4	100	pc	300
50	"	Φ5	100	pc	300
51	"	Φ6	50	pc	150
52	resistor	10KL 1206, 2W	10	pc	5
53	"	100KL 0.25W	40	pc	20
54	"	130KL 3W	20	pc	10
55	"	154KL 0.25W	40	pc	20
56	"	10003 1W 0812	5	pc	10
57	"	10KL 0.25W 0812	5	pc	10
58	capacitor	470uF, 450V, CBB	5	pc	5
59	"	0.47uF, 2KV	6	pc	12
60	"	0.047uF, 2KV	10	pc	20
61	"	0.1uF	60	pc	60
62	IGBT	ST51N150	2	pc	20
63	DC/DC	NM-H1212DC	2	pc	80
64	IC	74104	5	pc	5
65	IC	PC923	2	pc	2
66	SMA cable	10, 20, 40cm	4	set	200
67	soldering iron	AC 220V, 100W	2	pc	40
68	"	AC 220V, 60W	2	pc	40
69	heat blowing solder	KAWH 852D	1	set	200
70	heat blower	TH48611B	1	set	50
71	digital tester	DT9208A	3	set	300
72	tester	SUNWA YX560TRF	3	set	100
73	adhesive	302	20	pc	40
74	"	502	20	pc	40

Source: Monte Binga

Images of the Susan 1 and Susan 2 with DPRK markings



Name of vessels in Korean

Political slogans praising DPRK leadership

Source: The Panel

Letter from the Mozambique Ministry of Defence to the DPRK Ministry of Defence



The Ministry of National Defence of Republic of Mozambique presents its compliments to the Ministry of the Armed Defence Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has the honor to inform that the Republic of Mozambique as a Member State of United Nations Organization (UN) has been notified by the latter in regard to the implementation by our country of Resolution 1874 (2009) and several other UN Resolutions related to sanctions imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.


The abovementioned notification indicates that the UN Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by the Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) 20194 (2013) and 2270 (2016) is carrying out an investigation over incidents of non-compliance of the aforesaid resolutions.

The Panel has indicated that it intends to visit our country next week in order to gather reliable and verifiable information regarding the suspicions of non-compliance.

In light of the above and of the long historical ties and cooperation that links our two countries, the Ministry of National Defence of Republic of Mozambique wishes to inform through this letter, that in order to conform to the UN Security Council resolutions, the Republic of Mozambique has decided to temporarily suspend, with

immediate effect, all the activities under the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement reached upon between our two Ministries.

The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Mozambique avails its self of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Armed Defence Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the assurances of its highest consideration.

The Minister

Atanásio Salvador M'tumuke

To:

The Ministry of Armed Defence Forces
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Pyong Yang

Ref: 160/GM/MDN/2016
Maputo, 16th September 2016

Az. Martírios de Mueda nº 280/373, Telef: 49200114, 490642/493690, Fax 491699/493189/492020, Telex 6-331 MO-MDN, C.F. nº 3214
MAPUTO, MOÇAMBIQUE

Source: Mozambique

Annex 29: Contract between Crist and Armex

Załącznik nr 19

Strona 1 z 3

Umowa o dzieło

zawarta dnia: 2014-07-01 w Gdańsku pomiędzy: ARMEX SP. Z O. O.
 adres: 80-955 Gdańsk, Marynarki Polskiej 96
 rejestr: Sąd Rejonowy Gd.-Płn. VII Wydz. KRS nr 0000163921
 reprezentant:
 nip: PL 584-025-17-29 zwany dalej Zamawiającym,
 a: Grupa Koreńska:

Nr	Nazwisko	Imię	Nr paszportu	Miejsce zameldowania
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
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44				

Nr	Nazwisko	Imię	Nr paszportu	Miejsce zameldowania
25				
26				
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§1

W ramach niniejszej umowy Zamawiający powierza, a Wykonawca zobowiązuje się do:

wykonania dzieła: Budowa sekcji okrętowych oraz prefabrykacji wyposażenia na nowobudowanych jednostkach NB369, NB69/2, NB305, NB306, NB371, NB302, NB374, NB428, NB373, NB378 w zakresie prac szlachetniczych – łącznie 1700 ton konstrukcji stalowej oraz 100 ton wyposażenia.

miejsce wykonania: Polska, Crist SA, 81-336 Gdynia, Czechosłowacka 3, 583-000-54-43, zwane dalej Kontrahentem Zamawiającym.

[REDACTED]

§2

Termin wykonania:

rozpoczęcie: 2014-07-01

zakończenie: 2014-12-31

Zamawiający może skrócić lub przedłużyć termin wykonania dzieła.

§3

Wynagrodzenie za prawidłowe wykonanie umowy:

wartość:

podstawa zapłaty: wystawiony rachunek przez Wykonawcę

termin płatności: zaliczkowo każdego miesiąca wypłaca się po [REDACTED] zł dla każdej osoby, ostateczne rozliczenie po

płatność: wykonaniu zadania

płatność: płatność w PLN

§4

inne:

badania lekarskie: badania lekarskie po stronie Zamawiającego

odzież i wyposażenie: odzież ochronna po stronie Wykonawcy

zakwaterowanie: nie dotyczy

posiłki: nie dotyczy

narzędzia: po stronie Wykonawcy

§5

Wykonawca zobowiązuje się do:

- 1) Wykonywania dzieła zgodnie z ustaleniami z Zamawiającym,
- 2) Wykonywania dzieła rzetelnie i w terminie wskazanym w § 2, mając na uwadze ustalenia w §3,
- 3) Zachowania poufności wszystkich informacji, które uzyska w terminie wykonywania dzieła, które stanowią tajemnice handlową Zamawiającego i jego Kontrahenta,
- 4) Nie podejmowania żadnych rozmów z Kontrahentem Zamawiającego dotyczących kwestii finansowych,
- 5) Nie podejmowania jakichkolwiek czynności mających na celu uzyskanie informacji od osób trzecich, związanych z przedmiotem niniejszej umowy, które stanowią tajemnice handlową Zamawiającego,
- 6) Zaniechanie spożywania alkoholu w jakiejkolwiek postaci przez cały okres trwania umowy zarówno w czasie wykonywania dzieła i w czasie wolnym,
- 7) Przestrzegania u Kontrahenta obowiązujących przepisów, a w szczególności dotyczących bezpieczeństwa pracy z ogniem,
- 8) Nie podejmowania pracy w jakiejkolwiek formie z Kontrahentem Zamawiającego przez cały Okres trwania umowy.

§6

W przypadku nie wykonania dzieła w terminie, wykonania go wadliwie lub w sposób nienależyty Zamawiający ma prawo do pomniejszenia wynagrodzenia lub anulowania zamówienia bez odszkodowania.

- 1) Naruszenie zobowiązań Wykonawcy wymienionych w § 5 będzie traktowane przez Zamawiającego jako poważne naruszenie warunków niniejszej Umowy.
- 2) Naruszenie zobowiązań Wykonawcy wymienionych w § 5 będzie skutkować prawem Zamawiającego do rozwiązania niniejszej umowy ze skutkiem natychmiastowym. W takim przypadku koszty przejazdu w obie strony oraz inne koszty ponosi całkowicie Wykonawca.
- 3) W przypadku poniesienia jakichkolwiek strat z tytułu naruszenia przez Wykonawcę jego zobowiązań, a także narażenie dobrego imienia Zamawiającego, Zamawiający ma prawo do obniżenia wynagrodzenia do 60% jej wartości.

§7

- 1) Wykonawca ponosi odpowiedzialność materialną za zużycie ilościowe i assortimentowe materiałów oraz za powierzonej sprzęt i narzędzia.

- 2) Wykonawca oświadcza, że:

- a) posiada odpowiednie i aktualne badania lekarskie,
- b) jest przeszkolony w zakresie BHP i Ppoz. na standowisku pracy,
- c) posiada odpowiednie kwalifikacje do samodzielnego wykonywania dzieła bez nadzoru,
- d) jest ubezpieczony i posiada zaświadczenie uprawniające do świadczeń rzeczowych (zdrowotnych) podczas pobytu w państwie członkowskim EOG,
- e) rezygnuje z dobrowolnego ubezpieczenia społecznego chorobowego, emerytalnego i rentowego.

13/1

Strona 3 z 3

§8

Zamiarem stron tej umowy jest, by nic co jest zawarte w Umowie, nie było uważane za tworzenie i oznaki stosunku zatrudnienia pomiędzy Zamawiającym a Wykonawcą, a Wykonawca odstępuje od jakichkolwiek takich roszczeń, również wobec Kontrahenta Zamawiającego.

§9

Jakiekolwiek zmiany w niniejszej umowie mogą być dokonane tylko w formie pisemnej pod rygorem nieważności. Strony nie mogą powoływać się na ustalenia pozaumowne.

§10

W sprawach nieuregulowanych niniejszą umową stosuje się przepisy Kodeksu Cywilnego. Właściwym do rozstrzygania sporów mogących wyniknąć w wyniku realizacji niniejszej umowy jest Sąd Rejonowy w Gdańsku.

§11

Umowa została sporządzona w dwóch jednobrzmiących egzemplarzach, po jednym dla każdej ze stron.

Zamawiający:

Cecylia Kowalska – Prezes Zarządu

Maciej Kowalski – Członek Zarządu

Wykonawca:

Nr.	Nazwisko	Imię	Podpis
1			
2			
3			
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18			
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20	K.		
21	K.		
22	K.		

Nr.	Nazwisko	Imię	Podpis
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24			
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Source: The Panel

Annex 30: Agreement between Armex and Rungrado

Kwoty w PLN
(5 dnia)

UMOWA

Na usługi kooperacyjne w zakresie demontażu, montażu i spawania konstrukcji stalowych z dnia 2012-07-01 zawarta pomiędzy:

Armex Sp. z o. o.
z siedzibą: 80-955 Gdańsk, ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96
NIP: 584-025-17-29
reprezentowanym przez:

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]

Zwanym dalej Zamawiającym
a

KOREA RUNGRADO GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION

reprezentowanym przez: [REDACTED]

Zwanym dalej WYKONAWCĄ

§ 1 Definicje

O ile w dalszej części Umowy będzie występować określenie ZLECAJĄCY należy przez to rozumieć firmę kontraktującą sekcje/bloki statków.

§ 2 Przedmiot Umowy

1. Zamawiający zleca, a Wykonawca przyjmuje do wykonania spawanie prefabrykowanych i montowanych sekcji oraz bloków statków na jedn. NB142/2, B68/1-4, NB38/1-2 wg załączonego harmonogramu.
2. Wykonywanie prac będzie odbywało się na jednostkach w oparciu o dostarczoną dokumentację i zgodnie ze standardami i normami obowiązującymi.
3. Nadzór nad wykonywanymi pracami będą pełnili przedstawiciele Zamawiającego, lub wyznaczeni przez niego ludzie, wspólnie z przedstawicielem Wykonawcy.
4. Wykonawca zobowiązuje się do wykonania zleconej pracy zgodnie z obowiązującą technologią, zgodnie z wymogami i przepisami BHP oraz ppoż.

2

§ 3 Cena umowna

1. Za wykonane prace Zamawiający zapłaci Wykonawcy jedynie kwotę wynikającą ze stawki umownej, pod warunkiem, iż Zamawiający i Zlecający przyjmą bez zastrzeżeń wykonany przez Wykonawcę zakres prac, a powyższe znajdzie potwierdzenie w protokole zdawczo-odbiorczym podpisany pomiędzy Wykonawcą i Zamawiającym, na warunkach określonych poniżej.
2. W przypadku prac w systemie godzinowym stawka będzie wynosić [] PLN (dwadzieścia 00/100) za roboczągodzinę.

§ 4 Nadzór i Koordynacja prac

1. Prace należy wykonywać w oparciu o dostarczone przez Zamawiającego:
 - a. dokumentację techniczną i technologiczną
 - b. ramowy wykaz odbiorów kadłuba
 - c. ramową technologię remontu i budowy kadłuba poszczególnych jednostek
 - d. plan kontroli spoin
 - e. plan prób szczelności
 - f. książkę odbiorów prac
 - g. poleceń nadzoru Zamawiającego

§ 5 Obowiązki Wykonawcy

1. W celu realizacji Umowy Wykonawca zgodnie z procedurą prawną obowiązującą przy zatrudnianiu obcokrajowców, oddeleguje do siedziby Zamawiającego wykwalifikowanych pracowników w zawodzie spawaczy, posiadających:
 - a. stosowne kwalifikacje i uprawnienia
 - b. praktykę stoczniową
 - c. dodatkowo Wykonawca oddeleguje minimum 1 pracownika do nadzoru nad pracami prowadzonymi przez Wykonawcę na terenie Zamawiającego
2. Wykonawca gwarantuje:
 - a. dobrą jakość prac wykonywanych przez swoich pracowników
 - b. odpowiednią wydajność pracy
 - c. podporządkowanie się pracowników Wykonawcy wszelkim przepisom, normom i zasadom obowiązującym na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

2

- W przypadku niespełnienia któregokolwiek z ww. punktów przez pracowników Wykonawcy Zamawiający ma prawo do:
- a. żądania zadośćuczynienia
 - b. żądania przysłania innego pracownika na koszt Wykonawcy
 - c. odstąpienia od Umowy, bez zachowania okresu wypowiedzenia.
3. Nieuzasadnione przekroczenia zużycia ilościowego i asortymentowego materiałów obciążają finansowo Wykonawcę.
 4. Wykonawca od momentu przekazania materiałów, jak również udostępnienia mienia Zamawiającego, Zlecającego lub osób trzecich, do czasu odbioru prac lub zdania mienia ponosi pełną odpowiedzialność materialną za ich uszkodzenie, zagubienie lub zniszczenie wynikłe tylko z winy Wykonawcy.
 5. W przypadku niespełnienia wymogów jakościowych i terminowych przez pracowników Wykonawcy, wynikłych z winy Wykonawcy, Zamawiający zastrzega sobie prawo do odstąpienia od Umowy bez zachowania okresu wypowiedzenia.
 6. Kierownicy remontu, kierownicy wydziałowi, mistrzowie, inspektorzy Bhp i ppoż. i inni uprawnieni przez Zamawiającego lub Zlecającego mają prawo do kontroli pracowników Wykonawcy pod względem przestrzegania przepisów, norm i zasad:
 - a. prawnych obowiązujących w Polsce
 - b. przepisów Bhp i ppoż.
 - c. współżycia społecznego
- Przedstawiciele wyznaczeni do ww. kontroli są uprawnieni do wydawania wskazówek dotyczących respektowania ww. przepisów. W przypadku nie podporządkowania się pracowników Wykonawcy ww. zaleceniom Zamawiający ma prawo do odesłania pracownika łamiącego przepisy do Wykonawcy a nawet ma prawo do odstąpienia od niniejszej Umowy bez zachowania okresu wypowiedzenia. Prawo do odesłania pracownika do Wykonawcy przysługuje również w przypadku niespełnienia przez Wykonawcę gwarancji omówionych w punkcie 2 niniejszego paragrafu.
7. Zamawiający nie ponosi winy za zdarzenia (w tym wypadki) zaistniałe przy pracy pracowników Wykonawcy, wynikłe z nieprzestrzegania stosownych przepisów.
 8. Wykonawca pokryje wszelkie szkody osobowe i majątkowe spowodowane przez swoich pracowników osobom trzecim i Zamawiającemu.

§ 6 Czas trwania Umowy

1. Umowa zostaje zawarta na czas określony od ██████████
2. Zamawiającemu przysługuje prawo do wcześniejszego rozwiązania niniejszej Umowy z 3-miesięcznym okresem wypowiedzenia.
3. W przypadku naruszenia postanowień Umowy Zamawiającemu, tak jak i Wykonawcy przysługuje prawo do odstąpienia od Umowy ze skutkiem natychmiastowym.
4. Przy rozwiązaniu Umowy wymaga się pisemnego powiadomienia drugiej strony z miesięcznym wyprzedzeniem.

§ 7 Warunki płatności

1. Wykonanie prac zapisuje się w protokole prac wykonywanych, co miesiąc zgodnie z postępem wykonywanych prac. Obliczenia wykonuje się co miesiąc.
2. Wartość prac ujętych w kontraktie uwzględnia wynagrodzenie Wykonawcy i wszystkie jego koszty związane z wykonaniem tej Umowy: utrzymywanie pracowników, koszty prac itd., jak również wszystkie podatki i opłaty obowiązkowe do zapłacenia przez Wykonawcę.

§ 8 Postanowienia końcowe

1. Do wykonania Umowy i rozstrzygania sporów z nią związanych oraz w sprawach nieuregulowanych niniejszą Umową mają zastosowanie przepisy prawa polskiego.
2. Wszelkie spory wynikłe w trakcie realizacji Umowy rozstrzygać będzie Sąd Powszechny w Gdańsku
3. Wszelkie zmiany do niniejszej Umowy mogą być wprowadzone w formie aneksu pod rygorem nieważności.
4. Strony nie ponoszą odpowiedzialności za częściowe lub całkowite niewykonanie zobowiązań Umowy, jeżeli to niewykonanie nastąpiło na skutek okoliczności siły wyższej.

Za okoliczności siły wyższej poczytuje się okoliczności, które powstały po zawarciu Umowy, na skutek nieprzewidzianych przez Stronę zdarzeń o charakterze nadzwyczajnym, jak: wojnę, klęski żywiołowe, strajki oraz działania rządowe i administracyjne uniemożliwiające wykonanie zobowiązań Umowy.

Strona dotknięta siłą wyższą niezwłocznie powiadomi na piśmie drugą Stronę o zaistniałym przypadku siły wyższej. Świadczeniem wystąpienia okoliczności siły wyższej i okresu jej trwania będzie dokument Izby Handlowej Kraju Strony powołującej się na te okoliczności.

Jeżeli na skutek wystąpienia siły wyższej lub innej nieprzewidzianej przez strony sytuacji wykonanie Umowy byłoby prawnie lub faktycznie niemożliwe, to każda ze Stron będzie uprawniona do zawieszenia wykonania niniejszej Umowy.

W takim wypadku Strony w terminie dwóch tygodni podejmą decyzję co do dalszego obowiązywania Umowy lub odstąpienia od Umowy.

W przypadku gdyby okoliczność siły wyższej trwała dłużej niż 30 dni, każda ze Stron będzie miała prawo do rozwiązania niniejszej Umowy z 2-tygodniowym wyprzedzeniem.

ZAMAWIAJĄCY:

Armex sp. z o.o.

ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96
80-955 Gdańsk

ARMEX Spółka z o.o.
80-955 Gdańsk, ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96
NIP 854-025-17-29 REGON 19557577
tel. kom. 509 020 447; 509 019 300

WYKONAWCA:

Korea Rungrado General Trading Corp.

ADD: Segori Dong, Dist. Potonggang
Pyongyang, DPR Korea

KOREA RUNGRADO GENERAL TRADING CORP.
ADD: Segori Dong, Dist. Potonggang
Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Tel: 850-2-18-111 Fax: 810-850-238-14507

Source: The Panel

Annex 31: Extract of the specifications of project NB428 and associated drawings

Karstensens Skibsværft A/S

71,80 m Hull NB 428

Windows (supplied by BUYER) as described under gr. 515.
 Access to wheelhouse top by vertical ladder. Foundations for lights and antenna foundations etc to be fabricated and mounted as per BUYER-drawing.
 Sliding windows to have collection boxes around and drainage pipe.

26 HULL OUTFITTING

261 Hull marks

Ship number on each side forward, on transom and on heli deck to be marked by welding lines. The vessel to be provided with draft marks in decimetres on stem, midship and stern on both sides.
 Draft marks positions to be checked and approved by DMA or Class.
 Hull markings for thrusters and bottom equipment to be fitted.
 Every tenth frame to be marked with respective number for underwater inspections.
 Waterline and tug marks to be arranged by tack welding.
 All bottom tanks to be marked by welding. Marks for tugboats.
 Benchmarks 30 pcs 50x50 mm StSt plates to be fitted at locations as per separate drawing. Plates to be delivered by BUYER.

262 Bottom plugs to be St.St. One type for fuel tanks and different type for water tanks(different head)

Bottom plugs to be mounted in all tanks, bilge wells, engine room, and sonar/thruster room. Plugs to be 3/4" made of stainless steel as per NS (Norwegian Standards). Tank number to be marked with tag welding at side of each plug as per detailed drawing.

In engine room two sea chests (high and low) to be arranged, as described under gr. 220. Top of seachets to be sloped in order to vent sea inlets.
 Bilge wells with removable stainless steel gratings. Wells to be located as per Unit drawings.

263 Foundations


Foundations to be arranged for weapon systems including: 2x MU 09-Torpedo on aft deck (only reinforcement below the deck), foundation radar sight wheelhouse top, foundation 2 DLS launchers frame 20- 25, foundation salute canon, foundation light machinegun, foundation heavy machinegun.

Small foundations for equipment in ER, Gear room etc to be delivered tag welded on its positions.

Alignment of foundations to be after standard stated on the drawings - in general 1mm/ 1m.

All as per supplied drawings.

Foundation for main engine and machinery as per gr. 223.



Source: The Panel

Annex 32: Crist letter to the Panel dated 15 January 2018


CRIST®
 CRIST S.A.
 81-336 Gdynia
 ul. Czechosłowacka 3
 REGON: 003002873
 NIP: 583-00-05-443

tel.: + 48 58 769 33 00
 fax: + 48 58 769 33 01
www.crist.com.pl
 e-mail: biuro@crist.com.pl

Gdynia 15.01.2018 r.

Your reference: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.02

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
 Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
 established pursuant to
 Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

Regarding your letter dated to CRIST S.A. dated of Jan. the 2nd, 2018, and information presented by the panel contained therein, we would like to point out few things that we disagree with. First of all our company acts in accordance with Polish, EU and International law respecting the rules of convention 29 of Internal Labor Organization, concerning forced or compulsory labor, and maintains the highest standards of business ethics in relations with our suppliers, cooperators and workers which is stated in CRIST "Code of Ethics and Good Conduct in Business" (hereinafter: CRIST Code of Conduct). With this said we would like to point out that:

- No cases of employing North Korean workers by CRIST S.A. itself, have ever been applied. In the past, we used to cooperate with company ARMEX Sp. z o. o. This company once employed North Korean workers. Under the cooperation agreement all our suppliers and cooperators are obliged to provide the legality of the employment and compliance with rules and regulations of CRIST Code of Conduct. The ARMEX company was obliged to follow those rules and was under the control of Polish State Labor Inspection. CRIST ceased its cooperation with ARMEX in July 2016, and from that time we had no contact with them. We have never cooperated with Armex to "hire overseas workers from DPRK". ARMEX was one of many subcontractors to our shipyard that was hired to do some welding work on our projects. It is worth mentioning that the workers employed by ARMEX weren't only from DPRK. The ARMEX North Korean workers did some work on our premises, but had never been involved in the project NB 428 as per our statement dated on 05.09.2016 provided to Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The project NB 428 was designated as a multipurpose vessel. In reference we are sending to you the General Arrangement plan which was an attachment to our contract with Karstensens Skibsverft A/S. There are no drawings of military installation in the signed contract documents. Referring to the foundations, they are structural parts which can easily be adapted to serve many future functions, not necessarily for military purposes. It is a common and widely applied practice in the shipbuilding industry to implement some structural solutions at the early stage, which can serve several purposes, but not necessarily be implemented even after many years of service. Furthermore we were assured

IKS: 0000361752
 Ad Rejonowy Gdańsk-Północ
 III Wydział Gospodarczy KRS w Gdańsku
 Kapitał Zakładowy: 769.230,80 zł.

BNP PARIBAS BANK POLSKA S.A.
 77 1600 1303 0004 10071012 2001
 CREDIT AGRICOLE BANK POLSKA S.A.
 49 1940 1076 6601 0283 0000 0000
 PKO BANK POLSKI S.A.



