

Faith in Reason: developing a survey measure of belief in the rationality of others

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abstract goes here

Introduction

What we believe about other people matters. It is not enough that others are trustworthy, reasonable or well intentioned. Successful coordination, as well as individual wellbeing, benefit when we also *perceive* others as trustworthy, reasonable or well intentioned.

Generalised trust

Second order effects of Disinfo

Karpf D (2019) On digital disinformation and democratic myths. Mediawell. Available at: <https://mediawell.ssrc.org/expert-reflections/on-digital-disinformation-and-democratic-myths/>

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Document prepared with RMarkdown (Allaire et al., 2020) and papaja (Aust & Barth, 2020). CRediT (Contributor Roles Taxonomy) autogenerated using Tenzing (Holcombe, Kovacs, Aust, & Aczel, 2020). Template is available here github.com/tomstafford/rmarkdown_ap

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Hoes E, Clemm B, Gessler T, et al. (2022) The Cure Worse Than the Disease? PsyArXiv. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/4m92p>

Jungherr A, Rauchfleisch A (2022) Negative downstream effects of disinformation discourse: evidence from the US. SocArXiv.

Lee T (2021) How people perceive influence of fake news and why it matters. Communication Quarterly 69(4): 431–453.

Nisbet EC, Mortenson C, Li Q (2021) The presumed influence of election misinformation on others reduces our own satisfaction with democracy. The Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review. Available at: <https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-presumed-influence-of-election-misinformation-on-others-reduces-our-own-satisfaction-with-democracy/>

Nyhan B (2020) Facts and myths about misperceptions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 34(3): 220–236.

Third person effect

- Some part of the TPE may be driven by accurate perception of others Lyons B (2022) Why we should rethink the third-person effect: Disentangling bias and earned confidence. Available at: <https://www.dropbox.com/s/tpzy6elovfi0y1o/Why%20we%20should%20rethink%20TPE%20%28v2%2C%202022%29.pdf?dl=0>
- driving calls for censorship Olshansky A, Landrum AR (2020) Third-person perceptions and calls for censorship of Flat Earth videos on YouTube. Media and Communication 8(2): 387–400. Feng GC, Guo SZ (2012) Support for censorship: a multilevel meta-analysis of the third-person effect. Communication Reports 25(1): 40–50.

Gullibility

Altay, S., & Acerbi, A. (2023). People believe misinformation is a threat because they assume others are gullible. *New Media & Society*, 0(0). <https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448231153379>

Confidence in their abilities, friends' and family's abilities, and people's abilities to spot misinformation was measured with three statements adapted from Corbu et al. (2020) and the European Commission (2018): "I am able to identify news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false" "My friends and family are able to identify news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false" "People in general are able to identify news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false"

- negatively conceived
- unidimensional: influence

Rationality

Dawson, N. V., & Gregory, F. (2009). Correspondence and coherence in science: A brief historical perspective. *Judgment and decision making*, 4(2), 126-133.

Method

Part of a larger survey

Sample

Item development

See Table 1

Prereg

Results

Now let's integrate some R code to generate/import some data, run and analyse and integrate it into the document:

You can't see it in the PDF, but in between this paragraph and the last we asked R to generate some random data and save it to a CSV file. Now we're going to import the data from the CSV file, as if it was independently created data - from an experiment or similar - and plot a graph.

See Figure 1. Of course we could draw all sorts of things, but this is a proof-of-concept. Finally, let's run a t-test and integrate the results into the text.




Figure 1. Histogram of all data, grouped

We found there was a statistically significant difference between the two groups ($t=-5.92$ (588.25), $p = 0.00$). Note how the exact values in the previous sentence change every time we re-make the document (because the document also re-generates the underlying data).

The above paragraph does the integration of statistics long-form, because I didn't know a better way (and because I think it is still useful to show). `apa_print()` exists as a helper function: http://frederikaust.com/papaja_man/reporting.html.

Also, everyone loves tables. See Table 2. I feel obliged to mention that the actual items reported in this table **do not** correctly reflect the actual subscales for the ASRS short and long scales. Note illustration of **bold** and *italics* formatting in this para.

Discussion

References

- Allaire, J., Xie, Y., McPherson, J., Luraschi, J., Ushey, K., Atkins, A., ... Iannone, R. (2020). *Rmarkdown: Dynamic documents for r*. Retrieved from <https://github.com/rstudio/rmarkdown>
- Aust, F., & Barth, M. (2020). *papaja: Create APA manuscripts with R Markdown*. Retrieved from <https://github.com/crsh/papaja>
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Table 1
Scale item wording

nums	items
1	The typical person is often irrational
2	People are often misinformed on important issues
3	People are too easily manipulated
4	People often act for reasons they don't understand or endorse
5	The average person can be persuaded to change their mind if given good reasons
6	Most people hold accurate views about the world
A	For this question please click the middle option, 'neutral', to show you are paying attention
7	An individual's beliefs about the world are generally coherent
8	People's behaviour is generally consistent with their beliefs

Note. Response was on a 7 point Likert scale from (1 = "Strong Disagree", 7 = "Strongly Agree"). Items 1,2,3 and 4 reverse coded so that for all items higher scores represented stronger faith in reason.

Table 2
Item grouping to subscales

	Hyperactivity	Inattention
ASRS-18	5,6,12,13,14	1,2,3,4,7,8
ASRS-6	5,6	1,2,3,4

Note. This table was created with `apa_table()`.