Bluetooth: hci_event: Ignore NULL link key

This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the
CVE:

Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification
1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof
the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge
of the PIN. [1]

The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]

It's a reflection attack. The paper mentioned that attacker can induce
the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN
code. In BR/EDR, the key generation is actually handled in the controller
which is below HCI.

Thus, we can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification
event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in
btstack project. [3]

v3: Drop the connection when null link key be detected.

v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Used bt_dev_dbg instead of BT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tag

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55ed8ca ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")
Link: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-26555 [1]
Link: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9474325/authors#authors [2]
Link: https://github.com/bluekitchen/btstack/blob/master/src/hci.c#L3722 [3]
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

net/bluetooth/hci_event.c

@@ -4742,6 +4742,15 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
 	if (!conn)
 		goto unlock;
 
+	/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */
+	if (!memcmp(ev->link_key, ZERO_KEY, HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE)) {
+		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR",
+			   &ev->bdaddr);
+		hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
+		hci_conn_drop(conn);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
 	hci_conn_hold(conn);
 	conn->disc_timeout = HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT;
 	hci_conn_drop(conn);