- No cases of employing North Korean workers by CRIST S.A. itself, have ever been applied. In the past, we used to cooperate with company ARMEX Sp. z o. o. This company once employed North Korean workers. Under the cooperation agreement all our suppliers and cooperators are obliged to provide the legality of the employment and compliance with rules and regulations of CRIST Code of Conduct. The ARMEX company was obliged to follow those rules and was under the control of Polish State Labor Inspection. CRIST ceased its cooperation with ARMEX in July 2016, and from that time we had no contact with them. We have never cooperated with Armex to "hire overseas workers from DPRK". ARMEX was one of many subcontractors to our shipyard that was hired to do some welding work on our projects. It is worth mentioning that the workers employed by ARMEX weren't only from DPRK. The ARMEX North Korean workers did some work on our premises, but had never been involved in the project NB 428 as per our statement dated on 05.09.2016 provided to Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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RS: 0000361752
 sđ Rejonowy Górnictw Północ
 III Wydział Gospodarczy KRS w Gdańsku
 Kapitał Zakładowy: 769.230,80 zł.

BNP PARIBAS BANK POLSKA S.A.
 77 1600 110 0004 1007 1012 2001
 CREDIT AGRICOLE BANK POLSKA S.A.
 49 1940 1076 6601 0283 0000 0000
 PKO BANK POLSKI S.A.



Annex 33: Extract of Nauta website

NAUTA Member of: **MARS** Shipyards & Offshore

Start News Ship repairs Ship conversions **Special projects** New buildings Company Contact

Special projects

Apart from the civilian production, Nauta Shiprepair Yard provides services in the area of repair, modifications and building of the naval vessels for the Polish and foreign navies, including, but not limited to the works on board submarines. Having obtained all necessary certificates the total level of the services for the Polish navy has been constantly growing.

The gained experience in repairs of naval vessels, low labour costs and certified quality makes the yard an ideal place for repairs of naval vessels for other NATO countries.



Source: <http://nauta.pl/index.php?special-projects> (accessed on 14 December 2017)

Annex 34: List of Exhibitors to the 20th PITF (Spring)

전람회 참가회사 EXHIBITORS		
KPe.010	우승무역회사 영광가구합영회사 대룡합영회사 칠금무역회사 개성고려인삼무역회사 신발무역회사 파선령선합영회사 수성무역회사 하나천자무역회사 현못기술개발회사 장애자후원회사 장수봉물무역회사 자원개발투자회사 대성3모역회사 항공무역회사 황금벌무역회사 은파산무역회사 조선고려약회사 정성무역회사 무병새기술교류사 경수봉무역회사 은원무역회사 은파산무역회사 강봉무역회사 한성급여회사 고려약수출입회사 만년제약합영회사 조선동방족효약물개발사 류경대외건설총회사 대신후역회사 장명첨단의료품개발교류소 만년보건회사 상원무역회사 장생합작회사 만경식암무역회사 학봉약물의료회사 지농무역회사 로성기술협조교류사 동양무역회사 남강무역회사 대성산무역회사 금은산무역회사 첨단생물공학기술교류사 제약수출입회사 유아무역상사 오가산무역회사 정성무역회사 묘향2무역회사 진영상업기술교류소 금연연구보급소 창공무역회사 수성무역회사 동라888무역총회사 진흥회사	USUNG TRADING CO. YONGGWANG FURNITURE J.V.CO. TAERYONG J.V.CO. CHILGOL TRADING CO. KAESONG KORYO INSAM TRADING CO. FOOTWEAR TRADING CORP. RASON RYONGSON J.V.CO. SUSONG TRADING CORP. HANA ELECTRONICS TRADING CO. RYONMOT TECH.DEV.CO. COMPANY FOR SUPPORTING THE DISABLED JANGSCUDONG TRADING CO. NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT & INVESTMENT CO. DAESONG 3 TRADING CORP. HANGGONG TRADING CO. HWANGGUMBOL TRADING CO. UNPHASAN TRAING CO. KOREA KORYO MEDICINE COMPANY JONGSONG TRADING CORP. MUBYONG NEW TECH. EXCHANGE CENTER KYONG SU BONG TKADING CO. UNWON TRADING CO. JINPHASAN TRADING CORP. KANGBONG TRADING CORP. KONGANG J.V.CO. KORYO MEDICINE IMPORT & EXPORT CO. MANNYON PHARMACEUTICAL J.V.CO. KOREA ORIENTAL INSTANT MEDICINE DEV CENTER. RYUGYONG EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. TAESIN TRADING CO. JANGMYONG HIGH-TECH. MEDICAL SUPPLIES DEV CO. MANNYON HEALTH CORP. SANGWON TRADING CORP. JANGSAENG J.V.CORP. MANGYONG SOGAM TRADING CO. HAKPONG MEDICINE & MEDICAL DEVICE CO. JINUNG TRADING CO. THOSONG TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION CO. TONGYANG TRADING CORP. NAMGANG TRADING CO. DAESONGSAN TRADING CORPORATION KUMUNSAN TRADING CORP. HIGH-TECH BIOENGINEERING SERVICE CO. MEDICINES IMPORT & EXPORT CO. YUA TRADING CORP. OGASAN TRADING CORP. JONGSONG TRADING CORP. MYOHYANG 2 TRADING CO. JINYONG TRADING CO. TOBACCO CESSION CENTER CHANG GONG TRADING CO. SUSONG TRADING CO. RUNG RA 888 TRADING CO. JINHUNG CO.
KPe.043		

전람회 참가회사


EXHIBITIORS

대원전지합영회사	TAEWON BATTERY J.V.CO.LTD.
파선대홍무역회사	RASON TAEHUNG TRADING CORP.
신봉무역회사	SINBONG TRADING CO.
해방산무역회사	HAEBANGSAN TRADING CORP.
금은산무역회사	KUMUNSAN TRADING CORP.
성천강무역회사	SONGCHONGGANG TRADING CORP.
송도무역총회사	SONGDO TRADING CORP.
화장품무역회사	COSMETICS TRADING CO.
전진대물기술교류사	JONJIN TAERYUN TECH. CO.
금강산국제판광특구개발총회사	KUMGANGSAN DEV CORP.
상원무역회사	SANGWON TRADING CORP.
태성무역회사	THAESONG TRADING CO.
의료기구회사	MEDICAL APPARATUS CO.
락원무역총회사	RAKWON GENERAL TRADING CORP.
구룡강무역회사	KURYONGGANG TRADING CO. A likely alias of KPe.008
종이무역회사	SONGI TRADING CORP. Designated by the U.S.A.
밀우리무역회사	PYOLMURI TRADING CO.
삼천리조명기술무역회사	SAMCHOLLI L.T.C.O.LTD.
백호무역회사	PAEKHO TRADING CO.
상명무역총회사	SANGMYONG TRADING CORP.
예홍합작회사	YEHUNG J.V.CO.
잠업합작회사	SERICUL TURE J.V.CO.
삼송무역회사	SAMSUNG TRADING CO.
승진무역회사	SUNGJIN TRADING CO.
신홍정보기술무역회사	SINHUNG IT TRADE CO.
수정첨보기술교류사	SUJONGCHON TECH CO.
원봉무역회사	WONBONG TRADING CORP. Designated by the ROK
평양령봉무역회사	PYONGYANG RYONGBONG TRADING CO.
해양무역총회사	HAEYANG TRADING CORP.
진흥회사	JINHUNG CO.
부성회사	PUSONG CORP.
묘향천호합작회사	MYOHYANG CHONHO J.V.CO.
평양대진첨단기술개발사	PYONGYANG TAEJIN HIGH-TECH DEV.CO.
조양방직합영회사	JOYANG TEXTILE J.V.CO.
경공업무역회사	LIGHT INDUSTRY TRADING CORP.
국흥무역회사	KUKHUNG TRADING CO.
삼지연무역회사	SAMJIYON TRADING CORP.
금연연구보급소	TOBACCO CESSATION CENTER
장명첨단의료품개발교류소	JANGMYONG HIGH-TECH MEDICAL SUPPLIES DEV.CO.
고려약수출입회사	KORYO MEDICINE IMPORT & EXPORT CO.
무병새기기술교류사	MUBYONG NEW TECH EXCHANGE CENTER
보통강무역회사	POTHONGGANG TRADING CO.
승진개발무역회사	SONGJON DEVELOPMENT TRADING CO.
묘향정보기술교류소	MYOHYANG IT CENTER
조선출판물수출입사	KOREA PUBLICATIONS EXPORT & IMPORT CORP.
외교단친선수입상사	DIPLOMATIC CORPS FRIENDSHIP IMPORT CORP.
만년보건회사	MANNYON HEALTH CORP.
대하무역회사	TAEHA TRADING CO.
대덕산무역총회사	TAEDOKSAN TRADING CORP.
영흥무역회사	YONGHUNG TRADING CORP.
창품무역회사	CHANGGONG TRADING CO.
백호1무역회사	PAEKHO 1 TRADING CO.
원경건재물합영회사	WONGYONG BUILDING MATERIALS J.V.CO.
홍성무역회사	HUNGSONG TRADING CORP.
금화무역회사	KUMHUA TRADING CORP.

전람회 참가회사

EXHIBITIORS

길림 성룡린 수출입유한공사	JILIN PROVINCIAL DRAGON LIN IMPORT & EXPORT CO.,LTD.
길림 성길순상무유한공사	JILIN PROVINCIAL JISHUNCHENG TRADE CO., LTD.
길림 성신오상무유한공사	JILIN PROVINCIAL XINAQIAN TRADE CO., LTD.
길림 성홍춘율동무역유한공사	HUNCHUN RONGTONG TRADE CO., LTD.
길림 성석립상무유한공사	JILIN PROVINCIAL SHILIN TRADE CO., LTD.
길림 성비가실외용품유한공사	HUNCHUN CHANGYI TRADE CO., LTD.
길림 성화총창이무역유한공사	JILIN FEIGE OUTSIDE PRODUCTS CO., LTD.
광동 성광주동방수입상품유한공사	GUANGZHOU DONGFANG IMPORTED GOODS CO., LTD.
광동 성신진회동경공업제품유한공사	SHENZHEN HONG WAN CHANG TRADING CO., LTD.
절강 성온주화예국제상품유한공사	TAIWAN FU LING TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
산동 성룡오건경무유한공사	SHENZHEN HUIFENG QINGGONG CO., LTD.
하북 성문안현지의수지제품유한공사	WENZHOU HUAIYI GUOJI SHANGPIN CO., LTD.
하북 성폐수시동양장평성오금공장	SHANDONG XINAQIAN ECONOMY & TRADE CO., LTD.
광동 성광주홍광일용품유한공사	HEBEI WENAN ZHIYI PLASTIC PRODUCTS CO., LTD.
길림 성장춘시구려일용품유한공사	BAZHOU DONGYANGZHUANG HONGSHENG HARDWARE FACTORY
길림 성자춘길원파학기술유한공사	GUANGZHOU XINGUANG DAILY NECESSITIES CO., LTD.
길림 성화웨이기전설비유한공사	CHANGCHUN JIULI DAILY NECESSITIES CO., LTD.
길림 성목자옥일용품유한공사	CHANGCHUN RONGDAYUAN TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
길림 성성애박광에풀제조유한공사	JILIN HUAWEI MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL CO., LTD.
길림 성장춘더흥기전설비유한공사	JILIN PROVINCIAL MUZIWI DAILY NECESSITIES CO., LTD.
료녕 성대련가양의무역유한공사	JILIN EVERPULSE HANDIWORK MANUFACTURE CO., LTD.
베이징 벽보탈동광전과학기술유한공사	CHANGCHUN DEXIN ELECTRONIC & MACHINERYSD CO., LTD.
광동 성불산교역선기제품설립유한공사	DALIAN JIAYANG YIHE TRADE CO., LTD.
광동 성광주진동수지방직물유한공사	BEIJING BAILUDATONG PHOTOELECTRIC TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
간동 성탁오사네르기파학기술유한공사	FOSHAN SHUNDE QIAOYI ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.
료녕 성십양은더오금수출입유한공사	GUANGZHOU JIANTENG PLASTIC TEXTILE CO., LTD.
료녕 성십양홍명파학기술유한공사	SHANDONG BOS ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
상해 태도식품기계유한공사	SHENYANG ENDE HARDWARE IMP&EXP CO.,LTD.
하남 성자성현록주목제품유한공사	SHENYANG HON MING TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD.
호북 성무한광복홍경과학기술유한공사	SHANGHAI TAKNO FOOD MACHINE CO., LTD.
로녕 성단동회실업유한공사	ZHECHENG GREEN FOREST WOOD CO.,LTD.
광동 성주해고리진기제품주식유한공사	WUHAN OPTICAL VALLEY HONG JING TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD.
베이징요부상무유한공사	DANDONG TENG HUI INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.
강수성대중기제품유한공사	GREE ELECTRIC APPLIANCES INC. OF ZHUHAI
대만로얄팀회사	BEIJING YOP TRADING CO., LTD.
대만화이언파학기술주식유한회사	JIANGSU JINGHAI TRANSFORMER CO.,LTD.
대만홍중생물파학기술유한회사	ROYAL TEAM CORPORATION Previously investigated by the Panel
대만성고파학기술주식유한회사	FEYNMAN TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
대만사로티의무역유한회사	HONG ZHONG BIOTECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD.
대만매산차유생산합작사	TAIWAN TIGHT TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.
대만상해자목수자조종기계유한공사	BENESSERE & SALUTE CO., LTD.
월남수퍼커피회사	MEI SHAN TEA SEED OIL MANUFACTORY CORPORATION
씨씨엘그룹	FANTABULOUS MACHINE INC.
베트남타국제회사	SUPER COFFEE MIX VIET NAM LTD.
하베드무역정보회사	CCL GROUP
오티ング회사	VIET DELTA INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD.
제임슨양주(복건)회사	HA VIET TRADING AND MEDIA COMPANY
에스 앤 피 그룹	OTIM SPA
하이웰보건회사	JAMESON'S WINERY (FUJIAN) CO. LTD.
마르스파트회사	S AND P GROUP
에플라회사	HI WELL HEALTHCARE CORP. NEW ZEALAND
트리아스 쿠르세회사	MARSFARM CO., LTD.
케이케이 뉴니비셀회사	ERLA PT. CO.
강북 국제회사	PT.TRIAS SOLUSI INDONESIA
신사무역회사	THAILAND KK UNIVERSAL CO., LTD.
마더니스트 건강영양제품회사	KANGFU INTERNATIONAL PTE LTD.
	SINSAR TRADING (PTE) LTD.
	MOTHERNEST HEALTH PRODUCTS RBK NUTRACEUTICAL PTY LTD.



Source: NK News

Annex 35: Chinese company's brochure exhibited at its booth



Source: NK News

Annex 36: Syria**Letter from the Syrian Arab Republic**

**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE
UNITED NATIONS**

820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313
Fax: (212) 983-4439

MOST URGENT

PM/2017/324

New York, 17 August 2017

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to the letter no. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308 dated 5 July 2017, has the honor to inform the following:

1. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has no inter-action with the two entities or individuals whose names are mentioned in the letter.
2. There are no DPRK technical companies in Syria, and the only presence of some DPRK individuals are confined in the field of sports under private individual contracts for training in athletics and gymnastics.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of its opportunity to renew to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

H.E. Hughes Griffiths
Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)




DPRK Corst Company invoice for shipment to SSRC front company Megatrade in 2017

CORST	CORST COMPANY LTD.				
PROFORMA INVOICE					
					No. CRST-AK/17-0725
					Date: Jul. 25, 2017
<i>INVOICE of Amperie Meter</i>					
Shipped per		Sailing on and about	Jul. 25, 2017		
from	P'yongyang Airport of D.P.R.Korea	to	Damascus Airport		
Adeeb Kabeiki Co. Aleppo Street, Building 34 Damascus, Syria. P.O.Box: 11384 TEL: (00963) 11-3171981					
<i>for account and risk of Messrs</i>					
<i>Insured by</i> The Seller					
Samples Exclsd.					
Contract No. _____					
Charge					
L/C No.	Description (Item Number)	Unit	Quantity	Unit Price in EUR	Amount in EUR
					CIP Damascus Airport
1 cuse	Amperie Meters	pc	12	2.55	30.55
Total Export	TOTAL:	pc	12	I Say: Forty Three EURO (and 35/100 Only)	
<i>* No Commercial Value</i>					
We hereby certify that this invoice is authentic and the value stated herein is only for Customs information.					
					

Source: The Panel

Airway bill showing foreign company as shipper and DPRK Embassy in Damascus
as consignee



Source: The Panel

Annex 37: Bills of lading of interdicted shipments

COPY					
1. Shipper: Insert Name, Address and Phone/Fax <div style="border: 2px solid red; padding: 5px;"> CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD. ADDRESS: 322-1 CHANGXIN A5-7-1, QINGNAN STREET, HEPING DISTRICT SHENYANG TELE: +86-24-83953282 </div>			PORT TO PORT OR COMBINED TRANSPORT BILL OF LADING Business No. _____ Date of Lading No. _____ Export Reference _____ Forwarding Agent and References D/A/R/No. _____ Point and Country of Origin _____		
2. Consignee: Insert Name, Address and Phone/Fax <div style="border: 2px solid red; padding: 5px;"> METALLIC MANUFACTURING FACTORY ADDRESS: 129, MAY STREET, DAMASCUS-AL-SABA 8 RAHAT SQUARE P.O. BOX: 12184 TELE/FAX: 00963-11-2311427 </div>					
3. Notify Party: Insert Name, Address and Phone/Fax NAME AS CONSIGNEE			It is agreed that no responsibility shall attach to the Carrier if no notice is given to him by the Carrier of his neglect to inform him Also Notify Party, route & instructions		
4. Combined Transport* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5. Container Transport* <input type="checkbox"/>		6. Combined Transport* <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Place of Receipt _____ 7. Port of Loading _____		Service Contract No. _____ Commodity Code _____	
8. Port of Discharge LATTAKIA		9. Combined Transport* <input type="checkbox"/> 10. Place of Delivery _____ LATTAKIA		Type of Movement _____	
Marks & Nos. Container / Seal No.		No. of Container or Packages		Description of Goods (If Dangerous Goods, See Clause 20) 62 PACKAGES ACID-PROOF BRICK DAUB	
U/M		62		Gross Weight 131986.000KGS NET WEIGHT 131076.000KGS	
TOTAL:		62		70.6980CBM 131986.000KGS NET WEIGHT 131076.000KGS	
ON C/O PO TERM SHIPPER'S LOAD COUNT AND SEAL OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID					
PCLU3297500 / CB859294 / TOKU3429618 / CA859286 / PCTU5433628 / CR403465 / CHHU4190770 / CA858117 / TDHU1136912R / CH338106 / PCTU5895418 / CB306472 /		Description of Contents for Shipper's Use Only (This part of This B/L Contract) 10 PACKAGES / FCL / FCL / 20GP/ 10 PACKAGES / FCL / FCL / 20GP/ 12 PACKAGES / FCL / FCL / 20GP/			
Description of Goods (If Dangerous Goods, See Clause 20)		Description of Contents for Shipper's Use Only (This part of This B/L Contract)			
15. Total Number of Containers and/or Packages (in words) SAY SIX CONTAINERS TOTAL					
Freight & Charges		Revenue Total		Rate	
0000				Amount	
				Freight Collected	
				Freight & Charges Paid/Collect'd by	
Recorded in external reference, goal order and condition except as otherwise noted. The total number of the packages in units billited in the variance, the description of the goods and the weights shown in this Bill of Lading are furnished by the merchants and which no carrier has no necessary means of checking and it may not be used after the Bill of Lading is issued. The carrier has issued one original Bill of Lading, all of the tandem bills of lading and the original Bills of Lading must be surrendered and endorsed or signed against the delivery of the container and whereupon any other original Bills of Lading shall be void. The merchants agree to remain liable for the consequences of their Bill of Lading as if each had personally signed this Bill of Lading. *Applicable Only When Document Used as a Combined Transport Bill of Lading. **Applicable Only When Document Shall be Charged according to the Tariff published on the Home page of LINES.COSCO SHIPPING.COM. If any questions or inquiries, please search by "Document & Document Tariff Enquiry". Other services and more details information, pls visit LINES.COSCO SHIPPING.COM.					
Date Laden on Board: 14 JAN 2017 Signed by: _____					
0000 - Date of Issue: 14 JAN 2017 Place of Issue: _____ Signed for the Carrier: _____					

COPY
PAGE: 1 OF 2

PORT TO PORT OR COMBINED TRANSPORT BILL OF LADING

1. Consignor CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD. ADD: NO.322-1 CHANGXIN A5-7-1, DONGWAN STREET, HEPING DISTRICT SHENYANG TEL: +86-24-83953282	2. Consignee METALLIC MANUFACTURING FACTORY ADDRESS: 29. MAY STREET, DAAMASCUS-AL-SABE E BAHRET SQUARE P.O. BOX: 12184 TEL/FAX: 09963-11-1311427	3. Carrier Name Address and Phone/Fax Forwarding Agents and Reference EMC/CN 100		
4. Notify Party- Insert Name Address and Phone/Fax I have agreed that no responsibility shall attach to our Carrier or its agents for failure to notify	5. Also Notify Party-routing & Instructions Port and Country of Origin			
6. Commodity LATTAKIA	7. Combined Transport* Place of Receipt Port of Loading	8. Combined Transport* Place of Delivery Port of Discharge LATTAKIA		
9. Description of Goods or Dangerous Goods, See Clause 201	Gross Weight	Measurement		
10. No. & Nos. Container / Sea No.	No. of Container or Packages			
N/M	76 PACKAGES	ACID-PROOF BRICK DAUR	159349.000KGS NET WEIGHT 157384.000KGS	91.8680CBM
TOTAL:	76 PACKAGES		159349.000KGS NET WEIGHT 157384.000KGS	91.8680CBM
ON CIV-FO TERM SHIPPER'S LOAD, COUNT AND SEAL OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID				
CB604146968 / CB607783 CB605594674 / CB607782 CSLU1659639 / CB406301 TENL3350986 / CB607781 TENL5056796 / CB607989 BLU12599600 / CB300426		11 PACKAGES / FCL / FCL / 20GP/ 11 PACKAGES / FCL / FCL / 20GP/		
** TO BE CONTINUED ON ATTACHED LIST **				
Declared Corp Value US\$		Description of Contents for Shipper's Use Only (not part of this Bill of Lading)		
11. Total Number of Containers Under Packages in Word Subject to Clause 7 Unwritten		SAY SEVEN CONTAINERS TOTAL		
12. Freight & Charges	Previous Term	Date	Per	Amount
I declare in solemn, apparent good order, and condition except as otherwise noted. The total number of the packages or units involved in the carriage, the description of the goods and the weights shown in this Bill of Lading are furnished by the merchants, who retain the carrier for no successive purpose of checking and is not a part of this Bill of Lading contract. The carrier has issued one original Bill of Lading, all of this term and date, one of the original Bills of Lading must be surrendered and endorsed or signed against the return of the shipper and waterway, any other original Bill of Lading shall be void. The merchants agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Bill of Lading as if each had personally signed this Bill of Lading.				
I acknowledge that this Document shall act as a Combined Transport Bill of Lading.				
Damage and Defense shall be charged according to the term published on the Home page at LINES.COSCO SHIPPING.COM, if any dispute occurs, please search by "Damage & Defense Term Finally". Other services and more detailed information, also visit LINES.COSCO SHIPPING.COM.				
9005 Date of Issue: 11 JAN 2017 Place of Issue		Signed for the Carrier		
Date Laden on Board: 11 JAN 2017 Signed by:				

Source: The Panel

Annex 38: Bills of lading of interdicted shipments

售货合同 SALES CONTRACT			
CONTRACT NO: 2016091501	DATE:2016-9-15		
THE SELLERS: CHENG TONG TRADING CO.,LTD			
THE BUYERS: GENERAL CO. FOR CABLES INDUSTRY-DAMASCUS			
双方同意按下列条款由卖方出售,买方购进下列货物:			
THE SELLERS AGREE TO SELL AND THE BUYERS AGREE TO BUY THE UNDER MENTIONED GOODS ON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS STATED BELOW:			
商品名称及规格 NAME OF COMMODITY	数量 QUANTITY	单价(USD) UNIT PRICE	金额(USD) Amount
Fire hydrant SS100/65-1.6	25 set	60	1500
Valve DN15,PN1.6MPa, CS46H-16C	78 set	30	2340
Cable VV3*50+1	20610M	5.9682	123005
Light switch 220V 10A	436 set	2	872
Welded pipe Ø32*2.5	9297kg	0.6	5578.2
Welded pipe Ø108*4	13124kg	0.55	7218.2
总价: USD140,513.4			
TERMS:FOB CHINA PORT			
5.付款条件: 预付 30%-验货后 3 个月内 70%			
PAYMENT TERMS:30% DOWNPAYMENT			
70% PAYMENT AFTER RECEIVING AND FINISHING OF INSPECTION OF THE GOODS WITHIN 3 MONTHS			
6.包装: 件(SEE PACKING LIST)			
PAKING: UNITS(见箱单)			
7.装运时间:2017 年 1 月前			
TIME OF SHIPMENT:BEFORE JAN, 2017.			
8.生产国别及制造厂家: 中国制造			
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: MADE IN CHINA			
9.装运国家: 中国			
PORT OF SHIPMENT: CHINA			
10.目的国家: SYRIA LATTAKIA			
PORT OF DESTINATION: 叙利亚拉塔基亚			
11.到达目的港的海运费及港杂费根据实际发生支付			
Actual freight payment will be made according to the number of containers and Syria Lattakia's port charges.			
12.其他条款:按买方特殊要求定制			
OTHER TERMS: MANUFACTURED ON THE BUYER'S SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS.			
*.付款方式及币种: 根据付款时情况另作定义			
*.Payment and currency: As defined in the case of payment			
<i>For and on behalf of</i> CHENG TONG TRADING CO.,LTD  <i>Authorised Signature(S)</i>			
GENERAL CO. FOR CABLES  INDUSTRY DAMASCUS			

售货合同 SALES CONTRACT

CONTRACT NO: 2016101001

DATE:2016-10-10

THE SELLERS: CHENGTONG TRADING CO.,LTD

THE BUYERS: METALLIC MANUFACTURING FACTORY

双方同意按下列条款由卖方出售,买方购进下列货物:

**THE SELLERS AGREE TO SELL AND THE BUYERS AGREE TO BUY THE UNDER MENTIONED GOODS
ON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS STATED BELOW:**

商品名称及规格 NAME OF COMMODITY	数量 QUANTITY	单价(USD) UNIT PRICE	金额(USD) AMOUNT
Stainless steel seamless pipe Ø45*2,321#	6804kg	2	13608.00
Stainless steel seamless pipe Ø56*,321#	6000M	2.00	12000.00
Stainless steel seamless pipe Ø70*1,321#	18615kg	2	37230.00
Stainless steel seamless pipe Ø159*,321#	5925M	2.50	14812.50
Copper Cu 60x6	669KG	1.80	1204.20
Angle L75x75x6	1670KG	0.80	1336.00
sheet iron T=3, 1000x2000	527KG	0.80	421.60
Bolts M6*50	10000SET	0.15	1500.00
welding rod Φ3.2, J422	282kg	0.9929	280.00
Bend DN40, O45x2.5	268pc	4.00	1072.00
Filter DN32,PN1MPa	13set	30.00	390.00
Lightning arrester S6.6,Cu=30M	3set	1000.00	3000.00
Breaker380V 3x250A	27set	30.00	810.00
Cable 2*2.5	2500M	1.00	2500.00
Heat shrink tube Ø100*0.6	325M	1.00	325.00
Lamp 220 40w*2s	15set	10.00	150.00
Ribbon L=200,W=3.5,100P/bag	93bag	2.00	186.00
Jinzo 70 ml Sa	295pc	0.50	147.50
Tape 19mmx10m	350pc	1.00	350.00
Tool 92set	3set	50.00	150.00
AL iron T=0.8	3257KG	2.50	8142.50
Glass fiber insulation tube DN80.089*50mm	2099m	1.50	3148.50
Round steel Ø25*3,L=2M	560KG	2.50	1400.00
Reducing agent YH-03	1750KG	0.23	402.50
Base insulator ZA-6T	50set	5	250.00
总价: USD104,816.30			
TERMS:FOB CHINA PORT			

5.付款条件: 预付 30%-验货后 3 个月内 70%

Payment terms:30% DOWNPAYMENT

70% PAYMENT AFTER RECEIVING AND FINISHING OF INSPECTION OF THE
GOODS WITHIN 3 MONTHS

G CO., LTD

ed Signature(S)

6. 包装: 件(SEE PACKING LIST)

PAKING: UNITS(见箱单)

7. 装运时间: 2017 年 1 月前

TIME OF SHIPMENT: BEFORE JAN, 2017.

8. 生产国别及制造厂家: 中国制造

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: MADE IN CHINA

9. 装运国家: 中国

PORT OF SHIPMENT: CHINA

10. 目的国家: SYRIA LATTAKIA

PORT OF DESTINATION: 叙利亚拉塔基亚

11. 到达目的港的海运费及港杂费根据实际发生支付

Actual freight payment will be made according to the number of containers and Syria
Lattakia's port charges.

12. 其他条款: 按买方特殊要求定制

OTHER TERMS: MANUFACTURED ON THE BUYER'S SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS.

*. 付款方式及币种: 根据付款时情况另作定义

*. Payment and currency: As defined in the case of payment

CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD

For and on behalf of

CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD

.....
Authorised Signature(s).....

METALLIC MANUFACTURING FACTORY



For and on behalf of
CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD

.....
Authorised Signature(s).....

售货合同 SALES CONTRACT

CONTRACT NO: 2016121011

DATE:2016-12-10

THE SELLERS: CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD

THE BUYERS: METALLIC MANUFACTURING FACTORY

双方同意按下列条款由卖方出售,买方购进下列货物:

**THE SELLERS AGREE TO SELL AND THE BUYERS AGREE TO BUY THE UNDER MENTIONED GOODS
ON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS STATED BELOW:**

商品名称及规格 NAME OF COMMODITY	数量 QUANTITY	单价(USD) UNIT PRICE	金额(USD) Amount
Acid proof bricks 300*300*20	5000 m ²	13.1534	65,767.00
Water glass&Daub (Acid proof bricks paste accessories)	44T	175.00	7,700.00
Valve DN15, 1.6Mpa	1 set	200.00	200.00

总价: USD73,667.00

TERMS: FOB CHINA PORT

5.付款条件: 预付 30%-验货后 3 个月内 70%

PAYMENT TERMS: 30% DOWNPAYMENT

70% PAYMENT AFTER RECEIVING AND FINISHING OF INSPECTION OF THE
GOODS WITHIN 3 MONTHS

6.包装: 件(SEE PACKING LIST)

PAKING: UNITS(见箱单)

7.装运时间: 2017 年 3 月前

TIME OF SHIPMENT: BEFORE MAR, 2017.

8.生产国别及制造厂家: 中国制造

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: MADE IN CHINA

9.装运国家: 中国

PORT OF SHIPMENT: CHINA

10.目的国家: SYRIA LATTAKIA

PORT OF DESTINATION: 叙利亚拉塔基亚

11.到达目的港的海运费及港杂费根据实际发生支付

Actual freight payment will be made according to the number of containers and Syria
Lattakia's port charges.

12.其他条款: 按买方特殊要求定制

OTHER TERMS: MANUFACTURED ON THE BUYER'S SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS.

*.付款方式及币种: 根据付款时情况另作定义

*.Payment and currency: As defined in the case of payment

CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD

For and on behalf of

CHENG TONG TRADING CO., LTD

Authorised Signature(s)

Metallic Manufacturing Factory



Source: The Panel

Annex 39: Information on General Company for Cable

Search

[About AFEI](#) [Members](#) [Activities & Contributions](#) [FYI](#) [Announcements](#) [Media](#) [Contact us](#)

Home > About AFEI > General Company for Cable Industry Damascus

Quick links <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Board Of Directors Young Industrialists Announcements 	<p style="text-align: center;">General Company for Cable Industry Damascus</p> <p>Country: Syria Representative:- Telephon: +963(11)2129980 Fax: +963(11)8821491 E-mail: g.o.eng.ind@net.sy Website: www.damacable.com.sy</p> <p>Address: P.O.Box 827, Damascus, Syria Sub sector: Cables</p> <p>The company is of the state owned of the General Organization for Engineering industries which belongs in its turn to the Ministry of Industry.</p> <p>The company produce and market all kinds of low voltage cable up to (1) K.V.</p> <p>The company apply the following standards SNS - IEC - VDE - in addition to the possibility of producing according to any other International Standards and company for some items.</p> <p>High quality of products good reputation in local and neighboring markets.</p> <p>Engineers and technicians have distinguished technical experience.</p> <p>the tow company use modern high technology machines and always aims at developing the production lines to follow - up the International development of this Industry.</p> <p>Uses the best raw materials conforming with the International Standards.</p> <p>The company are equipped with modern laboratory Instruments for testing the raw materials, semi and final products.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Back</p>
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Source: <http://arabengineeringindustries.org>

Annex 40: MINISO's profile on its website (top) and its product sold in Pyongyang (bottom)

The screenshot shows the MINISO website's brand profile page. At the top, there are language links for English, Japanese, and Korean. Below the header, there are navigation links for Home (トップページ), Brand (ブランド), Products (商品一覧), and News (最新情報). The main content area features a red-bordered box containing text about the brand's history and philosophy. Below this box, there is another paragraph of text describing the brand's international expansion and strategic partnerships.

MINISO, a Japan-based designer brand, was co-founded by Japanese designer Mr. Miyake Junya and Chinese young entrepreneur Mr. Ye Guofu in Tokyo, Japan, with the former serving as chief designer. MINISO is the promoter of global "intelligent consumer products".

Sticking to the life philosophy of "simplicity, nature and good quality" and the brand proposition of "returning to the nature", MINISO gains popularity among consumers with its core brand edges of updating products every seven days, pricing at a low level, and targeting at intelligent consumer product chains. It sets the trend of personalized intelligent consumption in the frontier market of household consumption. MINISO was run by MINISO Industries Co., Ltd. in 2013 and entered the Chinese market in September of the same year to comprehensively come into the market of intelligent consumer products in China.

Established in Japan in 2013, MINISO, actively explores the international market and has opened over 1000 stores in less than three years, with business turnover standing at USD 750 million in 2015 and nearly USD 1.5 billion in 2016. At present, MINISO has reached strategic cooperation agreements with more than 60 countries and regions including the United States, Canada, Russia, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong (China) and Macau (China), with an average monthly growth rate of 80 - 100 stores.

Source: <http://www.miniso.com/getinfo.php?cid=186&top=1>, accessed on 12 December 20



Source:NK News

**Annex 41: Photos of Strategic Cooperation Signing Ceremony between
MINISO and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held on
18 January 2017**



[English](#) | [Japanese](#) | [Korean](#) | [Chinese](#) | [Chinese \(HK\)](#) |

[Home トップページ](#)

[Brand ブランド](#)

[Products 商品一覧](#)

[News 最新情報](#)

[Store 店舗一覧](#)

[Contact お問い合わせ](#)

[News](#)

MINISO Signed Strategic Cooperation Agreement with North Korea, Fast Fashion Spread in the Korean Peninsula

Source: MINISO Read:1017 Date: 2017-01-22

On 18 January, 2017, Japanese fast fashion designer brand MINISO took another step forward, signing strategic cooperation agreement with North Korea after cooperating with Japan, South Korea and Mongolia, developing comprehensively in the East Asia Area. The signing of the agreement is of significant meaning to both North Korea and MINISO, for which both sides attached great importance to the signing ceremony. Mr. Miyake Junya, the global co-founder and chief designer of MINISO, Mr. Ye Guofu, global co-founder and CEO of MINISO, Mr. Li Minxin, the Vice President of MINISO Asian-Pacific together with Mr. Nan Chengyi, the chief delegate of North Korea Economic Cooperation Council China Dandong Office were present at the signing ceremony to witness this special moment.



(Illustration: MINISO signed cooperation agreement with North Korea, developing around the world.)

Source: Panel

Annex 42: Company profile on MINISO's website (Left: English website, Right: Chinese website)

Top Left (English Website):

- Company address: [Red box]
- Japanese headquarters address: [Red box]
- Japanese flagship store address: [Red box]
- Headquarters: [Red box]
- Flagship Store: [Red box]
- Website: [Red box]
- Email: [Red box]

Top Right (Chinese Website):

- 株式会社名創優品産業 (Miniso Co., Ltd.)
- 公司名称: 株式会社名創優品産業
- 创始人: 三宅順也
- 首席设计师: 董国富
- 注册资金: 一亿日元
- 成立日期: 平成25年9月
- 公司地址: 日本总店地址: 〒104-0061 東京都中央区銀座3-10-7
銀座京屋ビル7F
東京都豊島区西池袋1-21-2
ハイブリッヂ西池袋ビル1階
〒169-0075 東京都新宿区高田馬場1-5-19 K・Fビル1階1F号
- 公司网址: www.miniso.com
- 公司邮箱: miniso@miniso.jp

All addresses indicated on this page are in Japan

Bottom Left (English Website):

- MINISO
- [Good quality, unique style, trendy, reliable and low price. These are the features of Miniso's products.]
- The creation of Miniso is the creation of a life-style. We don't emphasize the style or style but offers us good quality and special products. We don't think popular trend should be with high prices, for the economy, we develop our products are not too expensive, but also not too cheap. We are emphasizing practicality, convenience, healthy and interesting in the future. Advertisements, advertising materials and messages to offer reasonable prices at the same time.

Bottom Right (Chinese Website):

- MINISO名创优品的Logo设计，以购物袋创意为主体形象，整体设计简洁时尚、极具现代感。在与品牌的行业属性完美融合的同时，突出购物、消费的概念。识别性强，让人记忆犹新。
- 其中Logo的品牌名称与“U”图形的设计组合，则是对消费者优质的服务理念的一种表达，更是一种对生活态度的倡导。“快乐就好！”的生活本质就是对快乐追求，让我们开心面对，享受生活赋予我们的一切！

Company profile page accessed on 11 October 2017

名創優品 Origin of Miniso

MINISO

Good **quality**, unique style, trendy, reliable and low price. These are the features of Miniso's products.

The creation of Miniso is the creation of a life style. She doesn't emphasize the so-call fashion or Style but offers real good quality and special products. We don't think popular brand should be with high prices. On the contrary, we develop our products based on future consumption concept, which is, restoring product essence, removing flashy and returning to the nature. Miniso enriches our living products and manages to offer reasonable prices at the same time.

名創優品 Miniso's logo



Miniso's logo is the image of shipping bag. The whole design is simple and modern. It perfectly combines the business nature, an shopping



The Logo brand name and graphic design portfolio is an expression of the customers with quality service concept of smile. It is a kind of life attitude advocate.  "Happiness is good!" The essence of life is the pursuit of happiness, let us face it with happy, enjoy all the thing in the life !

Source: Company official website at

<http://www.minisohome.com/getinfo.php?cid=186&top=1> (Company profile in English)

<http://www.miniso.cn/getinfo.php?cid=186&top=1> (Company profile in Chinese)

Company addresses
were deleted

Annex 43: DPRK Bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)

Names /Alias	Title and activities **	Location **	Passport number / Expiry UN Security Council designations where applicable
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang Pom Su, Jang Hyon U) 장범수	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative. Also operates in and travels to Lebanon under various aliases	Syria	Jang Bom Su: 15 April 1957. Under aka Jang Hyon U: 22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020 UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria” on 2 March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KPi.016
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a. Cho'n Myo'ng-kuk, Jon Yong Sang) 전명국	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative in Syria. Also travels to and operates in Lebanon under various aliases.	Syria	18 October 1976; PP No. 654210108; PP No. 4721202031 (expires 21 February 2017); Jon Yong Sang born 25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number 836110035, expires 1 January 2020
Ryom Huibong (aka Ryo'M Hu'I-Pong) 령희봉	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank	Dubai, UAE	18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20 January 2020)
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song Chol) 리선철	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank Transported money of DPRK laborers in the Middle East to the DPRK	Dubai, UAE	28 March 1964 PP No.: 836132137
Kwak Chongchol (Aka Kwak Jong-Chol) 곽정철	Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank	Dubai, UAE	1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-il) 김경일	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office opened at least 5 accounts at Banque International Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia. Two of them are in the name of a front company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been involved in transactions undertaken by Daedong Credit Bank in China.	Libya	1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB deputy chief representative in Libya” on 22 December (KPi.067)
Choe, Un Hyok 최은혁	Unification Development Bank (or Korea Unification Development Bank, UDB or KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un'So'ng. Choe Un Hyok's KUDB business card with his title of “Representative of KUDB, Moscow Russia” with the same address as the Embassy in Moscow is available in the Panel’s 2017 Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251.	Moscow, Russia	19 October 1985 PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)

	<i>Russia replied it has no information that DPRK citizen Chu Hyo'k [is] acting in Russia on behalf of or on the instructions of any DPRK financial institution. (see below)</i>		
Chu Hyo'k (Aka Ju Hyok) 주호혁	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>Russia replied Chu Hyo'k is not currently residing in Russia. (see below)</i>		23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct. 2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an “overseas FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.065)
Ri U'n-so'ng (aka Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song) 리은성	Korea Unification Development Bank representative <i>Russia replied that Ri U'n-so'ng is not currently residing in Russia. (see below)</i>		DPRK / DOB: 23 July 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Korean Unification Development Bank representative” on 22 December (KPi.078)
Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku Cha-hyo'ng) 구자형	Foreign Trade Bank Representative	Libya (also travelled to Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia 2015-2017)	8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 - used in July 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB chief representative in Libya” on 22 December 2017 (Kpi.070)
Kim Chol Sam (aka Jin Tiesan, 金铁三) 김철삼	Daedong Credit Bank Representative since 2006, and Treasurer for DCB. PoE reporting on activities: S/2017/150, paras 225-230 and S/2017/742, paras 51-56. <i>China replied that he returned to the DPRK on 14 October 2016.</i>		11 March 1971; 645120378 Res 2321 (2016) designated him as “Representative for Korea United Development Bank” on 30 Nov (KPi.035)
Ch'oe So'k-min 최석민	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016, Ch'oe So'k-min was the deputy representative at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has been associated with cash transfers from that FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK special organizations and RGB located overseas. <i>China replied that he is blocked from entry and that it requested Chinese banks to freeze the assets of designated individuals</i>	Shenyang China	25 July 1978 Res 2397(2017) designated him as “overseas FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.064)
Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim Tong-ch'o'l) 김동철	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Shenyang, China	28 January 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires: 26 September 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.068)

Ko Chol Man (aka Ko Ch'o'l-man) 고철만	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Shenyang, China	30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.069)
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka Mun Kyo'ng-hwan) 문경환	Bank of East Land Representative <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Dandong, China	22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March 2016 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Bank of East Land representative” on 22 December (KPi.071)
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae Wo'n-uk) 배원욱	Korea Daesong Bank Representative <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Beijing, China	22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb 2017 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Daesong Bank representative” on 22 December (KPi.072)
Pak Bong Nam (aka Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam) 박봉남	Ilsim International Bank representative <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Shenyang, China	06 May 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Ilsim International Bank representative” on 22 December 2017 (KPi.073)
Pak Mun Il 박문일	Korea Daesong Bank Representative <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Yanji, China	DPRK / 1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509 (expires 27/8/2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank” on 22 December 2017 (KPi.079)
Ri Chun Hwan (Aka Ri Ch'un-hwan) 리춘환	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Zhuhai, China	21 August 1957' PP No: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.074)
Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri Ch'un-so'ng) 리춘성	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a Euro account at International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of “Secretary’s Delegate of the DPRK’s Mission to Tripoli”. Account was closed on 22 August 2013. <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Beijing, China	30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (expires 11 March 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.075)
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li Cheng He) 리성혁	Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Reportedly established front companies to procure items	Beijing, China	19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (expires 19 May 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank” on 22 December (KPi.077)

	and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>		
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang So-Nam, Pang Sunam) 방수남	Ilsim (ILSIM) International Bank Representative <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Zhuhai, China	1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch'a Su'ng-chun) 차승준	Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative. Has held several accounts in his name at Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a cover company. <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Beijing, China	4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355
Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-hyo'k) 김경혁	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Bank <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Shanghai, China	5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14 September 2016)
Pak Ch'O'l-Nam 박철남	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the name "Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)" in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China" <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Beijing, China	16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)
Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho Ch'o'l-So'ng) 조철성	Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as "Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限公司)" and "Golden Tiger Investment Group ("Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.058)	Dandong, China	25 September 1984 PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019) Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.058)

	金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司”, both registered in Hong Kong. <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>		
Ho Young Il (Aka Ho' Yo'ng-il) 허영일	Hana Bank Representative In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a high volume of USD transactions for the FTB.	Dandong China	DPRK/ DOB: 9 September 1968
Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim Mun-ch'o'l) 김문철	Representative for Korea United Development Bank. Uses false entity names including “Chongryu Technical Company” or “Kyong Un Trading Company” <i>China replied that as a designated individual, he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested to freeze his assets</i>	Dandong, China	25 March 1957 Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Korea United Development Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.060)
Choe Chun Yong (Aka Ch'oe Ch'un-yo'ng)	Ilsim International Bank Representative		PP no: 654410078 Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Ilsim International Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim Myong Gi)	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative	Transited China, Ethiopia, UAE, visited Sudan ⁴	25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March 2018) UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 2 March (KPi.025)
Kang Min 강 민	Daesong Bank representative who, in late 2016, held Chinese bank accounts. <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Beijing, China	07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February 2018)
Kim Sang Ho 김상호	Representative, Korea Daesong Bank As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39 official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading Company representative in Yanji, China. <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Yanji, China	16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26 September 2018)

⁴ See S/2017/150, p. 64

Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim Cho'ng Man) 김정만	Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office 39 official posted to Hong Kong. <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Zhuhai, China	16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780
Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim Hyo'k-Cho'l, Hyok Chol Kim) 김혁철	Deputy Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Zhuhai, China	9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June 2017)
Ri Song-Hyok 리성혁	Koryo Bank Representative, He has reportedly established several front companies in order to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK. <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Beijing, China	19 March 1965; PP No.: 654234735 (expires 19 May 2019)
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-nam) 리호남	Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch representative (2014 to present) <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Beijing, China	DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires 21 February 2019)
Pak Ch'O'l-Nam 박철남	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts using the name "Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)" in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China <i>China replied that he is not designated by the UN and that it does not have specific information on his relationship with DPRK financial institutions</i>	Beijing, China	16 June 1971; PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)
Ms. Kim Su Gyong 김수경	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips around Europe, especially in France and Italy, with the assistance of her father, Kim Yong	Europe, also transited UAE and	16 January 1973; PP 745120374

	Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB agents who used their status as staff members of international organizations to help her obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See: S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187.	the Russian Federation ⁵	
Mun Cho'ng-Ch'o'l 문정철	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative. Has facilitated transactions for TCB.		Res 2094 (2013) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 7 March (KPi.012)
HAN, Jang Su HAN, Chang-su	Foreign Trade Bank Chief Representative		DOB 08 Nov 1969; PP No. 745420176

**Based on Member States information or UN documents

Sources: Information provided to the Panel by Member States and UN documents

⁵ The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were “not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory”.

Member State replies to Panel inquiries on entry/exit data of the above-mentioned individuals and any measures taken to expel them in accordance with the resolutions:

Russia letter to the Panel of 23 January 2018:

The Russian Federation has no information that DPRK citizens Chu Hyo'k, Choe Un Hyok, Ji Sang Jun and Ri U'n So'ng are acting in Russia on behalf of or on the instructions of any DPRK financial institution. Chu Hyo'k, Ji Sang Jun and Ri U'n-So'ng are not currently residing in Russia. We will inform you accordingly in case we receive additional information on the whereabouts of Choe Un Hyok".

Reply by China to the Panel of 25 January 2018:

"China seriously checked the list provided by the Panel. The 12 DPRK individuals KIM TONG CHOL in the list are designated individuals by the Security Council. After the relevant individuals were designated in the Security Council list, the Chinese competent authorities immediately listed them as the persons not allowed to enter China, and forbade their entry into China or transit through China for a third country. The Chinese competent authorities further requested Chinese banks and financial institutions to immediately freeze the assets of designated individuals and not to provide any fund, financial asset or economic resource to designated individuals. The relevant measures have been strictly implemented.

The other 10 individuals including HO YOUNG IL in the list are not the individuals designated by the Security Council. China does not have specific information about their relationship with the DPRK financial institutions or entities designated by the Security Council resolutions. If the Panel obtains solid evidence in this regard, it can be provided to China".

Annex 44 Information on DPRK financial institutions with overseas representatives
 (To assist in the identification of bank representatives)

Names, alias, Korean and Chinese spelling	HQ address / phone / fax/ SWIFT	Designations and information provided to Panel by Member States and United Nations resolutions
Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) 조선무역은행 朝鲜贸易银行 aka: Mooyokbank , Korea Trade Bank, Mooyokbank,	FTB Building, Jungsong dong, Central District, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814467 SWIFT/BIC FTBD KP PY	Res 2371(2017) on 5 Aug (KPe.047) State-owned bank which acts as the DPRK's primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation.
Koryo Bank 고려은행 高丽银行	Koryo Bank Building, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Res 2356 (2017) on 2 June 2017 (KPe.045) Associated with Office 38 and Office 39 of the KWP. Operated by Korea Myohyang Economic Group; joint venture partner in Koryo-Global Bank.
Koryo Credit Development Bank / Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] (Aka. Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Koryo Global Trust Bank) 고려신용개발은행 대성신용개발은행 (aka 고려글로벌신용은행)	Yanggakdo International Hotel, Pyongyang Te: +850 2 381 4100 Fax: +850 2 341 4013	Res 2371(2017) on 5 August (KPe.049) Joint venture with Koryo Bank
Korea Daesong Bank 대성은행 / 조선 대성은행 大成银行 aka: Choson Taesong Unhaeng , Daesong Bank, Taesong Bank	Segori-dong, Gyeongheung Street, Pyongyang +850 2 818221; Fax +850 2 814576 SWIFT/BIC: KDBKKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.035) Owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party.
Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation 조선광선은행 朝鲜光鲜银行, Korea Kwangson Finance Company	Jungsong-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang	Res 2370 (2016) on 2 March 2016 Provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving KOMID-related funds. For more info see PoE report S/2017/150, p. 63.
Ryugyong Commerical Bank (RCB) 류경상업은행/류상은행 Ryusang Bank, 柳京商业银行, 柳商银行	Changgwang Hotel, 5th Floor; Beijing, China; Dandong, China	Two ATMs at Pyongyang Airport and one in the lobby of Changgwang Inn. <i>Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM lists an address in the Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24</i>


		Joint Venture with OCN Pyongyang Office and Koryo Commerical Bank
Korea Unification (United) Development Bank (조선) 통일발전은행 (朝鲜)统一发展银行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T'ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank	KUDB Building, Pyongyang SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.033) USA on 16 March 2016 UN POE report info: /S/2017/150, p 62.
Hana Banking Corporation 하나은행 aka Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank,	ISB Building, Pyongyang; Haebangsan Hotel, Jungsong-Dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, Dandong, China SWIFT/BIC BRBKPKPIXXX	Partial Ownership by Central Bank. Overseas several Bank Card product lines for domestic use
Ilsim International Bank 일심국제은행 日心国际银行	Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea SWIFT: ILSIKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.034) Affiliated with the DPRK military and has close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) and has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
First Credit Bank. (JV) or Cheil Credit Bank 제일신용은행 第一信用银行 aka: First Trust Bank Corporation, Jeil Credit Bank, Kyongyong Credit Bank	a) 3-18 Pyongyang Information Center, Potonggang District (as of 2016). b) i Rakrang District, Jongbaek 1-dong Tel: +850 2 433-1575 (02-433-1575) SWIFT: KYCBKPPYXXX Rakrang Tel: 961-3331, 961-0003	Belongs to Workers Party of Korea. It was established in 2008 as JV venture with Singapore's Miracle Commerce Pte. Ltd., and its CEO William Toh (aka Toh Hwee Howe) who has been involved in trade with the DPRK using his other two companies, I-Tech Intelligence Resources and Sinsar Trading Ltd.
Koryo Commercial Bank 고려상업은행 高丽商业银行 aka Korea Commercial Bank	KCB Building, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang; ; Beijing, China; Shenyang, China; SWIFT/BIC KCBKKPPI	Joint Venture with OCN and Ryugyong Commerical Bank
Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商业银行	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003)

<p>AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)</p>		<p>Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.</p>
<p>Bank of East Land 동방은행 aka: Dongbang Bank, Tongbang U’Nhaeng, Tongbang Bank, Haedong Bank (해동은행)</p>	<p>BEL Building, Jonsung-Dong, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814410</p>	<p>Res 2087 (2013) on 22 January 2013 (KPe.013) Info in UN Panel reports: S/2017/150; pp 76-77 and S/2017/742, para 61. Facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation. Has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions.</p>
<p>Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) 조선통일발전은행 (朝鲜)统一发展银行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T’ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank</p>	<p>KUDB Building, Pyongyang SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY</p>	<p>Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.033) Information in UN POE report: S/2017/742, p. 22</p>
<p>Korea Kumgang Group Bank / Kumgang Bank (조선) 금강은행 金刚银行 aka: Kumgang Export and Import Bank</p>	<p>Kumgang Bank Building, Central District, Pyongyang</p>	<p>Associated with Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (under External Economic Committee of the Cabinet) and Korea Pyongyang Trading Company</p>
<p>Daedong Credit Bank 대동신용은행 大同信用银行 Aka Taedong Credit Bank, Dae-Dong Credit Bank, DCB Finance Ltd, Perigrine-Daesong Development Bank</p>	<p>Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, (b) Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, +850 2 3814866 SWIFT: DCBK KPPY</p>	<p>Res 2270 (2016) on 2 March 2016 (KPe.023) Representative offices and front companies in China according to Panel: S/2017/150, paras 225-230 and S/2017/742, paras 51-56. Clients include: T Specialist International (Singapore) Ltd, OCN (Singapore) International Distribution Pte Ltd; Pan Systems; Dalian Daxin Electron Co Ltd, Hongdae International, Yueda International Trading Co, Hing Heng, Korea Sinheung Trading Co, Hana Electronics.</p>

Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商业银行 AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003) Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.
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Sources: Information provided to the Panel by Member States, United Nations resolutions, "The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1718 (2006), UN Panel of Experts reports

Annex 45: Jin Huixing (金辉星) and Ji Honghua (吉红花) bank account opening documents showing address as DPRK Embassy Tripoli as well as Chinese passports

DEMANDE D'OUVERTURE DE COMPTE	
N° du Compte: 3353024622	
Montant: EUR	
Nom/Prénom ou R.Sociale : Mr JIN HUIXING Point de vente: AGENCE DJERBA HOUTM ESSOUK (33) Date de naissance : 07/12/1986 à Date de constitution : Nationalité : CN Secteur d'activité : Employés administratifs Document d'identité PASSEPORT Numéro G38783026	
Code client : 630349 Sexe: M Forme juridique : PERSONNE PHYSIQUE ETRANGERE Fonction : Employés de bureau Délivré le 16/11/2009 Lieu CHINA	
Autorisation BCT : Adresse : EMBASSY OF DEMOCRATIC KOREA TRIPOLI LIBYA Code PTT: 9999 ADRESSE A L'ETRANGER Adresse e-mail : wilsonkim@126.com N° Téléphone Fixe: 00862423415700 Code Marché/Segment : 16 Date Autorisation BCT : N° GSM: 008613464016209	
Option de signature : Séparée	
Code client : 630349 Nom et Prénom : Mr JIN HUIXING Date et lieu de naissance : 07/12/1986 - Identité : PASSEPORT-G38783026 du 16/11/2009-CHINA Adresse : EMBASSY OF DEMOCRATIC KOREA TRIPOLI LIBYA 9999 ADRESSE A L'ETRANGER	
Signature du Titulaire 	
Code mandataire : Nom et Prénom : Date et lieu de naissance : Identité : Adresse :	
Signature du Mandataire	
Code mandataire : Nom et Prénom : Date et lieu de naissance : Identité : Adresse :	
Signature du Mandataire	
Signature du Mandataire	

A50 369

中华人民共和国外交部请各军政机关对持照人予以通行的便利和必要的协助。

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
requests all civil and military authorities of foreign countries to allow the
bearer of this passport to pass freely and afford assistance in case of need.*

护照
PASSPORT

类型 / Type

P

国家码 / Country Code

CHN

护照号 / Passport No.

G38783026

姓 / Surname

金 / JIN

名 / Given name

辉星 / HUIXING

性别 / Sex

男 / M

出生地 / Place of birth

辽宁 / LIAONING

出生日期 / Date of birth

07 DEC 1986

签发地 / Place of issue

辽宁 / LIAONING

签发日期 / Date of issue

16 NOV 2009

有效期 / Date of expiry

15 NOV 2019

签发机关 / Authority

公安部出入境管理局

Exit & Entry Administration
Ministry of Public Security

46705176



中国公民普通护照

POCHNJIN<<HUIXING<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

G387830267CHN8612076M191115019202104<<<<56

630380

335

中华人民共和国外交部请各国军政机关对持照人予以通行的便利和必要的协助。

*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
requests all civil and military authorities of foreign countries to allow the
bearer of this passport to pass freely and afford assistance in case of need.*

护照
PASSPORT

P

国家码 / Country Code
CHN

护照号 / Passport No.
G48607033



吉 / JI

名 / Given name

红花 / HONGHUA

姓 / Surname

女 / F

出生日期 / Date of birth

15 APR 1968

签发日期 / Date of issue

19 JAN 2011

签发机关 / Authority

出生地 / Place of birth

辽宁 / LIAONING

签发地 / Place of issue

辽宁 / LIAONING

有效期至 / Date of expiry

18 JAN 2021

中国出入境管理局

公安部出入境管理局

Exit & Entry Administration
Ministry of Public Security

POCHNJI<<HONGHUA<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

G486070333CHN6804152F210118519202101<<<<62

Annex 46: Kim Su Gwang biodata and supplemental information

Name:	Kim Su Gwang
AKA	Kim Sou-gwang, Son-kwang KIM, KIM Son-gwang, KIM Su-kwang, KIM Sou Kwang
DOB:	18 August 1976
Passport #	DPRK passport number 918220369, issued on 13 May 2008, expired on 13 May 2013; LP # A549083 exp15 Feb 2011. In possession of several forged passports.
Affiliations and activities:	<p>Officer of the Reconnaissance General Bureau with strong skills in IT, encryption and communications.</p> <p>Deputy Trade Representative, Minsk, Belarus from 24 September to 16 December 2017.</p> <p>Former employee of an international organization</p> <p>Son of RGB Official Kim Yong Nam, who also the cover of a position as international civil servant to carry out activities in support of RGB itinerant officers working undercover in Europe and worldwide.</p> <p><u>Establishes bank accounts in the name of his wife, Kim Kyong Hui</u></p>
Address:	<p>Address no 1: 84 Viale della Grande Muraglia, 00144 Rome, Italy</p> <p>Address 2: Via C.G. Viola 68, Rome, 00148, Italy</p>
Telephone:	Work: 00390665131 Cell: 00393406777671

Supplemental information on Kim Su Gwang and his father, Kim Yong Nam's, educational and professional activities

According to information provided to the Panel, Mr. Kim Su Gwang served as an IT officer for an international organization where he engaged in systems networking, network design and programming, server and operating systems engineering, telecommunications, and systems networking. He was hired to the headquarters of the international orgnaization from Paris, where he received his Master's Degree in Telecommunications from the Ecole Nationale Superieure de Telecommunications de Paris (ENST) and another Master's Degree in Information Systems from the Institut Supérieur d'électronique de Paris (ISEP). His projects at these universities included: "laser technology in the military area"; "impact of comic ray on the earth and or/ of radio activities on Very High Integrated Components" and "Optimal Reception Algorithms for Digital Audio Communications." Kim Su Gwang previously worked in Paris at the Manugistics as a systems engineer undertaking software development. He regularly travelled to Paris both in the framework of his work and also as personal deviations from work trips made to London.

At his work, Mr. Kim Su Gwang was given positions with significant responsibility for the organization's information systems and resources. He served as Team Leader of Technical Infrastructure for the global information system used to track all the organization's activity worldwide, from planning projects and tracking food aid shipments to managing finances and paying staff salaries. In the Haiti Country Office

of the organization at which he worked, he managed a multi-million ICT budget for the 2010 post-earthquake recovery effort involving 6 sub offices for which he also engaged in assets management.

With regard to Kim Su Gwang's father, Mr. Kim Yong Nam, before taking up his position at another international organization, he received his diploma as an electronics engineer and served as the Head of the Computer Department at Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang, where he designed a "Duplex Computer System" for the DPRK's Foreign Trade Bank, designed and constructed a minicomputer Central Processing Unit. He also led research teams and lectured in computer programming, computer systems, computer architecture, and microcomputer design. Before taking up his position at UNESCO in Paris, Mr. Kim Yong Nam also spent three years at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna, Russian Federation, as part of a team developing a computer-based Data Processing System for the data of nuclear reactors. While at UNESCO, Kim implemented various IT projects including the establishment of a Computer Center for Training and Telecommunications services in Azerbaijan, a "Regional Academy of Advanced Network Administration and Design" in Kiev; a "Regional Academy for Computer-assisted Teaching and Learning" in Ukraine; a "Technological University of Tajikistan Computer Center for Training and Informatics Skill Development"; a "Computer Center for Training and Business Services" in Azerbaijan; a project entitled, "Advanced Information Technology Development in partners with Kiev Taras Shevchenko University in Ukraine; and "Advanced ICT Training sessions" in the Republic of Korea.

Source: The Panel

Annex 47: Passports of Kim Su Gwang (in name of Kim Sou Kwang)
 (aka Kim Sou-gwang, Son-kwang KIM, KIM Son-gwang, KIM Su-kwang)



Source: The Panel



Source: The Panel

**Annex 48: Copies of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy Identity Cards for
Kim Su Gwang (in name of Kim Sou Kwang), his wife Kim Kyong
Hui**



Source: The Panel

Annex 49: Corporate registration documents for OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd and T Specialist International (Singapore) showing same address and Director, Ng Kheng Wah (“Leo”)

1. OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd Registration

ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
(ACRA)



INFORMATION RESOURCES

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Business Profile (Company) of OCN (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD (198803322G)

Date: 03/02/2017

The Following Are The Brief Particulars of :

Registration No.	:	198803322G
Company Name.	:	OCN (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD
Former Name if any	:	
Incorporation Date.	:	15/09/1988
Company Type	:	EXEMPT PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES
Status	:	Live Company
Status Date	:	15/09/1988

Principal Activities

Activities (I)	:	OTHER HOLDING COMPANIES (64202)
Description	:	
Activities (II)	:	GENERAL WHOLESALE TRADE (INCLUDING GENERAL IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS) (46900)
Description	:	

Capital

Issued Share Capital (AMOUNT)	Number of Shares * 1200000	Currency SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Share Type ORDINARY

* Number of Shares includes number of Treasury Shares

Paid-Up Capital (AMOUNT)	Number of Shares	Currency	Share Type
1200000		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	ORDINARY

COMPANY HAS THE FOLLOWING ORDINARY SHARES HELD AS TREASURY SHARES

Number Of Shares	Currency

INFORMATION RESOURCES

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Business Profile (Company) of OCN (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD (198803322G)

Date: 03/02/2017

Registered Office Address	: 381 JOO CHIAT ROAD #04-00 OCN BUILDING SINGAPORE (427621)
Date of Address	: 18/01/2011
Date of Last AGM	: 30/06/2016
Date of Last AR	: 08/07/2016
Date of A/C Laid at Last AGM	: 31/12/2015
Date of Lodgment of AR, A/C	: 08/07/2016

Audit Firms
NAME
FIDES PAC

Charges				
Charge No.	Date Registered	Currency	Amount Secured	Chargee(s)

Officers/Authorised Representative(s)				
Name	ID	Nationality	Source of Address	Date of Appointment
Address		Position Held		
NG KHENG WAH	S1531876G	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	OSCARS	23/08/1990
30 OLIVE ROAD CALDECOTT HILL ESTATE SINGAPORE (298267)		Director		
NG KHENG ING	S1433838A	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	OSCARS	06/03/2008
36 KEW HEIGHTS SINGAPORE (465979)		Director		
KO FU HENG	S8008313J	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	01/08/2016
451 YISHUN RING ROAD #05-124 JADE SPRING @ YISHUN SINGAPORE (760451)		Secretary		

Shareholder(s)				
Name	ID	Nationality/Place of incorporation/Origin	Source of Address	Address Changed
Address				

INFORMATION RESOURCES

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Business Profile (Company) of OCN (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD (198803322G)

Date: 03/02/2017

Shareholder(s)					
Name	ID	Nationality/Place of incorporation/Origin	Source of Address	Address Changed	
Address					
1 NG SWEE HONG (DECEASED)	S0718906J	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	OSCAR'S	11/06/2007	
46 JALAN AMPANG SINGAPORE (268632)					
Ordinary(Number)	Currency				
1	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS				
2 NG KHENG ING	S1433838A	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	OSCAR'S	16/03/2008	
36 KEW HEIGHTS SINGAPORE (465979)					
Ordinary(Number)	Currency				
1139999	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS				
3 NG KHENG WAH	S1531876G	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	OSCAR'S	17/05/2009	
30 OLIVE ROAD CALDECOTT HILL ESTATE SINGAPORE (298267)					
Ordinary(Number)	Currency				
60000	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS				

2. T Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd Corporate Registration

ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
(ACRA)



INFORMATION RESOURCES

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Business Profile (Company) of T SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (S) PTE LTD (199705960W)

Date: 10/03/2017

The Following Are The Brief Particulars of :

Registration No.	:	199705960W
Company Name.	:	T SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (S) PTE LTD (w.e.f.28/10/1998)
Former Name if any	:	TILE SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD
Incorporation Date.	:	27/08/1997
Company Type	:	PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES
Status	:	Live Company
Status Date	:	27/08/1997

Principal Activities

Activities (I)	:	GENERAL WHOLESALE TRADE (INCLUDING GENERAL IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS) (46900)
Description	:	
Activities (II)	:	OTHER BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICE ACTIVITIES (EG JUNKETS, ADMINISTRATION OF LOYALTY PROGRAMMES) (82999)
Description	:	

Capital

Issued Share Capital (AMOUNT)	Number of Shares * 6080002	Currency	Share Type
		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	ORDINARY

* Number of Shares includes number of Treasury Shares

Paid-Up Capital (AMOUNT)	Number of Shares	Currency	Share Type
		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	ORDINARY

COMPANY HAS THE FOLLOWING ORDINARY SHARES HELD AS TREASURY SHARES

Number Of Shares	Currency

WHILST EVERY ENDEAVOR IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED AND CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.

**Business Profile (Company) of T SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (S) PTE LTD
(199705960W)**

Date: 10/03/2017

Registered Office Address	: 381 JOO CHIAT ROAD #04-00 LAGUN SARI BUILDING SINGAPORE (427621)
Date of Address	: 19/10/2001
Date of Last AGM	: 30/06/2016
Date of Last AR	: 08/07/2016
Date of A/C Laid at Last AGM	: 31/12/2015
Date of Lodgment of AR, A/C	: 08/07/2016

Audit Firms
NAME
MY PARTNERSHIP

Charges				
Charge No.	Date Registered	Currency	Amount Secured	Chargee(s)
C201402922	20/03/2014		All Monies	RHB BANK BERHAD
C201410526	26/09/2014		All Monies	CIMB BANK BERHAD
C201611654	17/11/2016		All Monies	MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD
C201611655	17/11/2016		All Monies	MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD

Officers/Authorised Representative(s)				
Name	ID	Nationality	Source of Address	Date of Appointment
Address		Position Held		
NG KHENG WAH	S1531876G	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	OSCARS	27/08/1997
30 OLIVE ROAD CALDECOTT HILL ESTATE SINGAPORE (298267)		Director		
CHEW NG SEW	S0194238G	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	OSCARS	27/08/1997
15 LEONIE HILL ROAD #07-04 HORIZON TOWERS EAST SINGAPORE (239194)		Director		

INFORMATION RESOURCES

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**Business Profile (Company) of T SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (S) PTE LTD
(199705960W)**

Date: 10/03/2017

The Following Are The Brief Particulars of :

Registration No.	:	199705960W
Company Name.	:	T SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (S) PTE LTD (w.e.f.28/10/1998)
Former Name if any	:	TILE SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD
Incorporation Date.	:	27/08/1997
Company Type	:	PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES
Status	:	Live Company
Status Date	:	27/08/1997

Principal Activities

Activities (I)	:	GENERAL WHOLESALE TRADE (INCLUDING GENERAL IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS) (46900)
Description	:	
Activities (II)	:	OTHER BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICE ACTIVITIES (EG JUNKETS, ADMINISTRATION OF LOYALTY PROGRAMMES) (82999)
Description	:	

Capital

Issued Share Capital (AMOUNT)	Number of Shares * 6080002	Currency	Share Type
		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	ORDINARY

* Number of Shares includes number of Treasury Shares

Paid-Up Capital (AMOUNT)	Number of Shares	Currency	Share Type
		SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	ORDINARY

COMPANY HAS THE FOLLOWING ORDINARY SHARES HELD AS TREASURY SHARES

Number Of Shares	Currency

INFORMATION RESOURCES

WHILST EVERY ENDEAVOR IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED AND CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.

**Business Profile (Company) of T SPECIALIST INTERNATIONAL (S) PTE LTD
(199705960W)**

Date: 10/03/2017

Officers/Authorised Representative(s)

Name	ID	Nationality	Source of Address	Date of Appointment
Address		Position Held		
KO FU HENG	S8008313J	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	01/08/2016
451 YISHUN RING ROAD #05-124 JADE SPRING @ YISHUN SINGAPORE (760451)		Secretary		

Shareholder(s)

Name	ID	Nationality/Place of incorporation/Origin	Source of Address	Address Changed
Address				
1 TTAT INVESTMENT PTE LTD	200010754E	SINGAPORE	ACRA	
381 JOO CHIAT ROAD #04-00 LAGUN SARI BUILDING SINGAPORE (427621)				
Ordinary(Number)	Currency			
6080002	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS			

Annex 50: Biodata and Passport of Wang Zhi Guo (王志国)

Name:	Wang Zhi Guo (王志国)
DOB:	11 July 1962
Passport #	China passport E25486535 / 140254055 / Hong Kong registration documents lists his “Chinese ID card number” as: 120102196207110550
Expiry :	PP expiry 2021.3.9
Affiliations:	<p>Shareholder, Lagun Sari (along with OCN and OCN director Ng Kheng Wah (“Leo”) and his daughter)</p> <p>Former Director, Pinnacle International Distribution (HK)</p> <p>Former Director, Pinnacle International Distribution (Singapore)</p> <p>Representative of China operations for OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd</p> <p>Used to direct Pinnacle International along with Ng Kheng Wah (“Leo”), OCN Director</p>
Address:	<p>Wang’s Chinese address in Pinnacle International Distribution (HK) registration documents is: An Shan Xi Dao Nan Kai Tianjin 300193</p> <p>Wang’s Chinese address in Pinnacle International Distribution (Singapore) registration documents is: No. 17 Jiangjia Hutong Li Gong Lou, Hedong District, Tianjin, China, which is the same address listed in the Lagun Sari registration documents</p>
Travels	Between 5 January 2013 and 10 August 2017, Wang Zhi Guo made 25 trips in and out of Singapore and spent a total of 1256 days in the country
Telephone:	+ 86 13802077316



Source: The Panel

Annex 51: Singapore Entries and exists for Wang Zhi Guo (2 pages) 2015-2017

IN/OUT STATUS	ENTRY/EXIT DATE	CHECKPOINT
ARRIVAL	10/08/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	31/07/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	03/07/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	11/06/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	04/05/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	26/03/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	27/02/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	09/12/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	31/10/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	29/08/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	04/08/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	15/06/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	21/05/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	21/02/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	25/01/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	22/10/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	12/10/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	11/09/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	09/09/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	08/09/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	31/08/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	21/06/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	28/05/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	04/03/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	12/02/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	30/11/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	30/10/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	31/08/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	14/08/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	13/07/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	03/07/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2

DEPARTURE	01/06/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	17/05/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	21/03/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	15/03/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	10/11/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	02/11/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	07/10/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	19/09/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	14/08/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	05/08/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	08/05/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	29/04/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	20/03/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	16/03/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	25/02/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	03/02/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	09/01/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	05/01/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2

Source: The Panel

Annex 52: Corporate registration documents for Pinnacle International Distribution (Singapore) showing Wang Zhiguo (王志国) Tianjin address

INFORMATION RESOURCES			
ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY (ACRA) 			
Date: 19/07/2017			
WHILST EVERY ENDEAVOR IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED AND CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.			
People Profile			
NRIC/FIN/Passport No.	: 140253055		
Name	: WANG ZHI GUO		
Nationality	: CHINESE		
Address	: NO 17 JIANGJIA HUTONG LI GONG LOU HEDONG DISTRICT TIANJIN CHINA		
Officer / Shareholder / Member of the following Companies			
Registration No.	: 199306208H		
Company Name	: PINNACLE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD		
Registration Date	: 21/09/1993		
Company Type	: PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES		
Company Status	: Struck Off		
Status Date	: 06/05/2009		
Company Address	: 381 JOO CHIAT ROAD #04-008 LAGUN SARI BUILDING SINGAPORE (427621)		
Activity (I)	: WHOLESALOE OF COMPUTER HARDWARE AND PERIPHERAL EQUIPMENT (46511)		
Description			
Activity (II)	: GENERAL WHOLESALOE TRADE (INCLUDING GENERAL IMPORTERS AND EXPORTERS) (46900)		
Description	: IMPORT/EXPORT & WHOLESALOE TRADING IN COMPUTER PERIPHERALS/ACCESSORIES		
Position	Date of Appointment	Date of Cessation	ShareHolding
SHAREHOLDER	30/01/2004		1
<hr/>			
Registration No.	: 199408052N		
Company Name	: LAGUN SARI WEDDING & CATERING SERVICES PTE. LTD.		
Registration Date	: 04/11/1994		
Company Type	: PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES		
Company Status	: Live Company		
Status Date	: 04/11/1994		

Source: Singapore Corporate Registry

Annex 53: Corporate registration documents for Pinnacle International Distribution (Hong Kong) Company Ltd (高峰国际营销(香港)有限公司) showing Wang Zhiguo (王志国) with another Tianjin address

 公司註冊處 Companies Registry	<p>周年申報表 Annual Return</p> <p>(《公司條例》第 107(1)條) (Companies Ordinance s. 107(1))</p>	存案 Filed 表格 Form AR1						
<p>重要事項 Important Notes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 填表前請參閱《填表須知》。 請用黑色墨水列印。 • Please read the accompanying notes before completing this form. Please print in black ink. 								
公司編號 Company Number 619438								
<p>1 公司名稱 Company Name</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> 高峰國際營銷(香港)有限公司 PINNACLE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION (HONG KONG) COMPANY LTD </div>								
<p>2 商業名稱 Business Name</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> N/A </div>								
<p>3 公司類別 Type of Company</p> <p>請在適用的空格內加上 ✓ 號 Please tick the relevant box</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 有股本的私人公司 Private Company having a share capital <input type="checkbox"/> 其他 Others </div>								
<p>4 本申報表日期 Date of this Return</p> <p>本申報表列載公司截至右列日期為止的資料 The information in this return is made up to</p> <table style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; border: 1px solid black; text-align: center; width: fit-content;"> <tr> <td>06</td> <td>08</td> <td>2011</td> </tr> <tr> <td>日 DD</td> <td>月 MM</td> <td>年 YYYY</td> </tr> </table> <p>(如屬有股本的私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。如屬其他公司，所列載的資料則應截至公司周年大會日期或以代替周年大會的書面決議的日期為止。 <i>For a private company having a share capital, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of incorporation. For other companies, the information should be made up to the date of the annual general meeting (AGM) or the date of written resolution passed in lieu of AGM.)</i></p>			06	08	2011	日 DD	月 MM	年 YYYY
06	08	2011						
日 DD	月 MM	年 YYYY						
<p>5 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> ROOM 1203, 12/F., GREAT EAGLE CENTRE, 23 HARBOUR ROAD, WANCHAI, HONG KONG. </div>								
<p>6 電郵地址 E-mail Address</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> (Nil) </div>								
<p>7 提交人的資料 Presentor's Reference</p> <p>姓名 Name: LOYAL PORT LIMITED 地址 Address: OFFICE UNITS 4-5A, 4/F., WING TUCK COMM. CENTRE, 177-183 WING LOK ST., SHEUNG WAN, HONG KONG. 電話 Tel: 23318206 傳真 Fax: 31101338 電郵地址 E-mail Address: tw@bucpa.com.hk 檔號 Reference: Our Ref.: (JENNY) / Doc. No.: 6194380003 / Deadline: 16/09/2011 指明編號 2/2008 (修訂) (2008 年 7 月) Specification No. 2/2008 (Revision) (July 2008)</p>		<p>請勿填寫本欄 For Official Use</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin-bottom: 10px;">  22700600069 AR1L 08/09/2011 0619438 </div>						
0 1 1 8								
<i>'CSA' by P & L Associates, Hong Kong. (AR1.Frm)</i>								

表格 Form AR1

公司編號 Company Number

619438

b) 10 有股本公司的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) of a Company Having a Share Capital
(有股本的公司必須填報此項。如未能盡錄於下列表格內，請用續頁 A 填報。 Company having a share capital must complete this section. Use Continuation Sheet A if there is insufficient space.)

截至本申報表日期的成員詳情 Details of Member(s) as at the Date of this Return

股份類別 Class of Shares **ORDINARY SHARES**

姓名／名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks	
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓* Transferred *			
			數目 Number	日期 Date		
王志国 / WANG ZHIGUO /	AN SHAN XI DAO, NAN KAI, TIANJIN, CHINA. ZIP: 300193 /	199,999 /				
康呂榮 / KANG LU RONG /	ROOM 308, TOWER A, CAMBRIGE PLAZA, NO. 188 SAN WAN ROAD, SHEUNG SHUI, NEW TERRITORIES, HONG KONG.	1 /				
總數 Total		200,000 /				

*如公司的股份自上一份周年申報表日期以來(如屬首份周年申報表, 則自公司成立為法團以來)有任何轉讓, 有關詳情亦請一併申報; 股份受讓人的姓名/名稱請在「備註」一欄註明。

* If there have been any transfers of the company's shares since the date of the last annual return (or since incorporation if this is the first annual return), please also provide details of the transfers; the name of the transferee should be stated in the 'Remarks' column.

12 董事 Director**A. 個人董事 Individual Director**

(如超過一名個人董事，請用續頁 C 繼續 Use Continuation Sheet C if more than 1 individual director)

請在適用的空格內加上 ✓ 號 Please tick the relevant box(es)

9) 身份 Capacity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to N/A
-------------------	--	---	----------------------------

中文姓名
Name in Chinese

王志國 /

英文姓名
Name in English

WANG /

ZHIGUO /

姓氏 Surname

名字 Other Names

前用姓名
Previous Names

(Nil)

別名
Alias

(Nil)

20) 住址
Residential AddressAN SHAN XI DAO, NAN KAI, TIANJIN, CHINA.
ZIP: 300193 / / / /

CHINA /

國家 Country

21) 電郵地址
E-mail Address

(Nil)

22) 身份證明 Identification

CHINA ID CARD NO: 120102196207110550 / / /

a 香港身份證號碼
Hong Kong Identity Card Number

(Nil)

b 護照
Passport

(Nil)

(Nil)

簽發國家 Issuing Country

號碼 Number

指明編號 2/2008 (修訂) (2008 年 7 月)
Specification No. 2/2008 (Revision) (July 2008)

第五頁 Page 5

Source: Hong Kong Corporate Registry

Annex 54: Two corporate registration documents for Lagun Sari (Singapore) showing OCN Address, Ng Kheng Wah and Chew Ng Sew as Directors and Wang Zhi Guo as shareholder as well as Wang Zhiguo (王志国)'s second Tianjin address



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Filing of Annual Return by Local Company

Details Screen

UEN 199408052N	Entity Name LAGUN SARI WEDDING & CATERING SERVICES PTE. LTD.
Company Type During Financial Period Concerned PRIVATE COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES	Please select applicable option Active

Address Section (as at 28/07/2016)

Registered Office Address 381 JOO CHIAT ROAD #04-00 OCN BUILDING SINGAPORE 427621	Address where Register is kept if other than the Registered Office 21 WOODLANDS CLOSE #08-34 PRIMZ BIZHUB SINGAPORE 737854
--	---

Particulars of Directors/Managing Directors/Alternate Directors, CEO, Secretaries, Auditors (as at 28/07/2016)

Director(s)			
S>No.	Name	Identification No./ Nationality	Date of Appointment
1	CHEW NG SEW	S0194238G / SINGAPORE CITIZEN	11/03/1998
2	NG KHENG WAH	S1531876G / SINGAPORE CITIZEN	04/11/1994
Managing Director(s)			
S>No.	Name	Identification No./ Nationality	Date of Appointment
Alternate Director(s)			
S>No.	Name	Identification No./ Nationality	Date of Appointment
Secretary(ies)			
S>No.	Name	Identification No./ Nationality	Date of Appointment
1	PAN GUOWEI	S8903036F / SINGAPORE CITIZEN	27/03/2015
CEO			
S>No.	Name	Identification No./ Nationality	Date of Appointment
Auditor(s)			
S>No.	Name	Identification No.	Date of Appointment
1	FIDES PAC	201406389Z	30/12/2015

Registered Charges Section (as at 28/07/2016)

Charge No.	Date of Registration	Amount of Indebtedness

Share Capital Details (as at 28/07/2016)

S.No.	Currency	Class of share	No. of Shares Held	Amount of Issued Share Capital	Amount of Paid Up Share Capital
1	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Ordinary	1764000	186800	186800
		Preference	0	0	0
		Others	0	0	0

Treasury Share Details (as at 28/07/2016)

S.No.	Currency	Class of share	No. of Shares Held	Amount of Issued Share Capital	Amount of Paid Up Share Capital
No data to display.					

Shareholder(s) Details (as at 28/07/2016)

S>No.	Name	Identification No. / Nationality	Currency	Class of share	No. of Shares Held
1	WANG ZHI GUO	140253055 /CHINESE	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Ordinary	50000
				Preference	
				Others	
2	OCN (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD	198803322G /SINGAPORE	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Ordinary	170000
				Preference	

				Ordinary		231600
3	CHEW NG SEW	S0194238G /SINGAPORE CITIZEN	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Preference		
				Others		
4	TAN CHOR KHENG	S1240064J /SINGAPORE CITIZEN	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Ordinary		231600
				Preference		
				Others		
5	TAN NGUAN KENG MDM	S1470052H /SINGAPORE CITIZEN	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Ordinary		540400
				Preference		
				Others		
6	NG KHENG WAH	S1531876G /SINGAPORE CITIZEN	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS	Ordinary		540400
				Preference		
				Others		

Group Share Information (as at 28/07/2016)

S/No.	Group Name	Currency	Class of share	No. of Shares Held	Shareholders
No data to display.					

AGM and Financial Details Section

Date Financial Statements made up to (Financial Period End) 31/12/2015	Has Annual General Meeting (AGM) been held? Yes
Date of Annual General Meeting 30/06/2016	Date of Annual Return 28/07/2016

Primary/Secondary Activity(ies) Section

Primary/Secondary Activity(ies) as at Annual Return: 28/07/2016	
Primary Activity WEDDING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES (INCLUDING BRIDAL STUDIOS AND WEDDING PLANNERS)(96040)	Primary User-Described Activity WEDDING PLANNING SERVICE
Secondary Activity FOOD CATERERS(56201)	Secondary User-Described Activity CATERING SERVICE

Is the principal activity(ies) as at Financial Period End different from principal activity(ies) as at Date of Annual Return?
No

Financial Information in XBRL Section

Financial Statements
Full set of financial statements

Note : For financial information in XBRL not uploaded to BizFile

- Please click on the **Go to BizFinX** button to load financial information in XBRL
- Click on **Refresh Page** to show the uploaded file

Note : For financial information in XBRL that have been uploaded to BizFile

- If you had successfully uploaded the file, it will be shown below
- To view the uploaded file, please click on the **Financial Period End** hyperlink
- To file the selected uploaded file with this AR, please click on one of the radio buttons under Select column

Source: Singapore Corporate Registry

WHILST EVERY ENDEAVOR IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED AND CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.

Business Profile (Company) of LAGUN SARI WEDDING & CATERING SERVICES PTE. LTD. (199408052N)

Date: 10/03/2017

Registered Office Address	: 381 JOO CHIAT ROAD #04-00 LAGUN SARI BUILDING SINGAPORE (427621)
Date of Address	: 10/05/2001
Date of Last AGM	: 30/06/2016
Date of Last AR	: 28/07/2016
Date of A/C Laid at Last AGM	: 31/12/2015
Date of Lodgment of AR, A/C	: 28/07/2016

Audit Firms**NAME**

FIDES PAC

Charges

Charge No.	Date Registered	Currency	Amount Secured	Chargee(s)
------------	-----------------	----------	----------------	------------

Officers/Authorised Representative(s)

Name	ID	Nationality	Source of Address	Date of Appointment
Address		Position Held		
NG SHI YI, TANIA	S9232298Z	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	24/01/2017
30 OLIVE ROAD CALDECOTT HILL ESTATE SINGAPORE (298267)		Director		
NG SHI YING, TRINA	S9232296C	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	24/01/2017
30 OLIVE ROAD CALDECOTT HILL ESTATE SINGAPORE (298267)		Director		
CHEW RONGHAO, MORGAN	S9015747G	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	24/01/2017
15 LEONIE HILL ROAD #07-04 HORIZON TOWERS EAST SINGAPORE (239194)		Director		
KO FU HENG	S8008313J	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	15/07/2016

WHILST EVERY ENDEAVOR IS MADE TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION PROVIDED IS UPDATED AND CORRECT. THE AUTHORITY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGE OR LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED AS A RESULT OF ANY ERROR OR OMISSION.

Business Profile (Company) of LAGUN SARI WEDDING & CATERING SERVICES PTE. LTD. (199408052N)

Date: 10/03/2017

Officers/Authorised Representative(s)				
Name	ID	Nationality	Source of Address	Date of Appointment
Address		Position Held		
451 YISHUN RING ROAD #05-124 JADE SPRING @ YISHUN SINGAPORE (760451)		Secretary		
Shareholder(s)				
Name	ID	Nationality/Place of Incorporation-Origin	Source of Address	Address Changed
Address				
1 WANG ZHI GUO	140253055	CHINESE	ACRA	
NO 17 JIANGJIA HUTONG LI GONG LOU HEDONG DISTRICT TIANJIN CHINA				
Ordinary(Number)	Currency			
50000	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS			
2 OCN (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD	198803322G	SINGAPORE	ACRA	
381 JOO CHIAT ROAD #04-00 LAGUN SARI BUILDING SINGAPORE (427621)				
Ordinary(Number)	Currency			
170000	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS			
3 CHEW RONGHAO, MORGAN	S9015747G	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	
15 LEONIE HILL ROAD #07-04 HORIZON TOWERS EAST SINGAPORE (239194)				
Ordinary(Number)	Currency			
154500	SINGAPORE, DOLLARS			
4 NG SHI YING, TRINA	S9232296C	SINGAPORE CITIZEN	ACRA	
30 OLIVE ROAD CALDECOTT HILL ESTATE SINGAPORE (298267)				

Source: Singapore Corporate Registry

Annex 55: Business card of OCN Singapore Purchasing / Distribution Manager also showing T Specialist, Watari, and Ohayo International



Source: The Panel

Note: Ohayo International is a wholesaler of electrical appliances, liquor, and tobacco to several countries, including the DPRK and was first registered nearly 13 years ago by T Specialist. As of January/February 2017, Leo Ng's daughters, Trina Ng, her sister Tania, and OCN Pte are Ohayo's shareholders; they and Leo Ng are listed as directors in corporate filings along with another Singaporean national by the name of Ko Fu Heng.

Annex 56: Biodata and passport of Ri Ik (aka Li Ik)

Name: Li Ik
 DOB: 11 February 1963
 Passport number DPRK Passport: 745420357, exp 11/11/2020
 A.k.a.: Ri Ik
 Affiliations: Regional Business Development Manager,
 OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd
 OCN Representative, Pyongyang

Address: 28 Cuscaden Road #05-10 Cuscaden Residences Singapore
 249723
 Telephone: +6591831221
 Email: CHRISTIN@OCN.COM.SG



Source: The Panel


Annex 57: Singapore entries and exits for Ri Ik (Aka Li Ik) from 2015-2017

IN/OUT STATUS	ENTRY/EXIT DATE	CHECKPOINT
DEPARTURE	08/06/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	27/05/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	10/03/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	27/02/2017	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	17/12/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	11/12/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	07/12/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	02/12/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	26/10/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	11/10/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	24/08/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	18/08/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	08/07/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	22/06/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	08/04/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	29/03/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	26/03/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	22/03/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	29/01/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	12/01/2016	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	18/12/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	24/11/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	28/10/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	20/10/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	04/09/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	20/08/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	20/08/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	19/08/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	27/07/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	04/07/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	20/06/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	27/05/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	01/03/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	30/01/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	21/01/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	12/01/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	12/01/2015	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2

ARRIVAL	24/12/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	19/12/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	12/11/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	25/09/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	25/09/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	24/09/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	02/09/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	09/08/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	28/07/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	10/06/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	27/05/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	05/05/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	29/04/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	24/04/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	14/04/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	25/03/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	15/03/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	14/02/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	05/02/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	03/01/2014	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	10/12/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	09/10/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	19/09/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
DEPARTURE	18/09/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 2
ARRIVAL	13/09/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	21/08/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	01/08/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	31/05/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	18/05/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	22/04/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	16/04/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	01/04/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	15/03/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	25/02/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
ARRIVAL	09/02/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3
DEPARTURE	18/01/2013	CHANGI AIRPORT TERMINAL 3

Source: The Panel

Annex 58: Screenshot from Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM, showing address in Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24. (OCN address listed on Bugsae Shop carrier bags is Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-01)




Source: <https://www.nknews.org/pro/exclusive-singapore-firm-still-denies-links-to-north-korea-despite-new-evidence/>

Annex 59: Use of Ryugyong Commercial Bank card provides 5% discount in Buksae shop



Source: Jaka Parker



Source: Jaka Parker (@JakaParker) instagram

Annex 60: Shopping bag obtained from Bugsae Shop (alternative spelling of Buksae Shop) in Pyongyang showing locations and “OCN Group” affiliation - June 2017



Source: NK Pro

Annex 61: Shopping Bag obtained from Bugsae Shop (OCN Group) at Changgwang Foreign House, Pyongyang, June 2017



Source: NK Pro

Annex 62: Ukrainian confectionary company export records for items shipped to the address: “OCN Pyongyang Office 01-05 Changwang House, Pyongyang DPRK” from April 2015 until January 2017

Screenshot of Import Genius, source of trade data

The screenshot shows the Import Genius website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for SERVICE: (9/3) 655-55-6 SALES: 855-3-4-1199, Live Chat, HOME, HOW IT WORKS, PLANS & PRICING, SEARCH, CONTACT US, and a Live Chat button with a profile picture. Below the navigation bar, the page title is "Bugsae Shop" with the subtitle "Bugsae Shop is a buyer that buys products from Тов Авк Конфекшінері". A large graphic features the Import Genius logo over a 3D island scene with mountains, a factory, and a boat. Below the graphic is a button labeled "Play muted". A banner at the bottom of the graphic area says "International Trade Starts With Our Data". On the left side, there is a sidebar titled "IMPORT GENIUS" containing text about bill of lading data and two buttons: "Learn More" (blue) and "Join Now" (green). At the bottom of the page, there is a search bar with "Instant Search" and several navigation links: "View Sample Shipment Records", "Shipment Alert Subscription", "Contact This Company", and "Sign Up". The main content area features a section titled "Sample shipment record for Bugsae Shop" with the same subtitle as the page. It includes a table for the "BILL OF LADING" with columns for Recepient, Sender, HS CODE, EXPORT DATE, WEIGHT, PRICE, CUSTOMS OFFICE CODE, and DECLARATION NO. The recipient is listed as "BUGSAE SHOP Ocn Pyongyang Office 01-05 Changgwang House, Ryongyang, Dprk". The sender is "ТОВ АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ 04080, М.ків, Вул. Межигірська, Буд. 82-А". The table also lists the export date as 2017-01-05, weight as 303.16, price as 26766.04, customs office code as 110100001, and declaration number as 200212. At the bottom of this section, there is a link to "Subscribe to access the complete shipping history for Bugsae Shop" and a "Join Now" button.

Source: Import Genius

List of exports to Bugsae shop at OCN Pyongyang address (exports of candy and confectionary items)

ImportGenius.com info@importgenius.com Toll Free: 855-573-9976 International: +1 480-745-3396		PRODUCT	HS CODE	CONSIGNEE	CONSIGNEE ADDRESS	SHIPPER	SHIPPER ADDRESS	EXPORT DATE	WEIGHT	PRICE (UAH)
.Шоколадні цукерки з начинкою		1806901900	"BUGSAE SHOP"	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK.	ТОВ "АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ"	04080, м.Київ, вул. Межигірська, 1	2017-01-05	1662.16	125317.46	
. Вафлі, повністю або частково покриті шоколадом		1905321900	"BUGSAE SHOP"	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK.	ТОВ "АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ"	04080, м.Київ, вул. Межигірська, 1	2017-01-05	167.4	17296.65	
. Вафлі солодкі без покривало		1905329900	"BUGSAE SHOP"	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK.	ТОВ "АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ"	04080, м.Київ, вул. Межигірська, 1	2017-01-05	194.4	17296.65	
. Мучні кондитерські виробки		1905906000	"BUGSAE SHOP"	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK.	ТОВ "АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ"	04080, м.Київ, вул. Межигірська, 1	2017-01-05	303.16	26766.04	
. Паста рослинно-молочна		1806329000	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK.	ТОВ "ТЕРРА ФУД"	23600 Вінницька обл., м. 1	2016-08-30	3440	5525.2	
. Паста рослинно-молочна		1517909999	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK	ТОВ "ТЕРРА ФУД"	23600 Вінницька обл., м. 1	2016-08-30	1652	1815.84	
. Готовий харчовий продукт		1901909100	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK	ТОВ "ТЕРРА ФУД"	23600 Вінницька обл., м. 1	2016-08-30	2268	2562.84	
. Суміш рослинно-вершкова		1517901000	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK	ТОВ "ТЕРРА ФУД"	23600 Вінницька обл., м. 1	2016-08-30	900	1323	
.Шоколадні цукерки з начинкою		1806901900	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK	ТОВ "АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ"	04080, м.Київ, вул. Межигірська, 1	2016-08-12	1863.44	6903.84	
. Вафлі солодкі без покривало		1905329900	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK	ТОВ "АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ"	04080, м.Київ, вул. Межигірська, 1	2016-08-12	86.4	288	
. Вафлі, повністю або частково покриті шоколадом		1905321900	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN PYONGYANG OFFICE 01-05 CHANGGWANG HOUSE, PYONGYANG, DPRK	ТОВ "АВК КОНФЕКШІНЕРІ"	04080, м.Київ, вул. Межигірська, 1	2016-08-12	37.2	144	
. Молоко питне ультрапастеризоване		401209100	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN Pyongyang, office #01-05, Changgwang House, Ryenhwado-Dong, Central district, Pyongy	ТОВ "ТЕРРА ФУД"	23600 Вінницька обл., м. 1	2015-04-17	12817	139175.03	
. Молоко питне ультрапастеризоване		401201100	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN Pyongyang, office #01-05, Changgwang House, Ryenhwado-Dong, Central district, Pyongy	ТОВ "ТЕРРА ФУД"	23600 Вінницька обл., м. 1	2015-04-17	12817	128469.26	
. Масло вершкове натуральне		405101100	BUGSAE SHOP	OCN Pyongyang, office #01-05, Changgwang House, Ryenhwado-Dong, Central district, Pyongy	ТОВ "ТЕРРА ФУД"	23600 Вінницька обл., м. 1	2015-04-08	11820	1158565.35	

Source: Import Genius

Annex 63: OCN Singapore label affixed to a wine bottle at the Bugsae Shop in Pyongyang, July 2017



Source: NK Pro

Annex 64: Luxury-branded cosmetics, handbags, watches, leather goods and footwear on display at the Buksae Shop in Pyongyang, July 2017




Source: NK Pro

Annex 65: Biodata on Han Hun II (Edward Han)

Name:	Han Hun II
DOB:	2 April 1957
Passport #	836134879
Expiry:	2021/3/9
A.k.a.:	Edward Han; Dr. Edward Han Hun II
Family members	<p><u>Wife:</u> Kim Mi-Kyong (김미경) • DOB: 1959/2/15</p> <p><u>Son:</u> Han Kumryong (한금룡) • aka “Han Song” (한 성) • aka: “Harvard Han” • DOB: 18 September 1984 • Worked at MKP Myanmar until 2013</p>
Affiliations:	<p>Sungri Economic Group (승리경제연합회) Dispatched to Malaysia in 1995 to serve as Malaysia Representative of Mansudae Overseas Projects (MOP) Established a Mansudae branch, M.O.P. (S) Pte Ltd, in Singapore on 20 May 1994 until it was struck off the register on 30 September 2009. In 2006 his tenure with MOP expired and he was given the status of “operative” in the Reconnaissance General Bureau. He had previously served as representative of RGB in Africa before 1994. On 20 June 2006 he registered Malaysia Korea Partners (MKP) in Malaysia jointly with Yong Kok Yeap with each of them owning half the shares (175,000 Ringgit) MKP signed a joint investment agreement in June 2009 with a DPRK China joint bank called “High-Fund International bank” which had an affiliation with DPRK Sungri Economic group. MKP established the International Consortium Bank (ICB) MKP employs IT personnel from the DPRK state science academy in its subsidiary, SOSIT are still working</p>
Address:	<p>MKP Capital LLC Berhd <u>Registered address:</u> 24-B Jalan Landak Off Jalan Pudu KL <u>Business address:</u> Lot 5, Jalan Satu Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jaya 43200 Balakong Selangor Darul Ehsan Malaysia</p>
Travels	Traveled to other South East Asian countries in 2016, including the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in October. The Lao PDR has not responded to the Panel’s inquiry
Telephone: Fax : Email Website :	603 9076 9678 603 9075 9678 enquiries@mkpholdings.com.my www.mkpholdings.com.my

Source: The Panel, Member States, Corporate Registry Documents

Annex 66: MKP network chart



Source: The Panel

Annex 67: MKP companies in Malaysia as of 15 December 2017

	Company Name	Corporate Number	Status	Address	Directors	Shareholders	Start
1	M.K.P. PROJECTS SDN. BHD.	199448-D	Dissolved	Rm.1 1st. Floor, Lee Rubber Bldg 145, Jalan Tun H.S. Lee Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Abdul kudus bin datuk; Lee Kung Wah; Chong ah Kow @ Chong Ching Che; Yong Kok Yeap;	Abdul Kudus Bin Datuk; Yong Kok Yeap; Chong Ah Kow @ Chong Ching Che; Lee Kung Wah	15 June 1990
2	MKP BUILDERS SDN. BHD	386207-P	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara Klh Business Centre 2, Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras, selangor	Han Hun Il; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	6 May 1996
3	MKP CAPITAL BERHAD	738326-V	Winding Up	24-B, Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 cheras, selangor	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	20 June 2006
4	MKP CAPITAL LLC BERHAD	980801-M	Existing	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	2 March 2012
5	MKP CORPORATION BERHAD	619741-U	Winding Up	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan	Han Hun Il; Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	26 June 2003

				Lot 5,Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11batu 9 Cherass Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Ramanan Ramakrishnan, Dato';		
6	MKP DYNAMIC ENGINEERING SDN. BHD	735910-W	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman;	Karnail Singh Nijhar Amar Singh, Tansri Dato'dr; Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Han Hun Il; Ramanan Ramakrishnan	31 May 2006
7	MKP DYNAMIC SDN. BHD	779980-A	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor), Menara Klhbusiness Centre, 2, Jalan Kasipillaryoff Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras selangor	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Ramanan Ramakrishnan; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman @ Mddaud;	Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Ramanan Ramakrishnan; Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh	7 July 2012
8	MKP HOLDINGS SDN. BHD	464492-W	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur,	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	23 June 1998

				Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor			
9	MKP SUPPLIES SDN. BHD	1210818-M	Existing	No. 3a-1, Jalan D'alpinia 10 taman D'alpinia, Puchong Selangor	Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Fang Chee Peng	30 November 2016
10	MKP-WUI LOONG SYSTEM SCAFFOLDS SDN. BHD	577418-H	Existing	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutua Lot 5 Jalan 1kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11 Batu 9 Cheras, Selangor	Kong Kam Wang; Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap; So Yu Shing;	Wui Loong System Scaffolds Co.Ltd; Mkp Holdings Sdn. Bhd.	17 April 2002
11	Nekad Ziplem SDN. BHD	614359-U	Existing	52 a, Jalan Landak off Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor)	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Jusoh Bin Awang; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il; Sumairi Bin Hashim	7 May 2003
12	ELEMENT FLASH (M) SDN. BHD.	658573-V	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5 Jalan Satu kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabalakong Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Chua Boon Lain; Tee Eng Soon;	Chua Boon Lain; Yong Kok Yeap; Tee Eng Soon	6 July 2004

13	SOSIT SDN. BHD.	749341-K	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jaya Batu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	3 October 2006
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Source: Malaysian corporate registry

Annex 68: Singapore Mansudae branch, M.O.P. (S) Pte Ltd, registered by Han Hun Il on 20 May 1994 until it was struck-off on 30 September 2009


BizInsights 

ACRA
ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE
REGULATORY AUTHORITY

BizInsights (People Profile Information)

People Profile of HAN HUN IL

Particulars		
Name	:	HAN HUN IL
NRIC	:	5020012
Nationality	:	KOREAN, SOUTH
Address	:	12 MARGATE ROAD #06-05 SINGAPORE 438053
Date of Change (Address)	:	-

Current Appointments	
NIL	

Past Appointments						
No.	Company / Business / LLP / LP / PAF	UEN	Company Status	Position	Date of Appointment	Date of Cessation
1	M.O.P. (S) PTE LTD	199302217E	STRUCK OFF	DIRECTOR	20-05-1994	30-09-2009

Disclaimer						
<p>The information in this report is extracted by BizInsights from a database comprising information filed with Accounting & Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) on or before 26 September 2017 and presented using a business intelligence solution from Elixir Technology Pte Ltd. The statements or ratios published by Elixir Technology are solely statements of opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or make any other investment decisions. Subscribers should not rely on any such statements or ratios in making any investment decision. This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part in any form or manner. The report may contain information compiled from information which ACRA, Elixir Technology and BizInsights do not control and which has not been verified unless indicated in this report. Whilst every endeavor is made to ensure that the information provided is updated and correct, ACRA, BizInsights and Elixir Technology disclaim any liability for any damage or loss that may be caused as a result of any error or omission arising out of or in any way related to the contents of this report. Certain figures in the financial statements may have been adjusted for analytical classification purposes in accordance with established methodology and research processes.</p>						

Source: ACRA

Annex 69: Countries in which MKP claims to operate

Figure 1: MKP's homepage claimed it operated in Algeria, Angola, Australia, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Congo, DRC, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, China, Kenya, Libya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, Tanzania, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The map at the bottom of the site further insinuates operations in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Mideast/North Africa, North America and Europe.

Our Partners	Our mission is to provide:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Algeria Angola Australia Burundi Cambodia China Congo Congo(DRC) Ethiopia Hong Kong Kenya Libya Malaysia Mozambique Myanmar Nigeria Russia Singapore Tanzania Uganda Vanuatu Zambia Zimbabwe 	<p>Strong Support</p> <p>While we are committed to providing ample support to those who need it, we are also appreciative of those who stand by us and hold us up in return. From the lowest ranking employees in our company to the suppliers that we work with, everyone deserves our thanks and praise. MKP give full assistance in endeavour projects and products. All necessary information provided from design stages till commencement and finish up the projects. Its portrait a strong hands on hands support towards the project.</p> <p>◆ Long Term Commitments</p> <p>Perseverance is our middle name. From the infant stages of planning and development, to the final phase of project completion, we never let anything stand between us and the finish line. MKP pledge to our customers to gives a long-term commitment. Our liability is to facilitate a commune-based Information repository, first-class services and pleasant relationship. In a way, It will ensure one's loyalty by present as a responsible corporate body.</p> <p>◆ Team Work</p> <p>We realise that when and if we work together as a team, we can produce optimal results, far better than what can be achieved alone. For this reason alone, we emphasise on team work in everything we do. MKP works together in contributing different skills and subordinate individual interest and opinion to the unity and efficiency of projects. In these bond of cooperation internally and also with external consultants, the direction are to archive successful result.</p> <p>◆ State of the Art Products</p> <p>MKP known to build significant projects that stands out from others. We present highest level of development, a concept to assessing and asserting novelty and inventive structure.</p>

Source: Archived version of the page:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20120119212635/http://mkpholdings.com.my/index.php>


Figure 2: MKP claims completed construction projects in Malaysia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Angola, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Russia, Hong Kong.

Construction Projects		
Completed Project	Ongoing Project	Proposed Project
Projects in Malaysia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Padawan, Sarawak Mines Wonderland Theme Park Paddy Museum, Kedah GET Road, Banting Central and South African Projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Zambia Lusaka Millennium City Zambia International Convention Center Zimbabwe: Harare Madagascar Angola Luanda Hotel Ritz (On Going) North Africa, Middle East , Russia Projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Libya Sudan Yemen Russia Hong Kong Project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Artificial Lake & Tree House Four Season Hotel Harbour Green New Town Tower Robinso The Arch Cheung Sha Wan Commercial Building Kwun Tong 502 Scaffolding Irrigation & Dam <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Waterway Water Pipes Irrigation Tunnel Dam Project in Africa 	<p>Venue: Padawan, Sarawak, Malaysia Status: Main contractor Length: 8.5 km Duration: September 1996 - April 1998</p> <p>MKP completed the Padawan access road project which has a gradient of 24 degree road inclination on time, on budget and at half the cost as proposed by other tendered companies (US 12 - 20 millions)</p>	   

Source: <http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php> (Page under tab, "Completed Project")

Figure 3: MKP claims construction projects in Malaysia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Angola.

Construction Projects

Completed Project	Ongoing Project	Proposed Project
Malaysia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shipyard • Marketing Office Nigeria <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zamfara International Airport • Renovation of Korea Embassy Ethiopia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gololcha Dam and Irrigation Uganda <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roadworks Construction Angola <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • T3 Type Detached Housing 	<p>Venue: Lot 2436-2437, Mukim Teluk Panglima Garang, Kelang, Selangor, Malaysia.</p> <p>Status: Construction of Shipyard, ship building</p> <p>Duration: January 2009 - December 2009</p>	 <p>Exterior Perspective 1</p>  <p>Exterior Perspective 2</p>  <p>Exterior Perspective 3</p>  <p>Admin Office Perspective</p>  <p>Interior Perspective</p>  <p>Warehouse and Hostel</p>

Source: <http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php> (page under tab, “ongoing project”)

Annex 70: MKP claims to have Mansudae Overseas Projects (MOP) “solid and rich experience since 1964”

About MKP Group of Companies

MKP Group of Companies which has mainly emerged as a construction company is now an international well-diversified group involved in a wide range of business activities with MOP's solid and rich experience since 1964.

MKP comprise of several notable divisions of various industries incorporate of construction, shipbuilding, technology, trading, manufacturing, banking, medical technology and eco-tourism & agriculture.



The image shows the MKP Group of Companies logo, which consists of the letters 'MKP' in a stylized blue font on a red background. Below the logo, there is a photograph of a group of men in suits gathered around a table, looking at documents, suggesting a business meeting or negotiation.

Source: MKP Website, <http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/aboutus.php> accessed 26 January 2018

Annex 71: MKP claims it constructed “National Heroes Acre” in Zimbabwe (constructed by Mansudae Overseas Projects)

MKP known to construct a remarkable structure all over the world.

Monuments are one type of structure explicit to commemorate an important event as a part of one nation's remembrance of past.

The monuments construct often to impress or awe human race of the events. It's also a structure that can convey historical or political information to the public's eye.

MKP has done several approaches in achieving the objectives of monumental structure. In events,

The National Heroes Acre in Zimbabwe was our projects that commemorate those who fell in the struggle for national liberation whose dedication and commitment to the nation justify their burial at this sacred spot.

We not only provide a shrine but also incorporate a beautiful landscape that inviting and serene for the visitors.



Heroes Acre Monument, Harare, Zimbabwe

Source: <http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/subfile/construction/construction3.php>,
Accessed 26 January 2018

Annex 72: Zambian corporate registry list of companies with MKP in their name



Patents & Companies Registration Agency
"Business Starts Here"

Entity Number:	Entity Name:	Registration Date:	Annual Return Status:	Nominal Capital Compliance Status:	Par Value:
Jun 30, 2011 18717	MKP HARDWARE AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIERS LIMITED		✗ FYE: 30-06-2012 Compliant	✗ Not Compliant ✗ Not Compliant	✗ Not Compliant ✓ Compliant
120150138517	MKP CONTRACTORS LIMITED	Dec 31, 2015	✓ FYE: 30-07-2017	✗ Not Compliant	✓ Compliant
120050058683	NHA - MKP ESTATES DEVELOPMENT LIMITED	Apr 29, 2005	✗ FYE: 30-06-2014	✗ Not Compliant	✗ Not Compliant
120060064168	MKP SECURITY SYSTEMS ZAMBIA LIMITED	Nov 7, 2006	✗ FYE: 01-01-2013	✗ Not Compliant	✓ Compliant
120040054717	MKP HOLDINGS LIMITED	Mar 1, 2004	✗ FYE: 01-03-2005	✗ Not Compliant	✗ Not Compliant
120130117265	MKP SOUTH AFRICA (ZAMBIA) LIMITED	Nov 15, 2013	✗ FYE: 31-12-2014	✗ Not Compliant	✓ Compliant
120110090060	MKP CAPITAL ZAMBIA LIMITED	Feb 4, 2011	✗ FYE: 04-02-2014	✓ Compliant	✗ Not Compliant
120110095546	MKP-IREHAB ZAMBIA LIMITED	Sep 13, 2011	✗ FYE: 30-09-2013	✗ Not Compliant	✗ Not Compliant
120010047965	MKP MOTORS (ZAMBIA) LIMITED	Aug 22, 2001	✗ FYE: 22-08-1912	✗ Not Compliant	✗ Not Compliant
120070068265	MKP BUILDERS ZAMBIA LIMITED	Aug 28, 2007	✗ FYE: 28-08-2012	✓ Compliant	✗ Not Compliant
120010047962	MKP CONSTRUCTION (ZAMBIA) LIMITED	Aug 22, 2001	✗ FYE: 01-01-2002	✗ Not Compliant	✗ Not Compliant
120100086671	OMEGA - MKP ZAMBIA LIMITED	Sep 1, 2010	✗ FYE: 07-05-2017	✓ Compliant	✓ Compliant
120060063279	MKP MINING CORPORATION LIMITED	Aug 16, 2006	✗ FYE: 16-08-2007	✗ Not Compliant	✓ Compliant
120060062028	MKP TMS HOSPITAL LIMITED	Apr 20, 2006	✓ Compliant	✓ Compliant	✓ Compliant
120070065306	MKP PATHFINDER LIMITED	Feb 8, 2007	✗ FYE: 01-04-2008	✓ Compliant	✓ Compliant
319980085789	MKP CONTRACTORS AND TRANSPORT	Nov 13, 1998	✗ FYE: 29-12-2016	Not Required	✓ Compliant

Source: Zambia Patents & Companies Registration Agency (PACRA)

Annex 73: MKP catalogue showing companies in MKP Group including in Angola, Zambia

OUR HISTORY & BACKGROUND

M K P

Where We Came From...

MKP GROUP OF COMPANIES

MKP was founded in the year 1964 as a humble but rapidly expanding construction company in Malaysia. Over the next decade, our company succeeded in landing major contracts both in our home country, but across the continents as well. In the 1980's, MKP continued to grow and branch out at a brisk pace, and before the year 1990 rolled by, our company emerged as one of the most innovative and **MKP BUILDERS SDN. BHD. (Malaysia)** expanding its divisions to include manufacturing of scooters for the African market, **MKP DYNAMIC SDN. BHD. (Malaysia)** electronic products such as scales and video phones **MKP-WU LOONG SYSTEM SCAFFOLDS SDN. BHD. (Malaysia)** ships, off-shore villas [*Member of WLS Holdings (PLC) Ltd., H.K*] company also further extended our reach overseas while **NEKAD AGRO-FISHERY SDN. BHD. (Malaysia)** Malaysian pioneer in the development as well as implementation of state of the art IT software, most notably in the **NEKAD ZIPPLEM SDN. BHD. (Malaysia)** [*Member of Fishery Association Negeri Kedah*]

ELEMENT FLASH (M) SDN. BHD. (Malaysia)

SOSIT SDN. BHD. (Malaysia)

WLS (OVERSEA PROJECTS) LTD., (H.K)
[*Member of WLS Holdings (PLC) Ltd., H.K*]

FLORA BIO-ENGINEERING (AUST) PTE. LTD.

EKP-BUILDING LIMITADA (Angola)

IIDB BANK

COMMERCIAL CAPITAL BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED (Z)
[*CCBCL*]

Before the dawn of the new millennium, MKP's productivity in the construction sector and growing client base was given a boost by our trading arm that supplies world class building material such as cement, furniture, fittings and accessories as well as graphite. **MKP HOLDINGS (Z) LTD.**

NHA-MKP ESTATES DEVELOPMENT (Z) LTD.
[*Member of National Housing Authorities Zambia*]

To extend our business, we have turned our attention to environmental **TRUST MEDICAL SERVICES (Z) LIMITED** division will be undertaking more environmentally friendly projects to fulfill the needs of the people that matters most to us.


MKP MINING CORPORATION (Z) LIMITED

MKP SECURITY SYSTEMS ZAMBIA

MKP BUILDERS (ALGERIA) LTD.
Today, MKP is a growing giant with operations in over 18 countries and more than 20,000 employees spread out across the globe.

Source: 2014 MKP Catalogue (same source for all ensuing photographs with the exception of those another source)

Annex 74: Yong Kok Yeap (MKP Chief Executive Officer) shaking hands with former Zambian president



Source: Page in catalogue devoted to important “partners” of MKP

Annex 75: MKP catalogue showing photos of MKP Zambia Director Yazid Merzouk accompanying Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia on visit to MKP Trust Medical Center in July 2008



Source: MKP catalogue

Annex 76: Yazid Merzouk and other MKP directors accompanying Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia on visit to Zambia MKP Trust Medical Center in July 2008



Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
Datuk Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak
visit to MKP Trust Medical Center in Zambia.



Medical Infrastructure and Specialist Center

We provided a much needed boost to Zambia's health care industry by building a hospital that houses various specialists from varying medical disciplines.



Source: MKP website

Annex 77: MKP Board of Directors (including Han Hun Il, Yong Kok Yeap, and Yazid Merzouk of MKP-Zambia)

Image 1: Left to right: Ms. Siti Faridah Md. Lias, Mr Mohamad Fauzi Bin Othman, Mr. Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, Dato' Dr. Yong Kim Yeap, Admiral Datuk M. Ramly Baker (Rtd), Dr. Edward Han Hun Il, Mr. Ismael bin Ariffin, Ms. Camy Soh Pui Hoon



Source: MKP catalogue

Image 2: Bottom to top: Dr. Edward Han Hun Il, Dato' Dr. Yong Kim Yeap, Admiral Datuk M. Ramly Baker (Rtd), Mr. Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, Mr. Ismael bin Ariffin, Mr Mohamad Fauzi Bin Othman, Ms. Siti Faridah Md. Lias



Source: MKP catalogue

**Annex 78: MKP leadership from left: Yazid Merzouk and Yong Kok Yeap,
Han Hun II to far right**



Source: MKP catalogue

Annex 79: Lawsuit between Yazid Merzouk and Commerical Capital Consortium Limited

For the Appellant:

*Mr. Fraser Chishimba, of Messrs Fraser
and Associates*

For the Respondent:

*Ms Comfort Mulenga of Attorney-General's
Chambers*

RULING

Mwanamwambwa, Ag. D.C.J., delivered the Ruling of the Court

Case referred to:

1. Newton Malwa vs Lucky Mulusa (& Another) Selected Judgment No. 24 of 2014.

Legislation referred to:

1. Rules of the Supreme Court, 1999. Order 4. Rule 9 (1)

Other Works referred to:

1. Atkin's Court Forms 2nd Edition. Volume 37 (1995 Issue), pages 196 and 211.

Where two or more proceedings are pending before the same Court, and it appears to the Court that some common question of law or fact, arises in both or all of them, or the rights to relief claimed therein are in respect of or arises out of the same transaction or a series of transactions, the Court may order any of them to be stayed, until after determination of any of them. Stay in this instance, is a temporary-hold-up in the proceedings, though it is clearly contemplated that the result of the action which proceeds will, as a test action, in effect determine the stayed proceedings. Stay is a discretionary remedy, when the several actions are not so

**IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR ZAMBIA
HOLDEN AT LUSAKA**
(Civil Jurisdiction)

APPEALS NO. 38 AND 101 OF 2012
SCZ/8/159/2012
SCZ/8/18/024/2012

IN THE MATTER OF: AN APPLICATION UNDER ORDER 8 RULE 3 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1999 EDITION AS READ TOGETHER WITH ORDER 59 RULE 14 OF RSC 1999 EDITION
AND

IN THE MATTER OF: STATUTORY INSTRUMENT NO. 26 OF 2012 OF THE SUPREME COURT (AMENDMENT) RULES, 2012 AND IN PARTICULAR RULE 58 (5) OF THE SUPREME COURT (AMENDMENT) RULES, 2012

BETWEEN:

SAMBA LUBEMBA **APPELLANT**

AND

OPHELIA HANYAAMA **1ST RESPONDENT**

SANGARE TRANSPORT LIMITED **2ND RESPONDENT**

ATTORNEY GENERAL **3RD RESPONDENT**

BETWEEN:

YAZID MERZOUK **APPELLANT**

AND

COMMERCIAL CAPITAL CORPORATION
LIMITED **RESPONDENT**

Coram: Mwanamwambwa, Ag D.C.J, Chibomba, Phiri, Wanki, Muyowwe, Wood, Malila, Kaoma, J.J.S., and Lengalenga, Ag. J.S.

On the 15th of October 2014

For the Appellant: *Mr. W.L. Mubanga, of Messrs Chilupe and Company; Permanent Chambers*
For the Respondent: *Mr. Mondenga, of Messrs Mondenga and Company.*

Annex 80: Zambia corporate registry of MKP Holdings Ltd with Yazid Merzouk and “Korea” national



Patents and Companies Registration Agency

Computer Printout - Local Company

120040054717

Local Company	MKP HOLDINGS LIMITED	Registration Number	120040054717
Date of Incorporation	01 day of March 2004	Date of FY End	01/03/2005
Registered Office	PLOT NO. 5591 KALUNDU, LUNSEMFUA ROAD		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 31102		
Town / City			
Country			
Certificate Signed By	N.J. Moola		
Phone			
Email			
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 2000		
Number of Shares	2000000		
Liability			
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			
Nature of Business			
Annual return			

Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency, www.pacra.org.zm

Annex 81: Zambia corporate registry of MKP TMS Hospital Ltd with Yazid Merzouk and “Korea” directors/shareholders



Patents and Companies Registration Agency

Computer Printout - Local Company

120060062028

Local Company	MKP TMS HOSPITAL LIMITED	Registration Number	120060062028
Date of Incorporation	20 day of April 2006	Date of FY End	31/12/2018
Registered Office	NO 05 REED BUCK ROAD KABULONGA LUSAKA		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 31102		
Town / City			
Country			
Certificate Signed By	W. Banda		
Phone	+2611266986		
Email	info@mkp-tmhospital.com		
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 15000		
Number of Shares	15000		
Liability	Normal Company		
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			
Nature of Business			
Annual return			

Year	Date Delivered
2017	10/05/2017
2016	27/05/2016
2015	22/05/2015
2014	15/05/2014
2013	26/06/2013
2012	20/08/2012
2011	29/09/2011
2010	20/03/2012
2009	20/03/2012
2008	20/03/2012
2007	20/03/2012
Class of Shares	Number authorised
Ordinary	15,000.00
Ordinary	25.00
	Par value Per share
	1.00
	25.00

Individuals

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
SIDNEY KAMWENDO		100030/11/1 ZAMBIA	BUSINESSMAN N		Yes			
YAZID MOHAMED MERZOUK		0962094 ALGERIA		Yes		Yes	2,750.00	Ordinary
BETTY MULONGOTI		183674/62/1 ZAMBIA		Yes		Yes	250.00	Ordinary
ABDELDJALLIL MERZOUK		PP.94999950 ALGERIA		Yes				

HO UN RAN		554132049 KOREA		Yes		Yes	500.00	Ordinary
HAN YONG		554132045 KOREA		Yes		Yes	1,500.00	Ordinary

Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency

Annex 82: Zambia corporate registry of Commercial Capital Corporation



Patents and Companies Registration Agency

Computer Printout - Local Company

119930029153

Local Company	COMMERCIAL CAPITAL CORPORATION LIMITED	Registration Number	119930029153
Date of Incorporation	14 day of July 1993	Date of FY End	14/07/1957
Registered Office	ZIMCO HOUSE, CHAINDA PLACE		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 32378		
Town / City			
Country			
Certificate Signed By	G K LIPIMILE		
Phone			
Email			
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 10000000		
Number of Shares	10000000000		
Liability			
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			
Nature of Business	[REDACTED]		

Individuals

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
DERRICK. MUNSELE		172180/66/1 ZAMBIA	ACCOUNTANT	Yes	Yes			
SAMSON SAKALA		138276/63/1 ZAMBIA	DIRECTOR			Yes	6,250,00 0.00	
DAVID KAYOMBO KAMBITA		160789/21/1 ZAMBIA	DIRECTOR			Yes	3,750,00 0.00	
KINGSLEY MUWOWO		ZAMBIA				Yes	250,000. 00	
WINNERD SIMWALA		164457/11/1 ZAMBIA	BUSINESSWOMAN			Yes	6,250,00 0.00	

Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency

Annex 83: Zambia corporate registry of MKP-Lloyds Green Tech Ltd



Patents and Companies Registration Agency

Computer Printout - Local Company

120110093559

Local Company	MKP-LLOYDS GREEN TECH LIMITED	Registration Number	120110093559
Date of Incorporation	30 day of June 2011	Date of FY End	30/06/2012
Registered Office	PLOT NO. 5490 LUNSEMFWA ROAD, KALUNDU LUSAKA ZAMBIA		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 31102 LUSAKA ZAMBIA		
Town / City	LUSAKA.		
Country	ZAMBIA		
Certificate Signed By	W. Banda		
Phone			
Email			
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 5000		
Number of Shares	5000000		
Liability			
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			
Nature of Business			
Annual return			

Individuals

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
MOHAMED YAZID MERZOUK		02867282 ALGERIA	DIRECTOR	Yes				
LLOYD CHINGAMBO		160749/43/1 ZAMBIAN	DIRECTOR	Yes				
CHARLES VICTOR HOLLAND	-	202930/61/1 ZAMBIA	DIRECTOR	Yes				

Business Entities

Business Number	Name of Business	Residential & Postal addresses	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
120040057384	LLOYDS FINANCIALS LIMITED	P.O. BOX 390035 LUSAKA ZAMBIA		Yes	2,000.00	Ordinary
120110090060	MKP CAPITAL ZAMBIA LIMITED	P.O.BOX 31102 LUSAKA ZAMBIA		Yes	3,000.00	Ordinary

Source: Zambia corporate registry

Annex 84: Zambia corporate registry of MKP Security Systems Zambia Ltd



Patents and Companies Registration Agency
Computer Printout - Local Company

120060064168

Local Company	MKP SECURITY SYSTEMS ZAMBIA LIMITED	Registration Number	120060064168
Date of Incorporation	07 day of November 2006	Date of FY End	01/01/2013
Registered Office	PLOT NO. 7393 CHAINDA PLACE, CAIRO ROAD		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 31102		
Town / City			
Country			
Certificate Signed By	B. MWALONGO		
Phone			
Email			
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 5000		
Number of Shares	500000		
Liability	Normal Company		
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			

Nature of Business**Annual return****Individuals**

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
TIMOTHY KAZEMBE		118178/61/1 ZAMBIA		Yes		Yes	100,000. 00	
N'GONGA OSWALD GOODSON BWALYA		177920/66/1 ZAMBIAN	DIRECTOR	Yes		Yes	50,000.0 0	
SAMSON SAKALA		138276/63/1 ZAMBIA	DIRECTOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	100,000. 00	

Source: Zambia Patents and Companies Registration Agency, www.pacra.org.zm

Zambia corporate registry of MKP-Irehab Limited



**Patents and Companies Registration Agency
Computer Printout - Local Company**

120110095546

Local Company	MKP-IREHAB ZAMBIA LIMITED	Registration Number	120110095546
Date of Incorporation	13 day of September 2011	Date of FY End	30/09/2013
Registered Office	NO. 5, OFF REEDBUCK ROAD, KABULONGA. LUSAKA ZAMBIA		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 311023, LUSAKA ZAMBIA		
Town / City	LUSAKA.		
Country	ZAMBIA		
Certificate Signed By	W. Banda		
Phone			
Email			
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 5000		
Number of Shares	5000000		
Liability			
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			
Nature of Business			
Annual return			


Year	Date Delivered
2012	26/04/2013

Individuals

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
ABDELDJALLIL MERZOUK		9499950 ALGERIA	DIRECTOR	Yes				
MOHAMED YAZID MERZOUK		02867282 ALGERIA	DIRECTOR			Yes	2,550,00 0.00	Ordinary
DERICK MWASHUNGUTI		451237/11/1 ZAMBIA	BUSINESSW OMAN		Yes			
MOHAMED YAZID MERZOUK		02030956 ALGERIA		Yes				
DR ZALILAH BINTI SALLEH GHANY		A23679291 ZAMBIAN	DIRECTOR	Yes		Yes	2,450,00 0.00	Ordinary

Business Entities

Annex 85: Corporate Registry Documents for Commercial Capital Corporation (CCCL)



Local Company	COMMERCIAL CAPITAL CORPORATION LIMITED	Registration Number	119930029153
Date of Incorporation	14 day of July 1993	Date of FY End	14/07/1957
Registered Office	ZIMCO HOUSE, CHAINDA PLACE		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 32378		
Town / City			
Country			
Certificate Signed By	G K LIPIMILE		
Phone			
Email			
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 10000000		
Number of Shares	100000000000		
Liability			
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			
Nature of Business			

Business Entities

Mortgage Code	Bank name	Amount	Date	Status
2185	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF ZAMBIA	2045	21/04/2008	
1163	INTERMARKET BANKING LIMITED	500000	13/07/2004	

Annual return

Year	Date Delivered
2007	28/03/2008
2006	23/08/2007
2005	31/12/2005
2005	30/06/2006
2004	06/04/2004
2003	22/05/2003
2002	15/05/2003
2000	26/12/2000
1999	31/01/2000
1998	26/01/1999
1997	31/03/1998

Individuals

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
DERRICK. MUNSELE		172180/66/1 ZAMBIA	ACCOUNTANT	Yes	Yes			
SAMSON SAKALA		138276/63/1 ZAMBIA	DIRECTOR			Yes	6,250,00 0.00	
DAVID KAYOMBO KAMBITA		160789/21/1 ZAMBIA	DIRECTOR			Yes	3,750,00 0.00	
KINGSLEY MUWOWO		ZAMBIA				Yes	250,000. 00	
WINNERD SIMWALA		164457/11/1 ZAMBIA	BUSINESSWOMAN			Yes	6,250,00 0.00	

Annex 86: Analysis of MKP claim that its website was hacked to create a false impression of a link to a DPRK financial institution

MKP has claimed that its website was hacked, and that the hackers uploaded an image and new content to create the impression of a false connection between MKP and a DPRK financial institution (the International Consortium Bank, or ICB). MKP claimed it discovered this alteration on 3 March 2017 and filed a report with the police. Here is the webpage in question:




Figure 1 (see below) shows a screenshot of the page in question as it appeared 3 March 2017.




Figure 1: Screenshot of page in question dated 3 March 2017

Archived versions of the site provide evidence to the contrary. These versions help determine approximately when the images and information appeared, and how it changed over time. If MKP's website was indeed hacked, then the hackers would have had to begin their operation years ago and routinely update the allegedly planted information multiple times, to conform to significant changes in MKP's website.

First, the image and information MKP claims hackers falsely inserted can be seen on its website two years before its alleged discovery. Figure 2 (below) displays an archived version of MKP's website as it would have appeared on 14 April 2015.




Figure 2: archived version of MKP's website as it would have appeared on 14 April 2015

The page remained almost unchanged between this date and 30 March 2017 when MKP filed its police report. Additionally, analysis of the exit data in the image which MKP claims was hacked into their website, reveals a Photoshop time stamp dating the most recent save (or resave with Photoshop) of this image back to 2012:07:06 at 17:53:54, predating MKP's claimed discovery and the image's supposed first appearance on MKP's website. If MKP's site was hacked and false information implanted, MKP failed to discover it for at least two years and the Photoshopped image itself is significantly older.

General information on ICB and MKP appeared far earlier on MKP's site, but in a different form. Prior to the 14 April 2015 archived image, information appeared on this page with identical text, albeit with another image. Figure 3 (see below) captures the page as it appeared on MKP's website on 31 August 2012. In both cases, individuals appear to have been photoshopped against the background of the wall with the ICB logo. As this is the case in both images, MKP's claim that the photoshopping of people onto the 2015 photo is evidence of recent hacking, does not stand up to scrutiny.




Figure 3: page as it appeared on MKP's website on 31 August 2012

On 19 January 2012, approximately seven months before the archived image of the MKP website first appeared, the page tab still existed under a different name: “HIB Bank”. Hi-Fund International Bank (HIB) is an alias for ICB – a fact which MKP acknowledged in its response to the Panel. The image for the 31 August 2012 page was the same used for the HIB tab seen on 19 January 2012 (Figure 4, see below).




Figure 4: The image for the 31 August 2012 page as it appeared on 19 January 2012

In addition to its claim about this false link to ICB, MKP also claims to have no connection to IIDB Bank. However, in 2005 MKP included IIDB Bank on a list of MKP companies and noted it owned a 50 percent stake in the company. Figure 5 (below) is an archived image of MKP's website as it appeared in 2005. In the top right, MKP lists the companies under its umbrella.





Figure 5: archived version of MKP's website as it appeared 26 October 2005

Figure 6 (below) is taken from the same page. It provides information on MKP's ties to IIDB and makes the 50 percent ownership claim.



Figure 6: Another section of page as it appeared 26 October 2005

Annex 87: MKP catalogue showing company organigram



Source: MKP catalogue

**Annex 88: Uganda Corporate registration documents with “Korean” nationals
for “MKP Builders San Bhd” (ID: F2220), “MKP Capital
Bernard” (ID: 106306), and “NH-MKP Builders Ltd” (ID:133404)**

MKP BUILDERS SAN BHD

Registration ID; - F2220

Incorporation Date; - 8th July 2011

Shareholders; -

Foreign Company – No shares Listed

Foreign Country Associates and their nationality;

Foreign Country Associates	Nationality
Mr. Yong Kyong Kin	Korean
Janet Lukonga Bilan	Ugandan
Muhamed .A. Banomaran	Lybian

Trades as; - VIDAS ENGINEERING SERVICES Co. LIMITED

Company Address; -

Vidas Engineering Services Co. Ltd,
Floor/suite No. 2nd Floor room A4 Jk
Building, Kiira road – Ntinda,
P.O. BOX 71911, Kampala
Tel; +256772661946
E-mail; vidaslimited@yahoo.com

Status;- Existing

Last date of filling returns 25th April 2017

Source: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug

MPK CAPITAL BERNARD CO. LIMITED

Registration ID; - 106306

Incorporation Date; - 26th February, 2009

Shareholders; -

Share holders	% share holding
Mr. Young Kyong	1
Mr. Edward Han	1
Mr. Henry Mukisa	1
Mr. Asa Mugenyi	1
Total Shares	Not illustrated

Directors and their Nationality; -

Directors	Nationality
Mr. Yong Kyong	Korean
Mr. Edward Han	Korean
Mr. Henry Mukisa	Ugandan
Mr. Asa Mugenyi	Ugandan

Trades as; - VIDAS ENGINEERING SERVICES Co. LIMITED

Company Address; -

Vidas Engineering Services Co. Ltd,
Floor/suite No. 2nd Floor room A4 Jk
Building, Kiira road – Ntinda,
P.O. BOX 71911, Kampala
Tel; +256772661946
E-mail; vidaslimited@yahoo.com

Status; - Existing

Source: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug

NH-MKP BUILDERS LIMITED**Registration ID;** - 133404**Incorporation Date;** - 7th July 2011**Shareholders;** -

Share holders	% share holding
National Housing & Construction Company Ltd	1,100,000
MKP Builders SDN. BHD (MKP)	900,000
Total Shares	2,000,000

Directors and their nationality;:-

Directors	Nationality
Jane Bilek Langoya	Ugandan
Mhanmed A. Benomran	Libyan
Henry Majoh Mukisa	Ugandan
Choi Dah Hwan	Korean

Trades as; - NATIONAL HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION Co. LIMITED**Company Address; -**National Housing & Construction Co
Ltd,Plot 5, 7th street, Industrial Area,

P.O. BOX 659, Kampala.

Tel; +256414330002

Status; - ExistingSource: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug

Annex 89: Corporate registration documents for “Vidas Engineering Services

VIDAS ENGINEERING SERVICES COMPANY LIMITED

Registration ID; 56387

Legal Status; Limited Liability Company

Incorporation Date; 2nd January 2003

Core Operational Area: Works and Supplies


- Our Business Sectors:**
- Building and construction materials
 - Plumbing materials
 - Protective wear
 - Timber and firewood
 - Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation activities
 - Civil engineering
 - Construction of buildings & carpentry
 - Construction of roads and bridges
 - Construction of water projects

Share Capital; Ug shs 20,000,000 divided into 1000 shares of @Ug shs 20,000 in preferred shares

Share Holders, their % share holdings and nationality

Share holders	% share holding	Nationality
Didas Ndamira	780	Ugandan
Joseph .O. Eyetu	20	Ugandan
Simpson Davids	20	Britain
Didas Rutandikire	180	Ugandan
Total Shares	1,000	

Source: Uganda Registration Services Bureau, www.ursb.go.ug

Annex 90: Linked in Profile linking Vidas Engineering to MKP Builders Sdn.

The image shows a LinkedIn profile page. At the top, there is a large circular placeholder for a profile picture, followed by a black redacted area. Below this, the job title "PROJECTS ENGINEER" is listed at "VIDAS ENGINEERING SERVICES CO LTD" and "MKP BUILDERS SDN BHD LTD" in Uganda, with 23 connections. A "Connect" button is visible. The main content area is titled "Experience" and lists three positions:

- Structural Engineer** at MKP BUILDERS SDN BHD LTD
- PROJECTS ENGINEER** at VIDAS ENGINEERING SERVICES CO LTD (Aug 2013 – Present • 4 yrs 4 mos)
- Architecture Engineer/Designer** at MKP Capital LLC Berhad (2011 – Present • 6 yrs)

Source: The Panel

Annex 91: Projects involving “Vidas Engineering Services - Media article and listing of projects on Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment Website

NWSC Unveils Shs500m Water Project in Hoima

By Johnbosco Tugume

National Water and Sewerage Corporation Hoima branch has unveiled Shs500 million water extension project aimed at provision of clean piped water.

The project was awarded to Vidas Engineering Services limited and is expected to have completed the work in three months period.

The National Water and Sewerage Corporation Hoima branch manager, Moses Nandigobe said the project is set to connect over 200 households to clean piped water in 20 villages of Mparo and Bujumbura divisions in Hoima Municipality.

Most of the beneficiary villages have spent over six years without accessing piped water while others had been connected but their taps had run dry because of their geographical locations. Mr. Nandigobe said villages in hilly areas could hardly get regular water access because of the too much pressure needed to pump water in those areas saying this new water project has been established at Bakuumira hill hence water flow to people's taps will be easy.

"This hill (Bakuumira) where our project is established is the highest of any intending customer that we intend to serve and water problems in mostly upland areas are going to be solved. Our plan is to ensure that every village in the municipality is supplied with piped water by 2020," said Nandigobe.

He revealed that the corporation is covering 61 villages in the municipality out of the existing 148 total villages.

The Chairman for Kyarwabuyamba cell, Hajji Ramathan Mugisa commended government for the project saying it will boost household development.

"I commend government for this because my village has been water stressed for years despite being in a municipality. Majority of my people had resorted to fetching water from water sources because they couldn't afford daily water expenses where a Jerry can of water costs between Shs500 to Shs700," he said.

Catherine Kato, a mother of three in Bujumbura cell called for the expedition of the project but cautioned against charging exorbitant tariffs. The councilor, Manday Magrette said once completed, it will boost sanitation and hygiene in the area.

"Sanitation has been a public concern here since people have flush toilets but couldn't use them due to failure to access constant water supply," she said

She also asked National Water and Sewerage Corporation officials to use media in sensitizing the public about piped water services like metre billing, unit measurements among others.

The municipality mayor, Marry Grace Mugasa however cautioned residents against blocking their fellows from passing water pipes in their land for connection.

Source: Kampala Post, 17 October 2017, accessed via
<https://kampalapost.com/content/news/nwsc-unveils-shs500m-water-project-hoim>

Annex 92: List of projects by Vidas Engineering Services on Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment Website

10/24/2017 Water & Sanitation Development Facility – Central



About Us Branches Towns Partners EU-Project Events Q

Central Home / Central

Water and Sanitation Development Facility – Central (WSDF-C) is the youngest of the four Water and Sanitation Development Facilities (WSDFs) established country-wide. It has been in operation since July 2010, with a regional office located at Wakiso Headquarters.

Project Summary

Milestone	No. of towns	Towns
No. of designs completed to date	17	Nakasongola, Bugoigo, Walukuba, Zigoti, Kagadi, Kabwoya, Busaana, Kabembe, Kalagi, Nagalama, Kikunyu, Kiyindi, Namulonge, Kiwenda, Busiika, Kiwoko, Butalangu
On-going designs under consultancy assignments	16	Ngando (Butambala), Lwengo T/C, Katovu, Kyazanga, Lukaya, Kyabadazza, Butenga, Buyoga, Kakindu, Sekanyonyi, Kasawo, Butemba, Kikandwa, Mbirizi, Kapeeka, and Gombe,
Towns under planning up to 2018	24	Lwengo T/C, Katovu, Kyazanga, Busaana, Kabembe, Kalagi, Nagalama, Kikunyu, Kiyindi, Namulonge, Kiwenda, Busiika, Kiwoko, Butalangu, Lukaya, Kyabadazza, Butenga, Buyoga, Kakindu, Sekanyonyi, Kasawo, Butemba, Kikandwa, and Mbirizi
Sanitation component	140 Household Ecosan Demonstration Toilets 28 VIPs 8 Water Borne: 8 Kyamulibwa Water Borne Toilet 120 Drilled Boreholes:	Nkoni, Kyamulibwa, Najjembe, Kinogozi, Butiaba, Bugoigo, Walukuba, and Gombe

SEARCH

#	Town/RGC	Narrative	Status	Partners	Contractors
11	Najjembe	Completed	100%	ADB, GoU	Vidas Engineering Services Ltd

10/24/2017 Water & Sanitation Development Facility – East



About Us Branches Towns Partners EU-Project Events Q

East Home / East

WSDF (Water & Sanitation Development Facility) is a department of Min. of Water & Environment. WSDF is divided into "sub-facilities" according to regions. WSDF thus has 4 regions which are South West, Eastern, Central & Northern. These facilities are each headed by a Manager and have got staff from a wide range of disciplines including Engineers, Hydrologists, Accountants/Auditors and Social-scientists.

WSDF-E supports small towns & rural communities (like Abim TC, Suam Town Board, Kotido) in construction of water schemes & sanitation facilities (i.e. toilets). It is typically a Water scheme or Sanitation Facility, e.g. Katakwi TC Piped Water Supply Scheme.

These small towns local government want to provide water for their people but because they do not have the adequate expertise to pursue this, they will opt for hiring contractors albeit with little to no finances to pay the contractors; this is where WSDF comes in. WSDF is able to lobby for donations from the likes of the European Union & Austrian Development Agency. WSDF, however, will not do the actual construction work. Instead, with its team of procurement and engineering officers, WSDF will do the financing and contracting and supervising of contractors on behalf of these small towns.

Project Summary

Milestone	No. of towns	Towns
No. of designs completed to date	20	Moroto(Moroto), Kotido(Kotido), Kacheri-Lokona(Kotido), Nakiperimoru(Kotido), Bugadde(Mayuge), Bwondha(Mayuge), Namwiwa(Kaliro), Kibale(Pallisa), Idudi(Bugiri), Lumino(Busia), and Kadungulu(Serere), Tubur(Soroti), Acowa(Amuria), Kidetok(Serere), Buyaga(Bulambuli), Bulambuli(Bulambuli), Namungatwe(ganga), Kibaale(Namutumba), Ikumba(Luuka), Bugobi(Namutumba),
No. of Towns under procurement	2	Namayingo(Namayingo), Amudat (Amudat)
On-going Construction	10	Namalu RGC, Buyende, Iziru, Namgera, Bulegeni, Ocpa, Kyere, Nakapiripirit, Kapelabyong, Busede-Bugobya
Expansion Plans	1	Katakwi town
Sanitation component	18 Household Toilets/7 Water Borne	Buwuni, Kagoma, Namagera, Iziru, Suam, Ochero, Luuka

				About Us		Branches., GoU	Towns	Partners	EU-Project	Events	Q
1	Abim TC	Completed	100%	M/S UPDEAL (U) LIMITED					14,200	22,264	
7	Kachumbala Town Board	Completed	100%	EU, ADA, GoU	M/S VIDAS ENGINEERING SERVICES COMPANY LIMITED				16,412	25,569	
51	Kapelabyong	On-going Construction	80%	EU, ADA, GoU	M/S VIDAS ENGINEERING SERVICES COMPANY LIMITED				14,957	23,299	

Source: Uganda Ministry of Water and Environment

Annex 93: Mining licence and Official September 2017 brochure and promotion event for MKP mining in Uganda and other information on Moroto Mine

UGANDA INVESTMENT AUTHORITY
Your Investment is our Business

Home About What We Do Uganda Sectors Online Services Media Contact

M.K.P HOLDINGS – MOROTO MARBLE EPL 4545

Project Title: M.K.P Holdings - Moroto Marble EPL 4545
Project Site or Location KASIMERI – MOROTO MUNICIPALITY (KATIKEKIRE)
Project Promoter or Owner Name: PETER KASUMBA – KAWESA Email: Mpkholdingsltd19@gmail.com Mobile: +256 704 535 905/+256 772 376 738
Country Uganda
Project Description [100 words] Project exploration license / Exclusive prospecting license No. 4545. Major mineral is marble in an area of 8.15sq – km of Moroto mountain forest reserve with NEMA clearance. The marble / limestone reserves are of economic quantity for long term exploration according to the 1994 North Korean survey report to government. The marbles are of very high quality. We need to set up processing and mining plants in Moroto, generate our purer and water supply. A cement factory for limestone is viable.
Investment Amount Required (US\$) 200 Million
Project Type Greenfield
Investment Type 'Joint Venture 'Private
Project status Pre-Feasibility

Source: Uganda Investment Authority 2017, www.ugandainvest.co.ug

Project Title:

**M.K.P HOLDINGS – MOROTO
MARBLE EPL 4545**

Site/ Location: KASIMERI – MOROTO MUNICIPALITY

(KATIKEKIRE)

Sector: Natural Resources

Project Description:

MKP Holdings Ltd under the Mining Act obtained registered Mining Instruments No. 205.367 plus special exclusive prospecting license No. 4545. The Major mineral is marble in an area of 8.15sq – km of Moroto mountain forest reserve with an Environment Impact Assessment License No. NEMA/4.5 over Moroto Mineral deposits. The marble / limestone reserves are of economic quantity for long term exploration. A pre-feasibility study makes a marble and / or cement processing factory in Moroto, a very viable option.

Project Details:

Investment Amount Required (US\$) 200 Million

Project Type: Greenfield

Investment Type: Joint Venture

Project Status: Pre-Feasibility

Project Contact:

Name: PETER KASUMBA – KAWESA

Email: Mpkholdingsltd19@gmail.com

Mobile: +256 704 535 905/+256 772 376 738

Country: Uganda



Source: Uganda Investment Authority, Bankable Projects 2017,
http://ugandanconventionuk.org/Bankable_Projects_2017.pdf

PROJECT TITLE:**M.K.P HOLDINGS – MOROTO MARBLE EPL
4545**

Site/ Location: KASIMERI – MOROTO MUNICIPALITY
(KATIKEKIRE)

Sector: Natural Resources

PROJECT DESCRIPTION:


MKP Holdings Ltd under the Mining Act obtained registered Mining Instruments No. 205.367 plus special exclusive prospecting license No. 4545. The Major mineral is marble in an area of 8.15sq – km of Moroto mountain forest reserve with an Environment Impact Assessment License No. NEMA/4.5 over Moroto Mineral deposits. The marble / limestone reserves are of economic quantity for long term exploration. A pre-feasibility study makes a marble and / or cement processing factory in Moroto, a very viable option.

PROJECT DETAILS:

Investment Amount Required (US\$) 200 Million

Source: 7th Uganda Investment Convention Programme, 16 September 2017,
http://www.ugandanconventionuk.org/2017_Brochure_UCUK.pdf

Annex 94: Omega Risk Solutions Organigramme showing Omega-MKP Zambia Ltd as part of Omega International Associates LP



Source: Omegasol Risk Solutions Website, <http://www.omegasol.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Slide1-1024x768.jpg>

Annex 95: Photo of Omega MKP Zambia Ltd hosting 2013 board meeting of Omega International Associates LP (from Omegasol catalogue) showing Yazid Merzouk (Timothy Jim Kazembe in middle)

BOARD MEETING IN ZAMBIA

Omega MKP Zambia Limited had a visit from directors from Group Office, over the period 01 December 2013 to 05 December 2013.

During this visit Mr. Faan du Toit, CEO of Omega International Associates LP, and Mr. Christo Roelofse, COO of Omega International Associates LP attended the Board Meeting. Mr. Roelofse together with the Country Manager, Etienne van Rensburg, visited the customers throughout Zambia.



Standing, from LTR: Mr. Goodson Bwalya (Director); Mr. Yazid Merzouk (Director)
Seated, from LTR: Mr. Faan du Toit (CEO – Omega International Associates LP & Director); Genl. Timothy Kazembe (Chairman of Board); Mr. Christo Roelofse (COO – Omega International Associates LP & Director)

During the Board Meeting, the Country Manager, Mr. Etienne van Rensburg, was congratulated on the performance of Omega MKP Zambia Limited during the period 01 September 2012 to 31 August 2013, and thanked for the effort that was put into achieving these successes.



Site visit to Kalumbila Mine

From LTR: Mr. Paul Chanda (Security Manager – Omega MKP Zambia Limited) and Mr. Christo Roelofse (COO – Omega International Associates LP) at the entrance of the Omega MKP Camp at Kalumbila Mine.

Source: MKP Omega Risk Newsletter, March 2014, Issue 16, (page 22),
<http://www.omegasol.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/SETHAGA-Mar-14.pdf>

Annex 96: Omega – MKP Zambia Limited Corporate Registry Document

Local Company	OMEGA - MKP ZAMBIA LIMITED	Registration Number	120100086671
Date of Incorporation	01 day of September 2010	Date of FY End	07/05/2018
Registered Office	STAND 7241 MUTAKASHA ROAD INDUSTRIAL AREA LUSAKA ZAMBIA		
Postal Address	P.O. BOX 36706 LUSAKA ZAMBIA		
Town / City	LUSAKA.		
Country	ZAMBIA		
Certificate Signed By	W. Banda		
Phone	+260968873368		
Email			
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 20000		
Number of Shares	20000		
Liability	Normal Company		
Articles Filed Date			
Amended Articles Filed Date			
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			

Nature of Business

Sector
8010. Private security activities

Annual return

Year	Date Delivered
2017	31/05/2017
2016	26/08/2016
2015	09/11/2015
2014	09/11/2015
2013	01/06/2013
2012	21/03/2013
2011	14/02/2012
2010	14/02/2012
Class of Shares	Number authorised
Ordinary	20,000.00
	Par value Per share
	1.00

Individuals

Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
TIMOTHY JIM KAZEMBE		118178/61/1 ZAMBIA	DIRECTOR	Yes	Yes	Yes	4,900.00	Ordinary
CHRISTOFFEL JOHANNES ROELOFSE		6405215113080 SOUTH AFRICA 4000		Yes				
PHILIPPUS JACOBUS CHRISTOFFEL SMIT		6811175002082 SOUTH AFRICA 4000		Yes				
STEPHANUS PHILLIPUS DU TOIT		5801215025087 SOUTH AFRICA		Yes				
CHARLES FUCHS		6412155020085 SOUTH AFRICA	DIRECTOR	Yes				


Business Entities

Business Number	Name of Business	Residential & Postal addresses	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
	OMEGA SECURITIES AFROQUE LIMITED			Yes	15,100.00	Ordinary

Source: Zambia Corporate Registry

Annex 97: Photos of MKP Omega Zambia

Archived versions of the MKP Services Division page show that the Omega-MKP tab posted online since at least 3 January 2012 (no screengrabs are available between mid-2009 and January 2012). The photo on the top right seems to depict a meeting between Yazid Merzouk (Zambia country director for MKP), General Timothy Kazembe (MKP Security Systems), N'gonga Oswald Goodson Bwalya (MKP Security Systems), and several of the Omega senior leadership.



Photos of MKP Omega Zambia, including of Yazid Merzouk (top right photo), as they appeared on the MKP website on 3 January 2012

Source: MKP Services Division Website (<http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/services.php>) on 3 January 2012, according to Internet Archive (Wayback Machine).

See also: <http://www.omegasol.com/about-us/>

Annex 98: Bulgaria's letter to the Panel of 6 October 2017



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
B U L G A R I A
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

11 East 84th Street, New York, NY 10028, Tel: (212) 737 4790, Fax: (212) 472 9865, e-mail: bulgaria@un.int

No. 207

New York, 6 October 2017

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

I am writing to you in response to your letter S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.380 of 7 September 2017, and have the honor to communicate the following information, as received by the competent Bulgarian authorities:

According to the Commercial Registry of the Republic of Bulgaria, there are two Bulgarian companies registered at two of the properties belonging to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Bulgaria, namely, "Terra Group" and "Technologica".

In February 2017 the DPRK Embassy and these two companies were duly informed about the restrictions imposed with UNSC Resolution 2321 (2016) - prohibition of use of real estate property owned by the Embassy of the DPRK for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities. The Embassy was called upon to cease any such activities as soon as possible; the two companies were further strongly advised to halt further rent payments. The DPRK Embassy has assured the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria that it would take the necessary measures to comply with the restrictions, including ceasing to receive any payments related to the use of its property. The relevant Bulgarian authorities have confirmed that no payments have been made by the companies to the Embassy's only bank account in Bulgaria since the beginning of 2017.

The two companies mentioned above are Bulgarian-owned and Bulgarian-registered; according to the Bulgarian legislation, any information related to their business activities deemed to be open and available to the public should be published on the website of the Commercial Registry (<http://www.brra.bg/Default.ra>). The number of employees and their nationalities, rental contracts, salaries paid to employees, etc. do not represent public information

[Redacted]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria held talks with DPRK representatives on the issue of the use of their real estate in Bulgaria focusing on the need for DPRK's full compliance with the sanctions regime. The Ministry demanded that the premises of the properties mentioned above be vacated as soon as possible. The DPRK Embassy stated that it had informed the two tenants about the need to comply with the sanctions regime and had asked them to vacate the premises.

I take this opportunity to assure the Panel of Experts that the competent Bulgarian authorities take all the necessary measures to ensure the strict implementation of all sanctions imposed on the DPRK, as per the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,



Georgi Panayotov
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Source: Bulgaria

Annex 99: Ongoing use of DPRK Embassy space by “Terra Residence” in Sofia, Bulgaria

Figure 1:

“Terra Residence” January 2018 advertisement from rental of its space (the DPRK Ambassador’s former residence), listing a number of options (“weddings”, “corporate, private and public, filming and advertising”) events (headings in yellow bar in Bulgarian)



Source: <https://www.terraresidence.com/>, accessed on 10 January 2018

Figure 2”:

“Terra Group” logo (in Bulgarian) at “Terra Residence” gate




Source: Dimitar Katsarov/The New York Times/ © 2017 New York Times News Service

**Annex 100: Contact information of companies renting DPRK Embassy space
in Warsaw, Poland**


Figure 1:

4FUN MEDIA S.A. contact information in Warsaw, Poland




Source: <http://4funmedia.pl/en/>, accessed on 30 November 2017.

Figure 2:
SCREEN NETWORK S.A. contact information in Warsaw, Poland



Source: <http://www.screenetwork.pl/>, accessed on 30 November 2017

Figure 3: NCG S.A. contact information in Warsaw, Poland



Source: <https://pracodawcy.pracuj.pl/ngc-s-a,8372>, accessed on 30 November 2017

Figure 4:


CM LUX MED contact information in Warsaw, Poland



Source: <http://www.luxmed.pl/dla-pacjentow/centra-medyczne-grupy-lux-med/centra-medyczne-grupy-lux-med/cm-warszawa/cm-lux-med-ul-bobrowiecka-1.html>, accessed on 30 November 2017

Figure 5:

GOLDEN MEDIA Polska Sp. z o. o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland



Kontakt



GOLDEN MEDIA POLSKA SP. Z O. O.

ul. Berezynka 39
03-908 Warszawa

Dane Sądu Rejestrowego: Sąd Rejonowy dla m.st. Warszawy, XII Wydział Gospodarczy
Numer KRS: 225921
Kapitał zakładowy w wysokości 100.000 zł.

NIP: 951-21-47-001
REGON: 140006066

BIURO - ADRES DO KORESPONDENCJI

Golden Media Polska SP. z o. o.
ul. Bobrowiecka 1A
02-728 Warszawa

tel: +48 22 48 84 285
fax: +48 22 48 84 384

e-mail: biurop@goldenmedia.tv


OSOBY KONTAKTOWE:

Hanna Krawczyńska
PR Manager
e-mail: h.krawczynska@goldenmedia.tv

Source: <http://www.goldenmedia.tv/kontakt>, accessed on 30 November 2017

Figure 6:


DIGITAL BEAST ESTATE Sp. z o. o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland



Source: <http://digitalbeastestate.pl/>, accessed on 30 November 2017

Figure 7:

DIGITAL BEAST PRODUCTION Sp. z o. o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland



Source: <http://www.digitalbeast.pl/>, accessed on 30 November 20

Figure 8:

PROGRAM Sp. z o.o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland



Source: <http://program.media/>, accessed on 30 November 2017

Figure 9:

DREAMSOUND Sp. z o.o. contact information in Warsaw, Poland

Source: <http://www.dreamsound.pl/>, accessed on 30 November 2017.

Annex 101: Poland's correspondence to the Panel of 15 January 2018

Annex to the letter SP.ONZ.NJO.2540.25.2018 of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations dated January 15th, 2018

Information for the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) on implementation of respective provisions of resolutions 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017) and 2375 (2017)

With reference to previous correspondence on DPRK activities in our jurisdiction please find below a summary of statements made during informal consultations on December 4th, 2017 in New York as well as follow up on actions taken by Poland in this regard.

1. Commercial use of DPRK Embassy premises in Warsaw

a. Diplomatic notes to the DPRK Embassy

As it has been indicated in previous statements, Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted diplomatic note (February 2017) to the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on use of the diplomatic property in contravention with binding law. In response the Embassy declared that the Embassy itself does not conduct any commercial activities, including the sublease of parts of the premises for commercial purposes. According to the statement factual use of premises has been aimed solely at providing services which are essential for the maintaining premises to the requisite extent and as such does not generate profit for the Embassy.

Pursuant to art. 20 paragraph 1(a) of Council Regulation (EU) 1509/2017 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and repealing Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 it shall be prohibited to lease or otherwise make available real property, directly or indirectly, to persons, entities or bodies of the Government of the DPRK, for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities, pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Considering above, in November 2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the Embassy of the DPRK with note on the return to the Government of Poland premises non-used for solely diplomatic purposes on the terms specified in Article 8 of the Agreement of May 10, 1966. However, the Embassy has yet to respond in this matter.

b. Formal notice sent to the companies concerned

Notwithstanding abovementioned, Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to inform all companies using the said premises of international obligations and legal provisions in force such as respective Security Council resolutions, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, relevant EU provisions and *Agreement of 10 May 1966 between the Governments of the Polish People's Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*. Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly stipulated that any activity, in particular an economic activity, cannot in any way be carried out in this property, as it constitutes a flagrant violation of the aforementioned provisions.

According to information we have been provided with, 8 companies decided to terminate agreement and change the venue, and 16 have not received correspondence as they did not run business activity at Bobrowiecka Str. 1A. In addition to the above, 1 company along with 2 close associates are about to terminate agreement immediately after finding another location.

It should be indicated that the companies concerned emphasized that they had not been in direct business relations with DPRK Embassy and relevant agreements on using premises had been signed with the Digital Beast Estate company not with the Embassy.

Prior to sending notice to the companies Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised meeting with the Digital Beast Estate company informing both on legal status of the premises and binding provisions in force. The company has also been informed on diplomatic note submitted to the DPRK Embassy reiterating international obligations but also stipulating that direct consequence of breaching international norms is that the property used in contravention of the rules will not be covered by diplomatic immunity. Therefore, the decision taken did not mean that the Embassy can freely manage the premises, but rather that the designated space uncovered by the diplomatic immunity may be subject to inspection as provided by the national law.

The company underlined that there is a binding contract concluded between the Digital Beast Estate and the Embassy of the DPRK on using specified premises at Bobrowiecka 1A free of charges in exchange for their ongoing maintenance, conservation and payment of utility bills. Considering above, there is no direct or indirect payment to the North Korean regime. The company underlined that it incurred significant costs to renovate buildings and adapt them to the needs of companies operating there mainly from the music, film and advertising industries. As the company bore significant expenses in this respect, in order to have capital returned the company decided to subleases space to other entities that are linked personally, capitally and organizationally with Digital Beast Estate.

All capital and organizational structures and linkage with other entities, as well as financial aspects are under scrutiny of national authorities.

c. Information to Ministry of Justice (National Court Register)

As we received feedback from companies regarding termination of contract, in order to prevent other companies from using premises we informed Ministry of Justice (National Court Register) on art. 20 paragraph 1 (b) of the Council Regulation 1509/2017 prohibiting to lease real property, directly or indirectly, from persons, entities or bodies of the Government of the DPRK. In accordance with national provisions as laid down in Act of August 20th 1997 on National Court Register registration of an entrepreneur in the National Court Register requires certain formal prerequisites to be met such as submitting respective form along with accompanied documents. Pursuant to Article 38 section 1 of the said Act the business register contain inter alia the following data: the name or company under which it operates, designation of its legal form and its registered office and address. Under the separate statutes entry into the National Court Register is often a mandatory condition of valid establishment of the company (partnership, limited partnership or limited joint-stock partnership, a foundation or an association). In addition any alterations such as venue of registered office also requires respective modification in the NCR.


Considering the fact that under article 20 paragraph 1 (b) the Council Regulation 2017/1509, which is directly applicable and binding in its entirety, leasing from persons, entities or bodies of the Government of the DPRK is explicitly prohibited, we ask Ministry of Justice to apply this provision to any new motion if they are submitted to National Court Register, as a self-standing prerequisite to dismiss motion due to unfulfilling formal criteria.

Source: Poland

Annex 102: Ongoing advertising of DPRK Embassy space in Warsaw, Poland by DIGITAL BEAST ESTATE Sp. z o. o.

Figure 1:

Digital Beast website advertises property management over an image of the DPRK Embassy property in Warsaw, Poland



Source: <http://digitalbeastestate.pl/>, accessed on 26 January 2018

Figure 2:

Digital Beast Estate's clients sublet the DPRK Embassy's space in Warsaw, Poland



Skontaktuj się z nami



Kontakt:

882 377 399

recepcao@digitalbeast.pl

Adres:

ul. Bobrowiecka 1a

(wjazd od van Beethovena)


00-728 Warszawa

Godziny otwarcia:

pon.-pt.: 9:00-17:00

Source: <http://digitalbeastestate.pl/>, accessed on 26 January 2018

**Annex 103: Addendum to lease agreement signed 13 February 2017 with
DPRK Ambassador for space in the DPRK Embassy in Bucharest,
Romania by IMA Partners SRL**

 ADDENDUM TO LEASE AGREEMENT
<p>THE EMBASSY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN ROMANIA, as a representative of THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, with premises in Bucharest, 28-36 Soseaua Nordului, 1st district, duly represented by Mr. RI PYONG DU, in his capacity as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Romania (hereinafter referred to as the "Lessor"); and</p> <p>S.C.IMA PARTNERS S.R.L., a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Romania, having its registered office in Bucharest, Budisteau Street, no.16, 1st district, registered with the Commercial Registry under no. J40/19413/2006, sole identification code 19248059, duly represented by Mr. Marius Iliev, in his capacity as director (hereinafter referred to as the "Lessee") together the parties" and individually a "Party".</p> <p>WHEREAS: The Parties have signed on 15.02.2011 a LEASE AGREEMENT for renting a building with a build surface area (footprint of the building) of 433 sqm and the plot of land on which the building sits, located at 28-36 Sos. Nordului (provisional postal number) with an area of 1774 sqm as detailed in the LEASE AGREEMENT.</p> <p>THEREFORE,</p> <p>The parties have agreed upon concluding the present protocol with the following terms and conditions:</p> <p><u>Art 4.1.</u> Starting with the date of this addendum all payments under the lease agreement shall be perform by the Lessee; in the following bank account of the Lessor: RO08BRDE445SV77480684450 opened with BANCA ROMANA DE DEZVOLTARE</p> <p>The other terms and conditions mentioned in Lease Agreement which don't contravene the provisions of this addendum remain unmodified.</p> <p>The Parties have signed this Addendum on February 13, 2017.</p> <p>Signed by Mr. Ri Pyong Du, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Romania on behalf Lessor and Marius Iliev on behalf of Lessee.</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;">   <p>Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Romania</p> <p>Mr. Ri Pyong Du</p>   <p>IMA PARTNERS SRL</p> <p>IMA PARTNERS SRL</p> </div>

Source: The Panel

Annex 104: Recommendations

1. The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future sectoral sanctions measures, includes the relevant HS codes as it did in resolution 2397 (2017).
2. The Panel recommends Member States exercise heightened vigilance over their companies to ensure the prohibition of transfer of the items listed in 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), including all industrial machinery and transportation vehicles.
3. Given that the same key individuals continue to feature in Panel reports for a growing number of different types of violations, the Panel calls upon Member States to take the appropriate action to ensure that these individuals cease their prohibited activities.
4. The Panel recommends that any Member State receiving coal shipments for delivery or trans-shipment must take enhanced measures to validate the documentation accompanying those shipments. To assist Member State efforts, the Panel recommends the establishment of a regional cooperative mechanism to share information on whether the relevant vessels actually docked and loaded coal from the ports claimed in their documents of origin. At a minimum, Member States should establish a point of contact for this purpose. The Panel will continue to serve as a resource for Member States seeking information.
5. Member States must be vigilant regarding vessel movements in the typical areas for ship-to-ship transfers and report such transfers to the 1718 Committee.
6. The Panel recommends that Committee designate (deny port entry for) all vessels and their captains involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers to the DPRK.
7. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following individuals for violations of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 2375 (2017): Shih-Hsien Chen, Boby Julian Akbari⁶ and Wang Songchang.⁷
8. The Panel recommends that Member States strictly implement resolutions pertaining to prohibited ship-to-ship transfers, including by enacting enabling legislation mandating appropriate action against all vessels and their captains found to be conducting them, as well as actions against vessels such as port entry denial (in force for at least six months with all costs borne by the owners or charterers). In addition, flag states should deregister all vessels reported as involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers. Member States should ensure that all contracts by petroleum industry companies registered or based in their jurisdictions include a clause stipulating that all transfers involving violations of the resolutions, in particular including prohibited ship-to-ship transfers and petroleum products transferred to the DPRK, be voided.
9. Member States hosting petroleum suppliers, brokers, importers and tanker companies dealing in oil and petroleum products must heighten their vigilance of the relevant entities to ensure that these are not re-directed to the DPRK in violation of the resolutions. Countries serving as trans-shipment hubs for petroleum products must undertake similar enhanced due diligence to validate the origin and intended destination.

⁶ Captain of the *Billions No.18*: Seaman's Book No. B2380031, DoB 30 July 1985.

⁷ Captain of the *Lighthouse Winmore*: Seaman's Book No. G50001538, DoB 7 August 1973.

10. The Panel further recommends that maritime protection and indemnity insurers include a clause in all contracts, stipulating that all transfers involving violations of the resolutions, in particular prohibited ship-to-ship transfers and petroleum products transferred to the DPRK, be voided.

11. The Panel reiterates its recommendations in previous reports for the designation of Pan Systems.⁸ The Panel further recommends the designation of following individuals and entities: Han Hun Il (Edward Han), Ri Ho Nam, Ri Ik (Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo, Pak In Su, Kim Chang Hyok, and Kim Su Gwang, as well as International Global System and International Golden Services.

12. The Panel recommends that Member States, as part of their implementation of the financial provisions of the resolutions, ensure that their financial institutions implement a risk-based approach to identifying sanctions violations in their “Know Your Customer” and compliance programs, including by ensuring more robust scrutiny at the onboarding, transaction monitoring, and account review phases. To this end, Member States should provide their financial institutions with more detailed and regular information on sanctions evasion risks.

13. The Panel recommends that Member States include all Embassy personnel within the scope of paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016) and ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in the names of family members or front companies, and to verify that bank accounts are closed when a diplomat ends his/her tour in the country.

14. Given the pervasive use of front companies to evade financial sanctions, Member States should ensure that their domestic corporate service providers implement effective due diligence measures to capture detailed and accurate information on clients and beneficial owners and file Suspicious Action Reports (SAR) in the case of arrangements suspected of being used for illicit purposes.

15. Member States should take measures to ensure that financial sector supervisors subject to their jurisdiction prioritize guidance, supervision and enforcement of controls that support implementation of the resolutions.

16. Member States with appropriate knowledge and experience should offer technical assistance to other Member States seeking assistance with their legal frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the resolutions.

17. The Panel recommends that Member States, in addition to ensuring an appropriate legislative framework for combating proliferation financing, require the establishment of robust information-sharing mechanisms among financial supervisors, financial intelligence units, customs and strategic trade control authorities, border control and security and intelligence agencies, and with the private sector.

18. The Panel recommends that the relevant countries take the necessary measures to ensure that all non-diplomatic activities taking place on DPRK Embassy property as prohibited by paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) be terminated and all related leases are cancelled.

19. The Panel recommends Member States to report as part of their national reporting to the 1718 Committee on the incorporation of the humanitarian exemptions contained in the resolutions into their domestic legislation.

20. In line with the latest resolutions’ requests to provide the Panel with additional resources, the Panel recommends that the Council request the

⁸ S/2017/742, para. 62.

Secretary-General to take specific measures to reinforce both the physical security, information security, administrative support and other relevant resources.

21. The Panel recommends that the Committee update the existing list of designated individuals and entities as follows:

(a) Ri Hong-Sop (KPi.004):

Designation: Head of Nuclear Weapons Institute

(b) Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028):

Other information: The MID oversees the DPRK's nuclear program. The Nuclear Weapons Institute is subordinate to the MID.

(c) Designate the following as being engaged in the DPRK's nuclear-related program

Name: Nuclear Weapons Institute

A.k.a.:na

Address: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Other information: Nuclear Weapons Institute is engaged in the DPRK's nuclear program and led by Ri Hong Sop. It is a subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department.
